CHAPTER-III

MORAL REASONING
Kant in his ‘Critique of Practical Reason’ says that,

“Reason, the faculty of principles, determines the interest of all the powers of the mind, and is determined by its own. The interest of its speculative employment consists in the cognition of the object pushed to the highest a priori principles: that of its practical employment, in the determination of the will in respect of the final and complete end”.1

According to Kant reason is the faculty which supplies the principles of a priori knowledge.2 Kant in his ‘The Critique of Pure Reason’ is concerned with reason per se because he believed all the determinations can be made a priori, i.e. such that their justification does not depend on any personal course of experience. In Kant the ‘pure’ and ‘a priori’ are usually interchangeable. For Kant pure reason commonly signifies just pure theoretical reason, which excludes the realm of nature. Kant also believed that there is practical reason or will that determine a priori and
independently of sensibility the realm of freedom and what ought to be. Practical reason is defined as that which determines rule for the faculty of desire and will, as opposed to the faculties of cognition and thinking. However, this is not to mean that Kant should not be understood to be denying empirical knowledge for he says,

“All our knowledge starts with the senses proceeds from thence to understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which there is no higher faculty to be in us for elaborating the matter of intuition and bringing it under the highest unity of thought”.

Reasoning has been defined differently by different thinkers but Kant’s explication is accepted as the classical approach. Reason, following Kant, is the employment of formal principles to reach conclusions. Following this, reason has come to be understood as the application by the individual of principles of thought to render perceptions cognizable, to divide ideas from perceptions and to integrate and unite these ideas in judgments and assessments yielding rules and laws of functioning. Similarly, moral laws are the result of moral reasoning acting upon perceptions and ideas of behavior, involved in the interaction between the individuals from where are derived secondary
laws, which have sometimes been taken to be universal laws that help to segregate the acceptable from unacceptable actions. In other words, reason is responsible for making moral judgments, or at least that is the argument presented by some of the philosophers.

However, for Kant reason is not competent enough to guide the will with regard to its objects, including gratification of our desires. There are no fixed ends to which our reason could consistently lead us with any greater certainty. But reason nevertheless endows us with a practical faculty and does impact the operation of our will. Kant clarifies,

"...[practical faculty] as broadly speaking, as one which is to have influence on the will therefore, admitting that nature generally in the distribution of her capacities has adopted the means to the end its true destination must be produce a will, not merely good as means to something else, but good in itself, for which reason was absolutely necessary".4

However, reason has a eudaimonological function as well for it is related to human happiness too. An individual is provided the necessary rational faculty for discriminating the pleasant from the unpleasant.
However, we need to draw a distinction between the operation of understanding and those of reason. Kant says,

"...understanding may be regarded as a faculty which secures the unity of appearances by means of rules, and reason as being the faculty which secures the unity of the rules of understanding under principles. Accordingly, reason never applies itself directly to experience or to any object, but to understanding, in order to give to the manifold knowledge of the latter on a priori unity by means of concepts, a unity which may be called the unity of reason, and which is quite different in kind from any unity that can be accomplished by the understanding".  

Kant lays emphasis on man’s endowed faculty of reason distinguishing him from everything else,

"...even from himself from everything else, even from himself as affected by objects, and that is reason".

Kant argues "...man and generally any rational being exist as an end in himself". Kant in his ‘Observation on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime’ condemns women for lack of human essential feature of being rational, thus he writes,
"...women will avoid the wicked not because it is unright, but only because it is ugly...Nothing of duty, nothing of compulsion, nothing of obligation...They do something only because it pleases them...I hardly believe that the fair sex is capable of principles".

Similarly, Aristotle terms women as underdeveloped men. The women, according to him, cannot reason nor are they capable of reasoning. He felt that women are essentially lacking what is required to rise to the level of men. Aristotle opines that men are capable of reasoning that distinguishes them as human beings. Women are more oriented to reproductive operations and are more akin to animals. The contemporary feminist philosopher Julia Kristeva has brought out that women are not Xerox copies of each other, according to her every woman differs from every other woman in one way or the other. A woman of our times lives in a performative self-contradiction. At one moment she is independent and skilled and at another she may break out in tears.

