CHAPTER V

INTERPRETATIVE CANONS IN THE MAHĀBHĀŚYA.
Tradition of interpreting codified texts in ancient India can be traced to the early passages which essentially tend to render helpful assistance to the comprehension of the Vedic Sanskritas. The sūtra literature which flourished as a memoric technique and aimed at the utmost brevity of expression naturally invited elaborate explanation of the texts for later generations. To name the types of commentaries we may cite bhāga, samgraha, vārttika, vṛtti, cūrṇī, nyāsa pañjikā, āṭīka, tippanī, dhanḍhikā, prakaraṇa. All of them are types of commentaries of some texts with distinguished features of their own. Of them, vṛtti, bhāga and vārttika were of earlier origin whereas the rest flourished more or less as annotations of the earlier commentaries. It was expected that an explanation would take up the words constituting the text, one by one, clarify their import with necessary illustrations and counter-illustrations, refute all adverse views and thereby bring out the essential import of the text. In the realm of the Pāṇinian system of Sanskrit Grammar, we meet each and every type of commentaries and annotations some of which may be mentioned here.

The Samgraha (compilation) by Vyādi is said to have compiled in one hundred thousands of verses as many as fourteen thousand topics of grammar. According to the Mahābhā, the theory of indestructible words was discussed therein in details. Kātyāyana, the

(1) Padacchadah padārthottir vigvaho vākyayojana, āksepyasya samādhānam vyākhyānam pāññalakṣānam. (Parāṣāropapurāṇa, XVIII).

(2) Theme of Grammar, According to the Mahābhā, the theory of indestructible words was discussed therein in details. Kātyāyana, the
schools of Saunāga (Mahābh. on P. 2.2.18) and Bharadvaṭa (Mahābh. on P. 1.1.20, P. 3.1.89, P. 4.1.79, P. 6.4.47, P. 6.4.155),
Vyāghrabhūti are famous for their vṛttikas. The last scholar wrote his work in verse. One Vaiyāghrapadya-vṛttika in verse is well known in the Pāṇinian school. Of the vṛttis which chiefly deal with the meaning of the rules, Kumāra's is the first work. Patañjali follows this vṛtti under P. 1.1.74. On P. 2.2.24 he refers to a vṛttisūtra. The Nyāsa refers to the vṛtti works of Cullibhatṭi, Mārulura etc. (Introduction of the Nyāsa of Jīnendrabuddha). The Kāśikā of Vāmana and Jyotśītya is known as a Mahāvṛtti. Some call it a parījāka type of commentary. Of the other vṛtti works in the Pāṇinian school are Bhāgavṛtti, Kāśavṛtti, Durghatavṛtti etc. According to Dānīnātha on the Sarvasvatākathābhārana and Sarvānanda in his Tīkāsarvasva, the Mahābh. is a āṇu type of commentary for it crushes all adverse opinions (aśeṣapratipaksacūrmanat). The Nyāsa of Jīnendrabuddha on the Kāśikā is a valuable contribution to the study of Pāṇini. The Kṛpanakanyāsā of Pujyapāda, Viśrāntanāyāsā, Kṣemendrānyāsā, Bodhināyāsā etc. are other nyāsa works in Pāṇini's school. Kāsiyota's Pradīpa and Bhartrhari's Dīpikā both on the Mahābh. are tīkās. The

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(2) (I) Sangrāho Vyādikrto laksāslokasamkhyo grantha iti prāśiddhiḥ (Uḍāyota on the Mahābh., Paspaḍa).

(II) Caturdaśasaṃhārani vastūnyasmin... (Dīpikā, Page 26, ref. to by Y. Mīnāmsaka).

(III) Sangrāha etat pradhānena, perikṣitam nityo vā syat kāryo vā (Mahābh., Paspaḍa).

(IV) Sobhanā khalu...... sangrahasya kṛtyaḥ (Mahābh. on P. 2.3.66).

(3) Sūtrārthapradhāno grantho vṛttih (Haradatta, Introduction to the Padamafjarī).
Badhiraat hatippani on the Čhāyā which is an annotation of Nāgosa's Uddyota is a tippani. Both the Prakriyakāramādi of Śeśa and the Sk of Bhaṭṭoṣi are prakṛtya works while the Vākyapādiya of Bhartṛhari is a prakarṇa.

The bhāṣya is however the most celebrated and widely admitted type of commentaries. The traditional view runs that a bhāṣya takes up statements from sūtras, comments in consonance with them and even explains its own observations too. The celebrated bhāṣyas of Śaṅkara on the Brahmasūtras as well as on the major Upaniṣads establish with grand success the well-reasoned philosophy of monism. Other schools of Vedānta and other Orthodox Indian philosophical schools have their meritorious bhāṣyas of antiquity. For example, we name the Śaṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya of Viśavoṃśabhrīṣu and the Śaṅkhyakarikabhāṣya of Gauḍapāda, the Yogabhāṣya of Vyāsa, the Vātsyāyanaabhāṣya on Nyāya, the Prāsaṭapādabhāṣya on Valācika, the Śabarabhāṣya on Māṁśā and bhāṣyas of Rāmānuja, Valla, Śāṅkara, Mādhva etc. on the Brahmasūtra. Śaṇḍāla of the 14th century A.D. adds to this stream his bhāṣyas on the Vedic texts. The Nīrūkta of Yāska, the pre-Pāṇini etymological work is referred to as a bhāṣya by Durgācārya on Nīrūkta 1.1. (bhāṣyavistara) and so on.

Patañjali's commentary, his magnum opus on the sūtras of Pāṇini, rather on the vārttikas of Katyāyana, goes by the name of

(4) (I) Sūtraastham padesādyā vākyāh sūtrāmasārābhihī, svapadānaḥ ca varṇyante bhāṣyam bhāṣyavido vidūḥ.

(Parāśāropapūraṇa,XVIII).

(II) Yad vismptam adṛṣṭam vā sūtrakāraṇa tat sputam, vākyakaro bravityeṣva ten adṛṣṭam ca bhāṣyakrt.

(Padamanjari of Haradatta).
Mahābhāṣya (the great commentary). It is a wonderful assimilation of all judicious views on linguistics of its times, an unchallengable storehouse of the supplementary maxims of Kātyāyana and others and a compendium of the linguistic views of various unidentified schools and scholars of grammatical studies. The Mahābh. is great in both volume and essence. It is unique as a commentary. Rightly does Prof. K.C. Shastri comment: "The Mahābhāṣya is certainly the greatest product of the intensive and methodical grammatical studies of the golden age.... The period of academic activities, of the three sages (trimuni) may happily be called as the real creative (a)(III)age of the science."

Unlike other bhasyas which are based upon the sūtras, the Mahābh. of Patañjali presents itself as a commentary of the (5) vārttikas. With inexhaustible zeal and inimitable dialectics, it goes into the essence and motive behind several thousands of vārttikas, one by one, and determines their utility or futility according as the case may be. Some might think that Patañjali, the author of the Mahābh., is an adverse critic of Kātyāyana. They find it convenient to believe in antagonism between these two respected authors. But this decision seems too bold. The sole aim, if there be any, of these two scholars must be to enrich the Paninian aphorisms in the light of everchanging linguistic phenomena in a living language. They have done their job in their own way.

(5) Kātyāyanaśrāṇītānāṃ vākyānāṃ Patañjalikātan vivaṇṇanāṃ (Padamājñāraī).
Kātyāyana refers to adverse criticisms against Pāṇini and answers them. Here supplement must not be a pointer to antagonism between Pāṇini and Kātyāyana. Where a sutra or a part of it seems superfluous, Kātyāyana does not hesitate to declare it so; where it is too narrow, he proposes supplementary aphorisms in accordance with the avowed duty of the author of vārttikas. To say that Patañjali defends Pāṇini against Kātyāyana does not seem very sound. Because Patañjali himself opines against so many sutras of Pāṇini with all reverence to him. In his eyes too, several sutras have no utility excepting the Mystic meritoriousness in their chanting. He proposes bifurcation of a number of rules. It appears that Pāṇini suffers in a sense more in the hands of Patañjali than in those of Kātyāyana, Kielhorn observes. Patañjali extends import of some Pāṇinian rules and deduces many interpretative canons from apparently superfluous words in the rules. Kātyāyana prefers reading them separately to deducing them even at the risk of oversimplification. These scholars represent their own ages and try to look into the up-to-date instances. May be cherish dissimilar notions on some points. But their basic approach to the interpretation of a language is identical. Thus tradition respects this chain of three celebrated linguistics and acknowledges superiority to a former of the latter. Had they been antagonists, their writings would not have been mentioned simultaneously as comprising the Pāṇinian school of Sanskrit Grammar. Critical summarisation and creative interpretation of the sutras through the vārttikas are some uncommon features of the Mahābhā. It refers to the two elder grammarians with great

(6) Yathottaram himini-trayasya prāmāṇyam(Pradīpa on P.1.1.29).
(7) respect and still does not stick to the infallibility of their observations. This healthy liberalism on the part of this grammar is not a defect but the path to perfection.

The Mahābhārata abounds in verses. According to Goldstücker, when verses form essential parts of arguments of the Mahābhārata, their authorship may safely be assigned to Patañjali himself. When they serve in the place of vārttikas Kātyāyana may be the author. Kātyāyaṇa and Nāgārjuna, two celebrated annotators, occasionally refer to the authorship of verses in the Mahābhārata and connect many of them with either Kātyāyana or Patañjali. Both these annotators however believe that the author of the vārttikas in verse is other than Kātyāyana and that with the help of inferences his authorship upon some verses can be ascertained. We know that some Vyākaraṇa-śṛṅgāti composed vārttikas in verse. Some verses in the Mahābhārata with all probability may be composed by himself. The Mahābhārata is a storehouse of the grammatical verses.

As we have already discussed, Patañjali along with Kātyāyana takes recourse to the analogy of popular experiences in many places, with a view to explaining intricate grammatical ideas at ease. This respectful recognition of popular usage and behaviour endears the Mahābhārata to the scholars.

(7) (I) bhagavataḥ Pāṇiniḥ ācāryasya siddham (Mahābhārata on P.8.4.68)

(II) Mañjalika acarayo mahataḥ śāstraughasya mañgalārtham siddhasabdham aditaḥ prayunkte (Mahābhārata, Paspaśā).

(8) (I) Slokevārttikakārāḥ sandignān asandigdhāṃsā bhavranti-nirāsaya paryajiganat (Pradipa on P.4.4.3).

(II) Vārttikakārāḥ Kātyāyanah, Slokevārttikakārayastvam eveti bhavah (Udyota under P. 6.4.22).
It is reported that all recensions but one of the Mahābhārata were once lost. If this report have any factual basis, may be, we unfortunately could not recover the whole of the original Mahābhārata. Still in its present form it is unrivalled as a grammatical work. The Mahābhārata, as a vivarana as Haradatta calls it, is bound to be elaborate. Kaiyāṭa compares it with a vast ocean, in the introduction of his Pradīpa to the Mahābhārata.

It is true that "it is nothing but an artificial device of grammar to analyse a sentence into parts (padas) and those parts (9) again into stems and suffixes" and that the Mahābhārata deals (10) primarily with this branch of grammatical studies. Bhartṛhari, the grammarian and philosopher, takes up the philosophical aspects of language in a later age and establishes a full-fledged philosophical system. Even then the Mahābhārata is supreme in its own sphere. "The grammatical method of analysing sentence and words into their component parts...is calculated to afford the only scientific (11) means, so far as the knowledge of meaning is concerned". Patañjali is more a linguist than a philosopher; Bhartṛhari is more a philosopher than a linguist. Of course, the Mahābhārata is not altogether negligent of the metaphysical aspects of a language.

(12) The theory of Sphota is discussed in the Mahābhārata on P. 1.1.70.

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(9) Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar (1930) - Dr. P.C. Chakrabarti, Page 102.

(10) Vyāhārāvya manyante sastrarthapraakārya yataḥ (Vākyapādiya 2.234).


(12) Sphotaḥ ādāo dhvanijn ādāguneḥ...Sphotaḥ śāravāvaneḥ śārandrayaḥ vṛddhiḥ etc. (Mahābhārata on P. 1.1.70).
Here Patañjali "declares in unmistakable terms that sphota represents what is sabda proper, whereas sound is only a quality, that is to say, it serves only to manifest sphota. ... He further elucidates the point that sabda has two aspects—sound and sphota; it is sound alone that is usually perceived and appears to be either long or short as the case may be, while sphota remains entirely unchanged (13) and is not readily perceptible by sense organs."

Patañjali's contribution to the study of interpretative canons is highly laudable. In fact, the groups of interpretative canons in Pāṇini's school owe their footing and illumination to the Mahābh. Patañjali has studied all interpretative rules with probable interpretations suggested thereof and decided their import and scope of application with numerous examples and counter-examples. The canons contained in the vārttikas too have got due attention in his work. It is the only source of the supplementary rules of Katyāyana and like-minded authors of vārttikas. Patañjali has critically analysed the import and the scope of the canons in the vārttikas and has tried his best to get them approved by the indication of Pāṇini's rules. Besides he himself has either referred to or proposed a large number of interpretative canons and proved the utility of the same. With high regards for his predecessors, he has put the seal of their approval of indication upon each and every of such canons. Rightly does Nāgese in his introductory sentence of the Pē remark that the old canons were accommodated either in the vārttikas or in the Mahābh. of the Pāṇiniāh school.

Canons in this system are comprehensive — their scope of study ranges from the role of indicatory letters to the peculiarities of compounds. The role of a canon itself is determined in the Mahābhārata. But for its illumination the interpretative rules of Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and other linguistics would have been left as unintelligible aphorisms. As a recognition of this service to the cause of grammar, Nāgęśa declines to admit an interpretative canon which is neither explained nor referred to in the Mahābhārata.

In our previous chapters, Patañjali’s illuminations are frequently referred to. This chapter is devoted to such canons which are either referred to or proposed in the Mahābhārata as canons and which were not mentioned by Pāṇini and Kātyāyana. The list by itself here is incomplete for some of such canons are already reviewed in our previous chapters.

1. THE QUESTION OF DEFINITIONS OF OBLIGATORY (NITYAVIDHI) AND NON-OBLIGATORY (ANITYAVIDHI) RULES.

The terms nitya and anitya appear in respect of certain conflicting rules in the vārttikas. The word nitya however appears in the Pāṇinian rules to refer to obligatory nature of operations formulated therein. In the canons of interpretation nitya and anitya develop a connotation which is formulated in some paribhāsās of later ages. The paribhāsās we propose to review here concern the connotation of these two terms under different circumstances. With all probability, Patañjali himself is the author of these canons. Of course the canons viz. Sabdāntarasya etc. and Laksanāntarena etc. are found in the P-sū of Vyādi.
The first of the series viz. Sādvāntaraśaya prāṇmuvān vidhir enityo bhavati (Pā 43) imports that when an injunction or operation awaits a conditioning cause in a place but ignores it in another place, it is 'enitya' (non-obligatory). The Mahābh. takes recourse to this canon under P. 1.3.60, 2.4.85, 3.1.20, 5.2.52, 6.1.5, 6.1.9, 6.4.101, 6.4.130 and 7.4.1 etc. Everywhere the canon appears as Patañjali's own pronouncement—end forms an inseparable part of the relevant discussion. In P. 1.3.60 it is invoked with reference to explaining middle forms in vyakrīnī, nyavīśa etc. The endings are affixed to the roots which are preceded by prefixes even when at is augmented between the prefix and the verbal root and a vikarana i.e. conjugalional sign appears between the verbal root and the conjugalional ending. It is argued that since at occurs somewhere (e.g., a-gacch-a-t) only where there is vikarana and elsewhere finds scope even though there is no such vikarana at all (e.g., a-yā-t, a-vet etc.), the rule which enjoins it is enitya. But a vikarana occurs in a place irrespective of at and the rule which enjoins it is nitya (obligatory).

Examples can be multiplied. In the lut (periphrastic future) conjugation of the third person singular, dual and plural in middle forms, -dā, -reu and -ras are substitutes (P. 2.4.85) of the conjugalional endings (i.e., -ta, -ām, -jha); replacement by 'e' of the last vowel along with the final consonant if any (tı) in endings too has a scope here (P. 3.4.79). It may be argued that these substitutes replace the endings altogether irrespective of the consideration of replacement of their final part (tı) by 'e' and hence the rule P. 2.4.85 is obligatory. But it may be put forth
in the same way that the replacement of the final part of the 
endings too takes place irrespective of total replacement (P. 2.4.85). 
This will make the rule P. 3.4.79 obligatory. Both are however, 
(14) 'anitya' on account of the present canon, opines Patanjali. Between 
these two non-obligatory rules (and operations enjoined therein), the 
replacement by 'e' (P. 3.4.79) occurs first as a paravidhi. Subse-
sequently total replacement of the modified endings takes place 
(P. 2.4.85).

The augment -tithuk by P. 5.2.52 is 'anitya' in this way in 
relation to 'puṣṇavābhāva' (elision of feminine suffix). Finally 
however both being internal operations (antaraṅga), elision of the 
feminine suffix takes place first as a paravidhi and the augmentation 
by-tithuk follows (e.g. bahutithī). Similarly relationship between 
(I) euphonic combination of two letters into one and prohibition of 
um (P. 6.1.5), (II) reduplication and lengthening of vowel (P. 6.1.9), 
(III) -ākac (p. 6.4.101), (IV) ān and ə (p. 6.4.130), 
(V) elision and vṛddhi of vowel (P. 7.4.1) and so on is analysed 
(14)(1) in the light of this canon.

As for the paribhāṣa Sabdāntarāt prāṇuvatāḥ sabdāntare 
prāṇuvatasāṁityatvam (P. 44) which teaches, as Kielhorn's transla-
tion goes, that 'when a word form after which.....or.....before which 
(a rule) should take effect (after the taking effect of another rule 

(14) Anyasya kṛteṣu dhāraurasse prāṇom, anyasyākṛteṣu...dhārauroṣo^ 
pyanītyāḥ anyasya kṛte etve prāṇuvanti, anyasyākṛte 
(Mahābh. on P. 2.4.85).

(14) (1) Kielhorn's literal translation of this canon runs thus: 
when the word form in reference to which a rule teaches some-
ting (after the taking effect of another rule that applies 
simultaneously) would be different (from what it was before that 
other rule had taken effect) then the (former) rule is not 
nitya.
that applies simultaneously) would be different (from what it was before that other rule had taken effect), then (the former rule) is not nitya', no trace is found in the Mahābh. by Kielhorn. Vaiḍyamātha, the commentator on Pē gives no example to explain it. Bhairavamśjāra, while exemplifying the earlier part shows that in 'ma bhave ujñahat' (uh + nič + lun čān + tip), reduplication of the root by P.6.1.11 being anitya, shortening of the penultimate vowel by P. 7.4.1 takes effect first.

