CHAPTER IV

EXISTENTIALISM AND MARXISM-
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
SARTRE AND MARX
In this chapter we will deal with the comparative account of Sartre and Marx. We will also include here a short account of the earlier and later philosophies of Sartre which we have already discussed in our previous chapters. But whereas in the previous chapters we have given separate account of earlier and later Sartre, here we intend to make a comparative study. We have divided this chapter into two parts i.e. section A and section B. Whereas in section ‘A’ we will give a comparative study of earlier and later Sartre, in section ‘B’ we will compare the philosophies of Sartre and Marx. Laying stress on later Sartre, where Sartre claims to be a Marxist, we may mention here that Sartre does not claim that he accepts Marxism into totality, but picks up what he considers to be the positive point of Marxism. Sartre rejects Marx’s dialectical materialism i.e. application of dialectics to nature as well as Marx’s theory of knowledge (Lenin’s theory of Reflection). We in section ‘B’ will discuss and examine the interpretation of Marxism by Sartre which in our view is colored by Sartre’s Existentialist philosophy. Marxism is a broad theory of the relation of Man, Society and Nature. This theory has been given different interpretations by different philosophers. Also many philosophers while interpreting Marxism in the lights of their own philosophies have been charged with misinterpreting Marxist text. In this thesis
we have attempted to show that Sartre also belongs to that group of philosophers who have interpreted Marxism within the framework of Existentialism to suite his own Existentialist commitment.

Section-A: A comparative study of Sartre’s earlier and later work.

We in this section will attempt to give a comparative account of Sartre’s earlier and later work. While giving the account of his earlier work we have also discussed about his work prior to *Being and Nothingness* i.e. *The Transcendence of Ego* and *Psychology of Imagination*. As we have discussed earlier that Sartre, in *Being and Nothingness* expounds his position in a very abstract manner. Every philosopher, in order to show the validity of his position, makes use of popular concepts, in a specific connotation which try to make his philosophy acceptable. As we have already shown in the previous chapter that Sartre in *Critique of Dialectical Reason* does retain the basic premises of his existential position as propounded in *Being and Nothingness*. But he attempts to modify those positions by removing the shortcomings, through Marxist philosophy, which appears to him as too abstract to be accepted. Thus in his later work he attempts to reconcile the two apparently diametrically opposed philosophical school.

Going through his work makes clear that, opposed to popular belief, Sartre never conferred upon himself the epithet “Existentialist” which has come to be so inseparably attached to his name and work. “The word was applied rather by Gabriel Marcel and French journalists seized upon it eagerly as a convenient label
for Sartre and his followers.”\footnote{Kern, Edit., \textit{Sartre, A Collection of Critical Essays}, Prentic-Hall, 1962, p. 2.} It is evident that he thought of himself as a phenomenologist, because he added to his fundamental work, \textit{Being and Nothingness}, the subtitle “An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology.”

Since the basic features of the philosophies which Sartre advocates is very similar to the philosophy of Existentialism as has been advocated by other philosophers, therefore we feel that the title existentialism can be appropriately applied to Sartre’s early philosophical position as projected in \textit{Being and Nothingness}.

He states his major philosophical work \textit{Being and Nothingness} as ‘phenomenological ontology’. But it is an ontology of human existence, not of some ultimate being. He wants to analyze human life or reality in all its aspects, such as man’s experience, perception, emotion and the varieties of mental life. The earlier work of Sartre shows a search of various aspects of human experience and existence and they have prepared Sartre to reach his fundamental ontological conclusions. Sartre is aware of the facts that ontological theories have to be established on the basis of a philosophical method. Sartre shares with Husserl and Heidegger the basic idea of phenomenology. The phenomenological studies are more detailed in his earlier work on \textit{Imagination} and \textit{Emotion}. In \textit{Being and Nothingness}, both ontological theorizing and phenomenological investigation go together. There are brilliant examples of the phenomenological analysis such as
‘bad faith, relation with the others’ etc. which has been discussed earlier. Both this expression is used in a sense different from common sense meaning. This also applies to a host of other expressions which Sartre applies to express his Existentialist positions. During the course of the analysis of this thesis we will at the same time also explain how Sartre uses the old terms with new connotations.

Sartre’s Philosophical essay *The Transcendence of Ego* (1936-1937) gives evidences of his early preoccupation with the tradition subject-object conception and his concern about his philosophical and psychological inadequacy. In an effort to transcend this traditional conception Sartre presents human consciousness as an absolute consciousness, purified of any ‘I’. This absolute consciousness, Sartre concludes, “when it is purified and the ‘I’, no longer has anything of the subject.”

Sartre’s Transcendence of Ego was the first important product of his assimilation of the new idea. It followed directly upon his visit to Germany In (1933-34). The work was significant because it linked the new French phenomenology with that of Husserl. Sartre adopts the Husserelian phenomenological method to analyze the different layers of human existence.

In Transcendence of Ego, ontology is concealed under phenomenological studies. In his phenomenological study of emotion or imagination he is more interested in what the investigation lead to about the nature of consciousness or

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freedom or man's relation within the world. The concept of pre-reflective 'I' has been earlier introduced in Transcendence of Ego which plays a 'pivotal role' in Being and Nothingness. In Transcendence of Ego Sartre says "the transcendental 'I' is not given in our pre-reflective experience. If we have to be true to what is given immediately to our experience, then we have to reject the transcendental ego. It is in other words called 'the phenomenological reduction'. Husserl accepts the principle of epoch with the idea of thoroughgoing phenomenological reduction," but unlike Sartre, he did not carry the demand of the epoch to its logical conclusion. Here one can compare Sartre with Hume who carries out logical implication to empiricism by denying a substantial ego. Husserl understands by the phenomenological epoch the bracketing of the presuppositions including our belief in the reality of the world. But Sartre also wants to accept only what is given in immediate experience. If Sartre wants to accept only the immediately given, the Husserlian notion like the transcendental ego cannot be accepted and belief in the existence of the world cannot be suspended. Husserl's phenomenological method is mainly concerned with the analyses of the structures of consciousness that constitute the world. But he does not show how consciousness is connected with the main purpose of life. Sartre points out that it is the nature of consciousness to be intentional, to point to other thing that are not conscious but of which it is conscious. For Sartre consciousness is nothing and has no essence but for Husserl his descriptive phenomenology is meant to arrive at the essence of the structure of, conscious of an object.

We find that most of the ideas which he develops in *Being and Nothingness* are already present in a embryonic form in his early works like Transcendence of Ego and *Psychology of Imagination*, therefore before analyzing and examining the content of *Being and Nothingness*. We will also take up some of the essential ideas of Sartre in his early works of *Transcendence of Ego* and *Psychology of Emotion*.

Sartre in his early book (The *Psychology of Imagination* 1940) has already linked the idea of Nothingness and Freedom. "In order to imagine, consciousness must be free from all specific reality and this freedom must be able to define itself by a being-in-the-world which is at once the constitution and the negation of the world. This means that consciousness must be able to effect the emergence of the unreal. The unreal is produced outside of the world by a consciousness which stays in the world, and it is because he is transcendentally free that man can imagine."\(^4\)

Sartre’s philosophy has a fundamentally ontological character, it is to apply in his own words, the ‘pursuit of Being’. Throughout his career Sartre remains faithful to his early intuition of philosophy’s ontological character. In *Transcendence of Ego*, he rejects, categorically what he took to be the classic problem of Epistemology. If the ego is no more than one object amongst others in the world then ‘The subject-object duality, which is purely logical, definitively,
disappears from philosophical preoccupations. In *Being and Nothingness*, as in the essay on Husserl, Sartre characterises epistemology as an ‘elementary’ philosophy. Knowing was described as a process of absorption, devouring, assimilation and dissolution. In the epistemological project the movement of philosophical inquiry begins and ends with consciousness and the investigation of its content. In Sartre’s ontological project the, starting point is indeed consciousness. But consciousness, phenomenologically reduced, possesses no content to be investigated. “Instead we are thrown out into the world and the weight of Being is seen to lie on the side of objects.”\(^5\) With this argument, Sartre believes that he avoids the trap of idealism which an epistemological approach necessarily lays for itself: What ontology reveals is a permanent, necessary and essentially precognitive presence of Consciousness of Being.

Sartre is concerned in both his literary and philosophical work to understand man not by means of some predetermined essence of human nature but through the action of real individual.

*Being and Nothingness* is an essay of phenomenological ontology, so it tries to resolve the question, “is there any conduct which can reveal to me the relation of man with the world.”\(^6\) Sartre discovers that being is everyone and, yet, hunted by non-being as it’s perpetual presence. “Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being like a worm.”\(^7\) The primary ontological relation is the presence of

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6. Ibid., p. 422.
consciousness, which is in the mode of not being, for-itself, to being, which simply is, that is, the polonium of the in-itself. The conduct which reveals the relation of man to the world is freedom, for nothingness is for-itself-is freedom. Sartre holds "a freedom which is ontologically unitary, irreducible and individual, which is flight, which we are but do not choose to be; which is powerless before the 'scandal' of the others; which pursues the impossible synthesis of the for-itself and the in-itself in the ideal unity of God. Such a freedom is in short, non synthetic. It can neither realize the community of human beings, nor secure the unity of Being. For Sartre ontology alone could apprehend being-in-the-world because it had its place in the perspective of the cogito, and consciousness as freedom. But apparently, ontology has realized its limits in a human reality whose fundamental possibilities and value haunt it as an incompleteness: man 'is a useless passion' and an unhappy consciousness with no possibility of surpassing its unhappy state."\(^8\)

In *Being and Nothingness*, whose period of gestation must have largely coincided with the discussion of Heidegger's Being-in-the-world, that Sartre engaged in, the problem is investigated from still another angle. "My body", Sartre writes here, "is coexistensive with the world, spread across all things, and at the same time it is condensed into this single point. To this body capable in seeing, smelling, feeling and hearing the world, manifest itself in an infinity of ways, though only one way at a time. Yet these various appearances of the world are not

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\(^8\) Ibid., p. 440.
to be considered subjective and psychological: they are considered as deriving from the nature of things and determined by human consciousness in the world." Human consciousness become a center in relation to which they arrange themselves in certain perspectives.

