CHAPTER II

Review Of Literature

Section I - CONVERSATION MEMORY: PERSONALITY, SOCIAL AND TASK VARIABLES

Section II - EMOTIONAL STATES & MEMORY
Chapter II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

In the preceding chapter, it has been pointed out that the study of conversation memory provides a means for examining the content and structure of social knowledge that plays a role in interaction processes. Experimental studies of different types on conversation memory have amply justified this view. In this chapter, we shall review some of the important studies that bear direct or indirect relation with the present problem. The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section deals with the review of the studies that demonstrate the influence of personality, social and task, variables on conversation memory. The second section is devoted to the review of the relevant studies that throw light on the impact of emotional states on retention and memory particularly conversational memory.
Herbert H. Clark and Peter Lucy (1975) in a study titled "understanding what is meant from what is said: A study in conversationally conveyed requests." Their study is based on the observation that in conversation people often mean something other than what they appear to be saying. The wife who says to her husband, "Would you mind opening the window dear?" does not expect him to take this utterance as a question to be answered by yes or no. She expects him to understand it as a request to open the window. For a sentence such as must you open the door? how does the listener it in its sense ("Please don't open the door") instead of its literal sense ("Is it necessary for you to open the door?").

It was proposed that the listener construct the literal meaning, checks the context for its plausibility, and if it is impossible, applies a rule of conversation to derive the conveyed meaning. To test this theory 23 subjects were timed as they drew simple deductions from ten different pairs of conversationally conveyed requests (for example, can you open the door? and must you open the door?) The first member of each pair conveyed a positive request, and the second, a negative one.
Consistent with the theory, those sentences conveying positive requests behaved as if they were positive, even when they were negative in literal meaning (for example, why not open the door?); those conveying negative requests behaved as if they were explicitly negative, even when they were positive in literal meaning (for example, why open the door?); some evidence was found for the notion that listener constructs the literal meaning before the conveyed meaning.

J.M. Keenan, B.M. Macwhinney and D. Mayhew (1977) in a study "pragmatics in memory. A study of natural conversation" This study is a simple demonstration of differences in the operating characteristics of memory as studied in the laboratory and in the natural situations. Sentence processing in the context of natural, purposeful communication said to differ from sentence processing in laboratory experiments in that pragmatic information is involved. Included in pragmatics information are the speaker's intention, beliefs, and attitude toward the listener; such information is referred to as the interactional content of an utterance. Recognition memory for statements made during a luncheon discussion group was tested in an incidental learning paradigm following a retention interval of 30 hours. Statement which were high in interactional content yielded excellent memory for surface from, as well as meaning; statements low in interactional content
showed no memory for surface form, and less memory for content. The central finding of this study is the excellent retention of surface form for statements that have high interactional content within the context of a real life communication contrast sharply with the commonly held belief that memory for sentences involves only memory for their meanings and not for their surface forms (James, 1890; Brewer, 1974). Three control studies demonstrate that this difference in memory for high and low interactional content statements can't be due to (a) difference in the textual properties of sentences; (b) difference in the quality of the distracters; or (c) reconstruction based on knowledge of the speaker’s stylistic habit. The result strongly suggests that the study of pragmatics in psychological process must be undertaken if we are ever to apply our work on learning and memory to real world situations.

Walter Kintch and Elizabeth Bates (1977) conducted research on memory for classroom lectures provides an interesting mean for testing psychological theories of memory in natural setting. They were interested in two important questions relevant to issues in memory. First, will student remember only the meaning of a lecture or will they remember the meaning plus the actual words used? second, is there a difference in the amount of memory for various types of students? In particular, are topic statements remembered better than were
illustrative material and is there preferential memory for extraneous statements (e.g. jokes, announcements) embedded in a lecture? However, in every lecture there are statements that fulfill a different pragmatic function: announcements about assignments, interactions with the audience at a personal level, joking comments to retrieve the attention of the listeners. These extraneous statements stand out from the lecture itself. Hence, one could expect a Von Restorff effect, such that these unique items are remembered better. To each topic statement there corresponds a number of other less important statements that illustrate and elaborate the main point. These will be termed as "detailed" statements here on the whole, detail statements are judged less important by the lecture than the topic statements. In recent work on memory and comprehension of stories, recall could be related to the position of a statement or proposition in the overall structure of the story (e.g. Kintch & Dirk, 1975, Rumelhart, 1975). Lectures, like text, presumably have a macro structure too and therefore one would expect that corresponding macro position would be most likely to be recalled. So, it appears reasonable to hypothesize that the statements that the lecturer designates as his topic statements correspond to macroposition. If so, they should be remembered better than detail statements. If the lecture is organized around the topic statements, one would expect these to be remembered better than detail statements, in
analogy with the recall advantage of macro proposition in a story. Two experiments were undertaken on recognition memory for Statements in a lecture, varying the instructions and the response format. Three types of statements were tested: topic Statements, details, and such extraneous remarks as jokes and announcements. In both Studies, memory for meaning was significant in all three categories. With a 2-day delay, there was still verbatim memory for all three types of statements; with a 5-day delay verbatim memory was greatly reduced. In both studies, extraneous remarks were remembered better than descriptive statements. Such an effect might be enhanced by the fact that jokes in particular provides relief in these experiments from the heavy information load of the standard lecture. Hence, the extraneous items in these experiments are unique both in content and in accompanying affect, in comparison with descriptive items. Contrary to predictions there were no differences in memory for topic versus detail statements. In a similar study Keenan et al. (1977) tape-recorded a faculty lunch room conversation and administered a recognition memory test to the unsuspecting participants 36 hour after the conversation had occurred. After this delay, subject were able to distinguish target sentences from true paraphrases for utterances high in what Keenan et al. term "interactive value" that is, figures of speech, mock insult, and jokes. Descriptive statements low in interactive value showed significant memory for meaning (i.e. rejection
rates for statement that did not occur in the conversation) but no significant memory for surface form. Control experiments demonstrated that the advantage occurred to high interactive utterances is a function of participation in the whole discourse rather than the relative "memorability" of the individual utterances taken out of context. In a list-learning experiment, with the same utterances presented in random order to non-participants in the conversation, there was no difference in memory for surface form for high versus low interactive utterance.

Elizabeth Bates, Walter Kintch & Mark Masling (1978) in a study entitled "Recognition memory for Aspects of dialogue" pointed out that recent research has suggested that memory for surface in natural discourse may be more robust than laboratory studies of connected prose have led us to believe. This experiment examined recognition memory for anaphoric versus explicit reference in a 20 minute videotaped drama. The results demonstrated significant memory for meaning, manifested as the ability to reject a false paraphrase. Further more, there was significant memory for surface form for several types of reference, including pronouns versus proper names, role versus proper names, an elliptical versus full clauses. In general, surface memory tended to be higher for explicit reference than for anaphoric utterances. Finally, there were systematic and significant biases towards several surface form in
control groups that were guessing about the relative naturalness of alternative utterances. The surface-meaning distinction, at least in natural discourse, should be reassessed as a distinction between semantic meaning on the pragmatic function of various surface forms.

B. Bonneveaux (1980) conducted a study to find out the influence of formal education, age, and socio-economic level on the memory and concept learning; 244, 5 and 6 years olds were investigated. Half of the subjects came from low Socio-economic level and the other half from middle-class back-grounds. The memory and the concept learning tasks were administered on the subject and complimented with interviews with mother. Results indicated that school attendance was associated with improved performance in both tasks. Age differences were relevant only among subjects who attended school. Important social class differences were found for memory tasks but not for concept learning. It is suggested that school experience and early home stimulation enhanced the opportunity to acquire memory and cognitive skills.

J.N. Thakerar & H.Giles (1981) determined whether non-content speech stereotypes relating to status would influence listener's perceptions of speakers speech style when they learned of their status immediately after having heard them. It was hypothesized that
discovering that a person just heard was a high status would induce listener to report higher speech style as having been more standard accented and slower than those who had been provided with such information. Conversely, it was hypothesized that those listeners who were told that a person just heard was of low status would report his/her speech as having sounded less standard accented and slower than the same group previously who had been afforded no extra information. Thirty six undergraduates served as subjects. Data indicated that (1) Subjects perception of speech style and personal impression of speaker were influenced by the provision of status-relevant information about the speaker after hearing his/her voice; (2) Subject perceived the high status speaker as having spoken at a faster rate and with a more standard accent and as being more than the (same) control speaker who is turn was judged more positively on these same dimensions than (same) low status speaker ; (3) When giving another chance to evaluate the speakers, subject’s impressions, based on non content speech rate; and (4) vocal stereotypes once evoked can mold speech judgment only minutes after listening to a stimulus speaker’s voice.