According to the canon of interpretation, Laksamāntarēna
Pṛṇmuvaṃ vidhiḥ anityaḥ (Ps' 45) an injunctive precept which gains (14)(II) ground with some other rule is anitya. It can be deduced from the incorporation of 't' in the rule Snasorallopāh(P. 6.4.111) where elision of 'at' (short 'a') is formulated to explain stāh, santi etc. In āstām (as + lan tas),āsanch (as + lan jhi) etc. an āt' is augmented before the verbal root by Ādajādinām (P. 6.4.72). Now at the first sight it seems that with a view to excluding this āt from the purview of the elision of 'a' by P. 6.4.111, the rule reads 'at' with t attached to it to restrict this elision to the short 'a'. But both augmentation and elision concerned are discussed in the ābhīya chapter (i.e. asiddhavat chapter) and the rules enjoining them are relatively inefficient. In other words, the rule on the augment āt is inefficient in relation to the rule of elision of 'a' vowel (P. 6.4.111). Such being the case, there is no scope of the elision of āt and to seek its exclusion with incorporating 't' in 'at'

(14)(II) Literally the canon means as Kielhorn translates, that 'a rule (which applies both before and after the taking effect of another rule that applies simultaneously) is (nevertheless) not nitya, when (after the taking effect of that other rule) it would take effect in consequence of (the existence of) some(third) rule (without which it would no longer apply).
In P. 6.4.111 seems superfluous. The Pradipa would like to justify that this 't' points out the optional nature of inefficiency in the 'abhiya' chapter. As a result, when augmentation is not inefficient in relation to the elision, there is scope of elision of this e too and the letter 't' in P. 6.4.111 excludes this e from this operation. Similarly in debhatuh (dambh + liṭ tas) etc. if the rule of elision of the nasal particle were always inefficient, there would be no 'e' etc. But by the very optional nature of inefficiency envisaged by P. 6 P. 6.4.22 when the rule of elision of n is not inefficient, advent of 'e', elision of the reduplicated part (abhyāsa) of the verbal root etc. take place in usual course. This is what a vārttika in verse (15) under P. 6.4.120 seeks to justify by 't' in P. 6.4.111. We see that the Mahābh. accepts this proposition and admits the optional (anitya) nature of inefficiency of rules in this chapter.

It is interesting to note that the Sk seems to ignore the paribhāsā. To counteract the effect of inefficiency in Bhuvo vug lunlītoḥ (P. 6.4.88) in the conflict between rules of vuk and uvan, (16) it supports a vārttika according to which the rule on vuk in this place may be considered as efficient. Similarly while explaining debhatuh etc. it takes recourse to a vārttika that the elision of (17) the reduplicated part of a verbal root and the compensatory advent of 'et' should be separately enjoined to counteract the inefficiency of the elision of n. It may be a simple process of explaining words with individual notes. But when numerous parts of

(15) Snasorattve takāreṇa jñāyate tvatvā-śāsanam
(Sl. vārttika on P. 6.4.120).


(17) Dambhāsāca ettvābhyaśalopeu vaktavyau (vā) Sk Vol III Page 301.
the Pāñinian rules are construed as indicating many interpretative canons to regularise operations in a number of words, it is better to recognise the present paribhāṣa in preference to vārttikas.

Klehorn exemplifies this canon with the word form Kurvah (kr + u + vae) where between elision of u before v by P. 6.4.108 and gunātion of r before u by P. 7.3.84 the latter is anitya because after elision of u, it can be restored (P. 1.1.62) as the condition of gunātion of r (kr + u + vah = kr vah = karvah = kurvah).

In certain cases between two rules of conflicting grammatical operations, the rule loses condition of its occurrence on account of a third rule i.e. to say the second operation seeks to gain ground against the first one with the help of a third rule. In such situations the first one generally cannot be treated as ‘anitya’. The elision of a (P. 6.4.64) loses its condition of occurrence on account of the samprāśāraṇa i.e. change of semi-vowels into vowels (P. 6.1.16) and the consequent combination of two vowels (P. 6.1.108) into the earlier one which is a samprāśāraṇa vowel as in brahma-ja (brehma-jyä + ka). The rule of this elision is ‘nitya’ in relation to that of samprāśāraṇa, argues the Mahābh. under P. 3.2.3. Since āt (P. 6.4.72) assisted by its vṛddhi (P. 6.1.90) poses an opposition to iyaṁ (P. 6.4.77) by disturbing its condition as in adhyāṣṭām (adhi-iñ + lañ ātām) the rule of this iyaṁ is ‘nitya’ and between āt and iyaṁ, both nitya the latter should prevail (P. 1.4.2) (vide Mahābh. on P. 6.1.108). Similarly the samāsanta suffix -sa (P. 6.4.116) followed by elision of the ‘t̐i’portion (i.e. en) of mūrdhaṁ (P. 6.4.144) mars the condition of acute accent (udātta) in the ultimate vowel (P. 6.2.197) and hence the rule P. 6.2.197 is ‘nitya’. In its
conflict with the rule on the samaśanta suffix which is also 'nitya', it wins over the latter (vide Mahābh. on P. 6.2.197). Between 'ot' (P. 6.3.112) and samprasāraṇa (P. 6.1.15) the latter followed by its swallowing of the next vowel (P. 6.1.108) opposes the former by disturbing its sthātin and here too between these two 'nitya operations, that of prevails over the other (vide Mahābh. on P. 6.3.112). Then follow samprasāraṇa and its consequent swallowing of the next 'a' vowel in uḍha (vah + kta = voh-te = uoh ta = uh te, = uḍh ḍha = uḍha) etc.

The Pradīpa under P. 7.2.23 discusses this phenomenon and clarifies that when a rule by itself fails to oppose another rule the former is not less powerful than the latter. In duel between Bālin and Sugrīva, the latter won only with the help of Rāma and so Bālin must not be treated as less powerful than Sugrīva. The analogy of this popular experience lies at the root of the present paraśāṇa. The Pradīpa itself shows under P. 6.1.108 and P. 7.1.23 that this canon is vulnerable somewhere. The Mahābh. while explaining the word tad-brāhmaṇaṇaḥ, examines the conflict between elision (luk by P. 7.1.23) and the replacement of the last letter in the stem by 'a' (P. 7.2.102) where the latter rule assisted by Ato'm (P. 7.1.24) is recognised as more powerful than that of elision. It is like recognising the Pāṇḍavas assisted by Vāsudeva as more powerful than the sons of Dhrtarāṣṭra. The Pr of Nāgasa

(19) reads another canon which admits casual inefficiency of the present canon. The Pradīpa has noted that when the conflict of two rules (i.e. lakṣaṇas) is concerned the canon which makes a rule 'nitya' in the face of a combined opposition is operative but when we speak of two conflicting operations (i.e. kāryayog) it has (20) nothing to serve.

We have already seen that when a vidhi (rule) assisted by its consequent rule tends to wipe out the condition of the advent of a third rule the last is generally treated as nitya. It is the first definition of 'nitya.' The second definition 'āvācit kṛtakṛtapaśaṅga-nātrenāpi nityatā (Pā 46) is this that when a vidhi may take place irrespective of anything in an instance, it is 'nitya.' The two are separately formulated with a view to treating two different sets of instances as nitya. It is noticed that what is nitya according to one formulation is not so according to the other. The Mahābhārata refers to these canons in many cases but in very few of them conclusion is favourably assisted by these canons.

Between the rule, the operation of o (P. 6.3.112) and that of samprāsarana (P. 6.1.15) in vaha the former is 'nitya' according to the first definition but by the second the latter is nitya though the former is not. The samprāsarana of v may take place even when 'a' is already replaced by 'o' but after the change of v into u, this 'u' with 'a' is promptly combined into u and replacement of 'a' by 'o' finds no scope at all. Thus o-vidhi cannot

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(20) Yada lakṣaṇayog eva vidhārṇa tādā......nātīyam, yada tu kāryayog vidhārṇa......tādā nāstīyetat. Pradīpa on P. 6.1.103.
appear irrespective of samprasārana and is anitya by the second definition. Between the rules pertaining to o and that pertaining to samprasārana, both nitya from different standpoints the former triumphs over the latter as the latter rule in order of enumeration.

The Mahābhāṣya refers to this second definition of nitya on P. 2.1.27, P. 3.2.19, P.7.3.3, etc. On P. 3.1.27 it is argued that between elision of -kvip and the elision of yak before any consonant excepting y (P. 6.1.64) the former pertains to paravidhi. This rule is nitya for the elision of -kvip takes place irrespective of the loss of y whereas y may be elided only if -kvip remains as the subsequent conditioning cause. So the rule of elision of -kvip triumphs over that of the loss of y [in mantu, valgu (valgu + y(ak)+ kvip) etc].

On P. 3.2.3 it is observed that the rule of samprasārana is nitya by the second definition because it does not depend upon the elision of ‘ā’. The elision of ‘ā’ is ‘anitya’ on this ground. For after samprasārana and its consequent swallowing of the next ‘ā’, it has no scope at all. But, by the first definition the rule on elision of ‘ā’ too is ‘nitya’. On P. 3.2.109 the Mahābhāṣya observes that the rule of reduplication which ignores it is nitya on account of the second definition. Similarly the rule on ai and ou are nitya for they occur irrespective of vyādhi (P. 7.3.3). In tud + tip (lat) = tudati, a conjugational sign (vikaran), sa is claimed though as a paravidhi, the rule of conjugation of u (P. 7.3.24) may triumph over it. But as we see, sa may occur.
irrespective of function and is nitya. This sa having occurred,guna
is totally prohibited by the rule Kārīti ca (P.1.1.5) for sa is a
sārabhdhātuva suffix losing no p and is technically treated as nit
(which has an indicatory ů).

Accent is a deciding instrument of ascertaining 'nitya' or
'anitya' nature of certain rules (vidhis). As the canon Svarbhinn-
ārya prōṣipun vaidhir anityao bhavati (Pā, 49) pronounces, a vidhi
which awaits and follows accentuation in a place but may not always
depend upon

(20(I)

'It is anitya. It is a mere specification of the aforesaid canon that
a vidhi which follows another vidhi in certain places/ may be indi-
different to it elsewhere is 'anitya'. It reminds us of the go-balīvar-
danyeya according to which along with 'go' (bulls and cows) sometimes
bullocks are separately mentioned at the same breath.

The Mahābh. refers to the present canon under P. 3.2.6,
Pā, 2.4.85 etc. Between the udātta accent and euphonic combination
of vowels in Kumāryai (kumārī + ā = kumārī+ā(t) = kumārī-ā) etc.
the latter may somewhere follow udātta accent but elsewhere no udātta
precodes. This makes the rule on euphonic combination non-obligatory.
The word kumārī is acutely accented in the ultimate vowel. āt is
augmented by āntyē (Pā, 7.3.112); i + a = ya. By the rule Pā.6.1.147
this ā after y is udātta then, kumāryā-e = kumāryai. With udātta 'ā'
and anudātta 'e' the euphonic substitute āt is udātta. The question is
whether in kumārī-ā(t)-(n)č,euphonic substitute of ā(t) and (ń)č,

(20(I) In Kilhorns translation, this canon means that when (the
wordform) in reference to which a rule teaches something (after
the taking effect of another rule that applies simultaneously)
would be different (from what it was before that other rule had
taken effect) in consequent of (some difference of) accentuation,
then the (former) rule is not nitya.
both udātta takes place first or accentuation of 'ya occurs first. By the present canon, the euphonic combination of a and e is anitya, for sometimes it may be preceded by udātta accent and sometimes not. Of course, the euphonic combination is antarāṅga for it depends on two letters whereas accentuation concerns a word.

Between udātta accent in i in kumārī and augmentation of at the latter may take place being preceded by an udātta vowel somewhere and elsewhere without being preceded by an udātta vowel. So the rule on augmentation is 'anitya'. Here however rule on accentuation too is 'anitya' for it meets augmentation casually.

In yānti (yā + satr + nip) vānti (vā + satr + nip) etc., the verbal root has no acutely accented vowel. Both the phenomena of the loss of acute accent and the combination of the vowels in the root and in the suffix satr (at) are 'anitya'. For euphonic combination may somewhere be preceded by nighāta (loss of acute accent) and somewhere not. The loss of acute accent too has the same fate for the same cause. It has been however decided that both are 'antarāṅga' and between them the loss of acute accent takes place, its rule being (paravidhi) the latter in order of remuneration. Subsequently euphonic takes place to make combination of vowels/the euphonic substitute acutely accented. As Kielhorn explains after Dhairavamisra, in dadhi+udaka, between replacement of i by y (P. 6.1.77) and antadatta for dadhi (P. 6.2.96) the former is anitya because it may appear even when dadhi would have a different accent before and after the rule P. 6.2.96 takes place.
(SI) It is not surprising that neither Purusottama nor Siradeva has referred to the aforesaid canons on the definition of nitya and anitya. Still the importance of these canons cannot be ignored altogether. The Mahabha, has analysed these in details. Moreover those two authors have accommodated many minor dictums in their treatises on interpretative canons. Nagesa’s sincerity in this case is highly laudable inasmuch as the results all canons on the definition of nitya beside those on para, antaranga and apavada in the chapter on Baddha (Pa, Ch.II). His approach to the selection of canons is more rational. We shall see later on that he discards many familiar dictums as well.

2. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE OF INTERNAL AFFINITY.

We have already studied in details the import and the scope of application of the canon of predominance of a rule of internal affinity. It has some exceptions too. Submission to the operation of luk (elision) is one such case of exception. For example, in goem privacy (goman + priyah) in bahuvrihi compound, elision (P. 2.4.71) of the first case-endings though bahiranga occurs first and leaves no scope of augmentation by anu which is antaraanga (P. 7.1.70). In tvadiya (yusmed + cha) tvat-putra (yusmed + putra) in possessive tatpurusa, not-putra (asmed + putra) in possessive tatpurusa etc. where the pronominal stem viz. yusmed or asmed is followed by either a suffix or a word (pada), there is the elision of the case-ending.

(21) Subsequently Par 47 guards against too narrow an accetptation of the expression Krtakta-prasaanga-matra in Par 46 while Par 49, on the contrary, states that Krtakta-prasaanga-matra occasionally must be taken in the very sense against which we were guarded by Par 47. Finally, Par 49 contains further restriction of the general definition of the term nitya. - Kielhorn Footnote, Page 209-10, Translation of Ps, 1871.
first and 'tva' and 'ma' to replace yuṣm(ad) and asm(ad) respectively are enjoined by P. 7.2.98. If however elision be left aside as bahiranga, replacement by 'tva' and 'ma' being antaranga would occur first before an ending in singular by P. 7.2.97 and the rule P. 7.2.98 would be redundant. To keep up the utility of this latter rule, relative weakness of the antaranga is admitted in respect of luk. That is why in mattara, tvatara (-tarap) etc. elision occurs first and replacement of the major part of the stem is sought by P. 7.2.98. Otherwise mere P. 7.2.97 would suffice. Some however think of the superiority of certain suffixes even in relation to elision of a case-ending and argue that for tvat-tara etc. the word 'pratyaya' in P. 7.2.98 is necessary. In their opinion, the word 'uttarapada' alone would indicate the canon.

For those who argued that the rule P. 7.2.98 is necessary for opposing the forms tava and mama which are due to P. 7.2.96 and that it has no capacity to signify the canon, the Mahābh. suggests that reappearance of the word 'maparyanta' from P. 7.2.91 should be the indication to the canon. According to the Pradīpa, if tva and ma were to oppose all other possible replacements, the apavāda (exceptional rule) as occurring in the place of an uṣarga (general rule) would replace as much of the stem as the uṣarga could. In other words, without reappearance of the word maparyanta tva and ma would replace the part of the stem we intend. The necessity of reappearance of the word 'maparyanta' therefore lies in the fact that elision of the case-ending having occurred first, no replacements in the stem, which are liable to take place before a case-ending are possible now
and that tva and ma must have a limitation with the word 'maparyanta' in replacement of the stems.

The difficulty we are to face here is this that while the author of the vārttikas expects the same conditioning cause for exceptional and general rules in a place, the Mahābhārah, admits by 'takra-kaundinya-nyāya' an apavāda which might not have encroached the scope of an utsarga. The indication in the Pāṇinian rule of the canon of a dominant elision triumphing over any antaraṅga operations is thus valid in the view of the vārttikas alone. So Nāgāra in both the Uddyota and the Paṇḍita reads the canon as a statement (vācanika) in the Mahābhārah, that can have indication in the vārttika line. Thus the conditioning cause of the aforesaid elision viz. compound etc. in tvat-putra etc. is of much importance (prāvalya).

The Pradīpa for the sake of the point of view of the Mahābhārah, however did not admit the reappearance of 'maparyanta' as the intended indication. So far as the suffixes, śnam, bahuc-and -akac- are concerned, the place of apavāda and utsarga is not the same. So another explanation is sought. It is opined in the Pradīpa that along with maparyanta, the words tava and mama should reappear. In that case, in tvat-kṛta etc. in the earlier member of the compound where tava could have scope otherwise, tva replaces the pronominal stem upto m. This accounts for the form tvat for the whole stem and admits thereby the superiority of elision of case-ending to the replacement which is antaraṅga. But Nāgāra rejects this proposal as cumbersome and points out that śnam, bahuc-and akac- need not be cited as cases of apavāda which has the conditioning cause different from
that of an utsarga. Because-snam by virtue of its indicatory u is placed after the last vowel in the stem (P. 1.1.47), whereas bahuc-precedes (and does not follow) the stem and-akar-is inserted in the stem before the last vowel therein. All this is expressly pronounced by Panini himself with the words viz. purastat in P. 5.3.68 and prak-tah in P. 5.3.71. Of course, Patanjali’s viewpoint is unchallenged and Kaliyata’s search for an indication in the line of the Mahabha is welcome.

It is to note that the elision termed as luk alone is taken up in the canon under review (lunmatra-vigaya). In ‘trapu’ (the alternative form being trapo), elision (luk) of -su by P. 7.1.23 triumphs over the elision (lopa) of vocative singular -su by P. 6.1.69. Of course, predominance of a latter rule can do it. Similarly, tat or yat (brahmanakulam) which is in nominative or accusative singular of neuter tat or yad, between lopa of the case-ending by P. 6.1.68 and luk of the same by P. 7.1.23 the latter rule prevails. The distinction between lopa and luk is this that the former affects an operation conditioned by a suffix though elided by P. 1.1.62 whereas the latter opposes the same by P. 1.1.63. Thus mere lopa of the ending in vocative ‘trapu’ would cause gunciation of ‘u’, which is conditioned by the ending, though elided but luk would decline to affect it. Because of the option of P. 1.1.63 indicated by the word ac in P. 7.1.73 however lopa is competent to ratify both trapo and trapu. Mere lopa of the nominative ending by P. 6.1.68 in ‘tai’ might have allowed replacement of the last letter of the stem by ‘a’ by P. 7.2.102. All this is clear in the Mahabha. on P. 6.1.69.
In pañca-khaṭvah (from pañcabhiḥ khaṭvābhiḥ kriyāḥ) consequent lengthening in the combination of 'a' and ā in khaṭvā + (t)ā(p) in the latter member, elision (luk) of tāp by P. 1.2.49 is admitted. Otherwise the ultimate ā could not be heard at all after tāp is elided. In atyāṅga (ati aṅgā), however, when the case-ending in component parts of the compound are elided by P. 2.4.71, there is no plural ending to facilitate elision of the secondary suffix by P. 2.4.62 to render the present form. By the interpretative canon Vipraitiseha etc., elision of the ending should triumph but the other as antaraṅgā is dominant. The canon of superiority of a behiraṅgā elision (luk), however, favours elision of the ending first and the question of impossibility of elision of the secondary suffix remains intact. This apprehension of Kaiyāṭa is justified even though Nāgārṇa takes it for a scholastic statement (praudhi).