There is an impression that Sartre merely adopts and adapts the Heideggerian reflections on man's Being-in-the-world. Rather he uses Heidegger's concept of Dasein as a point of departure for his own ontological observation, his own description of the conditions under which there may be a world and human reality. Most important is Sartre's concept of Nothingness which differentiates his world from that of Heidegger. Sartre, in a humanist manner, conceives of Nothingness as the prerogative of man's consciousness of self in the world. Instead of one all embracing Nothingness, he conceives of many nothingness that permeate existence. Consciousness he holds with Husserl is always consciousness of something. It must, therefore reveals something which it is not. First rising within man, it reveals to him his self and the relationship of that self with other phenomena in the world, at the same time it reveals itself as not being that self or those phenomena which it reveals. Thus it always represents a momentary rift, a distancing which divides 'Being into that which it is and that which it is not: an in-itself and for-itself. This distinction, of which only man is capable, is nihilating and result in Nothingness. Sartre may say that man brought

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Nothingness into the world, and by the same token he has created the world.

Sartre’s Nothingness in man’s perception of the world has often been misunderstood as being a moral and ethical Nihilism. This misinterpretation was, no doubt, facilitated by Sartre’s own shift of emphasis from a purely philosophical to a more moralist plane.

We see the translucency and total impersonality of consciousness, as stressed in the Transcendence of the Ego, changing more and more into an individual consciousness which implies individual responsibility. In Being and Nothingness, the for-itself, which is consciousness, is presented as being anchored in facticity and historicity through the in-itself; without which it cannot exist (since it has to be conscious of something). Though it is nothingness, it is the “nihilation of an individual and particular in-itself and not a being in general.”

“The concrete consciousness rises in situation and it is a unique, individualized consciousness of this situation and of-itself in situation. It is to this concrete consciousness that the self is present, and all the concrete characteristics of consciousness have their correlative in the totality of the self. The self is individual: it is the individual completion of the self which haunts the For-itself.”

“It is in this effort to choose itself as a personal self that the for-itself sustains in existence certain social and abstract characteristics which make of it

\[10\] Ibid., p. 618.
\[11\] Ibid., p. 91.
man (or a woman)....[and] in this sense each for-itself is responsible in its being for the existence of human race.”

This shows to some extent Sartre’s trend towards individualization and humanization. *Being and Nothingness* is his major philosophical work and in this it can be said that he incorporates and develops all his earlier views. We have already discussed in our earlier chapter, about the philosophers who influenced his thought. His earlier writings served a kind of foundation for the fuller discussion of *Being and Nothingness*. Hazel. E. Barnes in the translators introduction of *Being and Nothingness* states that “the subject matter of this philosophy is all inclusive as the title indicates and throughout a large part of the book the treatment is fully abstract. Yet we might also say that it is the study of a human condition, for since man is the being by whom nothingness comes into the world, which means that man himself is *Being and Nothingness.*”

The concept of Being and the non-being i.e. thing-in-itself and thing-for-itself has been discussed earlier in the second chapter. *Being and Nothingness* was written in 1942 and *Critique of Dialectical Reason* in 1960. It was true with Sartre, that at a time he used to work on several projects. A person asked him; can you explain that, you are working on all of them at once, without being able or you might say-without wanting to bring any of them to a conclusion? To this he replies, “yes, for the last fifteen years I have been looking for something- I was trying, if

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12. Ibid., p. 520.
13. Ibid., p. xvi
you like, to lay the political foundations of anthropology. This project got bigger and bigger. It grew like a generalized cancer. Ideas come to me, and I wasn’t sure what to do with them, so I put them anywhere-in whatever book I happened to be working on at the time.”¹⁴ He further says “now I have finished with that. The idea are all in place, I‘am working on something that will relieve me of all of them-the *Critique of Dialectical Reason.*”¹⁵

In *Being and Nothingness* he seems to be saying that one must decide for his own self and how to live, what is good and what is bad, and it is one’s personal decision which no one can take on behalf of another. But Sartre has not said enough, when he insists that human beings cannot find absolute value in the world, they can only pretend to themselves to do so. He has not taken account of the facts of forming moral opinions. In *Existentialism is a Humanism* [1943] which is a also taken to be the definitive statement of his moral views, attempts a solution to the problem of how to construct an Existentialist morality. Here he tries to defend Existentialism against the charge that it was a negative, gloomy, and depressing philosophy. He himself argues that, far from being gloomy, Existentialism is a optimistic philosophy, since it inspires people to, action by showing them the extent of their freedom of action ; and it also shows them that they are responsible not only for their own destinies but for other people’s as well. For whatever a man chooses, he chooses for everyone and not only for himself ;

¹⁵. Ibid., p. 9.
for the notion of choice entails the notion of a thing being good and ‘good’ means ‘good for everyone’. Thus if a man chooses freedom for himself, he is thereby committed to choosing freedom for everyone. Mary Warnock in this context states “There is a great deal that is confused and wrongheaded in this essay. It is worthy to mention for two reasons. First, it does meet to specific objection raised above there could be no such thing as an existentialist morality, if all that a man must do is to evaluate the world for himself alone; but Sartre himself repudiated it later and expressed a wish that it had not been published.”

It is true that Existentialism in its later manifestation did make contribution to moral philosophy. After Being and Nothingness Sartre did promise to write a book ‘on an ethical plan’. And in the footnote to his discussion in part III of Being and Nothingness, concerning the doomed nature of our relation with other, he writes: “these considerations do not exclude the possibility of an ethics of deliverance and salvation, but this can be achieved only after a radical conversion.” It can be said here that maybe this conversion is a conversion to Marxism and the book which he promised to write on an ethical plan is the Critique of Dialectical Reason which was published in 1960. But even before that, the clue to the connection between this work and Sartre’s earlier work is to be found in an essay which he published in 1957 entitled The Question of Method.

In this essay he has distinguished between a philosophy and an ideology.

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Sartre believes that every age has one and only one dominant philosophy, and a variety of ideologies which grow up. Sartre himself accepts that in the twentieth century, the dominant philosophy is Marxism. Existentialism is an ideology conceived within its framework: later on he claims his kinship with that of Marxism. How far he was able to achieve it, we have already discussed it in the previous chapter but we will discuss in detail in the next section. In this section our main emphasis will be to compare his earlier and later work. It is true that Sartre has changed his earlier position, but is it to that extent where he ceases to be an existentialist, or is *Critique of Dialectical Reason* just a continuation of his earlier work.

When we go through Sartre's later work *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, the typical concept of *Being and Nothingness* have disappeared, and a completely new vocabulary has taken their place. The idiom of the early work-ethic consciousness ego, nihilation, being, nothingness, these notions are now juxtaposed in the text with the distinct set of concepts which derive from the *Critique*-serialization, totalization, practico-inert and collectives. So the debate on early and later Sartre, is not completely invalid.

Here the basic question is Sartre's relation to Marxism. It's true that his outlook changed fundamentally after the second world war. He himself accepts "A simple formula would be to say that life taught me [la force des choses]- the power of circumstances, since I had already been made a soldier, when I had not wanted to be one. Thus I had already encountered something that was my freedom"
and which steered me from without, then I was taken prisoner, a fate which I had sought to escape. Hence I started to learn what I have called human reality among things: Being-in-the-World."  

After the war came the true experience, that of society. "The pre-war personage was more or less stendhal's egoistical individualistic had to be plunged into circumstances against his will unlike the post-war year as a man totally conditioned by his social existence and yet sufficiently capable of decision to reassume all this conditioning and to become responsible for what is made of one. Being and Nothingness traced an interior experience, without any co-ordination with the exterior experience, of a petty -bourgeois intellectual. Later on he believed that the individual interiorizes his social determinism: he interiorizes the relations of production, the family of his childhood, the historical past, the contemporary institutions, and he then re-exteriorizes these in acts and options which necessarily refer us back to them." These things were not present in his Being and Nothingness. In Being and Nothingness he radically rejects the concept of the unconscious, saying that it is a philosophical contradiction. The model of consciousness in his earlier work effectively excludes any idea of it whatever, consciousness is always transparent to itself, even if the subject creates a false screen of 'bad faith'.

18. Ibid., p. 33.
19. Ibid., p. 36.
The *Critique of Dialectical Reason* appears to be constructed on the idea that there is a fundamental homogeneity between the individual and history. The central theme of the book is the reversible relationship introversion between the individual, worked matter, the group, the series, the practico-inert and collectives. To adopt its vocabulary Sartre’s formal aim is to show how the totalizing acts of every individual are totalized in exteriority by others and becomes other to their agents, just as groups become other to themselves through serialization. Sartre claims that the *Critique* deals in a very systematic way with this aspect of history which presents itself as alienation and degradation of intentional projects, whether by individual or group, in their encounter with materiality and alterity, in the world of scarcity. There is, however, another aspect of history which is not accounted for by the *Critique*. Social facts are not simply a totalization in exteriority of an act of multiplicity of individuals and groups, which may during certain privileged moments achieve an apocalyptic sovereignty, but which normally fall into the practico-inert. They have an intrinsic order of their own, which is not deducible from the criss-crossing of innumerable individual totalization. The most obvious example of this is language- which can in no way be described as a simple totalization of all the speech - acts of linguistic agents. The subject who speaks never totalizes linguistic law by his words. Language has its own intelligibility as a system which appears heterogeneous to the subject. Can the theme of totalization and practico-inert ever account for the emergence of ordered social structures not merely random alienation of subjective projects? I don’t think it is possible.
The question is whether there is only totalization? There are two central examples in the *Critique*, of a multiplicity of totalization which fall into the practico-inert and become an alien power denaturing the intentions of their agents. One is that of different Chinese peasants cutting down trees to enlarge their cultivation of land, thus creating erosion, which thereby causes floods which then ruin their lands. The other is of the impact of gold in 16th century Spain—whereby the individual decisions of each single producer to rise prices caused an uncontrolled general inflation which eventually resulted in the collective improvishment of all of them. These two examples do not have the same type of intelligibility. This has already been discussed in the third chapter.

