CHAPTER V
Super Power Moves After the War

Arab forces were severely mauled and their morale and self-confidence was seriously shaken during the June war. Their unexpected and humiliating defeat left them stunned, uncertain and frustrated. Because of US support in arms and diplomacy for Israel, Arabs hostility towards the US was natural. They could not hope to get help from US and the West to recoup their losses and recover the areas occupied by Israel during the war as they had openly backed Israel during the crisis. Further, the US and Britain were annoyed with the Arab charge of participation on Israeli side during the war. But to recover their lost territory and prestige, they had to acquire advanced scientific and technological superiority over Israel. To achieve this aim they had no option except to depend on Soviet Union for military and economic help. As Arabs were incapable, with the existing military position to recover their lost territories from Israel, they hoped to succeed only by mobilizing international public opinion through Soviet Union.

1 The map of West Asia was changed during the June war. Egypt was deprived of the sovereignty of the Suez canal and the Straits of Tiran. The historic Sinai desert came under Israeli occupation. While Jordan lost its share of Jerusalem and the West bank of the Jordan river, Syria lost strategic Golan Heights to Israel.
Strategically, Israel was in a better and secure position. The conquered territories had increased the distance of strategic Israeli targets from the reach of Arab infiltrators and made sabotage activities more difficult. After the war Israel had become the strongest power in the region. It placed her in strong bargaining position, in case Arabs agreed to negotiate a final peace settlement. She was opposed to UN or third party interference for changing the status quo in the region. She believed that Arabs now faced with a superior Israel would come forward for a peace settlement through direct negotiations. Israel did not favour concessions and wanted to impress upon the world that the aftermath of 1956 could not be repeated.

On 12 June, Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol in a speech in the Knesset that Israel wanted a formal and binding peace treaty by direct negotiations with the Arab states, on the acceptance of "secure, agreed and recognized boundaries". He declared:

2 The Israeli control over Sharm-el-Sheikh assured Israel free passage through Straits of Tiran. The steep Jordanian valley was a better military barrier than the old boundaries. Control over Golan Heights assured both the security of cultivated areas in the north and the control of Jordan headwaters.

3 Another misperception was the assumption that the victorious party need not initiate peace moves. The famous expression "we are waiting for a telephone call from Hussein", formulated by Dayan at an interview on BBC Radio and Television, on 13 June 1967 was an assumption of Israeli behaviour at that time.
We declare to the nations of the world that they should not bow under the illusion themselves that Israel is ready to return to the state of affairs that existed up to a week ago. The State of Israel...is ready to fight and struggle for its rights...The state of affairs that existed up to now will not return. The land of Israel will no longer be exposed to acts of sabotage and murder....

Moshe Dayan in a Television interview broadcast in Washington on 11 June 1967, said that his country would never give back the Gaza strip to Egypt, nor the West Bank of the Jordan river and Jerusalem to Jordan. He rejected any idea of mediation or intervention by the great powers and insisted on direct talks with Arabs for the solution of all the problems. The results of the war revealed Israel's ultimate strategic dependence on the US. As a consequence of the war, the American connection, politically and militarily, was rendered more vital than ever. Israel's immediate objective was US commitment to her defence, renewed supply of arms and munitions and support for her position in regard to occupied territories.

4 Summary of World Broadcast (SWB), Part IV, WE/2490/A/14, 14 June 1967. Opinion in Israel was not unanimous about either the retention or the return of the occupied territories. Ex-Premier David Ben Gurion in an interview with John McCook Roots, a foreign correspondent in West Asia observed: "Peace, real peace, is now the great necessity for us...it is worth almost any sacrifice. To get it, we must return to the borders before 1967. If I were still Prime Minister, I would announce that we were prepared to give back all territory occupied in the Six Day War except East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights - Jerusalem for history's sake, the Golan for security."

5 The Times (London), 12 June 1967.
on grounds of security and as an instrument for forcing peace on the Arabs.6 The Arabs insisted on full Israeli withdrawal from newly occupied territory prior to the end of belligerency. Israel on the other hand, held out for direct negotiations and "a package settlement" in which withdrawal would occur only after the conclusion of peace agreement.

**US Interests**

The Americans had now realized that the outcome of the war was a victory not only for Israel but for them also. The new situation which had now emerged in West Asia was ideal for Americans. Because of Vietnamese setbacks, the US needed a counter-balance and they found it in West Asia. Arab defeat was construed by the US as a major defeat for the Soviet prestige.

Johnson and his advisers were mindful of how Eisenhower had dealt with the Israelis after the Suez war. They were determined not to adopt the same strategy of forcing Israel to withdraw from conquered territories in return for little in the way of Arab concessions. General thinking was that territories should be exchanged for a genuine peace agreement. Thus the US saw no obvious reason why the results of the war should immediately be changed by Western pressure and interference.7 They were satisfied to

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see the Soviet Union in the unenviable position of being committed to the losing side in a local war. The US wanted to see this Soviet frustration for further negotiations on outstanding issues. The Americans had come on top and they could maintain this position only by supporting Israeli stand of not withdrawing from occupied Arab territories, unless permanent peace was achieved. The US opted for a policy to allow Israel to retain occupation of Arab territories in order to secure leverage in negotiating a settlement of the conflict. The US did not want the Arabs and the Soviet Union to have political victory after a severe military setback. Thus for the first time in West Asia "there emerged an almost complete identity of interests between the United States and Israel and this fact made all the difference to the ability of Israel to stand firm in its demands." From the US point of view, the prerequisite to any full settlement was a willingness on the part of the Arabs to make a contractual peace with Israel. This willingness could in return be balanced by Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories.

US policy makers feared that a return to the status quo ante (i.e. the position that prevailed prior to the 1967 war) might reproduce conditions that had made war inevitable and this raised the specter of a US-Soviet confrontation.

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transformation of the international system from a bi-polar one to a multi-polar one, impressed upon the decision makers in the US that there was no need to interfere immediately in the outcome of the June war. Furthermore the frustrating Vietnamese experience created a psychological climate in which the prospect of further involvement in local wars was viewed with suspicion and anxiety. It was thus unwillingness to extend American military involvement which had prevented the US from intervening militarily during the crisis that led to the 1967 war. "Because of this refraining, the US ability and readiness to intervene immediately by diplomatic means against Israel, once the war was over, was again very limited". 

The option before the US decision-makers was to keep Israel strong in order to ensure that the US would not be drawn into any future wars in the region.