However, the institutions of social must be regulated by laws based on reason; only they will consistently protect freedom and ensure justice. However, only rational persons are capable of morality because
only rational persons have "...the capacity to act according to the conception of law i.e. according to principles". It can be argued that rationality would be incorrectly understood if it is required to only bring out certain kind of goods in preference over others. Reason by its very definition allows each person to make her own choice and not be limited to types or kinds of activities; all activities that are human are characterized by their affiliation to reason. The notion of rationality begins with the assumption that persons are independent, self interested, or mutually disinterested; they then typically argue that it is often rational for person to enter in to contractual relationships with each other.

Rationality is on one hand a normative concept for it involves an assessment of action or belief to enable a choice. On the other hand rationality is a descriptive concept that refers to intellectual capacity, commonly involved in the ability to use language. Therefore the philosophical rationalism of the Enlightenment holds human reason, or subjectivity, responsible for the validity of its own beliefs, values and decisions. Human reason is regarded as the sole and sufficient arbiter of truth, goodness and justice. Rationalism also challenges the authority of tradition. It challenges both the classical wisdom and supernatural claims of religion. In support of these ambitious claims for the power of human
reason, rationalist philosophers make certain assumptions about the
cognitive and practical subject, that is, the subject both as site of
knowledge and as source of values. Descartes’ founding of knowledge
on certainty is an influential instance of rationality. In a similar manner
Kant’s postulation of reason as the source of morality is another
instance. However, other philosophers too thought that rationality could
provide the foundation stone for morality. Kant is the paradigm example
for whom morality is simply equated with structures of rationality. Kant
and other rationalist philosophers did not just try to show that it was
rational to be moral but some even went to the extent to argue that it is
irrational to be immoral. For example, Bernard Gert argues,

"Impartial rationality requires acting morally simply
means that all impartial rational persons advocate acting
morally. Rationality requires acting morally means that it
is irrational to act immorally".10

Virginia Held is critical of the approach of equating of rationality
and morality. She says of ‘Rational choice theorists’

"...that their theories are formulated for just those
situations where individuals do seek to maximize their own
interests and remain uninterested in each other’s interests."
Their theories, they say, are not intended to deal with people in love".  

Virginia Held as a feminist criticized the liberal feminists for rejecting the ethic of care. Feminist defending the ethic of care agree that women are not treated as equals and denied justice and equality. These are primary moral considerations not only confined to the family but often elsewhere as well. Rational choice theorists point out that a person thinks only in self-interest and is not interested in the interests of others. Rational choice theorists assume that human beings are rational and therefore talk of morality only in terms of rational choices. The feminists on the other hand feel that a lot more needs to be considered as morally right that may involve non-rational elements, such as love, etc. the feminists feel that any emphasis on rationality jeopardizes considerations involving relations and emotional ties. Rational choice theorists repeatedly point out that they are not assuming that persons are in fact rational. The Rational choice theorists are then only prescribing for those who wish to be rational. 

The notion of morality depending on impartial rationality assert that a justifiable moral system is one which would be upheld by all impartial rational persons as a system available to all to manage their
behavior. However, not all who hold morality as impartial rationality agree that all rational persons who are impartial would always act morally. The moral point of view has to be rational in order to be an acceptable judge over separate mores and moralities. While customs and mores, as well as human approbation or disapprobation, are contingent and local, reason alone can claim to have certain universality.

It is interesting that Kant considers as objectively right behavior as also by benevolence and by respect for the moral law, or by still other motives. But then he slips back to his rationalist stand that the highest and the only unqualified moral motive is respect for the moral law. Therefore, for Kant and rationalist considerations based on concern for one’s own well-being or of others indicate a course of action at odds with those dictated through respect for the moral law, therefore respect for the moral law has to prevail. It is following this that for Kurt Baier the best course of action from the moral point of view would be “...the course of action which is supported by the best of reason”. The predominant view has been one in which reason is grasped in contrast to emotion as a value neutral and authoritative route to knowledge of objects by the subject-knower. Reason as a capacity is seen as having nothing to do with concrete aspects of the knower’s identity (state of mind) or of their identity with others (social existence). To the extent
that feeling or social position affect rational processes they are seen as
distorting them, which result in outcomes which are biased and
subjective as opposed to neutral and objective. Reason for action is the
ground for justified or justifiable behavior. However, it may be taken
into account that reasons may be subjective or objective. A subjective
reason is a consideration an agent understands to support his action;
which may or may not in the final analysis do so. The objective reason is
one that does support a course of action, regardless of whether the agent
realizes it or not.