The relationship between *Being and Nothingness* and *Critique of Dialectical Reason* has been the occasion for reading Sartre in terms of his own self reading and dominant ideas: it is often seen as a dialectical or narratively technological one, in which *Being and Nothingness* is the beginning and *Critique* the end. The *Critique* is thus the Aufhebung of his earlier work, negating, conserving and rising its argument in a higher level of insight. Contat and Rybalka formulates this interpretation as “Sartre returned only on rare occasions and always incidentally to *Being and Nothingness*: he never placed in question its essential conclusion. A note in the *Critique of Dialectical Reason* [p.p.285-86] moreover, explicitly links the problem of second great philosophical work to that of the first. While clearly indicating the expansion and development he brought to it and warning against erroneous interpretation to which *Being and Nothingness* might
give rise. In an important interview of 1965, he reapproached himself with having used in this work too literary a language and with having thus exposed himself to misunderstandings. One must also note the expression 'edict of bad faith' employed by Sartre in [1961] to designate Being and Nothingness. This formula clearly marks the limit of the work: in a first stage, Sartre founds phenomenology of consciousness on the analysis of behaviour through which individuals, envisaged through a psychological and moral prospective, manifest their fundamental alienation, but he does not yet account for the historical and social causes of this alienation and this precisely what he will attempt to do in his later work. To link very schematically Being and Nothingness and the Critique of Dialectical Reason, one might say that the problem Sartre attempt to solve in the second work is the following: how can we understand that history, the product of the free praxis of man turns against its agent and is changed into an inhuman necessity that makes of man the object of the historical process? The essential psychological perspective of Being and Nothingness is thus enlarged in the Critique of Dialectical Reason into a historical and social perspective that should allow one to account for the existence of alienated freedom.\textsuperscript{20}

The relation between Being and Nothingness and Critique of Dialectical Reason has been the subject of polemic. At the end of the book Being and Nothingness gave notice to an ethics that has never been completed. From this fragment, the Critique emerged. Sartre has always tied his political positions to his

philosophy or more correctly it can be said that he has always given his political positions a philosophical interpretations. Critique lends itself to numerous interpretations. Critique is of speculative interest that the theory of practice-oriented ensembles elaborates the status of collectives from within a philosophy that ontologically it knows only individual consciousness, the for-itself or praxis. And another, it is of practical or political interest: how can praxis caught within the practico-inert, alienated and yet not being determined ever to overcome alienation? How society can be created where in praxis and would affirm its freedom other than by a revolutionary project? The relation between Being and Nothingness and Critique primarily takes into account the question of human action. Critique is also seen with respect of all philosophy of history that claims to totalize the human past with a view to a collective salvation including Marxism. It has to be discussed that how far he was able to reconcile the ontology of consciousness condemned to be free with the ontics of a consciousness caught within the practico-inert or alienated in service or in institutions etc. Sartre in his book Critique of Dialectical Reason accepts Historical Materialism. He in his book Search For a Method states “I have said and I repeat that the only valid interpretation of history is historical materialism.” 21 He further states “Marxism is History itself becoming conscious of itself ; if it is valid, it is because of its material content, which are unquestioned and unquestionable.” 22

Here in this section we are not going to see Sartre’s alliance to Marxism but the thought of *Being and Nothingness* to *Critique of Dialectical Reason*. The term thing-for-itself can be substituted for praxis. Man, or rather consciousness is freedom. Raymond Aron in his book *History and Dialectics of Violence* writes “commentators have often judged paradoxical Sartre’s alliance not to Marxism-Leninism but to Marxism or a certain Hegelanized or existential Marxism. The *Critique* tends to resolve the paradox by treating a problem that Sartre dealt with even when he was not interested in Marxism and the Revolution, namely: what is the nature of the knowledge that we can obtain of the human world, of the world interwoven with innumerable actions and free consciousness. [This can be called praxis] In what does the knowledge of freedom or for-itself differ from the knowledge of things-in-itself?”

He further writes “Sartre is scarcely troubled by epistemology and perhaps would never have examined the methodology of the social sciences nor written of a prolegomena to every future anthropology had circumstances not forced him into a dialogue with Marxism-Leninism. *Being and Nothingness* contained in its philosophy many of the analysis of the *Critique*. The relation of the in-itself, the for-itself and the for-others an specific mode of interpretation and knowledge is found at the methodological level in understanding.”

Here Sartre holds “this understanding is indispensable for grasping the meaning of human behaviour. What is involved here is neither a particular gift nor a special faculty of intuition: this knowledge is simply the

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24. Ibid., p. 5.
dialectical movement that explicates the act by its final signification in terms of its starting condition."\textsuperscript{25}

The conjunction between historical materialism and understanding can be called Marxism of understanding. Sartre’s Marxism, having become a Marxism of understanding, is based upon human existence: “Man, for himself and for others, is a signifying being since one can never understand the least of his gesture without going beyond the pure present and explicating it by means of the future. He is, as well, a creator of signs to the extent that, always ahead of himself, he employs certain objects in order to designate other absent or future objects: but both operations are reduced to a pure and simple surpassing to surpass present conditions towards a subsequent change, and to surpass the present object towards an absence are one and the same.

Man construct signs because in his very reality he is signifying: and he is signifying because he is the dialectical overcoming of everything that is simply given; what we call freedom is the irreducibility of the cultural order to the natural order."\textsuperscript{26} For Sartre it is not that man is essentially defined by historicity, since he exists in societies without history but that he is defined “by the permanent possibility of living historically through the breakdowns that sometimes throw

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., p. 152.
even societies in confusion.” That is he is defined by the permanent possibility of historicity, which history itself reveals a-posteriori.

The Critique has the epistemological result or conclusion of a Marxist-existentialist theory of understanding and the social sciences. But it is situated at the transcendent or even ontological level. Sartre’s critical experience does not demonstrate or prove, it reveals, it does not argue, it describes phenomenologically. It is an experience at the same time as it is Critique because it has become conscious of the history lived by each and by all. Raymond Aron in his book History and the Dialectic of Violence holds that “from the project or praxis (the activity for itself) the Critique follows, by a phenomenological description, the process of objectification of the subjective, and the internalization of objectives; it brings to light irreducibility of history (i.e. of historical reality) to the intentions of actors, all the while maintaining the de facto intelligibility of the whole of history, which ontologically reducible to praxis, which, in turn, have been deflected and alienated both from each other and from their common work. They are praxis that have become prisoners of each other and prisoners of their work.”

In Critique the synthesizing and unifying activity of consciousness is in the same sense as defined in Being and Nothingness. Sartre accepts that consciousness is self sufficient, and history must come to it from without, first of all as an obstacle or a negation. Freedom immediately becomes enslaved by anticipating in

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27. Ibid., p. 167.
becoming. The emergence of history is mixed with the fall. The project of humanity is the recovery of its freedom in and by History. But this freedom, which would mark the end of history (or of pre-history), is possessed by the consciousness of each individual from the beginning and cannot entirely be alienated. The Sartrean scheme goes from individual praxis (the freedom of translucent consciousness which is both lost and preserved, to another paradise, the paradise of the project. It passes into this collective paradise by way of the fall into the practico-inert or history. The two tendencies or origins of Sartre's thought are juxtaposed rather than united. The for-itself has nothing to do with others (hell is other people). But for Marxism, it sees the reconciliation of man (men and nature) beyond the class struggle (development of the forces of production). But this is ignored by Sartre.

The question arises how does Critique gets from Sartreanism to Marxism, from monologue to dialogue, for the individual consciousness dialectic to the dialectic of consciousness. This transformation it seems, takes place in those moments in the concept materiality (or alterity), plurality, and scarcity. Firstly the analysis of the organic totality and of need, it seems, contains nothing to modify Sartre's thought. It is simply a matter of translating the structure of the for-itself into biological language, living being constitutes an organic totality. It experiences a need and this need reveals a lack suffered by the organic totality, a lack that constitutes its negation. Sartre holds “It is the first totalizing relation of the material being that is man with the material whole of which he is a part...... Need
is the negation of the negation to the extent that it is denounced as a lack with in
the organism; it is positivity to the extent that by means of it the organic totality
tends to preserve itself as such."²⁹

But here the question arises as why does need appear as the negation of
negation? As far it is known that need reveals a lack, a gap in the organic totality
and this negation can be negated in turn by inorganic, material elements. "The
organic totality is manifest as a totality and makes the material environment appear
at infinity, as the total field of its possibilities of situation."³⁰ This contradiction
between organic and material totality underlies the original and permanent states
of man or more generally of living being. "A man in need is organic totality who
perpetually turns himself into his own tool in the external environment."³¹ "The
action of the living body on inert matter can be exercised directly or by the
mediation of another inert body. In this case we call the intermediary a tool."³²
Organic function, need, and praxis are strictly tied together in a dialectical order
with the organism. This temporal relation of the future to the past through the
present is nothing other than the functional relation of totality itself. "It is its own
future beyond a present of reintegrated distinction."³³

The schema of intelligibility, characteristics of dialectical and
consciousness (of or the for-itself) in *Being and Nothingness*, is thus discovered

³⁰ Ibid., p.166.
³¹ Ibid., p. 167.
³² Ibid., p. 167.
³³ Ibid., p. 167-68.
along with organic totalities and so with living being. Living being presents a structure identical to consciousness itself, an identity that gives Sartrean philosophy an appearance of materialism. “And so to the extent that, (1) the body is a function, (2) the function is need, and (3) the need is praxis, it can be said that human labour, that is to say, the original praxis by which the body produces and reproduces its life, is entirely dialectical; the unity of the project gives a quasi-synthetic unity to the practical field, and the most important moment of labour is when the organism uses its own inertia in order to transform surrounding inertia.”34

This analysis which bring to light the dialectical structure of living being itself, leaves room for a formula in which Sartre’s Existentialism and Marxism seems to be reconciled. For Sartre dialectic as logic of labour, means “determination of the present by the future, change of place between the inert and the organic negation, contradictions overcome, and negation of negation: in short, continuing totalization. Such are the moments of a labour, whatever it may be.”35

But perhaps this reconciliation seems to be more apparent than real. Because the dialectic of need, present in all living beings whether vegetables or animals is not per se self conscious. The identity of structure between life and consciousness does not necessarily imply identity of being or of essence. If it is assumed that this identity is affirmed then the required result would be either a

34. Ibid., p. 173-74.
35. Ibid., p. 174.
kind of metaphysics of consciousness diffused throughout life or even in a opposite
direction, it would even lead to the devaluation of consciousness into an
epiphenomenon of the dialectic of life which would be unconscious of itself. Apart
from this the biological interpretation of consciousness and labour on the basis of
need, plays no role at all in the course of critical experience (that is outside the
fundamental opposition between the organic and the inorganic, or of
consciousness and materiality). Sartre avoids the question; 'why are there organic
wholes rather than simply inorganic matter’. It seems he considers the question
non-scientific.

Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka in their book *A Critique of Sartre* states
that, “there is a epistemological break between *Being and Nothingness* and
*Critique of Dialectical Reason.*” Ferric James states in this connection that “It is
clear, however, that if the above description is correct, it will not be logically
possible to describe the *Critique* as a radical break with the position of *Being and
Nothingness*. The fact is that in genuinely Sartrean fashion the new book has
changed the old; *Being and Nothingness* can no longer be read the same way after
its appearance. The idea of logical inconsistencies between the two positions is a
static one: it is more satisfactory to think that the *Critique* comes to complete
*Being and Nothingness* in certain basic areas where it remained abstract or
insufficiently developed; and this act of completion, lifting all the problems on to a

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higher dialectical plan, ends by utterly transforming the very appearance of the earlier system.”