The US was not eager to see an Israeli withdrawal so long as Israel remained on the Suez canal. US was not affected strategically or financially from the closure of canal and it was not eager to see Israel withdraw from it. It served two fold purpose of the US. The closure of canal created strategic and logistical difficulties for the Soviets in the massive build-up of their Mediterranean and Indian Ocean fleets. If canal remained in Israeli hands, it remained blocked to Soviet ships heading for North Vietnam and it

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9 Evron, n. 7, p. 79.
became time consuming and expensive for them to reach the Indian Ocean through other routes. Secondly, Egypt's loss of revenue from the canal was likely to put additional strains and create difficulties for the survival of Nasser. The worsening Egyptian economy, which could endanger Nasser's existence, was expected to force him to adopt moderate policies. Thus pro-Western conservative King of Saudi Arabia could emerge as a leader of the Arab world by offering to help Nasser to come out of the economic crisis. But the US influence had collapsed in the Arab world because of her pro-Israeli stand in the conflict and she was virtually left with no leverage in the Arab world. Even consistently pro-US King Hussein found it difficult to survive and resist public opinion which wanted him to accept Soviet help. It was in the US interest that the pro-Western rulers should survive and not accept Soviet arms. At the same time, the US was interested in the replacement of extremist Egyptian and Syrian rulers by some pro-Western leaders.

Soviet Interests

In the aftermath of the Arab–Israeli war, the Soviet Union faced new problems of meeting Arab expectations and bearing the burden of unilateral assistance to some of their economies. They emerged from the crisis with a new identification with the Arab world and fresh opportunities for influence. Her principal client states had been completely
demoralized and defeated in the war. Soviet Union felt acutely embarrassed by miserable Arab performance. She was faced with one of the greatest obstacles of foreign policy. The options left for her were either to disengage herself from radical Arab cause or to press forward to secure her position in the Arab world. The Soviet interest was to exercise great caution in situations which might lead to direct Soviet-American confrontation while at the same time help Syria and Egypt to consolidate their rule and rebuild their military strength. Soviet problem was how to refrain from giving all out support without losing credibility and playing into the hands of the Chinese who were accusing the Soviet Union of not coming to Arab rescue in the hour of need. But the intensity of the military defeat left the Arab states more than ever susceptible to Soviet penetration and offered the Russians an unprecedented opening. The US and Britain being angry with the Arabs for their criticism during the war, the Arabs had no option except to turn to Soviets for military and economic aid.

Soviet interests were adversely affected by the completely changed situation in the post-war period. It could not allow the new equilibrium to continue for long. With the closure of the canal, the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean became less accessible to the Soviet Union’s Mediterranean fleet than to its Pacific fleet. The military importance of

the Soviet Union presence in the Mediterranean was seriously reduced and Soviet strategic mobility was also restricted.\textsuperscript{11} A strong position in the region could provide Soviet Union with a base for pursuing activities farther afield. Suez canal was still important in the economics of sea transport. The power controlling West Asia could exert influence in East Africa, Southern Asia and Indian Ocean. The Soviet Union aimed at bringing about a repetition of 1956 United Nations action and convert a military defeat into a diplomatic victory. The Soviet Union was faced with the difficult task of regaining Arab trust and friendship, to strengthen friendly Arab countries to save themselves from the danger of the downfall and to show Israel that she did not intend to give up the position and influence in the Arab world.\textsuperscript{12}

Direct military involvement against Israel would have meant a possible direct conflict with the US and to have done nothing would have meant a great loss of prestige and influence in friendly Arab countries. For the preservation of her influence, the supply of arms was the least it could do to strengthen the Arab allies and at the same time avoid


\textsuperscript{12} Mordehai Nahum, "The Powers in the Middle East Conflict", \textit{New Outlook} (Tel Aviv), July-August 1967, p. 15.
direct involvement in a local war. It would also allay Arab fears that Israel would use her military advantage for further expansion. New arms supplies could also increase the dependence of individual Arab regimes on the Soviet Union. "This would maintain or even enhance Soviet influence...and would enable Moscow to impose a more strict discipline in the event of a future crisis" 13 through a stricter choice of the arms and control of spare parts. Moscow was also anxious to strengthen the bargaining position of the Arabs in case efforts were made to force a political settlement on them. It could also help Egyptian and Syrian Governments to maintain "progressive" postures and prevent their own overthrow by political factions. Thus the Soviet Union could still compensate the Arabs for having failed to come to their rescue during the war.

UNITED STATES AND THE LOCAL POWERS

In the months following the June war, the US continued to play a major role in the search for peace in West Asia. There was a feeling in the Administration that in order to avoid direct involvement, Israel should be kept strong. From this anxiety over US involvement came the determination not to allow Israel to be forced to withdraw from occupied Arab territories for anything short of a "real peace settlement".

Most of the Presidential advisers felt that there should be no return to the "unstable status quo ante". This time it was felt Israel deserved real security from her military victory. US public opinion which was overwhelmingly pro-Israeli did not regard Israel as the aggressor and it influenced the government's decision to support the Israeli position in the post-war period.

President Johnson felt a sincere friendship for the state of Israel and considered himself duty bound to give her every help he could. President Johnson was dependent on the Jewish votes in the big cities. The strong Zionist lobby and the important position that the Jewish community held in America had its influence on President Johnson's decision. The United States supported Israeli stand to retain some of the conquered areas and to acquire "defensible borders" even though this constituted a serious breach of UN principles - to end the state of belligerence, and to guarantee the right of sovereign nations to exist in peace and security with recognized boundaries and to enjoy innocent passage through international waters.

President Johnson's Five Comprehensive Principles

On 19 June 1967, on the eve of his meeting with the Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin at Glassboro, President Johnson while addressing the National Foreign Policy Conference for Educators, enunciated 5 comprehensive principles for the solution of the West Asian crisis. Significantly he chose
this time when Premier Kosygin was to address the Emergency Session of the General Assembly and suggest Soviet alternatives for the solution of the crisis. Announcing the five principles for finding peace in West Asia, Johnson said:

- Our country is committed – and we here reiterate that commitment
- first, the recognized right of national life;
- second, justice for refugees;
- third, innocent maritime passage;
- fourth, limits on the wasteful and destructive arms race; and
- fifth, political independence and territorial integrity of all. 14

These five principles announced by the US President formed the basis of American policy in West Asia after the June war. President's speech contained the outline of the kind of political settlement favoured by the US Government. Implicit in them was the support for the Israeli stand which clearly stated that there would be no withdrawal from occupied territories without hard and fast guarantees for peace. By re-interpreting its pledge to ensure the territorial integrity of all states in the area the US was able to adopt the position that Israel could use the newly acquired territories to bargain for a real peace settlement. It supported Israeli right to live as an independent nation and Israeli claim to

maritime passage. By advocating the control over the flow of arms supplies in the area, the US wanted to keep newly acquired Israeli superiority in the war. In the next 5 months American diplomatic efforts were aimed at achieving a UN Security Council resolution that could incorporate President Johnson's five points.