Reason for action is part of practical thinking as contents of
beliefs, desires, and other mental states. However, not all the reasons are
linked to the behavior under consideration. Therefore, paying of taxes
may be due to fear of punishment, which explains the payment. But
moral reasons are overriding thus the payment of taxes do not have the
structure of moral reasoning. In short, not all actions are based on moral
reasoning and practical reasoning is therefore not necessarily and only
concerned with morality.

For Kant the maxims of our actions to be justified on the basis of
the categorical imperative, the epitome of moral reasoning, the primary
rational principle, that is which do not need another principle to justify it,
being self-validating. The categorical imperative represents an end as necessary in itself without reference to another end, that is, as objectively necessary. Jacobs points out that,

"Morality concerns actions that are categorically imperative that are required, by reason alone, independent of motives or ends supplied by feeling or desire".¹³

But a Kantian relies on reason to understand the import of the categorical imperative and act in accordance with the rational will and not our feelings or emotions.

Although, the Kantian and utilitarian notions of reason differ radically, with Kantian ideas denying the morality of instrumental reasoning and utilitarian theory embracing, still both are rationalistic theory. Both the schools rely on a simple supreme and universal moral principle viz. Kantian categorical imperative or the principle of utility, in accordance with which every one ought always to act. Both ask us to be completely impartial and to reject emotion in determining what we ought to do. Though Kantian ethic join emotion in carrying out the dictates of reason, and utilitarianism allow each of us to count ourselves as one among all whose pain or pleasure will be affected by an action, for both
kinds of theory we are to disregard our emotion in the epistemological process of pointing out what we ought to do.

Mary Brabeck points out that through their work Piaget, Kohlberg, etc. try to establish that,

"Men it appears have a tendency to develop a rational moral belief based on an understanding of alternative notions and a commitment to a universal abstraction. Women develop less of a concerns about individuals, more feeling than thinking, more committed, and, thus, more morally labile".14

However, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel ignore and belittle the experience and reality of women, primarily because they felt morality must be based on rational principles, and women were not capable of such rationality. They only allow a degree or kind of rationality akin to that of men and from this conclude that women can only be deemed moralists and therefore are intrinsically lacking in morality.

Moral reasons are ones which may be understood and agreed to, or controverter in a moral discourse. Hare pointed out that
“...moral reasoning...too is a kind of exploration, and not a kind of linear inference, and...the only inferences which take place in it are deductive. What we are doing in oral reasoning is to look for moral judgments and moral principles which when we have considered their logical consequences and the facts of the case, we can still accept”.

However, locating morals is an effort to search for principles and then testing them against specific cases. Any rational action has its discipline, which is the discipline of moral thought that entails testing of the moral principles by deliberating on their results and seeing whether they are acceptable. It is our moral reasoning that helps us to arrive at a reasonably true or correct moral inference for a proposed course of action, or to assess whether an act which is already done is morally right or wrong.

Although, Gilligan has suggested that notwithstanding the greater internal inconsistency in Haan and Kohlberg suggestion that subjects are found to prefer interpersonal morality in action situations, while there was a trend toward greater use of formal morality in dealing with hypothetical dilemmas. Formal reasoning was found to be a liability in
action situations, sub-serving mental processes of defensive separation,
intellectualization and tending to powerless action. However, Haan
found that reasoning level was higher regarding a real-action situation
than it was regarding a hypothetical one and also Haan found that
interpersonal moral reasoning differs increasingly from the formal type
with development. Larrabee argues that in concordance with Gilligan,
Haan found that ego processes play an important role in interpersonal
morality but not in formal morality. Though, no sex difference was
found in the use of these two moralities; both female and male subjects
tended to prefer to use interpersonal moral reasoning in the action
situations.\textsuperscript{16} It can be argued that what we morally approve or disapprove
is dependent on some rational aspect, which is why we are willing to
give reason for our behavior. In applying a moral principle like \textit{Do not
hurt others}, after an act of cruelty we are we are subjecting the act to
rational scrutiny.