The changes from one work to the other are often substitutions of terms within a similar framework (Practico-inert for in-itself, praxis for for-itself, among others). Sartre’s development from Being and Nothingness to Critique conceals an essential poverty, whereby Sartre’s thought more or less blindly replicates the structure of bad faith or alienation he castigates in the ‘external’ world. The only perspective on alienation continues to be one ‘from the inside’.

Being and Nothingness is generally acknowledged to be Sartre’s greatest philosophical work. It is also one of Sartre’s most troubled texts. In the concluding paragraph of Being and Nothingness Sartre states “every human reality is a passion in that it projects losing itself so as to found being and by the same stroke to constitute the in-itself, which escapes contingency by being its own foundation, the Ens Causa Sui, which religious Gods. Thus the passion of man is the reverse of that of Christ, for man loses himself as man in order that God may be born. But the idea of God is contradictory and we lose ourselves in vain. Man is a useless passion.”

Sartre continues this trend of thought in the conclusion “that all human values are equivalent (for they all tend to sacrifice man in order that the self- cause

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may arise) and they are in principle doomed to failure. Thus it amounts to the same thing whether one gets drunk alone or is a leader of nations."\(^{39}\) The basic problem in *Being and Nothingness* is whether Sartre can suggest a viable alternative to his project other than in the purely apocalyptic, empty terms of authenticity, purifying reflection, and radical conversion. This problem in this conclusion is an attempt to distinguish sharply between ontology and metaphysics which tend to obscure the problem of a deconstructive reading or immanent *Critique* of the metaphysical tradition as well as the problem of the metaphysical tradition as well as the problem of the indebtedness of Sartre's own discourse to that tradition. In Sartre's later work, the moral problem is related to the problem of politics and social action. Is existential Marxism an answer to the questions that end *Being and Nothingness* or, indeed is it a dialectical transformation of both questions and answers, which reformulates them on a higher plane of theory and practice?

In a 1961 essay on Morley-Ponty, Sartre put forth a notion of what had to be done to overcome the difficulties of *Being and Nothingness*. Sartre asserts that one must investigate the tourniquets that mark the limits and extent of historical action and make men victims and accomplices in alienated processes despite good faith. Then he added in a footnote. "Not, as I did in 1942, by an eidetic of bad faith but by the empirical study of our historical fidelities and the inhuman forces that prevent them."\(^{40}\) In an interview of 1970, Sartre commented extensively on his

\(^{39}\) Ibid., p. 721.

progress since the writing of *Being and Nothingness*. He asserts his fidelity to the notion of man as freedom in a situation: “The ideal that I have never stopped developing is that, in the last analysis, a person is always responsible for what one has made of him.”\(^{41}\) But “*Being and Nothingness* retraced an interior experience without any relation to exterior experience-which had become historically catastrophic at a certain moment-of the petty-bourgeois intellectual that I was.”\(^{42}\) The self-commentary specifies certain nodal point in a model of “dialectical out coming” that relates Sartre’s early work to his later work. It is partially accurate and partially misleading. The phase “eidetic of bad faith” is valuable as a characterization of *Being and Nothingness*, but every thing depends upon its interpretation. Sartre’s work after *Being and Nothingness* are, it is true, more directly and extensively concerned with political, historical and social issues. But it is difficult to accept Sartre’s account of the theoretical foundations of his change in emphasis. The notion of interiorization and exteriorization (certainly resent in Freud and others)are, by and large, indicative of advance in social psychology.

It is difficult to assess Sartre’s claim that in his later works the range of freedom becomes more restricted. In *Being and Nothingness*, Freedom seemed paradoxically to be both total and self-effacing or self-nugatory, nothing in effect, but the nothing that makes a world of difference in meaning and value. Whatever the range of freedom, the theoretical issue that remains problematic in the later

\(^{41}\) Ibid., p. 101.
\(^{42}\) Ibid., p. 102.
Sartre is the very conception of freedom in its relation to the situation. On the problem of the impact of world war II, one may at least complicate matter by quoting Sartre against Sartre and quoting Sartre against Luckas: “One needs a great deal of time to write a theoretical work. My book Being and Nothingness, to which he directly refers, was the result of study begun in 1930. By the winter of 1930-40, I had already worked out my method and my principal conclusions. Lukas has the instruments to understand Heidegger, but he will not understand him; for Luckas would have to read him, to grasp the meaning of sentence one by one. And there is no longer any Marxist, to my knowledge, who is still capable of doing this. Finally there has existed a whole dialectic—and a very complex one—from Bretano to Husserl to Heidegger—influences, oppositions, agreements, new oppositions, misunderstandings, distortion, denials, surpassing, etc. All this adds up to what one could call an area history. Ought we to consider it a pure epiphenomenon? According to what Lukas says, yes or does there exist some kind of movement of ideas, and does Husserl’s phenomenology—as a moment preserved and surpassed-enter into Heidegger’s system? In this case the principle of Marxism are not changed, but the situation becomes much more complex.”

This statement on the proper method for intellectual history explicitly relies on the dialectical model. It comes from the work in which Sartre makes his boldest and most forceful attempt to forge an existential Marxist approach to problems, Search for a Method. And it suggests that to appreciate Sartre’s comments on

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43 Ibid., p. 39.
"Being and Nothingness", one must raise the further question of the nature of Sartre’s later thought not only in relation to his early works but also in relation to itself. Sartre’s later writings do not form a homogeneous whole. They are marked by ‘internal’ self contestation and by ‘external’ tension in relations to one another—features that render dubious the idea that even his later works are entirely intelligible in accordance with a dialectical model of totalization.

If one expects the *Critique* to overcome *Being and Nothingness* in the direction indicated by Sartre’s footnote in his 1961 essay on Merleau-Ponty, one will be disappointed. *Critique* is a study of social ontology and formal sociology—an attempt to delineate the abstract structures of historical intelligibility. It very much repeats the structure or problematic of *Being and Nothingness* in so far as a dialectic of alienation replaces an eidetic of bad faith. And there are even some losses in the process that are not dialectically reappropriated.

For Sartre, historical praxis is the lived experience of man as an existential agent. It is ‘known’ only indirectly through “rational non knowledge” in comparison or understanding; in contrast to causal explanation. The emphasis on comprehension of lived experience is the specific contribution to existentialism to Marxism. The role of comprehension reveals why the dialectical process of totalization must remain open and can never attain totality or the closure of Absolute knowledge. It is analogous to the problem of transphenomenality of *Being and Nothingness* in that it refers one to supplementary and displacement. The well-known conditions under which Sartre produced the *Critique* which lend
psychological plausibility to a relatively mechanical model of repetition in interpreting its relation to his earlier work, notably *Being and Nothingness*. For Sartre worked in a way that indicated the cathartic retelling of an old story, one that the notion of radical conversion in the writing of the *Critique* did more to conceal than to reveal. The narrowly analytic conception of the basis of dialectics informs the investigation of human history in its formal structures of intelligibility or conditions of possibility. Sartre begins by privileging the putatively “translucent praxis of the organic individual” in a manner comparable to the dominant treatment of the for-itself in *Being and Nothingness*. The confrontation of the individual with matter produces worked-over matter as a result of praxis. This worked-over matter is primary form of practico-inert. The practico-inert might be seen as a “baptized”, or named, in-itself of the second order. In *Being and Nothingness*, this derivative in-itself was at least implicitly present but not given a distinctive name, or discussed to some extent or granted the same importance. (In the earlier work, it referred, for example, the one’s past as the facility of the for-itself which the for-itself had to be in the mode of not being it - an essence or dead possibility that had to face up to in an ongoing totalization or temporalization). In the presence and practico-inert, individuals are serialized and related to each other by non-cooperative antagonistic reciprocity.

The group-in-fusion arises as an apocalyptic way out of the hell of serialization and atomization. The group begins with objectification by a third, as in *Being and Nothingness*. But in *Critique*, the group attains the status of a group-

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in-fusion (or what *Being and Nothingness* termed a ‘we’ subject) by internalizing the third. A common enemy and a common project enable members of the group to relate to one another, not in a purely dyadic manner, but in terms of the third. Each group member is a third for the other and the group is the third for each dyad. This group does have reality of at least an evanescent sort for Sartre in the *Critique* which is different from *Being and Nothingness*. It rests not only on the recognition of social-psychological process of shared internalization of the external (a process that would be a relatively superficial phenomenon in terms of *Being and Nothingness*) but also the importance of political and social (hardly discussed in his earlier work).

The status of group-in-fusion in *Critique* is problematic. First in contrast to *Being and Nothingness*, the apocalyptic moment occurs not in a footnote but in the principal text. Second the group-in-fusion is an evanescent though nearly perfect moment. It apparently cannot be stabilized into some ongoing form of community or institution. Third there is a difference between the status of the individual and that of the group in the *Critique*. The international praxis of the individual, like that of the for-itself in *Being and Nothingness*, is the generating source of meaning and value in the world. The praxis of the group, while not “unreal” or without ontological status, is nonetheless related to a constituted dialectic dependent upon the originating role of individuals. In **term of *Being and Nothingness*** one might say that the praxis of the individual is initially on the level of immediacy of the pre-
reflective consciousness, while the group depends upon reflection and the role of the other.

In comparison with *Being and Nothingness*, the *Critique* seems more militantly individualistic while at the same time it is more concerned about society and politics. And it does not furnish the elements that problematize individualism in the earlier work. The entire sweep of the *Critique* does seem to indicate that the sequence it presents constitutes at least a highly possible, perhaps probable, historical sequence. From a dialectical perspective, the major difficulty with the *Critique* is the very limited notion of mediation it develops. The scarcity is hypostatized. Analytic oppositions become regulative. Social revolution and a viable socialist regime seem to be unfounded hopes. As a result, Sartre furnishes a set of concepts and possible processes that enable an analyses of alienation from the inside. It shows the restricted nature of Sartre’s treatment of the problem of institutions. In his major works; Sartre never makes a sustained investigation and immanent *Critique* of existing institutions (for example, those of capitalism). In his understanding of the institution, Sartre retains the one-dimensional phenomenological prejudice that identifies truth with immediacy to the thing themselves, pre-reflective consciousness and the lived structure by contrast, is on the side of distortion.

