Chapter VII

CONCEPTION OF SABDA IN THE M. Bh.

The main object of grammar is to explain the formation of correct words. The very first sentence of the M. Bh. is "atha śabdānuśāsanaṃ". The word śabdānuśāsana means the science which draws a line of distinction between sādhuśabda (correct word) and asādhuśabda (incorrect word). Words, whose usage has been sanctioned by rules of grammar, are called sādhuśabda, as opposed to asādhuśabda. Kaiyata says that śabdānuśāsana is the most appropriate term for grammar. Patañjali has here used the word śabdānuśāsana, which is very significant for grammar. It shows that śabda is the main subject of discussion in his work. Hence, at the very beginning of his work, he has raised the question: "What is śabda?" taking the word gauḥ as

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अष्टाङ्गज्ञाने अस्ताःशब्दवेद्ये विषिष्ठ्याः सामानोऽस्मिनादिकारणं ।  

\[Uddyota\ thereon.\]

2  

व्याकरणस्य बैयकंन्यैे नाम - शब्दाःशरासननिविदित।  

\[Pradīpa\]

3  

अथ गोरीत्यथः क?  \[M. Bh. 1st\]  

\[Ahnika.\]
an example in his discussion. This question has been answered differently by different schools of thinkers. The view of Patanjali and his followers concerning this question is briefly discussed below.

Patanjali has discussed four alternatives before giving his own final answer to this question. They are as follows:

1. Whether the individual object possessed of dewlap, tail, hump, hoofs, and horns is sabda? or
2. Whether a movement like winking, gesture, etc. is sabda? or
3. Whether a quality like whiteness, brownness, darkness, etc. can be called sabda? or
4. The genus or the general nature which exists forever, even when individual objects are destroyed is sabda.

After discussing all these views, Patanjali says that they are not the proper meaning of sabda. The proper meaning of it is the eternal word, which is manifested by the transitory sound.
and which brings to the hearer the knowledge of what
which possesses a dewlap, tail, hump, hoofs and horns.

ETERNITY OF ŚABDA

Patañjali has further raised the question whether
śabda is eternal or produced. This question is
really one of the fundamental problems of the science
of linguistics, which has been seriously taken up by
almost all systems of Indian philosophy. In answer to
this question Patañjali has stated that this problem
had been examined in the Saṅgraha of 'vyādi'. This
indicates that before Patañjali this problem had
been solved by Vyādi and Patañjali agreed with his view.

Moreover, while dealing with śabda, Patañjali,
on several occasions, has expressly admitted the eter-
nity of śabda. In explanation of the Vārtika "Siddhe

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केनोध्वारितेन सायत्तायाम्रुकयुक्तार्थवाचाचारिनां
संप्रत्ययेऽवतिः स छुद्ध: ।
M.Bh. 1st Āhnika

2

किं प्रत्यत: छुद्ध: शाहोरित्वम् कार्य: ? संग्रहे सत्त
प्रायान्वेन परोक्षितम् ।

M.Bh. 1st Āhnika, and

संग्रहे - व्याकरणोऽवस्थे शुद्धसंस्कर्ने मन्यं हि
प्रितिहृद्यः ।

Uddyota thereon.
śabdārthasaṁbandheḥ he has clearly stated that śabda, artha and the relation between the two are eternal. He has further proved the eternity of śabda by analogy with what is observed in the world. A literal translation of the pertinent passage from the M.Bh. can be given as follows:—"How is it understood that śabda, artha and the relation between the two are eternal? From the world, for in everyday life, people first think about some objects and use words to denote them. They do not make any effort to coin words. In the case of objects, which are produced, an effort is made to produce them. Thus for instance, a man who wants a jar goes to the potter's house and says 'Make a jar, I want to use it'. But a man, who wishes to use words does not go to the grammarian's house and say 'Coin some words, I want to use them.' Even without going to the house of the grammarian, he thinks about the objects and uses the words, which denote them."

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1. M.Bh. 1st Āhnika.
Besides, Patanjali has maintained that śabda has two aspects - eternal and non-eternal. In the M.Bh. on P.I.4.109, he has stated that the vocal organ pronounces only one letter at a time. It does not pronounce two letters simultaneously. He has further stated that letters are destroyed as soon as their utterance is complete and then another letter is pronounced. Now it is clear that Patanjali is one of the ancient grammarians who has stated the distinction between the two kinds of śabda, viz. the eternal and the non-eternal. Whenever he speaks of the eternal śabda, he refers, as the commentators say, to the internal śabda, which is manifested in the region of the heart and is popularly called 'sphoṭa' in grammatical literature. But when he shows that śabda is produced and is liable to destruction as soon as it is pronounced, he refers to the articulated sound, which is capable of being heard by others.