In Plato non-ethical desires, a desire to be good and a capacity to
judge what is good and how it might be achieved are three different
ingredients in an individual form part of an ethical personality. However,
in this model there is assumed a similarity between the desire to do good
and reason. There appears to be circularity that reason is a kind of the
desire for truth and then good is thought of as a kind of truth. Then it

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will appear that reason can encourage us to do well, and this gives us a picture in which moral conflict is thought of as a disagreement between reason and passion. In contrast Rousseau's reference to 'passion' is ambiguous in this tradition and should not be thought of a necessary opposed to reason. It is only the non-moral passions which will at times manifest themselves as in clash with a reason that serves the good. However, in Plato good has a pure Form, like all others, i.e. for him it is a universal model of goodness applicable to all value judgments. For Plato actions and people are considered good to the extent to which they conform to this universal.

Plato's ethics depends on his notion of equating good with virtue and is therefore labeled 'Virtue Ethic'. One of the main claims of Virtue Ethic's is that we are social beings or animals that need to negotiate the ways we are to deal and live with each other. Virtue Ethic claims that without these negotiations in living with others we will not do well. It is argues that without friends and family members the life would be impoverished deprived of pleasures of associating with people as there will be no participation. Nancy Sherman rightly points out,

"It is not just that intimate relationships are instrumental to flourishing life: the ends and goals of intimate others"
constrain the very ends and goals of the agent, and the very
conception of the agent’s life: intimate relationships “are
not external condition of virtuous activities, like money or
power. Rather, they are the form virtuous activity takes
when it is especially fine and praise worthy”.

Rosalind Hursthouse reiterates the position when she says that Virtue
Ethic, as a neo-Aristotelian theory, claims that it is rational to be virtuous
because being virtuous provides one’s best chance to lead a flourishing
life. In their stride Aristotle and most of the contemporaries’
propagators of Virtue Ethic view emotions as taking part in reason and to
that extent governed by it. Following this it has been argued that Virtue
Ethic accommodates the concern of Care Ethic by not disregarding
emotions even though subjecting it to reason. Therefore when a virtuous
person is caring she too feels loving emotions related with that caring
activity.

The empiricist philosopher Hume wrote that actions and
affections are influenced by morals, therefore it follows that they cannot
be derived from reason alone. It is stating the obvious to say that morals
stimulate passions and thus produce or prevent actions. Hume goes on to
assert that reason by itself is completely powerless in the particular.
We have seen that ethic of care too argues that moral reasoning does not involve rationality alone but incorporates emotion, cognition and action. Nel Noddings quotes Hume and upholds his position, to quote that “Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions”.

It has been argued that ethic of care focuses on caring relations that include attentiveness, trust, and responsiveness to need. In contrast ethic of justice seeks a fair and acceptable solution, based on reason, leading to a discourse on interests and rights within a domain of competitiveness. The ethic of care avoids any reference to competition and on its part sees interests of cares and cared-for as intertwined. It can therefore be easily said that focus of justice is on protecting equality and freedom whereas care promotes social bonds.

The traditional moral philosophy upholding reason as the basis of morality makes a claim to universality, neutrality and objectivity. The net result of which is a drive for dominance. Chaslene Haddock argues that any moral theory must be judged by the consequences, the outcomes that follow from one’s moral view. Thus she focuses attention on the conditions that bring about different moral responses and argues that attending sympathetically with feeling, and the concern of the individual
and needs of others, is prerequisite for justice and for a morality of care.\textsuperscript{24}