**Israeli Annexation of Jerusalem**

The United States did not favour Israeli annexation of Jerusalem in defiance of UN resolutions and world public opinion. US and Britain felt that it would weaken Israel's position before the Fifth Emergency Session of the UN General Assembly. It would foreclose any possibility for an eventual reconciliation with moderate King Hussein and seriously harm the chances of arriving at a durable Arab-Israeli peace settlement. They advised Israeli government to wait at least for a "better time". It was evident that the US which was opposed to any forceful territorial aggrandisement in West Asia, may resist any such Israeli action. Israel disregarded the US-British advise and annexed Jerusalem in the last week of June. President Johnson and his top advisers expressed annoyance on Israel's disregard of their urgings and flouting world opinion. On Arab demands, the US Government in a formal statement on 28 June deplored Israel's hasty and unilateral move and declared that it would not recognize its validity. White House and State Department
disowned Israeli action as it did not reconcile with the US declarations, concerning the need for adequate recognition of Jerusalem's special status as a city sacred to Christians, Jews and Muslims. White House statement on 23 June 1967 said:

> The answer to the problem...could not be achieved by hasty unilateral action, and the President is confident that the wisdom and good judgement of those in control of Jerusalem will prevent any such move. 15

Department of State, on the same day in a statement said:

> The hasty administrative action today cannot be regarded as determining the future of the holy places or the status of Jerusalem in relation to them. The United States has never recognized such unilateral actions by any of the states in the area as governing the international status of Jerusalem. 16

Though the US reiterated that she would not accept or recognize the measures taken by Israel, it refused to apply any effective pressures on Israel to annul her decree unifying Jerusalem. In the General Assembly US abstained during voting on the Pakistani resolution (A/L. 527) on the ground that the Jerusalem question should not be considered in complete isolation from other Arab-Israeli problems. 17 But she urged

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15 Ibid., 17 July 1967, p. 60.
16 Ibid., 10 July 1967, p. 60.
17 GAOR, Fifth Emergency Special Session, supplement 1 (A/6790), p. 4, adopted by a vote of 99 for, 0 against and 20 abstaining including the US. UNDOC, A/RES, 2253 (E/S-V), 4 July 1967 expressed concern "at the situation prevailing in Jerusalem as a result of the measures taken by Israel to change the Status of the City" and called upon Israel "to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem".
Israel to keep Jerusalem issue open so that its final status could be included in any further negotiations for an overall peace settlement. Although the State Department officially declared the US opposition to Israeli unilateral action in Jerusalem, no further steps were taken to prevent Israel from going ahead with the "unification". After this the question of Jerusalem was dropped from every official statement issued by the US officials in Washington or at the UN despite the fact that one of Johnson’s famous five principles clearly stipulated the need for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all areas under occupation.

Refugee Problem

UN Secretary General U Thant’s report of 13 August 1967 stated that more than 100,000 Palestine refugees and more than 200,000 other Arab residents had been displaced as a result of the June war.18 During, and for several weeks after the fighting ended, Israel, despite formal denials, forced Arab residents to leave certain occupied areas. Defence Minister Moshe Dayan and other high Israeli officials frankly admitted that they were happy to see the Arabs go and did not "want them to come back".19 Israel applied psychological and economic pressures and, on occasions, even more direct measures to drive out Arabs of occupied areas.

The United States, concerned on both humanitarian and political grounds, cautioned Israel against evicting Arabs

18 UN Doc. S/7124.
from the West Bank and urged Israel to readmit the "maximum number" possible as an inflexible Israeli stand on the refugees question was likely to strengthen the hands of the Arab militants, making it much more difficult to reach an agreement on permanent frontiers and to bring even moderate Hussein to the Conference table. Therefore on 4 July 1967 the Emergency Session of the General Assembly passed the resolution (2252/ES-V) calling for assistance to refugees unanimously. 20 Because of increasing pressure from the UN and Western Governments the Israeli Government on 2 July prior to adoption of any resolution by UN decided to permit conditional return of only West Bank refugees. 21 The US, Britain and other Western countries strongly pressed Israel to admit as many refugees as possible and warned that her "hard line" on the refugee issue would seriously hamper any quiet diplomatic efforts aimed at opening the way for an eventual Arab acceptance of Israel. 22 But Israel refused to liberalize her stand concerning return of refugees and refused to abide by the advice of US and other friendly Western European countries.

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20 GAOR, Fifth Emergency Special Session, supplement 1 (A/6798), pp. 3-4, adopted by a vote of 116 (US) - 0 - 2.

21 Israel Digest (Jerusalem), 14 July 1967, p. 5. The cases of only those refugees who had left before 5 July and applied for return before 10 July and 10 August were considered by Israeli Government. 170,000 refugees applied for permission to return, of which only 21,000 were given permission. UN Doc. A/AG. 132/PV. 1, 6 December 1967, pp. 6 ff.

Permanent Peace

In the aftermath of the war, the US Government consciously decided that there should be no return to the unstable armistice arrangements of previous years. Instead Israeli occupation of Arab territory was to serve as a form of pressure to force the Arabs to make peace with Israel. The US adopted limited involvement as a low-cost means of perpetuating the status quo. It was meant to minimize the danger of being drawn into future conflicts. The Israelis, backed by the US, demanded a settlement which would remove the basic threat of future violence.

Shortly after the war ended, American officials provided economic aid and later, even agreed to sell war planes to Israel in order to help her overcome economic and military losses caused by the war and to strengthen her bargaining position. Economic and military aid was not used as a lever to force Israel to moderate her policies. US could have applied effective pressures on Israel, but powerful pro-Israeli lobby and coming Presidential elections of 1968 prevented their application. King Hussein was refused economic and military aid for seven months to pressurize him to agree to negotiate with Israel. US also expected that political and economic situation in Egypt and Syria would

23 In mid-September it became known that US would no longer delay the shipment of 48 A-G Skyhawk fighter bombers, it had promised Israel in 1966.

become desperate which could lead to overthrow of extremist rulers paving way for takeover by moderate, pro-Western and "realistic Arabs". In order to perpetuate Israel's military superiority over the Arabs, it called for end to arms race in West Asia. Its diplomacy was directed at ensuring Israel's security even though it meant continued insecurity for the Arabs. By preservation of the balance of power between Israel and Arabs, the US "always meant enough arms for Israel from all available sources to enable her to defend herself against all Arab challenges without need for direct US intervention in any war". 25

In short, the US wanted to keep the balance of power in Israel's favour to ensure that American involvement would never be required. In addition, the US decision to resume arms supplies to Israel was in an endeavour to offset the Soviet shipments to Moscow's client states. Even though the US was proclaiming objectively a desire for a 'peace' acceptable to all parties, her actions did not attest her impartiality. Powerful pro-Israeli groups, strong pro-Israeli sentiments, especially on the eve of the war, among large segments of the American population, and internal political considerations generally prevailed over the considered advice of many experts and even over America's best long term interests in determining American policies relating to the Arab-Israeli problem. As a result, many of these policies were so

misguided and biased that they were ineffective, and at times, detrimental. 26

US and Jordan

Jordan was the only pro-American state which suffered most during the June war. It had lost the West Bank and the Old City of Jerusalem and was under constant pressure because of the refugee influx in the country to accept Soviet offers for the supply of arms. King was not willing to cut off from West by accepting Soviet offers. He knew that Soviet Union could not get him back his lost territory from Israel. He wanted to keep the options open and utilize Soviet Union as a lever to pressurize America to resume arms supplies to Jordan and help him to get back his areas now occupied by Israel.