From the above exemplification, it can be deduced as Nāgārṇa firmly opines, that an external elision (luk) predominates only when it effects disappearance or disturbance of the conditioning cause of the relevant antaraṅga operation. Certain counter-examples may be cited to clarify the decision. In ati-bhavakāṇ (ati-bhavat-akāc), it is not luk of the case-ending of the members in the compound but the phenomenon of compound itself which can mar the conditioning cause viz. pronominal nature of the compound stem with reference to insertion of the suffix 'akāc'. The canon being ineffective, 'akāc' is inserted before compound occurs and is retained even in the compound stem and the explanatory sentence (vigrāhā-vākyā). In rājā-puṭrī affixation of
the intimate feminine suffix (nin) to the stem vis\(^*\) putra (P. 4.1.73) supersedes the compound which is external. In other words, the compound is between rāja\(\) and putrī and accent is determined by P. 6.1.1973. When we affix -an to sarva, (accented in the last vowel) to moan a resultant of sarva (sarvasya vikarāḥ) etc. elision of the sixth case-ending singular is not in a position to disturb the conditioning cause of acute accent in the first vowel of the inflected word (P. 6.1.191). Because the ending is not treated as lost. Thus accent in the first vowel is retained even if the ending is elided and renders affixation of -an impossible because it should occur after a stem which has the unaccented first vowel (cp Amātātācāra) (P. 4.3.140 acc.to sk, 139 acc.to Mahābh. pub. under the auspices of Govt. of India and 138 acc. to the Sūtrapātha, Haridas Skt Series 63). Keeping this inconvenience in view, retention of the governance of prātipadika (P. 4.1.1.) is upheld in śāh of Nāgūṇa on P. 4.1.1. This makes -an appear after the uninflected word sarva which has unaccented first vowel.

Kielhorn in his translation of Ps of Nāgūṇa has observed the nature of luk which supersedes an antaranga operation in the following sentence: "Although the luk of the present paribhāṣā denotes every luk, nevertheless the Bhasya on P. 2.4.62 shows that only that luk which destroys the cause of another operation is stronger than that operation because such is the case in the instances tvat-kṛta etc. that are formed by the jñāpaka rule P. 7.2.98." His view corroborates Nāgūṇa's.
One point more. The statement of Purusottama that upon this canon stands another canon viz. the lopavidhi is supreme does not stand scrutiny. It is rejected by Nāgosa.

The canon Antarāṅgān api vidhiṁ behiraṅgo lyāb bādhate (Pā 54/ Pu 54) is deduced from the word 'lyāp' in the rule P. 2.4.36. In prajagdhya (pra-ad+lyāp), replacement of the root ad- by jagdhi is antaranga and may occur even ā-ktvā is substituted by -lyāp, the behiraṅga. The rule in that case need not incorporate -lyāp. The word -lyāp can be justified in P. 2.4.36 if the (behiraṅga) replacement of -ktvā by lyāp occurs early before the (antaranga) replacement of the root by jagdhi. In that case the latter cannot occur without the provision with the word 'lyāp' in the injunctive aphorism. As it is compiled, the canon facilitates a number of operations. For example, (I) in pra-dha-ya (pra-dha+lyāp) -lyāp having occurred first, no scope is left for replacing the root dha- by dhi (P. 7.4.42), (II) in pradēya, replacement by t (P. 7.4.47) is over ruled, (III) in prakṛṣṇya, prajanya replacement (P. 6.4.42) of the ultimate letter of the stem by ā is ignored, (IV) in praśthāya, there is no 'i' to replace ā by P. 7.4.40, (V) in pradhāya, no scope is left for 'i' by P. 6.4.66, (VI) in prakrama, there is no lengthening of the root vowel (P. 6.4.18), (VII) in pra-prācyya, ā does not replace ēch by P. 6.4.19, (VIII) in pratidīvya, there is no uth in place of v by P. 6.4.19 and (IX) in pragṛhyya, there is no 'it' augment before the suffix (P. 7.2.35). All the operations overruled here were antaranga in comparison with replacement of -ktvā with -lyāp.
THE CONCEPT OF 'APAVĀDA' (EXCEPTIONAL RULE ETC.)
AND CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS.

The apavāda (exceptional rule) is the last of the series comprising para (latter rule) nitya (obligatory rule), antaranga (rule of internal affinity) and apavāda. It has been observed that the latter is more powerful than the earlier in this series.

Consequently, an apavāda rule triumphs over other formulations, barring few exceptions. The apavāda operates where an utsarga (general rule) was going to operate. In other words if a particular place is denied to apavāda, it seems redundant and completely useless. According to the Uddyota on P. 1,2,2 the relationship of utsarga vis-a-vis apavāda is admitted when both tend to occur in the same place and under the same circumstances. Nature of a rule or an operation enjoined in it is not static; a rule is either general or particular in relation to certain other rules. The Mahabharata observes that an apavāda ceases to be so when any of the requisite conditions fails. For example, between ād gūnā (P. 6.1.87) and Akah savarne dīrghah (P. 6.1.101) in aṣṭa Indram (aṣṭa-Indram), avape Indram etc., the latter must not be treated as an apavāda since its scope is open in kumāri + ḍhatu, dāṅḍa + agrām etc. and it would not be useless in case it is denied in the present instances. The gūṇa by P. 6.1.87 is antaranga here and it ignores the apavāda rule P. 6.1.101 (vide Ps 66). The euphonic combination

(22) Para-nitya-antaranga-pavadanam uttorottaram, valliye (Ps 33). But in the Mimamsa rule P. 3.3.14 of śruti, liṅga, vākya, prakarana, sthāna and samādhya, the earlier is stronger than the latter.

(23) Yena nāpṛapte yo vidhir arabhhyate sa tasya bādhaṃ bhavati (Ps 58).
We have learnt from Par. 57 that an apavāda is a rule which cannot apply in any case that would not fall under some other general rule; and we have seen that such an apavāda may be twofold: it either cannot take effect at all if it does not supersede the general rule (i.e. it would be anavakāsa if it did not supersede the general rule); or it is such that it might take effect together with or after the general rule. As we do not want any paribhāsa to teach us that an anavakāsa rule supersedes another general rule... it follows that Par. 57 can only teach us that an apavāda which might take effect together with or after the general rule, supersedes the latter; and it follows moreover that we are allowed to say 'one rule supersedes another rule apavāḍetvena i.e. because it is an apavāda' only when it is such that it might take effect together with or after the general rule but that when the latter is not the case we have to say 'it supersedes another rule anavakāsaṭvena i.e. because it would not take effect anywhere if it did not supersede another rule'. An apavāda in the narrower sense of the word that results from Par. 57 supersedes a general rule altogether; an anavakāsa rule, on the other hand, supersedes a general rule only so far that it takes effect before it; and the general rule takes effect subsequently if after the taking effect of the anavakāsa rule it is still applicable. — Footnote 4, Page 329-30 Kielhorn's Translation of Ps.
formulated in P. 6.1.101, unlike that formulated in P. 6.1.87.

requires two vowels of the same place and efforts of नेगोङा is
justified to resolve that conditions being same, the apprehension
of uselessness of a rule in presence of the other makes the former
(25) an अपवादः i.e. an exceptional rule which prevails over the
other conflicting rules. According to the महाभाष्य, every उत्सर्गः
genereal rule) is comprehended along with its limitation put forth
(26) by an अपवादः (Ps 63, 63, 65). For example, accentuation in
general in connection with suffixes (P. 3.1.3) is superseded by that
which is concerned with such suffixes as have े, ू and े as indicatory
letters (P. 6.1.197; 6.1.165). Similarly (I) kṣa (P. 3.1.45) supercised sic (P. 3.1.44); (II) सत्र and सानप (P. 3.2.124) oppose tiṅ
(P. 3.4.78) and so on.

As stated earlier, Pāṇini was acquainted with the view of the
predominance of अपवादः. His rule Vaś-arūpa etc. (P. 3.1.94) is a
formulation on some exceptions to it. The name of कृत्याचया and
Patañjali needs specific reference here. These two grammarians carry
on comprehensive discussions on the concept of अपवादः. The महाभाष्य
refers to it for more than fifty five times. There is however a bit
difference of opinion, as pointed out by later scholars, between the
महाभाष्य and the वृत्तिकाल on this occasion. Since beside operations

(24) (I) Sva-samāna-nimittakam sva-samāna-sthānikatvena ca yena
nāśprāptinyāyāḥ...(Uddyota on P. 1.4.2).

(II) Labdha-pratisthāḥ prathamam yūyam kim valavat karah,
apavādair ivotsargah kṛta-vyavṛtttyayāḥ paraikāḥ (Kushā 2/27).

(26) Purvar Iiyapavada abhiniviśante paśca utsargah. Prakalpya
dāpavāda-viṣayam tata utsargo abhiniviśate (Mahābhāṣya on P.3.1.3;
P. 3.1.45 etc.).

(25) Samāna-nimittakam eva niravakāsa-parābhyyam badhyate iti
drāghītām (Uddyota on P. 1.4.2).
with the suffixes -śnām, -bahuć- and -ākaś- in bhīnattī (bhīd-śnām-tip), bhāhuć-tam (śta-bahuć) and udēśa-kāś (udēśaḥ + akāś),
operations with general suffixes -śap, -kalpap and -ka respectively have a place of occurrence on account of the difference of the locus the author of the vārttikas proposes the prohibition of
general operations by some other way. It is evident that the author confines the scope of apāvada to particular instances where both utsarga and apāvada require identical locus (sthānān) and conditioning causes, going to make occurrence of either of the rules useless in a particular instance. The Maḥābhā, criticises this view. According to it even when the general rule and the exceptional rule require different locus and conditions and as such one might occur after the other, a general rule applicable to many instances is to be superseded by an exceptional rule. In this view -śnām-, bahuć- and -ākaś- being enjoined by exceptional rules (P. 3.1.78; P. 5.3.68; P. 5.3.71) will certainly oppose -śap-, -kalpap- and -ka respectively which are enjoined in general rules (P. 3.1.68; P. 5.3.67; P. 5.3.70). This decision has analogy of popular experience. When we say that brahmans should be entertained with sour milk and Kaundinya a brahmin should get takra (whey) we understand that instead of sour milk whey should be served to Kaundinya though there is scope of the gift of dādhi after takra is given to him.

(27) Śnām.bahuć-ākaśu nānādesatvād utsargapratigṣedah  
(Vā. on P.5.3.71-72).
(28) Asambhava evāpavādatvam iti vārttikamatena va taduktaṃ.  
(Uddyota on P. 7.3.3.).
(29) Satyapi sambhāve bādhanaṃ bhavati (Maḥābh. on P. 7.4.61).
(30) Dādhi brāhmaṇe bhyo diyetaṃ takram Kaundinyāya iti satyapi sambhāve dādhi-dānasya takra-dānem bāḍhakaṃ bhavati.  
(Maḥābh. on P. 7.4.61).
From this it follows that Patañjali admits both exceptional (niravālāsa) and predominant rules as apavāda (vidyā Ps. 58). Purusottama makes three (21, 22, 23) canons of it and Sīrdeva two (36, 37). In Mūnīśa too varieties of bāha are discussed.

There are some places in the Astādhyāyī where an apavāda (31) (Ps. 60) poses to obstruct two later rules of operations. (Ps. 61) it (32) arranged between two general rules tends to oppose both of them. According to the Mahābhā, in both these cases, the apavāda will obstruct the earlier of the general rules. Patañjali refers to at least 13 instances of the first case and 11 ones of the second. For example, kṣa (Ps. 3.1.45) obstructs cā (Ps. 3.1.52), but not 6it (Ps. 3.1.60; 66); -ka (Ps. 3.1.135) obstructs -nda (Ps. 3.1.140), but not -an (Ps. 3.2.1.). Similarly -dhab (Ps. 4.1.120) opposes -cā (Ps. 4.1.113), not dhrak (Ps. 4.1.129) nor -dham (Ps. 4.1.135); P. 4.1.55 opposes P. 4.1.54, not P. 4.1.57 and so on. In such places, a general rule which is the last of the three, max conflicting rules, prevails over the apavāda on account of its posterior position in order of enumeration (P. 1.4.2). It is interesting to note that nowhere in the Mahābhā, the aforesaid two canons are treated as exclusive instruments of solutions and that these are solutions referred to as prospective. Any obstruction of apavāda is sought in favour of further operations in the rules themselves. The

(31) Purastād apavāda anantarān vidhīn bādhante nattarān.
(32) Madhye apavādaḥ purvān vidhīn bādhante nattarān.
(33) Vārttikas have noted many such cases.

As stated earlier, the rule P. 3.1.94 has noted certain exceptions to the predominance of an exceptional rule. Exceptions to this exception are noted in the appropriate place in our discourse.

Certain other instances of apavādas conceding to utsargas may be cited here. For example, so far as operations in reduplicated verbal stems are concerned, no bādhaka (viz. para, nitya, antarānga or apavāda) is found opposing another operation. This is derived from the word 'aṅīt' in P. 7.4.63 which is meant for prohibiting lengthening in the stem in jaṅganyate, yaṅganyate etc. Before the frequentative suffix viz. yaṅ, after yakk is augmented to abhyāsa (P. 7.4.83) there is practically no scope of lengthening. Still its prohibition bears a meaning if only the obstructing role of the augment is ignored. Thus in jaṅganyate, shortening of the abhyāsa vowel by P. 7.4.57 is not opposed by P. 7.4.83. In adikṛtata, adikṛtata etc., i(t) by P. 7.4.83 is not opposed by lengthening which would occur by P. 7.4.94. In māmṛṣṣate the antaraṅga lengthening by P. 3.1.6 does not oppose i(t) by P. 7.4.79. In ājīgaṇat, retention of the initial consonant alone of the root in abhyāsa (P. 7.4.60) is not opposed by ā (P. 7.4.67). In other words, the last consonant in abhyāsa part is elided first and then ā.

is to replace the vowel which is ultimate in the modified form of abhyāsa. This exception viz. Abhyāsa-vikāregu bādhya-bādhaka-bhāvo nāsti (Pā 67) is referred to in the Mahābh. on P. 3.1.6 and P. 7.4.82.

Besides cases of some grammatical operation in abhyāsa, some other instances can be cited against infallibility of an exception. For example, the word (I) Dāśaratha (Dāśaratha + an) -an by P. 4.1.83 is affixed even in the face of -iḥ by P. 4.1.85.

(II). there is no bar to add -an by Amudāttadeśa ignoring -mayat by (Nityam vṛddha etc.) P.4.3.144 (according to Sk) and so on.

Indication to this canon viz. Kvacād apavāda-viṣaye-pyutsargo'bhinivīśate (Pū 115/ Ps 59) is the prohibition of sixth ending in favour of the second case-ending in Kṣaṁ Kāroko brajata etc. (P.2.3.70). Because it presupposes -yāν to which -an by P.3.3.12 would be an apavāda. According to Puruṣottama, a general rule by virtue of its generality would enjoin something generally. Of course it must concede to the unavoidable places of apavāda as envisaged in the Mahābh. (cp. Prakalpya apavāda-viṣyam etc.).

Thus in nīgyatuh, nīyuh (ni + liṭ jhi) etc. instead of -iyan which has prompter conditioning causes, yan by P. 6.4.82 is operative. The Mahābh. on Iko jhal (P. 1.3.9) discusses this point under review. It is stated therein that in čiṣati (či + san + leṭ tip) tuṣṭuṣati (stu + san + tip) etc. the suffix -san is treated as "kit" by P. 1.2.9 with a view to avoiding gubhation. Though lengthening of i or u by P. 6.4.16 would have no scope in case gubhation has taken place and the former as 'niravakāsa' would occur first
with opposition to the latter, Patanjali entertains the apprehension that gunation is possible after lengthening (anavakāśatvena bādhaka.-eya pravṛttyuttaram ubṣarga-pravṛtter angikarāt—Uddyota on P.1.2.9).

With this in view the rule on lengthening is supposed to stop gunation in both short and long vowels which can be lengthened by P. 6.4.16. In ūḍikṣaṭi, jihāṣaṭi etc. lengthening of the cerebral vowel opposes its gunation but effects replacement by i (P. 7.1.100). The prohibition of gunation by P. 1.2.9 in these cases is not so necessary. In jñāpsati it is necessary to treat saci as 'kit' (jīnap + nić + lat tip). Shortening in the root which is treated as optional, absence of it by P. 7.2.49 and it by P. 7.4.55 follow one by one.

Of gunation, elision and lengthening which may take place of nić, lengthening as 'anavakāsa' may obstruct both gunation and elision in absence of 'kit' nature of the suffix. But elision of nić might oppose lengthening, on account of the provision of the nature of 'kit', lengthening prevails.

One point more. It is observed in the Mahābh. with reference to the rule P. 2.2.3 that when an apavāda (exceptional rule) and ubṣarga (general rule) are optional, an ubṣarga does not operate in absence of the apavāda. The indication regarding it in the rule P. 2.2.3 is the word 'aryatāraśyām' that is meant for possessive tatpurusa (bhikṣa-dvitiya) beside ekadesin compound (dvitiya-bhikṣa) etc. The reappearing rule Vibhāṣa (P. 2.1.11) is not relied upon for this purpose simply on account of the aforesaid commitment. In the compound word ardha-pippali there is only ekadesin compound.

(34) Yatrotsargāpavādam vibhāṣa tatrāpavādena mukte ubṣargo
na bhavati (Mahābh. on P.2.2.3).
In unmatta-Gangam there is no bahuvrīhi compound beside Avyayī-
ḥāva. In Dāksi. there is no -an beside in. But there is no bar
to admit both Upagava (Upagu + an) with affixation and Upavapa-
tyam by compound. Two vibhāsas are at our disposal here, one from
P. 4.1.82 which admits alternative use of words formed with suffix
and explanatory sentence and the other from P. 4.1.81 which admits
compound. The term of option (vibhāsa) in P. 2.1.18 beside the
other term from P. 2.1.11 admits possessive compound beside Avydy-
ḥīva and explanatory sentence in Gaṅgāpāre, pāre, pare, and
Gaṅgāyāḥ pare. Along with the exceptional suffix (P.4.1.118) -an,
the suffix -dhak by P. 4.1.121 is particularly accommodated after
Pila (Paila, Pāleya). The word viz. anyatarasyam is a deterrent
to the prohibition of possessive compound in bhikṣā-dvitiya etc.

4. RELATIVE IMPORTANCE BETWEEN THE PRIMARY MEANING
(MUKHYA) AND THE SECONDARY MEANING (GAUNA).

Relationship between the primary meaning (mukhya) and the
secondary meaning (gaunā) deserves a critical study. It is deter-
mined by the canon Gaunā-mukhyeyor mukhye kārya-sampratycyeyh (Ps 15/
Pu 5/81 103). Here the conflict is not between a popularly known
meaning and a technical meaning envisaged in a scientific discourse,
but between the primary and the secondary meanings. The secondary
meaning owes its origin and existence to either necessity (artha),
or relevance (prakaraṇa) or proximity of some other word or some-
thing else. The primary meaning is independent of all these
extraneous elements. The Mahābhārata formulates the interpretative canon Gaṇa-mukhyayor mukhyo kārya-saṃpratyaḥ on P. 6.3.46 and opines in favour of a primary meaning with preference to a secondary meaning. The word 'go' primarily means a bull or a cow and secondarily indicates a dullard (vāhika); in the sentence, says the Mahābhārata, Gaur amabandhyah etc., it is not a dullard, but a bull that is denoted. Similarly -dhak is affixed to agni- in its primary meaning and not in the secondary viz. Agnir mānovakaḥ etc.