The feminists have argued that justice and rights are structured male moral norms, value and virtues, while care and responsiveness describe female moral norm, value and virtues. The dividing of moral labor has had the dual function both of preparing us each of our respective socially defined domains and rendering us incompetent to manage the affairs of the realm from which the women have been excluded. It is a remarkable irony to symbolize justice as being our nature through a figure of a woman with her blindfold hiding more than the scales she holds reveal.\textsuperscript{25}

Larabee argues that gender difference is supposed but which was not simply a matter of differences among the form or substance of woman's and man's moral reasoning, then a plausible account may be,

"...women and men are associated with different moral norms and values at the level of the stereotypes, symbols, and myths which contribute to the social construction of gender. One might say that morality is "gendered" and that the genders are "moralized"."\textsuperscript{26}
The notion of different moral norms has been interpreted in the history of Ethics as if one is based on reason and the other is not. However, the arguments that flourished in the eighteenth century forced a rethinking and women could no longer be reasonably denied the capacity to reason and to act accordingly. This exposed the social desire to control women by developing a picture of gendered realms of life, which resulted in women being portrayed as emotional and men as the reasoning gender.

The history of philosophy explicitly sides with reason from the time of Plato to the extent of it becoming the trade mark of a philosopher and stands in contradistinction to emotion irrespective of whether it referred to the intuition of Platonic Form, Aristotelian Syllogisms, medieval arguments alluding to essence or contemporary mathematical logic. In short the philosopher was expected not to feel but only think. The feminist conjecture is that this reflects the dominant standpoint which is male and therefore history of philosophical reason asserts rationality conjoin it to masculine illusion., It is this which has led Andrea Nye to say

"Therefore reason has presented itself as the other or binary opposition to physical existence, bodily sensations and emotions and by implication to femininity. In classical
philosophy therefore reason is the highest in hierarchical order and governs the body, emotion, and women, making reason, some feminist charged, the mark of oppression as men became masters of irrational women in the household and masters of primitive, less rational races overseas”.

Tronto C Joan understood and classified this with birth-based hierarchies and argued,

“The logic of argument against birth-based hierarchies that fueled the emerging bourgeois critique of aristocratic life forms could be extended to include the recognition that women also deserved an opportunity to exercise their rationality”.

Australian feminist philosopher Genevieve Lloyd, Adam and Held and other feminist writers bring out and identify a prolonged connection between reason and masculinity. Epistemology has had as its core the discussion of rationality being the determining factor in assessing the claims to knowledge and irrational aspects as not being acceptable. Lloyd argues that, historically speaking masculinity has been associated with reason ever since the times of ancient Greece and Plato in which female is seen as passive but emotional, in contrast the male is
identified as active and rational. These constitutive characteristics of women are identified with the body and while men are identified with mental activity. This relation of women to bodily matters and men to mental matters was further reinforced by Descartes’ mind-body dualism, rupturing the humans into two parts not only an individual into a mind and a body but into two genders that dominated by the body and the other dominated by the mind. Lloyd classifies Cartesian rationalism as sexless and Aristotelian reason as impure originating from a faulty biology and politics. The reason has been given the special place in political philosophy by linking it to justice.

The legacy of reason has flowed down all the way to John Rawls in the 20th Century. He argues that justice is based on reason and is the guiding principles for the basic structure of society, which according to him are the objects of the original agreement bringing in their association. Rawls says,

“They [i.e. justice] are the principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association”.

He goes on to argue,
"Since impartial and universalizable principles are a result of reasoned reflection about what to do, where such reflection is carried out without the distractions of emotion and without a prejudiced concern for one's own interests or the interests of specific others, the justice perspective is associated with rationality and with the value of one's status as a rational being capable of such reflection".\textsuperscript{30}

This is a modified version of the Kantian argument that

"...the authority of reason alone, as evidenced in the moral thinking of ordinary people. They are all bound by moral obligations, and they so must innately possess a fundamentally correct understanding of morality and its norm".\textsuperscript{31}

Kant understood that whatever force moral law possesses is justified only by its genesis through the Rational Will. In Kant the Rational Will is an end-in-itself being autonomous, that is, self-legisitating. Roger Sullivan rightly points out,