Nasser encouraged him to maintain cordial relations with the US, so that his options also remained open with the West. During the Emergency Session of the General Assembly, King Hussein visited US and met President Johnson to press upon him the urgency of the resumption of arms to his country. At the end of his meeting with President, he was bluntly told that he could not hope to get his lost territory back unless he reached a settlement with Israel. 27 US wanted to utilize his frustration for making him enter into direct talks with the Israeli Government for the settlement of the dispute.

27 Kinsche and Bawly, n. 8, p. 261.
Even though King Hussein knew that Soviet Union provided no alternative to him, he asked the US for economic and military aid with a warning that if they did not oblige him, he will have no way except to accept Soviet arms. He favoured American aid to Soviet but even visited Moscow to pressurize the West into being more accommodating and helpful. But he did not sign any pact with the Soviet Union with the hope that the US would agree to help his country.

He again visited the US in November 1967 and stressed the urgency of reaching a political settlement before the 'moderate' mood engendered at Khartoum was dissipated by the agitation of Arab militants in Jordan and other Arab countries. He was not totally averse to a political settlement with Israel. He hinted at Arab countries giving recognition to Israel's right to exist in peace and security and urged Israel to make concrete proposals for the consideration of Arabs regarding return of Jerusalem (old city) and occupied territories and solution of refugee problem. But this time the US officials were adamant

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23 Arab Heads of State met at Khartoum from 29 to 31 August and decided on three strict conditions for future relations with Israel; no direct negotiations; no formal peace; no recognition. Oil embargo was lifted in return for grant of financial aid from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to Egypt and Jordan.

29 New York Times. 13 November 1967. In February 1968, Jordan managed to use the threat of Soviet arms offer to obtain a lifting of the American embargo on weapons that had been
and favoured the appointment of a mediator to bring the two sides to permanent peace. The Americans put extreme pressure on King Hussein to accept their proposal. They kept arm shipments to Jordan in abeyance on the grounds that Jordanian airforce was incapable of operating the 36 F-104 star fighters. The Arabs encouraged by the Soviet Union, torpedoed the US moves for Israeli-Jordanian peace by summoning the Security Council to discuss the entire West Asian question. To counter Palestinian commando threats to King Hussein, the US later agreed to arm him.

**US and Egypt**

Nasser was faced with the immediate task of building up his shattered army and the country's deteriorating economy. He needed arms to boost the morale of his army and to recover the lost territory from Israel. Due to the closure of the Suez canal, Egypt's economy was hit hard. He knew that even with the help of the Soviet Union he would not be able to get the occupied territory vacated and open the canal. Israelis would not withdraw to pre-June positions unless forced by the US. US was annoyed with the UAR charges of American involvement in the air-raids carried out by Israeli on the first day of war. During the war, Nasser had cut off diplomatic relations with the US.

The US which favoured change of leadership in UAR was not eager to help Nasser to come out of these difficulties.
In accordance with the US anti-Nasser and pro-Israeli policy, President Johnson on 19 June in his statement held Nasser responsible for the war and stated: "If any single act of folly was more responsible for this explosion than another, I think it was the arbitrary and dangerous decision that Straits of Tiran would be closed." As the closure of the canal did not affect US strategically, and it affected the Soviet Union adversely, the US in the absence of general settlement showed lack of enthusiasm for reopening the canal. Further the US wanted to make it sure that after reopening, the canal would be available to Israeli shipping as well. Despite the serious economic and political hardships involved, the Arabs refused to submit to a "dictated peace" with Israel.

Fully aware of the usefulness of the US support in getting the occupied territories vacated from Israel, Egyptian Government sought to normalize relations with Washington. The scathing attacks on the US on Radio Cairo and in Egyptian press were abruptly stopped. By 23 July 1967 even Nasser intimated that while he fully intended to continue the fight, he was not slamming the door on a "political" settlement or even refusing to talk with the US. He disclosed that he had asked his delegation to meet with the Americans if feasible.31

diplomatic relations with the US were not restored, Egypt and Syria relaxed ban on travels by the Americans and in Cairo, a small group of US diplomatic officers started transacting business under the auspices of the Spanish Embassy.

In the Khartoum Conference, the Arab states were divided between conservative oil producing countries that opposed the economic warfare and radical non-oil producers joined, by Iraq advocating suspension of oil exports, closure of Suez canal, withdrawal of deposits from British banks - which they believed would create difficulties for the West. Nasser repeated his reference to a "political solution" with Israel and frankly conceded that UAR was in no position to undertake a new military offensive against Israel. The Arabs reached an understanding that the elimination of "the consequences of aggression" and the withdrawal of Israeli forces must be sought by diplomatic rather than military means. The summit agreed to harsh principles of "no peace with Israel, no negotiations with Israel and maintenance of the rights of Palestinian people in their nation".32 It decided to resume oil exports to West and in return Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya agreed to give £ 95 million aid to Egypt and £ 40 million to Jordan to compensate for the losses suffered during the war. Egypt also agreed to withdraw troops from Yemen. It was a

32 New York Times, 2 September 1967. Bashol remarked that the decisions "disregard the true interests of the people of the region and contravenes the principles of the UN Charter". S.D., Part IV, ME/2566/A/6, 3 September 1967.
victory for the Arab moderates as Saudi Arabia emerged as the leader of the Arab world after the conference. The Conference represented a definite gain for the US as Syrian and Algerian moves to continue the oil embargo against the West were defeated. This marked a retreat from committed and rigid Arab stand. Instead of imposing an embargo, the Khartoum participants decided to abandon economic warfare and to use their income to compensate nations for losses. Egypt's dependence on income from conservative Arab oil regimes changed Egyptian stance from leadership of radical Arab regimes to mediator between radicals and the conservatives.