Susan Kemper and David Thissen (1981) in study titled “memory for the dimensions of Requests " based on speech act theory which suggest that the form of requests convey pragmatically important
information about the social status of speaker and addressee. Lakoff and Ervin-Tripp have observed that indirect requests are used when there is a possibility of non-compliance. Indirect requests are used when there is a possibility of non-compliance. Indirect regrets permit the addressee more options other than compliance; they may be interpreted literally or the addressee may disagree with asserted or queried information. Direct request are used whenever comprehension can not be assumed or compliance can be superiors can assume both compliance and comprehension and hence use indirect requests without penalty. Superior may ensure compliance and comprehension by using direct forms. Subordinates are restricted to indirect form to allow the addressee many options. Both Ervin-Tripp and Lakoff agree on the general nature of the social conventions that govern the use of different forms of requests. They further agree that the form of requests conveys important information about the relative status of speaker and addressee and that violations of the conversational conventions are informative. The present research was undertaken to scale requests on dimension of politeness and directness and to determine whether requests that violate conversational conventions governing the form of requests are more memorable than request that conform to the rules. It was hypothesized that request that violate conversational convention governing the use of polite and direct requests by high-and low-status speakers would be
accurately remembered. Kemper and Thissen conducted two experiments. In experiment 1st; different forms of request were placed on interval scale of politeness and directness by applying nonmetric Multi Dimensional Scaling (MDS) to similarity judgments of the effectiveness of the requests. where in experiment IIrd; verbatim memory of the subjects were tested. The ten directive forms; the scale value of which already determined in Experiment 1st were again used. These forms were combined with twenty different topics. For each set of ten requests, about a particular topic, two cartoon were selected. These cartoons portrayed two (or more) individual in a social context that clearly specified the relative status of speaker and addressee. The two cartoons differed in whether the speaker was of higher or lower social status relative to the addressee. Each subject received a booklet of 30 cartoons. They were asked to rate, on a 7 point scale, the funniness of each caption. After a 20 minute interval during which the subjects carried out on unrelated task, then they were asked to recall of caption for the ten target cartoons which were provided as recall prompts verbatim recall of the original captions was stressed. Results revealed that subjects accurately recalled polite request by high status speakers but not polite request by low status speakers. In contrast, subjects recalled impolite request by low status speakers while forgetting or distorting impolite request by high status speakers. These result confirm
the prediction that request which violate conversational convention are more memorable than request that conform to the rules. On the basis of the finding of this study they have suggested that a speaker must select the form of request that is appropriate to the situation. This selection depends on conversational conventions governing politeness and directness. Speakers must consider such factors as setting (at home vs. work), magnitude of the requested service (alone of five dollars vs. one of five thousand dollars), asymmetries in age or rank, familiarity, and expected role responsibilities. Scale values of politeness and directness obtained from judgments of the probable effectiveness of request are highly related to the memorability of those requests. Thus a speaker who violates conversational convention governing the forms of requests, who does not appropriately balance politeness and directness, will pay two penalties: not only may the request fail but the inappropriate request will be accurately remembered.

R.W Gibbs (1981) conducted a study titled "memory for request in conversation" to see the differential effect of conventional indirect requests, non-conventional indirect requests and direct requests. The purpose of the present study was to examine surface memory for pragmatically important statement in natural conversation specifically, how well do people retain the surface form of requests stated in oral and
written conversation. Given the conclusion of Bates et al. (1978, 1980) memory for the surface form of indirect requests like May I have a pack of cigarettes? should be quite good, especially since these sentences are primarily used because of their indirect, polite form. Furthermore, memory for the surface form of both indirect and direct requests should be good because these sentences are high in "interactive value" (Keenan et al. 1977). Indirect requests involve the speaker making a specific, although polite demand of the hearer to perform some action. Direct request also involve the speaker making a demand of the hearer, but, without polite indirect form. It seems, then, that people should be sensitive to the specific form of a requests if it is made in natural conversation, especially, perhaps, it is non-conventional or inappropriate.

For testing the above said assumptions memory for conventional indirect requests I will have a hamburger; non-conventional indirect requests like how about a hamburger?; or direct request like Give me a hamburger was investigated under conditions where subjects watched a video taped conversation, recall a written transcript of the same dialogue, or heard the requests without context. Results indicated that when subjects viewed the videotape or read the transcript they recognized non-conventional indirect requests better than
either conventional indirect requests or direct requests. However, with no accompanying context there were no differences in subjects recognition memory for conventional and non-conventional indirect requests. This interaction between conventionality and context demonstrated that non-conventional indirect requests are not more inherently memorable than conventional requests, but are more distinctive because of their relation to some specific context. Thus memory for the surface form of requests in conversation is dependent upon the conventionality of an utterance given some context and not just in terms of its pragmatic function. Finally the present experiments establish that it does take subjects less time to comprehend conventional indirect requests than to understand non-conventional ones. Furthermore, they show that linguistic and social context are extremely important in determining the conventionality of a given utterance. Interaction between convention and context in use of indirect requests may be an even more powerful determiner of how people interpret and use these utterances. Further research on linguistic processing must pay careful attention not only to the conventionality of the utterances used but also to the nature of the situational context and the social relations between speakers and hearers.
Brian Macwhinney, J.M. Keenan and P. Reinke (1982) tested the J.M. Keenan et al. study of memory for natural conversations, in which it was found that even after thirty hours, subject had extremely good recognition memory for the exact wording of statements that contained information about a speaker's "intentions, beliefs, and his relations with the listener." Such sentences were said to be high in "interactional content". In experiment 1st of the present study, twelve graduate students had their conversations videotaped. The taped was then shown to twelve familiar non-participants and twelve non-familiar non-participants. Arousal was assessed in all subjects and later related subjects memory tests. Result corroborated the finding of Keenan et al. Subject showed excellent recognition memory for higher interactional content statements from a conversation even after a seventy two hours interval. However there was little relationship between arousal and subsequent memory. Moreover involvement had its greatest effect not on memory, but on subject's arousal.

D.H. Kausler and M.K. Hakami (1983) in an experimental study titled "memory for topics of conversation: Adult age differences and intentionality." In this experimental study twenty four young (aged 18-23) and twenty four elderly (aged 58-86 years) subjects received a series for topics for discussion, that were personal or impersonal in
content, followed by a recall test of the topics and a recognition memory test of the question asked during the conversation. Half of the subjects in each age group were forewarned (incidental memory). No effects for instructional variation were found at either age level for all memory scores. For recall, an age differences favouring young adults was found. However, no age difference was found for either the recognition of old questions as old or the recognition of new questions as new. Results are interpreted in terms of an age deficit for the retrieval of memory traces established by the comprehension of conversational contents.

Laura Stafford and John A. Daly (1984) conducted an experimental study and titled "conversational memory: The effect of recall mode and memory expectancies on remembrance of natural conversation". They have pointed out that conversation are part of our everyday life and central to the social life of an individual, unfortunately very little attention has been paid to the remembrance people have of them. Conversation represent stimuli that are distinctly different from most other stimuli that people are required to remember. Conversations are jointly created, constantly updated and necessarily are readily accessible by participants. The present study explored memory for the natural conversations in 128 under graduates who participated in dyadic social exchange. Even only after 5 minutes, subjects were abled
to recollect only about 10 percent of what was said. The mode of the recall (written VS oral) and the presence and type of memory goal affected what and how much, interaction was recalled. Subjects also remembered more of their partners comments in the interaction than their own. Oral communication anxiety affected both the production of discourse in the conversation and the recall of the interaction, while writing apprehension affected subjects written recall of their conversations. It is concluded that personality, recall mode, and expectancy concerning the upcoming memory task all effect how much and what is remembered.

Erland Hjelmquist (1984) conducted two experiments for testing conversation memory. The purpose of this study was to investigate some aspect of recognition memory for natural conversation. Though conversations are an everyday phenomenon, little is known about how verbal messages are remembered in that setting. Of particular interest in this study was evidence of both memory for content and verbatim memory under varying retrieval conditions. Another problem that has attracted little attention so far is how one memorizes one's own utterances as compared to those of the interlocutor in normal communication. A growing amount of research has given evidences which indicates that memory for surface structure characteristics of
naturally produced verbal discourse can be quite substantial. This is not in agreement with the idea that it is only conceptual meaning or gist of verbal message that is stored. Research that has given evidence in favour of the later contention has not used a naturally produced discourse. Instead subjects have usually been instructed to read or listen to prepared material. In this study, people's recognition memory for utterances from dyadic conversations was studied. Three types of utterances were used, namely, utterances that were exactly as they had appeared in the conversation, paraphrased utterances, and new utterances. The result supported the possibility that memory for surface structure features are important and a normal characteristic of how one remembers naturally produced discourse. Moreover, comparisons with earlier findings that have shown that memory for one's own utterance is generally better than memory for the other party's utterances could not in general replicate these findings. This result is also ascribed to the fact that a natural conversation was used. The findings of this study suggest that conception of conceptual meaning versus surface structure as used by many cognitive theorists is insufficient for characterizing how naturally produced verbal discourse is processed and stored. The results are worthy noting since the memory test was given four days after the five minute conversation took place and the subjects were not aware that memory for the conversation was of any interest.
E.T. Higgins and C.D. Mc Cann (1984) in an experimental study examined the impact of social context and personal motivation on verbal descriptions of another person and the temporal consequences of such descriptions on the encoder's subsequent impression, memories and evaluation of the person. 159 high and low authoritarian subjects described stimulus information about another person for an audience who had either equal status or higher status than the subjects and who purportedly either liked or disliked that stimulus person. Either a few minutes or two weeks after communication they asked subjects to reproduce the original stimulus information and to give their own impression of, and attitudes towards the stimulus person. As predicted, high authoritarian were more likely than low authoritarian to distort their description of the stimulus person to suit their audiences attitude when the audience had higher status, whereas both high and low authoritarian tailored their description to suit the audience when the audience had equal status. There was tendency for subjects own memory, impressions, and evaluations of the stimulus person to be more positive after describing the stimulus person information for a positive attitude audiences than a negative attitude audience. The results suggest that people have a tendency to use their audience tailored description of as stimulus person at a basis for their subsequent judgment and recall of the stimulus person without sufficiently accounting for the context-
biased nature of the description and that for high authoritarian recall this tendency increased significantly overtime. We discuss the need to consider the "context driven" aspect of social information processing and its interaction with chronic personal goals in models of person perception and interpersonal communication.

Robert S. Wyer, G.D. Bodenhausen and T.K. Srull (1984) proposed and applied a conceptualization of the manner in which trait and behavioural information is organised in memory in predicting both the recall and recognition of information of persons and groups using 228 undergraduates. Three information presentation conditions were considered: Subjects (1) were told to form an impression of a target (person or group) on the basis of the target's behaviours and given a trait based concept of what the target would be liked before learning about these behaviours; (2) were told to form an impression of the target, but a general trade based concept of the target was not induced until after they learned about the target's behaviours; and (3) received information about the target's behaviours with instructions to remember the information and only subsequently were told to form an impression and were given more general information about target's traits. Result support the proposed model, which assumes that (1) subjects attempting to form an impression of a person will organise the person's behaviour
around a central trait defined concept of what the person generally like; (2) subjects with prior expectancy for the trait of a person are likely to think more extensively about the behaviours of the person that are inconsistent, rather than consistent, with these traits; and (3) major differences exist between the recall of information about person and groups and recognition memory for this information.