"The appeal to the authority of reason alone, actually an appeal to the principle of non contradiction, therefore proves the correctness of the Universal Principle that laws
of Justice must be principles to which everyone can rationally assent, whatever other moral beliefs they might have.\(^{32}\)

Kant felt that the ability to think and determine for oneself what is morally acceptable and what is not is "inherent" for the self in view of the human capacity to reason. Kant was categorical that,

"...what gives every person dignity is neither social status nor special talents nor accomplishments but the innate power of reason, the capacity of each individual to think and choose, not only to shape his or her own life but also to protect and promote reciprocal respect by enacting laws that can form the legal structure of life for everyone."\(^{33}\)

Kant's emphasis on reason together with its restrictive application concluded that women are not up to the mark in reasoning and therefore are incapable of being full moral persons. Rousseau, on the other hand proclaimed that society would disintegrate if women are not from childhood to inculcate to be subservient to men.

Gilligan studied women, from the point of view of female's and male's moral reasoning and concluded that there has been a confusion
which has led to equate men’s notions of morality with human values. She argued that women’s moral development is not incomplete, as claimed, but different from that of men. Lloyd points out that,

"Gilligan suggests that males and females have, in general, different orientations or perspectives toward moral values and moral strategies. Women adopt a ‘care’ perspective, in which what matters to them is the preservation of relationships and connection with others; men adopt a ‘justice’ perspective, in which what matters is acting on impartial and universalizable principles. Since relationship are matters of intimacy and personal feeling, the care perspective is associated with a focus on emotion, especially on the altruistic is associated with a focus on emotion, especially on the altruistic emotions".34

Kant felt that only a rational being has the capacity or the will to act in consonance with laws, which is based on the principles of reason. This is so for reason is fundamental to deriving action from laws and therefore Kant classified will as practical reason. Kant argued that,

"If reason infallibly determines the will, the actions which such a being recognizes as objectively necessary are also
subjectively necessary. That is, the will is a faculty of choosing only that which reason, independently of inclination, recognizes as practically necessary, i.e. as good".35

Kant has insisted on the applicability of moral rule to all rational beings, which does not hold to scrutiny since as is rightly pointed out by Bernard Gert,

"...a basic moral rule is one that concerns actions open to all rational persons in all societies at all times".36

He goes on to say that,

"...a moral rule cannot be limited to any group smaller than this [i.e. limited to rational persons only]. If a rule applies to any group smaller than the class of all rational persons it is not a moral rule".37

Kant has been viewed as the leading philosopher who insisted on our moral principles having their source in reason, which is both universal and transcendental. It has since Kant’s time been assumed that the categorical imperative is the ultimate moral rational principle, in turn, forms the basis and provides the founding criterion for, the maxims
of our actions. Kant’s universal reason is the reason possessed by all and is the founding of morality that can provide all persons with the greatest premise for the assertion of universal morality. For example, Thomas K. Abbott writes,

"...we are able to ground the morality in reason alone, then we have achieved the foundation of a universal morality, whose basic principles, like the rules of logic and mathematic, are the same for all men, in all places and for all times".  

The reason being identified with maleness in the feminist scheme of things therefore, Kant’s characterization of the ethical realm has also been used as a paradigm of the ‘maleness’ of philosophy. Wollstonecraft is prominent among the feminists who objected to Kant’s characterization of the ethical on this ground. Her objection was not simply that Kant combines morality with reason, for she too felt that rationality was an essential basis for ethical judgment. As Karen Green points out,

"...she objected that he [Kant] failed to see the role played by the imagination and the passions in the development of reason. Central to her thought on the relationship between
reason and passion is the role of imagination. Her comments suggest that in order to judge wisely in matters of ethics, we need to be able to imagine what it would be like to be placed as others are, or have been...she [Wolstoncraft] suggests that often what one is required to know, when it comes to matters of ethics, is how it feels for an individual to be in that situation. One cannot know the feelings of others without having felt oneself. Thus sentiment and imagination are not inessential auxiliaries to our ethical life. They are necessary prerequisites for moral sensibility”. 39

Unlike Hobbes who believed that reason can transform the natural motivation of self-preservation into ethical motivation Kant assumed that recognition of the rationality in the categorical imperative would be sufficient to motivate a person.