The series of talks between Egypt's Foreign Minister Riadh and US Ambassador in UN Arthur Goldberg in New York during the meeting of the General Assembly in October 1967 marked an important departure from the previous position taken by UAR. It was the first high level contact between Egypt and the US since the war at which a political formula for the West Asian deadlock was sought by both sides. But after a week long discussion the two sides were nowhere nearer an understanding. The American attitude had hardened and they demanded much more precise terms of a settlement. They wanted a clear definition of the meaning of non-belligerency, with guarantees that the situation before 5 June would never return and they insisted on full maritime rights for all nations including the use of Suez canal by Israeli vessels, which was the farthest
Egyptians were willing to go on this subject. Riadh's stand was so far apart from the American demand for a permanent peace settlement that the meeting did not make any progress.

Reacting to extensive Soviet inroads into the Arab world, American officials, by the latter part of 1967, indicated a desire to restore normal relations with most of Arab states and expressed willingness to resume economic aid and sale of military equipment to some of the pro-Western Arab countries. The Pentagon announced that training of officers from Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan and certain other countries would be expanded while the training of officers from Iran and Sudan would be discontinued. Between Soviet economic, military and political assistance on the one hand and the pro-Israeli policies of the US and increasingly rigid stand assumed by Israel on the other, even the most militant Arab regimes were able to survive. The position of pro-Western Arab moderates like Jordan was weakened and the path was cleared for the Soviet Union to extend her influence in the Arab world. But after the Khartoum Summit the shift in Arab leadership from extremist to conservative hands could be seen. The dependence of Nasser on Saudi-Arabia for economic survival, his decision to withdraw his forces from Yemen and his agreement with the Summit decision for lifting the oil embargo represented the victory of moderate line. This fact represented a gain for

33 Kinsche and Bawly, n. s., p. 239.
US diplomacy. With the split in the Arab camp over the action to be taken to change the status quo in their favour, the US could afford time to take initiative for the solution of the crisis.

SOVIET UNION AND THE LOCAL POWERS

Arab defeat in the June war represented a major setback for Soviet diplomacy in West Asia. With Israeli control over Sharm al-Sheikh, the Suez Canal was closed to Soviet Union and it affected the strategic mobility of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union favoured return to pre-June positions of the Israeli forces as it favoured its Arab friends. Soviet Union opted for a policy of rearming the Arabs, working for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab territories and exploiting the anti-American and anti-West mood of the Arabs to increase its influence in the region. The Soviets could do this by following two pronged policy: firstly, by rearming the local West Asian powers to nullify Israeli gains and secondly, by following a pro-Arab policies in the United Nations in confirmation with the Arab line.

Soviet Union and Israel

Soviet policy after the war with Israel was to prevent it from converting its military victory into a political victory. Its policy was to isolate Israel by condemning it as the only party responsible for the war and compelling it to vacate the
Arab lands. Moscow Radio asserted that there had been few examples in history of such treacherous aggression as had been committed by Israel against the Arab states.\textsuperscript{35} The Arab refugees became an object of pity and Israeli failures to provide constructive solution provoked much criticism. Soviet press blamed Israel for killing prisoners of war and defenseless peasants and compared these crimes with "those perpetrated by Nazis". It warned that she would be held "entirely responsible for the criminal acts" which she had committed.\textsuperscript{36} Soviet press depicted Zionism as the most reactionary doctrine of malicious anti-communism which like Fascism "preached genocide and radicalism".\textsuperscript{37} Commenting on Eban's claim that "Israel intends to retain part of the territory which she conquered in the war against the Arabs", Moscow Radio on 12 June 1967 remarked:

\textit{Obviously, the Israeli rulers could not advance their unlawful territorial claims against neighbouring Arab countries, so impudently and openly, were they not supported by imperialist circles?}\textsuperscript{38}

\textit{Izvestia} on 19 June 1967 observed:

Growing more and more impudent, the Israeli rulers now lay claim to the fruits of their aggression and demand that the frontiers of Israel should correspond to the borders of ancient Palestine. \textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{SDB,} Part I, SU/2492/44/1, 16 June 1967.

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Izvestia,} 15 June 1967.


\textsuperscript{38} \textit{SDB,} Part I, SU/2490/44/2, 14 June 1967.

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Ibid.,} SU/2496/44/3, 21 June 1967.
Radio Moscow commenting on Israeli colonialist aims remarked:

The policy of Israeli leaders has always been

oval of extremism and readiness to make any

adventures in order to usurp Arab land and

its natural resources - above all oil.  40

Commenting on Israeli annexation of Jerusalem, Radio Moscow

observed, "The arbitrary incorporation of the old city...is

highly reminiscent of the Nazi method..." 41 A leading article

in New Times pointed to the dangerous situation created by

Israel because of its expansionist policy. It observed:

Israel's aggressive aspirations are creating

a dangerous situation in the Middle East... for peace and tranquility to be restored, the

aggressor must give up the territories he has

seized.  42

Israeli leaders vigorously decried the Soviet Union

as anti-Semitic. The Jewish press and publications, however,

regarded that the comparison of the Israelis to the Nazis was

intended mainly for internal purposes. It pointed out that

many of them (Soviets) were "aware of the real facts and given

to sympathising with Israel". 43 But the Israeli press resented

the Soviet stand on the Arab-Israeli conflicts and remarked:

40 Ibid., SU/2544/A4/2, 29 August 1967.

41 Ibid., 2504/A4/3, 30 June 1967.


43 The Jewish Observer and Middle East Review (London), 11 August 1967.
The tension which exploded in the Middle East last June was largely of Soviet manufacture....
Not one specific public word has been uttered by the Soviet Union for several years concerning the duty of neighbouring states to respect Israel's sovereignty and security. 44

Israeli Government in a note to Soviet Government on 16 June accused Moscow of encouraging Arab countries to intransigence and identifying itself with the "extreme and belligerent policy of the Arab states". 45 The general Israeli feeling was that the Soviet political offensive against Israel was a part of its many sided aid to the Arab countries.

While Soviet government was working with the US to find out some solution of the problem, the Soviet Press and Radio kept on attacking "Israel and the imperialists". Soviet Union maintained that —

The political intrigues of Israel and the states supporting it and their attempts to shed responsibility for aggression and even to obtain UN encouragement for keeping the occupied Arab territories have merely served to expose further their real expansionist intentions. 46

The Soviet Union also attempted to mobilize the widest possible international support for it. Soviet Union was critical of efforts to gain time for Israel to gain firm foothold in the conquered territories, in the hope that world will get

44  Jerusalem Post, 29 September 1967.
46  Pravda (Moscow), 23 July 1967.
accustomed to such a situation. In calling for the support of the third world for the policy of "liquidating the consequences of aggression" in West Asia, an article in *International Affairs* stated:

> The problems of the Middle East were inseparable from events in Vietnam, Greece, Cuba, the Congo and so on, the tensions of local war generated by imperialism affected the world as a whole, not only of the victims of aggression. In supporting the Arabs, the USSR and the other Socialist countries were thus protecting the interests of all the people's of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Even though the Soviet Union was critical of Israel and demanded it to be labelled as an aggressor, it did not approve of Arab hard line position that Israel had no right to exist, as a state. Some Soviet commentators thought Arab unwillingness to recognise Israel, unwise and expressed concern about Arab call for a new round. But overall Soviet attitude throughout the period was anti-Israeli and its policy was aimed at capitalizing the anti-Israeli mood of the Arabs to regain its pre-war position in the region.