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एक्षरश्चाति याद्वग्न न श्रे उपमण्यार्थसि। ....
उच्छरणप्रकरणिन: सत्वाय: कण: मयैः। उच्छरित: प्रश्चन्तः
वधापरः प्रक्ष्याते।

M.Bh. on P.I.4.109.
It is remarkable to find that according to Patanjali, the doctrine of both the eternity and the non-eternity of śabda has a most fascinating history, having its root in well-known śā śādvedic hymms. He has interpreted a part (dvē śīra) of the Rk (RV.IV.58,3) as referring to the two aspects of śabda namely the eternal and the non-eternal. In his comment on this passage of the M. Bh., Kaiyāta says that such a distinction between the śabdās is due to the difference between the 'vyāṅgya' (manifested) and 'vyāṅjaka' (manifest). Nāgèśa Bhaṭṭa explains Kaiyāta’s words ‘vyāṅgya’ as ‘āntaranāda’ and ‘vyāṅjaka’ as ‘vaikhari-nāda’. Explaining the same portion of this Rk Sāyaṇa goes a step further and discloses the purpose of that portion (dvē śīra) of the Rv. as follow:-

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\[ \text{M. Bh. 1st Āhnikā.} \]

\[ \text{Pradīpa thereon.} \]

\[ \text{Uddyota.} \]

2 Cf. Dr. K. C. Chatterji - M. Bh. Paspaśāhnika, p. 20.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF
THE SPHOTA DOCTRINE

It is very difficult or almost impossible to ascertain when and by whom the sphota doctrine was promulgated. History does not definitely mention the name of any particular scholar. There is no reference to the doctrine in the sutras of Pāṇini. Although Kātyāyana in his Vārtikas has referred to the two aspects of śabda viz. eternal and non-eternal, which description comes quite near to the sphota theory, he has not used the term sphota as such in his Vārtikas. From this, it may be inferred that the doctrine of sphota as such was not known at the time of these two grammarians.

SPHOTA THEORY AND SPHOTĀYANA

Some grammarians, however, think that the traditional promulgator of the sphota doctrine was the grammarian 'Sphotāyana' whom Pāṇini has referred to in his sutra VI.1.123. Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa in the colophon of his work named Sphotavāda has stated that the sphota

\[1\] Cf. Vārt. 9 in the M.Bh. on P.I.4.109.
doctrine was first propounded by the sage Sphoṭāyana. Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa has observed that in his own work, he has arranged and explained the teaching of the sage Sphoṭāyana. Haradatta, a commentator on the Kāśikā-vṛtti, however, interprets the word Sphoṭāyana quoted in the sūtra VI.1.123 not as the proper name of the Ācārya but as an epithet. Since the grammarian was well versed in the doctrine of Sphoṭa, he was called Sphoṭāyana. If Haradatta’s interpretation of the word Sphoṭāyana is taken as the correct one, then it should also be understood that the real name of the Ācārya had been lost or the epithet Sphoṭāyana had become more popular than his actual name. Whatever might be the case, it seems definite that the word Sphoṭāyana was directly or indirectly connected with the sphoṭa doctrine. Thus the occurrence of the term in Pāṇini’s sūtra obviously indicates that the doctrine

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Sphoṭavāda of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa.

\[2\]

Padamanjarī on the Kāśikā on P.VI.1.123.
of śphota was in existence before Pāṇini, Dr. P. C. Chakravarti thinks that "The original conception of śphota goes back to the most creative period of Indian thought. We mean the Vedic, when Vāk was considered to be a manifestation of the all pervading Brahman, Prāṇava regarded as the ultimate germ of all speech sound and potential factor in the creation of the world."

But all the views quoted above regarding the genesis of the theory of śphota are based, in fact, on mere conjecture. There is no strong evidence available other than tradition to confirm those views. The M.Bh. is the oldest work available to-day in which the word śphota is used in its technical sense. Although Patañjali has used the term śphota in the M.Bh. only on two occasions, yet the doctrine of śphota can be indirectly traced in many of his statements. He has expressly distinguished śphota from 'dhvani' in the M.Bh. on P.I.1.70. He has stated that śphota

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1 Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar, p. 85.