The other feminist Gilligan, as Lawrence Blum rightly points out, has in her work attacks philosophers who can only be classified as ‘moral rationalists’. Blum identifies these philosophers as

“It is the male qualities whose highest expression he naturally takes as his model. In the same way it is natural
for him to ignore or underplay the female qualities as they are found in his society - sympathy, compassion, emotional responsiveness...The moral rationalist philosopher this both reflects the sexual value hierarchy of his society and indirectly gives it a philosophic grounding and legitimation".40

The Enlightenment saw a period of interrogating the authority of tradition. In this period philosophers, like Kant, attacked tradition and authority to favor autonomy individual obtained through reason in a non utilitarian. The utilitarian philosophers identified reason with practical intelligence serving the purpose of helping the pursuit of happiness. In contrast Kant preferred to vindicate the authority of reason over the practical requirements. Kant was followed by radical idealists, like Fichte, Schelling.

The earlier critics of Enlightenment still argued for the role of rationality differently constituted and articulated, in the emancipation of humanity. In this sense, they were still committed to a version of the Enlightenment project as a key factor in the momentum of western modernity. This is most clear in the case of Hegel and Marx, whose dialectical accounts of the advance of reason through history presuppose
the advanced state of European culture and society. Both retain a clear commitment to modernity if only as the necessary precursor to a more thoroughgoing social and intellectual resolution. However, Enlightenment rationalism is historicized and collectivized by Hegel. The individual agents become instrumental in the realization of the aim of world spirit through the reason that is manifested in the historical process. The site of rational assessment is removed to the final stage of the dialectic. The historicized subject is materialized in the parallel narrative of Karl Marx. The historical process, according to Karl Marx, is driven by contradictions within the mode of production rather than by intellectual or rational factors. Thus, the rational subject of Enlightenment is radically historicized by Hegel and materialized by Marx, development which leads to radical understanding of the Enlightenment rationalism.

Kantian and other deontological approaches have identified the importance of satisfying needs, since the contention is that it can weigh heavily in the calculus of preference satisfaction. But it still relies on an abstract universal principle appealing to rational persons. Its condition that the utility of each person is to be seen as of equal importance to any other, it tries to build justice into its foundation. It justifies the political recognition of person's rights, the focus of justice, as highly conductive
to general utility. Like Kantian moral theory's categorical imperative, utilitarianism depends on a general universal principle viz. the principle of utility.

Feminist philosopher, Jaggar, has pointed out that fear of ethnocentrism and colonialism and doubts about universal reason have pushed ethics towards a more particularist view. On this view, ethics is not just an account of lived moral experience but also is understood as, Jaggar observes,

"...plural and local rather than singular and global,
grounded not in transcendent reason but rather in historically specific moral practices and traditions".\textsuperscript{41}

Theoretically speaking every moral rule is significant for every rational human being since she/he is a potential subject to whom all relevant moral rules may be applicable. However, according to Unger, a liberal world-view structures our experience around the dichotomy of the order of reason, thought, form, rules, and means and the order of desire, feeling, content, substance, and ends, in short between reason and sensation. On analogy ideas stand in contrast to to events as objectivity stands to subjectivity.
The alternative is found in Kohlberg for whom reasoning gives principles that govern and gear towards right action and therefore involves only the formal rationality. Emotions only play the role in derivation and motivation for moral adherence. Kohlberg argues that moral reasoning tends toward the higher levels as it appears to be influenced less by reference to the consequences of actions and more by reference to abstract and universal principles. Virginia Held argues that

“Within a Kantian approach, for instance, arguments about universalizability and formalism, about the connections between reasons and motives, about the responsibilities of agent, and about contracts have become ever more sophisticated - some would say scholastic”. 42

The emotional aspect as pointed out by Hare, are introduced in the moral language as prescriptivist rather than descriptivist. Hare has vehemently argued at moral language in its use is typically prescriptive that is it signifies what is to be done rather than simply describe is the state of affairs. However, Peter Markie has rightly pointed out that

“...the emotivists erred by overlooking an important logical feature of word such as “right” and “ought”. When we use such words to make moral judgments, we implicitly
commit ourselves to universal principles. If, for example, we say on a particular occasion that someone ought not to lie, we are committing ourselves to the general principle that lying is wrong. This, in turn, commit us to other judgments on other occasions, when lying is at issue. If we are to be consistent, we may not appeal to a principle at one time we would not be willing to accept at other times. Hare refers to this logical feature of moral judgment as its universalizability.43

It has been argued that emotivism failed due to its inability to account for the place of reason in ethics.