As we have mentioned earlier in this chapter that many of the concepts of *Being and Nothingness* are recognizable in the *Critique* under different names, and fulfilling different functions which serve sartre’s new objectives. For instance
the for-itself and the in-itself appear as praxis and practico-inert respectively. The concept of the project is carried over directly. In Critique one can recognize the personal and the political problems that concerned Sartre after 1945. Other people remain enemies at the same time become the source of freedom; the class is seen as a complex network of social formation in which the party (the institution) always has an ambivalent status, both expressing the ‘class praxis’ and distorting it, even on occasions trying to suppress it. The Critique aims at making explicit the philosophical basis of Marxism. In the later part of the work, the attempt to find Marxism leads him to deal with group formation (‘the group infusion’, ‘organised group’ and ‘the institution’). It is Marx, in fact, who Sartre sees as having originally achieved the synthesis between the specificity of individual human existence and man as a ‘objective reality’ that Sartre is attempting to elucidate.

In Being and Nothingness the ontological proof provides one with a means of grasping Sartre’s Method. The ontological proof starts from the point that all consciousness is consciousness of some thing and the statement goes on. There is a problem about the relationship between the two works; to describe it as a move from the ontological to the ontic and to draw a parallel between the for-itself and praxis, and the in-itself and the practico-inert. There is certainly a similarity in spirit between the two and both are concerned with freedom and the individual, both are opposed to any sort of mechanistic determinism. But at the same time there are striking differences. Being and Nothingness examined the nature of an a-temporal absolute, a consciousness which was responsible for time and not
produced by it. The *Critique* is concerned with History and its relativising effects, even to the extent of relativising his own earlier description of the absolute “Existentialism is a parasitical system living on the margin of knowledge which at first is opposed, but into which today it seeks to be integrated.”

*Being and Nothingness* asserts the absolute freedom of man, the *Critique* talks of necessity and destiny; the former was concerned with the unavoidable conflict of self and other; the later talks about reciprocity and group activity. In *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, his aim was to find the dialectic in human activity as opposed to Engels that its a law of nature that governs the world including man, but something that man creates in and by his own activity. If the structure of intelligibility of human action is dialectical, then it will be possible to establish firstly that, history is man made and secondly in what way it is man made, i.e. it will be possible to explore the dialectic of necessity and freedom implied by Marx when he states that man makes history but do so on the basis of previous circumstances. According to Sartre if it is projected into nature as natural law, the dialectic becomes unintelligible and contingent. According to Sartre, *Critique* attempts to show the intelligibility of the dialectic and consequently of History. This we find constitutes the foundation of Marxism.

Sartre develops from one phase to another phase in his philosophical ‘crusades’ against Marxian philosophy. If we accept that *Critique* is the

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continuation of Being and Nothingness than by ‘continuity’ we mean that persistent of a philosophical tradition and not merely a repetition. But the existentialism of Being and Nothingness is definitely not the same as the existentialism of the Critique. The difference between both the text is marked by discontinuity. By discontinuity we mean that despite Sartre’s sympathy for the working class, the goal of communism, the French communist party and his active ‘radical, politics, Sartre remained a ‘profound’ non Marxist in the realm of philosophy. Sartre has himself chosen for himself the label ‘existentialist’ as against Marxist and characterized himself as belonging equally to the bourgeoisie as well as the working class.

Sartre while commenting on existentialism’s crusade against idealism (and materialism), wrote “Thus Marx, rather than Kierkegaard or Hegel is right since he asserts with Kierkegaard the specificity of human existence, and, alone with Hegel, takes the concrete man in his objective reality. Under these circumstances, it would seem natural if existentialism, this idealist protest against idealism, has lost all usefulness and has not survived the decline of Hegelianism.....In fact existentialism suffered a eclipse. In the general struggle which bourgeois thought leads against Marxist dialectic, it gets its support from the post Kantianism, from Kant himself, and from Descartes; it means thinkers of addressing itself to Kierkegaard. The dawn will reappear at the beginning of the 20th century when people will take it into their hands to fight against Marxism by opposing it to
pluralism; ambiguity and paradox."^{45} We can see that Sartre’s writings both in *Being and Nothingness* and *Critique of Dialectical Reason* were not without contradictions. *Being and Nothingness* was written against the Marxist dialectic. Sartre while participating in an interview cum discussion with Simone de Beauvoir, described “*Critique of Dialectical Reason* as idealistic.”^{46}

Sartre from *Being and Nothingness* to *Critique of Dialectical Reason* did not have a method whereby he could differentiate between appearance and essence. Thus Sartre instead of being a fine idealist like he was in *Being and Nothingness*, in his multifaceted analysis of individual praxis, its facticity, practico-inert, history, its scarcity posed the problem of history in a mechanical way as a crusade “materialist” would pose it. It’s true that his proposals in both his works were not without contradiction.

As we have discussed in the earlier chapter that Sartre considers freedom and consciousness as abstract and general conceptions, he studied them in real life situation in *Being and Nothingness*. For Sartre the man of *Being and Nothingness* was a man of action. However unlike in *Critique* the concrete situation in *Being and Nothingness* remained outside the preview of history. Despite Sartre’s starting point by historical context, his epistemological ideal remained the ‘ontological’ individual. To put it in a different way, the purpose of *Critique* was the re-choosing of the ontic-individual at a historical level.

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Sartre's concept of individual and impersonal Cogito developed in *Being and Nothingness* was assimilated and realized in the concept of man (in historical context) developed in exposition of regressive analysis. This can be put in another way, as the historical man of *Critique of Dialectical Reason* was a mature and materialistic [mechanical] version of the pseudo-cogito notion of *Being and Nothingness*.

In both works Sartre has shown tremendous interest in the ontic structure of consciousness. In *Being and Nothingness* there are two degree of consciousness i). pre-reflective & ii). reflective. This was bound in form and content by reflective structure and was authentic in *Critique*. Sartre's notion of individual and group praxis were in continuity with his earlier version of consciousness. Just as pre-reflective cogito was determined by being-in-itself or other than consciousness in *Being and Nothingness*, in the same way in *Critique* individual praxis was determined by worked matter. Just as consciousness was defined as reciprocity and submission of the self and the other, in the same way in *Critique* Sartre transcribed individual, praxis, group, group-in-fusion, institution in the break up of the self and the other. Unlike the consciousness developed in *Being and Nothingness* Sartre's notion of individual praxis could effect an imposed unity on the material order.

In *Being and Nothingness* Sartre claimed that he concentrated on the social dimension of the self. Sartre argued that despite located in the social situation; the self remained self, “we” was thus a social or psychological framework of the same
self. Sartre while commenting in the genesis of the "we" structure wrote:

".........Suddenly some incident occurs in the street, for example, a slight collision between a jeep and a taxi: Immediately at the very instant when I became a spectator of the incidence, I experienced my self non-thematically as engaged in 'we'."47 Sartre interprets the self's relation with the other as Being-for-other. Sartre retained the Being-for-other's structure both in Being and Nothingness as well as in Critique.

In Critique Sartre presents the reflection of man in the following terms “human are thingified in as much as things are humanized, and human beings are historicised by things mediated by man”. Just as Sartre fought materialism in general and dialectical materialism in particular when he described Marxian philosophy as the spirit of seriousness in Being and Nothingness in the same way Sartre fought dialectical materialism (despite his rejection) in Critique when he describes men in terms of things and things in terms of man with a mechanical materialist approach. Here it can be noted that Sartre distorts Marxian philosophy when he accuses it of being challenged by a spirit of seriousness. It is unbelievable that Sartre could go to the extent of interpreting Marxian philosophy which as a world look, as a method of materialist interpretation is to be the philosophy of man who is bound by things devoid of freedom. Sartre in Critique unlike in Being and Nothingness presents man and things in pseudo-contexts, namely the context of scarcity, the context of need, the context of group-in-fusion, without taking into

47. Sartre, Jean. Paul., Being and Nothingness, p. 413.
account the productive forces and the relation of production as the native force of history Sartre is trapped in a circle of thinking when he defends human through things and things through humans. Sartrean philosophy in corporated appearances as an exclusive principle and moreover, its rejection of the dialectic of nature caused it to be ‘blind’ to the fact that causal-phenomena, concrete history, dialectical interdependency of phenomena, man’s intervention in nature and man’s manipulation of nature were law bound. Sartrean philosophy can not retrieve man’s natural existence in thought. It can be said that industrialization considered man unilaterally social.

In Critique Sartre needed an ‘abstract matter (a matter with which the physicist deals and non-dialectical) in order to have words to have meaning. He in Critique made use of worked matter (the matter reshaped by the worker through labour) whose scarcity as social dimension presented itself to individual praxis in the form of need. Thus Sartre made his historical man a victim of materialist illusion which he accused philosophers like Husserl and Heidegger were victims by his own argument. In Critique he suggests psychoanalytic theory to be appended to Marxian philosophy as it contains dialectical element. This is exactly in line with Sartre’s proposal of existential Psychoanalysis as a remedy for what he thinks to be the original ‘dogma’ of Marxian philosophy as a spirit of seriousness. Sartre was anti-Freudian in both Being and Nothingness and Critique of Dialectical Reason. In Being and Nothingness Sartre was against psychoanalysis
as an intellectual method, but in *Critique* he was positively towards human psychiatry.

Sartre on the question of relation with others and freedom states that 'one can have two conflicting relation with other'. 'Either one can attempt to assimilate other’s freedom into there freedom while simultaneously trying to preserve other’s freedom and there otherness, or one can attempt to reduce his freedom into an object. According to Sartre, our attempt to preserve the freedom of the other despite our good faith is bound to fail because in the process of preserving we make other’s freedom an object. For Sartre, we make the other into an object. We recognize the other as subject in this objectified freedom. Sartre constructs that depending on the for-itself’s capacity to exercise freedom all the relations of the self with the other are either in good or bad faith. In *Being and Nothingness* all relations depend for their continuity or discontinuity on the freedom of the for-itself. In *Critique* however Sartre took seemingly materialistic approach.

As we have discussed in the previous chapter that Sartre’s concept of freedom in *Being and Nothingness* is entirely different from his concept of freedom in *Critique*. In *Being and Nothingness* freedom is a freedom of choice and choice is abstractly abundant. In *Critique* freedom is the opposite of necessity and divisible. Unlike in *Being and Nothingness* in *Critique* freedom is not a pure and absolute choice. But both in *Being and Nothingness* and in *Critique* Sartre accepts that knowing is equivalent to freedom.
Just as in *Being and Nothingness* Sartre in *Critique* made human relation grounded in alienation. Sartre’s existential terms of human context is ‘situation’. Man in situation according to Sartre was simultaneously in and out of the ‘situation’. Thus according to Sartre man in situation is not only bound by the situation but also can go beyond the situation.