**Soviet Union and the Arabs**

In spite of the Arab defeat in the war, which represented a setback to the Soviet Union in West Asia, some

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48 *International Affairs* (Moscow), July 1967.
advantages were still available to the Soviet Union. Once the fighting was over, Soviet aim was to exploit hostile anti-west Arab mood and remove Western influence and strengthen its positions as the only reliable power supporting the Arab demands. Instead of detaching herself from what seemed a hopeless cause, Moscow chose to strengthen its identification with the Arab cause. It could do this by countering the Arab's inevitable skepticism and disillusionment by new display of solidarity and support. In Syria and Egypt, it found more fertile ground, providing scope for closer political collabo-
ration.

In the aftermath of shocking defeat, Soviet political and military help was the only hope for the Arab world. To assess the situation and assure the Arab masses and leaders of the continuation of Soviet military and economic assistance, President Nikolai Podgorny along with high officials visited UAR, Syria and Iraq in June and July. They tried to convince them that Moscow treated the Israeli attack, not as an isolated incident but as a part of the overall Western plan to wreck independent regimes in Africa and Asia pursuing anti-Western policies.50

50 Podgorny was in Cairo from 21 to 25 June, in Syria from 1 to 3 July and in Iraq on 3-4 July 1967. Commenting on his visit to Syria, Pravda said that he discussed "questions which arose as a result of Israeli aggression against Syria and other Arab countries and the practical steps that have to be taken to eliminate the consequences of this aggression".
Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party after hearing a report on the West Asian crisis (20-21 June) from Party Secretary Brezhnev issued a declaration approving the Soviet Government's policy and renewed the promise to do "everything necessary" to help the Arab people "administer a resolute rebuff to the aggressor". But it made it clear that the "rebuff must not be of a military character".\(^{51}\) The concluding communique of the Central Committee Plenum asserted that "the speedy resolute actions by the Soviet Union and other socialist states have played an important role in stopping the military operations in the Middle East". The resolution stated that it was necessary to "resist the slander campaign of splitting activity by Mao Tse-tung's group aimed at disuniting the anti-imperialist forces and undermining the trust between the peoples of the Arab states and the peoples of the socialist countries. Continuing the leadership's possible "defensive responses to such complaints, a massive and extremely defensive Soviet airlift (and later sealift) of weapons to the Arab belligerents began on 23 June.\(^{52}\) Soviet Union being anxious to avoid a further deterioration of conditions, urged Arabs to be cautious and moderate and stressed the need for a political rather than a military solution of the problem. Brezhnev in a speech in Kremlin in Honour of the Graduates from Military

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Academies on 5 July insisted that struggle was at bottom a "confrontation between the forces of imperialism...and the forces of national independence, democracy and social progress — and in such a confrontation, it was the duty of the Soviet Union to "frustrate the plans of imperialism...and to help the Arab states uphold their freedom and independence." Demanding Israeli withdrawal and compensation for Arabs, he further said:

We would like to emphasize that the aggressor must get out of the lands of other peoples and compensate the peoples of the UAR, Jordan and Syria for the damage inflicted on them. That is what justice demands. That is what the Soviet people and honest men throughout the world demand.

Regarding "imperialist" propaganda about Soviet role during the crisis, he remarked:

At present the imperialists are making propaganda machine work at full capacity...in an attempt to weaken and isolate Arab countries, sow dissent among them and drive a wedge between the Arab states and the Soviet Union and other socialist states. Our Arab friends understand very well the meaning of this venomous propaganda. They realize that in the present situation, it is particularly important to strengthen the united front between the Arab people and the people of the socialist countries.

Arab heads of the state who were meeting at the Khartoum Summit were urged by the Soviet spokesman to work for a "political solution" of the conflict.

54 For summary of these commentaries see Mizan (London), September-October 1967, pp. 215-17.
At the same time, Soviet commentators had endorsed the embargo idea while it was still under consideration. Pravda (16 August 1967) suggested that "if the controls (economic) are used skillfully...it would prove exceedingly effective". Commenting on Iraqi proposal for a complete oil embargo, Moscow Radio on 25 August 1967 remarked that "a blow against the oil interests of the West will accelerate the elimination of the consequences of aggression". Pointing to oil embargo and Arab deposits in Western Banks, Moscow Radio on 16 July 1967 said: "...if they are used skillfully, and enforced with true understanding and cooperation of the Arab nations, it will be most effective". On 23 August, it further suggested that "oil would be most potent weapon against the aggression and the powers supporting it".

Podgorny's and Kosygin's message to Arab summit conference extended full support to the Arab lawful rights and interests and "to achieve the removal of the consequences of aggression on a suitable basis, to cleanse Arab territory of foreign invaders and to make their contribution to strengthen peace and security in the Arab East". 55 The Soviet Union did not support any plan for initiated offensive military action. Even the Soviet press which accused Israel of aggression, counselled the Arabs to show restraint. Pravda charged that some Arab "super patriots" were hurting the Arab cause by their "hysterical appeals". It further observed that "certain

55 SWB, Part I, SU/2556/M4/1, 31 August 1967.
Arab leaders (Ahmad Shukairy) who have no relation to Arab governments have done no small harm to the Arab people by their ill-considered speeches.\textsuperscript{56}

The Soviet Union endorsed the summit call for a political solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute as "wise and just". Soviet Union congratulated Arabs for "showing realism and sober judgement". Soviet Union did so as the decisions were accompanied by economic help to Egypt from Saudi Arabia, Libya and Kuwait of £ 95 million per year, which in turn relieved the Soviet Union's economic burden of support for Nasser.\textsuperscript{57} To curb Syrians and Algerians demands for military solution of the problem, Soviet Union gave blessings to the political offensive unleashed by Nasser after the summit. The Soviet Union realized that Israel could be forced to withdraw only through Western pressure. It found it difficult to resolve the conflict in face of Israeli intransigence in view of US support to Tel Aviv. Thus it designed a policy to "prod the West into putting pressure on Israel to withdraw to the pre-June demarcation lines".\textsuperscript{58} Pravda praised the participants for realizing that the West Asian problem could

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., SU/2534/M4/1, 4 August 1967; Pravda, 3 August 1967.