It is to note that this canon has its corresponding maxim in the Mūmasā where vṛttidvaya-virodha is apprehended, though finally discouraged. Thus Viśnunāsāvara's view to mean both full-brother and half-brother by 'bhūtā' is criticised by Nīlakantha; similarly by 'matā', Aparādhi meant both mother and step-mother and it was criticised (Vaiśnavavallīka 2.135). This canon is again referred to by Sahāra. Irregularity admitted in cerebralisation of a in 'agnisoma' in P. 4.2.32 is cited as the indication to endorsement of the canon in the Paninićan system.

The question is whether the stem 'go' should undergo inflectional changes or not when it expresses some secondary meaning. The Mahābhārata and its annotations, viz. the Pradipika and the Udyota admit all declensional changes in a stem to mean even the secondary meaning. The argument is thus that a stem is declined in its primary sense and the inflected word by its relation to another word in a sentence will mean some secondary sense. In other

(35) Artha-prakarana-sabdārthasaṃbandhādi-nirapekṣa-svarūpaṃtiṃtraṃ yaṃ artheśaśabdāḥ pratyācayati saṃkhyāḥ...
(Uddyota on P. 6.3.46),
words, declension precedes the advent of secondary sense and we use 'Gaustisthati', 'Gana anaya' etc. with usual declension. Now, comprehension of the primary meaning happens only when the word is influenced by proximity of other words in a sentence.

When we replace 'mahad-bhuta' for 'amahän mahän bhuta', the quality of mahän (i.e. greatness) is superimposed upon amahän i.e. to say, greatness which is the primary meaning of 'mahat' is imported and secondary in mahadbhutah. It is on this consideration that the ultimate to of mahat is not replaced by a(t) by the rule P.6.3.46. Because this phenomenon should take place only when the primary meaning is denoted by the word 'mahat'. Thus in mahad-bhutä, the compressed substitute for 'amahatī mahatī bhuta', loss of the feminine suffix (pumkabhava) is admitted. For femininess is a primary meaning and loss of the feminine suffix too is treated as primary. In Gomati-bhuta, however, Gomati is the name of a river and there is no loss of the feminine suffix. When two boys are compared to the twin gods, Agni and Soma, called Agni-Šomau jointly, they too can be called Agni-Šomau; but when Agni and Soma mean two boys, in the compound of these two words, it is simply Agni-Šomau with neither lengthening of i nor cerebralisation of s. In the first instance, the

(36) Tatra padasya padāntarasahandhaś rtha-viparyāsasambhavat padakāryasyeva gauṃamukhyavyayā na prakārikākārayaḥ (Prādīpa on P.6.3.46). Kielhorn rightly analyses that addition of the suffix -yet, to svaśātra to mean son of the Father-in-law, being a pada-vidhi, this stem in its primary sense alone will have this suffix. The rule xxxx Ot(P.1.1.15) too concerns the primary indelible, But ata in (P.4.1.85) does not bother about the canon. Prohibition of the nature of pronoun in respect of sarva etc. when it is upasajarjana, by Panini's rule shows that upasjarjana is not treated as gama here. (Kielhorn, Footnote, Page 87-89, translation of the Ps).
two grammatical phenomena take place in the primary sense and subsequently the compound word is taken up in a secondary meaning as it is noticed in 'gau¥ vēhikāh'; but in Agnisomau, the meaning (37) is all secondary and hence there is neither ī nor s. In the chapter on cases (P. 1.4.13 - 1.4.55), however, the maxims of the predominance of mukhya over gauna does not operate at all excepting in the case where preference of mukhya is stated by something like the superlative suffix -tamāp etc. Thus it is the verbal locative case in Gangayān ghoṣah though secondary. The importance of 'sādhakatama' and 'ipṣitama' are well stated by -tamāp even though the latter concedes to certain simple accusatives.

In śka certain places as Purusottama says secondary meaning is preferred to the primary. For example, śītaka and uṣṇaka formed by P. 5.2.72 mean 'lazy' and 'expert' respectively.

5. SUPERIORITY OF THE INJUNCTIVE ROLE TO THE RESTRICTIVE ONE.

According to the canon Vidhīnyāma-sambhave vidhiśreva jyōyān (Pā. 109/6. 112) when a rule or a part of it may be construed either as an injunctive precept (vidhi) or as a restrictive formulation (niyama), its role as an injunction should be preferred. For example, the rule Yasya halāḥ (P. 6.4.49) which

(37) The replacement of i by ī in Agni, by Īdagnēḥ Somavaruneyah (Pā. 6.3.27) and s becomes ś by Agnēḥ stutstoma-somāḥ (Pā. 8.3.22).

(38) Vide the Mahābh. and the Prāḍīpa on P. 1.4.42; Gp. Sāmrthyā-gamyah prekarso nāśriyate (Prāḍīpa on P. 1.4.42).
formulates the elision of the first member of 'ya' after a consonant and before an ērdhadhātuka suffix. Some may argue that it is a restrictive rule for it prevents y of 'ya' from elision after a vowel in lolūyītā, yoyūyītā etc. It is however resolved that it enjoins the elision of y after a consonant and before an ērdhadhātuka suffix and is essentially a vidhi. It may be suggested that

(39) The Siddhāntaśāsana of Appayya Dīkṣita on the Monistic Vedānta clearly brings out the characteristic features of three kinds of pronouncements (vidhi), viz. apūrva-vidhi, niyama-vidhi and parisamkhya-vidhi, the first of which we call vidi and the other two 'niyama' in grammatical discourses. A vidhi (i.e. apūrva-vidhi) enjoins something which is otherwise unknown to us (Cp. Kala-trayo'pi katkamāyapraptasya prāpti-phaleko vidhiḥ ahyāh). Sprinkling of water over rice which one needs for preparation of cake (purośāse) in the Darsa-pūrṇamaśa ceremony is enjoined in the pronunciation 'Vṛihiṇi prokṣyati'. But for this, we could not know the process of action. But 'Vṛihiṇi avahanti' is a niyama-vidhi. Without it, one might easily know through popular experience that either pressing (avaghaṇa) or breaking with nails (maṅka-viḍalana) is necessary for separating rice from chaff. When somebody prefers the latter process, the former has no scope at all. The pronouncement orders in favour of pressing and thereby prohibits breaking with nails (Pakṣa-prāptiṣeṣaparipṛāptapraṇāsyoṃ viḍiḥ dvitiyāḥ). When two things, one thing is related to two ceremonies or two things are related to one ceremony the pronouncement which prohibits the unintended in favour of the agreeable is a parisamkhya-vidhi (Dvayoh sesinor ekasya sesasya va, ekasmin sesini dvayoh sesayor va nityapṛāptay seyantarasaya sesantarasaya va nivṛtti-phaleko vidhiḥ triyāh). For example, the enkindling of sacred fire (Agni-śeyāna) requires the ceremony with the tongue of a horse or an ass. The incantation 'Iśām agraṇāy rasamāṇtasya' may well be concerned with both of them. The pronunciation Aśvāḥśāhānādattede prohibits taking the tongue of an ass. While aṣvāṇā yaṣṭiḥ etc. should be identical in both the rītes called grhamadhiya and darsapūrṇamaśa the pronouncement 'Aṣvāṇāyaṣṭiḥ darsaṇaḥ yajati' prohibits the extended application of yaṣṭiḥ etc. in the grhamadhiya of which darsapūrṇamaśa is the prototype.
the rule even then would ratify the elision of the last member of 'ya' by 'Alontyasya'. But Patañjali's decision is this that reference to the whole syllable viz. 'ya' in the rule leaves no room for such apprehension i.e. to say, the canon 'Alontyasya' has no part to play here. The rule 'Ijadeh samumah' (P. 8.4.32) might be understood as a 'niyama' because it prohibits cerebralisation of n in pratim-kana, parim-kana etc. where the verbal root does not begin with a vowel. The Mahābh. suggests incorporation of 'samam' in P.5.4.34 to prevent n in pratim-kana etc. from cerebralisation. In that case, for cerebralisation of n in the hṛt suffix after a verbal root beginning with a vowel other than a, ā and possessing rum in consequence of the elision of ultimate i, the present rule would unquestionably be an injunctive precept. Or P. 8.4.32 should be explained as enjoining compulsory cerebralisation in pratim-kana etc. which would otherwise be optional by 'Ner vibhāgā' (P. 8.4.30).

The Pradīpa on both the vidhi rules discussed above ascertains the relative importance of 'vidhi' and 'niyama'. According to this annotation, in a niyama, negligence in the primary meaning, followed by inferred prohibition of something and repetition of what has already been said are some of the inconveniences.

(39)(contd.)

As it is found prohibition of the unintended in favour of the agreeable is the aim of both niyama and pariscalīṣyā. Appayya however distinguishes that in niyama positive favour of evaḥāṣṭa etc. is primary and prohibition is a subsequent whereas in pariscalīṣyā, prohibition of the unintended is primary. In grammar this prohibitory spirit in both of them resulting in restriction is treated with the common term i.e. niyama.
A vidhi never meets these inconveniences (Mīyane prāpta-bādhah, siddhāsyā punar upādānād anuvādadoṣāṣ ca etc. Prādīpa on P. 8.4.32). Sīrādeva too points them out. In his view superiority of vidhi is but a mere illustration of that of the antarāṅga. Between a restrictive rule and a deduction from a rule, he finds no distinction of superiority.

6. PREFERENCE OF A SUFFIX TO NON-SUFFIX.

Pratyayapratyayayor gṛhāṇe pratyayasyadva gṛhāṇam bhavati (Mahābh. on P. 6.4.1). Pratyayapratyayayoh pratyayē sam-

pratyayah (Prādīpa on P. 6.4.135). Pratyayapratyayayoh pratyayasya gṛhāṇam P. 111/31 117/Pu 92.7.

Where a word or group of syllable may mean either a suffix or something else the question of preference of the one to the other is pertinent. A suffix may drop its ṭ but a verbal root—etc. may do as well. By Tit svaritām (P. 6.1.135) svarīta accent may be claimed in kva (kim + ot) as well as in kīrati (kṛ + tip) girati (gṛ + tip in lat) etc. For the word kva is derived from a suffix which lost its indicatory ṭ. In the other two words, the vowel ṭ in the verbal roots changes into 1(t). In Vano ra ē (P. 4.1.7) 'van' may stand for either the suffixes viz. śvanip, vanip, kvanip or the verbal root van-; in Vasoh samprasāram (P. 6.4.131) Vasu-
srānsu etc. (P. 3.2.72) 'vasu' may represent the suffix or a verbal
root. Similarly in Sansāṃsabhikṣa uh (P. 3.2.168), Sanvatsah (P. 7.4.79) etc., san may be either the desiderative suffix or a verbal root. Under such circumstances the canon under review helps in determining the priority of the suffix. According to this canon in the confusion between a suffix and anything else the former is to be preferred to the other. The Mahābh. refers to this canon under the rule Āṅgasya (P. 6.4.1) as the opinion of some alien scholars who seeks to nullify the rule itself by solving instances related to this rule through this canon and through the other canon ‘Arthavādgrahanaś nānarthakasya’.

With the consensus of opinion among the scholars, the canon Pratyayāpratyaya etc. belong to some alien grammatical school.

Rāyān under P. 6.1.185 formulates one vārttika which prevents everything but a suffix from a svarita accent by this rule. It shows his disapproval of this canon. The Pradīpa under P. 6.4.1 cites a few instances which derive benefit from the present canon. For example, (I) in ‘dehi sanotl’ no lenthoning permissible in cases of the suffix -san, takes place; (II) in brahmānabhīṣa bhis is not replaced by -ais, (III) in yuṣmat-sāma, sāma is not replaced by -ākam, (IV) tu and hi, two particles, cannot be replaced by tāte, (V) ām, a non-suffix is not augmented by num, (VI) in prāng, āna has no such augment as muk. All the aforesaid operations which were apprehended in non-suffix take place only when suffix (including ending) is concerned. The same annotation comments that the two canons Arthavādgrahana etc. and Pratyaya, Pratyaya etc. resorted

(40) Titi pratyayagrahanam (V5, under P. 6.1.185).
to by some grammarians as a match of the Paninian rule P. 6.4.1. (41) fail to influence those cases where letters alone are concerned. It is for this limited utility of the canons that the Mahābh. does (42) not solely rely upon them. It stands that neither Kātyāyana nor Patañjali has employed this paribhāsa of preference of prefix to apratyaya in their treatises. The only reference to it in the (43) Mahābh., on P. 6.4.1 would be more information of an alien view. Kaiyata refers to it under P. 6.4.3 the Nyāsa under P. 1.2.2, and the Aṃrtyāsa under P. 6.3.118. All this for preference of short statements to a long discussion. Thus in P. 1.2.41 the word 'pratyaya' is inserted without reliance upon the maxim. Of course 'u' in P. 3.2.168 must be marked as a suffix.

7. CLAIMS OF CONSIDERATION FOR AN ASSOCIATE FACTOR.

The paribhāsa sahaśaritāśahaśaritayoh sahaśaritasyayath grahaṇaṃ (Pā. 112/Pu 49/Si 118) propounds that in a confusion between a similar thing and a dissimilar in relation to something else, the similar one should be preferred to the dissimilar. According to the Ps of Nāgasa, this canon is indicated in the Mahābh. on P. 2.3.8. Patañjali exemplifies therein that since the post-position 'apa' signifies exclusion or rejection (varjana) whereas 'pari', the

(41) Iyamvanostu nāyam parihāraḥ varnagraheṣu paribhāṣe-dveṣasyaye
mupasthānat...sryartham ityādeviṣyamvaṇprāsanteṣaḥ (Pradīpa on
Pā. 6.4.1.)

(42) *paribhāṣe tu Bhāgyakara-Vārttikakārābhyan na kvačīā
āśṛtāḥ (Pradīpa on P. 6.1.185).

*na kvačī laksyasiddhyartham āśṛtetyarthah (Uddyote on.
P. 6.1.185).
other post-position is capable of signifying exclusion and otherwise the latter when read along with the former as in P.2.3.10, must signify rejection. As a bullock can be assisted by another bullock to share the yoke, so is the case with these two indeclinables. So by Pañcanyapāparibhāṣā (P. 2.3.10), one cannot use the fifth case-ending in connection with pari which indicates a meaning other than exclusion or rejection. In Viparābhyaṃ jah (P. 1.3.19) by its very association with 'vi', 'para-' is a prefix and not the feminine form of para (superior).

In Dvi-trī-caturbhyaḥ sudd (p. 5.4.18), all the three mineral stems viz. ṛ, tri and catur have sudd to denote frequency of action. Still the word 'Krtr'tha' is incorporated in P. 8.3.43 as an adjective to catur. This can be construed as indicating that the canon under review is optional. For example, in Dīhīvevītān (P.1.1.6), the augment it (and not the verbal root it to go) is read along with verbal roots. Some would however say that similarity of the words referred to in P. 5.4.18 lies in the suffix i.e., -sudd which is affixed to the particular stems and that of the two roots and the augment it in Dīhīvevītān (P. 1.1.6) lies in their loss of the indicatory consonants. So these sutras may not be construed as preaching option for the paribbāṣā. Such a view is however absent from ancient discourses. Purusottama and Sīrādeva had nothing new in their discussions.

(43) Aṅgasyeti sutre tu tat-pratyākhyānavalkacācinopanysta, no tu siddhāntinā ityāsayah (Uddyota on P. 6.1.185).
2. INDICATION OF THE EFFECT OF ASSOCIATION IN A RULE.

Reappearance (anuvrtti) of certain elements in a rule from some other rules is a very peculiar feature of the rules. It results in brevity of the discourses. Pāṇini, the author of the Aṣṭādhyāyī, formulated the rule, Svaritendhikāraḥ (P. 1.3.11) as an interpretative canon on appropriate reappearance in his rules. The Mahābhārata has explained the word 'adhyālaya' and discussed its varieties with analogous popular practices. It has been decided there that svarīta accent is the beacon of reappearance. It is however very difficult to work out the position of a svarīta index in rules. The authoritative commentaries alone by virtue of their traditional relationship with the text can ascertain a svarīta. It is perhaps for this reason that interpretative canons pertaining to reappearance were utilised or formulated in post-Pāṇinian ages in the Pāṇinian system of grammar. Rightly does Śīrādeva recognise the canon (Śi 14) as an explanatory statement on the appearance of svarīta in Pāṇini's text.

According to the first of the three canons under review everything enjoined conjointly in a rule should reappear or be rejected in respect of a concern en bloc. Persons engaged in a job, we know, work or take leave jointly. According to the Ps of Nāgasaṇḍha the import of the canon Eksyogaśistānam saha vā pravṛttih saha vā nivṛttih (Ps 17/Pu 24/Śi 14) has analogy derived from this popular practice. It has its root again in the Pāṇinian rules which seek partial reappearance and thereby point out total reappearance in other places. In view of this in 'Adasā māt' (P. 1.1.12), māt is
incorporated, as it is construed, with a view to opposing the reappearance of ē(t) which was otherwise inevitable due to its appearance along with ē and ē for the same purpose in the rule (44) P. 1.1.11 by the present paribhāga. That Pāṇini sought to exclude ē(t) is a proof to his recognition of this canon. Moreover, Pāṇini has incorporated the word, sic once more in Ṛṣaḥ sic (P. 1.2.14) presumably to indicate that but for the word sic both (45) li & ē and sic enjoined in P. 1.2.11 could have reappeared jointly by the canon Bhavya etc. In addition, without the word ‘sup’ in Sup pratiṣṭhā nātrāṣṭho (P. 2.1.9) both ‘sup’ and ‘avayoga’ would be inevitable by the same canon. The word sup incorporated in this rule prevents avayoga from reappearing here. The influence of the canon is discernible in P. 7.2.1 which consisting of three words reappears in P. 7.2.2 as a whole. The whole of P. 3.3.17 reappears in P. 3.3.18. But in P. 6.4.161 the rule P. 6.4.154 minus tuḥ reappears admitting option in the canon. As Śrīdāva shows it reappears from P. 1.3.9 in P. 1.3.10 but the two other words are not reappearing.

Some think that incorporation of the word it in P. 7.2.35 in spite of its prospective reappearance from P. 7.2.8 should be interpreted as opposing the reappearance of the negative particle (46) ‘ṇ’ from P. 7.2.8 to P. 7.2.35. The Nākābhā, however puts forth a different view. According to Patañjali, it along with gatam might be inherited in P. 7.2.35 and still incorporation of ‘ṅ’ in P. 7.2.35

(44) Iduddod duvācānaḥ praghyam (P. 1.1.11).
(45) Liṅ-śicāvātmanopadoṣaḥ (P. 1.2.11).
(46) Ardhañkātukasyodvaiśeḥ (P. 7.2.35). Nākābhā Kṛtih (P. 7.2.3).
(47) confirms the claim of it only, not of its modification. The negative particle would however be rejected on account of another canon viz. 'Kvacidekadesopyamuvartate' which permits partial reappearance in certain circumstances. Patañjali's approval of these two paribhāsās is thus beyond doubt. Māgasa in his Uddyota however points out that the Mahābh. under P. 7.2.35 proposes to exclude the word it from the sūtra since it can be inherited from P. 7.2.8. Such being the case, the former proposition in the Mahābh. regarding word (49) opposition of guna of it by the/it in P. 7.2.35 seems to be a mere reference to some alien view.