Masakazu Miyamoto (1985) studied audience status as a manipulation of evaluation apprehension and its effect on free recall performance. Sixty subjects were randomly assigned to one of four audience conditions: Alone experimenter, peer, and experimenter and peer. They studied three lists of twelve Japanese nonsense syllables for a single presentation. The recall was tested for immediate and delayed periods. In contrast with alone conditions the three social conditions inhibited the recall behaviours. It is maintained that this social impairment of recall reflects an audience induced reticence. The findings are discussed in terms of self presentational theories of social facilitation.

Sally Planalp (1985) in an experimental study titled "Relational Schemata: A test of alternative forms of relational knowledge as guides to communications". In which three forms relational knowledge [ general dimensional, situation specific and
behavior specific] were contrasted for their ability to account for biases in memory for relational implications of remarks in conversations. Three conversations were constructed that contained approximately thirty remarks each. For each remark, three paraphrases were constructed that varied in the degree to which they expressed submissiveness or dominance. Two hundred two undergraduates read conversation consisting of combinations of those paraphrases and answered several distracter question; one week later subject were given all three paraphrase of each remark and asked to designate which paraphrase they had read earlier. Strong effects on both accuracy and direction of memory guided memory for conversation. Then three forms of the relational knowledge were contrasted, only behaviour specific knowledge accounted for a significant proportion of those memory effects. Findings challenge the validity of well established dimension and situation based approaches to relational-knowledge.

Raymond W. Gibbs (1986) conducted six experiments to examine how people comprehend and remember sarcastic utterances in conversation. Most of the hypotheses tested in the experiments were derivative of either the standard pragmatic Model or the echoic mention theory. Standard pragmatic Model, proposes that a hearer must first analyze an expression's compete literal interpretation before deriving
its non literal, sarcastic meaning (Cutler, 1976, Grice, 1975, 1978, Searle, 1979a). Whereas according Echoic mention theory, there is no non-literal proposition that hearer must substitute for the literal proposition. Rather the listener is reminded echoically for some familiar proposition (whose truth value is irrelevant) and of the speaker's attitude toward it. The first three experiments assessed the speed with which people comprehended sarcastic statements in written description of conversations. Data from three reading time studies indicate that subjects did not need first process the literal meanings of sarcastic expressions, such as "you are fine friend" (meaning "you are a bad friend") before driving their non literal sarcastic interpretations. Subjects also comprehended instances in which the echo was only implicit. The result of first three studies illustrate the importance of certain pragmatic information, which must be shared between speakers and understanders, in interpreting sarcastic utterances. If sarcasm has special pragmatic properties associated with it, then these utterances may be particularly memorable. Experiments four through six were conducted to test this idea. These memory experiments attempt to show not sarcasm is more memorable because it plays an important pragmatic role in discourse but also that sarcasm is memorable precisely because it is an instance of echoic mention. Experiment four tested whether people remembered sarcastic expressions better than non sarcastic expressions.
that are similar in meaning. Experiments five and six investigated whether people better recall sarcasm that is based on a speaker’s echoing of some norm than sarcastic utterances that do not explicitly echo any such norm. The findings of last three experiments showed that sarcasm was remembered much better than literal uses of the same expressions of non-sarcastic equivalents. Subjects recall sarcasm that explicitly echoed a previously mentioned belief or societal norm more often than they remembered sarcasm that did not involve some explicit echo. Overall results demonstrate that case of processing and memory for sarcastic utterances depend crucially on how explicitly a speaker’s statement echoes either the addressee or some other sources putative beliefs, opinions or previous statements.

Raymond W. Gibbs (1987) examined the hypothesis that people best remember requests that do not specify the main projected reason for addresses not complying with the request. Result of a recognition memory experiment using eighty four undergraduates and subjects supported this idea when subjects heard requests stated in conversational context. Without context, however there were no differences in subjects memory for the different types of requests. It is suggested that peoples memory for requests in conversation is dependent on the assessments made by speakers and listener’s of the particular
plans and goals that each has in various social situations.

Wolfgang Wagner [1987] measured recall and recognition accuracy for statements made during informed discussions by participants [speakers and listeners] and observers. Sixty-four males [all students and staff of the University of Austria] participated in a discussion of an environmental pollution problem. Additional subjects (observers) watched videorecording of the discussions. As hypothesized, self-generated statements by participants were recalled more completely, but on a more abstract plane, than other generated statements when measured immediately. Recall by participants was more concrete, but not more correct or complete, than observers recall. Delayed measurements showed participants recalling their partners' statements more accurately than observers. Self generation, reality monitoring and ego-involvement as memory determinants are discussed.

Pamela J. Benoit and William L. Benoit (1987) in an experimental study titled "conversational memory employing cued and free recall." They have pointed out that memory is an important albeit infrequently examined aspect of human communication. Conversational interaction requires participants to utilize their memory for a great variety of tasks. An understanding of memory is important both to communications theory, since conversational interactions rely heavily
on memory and to communication inquiry, since communication researchers often employ verbal reports for data (and all verbal reports other than concurrent verbalization employ memory). Interactants must be capable of storing and retrieving a great deal of information from memory in order to engage in communication, theories of interaction must be sensitive to the capabilities and limitations of memory. An exemplar is Capella and Folger's (1981) account of inconsistency in attitudes and behaviour which is based on the distinction between semantic and episodic memory. They have argued that recognition and especially cued recall are more natural retrieval procedure than free recall. This study focuses on a comparison of cued and free recall, testing two hypotheses: (a) verbal reports of conversational interaction employing cued recall are significantly more accurate than those employing free recall (b) conversational interactants remember more of their interactional partners' utterances than their own. Results showed that subjects recalled significantly more conversation in the cued recall than the free recall condition. There was no difference between recall of own and other comments overall or in the free recall condition. However, subjects in the cued recall condition remembered more of their own than their interactional partner's utterances. This may be due to accuracy criterion .... gist .... and does not necessarily reflect and inherent advantage in remembering one's own comment. Finally, they
have concluded this study tests the accuracy of verbal reports elicited from memory by free and cued recall items. Cued recall produced significantly higher amounts of remembering than free recall, demonstrating that humans are able to store and retrieve substantial amounts of conversational information, when properly elicited. Subjects did not recall more of their interactional partner's remarks than their own. In one condition (cued recall), subjects remembered more (82% versus 76%) of their own than the others' utterances, but this is quite possibly an artifact of the accuracy criterion employed (gist). Further work needs to be conducted in to the relative efficacy of various recall cues, and data here supported the notion that semantic cues are stronger than temporal ones (89% versus 69%). Research employing a verbatim criterion could determine whether the greater memory for own comments in the cued recall condition was an artifact of coding criterion, or whether subjects actually remember more of their own than other's utterances cued recall.

Judith A. Beaker, H.D. Kimmel and M.J. Bevil (1989) investigated the interactive effects of request form and speaker status on judgments of request in a laboratory study of meta pragmatics. One hundred thirty two college students read scenarios in which speakers made requests of them. Speakers were higher in status, peers or lower in
status than the subjects and the requests were imperatives with semantic aggravators, embedded imperatives, or permission directive with semantic softness. Subjects rated the speakers with respect to how rude/polite humble/arrogant, and powerful/weak they were being. Significant interactions were obtained for the first two ratings, indicating that the speakers status effect was stronger with permission directives than with the other request. Findings suggest that listeners view unexpectedly indirect requests as more impolite and sarcastic than request used in other situations.

Erland Hjelmquist (1989) in an experimental study titled "Recognition memory for utterances in conversation." In this study forty four university student listened to a dyadic conversation and were tested immediately afterwards or four days later. The two people in tape recorded conversation did not know each other, nor did the audience know the two speaker-listener on the tape. This design was used to further clarify the role of familiarity and personal participation for memory of conversational discourse. Gist memory was high in both conditions with lower performance after four days. Surface memory could be verified, and the level of variables used to index surface memory was about the same in both the immediate and delayed condition.
Robert S. Wyer, T.L.Budesheim and A.J.Lambert (1990) conducted an experimental study in which subject listened to a man and women discuss the behaviours of a third, target person. First, however, they received hand written sets of trait adjectives that each speaker had ostensibly used to describe the target before engaging in the conversation. Subjects with the objective of forming an impression of the target person had better recall of behaviours if they were evaluatively inconsistent with the female speaker's trait description of the target. However the behaviors consistency with the male speaker's description of the target had little influence. When Subjects listened to the conversation with instructions to infer each speaker's impression of the target they typically had better recall of behaviours that were inconsistent with trait descriptions provided by the particular speaker who mentioned them. When they were told to form impression of the speakers themselves, however, subjects had generally better recall of the behaviour mentioned by a given speaker when they were in consistent with the trait description provides by the other speaker.

B.S. Klein and J. Loftus (1990) in an article attempted to answer; how do people represent information about others in memory when they form impressions? Previous answers to this questions have been nearly unanimous in the model they describe. Subjects forming an
impressions of person interpret that person's behaviour in terms of the 
trait it exemplifies. When several behaviour exemplify the same trait, 
subjects organize those behaviours in memory in to a trait based 
category [ e.g. D.L.] Hamilton 1989; and T.K. Srull and R.S. Wyer ]. 
The present experiments challenge this organized representation model 
of impression formation, and show instead that a better account of data 
from impression formation studies are provided by a model in which 
behaviours exemplifying the same trait are stored independent of one 
another in memory. A unique feature of this model is the primary role it 
gives to retrieval factors, rather than the structure of the representation 
in determining organization in subjects recall of behaviours.