2 बच्चनोभद्रत: स्फोटमां निर्विद्यते।

M.Bh. on Ś.S. I. and in the M.Bh. on P.I.1.70.
is the proper śabda and dhvani is the quality of śabda (Vyanjaka of that śabda). He has taken the instance of a drum and has pointed out that any difference which appears when letters are pronounced at different speeds, is due to the difference existing in the manifesting sound (the Vaikharī-ṇāda) which is similar to the beater of a drum, as some sounds, which are produced by the beat of drum go twenty yards and some thirty yards and so on. It is dhvani which appears to be either short or long, while, sphoṭa remains entirely unchanged. Patanjali has further shown the difference between dhvani and śabda in a verse. He has stated that śabda has two aspects:- Dhvani and sphoṭa and out of them dhvani alone which by nature is short or long or both short and long, is cognisable by the sense of hearing not only by oneself but also by others.

M.Bh. on P.I.1.70.
Although the doctrine of sphiṭa appears to have been formulated to a certain extent in the M.Bh., it is uncertain whether Pataṇḍjali himself was the first promulgator of this doctrine, since the tradition recorded by Haradaṭṭa and Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa obviously pushes the doctrine back before Pataṇḍjali. But it can be stated with certainty that Pataṇḍjali was the first to examine minutely the form of speech and to formulate this doctrine. It is plain that Pataṇḍjali’s interpretation of sphiṭa formed the model and standard of later grammarians. There is unanimity of opinion that Pataṇḍjali’s interpretation became the basis for further exegesis and development of the sphiṭa doctrine at the hands of the later grammarians like Bharṭṛhari, Maṇḍana Mishra, Kaiyaṭa, Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa, Nāgeśa and others. Although almost all systems of Indian Philosophy have attacked the doctrine of sphiṭa and rejected it, yet its foundation laid down by Pataṇḍjali was so strong, that the doctrine instead of becoming weak, has been attracting the attention of scholars interested in the philosophy of language. That is why, leaving aside incidental discussion, more than half a dozen independent treatises on the sphiṭa doctrine are available today.

1(1) Sphiṭasiddhi of Maṇḍana Mishra.
(2) Sphiṭasiddhi of Bharata Miṣṭra.
(3) Sphiṭatattvanirūpaṇam of Seṣakṛṣṇa.
(4) Sphiṭavāda of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa.
(5) Sphiṭacandrika of Mauniśri Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa.
(6) Sphiṭanirūpaṇam and (7) Sphiṭasiddhīyāvyavāraśca of Āpadeva.
RATIONALE BEHIND THE SPHOTA DOCTRINE

The sphota theory is an elaborate attempt to explain how the meaning of a word is conveyed by sound which is uttered. For instance in the case of the word gauḥ what is it which conveys the meaning? Patanjali has stated that it is a matter of common experience that the individual letter: 'g' or 'au' or 'ḥ' (visarga) does not convey the meaning of cow, for, nobody understands the sense of cow by the individual letters of the word gauḥ. Secondly, if each individual letter in a word is sufficient to convey the sense, then each letter having sense will have to be termed as Prātipadika and the case termination would have to be added to each letter and as a consequence each letter would be termed a pada and the letter 'n' would be dropped in words like dhana, vana, etc. by the sūtra VIII.2.7.

1 अवर्धकास्तृ केवल: नोन्त प्रतिपुष्प्याः उपास्याने।
M. Bh. on 6.3.5.

2 यदि भी तहाँमि केवलं अवर्धकास्तृ अवर्धकास्तृप्राध्याय वति। कारणं? "अवर्धकास्तृ प्राध्याय विदेशं हृत प्राध्याय विदेशं अवर्धकास्तृ" हृत स्वाध्यायविदेशं, "कुछं पदयं" हृत पदयं। तत्र को द्विः? "पदयं" हृत नाथपापायिनि प्राध्याय वति - धनं, वनिनित।
The commentators of the M.Bh. Kaiyata and Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa have expressly said that the letters cannot convey the meaning either singly or jointly. For if a single letter has the capacity to convey the meaning of the whole word, the first letter of it, would do so, and the remaining letters would be superfluous. Nor can letters convey the meaning jointly. For, letters according to the Naiyāyikas, and the Vaiśeṣikas, are momentary. They hold the view that the preceding letter of a word perishes as soon as the following letter is uttered.

Pradīpa on the M.Bh. on 1st Āhnika (N.S. ed.) Vol. I, p. 17.