The indications of the canon Ekayoga etc. made particular provisions of partial reappearance of certain elements with a view to avoiding unintended results in certain instances. Several rules however, without any such provisions admit partial reappearance. This is formulated in the canon 'Kvacidekadesopyamuvartate'. As it is observed, partial reappearance may casually take place in rules of Pāṇini. The Mahābh. and its annotations establish this proposition under P. 4.1.27 and P. 6.1.93. The Mahābh. under P. 4.1.27 points out that from the previous rule (P. 4.1.26) the word 'asakhyādeh' recurs in P. 4.1.27 but 'avasyādeh' is avoided. Similarly from P. 5.2.24 the word 'mūla' alone recurs but 'pāka' is avoided in the rule Paksāttih (P. 5.2.25). From P. 6.1.92 'sup' recurs in the

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(47) ...ideva yathā syāt yad anyat prāpnoti tasmā bhut...gunkh. (Mahābh. on P. 1.1.6).
(48) ...Ārdhadhatukasya valāderiti. Idityamuvartate, noti- nivrttam (Mahābh. on P. 7.2.8).
(49) ...Ārdhadhatukasyeti sūtrasthasgrahanasya...pratyākyānāt. (Uddyota on P. 1.1.6).
(50) Dāmakāyanāntācā (P. 4.1.27). Autōmsaṣṭh (P. 6.1.93).
Later rule (P. 6.1.93) but vā is avoided. From P. 3.4.63 the word 'let' alone recurs in P. 3.4.64. Nyāp is avoided in P. 4.1.4. From P. 7.1.2 'pratyaya' only and not adī too recurs in P. 7.1.3. The word jantu not preceded by ksudra reappears in P. 2.4.9 from the previous rule. The most glaring example here is however Aluguttarapade (P. 6.3.1) which is an adhikāra rule of which 'aluk' recurs upto P. 6.3.25 and 'uttarapade' until the adhikāra of āṅga begins (P. 6.4.1) i.e. upto P. 6.3.83. This paribhāṣa too is reminiscent of the Pāñinian rule Svaritenādhikārah. The Predīpa ascertains that the svarita index as promised by Pāñini is the only determining instrument of a reappearance. It is clear that Pāñini's rule is more beneficent than the vague canon in the Mahābh. because the former supplies us with an interpretative device of svarita which can be ascertained at ease from old commentaries. As the practice goes even a part of a compound word if marked with the svarita can (52) reappear dispelling apprehensions that a compound word having one meaning might not be divided. Interestingly this canon is indicated by the word iti in the Pāñinian canon P. 1.1.67 which proves futility of inheriting iti from the canon P. 1.1.66 and admits the word nirdīṣṭa alone within its fold.

The particle 'ōa' in a rule has a positive role with reference to the recurrence of the word(s) from earlier rules. It has been decided that when among three consecutive rules the middle one incorporates 'ōa' with a view to admitting recurrence of an element

(51) Tasya pākamāla pīlvādi-karpaḍābhyaḥ suṣaṇābhacau (P. 5.2.34).
(52) (I) Tasya svaritatvam pratijñāyate tadovāṃvartate — — (Predīpa on P. 6.1.93).
(II) Śabdāmmūnapakṣe yasyaiva śabdasya svaritatvam pratijñāyate sa evāṃvartate — (Predīpa on P. 4.1.27).
from the previous rule, the element can well recur in the third rule. But when 'ca' in a rule admits an element reappearing from a remote rule its scope is limited within that sūtra which incorporates 'ca'. In other words no later rule benefits from the recurrence of the element. The canon viz. Ṛāmakṛṣṭaṇa notṭarastva (Pā. 79/Pu 87/Si 42) concerns the latter observation. For example, the rule Vadah supi kyap ća (Pā. 3.1.106) adopts -yat from Acō yat (p. 3.1.97) but 'Bhuvobhāve' (Pā. 3.1.107) does not. But in the triad of consecutive sūtras viz. Karmāṇi dvitīyā (Pā. 2.3.2), Tāṭīyā ća hośchanāsā (Pā. 2.3.3) and Antarāntaraṇā yukto (Pā. 2.3.4) 'ća' in the middle rule brings dvitīyā in Pā. 2.3.3 and it cannot prevent the reappearing element from recurring in Pā. 2.3.4. So the paribhāṣā Āmukṛṣṭaṇa etc. is ineffective so far as reappearance conditioned by 'ća' is concerned among triads of consecutive rules.

This canon can be deduced some grammarians say, from the incorporation of namul in Pā. 3.4.59. We know that in 'Śvādumi namul' (Pā. 3.4.26) the word namul was already incorporated. Now for the sake of brevity we could have drawn the word namul from Pā. 3.4.26 to Pā. 3.4.59 and written 'ktvā ća'. But the subsequent five rules (Pā. 3.4.60 - Pā. 3.4.64) inherit both ktvā and namul. Pāṇini, instead of making the particle 'ća' represent the inherited namul in Pā. 3.4.59 utters the word once more. It indicates that 'ća' could not permit recurrence of namul in the five rules. It proves that the paribhāṣā has indications in Pāṇini himself.

(53) Avyaye yathābhūpatakhyāne kṛṇaḥ ktvā-namulau (Pā. 3.4.59).
And its optional nature too was known to him as Puraṣottama and Siradeva observe. Because he incorporates 'ra in P. 8.4.12 to oppose extension of option by 'ca' in P. 8.4.11.

The Mahābh. on Lūṭi 'ca kipah (P. 1.3.93) observes that if no reappearance be possible without 'ca' then it should be incorporated in Dyudbhuyolūd (P. 1.3.91) too to obtain option here and that if it be possible without 'ca' it should be expunged from P. 1.3.93. Thus all 'ca's may be rejected in the rules. Kaiyata clarifies that since by svarītā index, reappearance can be marked, it is useless to incorporate 'ca' in rules. Nāgasaṅkha however limits the scope of this observation of the Mahābh. and comments that here rejection is proposed in respect of such a 'ca as is there to represent certain reappearing elements. In Aṭesāča (P. 6.1.90) 'ca' which is meant for re-enjoining cannot be expunged. Convenient explanation, often says the Mahābh., is the safe supplement of an aphorism. The recurrence or avoidance of a word can be ascertained through interpretation. In view of this both the author of the vrūttikas and Patañjali opine that in Kulyājiukāñcam (P. 5.1.55) (54) both 'luk' and 'kha' might be adopted from previous rules and that their incorporation in P. 5.1.55 is superfluous.

The last of the series of these four canons viz. Sannyoga-śiṣṭākāṁ anyatarāpye ubhāyor anyadāpyaḥ (Ps 87/Pu 66/Sī 75) is this that with the disappearance of the chiefly enjoined element its associates too disappear. The first canon claimed simultaneous

(54) Kulyājiukāñcam śiddhe lukkho-grahānarthākyam pūrvasmin trikabhavāt (vā, on P. 5.1.55).
occurrence and disappearance of two independent elements enjoined in a rule; here, however, disappearance of the chief element is followed by that of a subsidiary element, which is dependent upon the chief in all respects. The Mahābh. seeks to deduce this canon from the incorporation of the suffix-cha in the Paninian rule (55) P. 6.4.153. According to this rule, when words viz. vilva, vetra etc. (belonging to the group that begins with nāga etc.) affixed with -cha which is associated with the augment kuk are again affixed with another secondary suffix the earlier suffix -cha readily drops, leaving behind its subordinate associate kuk. As a result,

vilva + -cha = vilva + kuk + cha = vilvākīya;
vilvākīya (vilva + kuk + cha) + an = vatsivaka.

Similarly, vetra + kuk + cha + an = vaitreka.

Since nothing but -cha, associated with kuk can be affixed to vilva etc. we might easily expunge the suffix -cha from the rule P. 6.4.153. But it appears here to serve a definite purpose. For the very incorporation of -cha in P. 6.4.153 indicates that it alone will drop but its associate augment will not. From this it follows that Panini apprehended the existence of the canon under review and that he employed -cha to save the augment from elision.

(55) Vilvakādiḥhyasāchasya luk (P. 6.4.153). (Vadādināṃ luk ca enjōins -cha; Tatra bhavah, P. 4.3.53 enjōins -an).

(56) Yasāḥṣyaḥ sahāḥ sahāḥ pravṛttah sahāḥ (Vīṭhanarāmaḥ, P. 6.4.153) means the same.
As Panini sees in the Mahabhi, on P. 4.1.36 the canon has a popular basis too. For example, after the order that both Devadatta and Vajradatta will perform a job, when Devadatta leaves or dies, the other partner stops working. The canon however excels in the fact that unlike popular practice it allows very few exceptions. The death of one of the two co-born babies need not be followed by that of the other child; but in the discourse on Panini’s grammar, firm recognition from Panini with exclusion of exceptional cases benefits many instances. For example, two men who worship five Indrani, or five Agnayi, we use the secondary suffix -ay by Sāya devote (p. 4.3.34) which drops by Vivott Ingunayot (P. 4.1.20). Subsequently, the feminine suffix is dropped by Yek tothitaluki (P. 1.2.49). (57) With the feminine suffix goes the augment ūn in Indrāṇi and aī in Agnayi on account of the canon Sannyaga etc. e.g.

Pañcā-Indrāṇī+ay = Pañcā-Indrāṇi = Pañcā-Indra.
Pañcā-Agnayi+ay = Pañcā Agnayi = Pañcā Agni.
Similarly Pañcā dhāvarī + thak (to man Pañcābhī dhāvarīhiṅkāta) = Pañcā dhāvarī (thak drops by Adhyarādhāpurva = P. 5.1.23) = Pañcādhīvan (with the oclusion of the feminine suffix, prefixed by Vana va on P. 4.1.7 is elided).

(53) In pañcāri (=Pañcā + dat = Pañcā + root + dat) + kān, -dat drops along with its augment root in both gāthāe (gōṣṭhā-thik-dat) + kān and āsturā (āśṭur-thuk + dat) + kān, -dat drops along with thuk.

(57) Indrāvanuva = (P. 4.1.30), Vṛddhakṣonyaṇī = (P. 4.1.37).
(53) Tarkya pūrṇa dat (P. 5.2.43), Nāstikādarsaṁhitādat (P. 5.2.49), Sāt-śatipāya-āśṭurān thuk (P. 5.2.51).
which was the resultant augment of the numeral stem before dat. 
Pañākasa, pātka and cātuska are resultant forms. Patañjali examines 
the argument that these substitutes (e.g. r replacing n of dhivaḥ 
in dhivara) and augments should be brought within the jurisdiction 
(adhikāra) of aṅga so that the elided suffixes can not be treated 
as existing to support their consequent results, viz. substitutes 
and augments due to Na lumatāṅgasya (P. 1.1.63). Or it may be said 
that with the loss of the suffix the stem returns to its original 
form. The Mahābhāṣya accepts the canon under review as the third and 
concluding device to explain the disappearance of consequent effects 
with the loss of the suffix. It is clear that all the three expla- 
nations are reasonable while the last one is very simple and is 
hinted by none other than Pāṇini.

According to Pradīpa Purusottama Sīvādeva etc. the canon 
is optional. Prohibition of pumavad-bhāva by adha in the vārṭtika 
viz. Bhāṣyādhe taddhite on P. 6.3.35 is the indication to it. Thus, 
in śyenī + ḍhak = śaineya, the elision of ḍ by Yasyeti ca (P. 6.4.148) 
is not followed by that of n, which was enjoined as an associate 
of ḍ to replace t. The Uddyota justifies the non-elision of n with 
the rule Acah parasmin purva-vidhau (P. 1.1.57). As regards the 
word Srautrā, derived from srotriya which again is the from chandas- 
gha, the suffix-gha is elided before the later secondary suffix but 
the replacement of chandas by srotra before -gha lies intact. All 
admits that this very instance is a pointer to the optional nature 
of the canon.
It is noticeable that a prohibitory pronouncement prevails over relevant injunctions. Such a rule is formulated particularly to prohibit an operation in certain word forms etc. This phenomenon is observed in the canon Nisodhāsa vaśīyamāna (Ps 121/Nil 113). By the rule P. 7.2.39 augmentation of it is prohibited after the verbal roots vṛt- vṛdh- srdh- and syand- before an ārədhaṭṭuṇa ending which begins with s. But in cases of middle endings along with the present participle suffix -sanaḥ and so on which begin with s under certain circumstances, no such prohibition has any scope. For example,

- vart-sya-ti, vartisyate, vartisyamāna
- vart-sya-ti, vardhisyate, vardhisyamāna
- sart-syati, sardhisyate, sardhisyamāna
- syant-syati, syandisyate, syandisyamāna

Inclusion of the suffixes viz. -jatīyar and -desīyar in the list headed by tāśī (P. 6.3.35) with a view to effecting loss of feminine suffix before them in spite of the possibility of doing the same by P. 6.3.42 is construed by Nilakartha as an indication to this canon. In ārañj (p. 1.3.91) as well as in cases where -sya and -sān are added, these verbal roots have optional active endings. In other words, besides 1st formations, we get (I) avartat and avartīṣṭa (II) avartisyat and avartisyate and (III) vīrṛtseti and vīrṛtisyate from the verbal root vṛt-. Similar should be the case with other three verbal roots. With regard to syand- however, optional occurrence of it may be claimed by another sutra. This
optional occurrence of it is an extra in comparison with its prohibition by P. 7.2.59. Still incorporation of the word 'ésturbhayah' in P. 7.2.59 may be construed to object the optional augmentation by it before active endings. Patanjali however rejects the word and relies on the canon that a prohibitory rule prevails over all other rules. Thus in active, no it is augmented in asyant-syati, asyant-syat, asyadat etc. but in middle we have (I) asyant-syate and asyandisyate, (II) asyant-syota and asyandisyota and (III) asya-mit and asyandista etc. with optional it.

Prohibition of the augment it after the verbal root kip- before -tasi (in lut) is sought by Pāṇini by the rule Tāsi ā kīpah (P. 7.2.60). The Mahābhārata contends that this rule is unnecessary because the verbal root kip- has optional active endings in lut, lūt, lūn and with -san. In absence of both the rule P.7.2.60 and the word 'ésturbhayah' in P. 7.2.59 the augment it will be prohibited before active endings. According to the Uddyota, Tāsi is necessary but ā kīpah is superfluous. It is of the opinion that the proposal of expunging the whole of P. 7.2.60 in the Mahābhārata is a mere reference to an alien view.

The rule 'Na lumatāngasya' (P. 1.1.63) is a prohibitory rule which prevails over all relevant injunctions. In Kāśyapa niś (P. 3.1.30) pięt would effect vṛddhi in the stem vowel but ā opposes it by P. 1.1.5. But 'Na kanyamiśanām' (Ganap rule 191) excludes this root from the potential list of 'mit' roots which claim shortening of a vowel. This very prohibition of being a 'mit' and of the consequent shortening suggests that vṛddhi is sure in the word Kāmyate.
It must be mentioned in this connection that propounders of the \( \text{Mīmāṃsā} \) system of philosophy lay more stress and greater importance upon a \textit{vidhi} (injunctive precept) in comparison with a prohibition. They argue that since the latter is based upon the former it must not supersede the \textit{vidhi}. Writers of the \textit{Dharma-śāstras} however hold identical views with grammarians.

10. THE SCOPE OF AN OPERATION IN LETTER VIS-A-VIS AN OPERATION IN A STEM WITH ADJUNCTS.

The \textit{paribhāṣa} \textit{Vārṇa-āṅga vāliyāḥ} (Pā 55/Pu 74/Sī 60/Mīl 60) is deduced from the incorporation of the word \textit{'asavarna\(^*\)} in P. 6.4.78. It has serious implications because it overrules the rule of internal affinity. For example, in the words \textit{iyāya, iyoga, uvokha etc. all in active 1st third person singular just after reduplication of the verbal root and elision of some elements of the earlier part (abhāṣa)}, the question appears as to whether lengthening of the \textit{vowel through euphonic combination} should take place or any transformation of the \textit{vowel in the second part of the reduplicated verbal root before the ending should prevail.}

The lengthening through euphonic combination is internal in comparison with the change of the \textit{vowel in the second part.} On account of the present canon, the rule of internal operation will be superseded. Subsequently, by the rule P. 6.4.78 the first vowel will be replaced by \textit{iya\(\tilde{n}\)} or \textit{uvan} according as the case may be. This rule does not help occurrence of this replacement before

\[ \text{(59) Viḥitapratisiddhatvāḥ vikalpa iti mantavyam... Hitakṣerā, 2.127.} \]
the same vowel for it has mentioned a heterogeneous letter as the subsequent conditioning cause. But this replacement might already be rendered impossible on account of the euphonic replacement of two consecutive vowels by the corresponding long vowel. From this it is proved that the euphonic combination is opposed by the replacement which pertains to aṅga (the stem with adjuncts before a suffix or ending). Some scholars think that since in absence of the present maxim, the whole of the rule P. 6.4.78 seems redundant, it is reasonable to indicate the maxim not by the word 'asaṇvo' along but by the whole sūtra. Others vis. Puruṣottama etc. argue that the very word being an evidence to the possibility of a dissimilar vowel as the paraṇimitta can indicate the canon Vārṇād etc. Whatever it may be, on account of this paribhāṣā (I) gunāti opposes the transformation of u into v in bhavati from bhū- whereas (II) in kāra (kr + ghan) vrddhi opposes the replacement of r by yan. It has been however noticed that the simultaneous occurrence of two potential operations in the same locus is a pre-condition of the application of his canon. In siv- + -na resulting in syona, however, it is the internal y (Yaṇa) which opposes gunāti in the 'aṅga' before the suffix. Some seek to explain this anomaly by saying that gunāti depends upon the suffix but yaṇ does not. In other words, the conditioning cause of these two operations being different, the canon Vārṇād etc. is inoperative. But Nāgasa points out that such difference may be found even in iyosa, uvokha etc. even though Puruṣottama shows 'a' in the ending as the condition of both guna (or vrddhi) and replacement by yan. According to Nāgasa the canon should be treated as non-obligatory; keeping the
word form viz. syona in view. Still the sameness of the locus of the conflicting operations is the pro-condition of the employment of the canon Vāṃśa etc.

From tuk in P. 6.4.19, too, it seems that this canon is optional. Otherwise, replacements of ō by s, being the first choice, as enjoined in an āṅgavīdhi, no scope of tuk would be left and it would be useless to incorporate t(uk) any more in P. 6.4.19. This reading of ō with t(uk) is however construed by both Purusottama and Siradeva as the indication of necessity of the name āśraya (i.e. conditioning cause) for both the āṅgavīdhi and the varṇa-vīdhi concerned. In other words, augmentation by tuk which is the varṇa-vīdhi and replacement of ō by s which is the āṅgavīdhi having as their conditioning causes ō and -na respectively, the maxim is ineffective. The appearance of tuk by P. 6.4.19 in this way becomes a pointer to the sameness of condition of two vīdhic. But as we have found in Nāgasa, sameness of condition is ignored for the sake of iṣṭaṇa etc. In that case, the significance of tuk would lie in the non-obligatory nature of the canon. Even the two illustrated predecessors of Nāgasa viz. Purusottama and Siradeva in their exposition of interpretative canons cite the Nyāsa under P. 1.2.4 to illustrate the employment of the canon Vāṃśa etc. in case of different conditions of the two operations. The indicatory ō of -naḥ in P. 3.3.90 prohibits gāṇāṇa in the stem viśeṣ-(viśeṣ + naḥ = viśeṣa), which could otherwise be opposed as bhāraneṇa. This ō too is a proof to the admission of difference of conditions in respect of a varṇa rule and an āṅga rule. Under such circumstances, it will be convenient, as Nāgasa observed to admit optional
employment of this canon and to explain instances of its non-appearance with the canon of antaraṅga or so irrespective of the difference of conditions of the rules of two operations.