G.P Thomas (1992) revised the literature that has dealt with 
the effects of conversation on cognitive processes and develops 
propositions regarding how this literature can be extended to consumer 
relevant processes. On the basis of the argument that conversational 
rules are more ambiguous and flexible than are the rules governing 
prose, the prevailing thinking in the communication literature is the 
conversations should be more difficult to remember [ Gamst 1982, 
Stafford and Daly 1984; Stafford et al 1987]. Despite apparent 
consensus and findings that memory for conversations is generally low 
(ten percent according to Stafford and Daly; 1984). Direct comparison
of recall for the content of conversations and recall for comparable information contained in prose has not been made. Nevertheless, it is proposed that (a) Consumers will remember less of what they are told during conversations than they will when the same information is embedded in one-way communication (b) Consumers will remember less of an advertisement’s information when it is embedded in a conversation than when it is conveyed through prose. One explanation for the lack of a direct empirical comparison of memory for conversations versus memory for prose is that memory for conversations appears to be affected by pragmatic information. The discussion is limited to structural elements in the verbal dimension that affect the manner in which conversant process information.

R. S. Wyer and others in an experimental study titled “Person Memory and judgment. Pragmatic influences an impression formed in a social context.” They have explained that the information one receives about people in conversation can come both from statements that people make about themselves and statements that others make about them. These statements can describes either general characteristics of an individual’s personality or specific behaviours the person has performed. Recipients of this information often use it to form impressions of the person being described and to infer the person’s
traits and general likableness (Srull & Wyer, 1989). On the otherhand, they are also likely to form impressions of the individuals who convey information about others. The present study is concerned with the cognitive processes that underlie the use of the information conveyed about a person in a social context and their effects on both the recall of information and judgments to which it is relevant. Subjects who receive information about a person's trait and behaviours in a social context are likely to focus their attention on the pragmatic implications of this information (i.e. why the information was conveyed. To examine this hypothesis, subjects listened to a taped conversation in which a male target (T) and another speaker (O) exchanged anecdotal accounts of T'S behaviour. Subjects typically used O's trial description of T to form an evaluative concept of O rather than of T Whereas T'S trait description of himself had no effect on evaluation of him. Subjects had better recall of Statements O made when they were unfavourable and, therefore, violated a conversational norm to be polite. However, behaviours that T himself mentioned were often recalled better when they were favorable and therefore, in violation of normative expectation to appear modest. The inconsistency of T'S behaviours with initial trait descriptions of him had little effect on the recall of these behaviours. The present study provides insight into several issues that need to be explored in gaining of full theoretical and empirical understanding of impression formation
in conversations and the factors that need to be considered. However, much more work at both the conceptual and empirical levels remains.

Ira E. Hyman (1994) in an experimental study titled “conversational Remembering: story recall with a peer versus for an experimenter” explained that several theorists (Bartlett, 1932; Jenkins, 1974; Neisser, 1982) have noted that the demands in traditional memory experiments lead subjects away from integrative, expensive reconstructions and towards simple, accurate reproductions. Such research may not reveal all the information people have available about an event nor the constructive nature of remembering. In conversations with people other than memory researchers, for example, personal reactions may often be the first, and sometimes the only, information included (‘It was a wonderful movie, I loved it, She is great person, You will really like her; I found the article difficult to read, but the data are interesting). Thus, studying memories produced in a variety of contexts, particularly social contexts, can provide differing views of memory content and organization, retrieval strategies, and functions served by remembering. The present study addressed how the social context during retrieval affects the content and organization of memories. Subjects shared their memories of a short story either with an experimenter or another subject. They did so either under memory instructions or instructions that emphasized their personal reaction. He
expected that subjects remembering the story in conversation with a peer would include more personal reactions to the story, more information concerning the study viewed from a broader perspective, and include less narrative retelling of the story. Instructions were manipulated to see if individual subjects recalling for an experimenter could be induced to remember in a fashion similar to more normal conversation. As a manipulation of social context, subjects talked about a short story either with another subject (dyads) or for an experimenter (experimenter tested). In addition, the instructions were manipulated subjects were asked about their memory of the story or their personal reactions to it. Regardless of instructions, the dyad subjects spoke more about their evaluations of the story, included more comments linking the story to a larger knowledge frame (meta comments) and more often used remembered details to support their positions. In contrast, the experimenter-tested subjects more often included story details and interpretations in narrative accounts of the story. The dyad subjects included in their recalls information that is part of story memory but seldom evidenced by single subject remembering for an experiment. Thus conversational remembering often relies on a non-narrative retrieval strategy. Regardless of social context, personal reaction instructions led to more meta comments and evaluations, and less narrative than memory instructions. The organization and contents of non-narrative conversational remembering may be explained by the dual
demands of conforming to conversational rules and of establishing social bonds through self-revealing comments. Finally they have pointed out that the purposes of conversational remembering are to search for meaning, to learn about others and explain ourselves, and to build and maintain social bonds.

D.L. Long (1994) explored two components of natural discourse (i.e. pragmatics and discourse style) in the context of conversation embedded in to narratives. Result from three experiments with a total of 180 undergraduates suggest that both components play a role in memory for the surface of the sentences. Recognition memory increased as a function of information about the speaker's positive and negative attitudes. Recognition memory was enhanced to the extent that such evaluative information was conveyed by formulaic expressions (i.e. idioms, common expressions) that are characteristic of oral style discourse. Results were confirmed using a recall task. Subjects exhibited substantial verbatim memory for evaluative and formulaic expressions.

G.W.R. Patton (1994) conducted a series of experiments for testing the efficiency of name mnemonics used during conversation. In experiments 1, with 37 undergraduates, the face-name mnemonics (FNM) facilitated recall of surnames of photographed individuals; however, the FNM reduced name recall following conversations. Experiment 2, with
40 undergraduates, refined the procedure used in experiment 1, by including a control group in the design and strengthening the training procedures for the FNM group. Results of experiment 3 paralleled those of Experiment 1, again showing no advantage using the FNM during conversation. Experiment 3, with 30 undergraduates, explored alternatives to the FNM and featured use of self help and stranger-provided mnemonics. A combination of self help and stranger provided mnemonics produced significantly greater recall of surnames following conversation than that achieve by self help strategies alone, a control group, or the FNM.

Recently, R.S. Wyer and others (1995) tested the hypothesis that (1) reaction to the statements made during an informal conversation use are likely to be influenced by perceptions of their pragmatic implications as well as literal implications for the persons and objects to which they refer; and (2) recipients sensitivity to a statements pragmatic meaning may depend on their information processing objectives when they encounter the statement and the extent to which the statements violate the recipients normative contextual and stylistic expectations of the messages. The hypotheses are supported by data from study by R.S. Wyre etal. and two studies in which 284 university students were asked to form impression of persons on the basis of
information exchanged during conversations in which they did and did not actively participate.

More recently, M.S. Bourgeois and L.A. Mason (1996) in a study pointed out that use of memory wallets to prompt factual information during conversation with day-care center volunteers was examined for four subjects with dementia (aged 78-80 yrs). Memory wallets contained 15-20 pictures and sentences about familiar persons, places, and events that each subject had difficulty remembering. All subjects used the memory wallets to improve their conversations by increasing factual statements and decreasing ambiguous, unintelligible and preservative utterances. Volunteers decreased their use of questions and prompts during conversations in which subjects used their memory wallets. Results demonstrate the effectiveness of using volunteers to develop memory wallets and to encourage their use during conversations with day care clients.
Section II

EMOTIONAL STATES AND MEMORY

Research on the relation between emotional states and cognitive processes has burgeoned in the past ten years. Although this area of research has a much earlier history of activity. It lay dormant for many years. Beginning in the mid-1970s, this research area began to accelerate to the point where it has now become a major area of activity. A number of articles, books, and edited volumes now attest to the vitality of this research area (e.g. Clark and Fisco, 1982, Clark & Isen, 1982, Fielder & Forges, 1988; Isen 1984) and a new journal appeared in 1987 "Cognition and Emotion", which is devoted entirely to relations among emotional states and full range of cognitive processes typically studied by psychologists. This section describes the important aspect of research on emotional states as they influence memory process.

G.H. Bower, G.S. Gilligan and Kenneth Manteiro conducted a series of experiments in (1981) for determining that the selectivity of learning caused by affective states. They have used post-hypnotic suggestions to investigate how emotional states influence the learning and memory of a text. In experiment I, 16 undergraduates with scores on the standard Hypnotic susceptibility scale, happy and sad readers were
identified. They have recalled more facts about a character who was in the same mood as they were. In experiment II 16 experienced mental health professional served as a subject but this time selective recall by character could not be produced by inducing the mood at recall after subjects had read the story in a neutral mood. In experiment III in which 32 subjects were used found that mood during reading caused selective learning of mood congruent incidents; but during recall mood had little effect. Experiment IV (with 16 subjects) found that inducing the mood only during recall produced no selective recall of happy vs sad incidents. Finally in experiment V (with 16 subjects); subjects selectively learned whatever affective material was congruent with their emotional state, rather than identifying exclusively with the same mood character.

R.J.Madigon and A.K.Bollenback conducted two experiments in (1982) to see the effects of induced mood on retrieval of personal episodic and semantic memories. 95 subjects (mean age approximately 30 years recruited by campus posters. In experiment I subjects read statement that induced temporary elation or depression and then recalled specific personal memories. Subjects in the elated condition rated their memories as significantly more pleasant than those experiencing a depressed mood. In experiment II subjects who had read elated or depressed statements gave single word associates to each of 15 stimulus words. The mean ratings for
associate words produced by subjects in the elated condition were significantly more pleasant than those from depressed.