Unlike in *Being and Nothingness* Sartre in *Critique* did not place failure of love in the individual but in the social institutions and structures which limit individual praxis. In *Being and Nothingness* Sartre in the same way as in the *Critique* presented love as beyond conflict. In *Critique* Sartre argued that one loves at the cost of being alienated from history. Love among human individuals meant their general hatred against inhumanity. Unlike this love in *Being and Nothingness* becomes valueless perpetually when it turns into its opposite hate or its counterpart sadism.

Sartre in *Critique* discuss the failure of a individual relation as reflection of the failure of social institution as his project is to link individual to history. Unlike in *Being and Nothingness* Sartre in *Critique* discussed the situation of praxis in the wake of social structures. As a whole Sartre remained an existentialist, even in the *Critique*.

Section-B: *A comparative study of Sartre and Marx.*

We in this section will attempt to give a comparative account of Sartre and Marx. We will try to show that Sartre in his later work *Critique of Dialectical*
Reason accepts Marx’s Historical Materialism and rejects Dialectical Materialism and his Theory of Knowledge. We will also show that Historical Materialism which Sartre accepts is also interpreted in such a way that the basic Marxist premises of Historical Materialism namely the mode of production (productive forces and production relations) and its relation to Super structure is not accepted by Sartre. We may state here that Sartre by rejecting dialectical materialism and the mode of production as the basis of the development of the society takes away from Marxism its very foundation. Without dialectical materialism and the economic structure, Marxism turns into an abstract theoretical exercise.

Existentialism is an irrational trend, which arose in the 20th century. Jean Paul Sartre in his book Existentialism and Human Emotion states “In any case, what can be said from the very beginning is that by Existentialism we mean a doctrine which makes human life possible and, in addition declares, that every truth and every action implies a human setting and a human subjectivity.”

Sartre’s philosophy has been the subject of a varied reception. Reading of his work diverge because of basic differences in what counts as viable philosophical activity. Phenomenologists, analytic philosophers, Marxists, structuralists, and the historians of philosophy each offer distinctive accounts of his thought.

In order to interpret his philosophy one has to re-examine the views of his

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Sartre, Jean. Paul., *Existentialism and Human Emotion*, Printed in USA. CASTEL., p. 10
early work of 1930s & 40s i.e. in and around *Being and Nothingness* (1943). And recount its development and transformation into the 50s and 60s- clustering around the *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (1960). This has been discussed in section ‘A’. In his *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (1960), Sartre claims his kinship with Marx and consider that “Marxism is the philosophy of the present era and his existentialism is an ideology that has developed at the margin of Marxism and not against it.” Though this claim for kinship with Marxism can be traced in his earlier works too. *Being and Nothingness* contain explicit reference to Marxism on certain important issues though it is very brief but in Existentialism and Humanism (1946) he makes more elaborate reference to Marxism. In *Being and Nothingness*, he had primarily emphasized a point of difference between his own idea and that of Marx on the question of Man’s individuality. But in Existentialism and Humanism, he expresses his admiration for and agreement with Marx on the question of viewing philosophy as a weapon of social revolution.

The idea of freedom which Sartre expounds in *Being and Nothingness* is not a content of his philosophy: it is the origin of all philosophizing. Transcendence of Ego had established that the cogito was ‘the first condition and absolute source of existence, and this claim is re-iterated in *Being and Nothingness*. The only point of departure for philosophy is the free individual consciousness. This freedom of consciousness is clearly distinguished from the ‘empirical and popular concept of freedom’ which corresponds to its conventional

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social, political and historical uses. The deep ambiguity at the heart of Sartre's work is between the permanence of, and the realization of philosophy. The former rests on the philosophic freedom, the cogito. The latter demands the securing of those unspecified and quite distinct, political, social and moral freedoms. In an important sense, freedom is not a problem for Sartre what is problematic is the relation between the philosophic enterprise and the emancipation of men. Later Sartre admitted the limit of the notion of subjectivity outlined in *Being and Nothingness*. He had sought to make freedom inhere in situation and to entail the freedom of others. *Being and Nothingness* was published after the outbreak of the II\textsuperscript{nd} world war and France's occupation by German troops, it is best understood as the products of Sartre's pre war reflections. In fact the experience of war and occupation proved decisive for him by radicalizing his thinking on history and politics. He was not only rudely disabused of many comfortable pre-war assumption, but also compelled to reconsider the nature of moral responsibility and the historical meaning of individual actions. Sartre described how, on the outbreak of war, it appeared history and 'burst over him'.

"I work to find myself scattered over the four quarters of the globe, linked by every nerve in me to each and every individual. All my ideas were turned upside down."\textsuperscript{50} Here it seems that the war opened his eyes. He suffered his indignity of being mobilized, was without having seen conflict, taken prisoner in June 1940, and only finally released as a civilian in March 1941. Having

secretly resolved to know nothing of violence and unhappiness as elements of history: Sartre believed that peace was a natural state and substance of the universe. There was a radical change in his attitude. He was thinking a good deal about the post war period. He adopts a new morality based on the notion of genuiness: which demanded of each person, including himself, commitment to positive action. On his final return from imprisonment his behaviour was notable for the new and marked stringency of his moral standards.

Sartre’s *Critique of Dialectical Reason* came out in 1960. The passage from *Being and Nothingness* to *Critique* shows that Sartre does not hesitate to change his position and to challenge what he himself once believed. The guiding principle behind the development of Sartre’s thought is: every truth has become so. The principle has enabled Sartre to ‘depass’ his earlier position. The dialectical reason, according to Sartre, manifests necessarily through such an act of depassing. As in his earlier work including novels which are not philosophical primarily, his concern for Marxism can be seen. His essay *Materialism and Revolution* (1946) is very important. It contains Sartre’s early philosophy and political thought. Particularly his attitude towards Marxism and communism. Here Sartre subscribes to the philosophy of proletariat and upholds the aspirations of the working class and the idea of revolution. Any philosophy, according to Sartre can claim to give a proper understanding of the world only when it does so with a view to changing it. And Marx emphasises this fact in the eleventh thesis on feurbach; “The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in various ways; the
point however is to change it.” Sartre proclaims himself to be a Marxist and expresses his hope that only Marxism can provide solace to the suffering humanity. Can his endorsement of Marxism contribute to the emancipation of the proletariat? This poses a big question because Sartre has been critical to the theoretical foundation of contemporary Marxism, particularly his assertion that Marx, Engels and Lenin, while elaborating there thesis on historical materialism, subjugated the entity of an individual’s personality and lost sight of the significance of an individual’s historical events.

Inspite of this differences given on the above issue Sartre shares Marx’s view that philosophy should not only present an understanding of the world but it should also do it with a view of changing the world. For Sartre any philosophy has its credibility only in being able to guide praxis (a purposeful human activity). Marxism, according to Sartre, is the philosophy of our age because it has been able to guide the revolutionary praxis of the working class successfully and it claims to be the philosophy of the proletariat. Marx has been able to explain the true perspective of the individual man and his freedom. This means Sartre’s own thought about the individual man and his freedom has undergone a radical change. Sartre’s account of Marxist ideas of individual and freedom reveals to what extent he subscribes to dialectical materialism and historical materialism. This is particularly important for the question of dialectical materialism and historical materialism that Sartre claims that later Marxist, including, Engels deviated from the original thought of Marx. Moreover Sartre even appears to oppose Marx
himself in certain aspects in spite of his regard for Marx as the true exponent of
the idea of individual man and his freedom. [Or to stress the fact again here,
'Sartre states Marxism is the philosophy of present era and existentialism is the
ideology that has developed at the margin of it and not against it'].

Sartre in his book Search for a Method states:

"I have often remarked on the fact that an 'anti-Marxist' argument is
only the apparent rejuvenation of a 'pre-Marxist' idea. A so-called 'going
beyond' Marxism will be at worst only a return to pre-Marxism; at best, only
the rediscovery of a thought already contained in the philosophy which one
believes he has gone beyond. As for 'revisionism'; this is earlier a truism or an
absurdity. There is no need to readopt a living philosophy to the course of the
world, it adopts itself by means of thousands of new efforts, thousands of
particular pursuit, for the philosophy is one with the movement of society.
Despite their good intentions, those very people who believe themselves to be
most faithful spokesmen for their predecessors transform the thoughts which
they want simply to repeat, methods are modified because they are applied to
new objects. If this movement in the part of the philosophy no longer exists,
one of the two things is true. Either the philosophy is dead or it is going
through a 'crises'.... in the second case the 'philosophical crises' is the
particular expression of a social and its immobility is conditioned by the
contradictions which split society. A so-called 'revision' performed by
‘experts’ would be, therefore, only an idealist mystification without any real significance.”

Sartre claims that he has developed his own ideology of existentialism at the margin of Marxism. The ideology particularly aims at explaining the varied dimensions of human relations. Accordingly the ideology of Existentialism it does not go against the philosophy of Marxism. This is Sartre’s claim, on the contrary, he further holds, it helps Marxism to extend its scope and thereby enables Marxism to guide the praxis of the working class in a fruitful way. He feels that the followers of Marx have reduced the philosophy to a hypostatised dogma and have denuded it of its necessary dialectical character. By supplementing itself by the ideology of existentialism, Sartre claims, the philosophy of Marxism will regain its efficiency when Sartre explains his justification for his claim that existentialism has autonomy and it supplements Marxism. His criticism against Marxism is mainly directed towards contemporary Marxism. The contemporary Marxist or the later Marxist according to Sartre regard the basic principle of Marxism as constitutive principle and not a regulative principle. Stare’s criticism is not only directed towards later Marxist but against Marx’s own thought also. This is so at least in respect of Marxist epistemology and dialectical materialism. Sartre raise a system of philosophy against the principle of dialectical materialism. Sartre rejects the dialectics of nature in his essay Materialism and Revolution too.

Sartre’s criticism of Marxism leads to another important question. The question is concerning the identification of Sartre’s own thought. When Sartre refer to his own thought as existentialism in *Critique of Dialectical Reason* as an ideology with autonomy, his ideology is not the same as that which Sartre has worked out in *Being and Nothingness* and *Existentialism and Humanism*. He should not call his changed ideology ‘existentialism’ and thus allow a confusion regarding his position. As also his claim that he has depassed his own earlier thought can not be justified.