11. A VERBAL ROOT INCLUSIVE OF ITS CAUSATIVE VARIANT.

So far as a change of a letter into a guttural letter (kutva) is concerned, the operation enjoined in respect of a verbal root can be extended to its causative variant too. For example, s is cerebralised in abhiṣeṣyaṣati by P. 8.3.65. In pra-jighayayatī (pra-hi+ni+sa+ti) h is changed into gh by P. 7.3.56. The only exception to this phenomenon is before ēṃ, the conjugational sign (substitute of 'cil') before luni (aorist) in active voice after all causative roots along with the roots sṛ, dru and sru. As a result, we get pra-jighayet (pra-hi+ni+luni+ti) where h is retained. In jighya (hi+lita), jighyatuh (hi+lita atus) etc. where there is reduplication of the root (but no ni+ and no subsequent ēṃ before luni) this phenomenon occurs to replace h by gh i.e., to say, it occurs both in the simple root and in its causative variant when there is reduplication. Patañjali shows that since with the addition of the causative suffix ni+, the stem or the anāṅga is virtually changed and it is impossible and illogical to claim a change into a guttural letter (kutva) in causative verbal stem, the prohibition of this change before ēṃ in Heracāhī (P. 7.3.56) suggests that elsewhere the causative verbal stem undergoes such an operation.
12. INDICATION OF SIMILARITY BY EITHER THE NEGATIVE PREFIX 
AN OR THE COMPARATIVE POST-POSITION TVA.

The canon Nāṇ-iva-yuktam anyasadṛśadhikaranaḥ tathā 
hyarthagatiḥ (Ps 75/Pu 97/Sā 31) is thoroughly examined in the 
Mahābh. under P. 3.2.12. It is ascertaining the significance of 
the word 'acveḥ' in this rule. The canon reappears under P.6.1.45 
to explain the word viz. asiti therein. We know that either 
paryudāsa (reference to something different with a negative 
particle attached to a word) or prasajya-pratisodha (prohibition 
of something mentioned) may be the significance of a negative 
particle. The former primarily asserts something different from 
what is stated with a word to which the negative particle is 
attached. In the latter case, direct prohibition is sought. For 
example in the former, some characteristic features of A are 
expected in B which is referred to by non-A. The word abhraṃga 
would mean a kṣetriya or so, different from a brahmin but similar 
to him by some qualities. By prohibition however 'non-A' denotes 
negation of 'A'. The word asūryam-pasya means one who has not 
exposed oneself to the sun. The sentence 'ghaṭa na pataḥ negates 
pata (cloth) in ghaṭa (jar). From this it follows that both 
atyantābhāva (extreme negation) and anyonyabhāva (mutual differ­
ence) may be indicated in 'prasajya-pratisedha'. It has been

(60) Ni-sri-dru-arubhyāḥ Karteśi ānaḥ (P. 3.1.48).
(61) Evar ānaḥ jñopayetvācāyāmīvyetra myadhikṣaya kutvan 
bhavatīti (Mahābh. on P. 7.3.56).
(62) abhraṃga ityādi tāropitā-brāhmaṇa-tve-vān 
ksetriyādirīti bodhah (Parama-laghu-mahāṣa, Page 64 
Chowkamba, 1946).
(63) observed that action (i.e. to say, verb) and qualification (i.e. to say, an adjective) may be related to the negative particle and that prohibitory expression may be either within the framework of a compound word or within a sentence in such cases.

(64) Sixfold meanings may otherwise be enumerated in connection with naḥ and its substitutes, namely, a- and an- in compounds. According to Bhartrhari, they are similarity (sādṛṣya), negation (abhāva), otherness or distinction (aryatva), meagreness (alpatā), invisible or distinctionless (a-prāṣāntya) and conflict (virodha). All of them may significantly follow from paryudāsa whereas abhāva i.e. direct negation is at the root of prasajya-pratigedha. Similarity, so far as its grammatical connotation is concerned, does not primarily rely upon distinction and so these two are separately mentioned by Bhartrhari. Logicians and rhetoricians however, admit that distinction lies at the very root of similarity. It is however evident that two similar things have similarity in some aspects but are different otherwise. A grammarian expects by distinction several points of difference.

Quite in tune with this discussion is the canon we have proposed to review here. According to this canon, naḥ or its substitute in a rule would signify similarity. For example, in P. 3.1.12 the word 'acveḥ' means something similar

(63) Prasajyāyen kriyāgunaṃ tataḥ pascat nivṛttim karoti
(Mahābhāṣya on Naḥ, P.2.2.6).
to the suffix \( \text{cvi} \). Accordingly, the whole rule is construed to enjoin after words of \( \text{bhr} \) group the suffix \( \text{-kyas} \) which is similar to \( \text{cvi} \) in meaning i.e. \( \text{abhuta-tadbhava} \) (i.e. assumed occurrence of something which was absent earlier). In P. 6.3.132 the word \( \text{apratam} \) points out a case-ending other than the first and the word \( \text{vibhaktan} \) has no part to play but supporting the sense already known from the word \( \text{apratam} \). The word \( \text{kara} \) seems redundant in P. 3.3.19. Because the word \( \text{akartari} \) suffices to refer to other cases. In spite of the distinction signified by \( \text{mahab} \), some sort of popularly recognised similarity can be discerned there. The \( \text{mahah} \) cites a popular practice in support of the canon and comments that a person directed to bring a \( \text{(65) non-brahmin} \), does never bring a piece of stone but brings a person, may be a \( \text{ksatriya} \), similar to a \( \text{brahmin} \) by virtues.

It is to note that a \( \text{varttika} \) urges inclusion of the word \( \text{abhuta-tadbhava} \) in the rule P. 3.1.12. It proves that the \( \text{(66) author of this varttika} \) does not employ this canon. \( \text{patanjali} \) however refers to it with interpretative notes to counteract the suggestion of the \( \text{varttika} \). He does not use the word ‘\text{iti}’ after this canon. It indicates \( \text{patanjali's authorship} \) of this canon which is under review.

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(64) \( \text{tat-sadarvam abhavasa tadanyatva tadapada} \), apradastya virodhasa neahrtaah sat prakrtaah. (\text{shatya hari quoted in Parama-laghuma-jus, Page 66}).

(65) \( \text{abrahaman anaya ityukte brahmana-sadrga evam yate, nasau lohagam aniva krti bhavati} \). (\text{mahabh. on P.3.1.12}).

(66) \( \text{brhadisvabhuta-tadbhavagyapram} \) (\text{va on P.3.1.12}). This \( \text{abhuta-tadbhava} \) is inserted in P. 5.4.50 as the meaning of \( \text{cvi} \) by a \( \text{varttika.} \)
Significance of similarity by iva is too simple to state. It is employed in both popular life and scientific discourses. The Mahābhārata discusses the meaning of the particle iva under P. 2.1.54.

13. THE SUFFIX -AN EXCLUSIVE OF THE SUFFIX -NA.

According to the canon Taśchālike maṅgāndi bhavanti (P. 2.2/Pu 66/Si 76) the suffix -na under the adhikāra rule Śilām (P. 4.4.61) admits the features of the suffix -an. For example, the words āṇuṣa (āṇuṣ + na), tāpasa (tāpasa + na) etc. are affixed with -ṇip which is originally enjoined after a word derived with -an (P. 4.1.15). The canon appears in the Mahābhārata on P. 6.4.172 which points out the irregular formation of kārma from karmam with -na. The elision of 'ti' portion of the stem (i.e. -an of karmam) by nipātana as admitted in this rule and not by the rule Nastaddhite (P. 6.4.144) indicates it. It is an exceptional case. In fact, elision of the 'an' element by P. 6.4.144 could be obstructed before -an-. If this retention of 'an' element in karmam were not inevitable before -na too, the provision of the loss of 'an' by P. 6.4.172 would be useless. In other words, the suffix -na under the adhikāra of Śilām (P. 4.4.61) effects such operations which are originally concerned with -an. On account of this canon of interpretation, the suffix -pān is affixed to a word which is derived with -na. Originally it is enjoined after words derived with -an by Ano dvyačaḥ (P. 4.1.156).
Of course, an indicated canon of interpretation cannot have obligatory employment (cp. Jñāpeśa-siddham na sarvatra - (ps'125). As a result, the feminine form of chātra (chātra + nā) is chātrī with -ṭāp and not chātrī with -nīp. Moreover, the suffix -nā cannot affect the consequences of the suffix -am in P.3.1.240, P. 4.2.67, P. 5.2.101 etc. for nowhere in jujā, dānā, prajnā etc. -nīp is affixed. Of course, in these instances, sīla is not the meaning to be imparted with the secondary suffix -nā.

14. RECOGNITION BY PAST NATURE.

The Mahābhārata, while examining the importance of the rule, Nādi (P. 6.4.3) concludes that this formulation on lengthening of the final vowel of the stem before -ām, the sixth inflectional ending in plural, preceded by the augment maṭ is solely meant for prohibiting this operation in cārmanām etc. where -ām only is added to the stem, maṭ finds no scope and the penultimate vowel in the stem has no lengthening. In narāṇām etc. however, Nādi (P.6.4.3) is not indispensable. If the ultimate vowel in the stem be lengthened otherwise before the ending -ām, the augment maṭ could be augmented to this ending even after the long vowel, in the stem, because of its erstwhile short nature. In that case, the utility of the paribhāṣā under review, Sāmpratikabhāvā bhūtāpūrva-gatiḥ (Ps'77/Pu 15/Si 39) could have a scope of application. The insertion of the word hrasva in the rule P. 7.1.54 might be construed to signify that the short vowel, though lengthened by proximity of -ām, should be treated as short for augment's sake.
The sutra being ‘Nemi’ the presence of the augment -nut proceeds
lengthening of the ultimate vowel in the stem and the paribhasa
finds no scope. This very rule indicates Pāṇini’s disapproval of
the present paribhāṣā in this case.

In (gomat + kyac + kvip + su) gomān etc., the word adhitto
in P. 7.1.70 is unnecessary. Still it may be construed to mean
that the operation i.e., advent of nun extends to the instances
where the present verbal stem was previously not a verbal root at
all. But words formed through such a process are extremely arti-
ficial and no complexity should be encouraged in their formation
to justify the maxin. Purusottama and Śrāvaka however, insist
on retaining the canon and exemplify vṛksaiḥ, where in spite of
the final ‘a’ being changed into ‘e’ by P. 7.3.103, the ending
-this is replaced by -eis. The word ‘ac’ in ‘Acā yat’ (P.3.1.07)
to justify dītasya (dītsa + yat) dītasya etc. may be an indication
to the point.

15. THE LOCUS OF AN OPERATION IS NOT THE CONDITIONING
CAUSE OF THE SAME.

The paribhāṣā, Kāryaṃ samabhavaḥ hi kāryā niṃttatayā
maśāriyaḥ (Pu 10/Pu 2/Si 93) intends on establishing that a word
or its part which undergoes a grammatical operation in itself
cannot serve as a conditional cause (nimitta) of the same. As we
have already seen, there may be either precedent conditional cause
(pūrvanimitta) and subsequent conditioning cause (paranimitta) of
an operation. In the sutras of Panini, the former is read in the
fifth case-ending, the latter in the seventh ending whereas
the locus (sthānīṇa) is always in the sixth ending. Under such circumstances distinction between locus of an operation and its conditional causes (nimittas) is sharply noted and the interpretative canon Kāryam ambhavan etc. seems to be nothing but a clarification of this fact. As Śrādeva thinks prohibition of guna in dīdāṁ, vevīn- by P. 1.1.6 instead of P. 1.1.5 is an indication to the canon. Even jām- included in the kārtādi list may be an indication to this effect. Of course, P. 1.1.6 is declared superfluous in the Nāhābh. and if it be retained at all its purpose would be the prevention of vṛddhi of a non-āk vowel in dīdāyaka etc. Thus the Nāhābh. did not simply reject dīdāṁ- and vevīn- by pointing out elision of n in them (Kielhorn's translation of Ps. Page 52).

The present canon may be invoked for the following instances:

(I) In adhyēta (=adhi- in + tṛ) verbal roots themselves have lost indicatory n from their original forms. This elision of n is not a nimitta to prohibit gunation of the vowel in these roots (P. 1.1.5).

(II) In uryuṇāvāyati (uryuṇā + san + tīp) reduplication of the verbal root precedes gunation by P. 1.1.59. The word San-yanoh (P. 6.1.3) in the sixth ending means that the root along with -san or -yan is the locus of reduplication and the augment 1(t) not before -san should be a paramimitta to this operation. According to Śrādeva, -san, augmented by it is the nimitta because
reduplication affects primarily 'mü' and not -san too. Thus before san preceded by i(t) neither gunation nor its change into av is effective in the wake of the ensuing reduplication (P. 1.1.59). As the Tattvabodhini notes, that which in itself undergoes an operation (kārya) is kāryin (vide Tattvabodhini on P. 1.1.59).

(III) In sunoti (su + sm + tip = su n ti = sunoti) the conjugational sign sm loses s and is consequently a sārve-dhatukā and an 'apit' i.e., 'ni't' (P. 1.2.4). It prevents su from gunation. But tip causes gunation in 'mü'.

(IV) In aririsati (r + san + tip) -i(t)-sa is not a para-nimitta but forms an inseparable part of kāryin viz. ris with reference to reduplication. Here guna of r occurs first and then reduplication takes place. Thus the rule P. 1.1.59 has no part to play in the formation of this word.

(V) In dudyūṣati (div + san + tip) too between replacement of v with uth and reduplication (P. 6.1.9), uth occurs first as enjoined in a paravidhi. This uth is not a conditional cause of reduplication but an integral part of the kāryin. Consequently the operation in the earlier vowel viz. its change into the semi-vowel y in euphonic combination is possible even before reduplication takes place (P. 1.1.59). Thus dyu is reduplicated to give dudyūṣati as the form.

Nāgase in his Pā on this occasion comments that distinction between inherent cause and conditional (nimitta) cause is
admitted in all sāstras and popular practices and that nimitta cause is meant here in the canon under review. It is therefore useless to indicate this canon through jñāpaka. The Mahābhāra, on P. 1.2.59 hints at such observation. Both Purusottama and Sīra-deva however observe irregular utility of this canon. For example, in pipāvīgata (pūṇ + san + lat ta), they say, san- is within the kāryin of reduplication but it augmented to -san by P. 7.2.74 is a paranimitta to guna and consequent replacement by sv of the vowel in the root. In sadhi (sās + imperative sip), hi which is sthāvin of -dhi is the nimitta of replacement of sās- with sā-. Of course, kāryin of an operation cannot be prevented from being the conditional cause to another operation. Thus the view of Purusottama and Sīra-deva is not of much importance. A nimitta too cannot be nimittin i.e. kāryin, of an operation. As noticed by Purusottama (No.94), there is no doubling of r after h in grāmehrada (P. 4.2.142) by P. 8.4.46 and of the same after a vowel and before a consonant in śprardhāyānāḥ (P. 1.3.31) by P. 8.4.47 to admit the aforesaid statement. This observation is a repetition of the canon of predominance of sruta over anumāta (Ps/113).

16. INSIGNIFICANT GENDER AND MÚTHER IN RULES.

Significance of gender is already dealt with to some extent in connection with the two canons viz. Prātipādikagrahāna linga-visistasyēpi grahāna (Ps 72) and Viśhektau lingavisistāgraḥāna (Ps 73). In the canon Sūtra linga-visacānamp atāntrām (Ps 74/ Pu 117/31 30) it is proposed that words in the rules are
utilised with a particular gender and number which may have no relevance and which accompany the word concerned in the rule. In Nāmaśā too, gender and qualification in uddēya are used without specific aim. The Nāmaśā, analyses their role with the help of analogy from popular practice. A person desirous of boiling rice, procures rice along with chaff etc, desirous of eating meat one procures flesh along with bones etc. Similarly, a grammarian utters a word in the particular number and gender which have no significance. It can be deduced from Panini's rule, Ardham napumsakam (P. 2.2.2). The word napumsaka in this rule is useful if only we admit that number and gender have no relevance in a rule. With the canon, the word ardha in neuter, meaning 'half' forms a member in Ekasesin compound (e.g. artha-nāvan, artha-rāh etc.). Of course, the Nāmaśā under 5 o n (the Nāhaśāra rule no. 3) reads the word ardha in masculine to mean 'half'. From this it follows that the word ardha in both masculine and neuter means 'half'. In that case, incorporation of the word ardha in P. 2.2.1 with pūrva, aparā, adhara and uttara would mean admission of compound with the word ardha in both genders. A separate rule Ardham (P. 2.2.2) reading the word in neuter could however manage to restrict it to neuter only. Still napumsakam is incorporated with the apprehension that neuter gender in the word ardham may not have any indication within the rule. This indicates the paribhāṣā under review. The word ekā in P. 1.4.1 in spite of the word samjña in singular is another indication to the canon. Neuter in the word tandhunā in P. 6.1.14 and plural in grīvābhyaḥ in P. 4.3.57 are two instances
Of the same.

(67) A vārttika in the Mahābh. on P. 4.1.92 refers to this interpretative canon in connection with the chapter of secondary suffixes. The Pradīpa extends its scope over all the grammatical operations with few reservations regarding number. For example in the rule, seha supā (P. 2.1.4) where 'sup' recurs from P. 2.1.2 both sup and supā are in singular number and a compound of two words is primarily admitted. Of course, the word kovalāt in P. 5.4.124 indicates compounds of more than two words.

On P. 3.3.18 it is commented by Patañjali that number and gender of a word in a rule are used for the sake of use only. Grammar is based on usage which has no partiality whatsoever with particular gender or number. As regards P. 4.1.92 Patañjali's view (70) is this that by apatya we mean prajana (issue) and it is referring to all genders. Thus both Gārgya and Gārgī are products of the same rule only with the excess of feminine suffix in the latter word.

(67) Taddhitārtha-nirdesā linga-vacanam apramanam tasyāvivaksitātvat.

(68) Kvaśit saṃkhyā tu vivakṣyate.

(69)(I) Avacyam kṣayaḥ vibhaktyā kenaśilīṅgānā nirdeśāḥ kartavyoḥ (Mahābh. on P. 3.3.18).

(69)(II) Prayogamūlatvād vyākaranā-sūrtōh, prayoga ēc sarva-linga-saṃkhyā bhavo praṭyayāhām darsanaḥ iha ēc linga-saṃkhyāyor avivakṣa ityarthāḥ (Pradīpa on P.3.3.18).

(70) Siddhatā tu prajanaśya vivakṣitātvāt (vārttika on P.4.1.92). Prajanaḥ sarvalingāḥ (Mahābh. on P. 4.1.92).
Before going into the discussion of the canon Rvacit svârthikâh prakrîtite linga-vacânasya itivartante (Pa 24/Pu 58/ Si 61) irregularities of number and gender in Sanskrit may be noted. Of course, rare phenomenon in languages, ancient or modern. A list is furnished below to illustrate irregular number in English words:

(I) Colour, custom, letter, manner, effect, number, part, spectacular, premise, quarter etc. have two meanings in their plural forms.