Michael Natale & Michael Hantas (1982) conducted an experiment to determine effect of temporary mood states on selective memory about the self. 54 undergraduates were made to experience a happy, sad or neutral states by means of a hypnotic mood induction procedure. Temporary depression caused decreased recall of positive life experiences, weaker memory strength for positive information about one self, and a bias to recall false negative self descriptions. Induced elation was associated with decreased recall of negative events and an increased recall of positive events. Result support A.T.Back's (1967, 1976) notion that mood states are associated with distorted information processing about the self.

Riskind etal.(1982) claimed that self devaluative of the Velten mood induction procedure (VMIP) do not lower mood or other wise mimic depression but that elements of the VMIP that suggest depression -- related semantic states do. An experiment involving 52 undergraduates indicated that both aspects of the VMIP have a powerful impact on mood and that self devaluation statements have a priming effect on the accessibility of positive and negative memories different from that of the VMIP elation statements.

Warner Wippich (1982) conducted an experiment in which 48 students listen to an abstract and a concrete text in an experimentally
induced relaxed mood state or in a neutral mood context. Both text were to be recalled either in the same (congruence) or in the other mood context (discongruence). Subject also answered question about the text (cued recall). The quantity of recalled words and recalled substance words from the text, but text propositions were recalled significantly better in a congruent mood state. Mood context have no effect on recall congruency effects persisted with additional cues. A stronger congruency effect was found with the abstract text. It is concluded that identical mood state at the time of encoding and recall facilitate the retrieval of the text propositions by an organized retrieval search.

Clark and other (1983) examined in 3 studies with 97 undergraduates how mood is stored in memory and the changes in arousal that reoccur with subsequent moods that may prime affectively toned material stored earlier. In study 1st 37 subjects learned a list of phrases while experiencing enhanced arousal and a second list experiencing in a normal arousal. Subjects were given recall test for phrases on both test when they were experiencing either enhanced arousal or normal arousal. Results support the hypothesis that level of arousal serves as an effective retrieval cue for material previously stored with information about similar levels of arousal. In study IInd, 16 subjects followed the procedures of study 1st, but at recall half the subjects viewed either an erotic or non-erotic film before a free recall test of lists of phrases learned earlier.
Result provided the additional support for the hypothesis. In study IIIrd, 44 subjects listened to a story while stepping up or down on a block (high arousal) or while stringing cardboard disks together (normal arousal). All subjects took a memory test; half from each arousal condition were told they had done well and half were told results were not yet available. Finally, all subjects filled out a survey about their university. Results show that in the presence of arousal induced by success, subjects rated their university more favorably. It is concluded that arousal may be stored in memory along with other material.

Boggiano, Hetal and T. Paula (1983) in their study titled "Bonuses and bribes: Mood effects in memory." Selected 92 university students free recall of emotionally positive negative and neutral adjectives as an indirect assessment of the effects of reward on expectations about intrinsic interest. Reward for performing later activities described as interesting (a "bonus"orientation) produced recall of a greater number of emotionally positive adjectives, whereas reward for the same activities described as boring (a "bribe"orientation) produced recall of a larger number of negative adjectives. A cued expectancy analysis suggested that reward served to polarize initial attitude about forthcoming tasks; These polarized attitude, like moods influenced the nature of words retrieved from memory.

Schare, Mitchel, Linsman, Stephen and E.S. Norman (1984)
examined the notion that when the effective states accompanying learning and remembering are the same, information will be retained better than when they differ. In three experiments with 198 undergraduates self statements developed by E. Velten were used to influence subjects to feel some what depressed or elated or to experience no mood change. A 2 x 2 experimental design incorporating a single word list and varying the mood conditions present during learning and later testing, was used in each of 1st & 2nd experiments neither of which revealed states dependence. However a significant effect was found in experiment III, which employed an interference paradigm. In terms of free recall items learned and tested under the same mood were recall with 30% greater accuracy than items learned and tested under different moods.

Macklenbrauker and others (1984) in an experiment tested the hypothesis that (1) recall is higher when mood at test matches mood at input than when it does not match and (2) people learn more about event that match their mood states. Both hypothesis are consistent with the network model of mood and memory proposed by G.H. Bower and colleagues. A comparatively mild mood induction technique was employed by altering passage in a text presented to 64 subject most of whom were university students. Mood (happy VS sad) was varied both at learning and at recall, and the emotional content (pleasant vs unpleasant vs neutral) of the text to be learned was manipulated. It was found that the empirical
evidence with some restriction favoured the hypothesis and disagreed with mood congruity hypothesis, possible explanation for the failure to obtain a mood congruity effect are offered and results are discussed with reference to the network model of mood and memory.

G. Marshall, A. Kathleen, Back and C. Robert (1985) in their study compared G.H. Bower et al. interference task procedure with a simple learn test procedure to study mood change and recognition memory for nonsense syllables among 29 male and 29 female undergraduates. Half of the subjects learned one list while happy or sad induced by E. Velten’s (1968) mood induction procedure and were tested 24 hours later while in the same or opposite mood. The other half learned 2 lists at an interval of 24 hours and were tested for recognition of the 1st list after another 24 hours, with mood being systematically varied across the three occasions. Subjects mood rating changed appropriately following either induction procedure but the only significant memory effect was higher retention among the single list groups. Results confirm previous failures to find mood dependent recognition memory effects and extend this failure to research using the interference procedure.

G.H. Bower and J.D. Mayor (1985) attempted to replicate mood dependent retrieval (M.D.R.) in a two list interference design. In the present study, 48 university students were selected on the basis of high scores on the Harvard group scale of hypnotic susceptibility. Subject in the experimental condition learned two word list for free recall, one list while feeling happy and the second list while feeling sad. Later they recalled
both list while feeling happy or sad. Results reveal no mood-dependency in recall subjects recalled about the same percentage of words from the same mood list as from the opposite mood list. The conflicting evidence for M.D.R. is reviewed and it is concluded that M.D.R. must be judged to be an unreliable phenomenon in the laboratory.

Scot Wetzer (1985) attempted a modified replication of previous finding of G. Bower et al regarding affective state dependent set retrieval (AS DR) Bower et al observed ASDR when using an interference task but not when using free recall with short or long retention intervals. Result from modified replication study using mood induction and an interference list learning task over 24-48 hour intervals with 135 undergraduates subjects indicate that it was impossible to replicate Bower's findings. It is suggested that Bower and colleagues findings confound theoretically distinct effects. Pure A.S.D.R. and interference effect. It is concluded that considering the difficulty of reproducing affective state dependent retrieval, caution must be exercised in drawing conclusions about its generalizibility.

J.D. Mayor and G.H. Bower (1985) commented on Scot Wetzelers unsuccessful attempt to replicate mood dependent retrieval originally found by G.H. Bower et al. The present study has suggested that the learning materials, the retrieval between learning and the mood induction technique may have attenuated the effect. Two hypothesis are
offered to account for the conflicting reports of mood dependent retrieval in the literature.

S.A. Small (1985) measured tachistoscopic recognition thresholds for words that were either depressively congruent or neutral among ten undergraduates who were subjected to Velten's (1968) depressive mood induction procedure or to a neutral control condition. Results show that recognition threshold for depressive congruent words were lower for depressively induced subjects than for controls, while threshold did not differ between groups for neutral words. Results are discussed in relation to G.H. Bower's cognitive theory of emotions, which suggest that moods are represented as moods in semantic network and are linked to a variety of other moods including those that represent words that are qualitatively related to the mood.

S.W. Duncan, M.C. Todd, Perlmutter & J.C. Masters (1985) in their study titled "Affect and memory in young children" formulated hypothesis based on state dependent theory; the relationship between affective states and memory, that recall will be best when the affective states at recall matches that during learning. Sequential happy neutral and sad effective states that were either inconsistent (e.g. sad - neutral) were experimentally induced in 72 pre-school children (aged 4 & half years to 5 & half years) prior to encoding and then again prior to retrieval (free and cued recall, recognition memory). Facial ratings indicated that the
inductions were effective in inducing affect. Never the less emotional states did not influence subjects' ability to recall items under free or cued conditions and recognition memory was essentially perfect for all subjects. Thus there was no evidence for states dependent learning or for a positive loop between subjects' positive affect at retrieval and memory for positively rated information. Results are discussed in terms of generally inconsistent findings in the literature on the role of affect in children's memory and factors that may limit states dependent learning in children.

E.Eich and J.Metcafe (1986) in their study titled "mood dependent memory for internal vs external events" proposed that event that originate through internal mental operations such as reasoning, imagination and thought may be more coloured by or connected one's current mood than are Alexender R.K.Guenther, R.K. Guenther(1986) conducted two experiments with a total of 61 undergraduates to examine mood biasing, the tendency to remember to information consistent with one's prevailing mood. Mood biasing was demonstrated in experiment I, in which mood induced subjects recalled personal experienced and a list of self descriptive personality traits based on a bogus personality test. Elated subjects recalled more positive experiences and traits. While depressed subjects recalled more negative experiences and traits. In experiment II, mood induced who were told that people who experience mood induction tend to remember information contrary to their mood did not show any
mood selectivity effect for the recall of personality traits but did show the usual mood dependent retrieval for recall of personal experiences.

K.T.Strongman & P.N.Russell (1986) explored the relationship between emotion and recall in 183 undergraduates. Subjects were exposed to sentences that had either emotional or animal content. Result indicate that emotional material had more prominent role in recall than animal material. Finding supports M.I.Posner and C.R.Synder’s (1975) idea that emotional memory has special characteristic that set it apart from memory for material from other categories. Findings confirm M.I.Posner’s (1978) suggestion that emotion raises the level of alertness and there by enhance recall.

R.Peeters & G. D.Ydewalle (1987) discussed research by L. Hasher (1985) indicating that the depressed or non depressed mood of subjects required to learn emotionally positive, negative, and neutral items do not facilitate the learning of mood congruent information. An alternative explanation for these negative results suggests that the manipulation of the affective nature of the learning material was over ridden by a context factor (the subjects mood at encoding and retrieval ) which was essentially the same on both occasions.