For Marx philosophy is not merely an interpretation or understanding of the world. Its an understanding which can be known as a purpose of the changing what is understood and which can guide the act of changing. Any philosophy-being a part of the superstructure or the social consciousness, is conditioned by the material conditions of the society. A philosophy which feels the need for a change and tries to understand and interpret the world with the urge for changing it is revolutionary. Marxism is a revolutionary philosophy in this sense and it is distinguished from other philosophies in its being revolutionary. The urge for bringing about change is according to Marx, a free urge, and the revolutionary projects is a free project. According to Marxian sense, freedom in this context is freedom related to necessity; necessity here means necessity imposed by objective condition. But Sartre at that stage of development of his philosophy would not relate necessity from freedom.
A widespread and widely spread misconception about Marxism is that it may be conceded that it is concerned about equality, it accords freedom at best a secondary place. It is sometimes stated that in the interest of equality Marx and his doctrine are prepared to sacrifice liberty. It is also not true that Marx was not concerned with the individual and therefore, ignored the problems of the freedom of the individual in society. For him “the human essence is not abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.”

For him the individual and society, the individual and the class to which he belonged represented not an identity but a unity, interpretation and struggle of opposites. That is why in the same Communist Manifesto which stated that all recorded history is the history of class struggle and called upon the workers of the world to unite and also envisioned the future communist society thus “In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.”

Marx philosophy, like most of the existentialist think, represent a protest against man’s alienation, his loss of himself and his transformation into a thing; it is a movement against the dehumanisation of man inherent in the development of western industrialism. It is ruthlessly critical of all ‘answers’ to the problem of human existence which try to present solution by negating or camouflaging the

dichotomies inherent in man’s existence. Marx philosophical tradition, reaches from Spinoza, through the French and German enlightenment philosophers of the 18th century to Gothe and Hegel and the very essence of which is concerned for man and the realization of his potentialities.

Marx’s theory of historical development of which his concept of freedom is an integral and important part is not an economic theory of history, or historical materialism. Nor is it historical materialism, far less does it subscribe to the teleological viewpoint. The subjective factor and the role of the individual are indispensable part of the historical process.

The clearest statement of this statement of this point can is to be found in the letter from Engels to J. Bloch written in September 1890.

"According to the materialist conception of History, the ultimately determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life. More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure—political forms of the class struggle and its results...also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their form. There is an interaction of all these elements in which, amid all the endless host of accidents...the economic movement finally asserts itself as necessary...

"We make our history ourselves, but, in the first place, under very definite assumptions and conditions. Among these, the economic ones are ultimately
decisive. But the political ones, etc. and in deed even the traditions which hunt human minds also play a part, although not the decisive one...

"In the second place, however, history is made in such a way that the final result always arises from conflicts between many individual wills, of which each in turn has been made what it is by a host of particular conditions of life. Thus there are innumerable intersecting forces, an infinite series of parallelogram, which gives rise to one resultant--the historical event...what each individual wills is obstructed by everyone else, and what emerges is something that no one willed ....But from the fact that the wills of individuals–each of whom derives what he is impelled to by his physical constitution and external, in the last resort economic, circumstances (either his own personal circumstances or those of society in general)--do not attain what they want, but are merged into an aggregate mean, a common resultant, it must not be concluded that they are equal to zero. On the contrary, each contributes to the resultant and is to this extent included in it."\textsuperscript{54}

One would like to pass on from here in bringing forward Marx's or, rather, the Marxist definition of freedom. The clearest enunciation of this is, again, provided by Engels but in a book which Marx read through, contributed to and completely approved of -- the celebrated text which has come to be known as Anti-Duhring. It reads:--

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 487-88
“Hegel was the first to state correctly the relation between freedom and necessity. To him freedom is the appropriation of necessity. ‘Necessity is blind only insofar as it is not understood.’ Freedom does not consists in any dreampt of independence from natural laws, but in the knowledge of these laws, and in the possibility this gives of systematically making them work towards definite ends. This holds good in relation to the laws of external nature and to those which govern the bodily and mental existence of men themselves--two classes of laws which we can separate from each other at most only in thought but not in reality. Freedom of the will therefore means nothing but the capacity to make decisions with knowledge of the subject. Therefore, the freer a man’s judgment is in relation to a definite question, the greater is the necessity with which the content of this judgment will be determined: while the uncertainty, founded on ignorance, which seem to make an arbitrary choice among many different and conflicting possible decisions, shows precisely by this that it is not free, that it is controlled by the very object it should itself control. Freedom therefore consists in the control over ourselves and over external nature, a control founded on knowledge of natural necessity: it is therefore necessarily a product of historical development.”

This gives the general approach of Marxism to freedom, i.e. choice but not arbitrariness, decision but not random faith.

Marxism tends to interpret the world because it aim’s at changing it. It has

been developed for the purpose of giving expression to the comprehensive movement of the society. It is engendered directly by praxis and is directly supported by Praxis. Sartre maintains that philosophy is "simultaneously a totalization of knowledge, a method of, regulative idea, an offensive weapon, and a community language."\textsuperscript{56} Marxism as whole is social and political weapon. One cannot take its method in isolation and employ it as a social and political weapon. "Marxism can treat the problems of human relations correctly because it assumes fully its role as a practical philosophy, that is, as a theory clarifying social and political Praxis."\textsuperscript{57}

Sartre describes the significance of Praxis in Marxism further from another consideration. Anthropology demands to know the being of human reality. At the same time, we cannot deny the fact that it is impossible to determine any human essence. In presenting the individual man in his true perspective, Marxism satisfies both these condition. It is aware that except in some kind of idealism human essence can not be determined and at the same time it tries to know the being of human reality. That is why Sartre states here, "Marxism appears today to be the only possible anthropology which can be at once historical and structural. It is only one which at the same time takes man in his totality that is in term of the materiality of his conditions."\textsuperscript{58} It is because of the role that Praxis occupies in Marxism, that it appears to be only possible anthropology, "The foundation of

\textsuperscript{56} Sartre, Jean. Paul., \textit{Question of Method}, p.12.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., p.176-177.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., p.175.
anthropology is man himself, not as the object of practical knowledge, but as a practical organism producing knowledge as a moment of its Praxis."\(^59\)

Sartre states explicitly that he is in profound agreement with Marxist philosophy and at the same time maintains the autonomy of the ideology of existentialism. Marx at the same time asserts the specificity of human existence as well as takes the concrete man in his objective reality. As such he realizes the significance of Praxis. The whole question of the relation between the philosophy of Marxism and the ideology of existentialism rests on the question of praxis and the characteristic of being a practical philosophy.

For Sartre philosophy is comprehensive and pervades the cultural milieu of the society in such a manner that no thought remains outside it. It is "totalization of knowledge."\(^60\) Ideology on the other hand is fragmentary. It's a application of this method of philosophy to some particular area. However the area may be new in the sense that it has come to light because of some new situation. Edit Kern in his book *Sartre: A Collection of Critical Essays* states that "for the very nature of philosophy it follow that the period of philosophical creation are rare-Sartre designates such period, 17th to 20th century dominates by (1) Descartes and Lock, (2) Kant and Hegel (3) Marx."\(^61\)

\(^59\) Ibid., p. 179.
\(^60\) Ibid., p. XXXIV.
Marxism successfully establishes its claim as philosophy of the present age primarily because it takes into account both totalization and individual in proper perspective. Marx recognizes the dialectical character of being and that of knowing. Recognizing history as a dialectical process Marx also recognizes totalization. According to him the objective reality consists in nothing but in this historical totalization, and the concrete individual man must be viewed in the perspective of this objective reality.

Sartre does not refer to his earlier position which is also described as existentialism and which he has maintained in *Being and Nothingness* and Existentialism and Humanism. He defines existentialism, as his later position in *Critique of Dialectical Reason* as “existentialism first of all maintains that the real man with his specificity of existence as well as which is positioned in the objective reality is not unknowable. He can be known. But in order to discover the real man at his work, in his home, in the street”62 existentialism address itself to experience. The real man can never be know by the empty concept provided by the “idealism of the right”63 or by the “idealism of the left.”64 Existentialism admits two more things. First it admits that “truth is something which becomes, it has and will have become. Secondly truth is totalization. Not only it is totalization but the process of totalizing in which truth consist is a ceaseless continues process.”65 Existentialism

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63. Ibid., p. 28.
64. Ibid., p. 28.
65. Ibid., p. 30.
also admits that historical materialism provides us with the only valid interpretation of history. It further asserts that "there are only man and real relation between men. From this point of view, the group is in one sense only a multiplicity of relations and of relations among those relations."\textsuperscript{66} All this clearly bring out Sartre's contention that existentialism is developed at the margin of Marxism and not against it. It is also clear that existentialism, as an ideology it remains within the compass of the dominating idea of Marxism.

In the \textit{Critique of Dialectical Reason} Sartre accepts Marx's historical materialism but rejects dialectical materialism. Sartre claims that he remains faithfully to Marx's own thought when he raises objection against 'contemporary Marxism', it can not be accepted in an qualified manners. Sartre himself refer to some kind of inconsistency between his own view and Marxism when he observe "we were convinced at one and same time that historical materialism furnished the only valid interpretation of history and that existentialism remained the only concrete approach to reality. I do not pretend to deny the contradiction in this attitude."\textsuperscript{67}

Now the question arises whether Sartre really subscribes to dialectical materialism. It is really very difficult to find a definite answer. It is explicit that Sartre never accepts it as a true explanation of the inanimate nature though he indirectly asserts that there is no reason to deny it. In \textit{Critique of Dialectical}

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., p. 76.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., p. 21.
Reason he observe “ought we to deny the existence of dialectical connection at the center of inanimate nature? not at all. To tell the truth, I do not see that we are at present stage of our knowledge, in a position either to affirm or to deny.”68

At other places in the same book, however Sartre explicitly refer to certain points in dialectical materialism which he does not accept. He refer to dialectical materialism as monistic materialism of Marx. The “monistic affirmation is given as a dogmatic truth,”69 he says and adds that the monistic materialism of Marx denies any dialectical relationship between thought and being because it reduces thought to being. Finally he claims that the Marxist dialectic of nature invents a nature without a man since the dialectic of nature is transcendental and prior and the nature of man resides outside himself in a nature which is extra human.”70 We find that Sartre at some place definitely seem to deny dialectical materialism whereas at other places he expresses the limitation of scientific knowledge due to which we can neither affirm or deny the applicability of dialectics to nature.