(II) Advice, beef, compass, return, sand, air, force etc. have one sense in singular and the other in plural.

(III) Brother, cloth, dice, genius, index etc. have two plural forms in different senses.

(IV) Summons, alms, caves, riches etc. are true singulars for in all of them 'the final s is part of the original singular noun and not a sign of the plural' i.e. they are singular by etymology. But caves, alms and riches are now used as plural whereas summons in plural becomes summonses.

(V) Amends, means, news, innings, gallows, odds etc. are true plurals in which the final s is really a sign of the plural. Of these words, amends and odds are sometimes used in plural too while the rest are used always as singular.

(71) Video Nofield, Book IV.
Some names of sciences, namely, physics, politics, ethics, metaphysics etc. are always plural and their corresponding Greek words from which they have been transliterated are plural.

Decr, sheep, fish, yoke, brace, dozen, score, hundred weight, pice etc. have same form in singular and in plural.

Cattle, swine, etc. are singular in form but plural in sense.

Abuse, information, alphabet, furniture, offspring, poetry, scenery, issue, holk etc. are not used at all in plural or are used in plural in some specific senses (abusos = wrong uses issues = results). Thus there are peculiarities with regard to number in many English Words.

In Sanskrit, number can in any way be justified in many words where it seems apparently irregular. For example, the word prāna may be a pointer to polygamous society in ancient India (vide S's on P. 1.4.21). Persons of eminence and honour are mentioned in Sanskrit (as in Hindi) in plural only presumably to refer to their multi dimensional personality. The first person pronoun, unaccompanied by any adjective in both singular and dual is optionally used in plural apparently for generalisation (P. 1.2.59). The words, phalguni and proṣṭapada, both dual in number to mean stars, are however optionally used in plural without apparent reason (P. 1.2.60). Similarly punarvasu in dual and tīṣya in
Singular form a compound noun in dual (P. 1.2.63). The words dveya, dvitoya (twin), traya, tritaya (triad), cetugayya (quadruplo), gane, sanmaha, puga, jata etc. (group) are used in singular to denote group concept. This collective sense is evident in vimeti, trimeti, catvarimeti, sata, sahasra etc., all singular. All these words, when meaning more than one such group may be in dual or in plural accordingly. It may be mentioned here that concept of dual number in profusion came from that of twin gods in the Vedas. Of course, dual number is found also in Greek, Balto-Slavic and to some extent in German. In Indo-European, it referred to natural pairs.

Gender is determined in Sanskrit not by biological considerations but with some grammatical points of view. As reported in the Mahabharata, when sanstya is. gradual waning (72) of gunas viz. sattva, rajas, tama as well as sound, smell etc. is said to have taken place, the repose of the guna(s) concerned is feminine. But when the growth or occurrence of guna(s) is signified it is masculine. Where neither is clearly (73) discerned, it is neuter. As the Udryota explains, of the five elementary materials (bhuta) namely, prthivi, ap, tejas, vayu and akasa, the latter has less gunas than the former. For example, akasa has sabda (sound) only, vayu has sparsa (touch)

(71)(a) Sanskrita o prakrit Bhasear Kramavikas. P.C. Majumdar, Pages 16 & 35.

72. Sanstya-prasavau lingam.

73. Sanstya-vivakṣaγyam stri, prasavavivakṣaγyam puran, ubhayorayavivakṣaγyam napunsakan. Mahabharata 1.2.64.
whereas पर्यावरण has रुप (colour), रस (flavour), गंध (fragrance), and स्पर्श (touch), न (water) has रुपा, रसा and स्पर्श. All these guṇas are products of the primordial guṇas viz. सत्त्व, राजस and तन्त्र. But waning and growth of the guṇas are incessantly taking place in every matter, (74) says पतञ्जलि. In other words, matters are changing every moment. Under such circumstances, nothing but विवेक (desire of expression) can be the criterion in determining gender in a Sanskrit word. In short, the waning or growth of some guṇas in a matter, as expected by a speaker, would determine feminine, masculine or neuter gender in Sanskrit.

Irregular gender in Sanskrit words should be justified in the above light. The words, दास, स्त्री and बलात्रा, all (75) meaning wife have masculine, feminine and neuter gender respectively. The word मित्र in neuter denotes a friend of either sex. This indefiniteness may justify its gender. The word पुर (town) is feminine but a compound noun with पुर as the last member (as राजपुरा) is neuter. 'नान' is feminine but चक्रा-न्या in शास्त्री is masculine, नान is neuter. In fact, use of gender is a popular phenomenon and a grammarian need not be blamed if he fails to find out sharp reasoning behind gender in some words. Such inexplicability of gender is not unique in Sanskrit, leaving aside हिंदी, a modern Indian vernacular descending from Old Indo-Aryan, we see the

(74) न इ इस्लाम पर्यावरण स्थापना निउर्तम नियुक्तिगाढ़ते; वर्णस्ते...अपचयन्या ते युज्यते - नान्या. on P. 1.2.54.

(75) नान्या स्त्रिया त्वबारोग्या-बहुत्वमेः शर्मो अर्पया त्यतं... दरश अत्युत्तरम् त्ववारोग्यादिग्या-बहुत्वस्या अवययिण्य अर्पयो बोधयिण (स. on P. 1.4.21, Page 177).
use of irregular gender in Deutsch (i.e. German language) where
das Fräulein (unmarried girl), das Mädchen (little girl), das
Weib (wife) are not feminine but neuter, der Zug (the train) is
masculine, most of the rivers, trees and flowers are feminine,
provinces, towns and cities are neuter, almost all abstract nouns
are feminine and so on. Moreover nouns ending in -ei, -le, -heit,
-heft, -in, -ion, -schaft, -tät- ung etc. are feminine in German.
In Sanskrit and Hindi too, words with certain suffixes are always
feminine or neuter according as the case may be. The words, hināri
coldness (excessive/much) yavānī (bad barley), aravānī (big forest) etc.
al inanimate are feminine. So vivakṣa (intent of the speaker)
alone is the only inspiration behind such usage in a language.
Panini is well aware of this phenomenon of the so-called irregular-
ity of gender and number in a language and discards any formulati-
on in this regard on the ground that gender and number are
recognised in words (sanśās) in their popular use (vide P. 1.2.53).
Puruṣottamadeva in his Bhāṣavṛtti on this rule cites apah, dārāh,
gṛhah, and varśāh as instances.

Now we come to the paribhāṣā. It is put to record here
that nominal stems sometimes change their number and gender when
a secondary suffix is affixed to them. For example, (I) from luti,
samī and sundā all feminine, with the suffix -re ve get lutiṁra,
samīra and sundāra in masculine gender and (II) ap, a feminine
plural stem, with the suffix -kalpap with no apparent change in
meaning results in ap-kalpa, a neuter singular word. It is noted
even by Pāṇini himself in P. 5.4.14. On this rule the Maññabh. points out that since -nac is affixed in feminine only in the sense of exchange of action (P. 3.3.49), reference to feminine again in P. 5.4.14 to explain vyāvāksaśi etc. can be relevant if only apprehension of change of gender be existing by virtue of the paribhāṣā under review. As a result of this canon in guḍa-kalpā drakṣa, tailakalpā prasannā etc. referred to in P. 5.3.67 the meaningless suffix -kalpap effects change of gender in the words which are derived from guḍa, taila etc. But in (77) vidvad-kalpaḥ, yadās-kalpaṁ, vidvad-deśiyeḥ etc. there is no change in gender. In paḍṭoruṇam, paḍantirūṇam etc. number is changed with the suffix.

Patañjali discusses this phenomenon again under P.5.3.68. It has been noticed therein that with the addition of bahu- there shall be no change in the gender of the stem. For example, in bahu-guḍa drakṣa, bahu-taila prasannā etc. guḍa, taila etc. retain their original gender. The participle 'tu' in P. 5.3.68 may be a pointer to this phenomenon. Of course since the suffix is svārthika (without independent meaning) it is natural that the original gender is retained. Under such circumstances, the Maññabh. tends to construe the incorporation of 'tu' in the rule to signify that somewhere a svārthika suffix may effect a change of gender in a stem. Thus peyas-kalpaḥ yavagaḥ is correct. Nāgośa in

(76) Yat strīghrañam koroti taj-ūnāpayatyaśeryāv svārthikāḥ ativartanta'pi liṅga-vacanānīti (Maññabh. on P. 5.4.14).
(77) Svārthikāsā ca prakṛtī liṅga-vacanānyamāntantā (Maññabh. on P. 5.3.67).
the Uddyota on P. 5.3.69 opines that he does not mind if 'tu' in the sutra is declared as superfluous. Because reference to stri in P. 5.4.14 is competent enough to indicate the intent of the paribhasā Kvaśit svārthikāh etc.

18. INSTANCES OF IRREGULARITY OF FORM.

The Mahābhāṣya under P. 1.1.27 examines the phenomenon of nipatana (irregularity) in connection with the absence of cerebralisation of n in the word 'saranāma'. The overriding force of nipatana is admitted therein. In this respect, a nipatana resembles a prohibition (cp. Badhakānyeva nipatanaṁ bhavantī - P. 119). For example, the rule 'Na kapi (P. 7.4.14) prohibits shortening of the preceding vowel before -kap, a samāśanta suffix. With the prohibition of the possibility of shortening by the rule Kāṇā (P. 7.4.13) is gone for ever. Similar is the casual absence of inevitable cerebralisation of n in the word sarvanāma. Under no circumstances there shall be cerebral n in the word sarvanāma. Optional loss of the nasal element in the prefix san- before the words hita and tate may be indicated in the Paninian use of the word sātātya in P. 6.1.14. This is what the verse 'Lumpod avasyaṁ Kṛtye etc.' means. It must not be construed as a case of nipatana for both sātāta and sāntata or sakhita and sānvātata are valid. But as there is no injunction, whatsoever, regarding the suffix -gyaṁ after sāntata, a word sāntatya cannot be formed at all. The word purāna is a casual word but it cannot swallow the usual form, puratana.

(78) Yadi tu purvokta-rityā stri-graham an śrārtha śūpakaṁ ityucyto teśeṇa pratyākhyaṇa -- Uddyota on P. 5.4.69
Because, the latter word is included in the word-group beginning with prṣodara. From this, it follows that nipatana if not prevented otherwise, prevents the usual operation from taking place.

Instances of nipatana in the Pāṇinian rules are large in number. In tisthādgu (P. 2.1.17) the suffix -satṛ, shortening of o in 'go' into u and the avyāyībhāva compound are casual phenomena. In ṣyatāgava, however, the suffix -satṛ, -tac after the compound word and avyāyībhāva compound itself are irregular. Pārṣeṅgāga and Madhyeṅgāga have inexplicable occurrence of 'e' in the first member (P. 2.1.18). Daśvāṇ, sāhvaṇ, mājhvaṇ are irregularly formed with the suffix -kvasu (P. 6.1.12). In upēyivaṇ, īyivaṇ, sāmyivaṇ etc. the augment it is irregular. Anēvāṇ (naṁ-asi + kvasu) and amucāna (au - vac + kāṇsā) irregularly denote the agent of the action denoted by the verbal root (P. 3.2.103). In haiyāṅgavāṇa (P. 5.2.23) both the suffix -khan and replacement of the stem viz. hyogodha by hyaṅgu are irregular. In ētrotiyā, too, both the suffix -ghan and replacement of ētand as by ētrot (P. 5.2.24) are unusual. The words adya, sadyas, parut, parāri, alsanah, paradyevi, pūrvedyuh, amedyuh, aṃyārēdyuh, iteṛedyuh, aparedyuh, sāhārēdyuh, ubhayedyuh, uṭṭerēdyuh etc. result from nipatana (P. 5.3.22).

Twenty five words, viz. acatura, vicatura etc. are irregular forms in compounds as noted in P. 5.4.77. In dvi-stāva and tri-stāva (P. 5.4.84) the samasaṁta suffix -ac, elision of the ti element of the compound stem and the compound itself are irregular. The word nīspravāṇi (P. 5.4.160) irregularly loses -kap. In suḥṣrt and

(78) Prātiṣiyika-vidhīma viśā saṁdha-prakriyasya śāhda-svarūpasya nirdeso nipatanañ. (Bālamāṇorasme on Kṣayya etc. P. 6.1.81).
dur-hṛt, the replacement of ṣrīdaya by hṛt is irregular (P.5.4.150).
Suprāta, suśva, suḍiva, sārīrakṣa, catureśya, eṇipada, ajośa,
prophoṣaṇa are in irregular compounds (P.5.4.120). Words read in
the pradavia class are well known irregularities (P. 6.3.109).
Dāndināyana and the like too are casual (P. 6.4.174). Eighteen
words, viz. givasita, skabhitata etc. too are casual (P. 7.2.74).
Another group of eighteen words viz. dādhati, dardhati etc. is
formed irregularly (P. 7.4.65). Āsandivat, asthivat, ṣakrīvat,
kakṣīvat, raṃṣavat, cāṃṣavatī etc. are formed with -setup through
irregular changes in stems. Similarly there is nipātana in pankti,
trimēt, āṣta (P. 5.1.53), getvara (P. 3.2.164), ṛtvya, mādhvi,
hirvācya (P. 6.4.175) etc.

It is interesting to note that while dealing with such
unusual forms the rules read them as they are. Where derivation
is admissible, words are referred to with stems and suffixes in
the rules. We see that at the instance of Jayāditya, a nipātana
may be a-bādhaka for justifying purātana beside purāna and so on.
According to Nilakanṭha, this has its origin in the word ‘eva’ in
P. 3.4.70.

Some other unusual operations are somehow accounted for
with the device of either bahula or vyavasthita-vibhāṣā in the
Aṣṭādhyāyī. The term bahula signifies that the rule which incor-
porates it will have obligatory scope of application in certain
but instances will cease to have so in some other cases. Elsewhere
its function will be optional but in some quite unintended places
the rule will effect results even in absence of necessary condi-
tions. For example, by the rule Kartṛkarana ṣrī bahulan (P.2.1.32)
besides compounds in deva-trata, nakha-bhinna etc. and lack of compounds in dētraṇa lūmavān etc. the words pade-kāraka, gane-
ćopatka etc. are formed in compounds where the fifth and the seventh cases appeared in the earlier members. The word sprhaṇīya wi
with -aniyar as signifying dative by the suffix-anīyar is justified
by P. 3.3.113. In Kālidāsa, shortening of ī is regular and both pramada-vana and pramāda-vana are correct with optional shortening.
But the word namāghosa does not admit shortening (P.6.3.63). In
stambha-rana, karpa-japa etc. there is compulsory retention of the
case-ending in the first member but in vano-cara and vanaḍāra
there is alternative retention. In kuru-ḍera etc. however there
is no retention at all. Some eighteen sutras in Panini incorporate
(32) the word 'bahula'. Of them 'Bahulaḥ čhandasi' appears eleven
times thrice in book II, once in each of the books XIII, V & VI
and five times in book VII. The sūtra Vyasyayo bahulaṃ (P.3.1.85)
is bifurcated in the Mahābhārata to enable its second part to explain
(33) all unusual operations pertaining to case-ending, conjugational
ending, letter, gender, person, tense, middle conjugation etc. in
the Vedic texts. The rules Anyeṣam api drṣyate (P.6.3.137),

(30) Vyavasthitā-vibhāṣāyāpi kārāṇī kriyante.
(31) Kvaḍit pravṛttāh kvaḍidepravṛttāh kvaḍid vibhāṣā kvaḍid
vidheḥ vibhāṣām bahudhā samākṣaya ātāt-vibhāṣām bahulaṃ
vyuḍanti.
(32) P.2.1.22; Bahulaḥ čhandasi (P.2.4.39; 2.4.73, 76; 3.2.83;
5.2.112; 6.1.24; 7.1.8; 12, 103; 7.3.97; 7.4.76); 3.1.65;
3.2.61; 3.3.1; 3.3.113; 4.1.148; 4.1.160; 6.1.70; 6.1.123;
6.1.178; 6.2.199; 6.3.14; 6.3.63; 6.4.76; 6.4.122; 6.2.122;
8.3.52.
Anyebbhyo'pi dyayanto (P.2.2.75), Anyebbhyo'pi dyayate (P.2.2.78; 3.3.130) etc. have noted some unexpected operations.

The canon Vyavasthita-vibhāsasyapi kāryāpi kriyanto explains certain irregular formations. Pāṇini defines simple vibhāsa (option) by the rule 'Na veti vibhāsa' (P.1.1.44). There are prāpta-vibhāsa, aprāpta-vibhāsa, ubhayatra-vibhāsa and vyavasthita-vibhāsa. When a rule enjoins an optional operation which was already codified and could take place compulsorily by another rule it is a case of prāpta-vibhāsa. Compulsory prohibition of pronominal nature of a compound word which is the result of a Dvarāva compound with a pronoun as the last member (P.1.1.31) is made optional by 'Vibhāsa jasi' (P.1.1.32) before the inflexional ending in nominative plural (jasi) class concept of inanimate objects in Dvarāva compound is expressed in the singular number by P. 2.4.6 (e.g. dhānā-śasāli). But it is optional with reference to certain inanimate objects mentioned in P. 2.4.12 (e.g. luṣa-kāsā, luṣa-kāsāḥ etc.) by the latter rule. So far as animate objects namely mrga (deer), śalini (bird) etc. are concerned the option of singular number is admitted by P.2.4.12 and is a case of aprāpta-vibhāsa. The option of the phenomenon of Nominative being Accusative with the addition of causative suffix -hie with the verbal roots hr- and hl- (P.1.4.53) when they have no deal with the meanings motion, perception etc. (P.1.4.52) is a case of

(83) Sup-tiś-upagraha-liṅga-narāṇam kāla-hal-cā-svara-hatr-
yena ca,
vyatyanami icchatā sastraśrūgān aṣṭi ca sidhyati bakulakena
(verse referred to in the Mahābh. without any commentary on P.3.1.35).
aprāpta-vibhāga. But the root abhi-ava-hṛ- means coming and
vi-hṛ is intransitive. In their case, the option is a case of
prāpta-vibhāga. This is ubhayatra-vibhāga because the same rule
accommodates both prāpta-vibhāga and aprāpta-vibhāga.

The vyavasthita-vibhāga is a vibhāga based on vyavasthā
(84) i.e. special arrangement. It is a provision in a rule to enjoin
somewhere an operation, to prohibit the same in some other cases
and to arrange the same elsewhere as optional. In other words,
besides simple option of an operation in a particular instance,
the vyavasthita-vibhāga makes a rule function somewhere and
inoperative elsewhere. Unlike bahula it does not operate even in
absence of necessary conditions in some cases. For example, by
the rule Abhinivisaśa (P. 1.1.47) which adopts the word apra-
rasyān from P. 1.1.44 there is only Accusative in Samārga
abhinivisate and no locative. Conversely, there shall be no accusa-
tive in pāpabhiniṣeṣaḥ. In euphonic combination of 'go' and 'akṣa'
avai in place of 'o' appears compulsorily with such vibhāga in
P. 6.1.122 to form gavākaṇa whereas go + agrā is a simple case,
with the option of euphonic substitute viz. o for k and a,
retention of two consecutive vowels and replacement of o by avai
in the words gavrā, go agrā and gavākaṇa respectively. The word
gavākaṇa means casement, the entrance (akṣi) of solar rays (go).
To mean the eye of a cow or bull the word would be gokṣi alone.