S.W.Roles, H.J.Riskind & W.J.Lane (1987) in their study titled. “Emotional states and memory biases.” Effects of cognitive priming and mood explained that recent studies have shown that naturally
occurring and experimentally induced affect states enhance the accessibility to retrieval of memories of life experiences that are congruent in valence with the affect states. Previous studies have suggested that this memory bias results from the influence of affective process on memory retrieval. Subject read statements expressing positive or negative self evaluation ideas or describing semantic states that often accompany positive or negative mood states. The semantic and self evaluative statements had, in general, equally strong effects on mood states. However, the self evaluative statements had a stronger impact on recall latencies for life experiences than did the semantic statements. Moreover, the impact of the self evaluative, but not the somatic, statements on recall was found to be independent of statements effect on mood state. This suggest that the cognitions accompanying a mood altering experience may have a substantial effect on the capacity of the mood state to influence memory retrieval.

P.J.Forgas, K.D.Burnham & C.Trimboli (1988) conducted an experiment to find out the influence of positive and negative mood on children’s recall and recognition memory and impression formation judgments in a two list experimental design. A total of 161 school children, eight to ten years old, were presented with audio-visual information containing positive details about two target children. Each presentation was preceded by happy or sad mood manipulations. One day
later, the children were again placed in a happy or sad mood, and their recall and recognition memory and impression formation judgments were assessed. Results showed that memory was better when (a) the children felt happy during encoding, retrieval, or both. (b) the material was incongruent with learning mood. (c) the two target characters were encountered in contrasting rather than in matching mood states; and (d) recall mood matched encoding mood. A happy mood increased the extremity of both positive and negative-impression formation with normal or depressed adults.

L.T. Johnson & E. Klinger (1988) replicated the experiments of G.H. Bower and J.D. Mayor to test the claim that recall may be considered mood dependent, using non hypnotical tracking task with varying success, and they subsequently learned and recall a word list. Subjects then completed the differential, Emotions scale IV. It was hypothesized that subjects would attribute their mood accomplishment on the experimental task. Result show that subjects mood were significantly changed, but subjects recall was not related to their learning or recall moods, findings indicate that recall is mood dependent.

A.J. Singer & P. Salovey (1988) discussed the G.H. Bower network theory of affect. This theory specified four ways in which mood can have an observable effect on memory. (a) Memory is facilitated when
mood states at learning matches mood state with recall. (b) Material with affective tone that is congruent with current mood is most easily retrieved from memory. (c) Material with affective tone that is congruent with current mood is most easily learned; and (d) affectively intense material is learned best. Empirical literature that addresses each of these prediction by looking at studies that manipulate mood in the laboratory as well as those that utilize naturally occurring mood is discussed. Each prediction was supported although congruency during learning (prediction C) yielded most consistent findings.

G.C. Ucros examined 40 studies (published between 1975-1985) on mood state dependent memory as well as mood congruent memory. Findings highlight the importance of methodological variables, more particularly, variables related to the degree of commitment of subjects to the experiment, and the variables related to the nature and complexity of the experimental environment. Two dimensions, realism to the experiment and demand sensitivity, completed to account for the methodological result and some of theoretical results. Those that emanate from external sources. If, so then a shift in mood state, between the occasions of an event encoding and event retrieval, should have a greater adverse impact on one's memory for internal than for external events. To investigate this inference, a series of studies were conducted that relied on
a continuous music technique to modify mood, and on the generate read procedures devised by N. J. Slamecka and P. Graf to distinguish external events to be recalled after a shift in mood state.

B. E. Foa and others (1989) examined mood congruent and mood state memory effects in 40 speech anxious university students. Anxiety was induced in subjects by informing them that they would be delivering a speech during the experiment, mood could be either anxious or non-anxious at encoding, recall, both, or neither. Subjects rated the self descriptiveness of anxiety and non-anxiety adjectives during the encoding phase and recall them later. Mood dependence effects were not obtained with self-report measures of mood including a shortened version of the state trait anxiety inventory. However, post hoc analysis indicate that anxiety words were recalled least often in subjects whose heart rates increased from encoding to recall.

G. H. Bower and J. D. Mayr (1989) conducted a series of experiments with a total of 168 college students failed to provide stable evidence for mood dependent retrieval (MDR) a special case of context dependent memory. In each experiment, subjects learned two or more different word lists in different (happy or sad) mood and were then tested for recall of the lists in one or the other mood. In five of the six experiments the lists were composed of pleasant and unpleasant items. Faster learning of mood congruent material was observed in experiments
that tested it; this effect was modifiable by explicit learning instructions in experiment 3. Mood dependent retrieval (MDR) i.e. better recall of the list in matching mood, was not observed in the first three experiments where mood was a prevailing background incidental to list learning event. M.D.R did appear in the fourth experiment which induced subjects to attribute the cause of their emotional reaction to the material being learned. However, that result failed to replicate in experiment 5. In experiment 6, items to be remembered were subjects generated which also failed to produce MDR effect. The inconsistent results on M.D.R. are attributed to the complexities of laboratory experiments on induced emotions.

M.S.Clark (1989) commented on H.C.Ellis and P.W.Ashbrook's over view of theoretical viewpoint and methodological issues in mood and cognition (memory). Discussion focused on (1) the usefulness of mood and memory research for understanding and prediction social judgments and behaviors and (2) the contribution that personality and social psychologist may make to such research.

P.R.Costanzo and L.Hasher (1989) in an article "mood and memory: A Reconsideration" raised a number of concerns about the relationship between mood and memory. The first is with the directionality of this relationship. In contrast with many other approaches, including, those reviewed by Ellis and Ashbrook (1988), they have argued for affect
as a secondary manifestation of an underlying cognitive operation. More specifically they have proposed that in the domain of personally relevant memory, mood or affect is triggered by the access of significant cognitive content. This preliminary formulation implies that efforts to explore mood memory relations via content-free manipulation of mood states may be less than optimal in the case of personally relevant memory. Since such memories are likely to be well organized and well rehearsed, their recall is unlikely to be affected by irrelevant episodic moods. On the other hand, retrieval of personally meaningful memories induces potent mood states in the individual which are likely to have an impact on subsequent memorial tasks.

H.C. Ellis and P.W. Ashbrook (1989) in their article titled "The state of mood and memory research: A Selective Review". In this paper they have described some of the principal issues in current research concerning the effect of emotional mood states on memory and cognition. Their intention was to provide a perspective on current issues and directions. This paper briefly examined six issues in mood memory research which include (a) theoretical approaches (b) methodological issues (c) state dependent effects (d) mood congruency effects, (e) clinical studies of mood effects and (f) mood effects on personal memories.

J.M. Fitzgerald (1989) studied the relationship between mood and the recall of the personal memory consistently find that subjects
exposed to positive mood statements show faster access to positive memories than to negative memories. In contrast, exposure to negative mood induction appears to produce a slowing of cognitive tempo but the data on facilitation of negative memories has not been consistent. Because the facilitation effects found for positive memories appear independently of mood change. They have argued that available data are most consistent with the hypothesis that exposure to positive event and for mood induction materials primes the positive self-schema of individuals which in turn, primes positively toned memories. Negative mood manipulations have generally been less consistent because negative self-schema are less prevalent in the population. The relationship between autobiographical memory and self-schema is characterized as a cyclical one functioning independently of mood.

R.E. Ingram (1989) in an article "External validity issues in mood and memory research" explained that Ellis and Ashbrook (1988) have provided an insightful and in-depth analysis of the current concepts, data and conclusions of mood and memory research. One issue that has not received sufficient attention in this area, however concerns the external validity of many mood memory research strategies. In particular questions are evident with respect to the reliance on laboratory based mood induction procedures to study mood memory relations. Depending upon the specific conceptual questions of interest many such procedures may not
accurately model extra-laboratory associations between mood and memory variables. Specific external validity problems are noted along with suggestions intended to facilitate generalization of experimental work on mood and memory.

J.F. Kihlstrom (1989) explained that the effects of mood on memory can be viewed in terms of either resource allocation theories of attention or associative network theories on memory. He has clarified that the resource allocation model is ambiguous with respect to both the mechanism by which mood affects memory processing and the effects of elations as opposed to depression. Associative network theories on the other hand, anticipate a phenomenon mood-dependent memory that apparently can’t be produced reliably. Possible reasons for this failure include the relative weakness of emotional mood states, the distinction between explicit and implicit retrieval cues, encoding variability, and automatically. The resource allocation and associative network theories are best reviewed as complementary rather than competitive views on mood and memory.

J.D. Laird (1989) stated that Ellis and Ashbrook (1989) have incorporated mood variables effortlessly into theories of memory, by assuming that emotional feeling have the same effects as cognitions. However he clarified that those theories have not challenged the usual assumption that emotions and cognitions are intrinsically different. Mood
memory relations suggest that emotional feeling are in fact cognitions. The same conclusion has been reached in research on the process which generate emotional experience. Both bodies of research indicated the only difference between emotional feeling about one self and cognitions about others is whether the object is one's self or not. It also appeared that the same processes generate other feeling states, all of which may play the same role in memory.

Lewis and other (1989) conducted a study to investigate the relationship between mood – congruent and mood – state dependent learning. Twenty four subjects learned two lists of affectively assessed words: One list under a positive, the other under a negative hypnotically induced mood. Each subject recalled words from both lists under either a positive or negative induced mood. Unlike other mood dependent learning studies each subject's learning list were composed of words which had been idiographically assessed as liked are disliked. Evidence was found for a mood dependent effect as well as mood congruent learning. In addition it is shown that the mood dependent effect is due to the effects of mood congruence.

Kevin M. Mc Conkey (1989) in an article "Complexities of hypnotic mood and memory" has offered comment on the use of hypnosis to induce mood, and a distinction is made between the intended and unintended effects of the mood induction procedure on memory. While
hypnotic procedure may be used for mood induction, they may also impact on cognitive processes that the induced mood is assumed to influence. Specifically, it is argued that aspect of the procedure, rather than of the induced mood, may be responsible for the changes that occur in memory.