Discourse ethics, as Habermas argues, runs counter to moral relativism, elements of which are to be found in feminist ethics, for it fails to conform to cognitivism, universalism and formalism. Habermas argues that these three elements are applicable to ethic of care. For him a moral theory has to be cognitive and can only be decided on the basis of reason. The rationality that emanates from this is a notion of justification of decisions taken for any particular action. He maintains that justifications transcend subjective biases by opening moral decisions up for rational deliberations moving away from personal motivation. The
thrust of the Cognitivist argument runs counter to relativism and contextuality since it is argued that they should be available to the entire community of rational beings and not be viewed as confined to the decider. Roth argues,

“The basic principle of the “discourse ethic” of Jurgen Habermas is a clear modification of the categorical imperative. The principle is that for a norm to be valid it must be accepted in a practical discussion by all those who are affected by the norm. The participants in the practical discourse must then also foresee the consequences of the general observance of the norm for the realization of the particular interests of each of them. This view that moral norms must be constructed by communities engaged in free practical discourse implies that the good society must be fundamentally democratic”.

However, Jchris Cuomo’s contention has to be taken care of in any feminist ethical stance. She argues,

“Feminist rejection of traditional moralizing makes sense if it alludes to a radical, opposed to urge that an essential in feminism....in her categorical rejection of ethical theorizing. Cornell’s moralizing models are Catharine
Mackinnon and reformist who eschew radical sexual politics. She appear ignorant of the volume of work in feminist ethics that rejects purity and is critical of liberal conceptions of the self and rationality, values and evaluations of feminist ethics are normative, not just descriptive, but they need not be absolute, universal, unified or exclusive. Within philosophy, feminist ethics has razed moral edifices that assume, falsely, that ethical agents are reducible to rational robots and that ethics equal rule-following, and it has favored constructing ethical theories that are sensitive to context, difference, particularity, and connection”.

The women ethicists claim to have worked to portray a realistic personal identity in the social construction, however, they have to, at the same time, face the stiff challenge from the rationalist claim of non-contextual universal moral framing that lead to automaton in moral decisions. However, the woman always finds herself in the context of being a daughter, wife, mother, lover, friend that is different relations determined contextually. The conceptual conflict in the female situation leading to the feminist assertions on particularism in moral decisions is a perennial question that has to be confronted.
The history of philosophy, including ethics, displays a deep rooted sexism. Philosophy, it appears, is blind to even the biological facts that homo-sapiens, or humans, comprise of two sexes, viz. male and female. The history of philosophy shows that its main concern is the male, displayed, as the feminist argue, in the emphasis on reason, to the cost of ignoring other aspects of human life. This is why even when talking of females the philosophers have always talked in terms of the other to the male and defined the female in contrast to the masculine. The reaction was the critique offered by feminists, including in ethics, resulting in a departure and rupture leading to creation of new theories, methods and values. Feminist philosophers, who read Kant debated questions of maleness of reason along two axes, viz. debate about Enlightenment rationality and debate about universality. Some feminists argue that understanding the formal conditions for universal rational or moral agreement is a precondition not only for consistent claim about knowledge and moral judgment, but also for the healthy functioning of a society but on reciprocal recognition of persons. The institution of society must be regulated by laws based on reason for only they consistently protect freedom and justice. Some philosophers, like Mill, Aristotle, and others, have a conception of moral value as grounded in nature. But this is quite a different view of nature and value from the one
that is understood contemporarily. The care approach towards moral reasoning does not involve rationality alone, but an intertwining of emotion, cognition and action.
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