S.H. on the Kārikā 26.

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individually exists only for a moment, it cannot Borm a united whole with another. As soon as the letter 'au' is uttered, according to these philosophers, the letter 'g' which has been previously uttered, perishes in the third moment of its utterance. Similar is the case with 'au' and 'h' (visarga). Thus, it is quite obvious that a combination of momentary letters is impossible. Therefore letters which are momentary, cannot convey the sense either separately or jointly.

The arguments of these philosophers that although the letters may be momentary, the last letter of a word helped by the impressions left on the mind by preceding letters, conveys the sense, is also not tenable. If it were so, there is no reason why the impressions left by the preceding letters should arise and be collected in exactly the same way. In spite of this, if it be assumed that impressions arise at the last moment only at the utterance of the last letter of a word, there would be no distinction between

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The Naiyåyika and the Vaiśeṣika do not accept the eternity of Śabda. They assume that the recognition (pṛāyabhijñā) of letters as 'soyam kakāraḥ' is due to their belonging to the same class. See -

उत्त्यक्तः कृतिप्रख्यात: क हति उद्धेरनित्यताः।
सोऽवेषः क हति उर्ध्ववृत्त साधारःन्यमण्डलैः॥

S.M.K. 166.
Śākhyas too accept production and destruction of śabda, cf. न उद्धेरनित्यतः कार्यं प्रतियेकः:
nadi and dīna, rasa and sara, where there is difference of order only, as these words consist of the same letters and are comprehended by the same faculty of retention.

THE VIEWS OF THE MIMĀŚAKAS (IN REGARD TO THE NATURE OF ŚABDA)

It would not be out of place to state here that the grammarians and the Mīmāṃsakas hold in many respects similar views regarding śabda. Both look upon śabda as eternal and both maintain that śabda is manifested and not created. But a critical analysis of their views clearly shows that the Mīmāṃsakas' view about śabda differs from that of the grammarians mainly on two points, which are as follows:

The first point on which the Mīmāṃsakas differ from the grammarians is this: according to the former

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Pradīpa on the M.Bh. 1st Añhika (N.S. ed., p.17).
there is no need to accept the doctrine of sphoṭa. The letters, they say, are enough to convey the sense. The revered Upavarsa holds the view that in the case of the word gauḥ the letters 'g', 'au' and 'h' (visarga) alone constitute the word. Among people the word śabda is applied to what is heard by the ear and the word gauḥ is nothing more than the three letters viz. 'g', 'au' and 'h' (visarga). This is the view of the revered Upavarsa endorsed by Śabara.

Similarly Śālikanātha in Prakaraṇa pañcikā says that the letters are the śabda because they only can be cognized by the ear.

Thus the Mīmāṃsakas think that speech is significant in letters and letters form a unity because meaning is conveyed by a particular unity of letters

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Śabara Bhāṣya on the M.S.I.1.1.

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P.P. 87.
popularly called pada. They also maintain that letters are always in existence and they are uncaused since the vocal apparatus only manifests them and uncaused is not liable to be destroyed. They are articulated, only when there is felt a need for expression and soon after that, they assume their original forms.

While dealing with śabda as the ultimate cause of creation, Śaṅkarācārya has put the following question. What kind of śabda is really meant, when one speaks about the origin of the world from śabda? In answer to this question he has stated that according to some it is sphoṭa. He has discussed this problem in the Bhāṣya on the VS.I.3.28, at great length to find out the exact nature of śabda. He has given reason, why he does not believe in the existence of sphoṭa. He has pointed out that the acceptance of

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1. तत्त्स्वच्छेषे कर्मा एव ज्ञातः, तेऽ च नित्या विवधकृतात्।
   तैर च व वर्णः सहारिता: पदवाष्ठवज्वल्यांबोध्या:स्प्र्त्यत्वायारितः:
   यवन्ति।

   Upodghāta of Sphoṭavāda of Nāgēśa Bhaṭṭa, p.3.

2. किमात्मकं पुनः शब्दमित्रेष्वं शब्दप्रमत्त्वूप्यम्?
   स्प्रोटिन्त्याह।

   S. Bh. on VS.I.3.28.
sphoṭa creates two difficulties viz. dhṛṣṭahāni (a negation of perceptible facts) and adṛṣṭakalpanā (assumption of something which is imperceptible), since, in popular usage we use the words to mean something and we convey our meanings by the words we employ. In conclusion, he, like the Mīmāṃsakas, has supported the view of the revered Upavarga and accepted that letters alone constitute a word called pada, which conveys the sense.