\textsuperscript{57} Abraham J. Becker, "Oil and the Persian Gulf in Soviet Policy in the 1970s", in The U.S.S.R. and the Middle East (Jerusalem, 1975), p. 192; ed. Goffino and Shamir; G. Nirskey, "Arab East : Moment of Truth", New Times, 12-20 November 1967, p. 28, regarded the "decision of the oil rich Arab States, to give the UAR and Jordan financial assistance" as the most tangible result of Khartoum summit.

\textsuperscript{58} Kimche and Eavly, n. 8, p. 238.
not "be solved by old methods and for being prepared in one form or another, to recognize Israel's pre-war boundaries".\textsuperscript{59} The Soviet Union tried to tone down Arab belligerency in deed as well as words so that Israel would not be able to exploit the Arab slogan of liquidating Israel in the countries of the West, and West would also be inclined to help evolve a solution just to the Arabs.

\textbf{Arab Aid}

Immediately after the war, the Soviet Union set out to recoup its losses in the Arab world by replenishing the arms supply. Soviet Union supported Nasser in his endeavour to improve his shaky position. During Podgorny-Nasser talks from 21 to 25 June 1967, though the Soviets agreed to help Egypt on an emergency basis to build her armed forces in order to withstand Israeli-US pressure they did not support Arab plan for offensive military action. Egypt was clearly told that while the Soviet Union would help to repair the war damages, they would only replace the lost weapons with defensive ones — with fighter aircraft, for example, rather than bombers.\textsuperscript{60}

Though the policy of reequipping Arab armies after their defeat

\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Pravda}, 5 September 1967.

\textsuperscript{60} Richard Allen, \textit{Imperialism and Nationalism in Fertile Crescent} (New York, 1974), p. 506; also see Keesing Research Report, pp. 50-51.
offered new possibilities of penetration and influence to the Soviets, it made it clear to Arab friends that military solution of the conflict was out of question in near future. They wanted to make sure that neither their nor Arab action should give rise to another debacle.

Soviet Union and six East European countries met in Budapest on 11 and 12 July and agreed on a joint programme to speed the re-arming of the defeated Arab states. A joint communiqué gave three distinct pledges to the Arabs: (i) to consolidate their defense potential; (ii) to give aid required for the struggle against aggression; and (iii) to give extensive help for economic development. The Soviet bargaining position had been strengthened as a result of Arab defeat and Nasser was anxious to facilitate the development of a Soviet force to offset the power of the Sixth Fleet. On his visit to Cairo on 21 June 1967, Podgorny demanded a command post and repair shop at Alexandria, to be controlled and guarded by

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62 Christian Science Monitor, 15 July 1967. In a joint statement published in Izvestia, the heads of diplomatic missions in Moscow of Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, the Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, UAR and Yemen hailed the decisions as "fresh evidence of the profound friendship between our peoples and of the Soviet Union's readiness to render all possible assistance to safeguard the success of the Arab peoples struggling for their freedom." Soviet News, 11 July 1967, p. 30.

Russians. The Russians were given a large dry dock, two floating docks and a repair yard for their exclusive use in Alexandria. A formal agreement allowing the Soviet Union access to facilities on the Mediterranean was signed in March 1963.

Massive air deliveries of Soviet replacement weapons for UAR and Syria began pouring in even before the Israeli advance into Syria was terminated. Arms aid began before the Soviets could have had any confidence that either Nasser or the Syrian left Ba'athist leaders would be able to survive politically. She flew new MIG's and airlifted other badly needed military equipment to the UAR and other Arab countries. Three weeks after the end of fighting 130 tactical aircraft had been airlifted to the Middle East. 64 The transfer of arms was augmented by an unprecedented transfer of military skills, in an attempt to establish an effective Arab military capability. A comprehensive retraining of Egyptian forces was quickly instituted and Soviet military mission was established in Egypt and a large influx of Soviet advisers and instructors took place in summer 1967. Russian advisers and technicians were posted to every air and naval base, military training facility and major maintenance depot in the country. 65 It demonstrated


that Soviet Union was still willing to place its arsenal at the disposal of Arab friends for Arab cause. The decision to rearm Arab states meant that the Soviet Union would not turn back because Arabs had suffered a defeat. In pursuance of its broad commitment to help Arabs administer a "resolute rebuff" to any aggressor, the Soviet Union was trying to rebuild a semblance of Arab defence capability.

Meanwhile the Soviet Union offered no response to a suggestion in President Johnson's speech to the effect that any new arms shipments to the region might at least be registered with the UN as a first step toward controlling the arms race in that area. In August, further supplies were sent through sea. By October, they had replaced virtually entire losses in the aircraft and had sent in about 300 tanks, bringing Egypt's total to 700 tanks. The Soviet airlift of military

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66 By mid-July, Israeli sources asserted that about 100 MIG's and over 100 tanks had reached Egypt either directly or via Algeria. Reports of Christian Science Monitor, 13 July 1967 and New York Times, 20, 21 August, 23 September, 12 October 1967, claimed that Soviet Government had replaced approximately half of the MIG's and nearly half of the tanks lost by Egypt in that war.

67 Kasher and Bady, n. 3, p. 250. Western specialists estimated that Soviet Union had replaced 300 of 365 jet fighters, 50 of the 69 bombers, 450 of 550 tanks, they had lost during the war. New York Times, 22 October 1963; Times (London), 25 April 1963 claimed that between June 1967 and October 1968 deliveries of arms totalled $2.5 billion to Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Yemen.
equipment gave a tremendous boost to army morale and enabled
Arab army to rebuild its shattered formations. As a demo-
strative form of military support aimed at reassuring the
Egyptians and deterring further Israeli attacks, twelve Soviet
warships visited Alexandria and Port Said in the second week
of July and remained there until October 1967. The commander
of the Soviet squadron Admiral Molokhov declared on arrival
that the Russians were ready to "co-operate with Egyptian
forces to repel aggression." By its willingness to deliver modern arms, the Soviet
Union established a special position for itself in the Arab
world. The supply of arms meant that Arabs did not have to
make peace on the basis of military situation produced by war.
Its impact was reflected at the Khartoum summit of September
where a policy of no concessions was adopted. The massive
re-supply arms had psychological and diplomatic effect of
preserving Soviet prestige in the region. The Russians
apparently decided that because of the immense economic and
political investments already made in the Arab world and of the

68 Kimche and Bawly, n. 6, p. 249.
69 James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications
70 Robert E. Hunter, The Soviet Dilemma in the Middle East,
    Part I: Problems of Commitment (Adelphi Papers No. 59,
    London, September 1969), p. 11. By the beginning of
    November 1967, Marshal Zakharov, a senior Deputy Defence
    Minister, was able to tell Nasser "Mr. President, I think
    that Egypt can now stand up to anything Israel can deliver.
    I have no fears for the Egyptian front. The defences are
    perfectly alright." Quoted in Heikal, n. 65, p. 49.
unique opportunities which existed for further Soviet penetration, they should continue to provide costly and urgently needed help to the Arabs.