J.H. Riskind (1989) clarified that Ellis and Ashbrook have provided a valuable perspective on what will be required for fully developed models of mood and memory. However he explained that there is another way of looking at these issues which emphasized the need for a more detailed analysis of mood as a construct. Mood have both cognitive and semantic components, and different mood states such as fear verses depression may differ in their memory effects and their effect on the allocation of attentional capacity. Finally there is also another way of looking at the notion that personal memories are relatively impervious to mood effect.

J.H. Riskind (1989) suggested two alternative approaches to mood and memory, subjective mood and cognitive priming, can be reconciled by a cognitive redefinition of mood. Cognitive priming provides a coherent explanation for many of the puzzling findings in the mood and memory area, especially mood states dependent memory. According to this conception, priming effects of mood induction on the learning and recall of schema congruent material may frequently pre-empt mood-state
dependent memory. Also in this view mood state dependent memory may occur only with certain kinds of material, the nature of which suggest, the mediating mechanism for such effects. For example it seems that mood-states dependent effect may be more likely with narrative than with list material. Finally, the priming position suggests that mood might be profitably redefined as a cognitive state rather than as a subjective feeling state.

T.B.Rogers and B.J.Frizzel (1989) criticised H.C.Ellis and P.W.Ashbrook review of research on mood and memory which focused on a compartmentalized approach to psychology. They have identified three salitudes in contemporary psychology, physiological, socio-cultural, and cognitive whose isolation serves to severely restrict the explanatory power of research embedded rarely within a particulars solitude. They clarified that major weakness of the research revised by Ellis and Ashbrook appears to rest in the commitment to a specific solitude. It is suggested that research in this area focus more upon integration of findings from the three solitudes.

P.Salovery and J.A.Singer (1989) conducted three studies to investigate congruency between mood and recall of childhood verses recent autobiographical memories. Because childhood memories are well rehearsed and perhaps more elaborated, their recall should be less influenced by contextual variables like mood compared with more recent
memories. In the first study, sixty undergraduates were induced to feel happy, sad, or neutral moods while engaging in one of two mood induction technique self generated imagery or guided imagery audio tapes. Following mood induction, subjects recalled five childhood memories and later them on various emotion scales. Weak support for the “thought congruency” hypothesis described in Gilligan and Bower(1984) was found. In second study thirty six undergraduates experienced happy, sad or neutral moods using only the self generated imagery technique. They were then asked to recall five memories of events from the past week. Stronger congruency between happy mood and recall of happy recent memories was demonstrated. Sad memories were promoted by sad moods and inhibited by happy moods, but these differences were not significant. The results of both studies indicated that the “thought congruency” effect may be mediated by the time frame of the memory. A third study was conducted to provide a direct test of this hypothesis. Sixty six subjects experienced either happy, sad or neutral moods using the self generated mood induction procedure. They then were asked to recall memories both from childhood and from the recent past. Weak mood congruent recall was found among both happy and sad subjects when they recalled childhood memories, but strong mood congruent recall effects were observed in happy and sad subjects when they recalled material more recently encoded in autobiographical memory.
W.G. Parrot and J. Sabini (1990) conducted two quasi-field experiments to find out the effect of mood on memory under neutral conditions. In both experiments, subjects in happy moods recalled autobiographical memories, recalled by subjects in bad mood, a phenomenon termed as mood incongruent recall is a reliable phenomenon, occurring when subjects are unaware that their moods relevant to the experiment. Mood incongruent recall for laboratory mood induction, and for self-regulation of mood and depression are discussed.

F. Hewer and D. Reisberg (1990) described a study with forty undergraduates that challenges the claim that emotional arousal causes a narrowing of attention and thus impoverished memory encoding. Results from a long-term (two-week), incidental learning procedure show that emotion promoted for information central to an event and for peripheral detail. This contrasts with the results of explicit instructions to remember or to attend closely to the event, both of which seemed to promote memory for the events just at the expense of detail.

J. B. Morel (1991) conducted an experiment to see the effects of mood induction on the recognition memory of word types. In this study 88 undergraduates underwent mood induction via depressed or elated self-statements and were then presented with emotionally pleasant words. After 24 hours, subjects underwent mood induction with either the same or
opposite words. Exact match words produced faster reaction time (R T) and a higher proportion of correct answers. Induced mood bore some relation to speed but not accuracy of recognition of mood congruent words.

F. Elizabeth and other (1991) in their study titled “Eye fixations and memory for emotional events”. In this study subjects watched either an emotional, neutral or unusual sequence of slides containing one critical slide in the middle. Experiments 1st and 2nd allowed only single eye fixation on the critical side by presenting it for 180 m sec (exp.1) or 150 m sec (exp.2nd). Despite this constraint, memory for a central detail was better for the emotional condition. In experiment 3rd subjects were allowed 270 m sec to view the critical slide while their eye movements were mentioned. When subjects who had devoted the same number of fixations were compared, memory for the central detail of the emotional slide was again better. The results suggests that enhanced memory for detail information of an emotional event does not solely because more attention is devoted to the emotional information.

Muller et al.(1991) conducted a series of experiments in which happy or sad moods were induced in college students before they studied a list of words. The same or different mood were then induced before subjects were tested for free recall of the list. In addition, subjects were administered individual difference measures of mood states, including the test anxiety inventory, a mood awareness questionnaire and then Eysenck
personality inventory. It was hypothesized that subjects who professed to be aware of their moods would be most likely to show disrupted performance when study and test moods were different. Mood dependent performance was not generally observed and no evidence was found for mood dependent performance in high awareness subjects.

C.R.Barclay (1991) explored everyday autobiographical memory and mood interactions in four women with premenstural syndrome (P.M.S) and a matched control group (aged 30-42yrs). Subjects kept daily records for 2 consecutive menstrual cycles. Pre-menstrual syndrome subjects were more depressed and more negative (angry) than positive (experiencing burst of energy) in their daily moods than controls. Memory accuracy was poorer overall for P.M.S subjects. Although no direct effects of menstrual cycle phase on memory were found. Instead, mood affected memory indirectly through mood related self-schemata that subsequently mediated mood congruity effects. P.M.S. subjects processed information selectively from negative events and events experienced in negative moods compared with controls.

G. E. Matt, C. Vazquez and W. Campbell (1992) metaanalyzed research on mood congruency (MC) memory in normal non depressed (non-DP) subclinically depressed, clinically depressed, induced depressed, and induced elated persons. Magnitude of mood congruent recall was estimated, the robustness was examined and extent to which strength of
MC recall was related to self referenced encoding and mood intensity was explored. A symmetrical recall favouring positive stimuli may be part of normative pattern of memory performance among normal non depressed individuals. Subclinically depressed individuals show symmetric recall of positively and negatively valenced material. Clinically depressed induced depressed and induced elated subjects displayed MC recall. With the exception of induced elated mood effect estimates derived from different studies were robust. In studies on induced elated mood, self referent processing was associated with stronger MC recall as compared with other studies.

K. A. Weaver and N. A. McNeil (1992) criticised Greg & G. H. Bower because they did find mood priming effect while conducting experiment on semantic task such as lexical decision making and word recognition. They have been criticized because they includes (1) mood induction techniques that required instructions to feel the mood and (2) the use of over learned task that did not require controlled processing. In this pair of experiments, the author attempted to address these criticism. However results did not demonstrate a mood priming effect for happy and sad subjects who appraised sentence content as being happy or sad. Result support the dissociation of semantic and episodic memory. A total of 56 undergraduates participated in the study.

P. C. Watkins et al. (1992) investigated whether mood congruent
memory (MCM) bias in depression a function of implicit or explicit memory. Implicit memory is taken as a measure of case of activation, whereas explicit memory also taps elaboration. As expected MCM bias was found in explicit memory task but not in the implicit memory task. They believed that this finding supports the involvement of elaborative mechanism in MCM. In addition, memory bias was found with words related to depression but not with words denoting physical threat. Thus MCM bias in explicit memory was found to be specific to information that was congruent with depression rather than to all negative information.

H. Bless, D.L. Hamilton & D. M. Mackie (1992) conducted a study in which 93 undergraduates in a positive, neutral or negative mood were presented. With behaviour description exemplifying different categories to investigate mood effect on the organization of person information. Subject were instructed to form an impression about the person performing the behaviours (impression set) or to memorize the behaviours (memory set). Neutral mood subjects showed higher recall and more clustering under impression instructions than under memory instructions. Regardless of instruction subjects in positive and negative mood showed considerable clustering regardless instruction set whereas subjects in negative mood showed little clustering regardless of instructional set. Thus recall appeared to be mediated by different processes in the positive and negative mood conditions.
J.P. Forgas (1992) in an experiment to determine whether good and bad mood have a different influence on perceptions of typical and atypical people. 66 students in happy, sad or neutral moods recalled and formed impression of high or low prototypical characters. Subjects received an audio-visual mood induction in an allegedly separate experiment, before recalling and forming impressions about people who were consistent or inconsistent with familiar prototypes. The predicted mood congruent bias in judgments was significantly greater for nontypical than for typical people. Evidence for positive negative mood asymmetry in memory was found with better recall of typical people in positive mood and typical people in negative mood.

V.D. Philpot & S. Maddona (1993) investigated whether learning and retrieval were associated with changes in mood state for 50 college students. Subjects were assigned to one of five treatment conditions. Happy-Happy, sad-sad, Neutral-Neutral, Happy sad and sad Happy. Mood was induced via the Velten procedure. During the 1st mood-induction phase, subjects were exposed to a serial learning task and recall trial, followed by a digit symbol task. In the next phase subjects were given a five minute muscle relation exercise and five minute distracting task. In the final phase, subjects underwent a second mood induction phase and a subsequent recall trial and digit symbol task. Mood congruent (i.e. Happy-Happy, Sad-Sad) groups performed at a higher rate on the
subsequent recall trail than did groups who shifted mood.