(84) The term vyavasthā appears in the Pāṇini rule P. 1.1.34
and the identical gana-sutra: Svabhidheyāpekaśvadhiniyana
vyavasthā (Sk on P. 1.1.34).
Elsewhere both gônga and gavanga are valid. The word Dovatrata or Bhavatrata, signifying a name never replaces -ta(-kta) by -na even though train + kta gives both trêta and trêpa by P. 8.2.56. The set grf + ap gives both gala to mean human limb and gara to mean poison. While denoting simple action inherent in the verb we get both the forms. Thus Aćo vibhāsa (P. 8.2.21) is under the spell of vyavasthita-vibhāsa. By Vibhāsa vṛtth (P. 3.1.143) which ratifies optional affixation of -na and -ac after the verbal root grah-, we get grāha with compulsory -na to mean an animal in sea and graha with compulsory -ac to mean a heavenly body (planet) whereas simple action is denoted by both grāha and graha. In P. 3.2.124 the Mahābh. draws the word vibhāsa from P. 3.2.121 and proposes it as a Vyavasthita-vibhāsa. Thus in Kaurvataḥ, kurved-bhaktih, kurvāṇataraḥ, paćamānakalpaḥ etc. there is compulsory -satṛ or -śaṇac as the root admits but in paćatitanam etc. there is neither -satṛ nor -śaṇac. In a case of aprathāsamāndhirakaraṇa (where it is related to another word which is not in nominative) these two suffixes are obligatory while in prathāsamāndhirakaraṇa it is an optional phenomenon ratifying both paćan and paćati or paćamāna and paćato etc. Juxtaposition of the indeclinable 'iti' prevents -satṛ and -śaṇac from taking place in hamti iti, palēyate iti, etc. The verbal root  śc with -kta gives both śita and śāta in ordinary cases (P. 7.4.41) but in connection with vrata (a sacred vow) it would be vamaśīta only. The Mahābh. reads these instances under P.7.4.41. According to the Pradīpa the list in illustrative, So in P.2.4.56
Patañjali proposes to borrow 'vā' from the previous rule and construe it here as an instrument of vyavasthita-vibhāsā. In pravetā, pravetum, pravīta, sammīti etc. there is 'vī' to replace 'aj' but in samāja, samāja, udāja, udaja, samajana, udajana etc. there is no 'vī' at all. It follows that the parībhāṣā referred to in the Pā (Pā 108/Pu 62/Śi 127) on this phenomenon has a solid basis in the Mahābhārata of Patañjali. As Puruṣottama observes, when instances as a ājīti are meant, this kind of vibhāsa to affirm or negate an operation without any scope of option is resorted to. According to Nilakantha (No.93) this is a case of suitable interpretation and is clarified in the Mahābhārata on P. 3.2.124.

Yoga-vibhāsa i.e. bifurcation of one sutra into two parts is an interesting device adopted by Patañjali with a view to ratifying certain unusual Sanskrit words. Patañjali examines the claim of both the first and the seventh nominal endings in the word 'antaratama' in P. 1.1.50 followed by Uraṇ raparāj (P.1.1.51). It proves that since rules had been read orally before they were written, there may be disputes as to the exact extent of every (36) sutra. There are references to yoga-vibhāsa in some forty four cases in the Mahābhārata. Of them, some are simple bifurcations of the existing sutras whereas in certain cases some changes with regard to the position of words in existing sutras are proposed. For example, in Trūtiyā tātātārthana ganaṇacānana (P. 2.1.29) the word

\[(36)(I)\] Devatrato galo gaha itiyoga ca sad-vidhīh, 
mitheste na vibhāyanto gavakṣah svasātavṛtah 
(Mahābhārata on P. 7.4.41).

\[(II)\] Ekaśodhāraṇam na vyavasthitā-vibhāsānaṁ parigapanām, 
anyāsāṁ api sambhayat (Pradīpa on P. 7.4.41).
'ortheaa is expected at the last position. Regarding Sāryogāntasya lopah (P. 3*2*23) and Rāt sasya (P. 3*2*24), Sāryogāntasya lopah/ sasya and Sāryogāntasya lopah/sasya/Rāt are suggested in the Mahābhārata. It challenges the reading of the latter rule. In P. 3*4*2 the word 'vyaveye' dissected from the original rule is put before the modified rule and after the rule P. 3*4*1.

It is to note that all references to bifurcations and permutations of the Paninian rules concerned are not Patañjali's own propositions. He refuses to admit the utility of two arrangements proposed under P. 1*4*3. It may be so that this device was being widely practised at Patañjali's time and he favours it in certain cases in unmistakable terms. According to Prof. K.C. Saotri, the device was invented and adopted by Katayana and Patañjali. It is evident that it is taken recourse to only to ratify certain irregular operations. Some may however apprehend that through bifurcation of rules more sentences are formed adding to the cumbrousness of the discourse so eagerly and avowedly sought to be avoided. Such a suggestion can forthwith be rejected on the ground that though cumbersome, this device is solely competent to solve some irregularities of word formations otherwise inexplicable.

(86) P. 1*1*12; 1*3*14; 1*4*17; 2*1*4; 2*1*29; 2*1*35; 2*3*62; 2*3*71; 2*4*70; 3*1*26; 3*1*66-68; 3*1*85; 3*1*39-50; 3*2*4; 3*4*12; 5*1*24; 5*3*5; 6*1*1; 6*1*102; 6*2*42; 6*2*122; 6*4*16; 6*4*52; 6*4*124; 6*4*140; 7*1*6; 7*1*72; 8*2*23-24; 8*4*2; 8*4*3 etc.

(87) Yogavibhaga an itasiddhih (Ps 123/Pu 100/Si 124).
(88) Pada-gauravod yoga-vibhaga garīyan (Ps 132/Pu 98/Si 113).

Bālakṛṣṇa reads it in the appendix of his work and declares it as rootless.
Whether words can be dissected into component parts, viz. stem and suffix, is a vexed question in the history of the study of Sanskrit language. Linguistic studies began in India in a very early period. Pāṇini, probably a pre-Buddha grammarian refers in his rules to a number of his predecessors of remarkable success in this field. Yāska, the pre-Pāṇini etymologist referred to Sthānlāsthivi, Sākapūni etc. as older authorities. Pratīcākhyā va... abound in such references to earlier scholars.

From its early inception, grammatical study devoted much attention to the question of dissection of words. For example, 'rudra' was derived from rud-, 'chandras' from chādi- and ādva from dvā (day) in the Veda. Sākapūni proposed formation of the word 'agni' with a, g,ani taking them from the roots ay(ayeti), aṅj(aṅkta) or dah(dagda) and ni respectively. Sthānlāsthivi suggested nāṁ-knopi- as the stem of agni. Even Yāska himself proposed agra, aṅganayana and agraṇī as probable sources of the word 'agni'. His viewpoint in respect of derivation of words too is noticeable. He did not mind if there was a venture to analyse

(89) Vide Goldstücker, Pāṇini (Chowkhemba Skt Series Ed. 1965), Page 247.
(90) P. 1.1.16; 3.4.40; 51; 2.3.13; 19; 20; 6.1.32; 123; 131; 192; 127, 130; 6.3.20 etc.
(91) Vide Hirukta 7.14; 2.1; etc.
(92) Tait. Saptā 1.5.1.1, Tait. Sam (5.6.6.1.), Alt. Āraṇyaka 2.1.6 etc. Tait. Brāhmaṇa (2.2.3.3.)
(93) Hirukta. 7.14.
(94) Hirukta 2.1.
a word with certain syllables, verbally similar to the word. Only a tolerable meaning is expected. According to a vārttika of the Paninian school, the Nirukta favoured dissection of all nominal words (nāma) from verbal roots. Identical was the opinion of Śākatāyana. All words wherein a verbal root is easily discernible or can be assumed or is not known should be dissected, said he.

Beside this liberal thesis there was the antithetical approach on the part of Gārgya who did not favour the view that all nominal words are subject to dissection. The polemics of these two camps is recorded in Yāska’s Nirukta.

The argument of the earlier group of scholars headed by Śākatāyana is this that words can be dissolved at the instance of the Vedic pronouncements which uphold such explanations on the words viz. rudra, ēndra, deva etc. quite in conformity with popular meaning. As Patanjali comments, a grammarian does not prepare a new word but interprets existing words in the possible analysis. A grammar is primarily concerned with accentuation and derivation of words. Ascertaining the meaning of words from the Nirukta, the grammarian finds it easier to explain their formation. Vyāghrabhūti suggests assumption of both stems and suffixes in accordance with necessity.

But a pragmatist may not favour this view. Since words are 'as usual as trees' they may not be universally broken into pieces viz. suffixes and so on. The old Kātantras did not favour universal

(95) Nāma ca dhātujam āha Nirukta (Va. on P. 3.3.1).
(96) Nirukta 1.12. 2-3.
dissection. But the later scholars follow Sākātyayana. For example, the Panjī of Trilocaṇa argues that a cooker when he does not cook is called still so because he is capable of cooking (ca. 220). Later grammarians have a compromising attitude to this controversial question. It is found that Chandragomin, the Sarasvatī-kanthābharana (2.4.1.2.3), Kramādīvara, Vopadeva, Padaśāhīra, Śrījīva Gosvāmin, Purusottama Vidyāvägīśa etc. accommodate some rules (Uṇādi) on unusual derivation of words.

Now we may summarise the views of Pāṇini and his followers.

The Pāṇini has formulated rule P. 1.2.45 to recognise as prātipadika such meaningful words as are formed with neither kṛt nor taddhita nor samāsa and are different from both a verbal root and a suffix. From this it follows that he admits some words which have no derivation. It is supported by the fact that he incorporates the word kamsa besides kemi- in P. 8.3.46 even though with Sākātyayana’s 3.62 ‘Kamsa’ can be formed from kemi + sa. Moreover from kamsa and parasu we have kamsīya and parosavya whose ordinary phonomena (97) of guna and vyādhi are absent. Patanjali treats them as words without derivation. According to Nāgasa, Pāṇini does not admit universal derivation of words. On P. 7.1.2 it is amply clear in a vārttika that sākthi, sāndha etc. have no derivation whatsoever in Pāṇini. The Uddyota has opined in favour of non-dissection of (98) all uṇādi words.

(97) Mahābh. on P. 1.1.61.
(98) Mahābh. on P. 7.1.2 and the Uddyota on the same.
Of course, certain rules (P. 3.3.1, 2,3; 3.4.72; 7.4.75 etc.) clearly admit Pāṇini's approval of Vyutpatti theory. Moreover his P. 7.2.9 is very much similar to Sākatayana's 366. Words viz. hasta, garta, danta, ganthyaanta, gṛhayaça, gṛdayita etc. are analysed in the Pāṇinian system quite with unusual suffixes that belong to the upādi class of Sākatayana. With all these evidences, Holder thinks that Pāṇini may have admitted certain upādi suffixes and words concerned with them as usual but have left the rest as unusual. It is probable that the author of the Āstādhyāyī holds thus a double-faced view which is a compromise between two opposite standpoints on this particular issue. According to Yudhisṭhira Mīmāṃsaka, every grammarian owns to his credit the General Rules as well as the Dātupātha, Unādi-pātha etc. and thus Pāṇini has his own upādi rules too. Prof. K.C. Gangti eulogises Pāṇini for steering a middle course... the true synthesis which is always the golden mean between the two extreme thesis and antithesis (Bengal's Contribution to Sanskrit Grammar, Part I, Pago 47).

Kātyāyana's favour for such words is well presumed. Patanjali refutes many vārttikas which plead for such words as can be dissected. Still he himself favours to some extent such practice of analysing sāṃjñā words with assumed stem and suffix in a verse on P. 3.3.1. This is not a mere reference to an alien view. Because the verse is followed by neither 'iti' which is a mark of quotation nor an explanation. The word 'bohula' in P.3.3.1 is construed to extend recognition to Vedic words and popularly

(99) Vyākaraṇa Darsanam Itihāsa, I, Prāk-Itihāsī, Page 41-42.
known sanāti ones over and above the unādi ones related to other grammatical schools. Thus the Pāṇinian school is not altogether detached from the tradition of dissecting unusual words. The cautious approach in this school to this phenomenon is welcome. It will be wrong to seek to derive every word in Sanskrit vocabulary, a large part of which comprises Dravidian, Aśtric and other foreign words.

A few words on the authorship of unādi rules may not be irrelevant here. According to the Uddyota these were formulated by none but Śāktaśyana. It is based on the observation of Yāska and the vārttika in verse quoted under P. 3.3.1. The Supamāñga (101) of Vimala Sarasvatī comments that vararuci separately formulated rules to clarify (sphutikaraṇaya) unādi. Goldstucker discusses this point. His decision is however this that the unādi list (102) must be of Pāṇini's own authorship. He finds that there is perfect accord in meaning and significance of technical terms and indicative letters of common use in Pāṇini's rules and in the unādi ones and that failure of the rules P. 7.1.2, P. 7.3.50, P.7.4.13, P. 8.2.78 etc. to accommodate unādi words is nothing but an indication of later origin or use of these words mentioned therein. According to Prof. Suryakanta in his Introduction to Bṛhatmahā, "the list of unādis was first drawn up by Pāṇini on the basis of Śākta and was afterwards modified and corrected by Kṛtyāyana. The

(100) Pāṇinian Interpretation of the Sanskrit Language - Appendix.
(102) Goldstucker, Pāṇini Page 199.
extent of changes introduced by Kātyāyana into the text was so
great that ultimately popular tradition came to credit him with
its sole authorship. That some vṛtttikas champion the cause of
unādi words is a proof to Kātyāyana's underivable favour and
interest in them. The decision of Panini's engagement whatsoever
in their treatment is logical so far as his reference to them and
similarity of some of his rules with Sākātāyana's are concerned.
From the Mahābh. downwards, a hard line was followed with regard-
to unādi words to avoid strained analysis in favour of recognising
them as nominal basis which have no grammatical derivation.

It is to note in this connection that the very name of unādi
that contains un-certainly a pre-Paninian coining has reference
to न, an indicatory letter that administers vyādhi in the vowel
of the stem in kāru (क्र + न) etc., and that न in the Paninian
system too has the same rearing in Kumbha-kāra (kumbha-क्र + न)
(103) etc. Thus the observation in the Mahābh. that indicatory letters
appearing in alien rules have nothing to do with Paninian system
of interpretation does not hold good so far as न is concerned.
Bahuvrīhi compound is characterised by denoting something other than the component members (anyapadārtho - P.2.2.24).

There is however certain relationship between the denoted meaning of the major component and that which is denoted by the compound. For example, in citra-gu, the owner of the cows of variegated colour is denoted and there is the relationship of the owner and the owned (sva-svānti-bhāya). In the word ichita-guśāsa a man with red turban is meant, relationship between turban and the man being saṃyoga (physical connection) where-as in loma-karṇa where a man with the long ears is meant, relationship between the man and the ears is saṃsvayā (inherent relation).

The question is whether the meaning of the principal component member too should be comprehended or not in the compound word. When a lemva-karṇa is invited his long ears come along with the man but a citragu must not come with his cows. Thus with reference to an action, there is difference between the two instances. In the earlier instance, we understand the tad-guṇa i.e., the subservient meaning of the member word and it is a case of tad-guṇa-saṃvijñāna bahuvrīhi (cp Tasya anyapadārthasya guṇā upalakṣaṇānī teṣām api kārye saṃ-vijñānām - Pradīpa on P. 1.1.27). In the latter, this is not the case. Relation to action may be, says the Uddyota on P. 1.1.27, either mere proximity or active participation. When a man with white attire (suklavāṣas) is entertained at a dinner table his attire has nothing to do. But when one
looks at such a man it is directly concerned. Generally when tadguna is related to anyapadartha by samavāya or sanyoga, the compound is tadguna-samvijñāna (cp. Uddyota on P. 1.1.27). In the Pāṇini the tadguna is related to anyapadartha by sañcāra or sanyoga the compound is tadguna-samvijñāna (cp. Uddyota on P. 1.1.27). In the Pāṇini the Nāgase ṣa puts emphasis upon samavāya as the relationship between the meaning of the compound and that of the principal member. In case relationship is of a different kind, the compound is generally tadguna-samvijñāna type of bahuvrāhi compound.

As for the word sarvādi (P. 1.1.29), a group to which its component members viz. sarva etc. are related by samavāya, sarva too is termed as sarvanāma. The idea of tadguna-samvijñāna bahuvrāhi is expressly exhibited in P. 3.2.56. Therein with a view to excluding āvya from evyartha, āvya is incorporated. This is useful if only ēvyartha includes āvya too by tadguna-samvijñāna compound (cp. Pu 6).

21. NON-OBBLIGATORY SINGULAR NUMBER IN WORDS OF CO-ORDINATE COMPOUNDS

The Mahābhārata on P. 1.2.63 construes the word bahuvācana incorporated therein as the indication of the canon Sarvo dvandvo vībhāṣeṣyokvañ bhaṅa (Ps 34/Pu 30/Si 16). The canon admits alternative singular number in certain instances. For example in the compound of one tisyā and two punarvasus the whole comprises three and should be usually in plural. But the rule (P. 1.2.63) seeks to admit dual number instead. The word bahuvācana being redundant indicates the possibility of singular number too in the compound word tisyapunarvasa. It is reasonable too. Thus compounds between limbs of animals etc. (P. 2.4.2) as well as those ratified...
by P. 2.4.3-11 are always in samāhāra and singular number. In
dedhi-payāsī etc. (P. 2.4.14-15) samāhāra is prohibited in favour
of itareṣa-yoga. There is however option between the two in
instances under P. 2.4.12-13. In the remaining cases too, this
option should be extended by general logic. The question then
arises as to why the rules P. 2.4.12-13 are formulated at all. The
earlier is specific in the sense that compounds intended should be
between trees or birds or animals or so and not between birds and
animals etc. The last three words viz. asva-vahāvā, pūrṇāpāra and
adharottara are however specifically incorporated in the rule. As
regards P. 2.4.13 the compounds referred to would be of inanimate
things. The result is this that excepting compulsory samāhāra and
itareṣa, words in dvandva compounds would have option between
the two with certain reservations for instances under P. 2.4.12-13.
Of course, as a vārttika on P. 2.4.12 wishes, dvandva of fruits,
soldiers, trees, deer, birds, little creatures, paddy and grasses
would be in singular only when constituent parts are in plural
(baderāmalaka, rathikāsvārochau, plakṣaṇyagrochau etc. in dual).
By the canon under review, both Bābhavya-sālaṃkāyanam, Bābhavya-
sālaṃkāyanau are correct. Under these circumstances the word viz.
sarva in the canon refers to remnants in totality and not all
dvandva compounds (cp. Uddyota on P. 1.2.63).

Some would however mean by sarva the cases of jñātidvandva,
reports the Uddyota. In that case too, the compound of tīgya and
two punarvasus, all inanimate, falls within the scope of compulsory
samāhāra and singular number by P. 2.4.6. The word bābhavacāma in
P. 1.2.63 which admits the reverse viz. plurality thereby indicates
that such compounds belong to the concurrent list of samphara and itaretara and not to the former alone, as appears from P. 2.14.6. Or it may be deduced that when class concept is emphasised it is in singular but when individual members of the class are meant it is in plural.