The Arabs were obliged and thankful to the Soviet Union for helping them in the hour of peril. Syrian Prime Minister Youssef Zeayan while on a visit to Moscow (29 November to 2 December 1967) "expressed deep gratitude to the people and Government of the Soviet Union for the great support and assistance rendered to the people of Syria and other Arab states...." 71 President Nasser, in a speech at the National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union at Cairo, on 23 July 1968 observed:

Had it not been for the Soviet Union, we would now find ourselves facing the enemy without any weapon and compelled to accept his conditions. The United States would not have given us a single round of ammunition.... Had it not been for the Soviet Union and its agreements to supply us arms, we would now be in a position similar to our position a year ago, we would have no weapons and should be compelled to accept Israel's conditions under threat. 72

Heiykal, Al Ahram's editor wrote that the Soviet Union has proved that it is a "genuine friend and has given us everything it could." 73

Soviet Union and Jordan

Jordan's military and economic position became desperate as a result of the reverses suffered during June war.

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71 Pravda, 3 December 1967.
73 SIR, Part IV, ME/2506/A/1, 3 July 1967.
Post-war Jordan offered another area of influence to the Soviet Union. During the war, the Soviet Union had supported King Hussein’s efforts as he was siding with Egypt and Syria. It was for the first time that the Soviet Union had supported any conservative and pro-Western country in the region. The Russians wanted to capitalize on King’s annoyance with the US and West for having supported Israel during the war even at Jordan’s cost. To win over Jordan and alienate it from the US, Radio Moscow on 28 July 1967 commented:

During the bloody invasion by the Israeli troops the USA and Britain did not find it possible to protect the territory of Jordan against the Israeli invaders, nor its population from untold sufferings. 74

The Radio broadcast gave credit to the Soviet Union for its stand in the Security Council to obtain ceasefire and in stopping of Israeli advance into Jordanian territory.

The US was angry with King Hussein for having aligned with Nasser and having charged the US for participation in the Israeli raids on Egypt and Jordan. The US had announced the discontinuation of the arms aid to Jordan. But King urgently needed arms for his survival and defence against Israel. He was under pressure from the nationalists to become a military client of the Soviet Union. Soviet Union with the aim of exploiting the anti-US atmosphere, created by the war and

the American refusal to arm Jordan which was frantically trying for it, made it known that it would be willing to help Jordan with Soviet arms. The Soviet Union with this arms offered wanted to undermine the American position and strengthen her own in those areas where she had made little headway. King Hussein who during his visit of the United States in June 1967 had failed to get favourable response from the US, visited Moscow in October to explore the possibility of Soviet-Jordanian co-operation. Soviet Union considered the royal visit as an important step in the improvement of Soviet-Jordanian relations. King Hussein thanked the Soviet Union for denouncing Israeli aggression, looked forward to strong and permanent relations with the Soviet Union and expressed a special desire to strengthen cultural and scientific ties. He expressed deep gratitude of the people and the Government of the Soviet Union for the sincere and valuable support and aid, the USSR had rendered and continues actively to render the Arab states that have been victims of aggression.  

The Soviet Union declared its commitment to render the Arab states the necessary support in their righteous struggle for their lawful rights, in the rehabilitation and development of their economy and in strengthening their defence potential. "The two sides declared their desire to continue strengthening and developing mutually advantageous contacts in economic,

75 Pravda, 3 October 1967.
cultural, political and other fields." Russians offered him all the arms on condition that he jettisoned all his Western arms. Hussein, who was using the Soviet Union merely to pressurize the US was aware that it would put him entirely in Soviet hands. This would have meant that in future he would not get another penny or cent from the West. Further, he knew that he could not expect the Soviet Union to get him his lost territories. With the US help he expected to get back his lost territories as he expected the US to put pressure on Israel to keep Hussein under their influence. He resisted pressure to accept Soviet arms and preferred to rely on the United States.

After his Moscow trip, it was announced that he had entered into economic and cultural agreement with the Soviet Union and quietly managed not to accept Soviet offer for arms. It was because King Hussein was not willing to risk a total break with the West. Jordan refused to become Soviet ally and did not agree to enter into any agreement for arms with the Soviet Union, though the King badly needed these for his survival and his country's security. Thus the Soviet Union could not succeed in bringing Jordan under its influence in the same way as it had been successful in its relations with Egypt and Syria.

76 Kinsch and Badly, n. 8, p. 27.
Concluding Observations

Despite their mutual disillusionment, both the Arabs and the Soviet Union responded to the crisis not by drawing apart but by drawing closer. The Arab political upheaval led to still further intensification of psychological, political and material bonds with Moscow. The June war made Egypt's and Syria's dependence on the Soviet Union for arms and political support more critical than ever. Soviet support became the Arabs' only hope of recovering their strength, prestige and lost territory. For the Soviet leaders, Egypt's and Syrian dependence and continuing Arab-Israeli crisis served as the basis for a military and political presence in these countries. The advance of Russian power offered a challenge to the established position and interests of the United States in the area.

The Soviet Mediterranean squadron substantially grew in size and capabilities after the war. The Soviet Mediterranean fleet gave political and military support to Egypt, Syria and Algeria. The very presence of a standing naval force, increased Soviet influence in the region. In crisis, the presence of an interpositionary or trip-wire force greatly enhanced Soviet capability to deter American intervention and allowed the Soviet Union to lend greater credibility to their minatory diplomacy.

Russians successfully exploited the bitter anti-American and anti-British feelings which had developed in the
wake of the Arab defeat. Because the Arabs were so enraged with the West and because they quickly discovered that only the Russians were willing and able to provide the considerable political, military, and economic aid which they desperately needed, the Soviet Union did not find it difficult to restore and even extend her influence in the Arab world.

The United States on the other hand opted for a policy of non-intervention in the outcome of the war. It did not force Israel to withdraw to pre-June war borders and wanted Israel to use conquered Arab territories as pressure to achieve peace agreement of their liking. This move denied the Soviet Union and the Arabs to achieve political victory after a severe military setback. The US policy makers opted for a policy of keeping Israel strong to avoid any future involvement. Their call for an end to arms race was aimed at maintaining Israeli superiority in terms of arms. While the US used economic and arms aid to force King Hussein to negotiate with Israel, this lever was not used to force Israel moderate her policies.