M.H. Thaul & S.K. De Etoile (1993) investigated the effects of music when used as a mood induction procedure or background stimulus on the ability to recall previously encoded information. 50 Female undergraduates (non music majors) participated in one of the 5 following experimental conditions: the presence of music either as background stimulus during encoding or recall or music used to induce mood prior to learning and recall. Analysis revealed that subjects who participated in the mood induction condition recall significantly more information than did those in the non music condition with the background music present during encoding.

S. Breckler (1994) investigated the accuracy of blood donors memory for the emotions they experienced during blood donation. 379 donors were assigned to one of four conditions they received a predonation booklet, did not received a predonation booklet received a postdonation booklet, or did not receive a post donation booklet. Subjects completed the mood adjective check list compared to what they reported at the time of donation, subjects remembered a greater contrast between predonation and postdonation and postdonation emotions. Subjects also remembered experiencing more anxiety than they actually did. The bias memory was especially pronounced among relatively in experienced donors who had not been asked to report on their emotions prior to their actual donations. The
memory bias was also related to subjects attitude at the time of recall.

S.J.Kawitkowki and S.R.Parkinson(1994) conducted two experiments (120 psychology students in experiment 1st and 128 in experiment 2nd ) to examine depressed mood on recall of target words and recall of descriptors words either negatively valanced or neutral and were not related semantically to target adjectives. There was no overall difference in the recall of targets by naturally depressed and non depressed subjects. There was mood x descriptor interaction on target recall and depressed subjects recalled more negative descriptors than did non-depressed subjects. In contrast, when a depressed mood was induced through a velton mood induction procedure induced depressed subjects recalled fewer target words than did non depressed subjects and there was no differential recall of descriptor words by induced depressed and non-depressed subjects.

Macauly etal.(1994) in a study entitled “Mood dependent memory” (MDM) suggest the more one must rely on internal resources rather than external aids to generate both the target events and the cues required for their retrieval, the more likely is one’s memory for these events to be mood dependent. To initiate this “do it your self” principle, 3 experiments were conducted in which subjects experiencing either a pleasant or unpleasant mood generated autobiographical events in response to neutral nouns. Subsequently subjects were tested for event free recall
while in the same or the alternative mood state. All three studies showed MDM such that likelihood of recalling an event generated two or three days ago was higher when generation and recall moods matched than when they mismatched.

J.S.Kaufman (1994) in an article pointed out that much of the works on mood congruent memory since late 1970s is not very consistent, and the findings most likely reveal only a fraction of the potentially larger emotional / cognitive interaction. The author explores theoretical concerns related to the work on mood congruent memory and makes two recommendations pertaining to supplementing experimental approaches with more holistic research in naturalistic contexts. Ideas for investigation based on current findings are considered, and these are used to suggest potential directions for research.

S.R.Schmidt (1994) in an experiment compared the memory for humorous and non-humorous version of sentences. Humorous sentences were better remembered than the non humorous sentences on both the free and cued recall tests and on measure of sentence recall and word recall. These effects persisted when subjects were warned that they were about to read a humorous sentence but were attenuated in incidental learning recall was also scored as a function of subjective ratings of humour. Subjective humour affected memory in both within and between subjects designs. Attention; arousal, rehearsal, retrieval and surprise explanations were
explored. Results suggest that humorous material received both increased attention and rehearsal relative to non humorous material.

Gonzalez et al. (1994) conducted two experiments and investigated a possible mood congruent memory bias in explicit memory (free recall test) and implicit memory (word stem completion task) for positive and negative word in depressed and non depressed college students. It was assumed that a comparison of implicit and explicit mood congruent memory bias would reveal the cognitive process involved. A total of 92 adults participated in experiment 1st, stimuli were two lists of eighteen adjectives. The implicit task was presented before the explicit task. Experiment 2nd included both intentional and incidental learning conditions. The stimuli consisted of 2 lists of 27 adjectives. Results of both studies indicated that depressed subjects showed a memory bias not only on the traditional explicit memory task, but on the implicit memory task as well.

Eric Eich (1995) in an article "Mood as a mediator of place dependent memory" gathered evidence from three studies suggested that how well information transfers from one environments to another depends on how similar the environments feel rather than how similar they look. Thus even when the target events are encoded and retrieved in the same physical setting, memory performance suffers, if the attending affective states differ; conversely, a change in the environment produced no
performance decrement. If, whether by chance [experiment (one and two) or by design(exp 3)], the mood at retrieval. These observations imply that place dependence effect are mediated by alterations in affects or mood, and that data that appear on the surface to demonstrate place dependent memory may, at a deeper level, denote the presence of mood dependent memory.

Eric Eich (1995) reviewed 48 studies published since (1968) clarifying either the circumstances under which mood dependents memory (MDM) occurs or the mechanism that enables its emergence, the results focusses on four factors that appear to play pivotal roles in the occurrence of (MDM) the nature of target events or the manner in which they are encoded; the nature of retrieval task efficacy of mood modification and whether alterations in affects one dimensional or two dimensional. Exploring these factors in detail may make it possible to resolve much of controversy that now surrounds MDM and to acquire fresh insights into its cognitive and affective foundations.

H.C.Ellis et.al.(1995) conducted a study entitled “Emotion and memory: Effect of mood states on immediate and unexpected delayed recall” in which sixty undergraduates in whom sad or happy mood states were induced experienced no effects on the immediate free recall of serially presented word lists compared with thirty undergraduates in a neutral mood condition. The usual primacy and recency effects were
obtained in the free recall or serially presented words for sad, happy and neutral mood subjects. In contrast, both sad & happy subjects showed impaired recall in a surprise recall test of all the items, visually localized in the primacy portion of the curve. The mood impairment in the delayed surprise, but not immediate, free recall test suggests that mood effects in memory are more likely to operate in the delayed surprise task because it is more difficult task that places greater demands on retrieval than does the immediate free recall task. Results are interpreted using a resource allocation model that assumes that mood states will have their greatest effects on memory when the task are more difficult.

D.B.Burt et al. (1995) in an experimental study titled “Depression and memory impairment: A meta analysis of the association, its pattern, and specificity. The purpose of this investigation was to determine whether depression is associated with memory impairment, whether moderator variables determine the extent of this association, and whether any obtained association is unique to depression. Meta analytic techniques were used to synthesize data from 99 studies on recall and 48 studies on recognition in clinically depressed and nondepressed samples. Associations between memory impairment and other psychiatric disorders (e.g. schizophrenia, dementia) were also examined. A significant, stable association between depression and memory impairment was revealed. Further analyses indicated, however, that it is likely that depression is
linked to particular aspects of memory the linkage is found in particular subsets of depressed individuals and memory impairment is not unique to depression.

J.D. Mayor, L.J. McCormic and S.E. Strong (1995) presented evidence that every day mood brings about a hypothesized effect on memory, termed mood Congruent memory (MCM). The MCM effect states that happy people will better remember happy than sad materials whereas sad people will better remember sad than happy materials (or remember such materials equally). One preliminary study and three experimental studies were conducted using 737 undergraduates. The studies provided strong evidence that MCM does Occur with everyday natural mood. The correlation between pleasant unpleasant memory retrieval and mood was found across to independent task in all three experimental studies. Finding suggest that every time a person retrieves an example of a category or associates one concept to another, that person’s memory will be biased by mood.

H.C. Ellis and others (1995) conducted two experiments with a total of 128 undergraduates, examined the issue of whether induction of a depressed mood would effect prose memory and comprehension and impair the ability of individuals to use prior knowledge, activated by way of a title, in remembering an ambiguous passage. Half of the subjects were given the title of the passage prior to reading the passage. In experiment 1,
depressed subjects who were given a title for the passage recalled fever idea units when compared with natural controlled conditions, but no depressive deficit in recalled occurred in the absence of a title. In experiment 2 the same pattern of results occurred when subjects learned two successive passages. Judgment of comprehension predicted passage recall and were better predictors for neutral than depressed mood subjects. A depressed mood state did not affect average judgments of comprehension even when recall was correspondingly impaired.

Recently, B.P. Bradley, Karing Mogg and Rachel Williams (1995) assessed implicit and explicit memory biases in 19 clinically depressed, 17 clinically anxious and 18 normal controls. All the subjects were between 18 and 65 years. The implicit memory test was a primed lexical decision task, with anxiety and depression relevant words, and subthreshold and subrathreshold primes. The explicit memory test was incidental free recall of self referenced words. The pressed group showed greater suprathreshold and subthreshold priming effects for depression words, and recalled more depression words, than the other two groups. Results suggest that clinical depression but not clinical anxiety is associated with mood congruent biases in both automatic and strategic memory processes.

More recently, M.K. Johnson et al. (1996) explored the impact of the direction and target of listeners emotional focus on their
subsequent ability to identify the origin of memories for statements they had heard. In Exp.1, Forty Five undergraduates heard an audiotape, and in Exp. 2 and 3 One Hundred Forty undergraduates watched a videotape of two people making statements about a wide range of topics varying in the strength of the effective response they were likely to evoke. Subjects were given tasks that focused them on how they felt about what was being said or on how they thought the speaker felt. Self focus resulted unequal or better recognition for the content of the statements than did other focus, but poorer identification of the source of the statements. However, the deficit of self focus relative to other focus was eliminated when subjects focused on how they felt about the speakers rather than on how they felt about what was being said.

Therefore the existence of substantial body of evidence, clearly demonstrating mood biasing effect in memory. Review of literature makes it crystal clear that emotional mood of the subject is a potent determine of memory and hence the conversational memory is not an exception. The finding of the present study will not only open a new area of research in memory but will also provide significant information about the development of interpersonal relations and will highlight the processes of impression formation.