Sartre at different moment of his argument, took seemingly contradictory position. His statement of approval can be seen as :-

(a). Everything we establish in the Problem of Method follows from our fundamental agreement with historical materialism.”71

68. Sartre, Jean Paul., Critique of Dialectical Reason, p. XII.
69. Ibid., Summarized by R. D. Laing, p. 95-97.
70. Ibid., 95-97.
71. Sartre, Jean Paul., Critique of Dialectical Reason, p. 15.
(b). I have proposed certain methodological rules; but they cannot be valid in fact they cannot even be discussed, unless the materialist dialectic can be assumed to be true."\textsuperscript{72}

(c). Marx's originality lies in the fact that in opposition to Hegel he demonstrated that history is in development, that Being is irreducible to knowledge, and also, that he preserved the dialectical movement both in Being and in knowledge. He was correct practically."\textsuperscript{73}

(d). Marx, however, began by positing that material existence was irreducible to knowledge in its real efficacy. Needless to say, this is my own opinion."\textsuperscript{74}

(e). .......Marx the theorist produces a materialist and dialectical interpretation of history, it is because it is required by the materialist dialectic as a rule for working-class praxis and as sole foundation of true [that is to sat future] universality."\textsuperscript{75}

(f). It should be noted that Marx-so clear and intelligible in his dialectical reconstruction of the capitalist process and in demonstrating its necessity- always refused, and rightly so, to present Marxism as a general historico- philosophical theory the supreme virtue of which consists in being supra- historical."\textsuperscript{76}
(g). Marx was right, subject to the qualification that there is a circular process at work here and that the state, being produced and sustained by the dominant, rising class constitutes itself as the organ of contradiction and integration of the class.”

(h). The Marxist future, however is a genuine future: it is completely new, and irreducible to the present.”

(i). .... of course dialectical materialism has a practical advantage over contemporary ideologies in that it is the ideology of the rising class.”

(j). Sartre quoting from Marx’s Wage, Labour and Capital : “In production men not only act on nature but also in one another. They produce only by co-operating in a certain way and mutually exchanging their activities. In order to produce they enter into definite connections and relations with one another and only within these social connection and relation does their action on nature, dose production takes place. the relation of production in their totality constitutes what are called the social relations, i.e. society. Sartre said ‘I entirely agree with Marxism in this point.”

We may state here that the above statement which Sartre accepts has a great significance in the Marxist concept of historical materialism because it

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77. Ibid., p. 639.
78. Ibid., p. 25.
79. Ibid., p. 25.
80. Ibid., p. 146.
brings out the fundamental relationship between the forces of production and the
production relations (Mode of Production). The fundamental interaction between
nature, man and society in terms of their historical development, resulting in the
political, legal and social structure is what Marx regards as the relation between
the economic base and the superstructure. It seems to us that though Sartre denies
the application of dialectics to nature, he by agreeing with the above mentioned
Marx's statement, Sartre inadvertently accepts Marx's view of inseparability of
dialectical and historical materialism.

Marx above statement brings out the important fact that man can succeed in
intering into production only by interacting with nature and other human beings.
We may add that man can interact with nature for the purpose of production, only
by understanding the law of nature. It is in this fact which is implied in the above-
mentioned statement of Marx. And if Sartre accepts this statement then he would
be contradicting himself if he rejects the application of dialectics to nature. It also
needs to be mentioned here, which we have discussed earlier [chapter III] that
Sartre instead of making productive and production relation i.e. mode of
production as the basic constituent of historical materialism, posits 'scarcity' as the
motivating force of history. This contradiction which, it seems to us, is one of the
factors which makes Sartre's existentialist position as irreconcilable to Marxism.

Apart from these approvals there are disapproval's also. They are as
follows :-
(a). "This amount to requiring Marxist to establish their method as a-priori:
Whatever relations are investigated there will never be enough of them to establish
a dialectical materialism."  

(b). The attempt to ground the Marxist dialectic on anything other than its
content, that is to say, the knowledge which it provides, might be denounced as
idealism."  

(c). The supreme paradox of historical materialism is that it is at one and
the same time, the only truth of History and a total determinism of the truth." 

The above statement reflects Sartre’s prejudice against historical
materialism, in accordance with his earlier position which was considered as
deterministic. To regard both historical materialism as true and as well as
deterministic, it clearly implies the denial of freedom. This means that Sartre can
not agree with Marx’s statement, “Man makes their own history, but they do not
make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by
themselves but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted
from the past.”  Then the issue is that how can Sartre reconcile existentialism
which claims to stand for individual freedom and Marxism which according to
him, because of his determinism denies individual freedom. 

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81. Ibid., p. 286.  
82. Ibid., p. 384.  
83. Ibid., p. 18.  
(d)......We do not know what it means for a Marxist history to speak the truth. Not that his statements are false far from it: but he does not have the concept of truth at his disposal."\(^{85}\)

(e). The source of this dogmatism ties in the basic problem of dialectical materialism."\(^{86}\)

(f). Marxist have played the positive game."\(^{87}\)

(g). But if Dialectical Reason creates itself [rather than suffering itself]. How can one prove that it corresponds to the dialectics of being with relapsing into idealism? No doubt it will seem surprising that I refer to Marxist monism as a dualism: It is in fact both monist and idealist."\(^{88}\)

(h). When dialectical materialism claims to establish a dialectic of nature it does not present itself as an attempt at an extremely general synthesis of human knowledge, but rather as a mere ordering of the facts....This gigantic-and, as we shall see, abortive attempt to allow the world to unfold itself by itself and no one, we shall call external or transcendental dialectical materialism."\(^{89}\)

(i). However on looks at it, transcendental materialism leads to the irrational, either by ignoring the thought of the empirical man or by creating a

\(^{85}\) Sartre, Jean Paul., *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, p. 19.
\(^{86}\) Ibid., p. 19.
\(^{87}\) Ibid., p. 21.
\(^{88}\) Ibid., p. 25.
\(^{89}\) Ibid., p. 26.
noumenal consciousness which imposes its law as a whim, or again by discovering in nature without alien addition laws of dialectical reason in the form of contingent facts."\(^90\)

(j). A materialist dialectic will be meaningless if it cannot establish, within human history the primacy of material conditions as they are discovered by the praxis of particular men and as they impose themselves on it. In short, if there is any such thing as dialectical materialism it must be a historical materialism; it must be one and the same thing to produce it and have it imposed on one, to live it and to know it. Consequently, this materialism if it exists can be true only within the limits of our social universe."\(^91\)

Sartre’s attitude towards Marxism which is explicit in his later works reveal three things (1). There are certain point in the thoughts of Marx which he endorse and commands. (2). Contemporary Marxism, in his opinion, suffers from certain defects which must be removed to let Marxism work as the philosophy of the present era. (3) There are certain basic disagreement between Sartre and Marx. (i). Marx idea of philosophy as theoretical means to change the world; (ii) historical materialism according to which “the mode of production of material life generally determine the development of the social, political and intellectual life.”\(^92\) And the dialectical movement involved in the process of the social development, (iii) the idea of freedom understood as something inseparable from the idea of necessity.

\(^{90}\). Ibid., p. 32.
\(^{91}\). Ibid., p. 33.
\(^{92}\). Ibid., p. 186.
The basic point of disagreement between Sartre and Marx are two 1\textsuperscript{st}. Sartre rejects Marx's theory of knowledge which according to him fails to account for the subjectivity involved in knowledge. 2\textsuperscript{nd}, Sartre expresses serious reservation about dialectical materialism when he rejects Marx's dialectics of nature. This position of Sartre, vis-à-vis Marxism appears to be rather queer. Development of Sartre's thought was primarily determined by the influence of two factors. (1) Sartre was under the influence of the bourgeois intellectual trend which regarded philosophy as hypothesized immobile obstruction and therefore it distorted the ideas of Hegel and Marx. On the other hand he was also under the influence of the real social conditions. Thus regarding Marxism Sartre on the one hand observe: "It was about this time that I read capital and the German Ideology. I found everything clear, and I really understood absolutely nothing. To understand is to change, to go beyond oneself. This reading did not change me."\textsuperscript{93} This happened because Sartre read this philosophy just in the same way "as one studied that of any philosopher or any other sociologist."\textsuperscript{94}

Thus it seems that, so long as Marxian philosophy appeared through written words, it enjoyed no privilege in Sartre's eye and he remained objective. But on the other hand Sartre observes and in an interview states, "what did begin to change me was the reality of Marxism, the heavy presence on my horizon of the masses of workers, on enormous, somebody which lived Marxism, which

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., p. 246.
practiced it, and which at a distance exercised and irresistible attraction on petite bourgeois intellectuals."

Thus when Marxism, Sartre states, "was presented as a real determination of the proletariat and as the profound meaning of its acts-for-itself and it-itself the Marxism attracted us irresistibly without our knowing it: and it pulled all our acquired culture out of shape."\(^{96}\)

Thus it was real social condition which inspired Sartre to change and to go beyond himself. Since "every truth has become so" no understanding is complete till it helps the person to change, to go beyond himself or to depass his own position.

Sartre has discarded in his later works the most important categories employed in his earlier works and he has also given new meaning to some of the ideas. The Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself are observed into praxis and process. He no longer regard the individual to be free in the same sense, as he understood previously. It appears that "Sartre's declaration for Marxism means that, in his opinion men are not free after all." It is seen that inspite of such significant radical changes, the key positions of the earlier book are still conserved in the later; but conserved through a dialectical transformation as one moment in the later synthesis. If it is true then there would be no ground for hesitation to conclude that for Sartre his earlier works are now depass. But the matter is some what different through out the development of his thoughts, there lies at their room

\(^{95}\) Ibid ., p . 20.
\(^{96}\) Sartre, Jean Paul. , Critique of Dialectical Reason, p. 28.
an ontological principle which does not permit us to conclude in that way. In fact the ontological principle is mainly responsible for Sartre’s disagreement with Marx. The ontological principle obtained by Sartre from Descartes asserts a dualism of matter and consciousness. On *Critique of Dialectical Reason* Sartre accuses Marx for reducing thought to Being and ignoring the separation between thought and Being. This he does because he still holds the Cartesian dualism. This is quite explicit in *Being and Nothingness* also. Sartre’s description of the in-itself and the for-itself make it difficult to establish a bond between them and we feared that we might fall into an insurmountable dualism. In *Being and Nothingness* Sartre is eager to bridge the gap between for-itself and in-itself, but in *Critique of Dialectical Reason* Sartre finds that an attempt to do so leads to monism and as such he is eager to emphasize the separation between thought and Being. Thus his whole stance of reviving Marxism by supplementing it with his existentialism is nothing but an academic exercise in futility.