But the view of the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntins does not stand close examination, since the same question can be repeated viz. whether the letters, which constitute a word, convey the sense individually or jointly. The first alternative is not acceptable.

1 स्कौटवाचिकत्वं इष्टहर्निर्चितकल्पनाः

and also

वर्मकुप्या यु इम्मेव हाति प्रभावपर्यः।

Ś. Bh. on VS. I. 3. 28.

It should be noted in this connection that the Nyāyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas also hold the similar view. Śrīdhara has vigorously refuted the doctrine of sphoṭa. He states that sphoṭa is never directly perceived, but falsely assumed by the grammarians; the denotation lies within the word and not within an imperceptible entity as sphoṭa. To assume sphoṭa as distinct from letters is as fallacious as to see a flower in the sky. (Nyāyakandali, vīy. SK series, pp. 269-270).

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because as a matter of fact, the cognition of the meaning does not appear on hearing single component letters severally, and apart from the components there is no single entity in the form of the composite whole, from which the cognition of the meaning would follow. Secondly, 'letters have no sense' says Patanjali, since the same sense is found, though there is metathesis, elision, augment or substitution of letters. Instances of metathesis are tarka from kṛt, sikatā from kas and sīmha from hiṃs: here there is metathesis of letters and no change in meaning is observed."

The second alternative viz. the letters convey the sense jointly (the letters constitute words, which convey the sense) is also not tenable, because letters

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for detail see Phil. of Gr. Sānkhyas also hold the similar view:

स्फूटत्वं सत्तानाम स्फूट: स्फूट: शब्द: निन्दु कर्म प्रव.

SV. on the S.S. 5757.

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M.Bh. on S.S. 5 (N.S. ed.), p. 134.
separately manifested cannot combine into an aggregate. Although letters can be eternal according to the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntins yet the meaning of a word is not understood unless a word is uttered by a speaker or heard by a listener. In the case of the word gauḥ at the moment when the letter, g is heard the letters ‘au’ and ‘h’ (visarga) are not heard. The case is similar with ‘au’ and ‘h’ (visarga). Hence these philosophers have to accept the fact that letters are uttered by the speaker one after another and they disappear as soon as their manifesting medium is destroyed. Therefore even eternal letters cannot be grouped together because things, which are not available at the same time, cannot be grouped together and unless they are grouped together and combined into one word, they cannot convey the sense. Madhavācārya has rightly observed that just as a mere collection of flowers does not form a garland, so a mere collection of separate letters can never produce the idea of a word without a combining element or factor.  

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परस्परिर्ज्ञाप्तिः प्रमाणपाशी प्रज्ञानिनिर्विशिष्टोऽपि ज्ञातिः स्वेतो वहित विनिर्मित पद्धति प्रतिप्रकाशुपपत्तः। 

Pāṇinidārśana in Sarvadarśana sahgraha.
It may be said in support of the above view that although letters disappear as soon as they are uttered, there remains a remembrance of them and that it is from this remembrance that the cognition of meaning follows. This view is also not tenable because as a matter of fact remembrance also has a momentary existence and therefore it also cannot denote the sense of a word.

Moreover, it is argued in the Sābara Bhāṣya on MS I.1.5 that each letter leaves its impression on the mind of the listener and the last letter of a word along with the help of the impressions left on the mind by the preceding letters of that word, gives the meaning of the word. This argument also cannot stand for obvious reasons. If the cognition of meaning was derived from the last letter, then the popular usage of the ordinary people. "We cognize the meaning from the word" and one word and one sentence etc. would be unjustifiable. The use of the singular case-termination after the word śabda in the

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Sābara Bhāṣya on MS I.1.5.
expression “वम्बाक्षरः प्रतिपदाश्च” and the relation of the word शक with pada as also with vākya in the expressions: “एकं पदम्” and “एकं वाक्यम्” clearly indicate that the word gauḥ etc. are in existence quite apart from the letters 'g' and the rest and it is this composite whole from which the cognition of the sense results. Therefore grammarians go a step further and maintain the existence of eternal sphoṭa which is manifested by those letters as distinct from the letters.

The second point regarding शब्दम् on which the Mīmāṃsakas differ from the grammarians is as follows. According to the Mīmāṃsakas each individual letter is single, unique, and eternal. The same letter is repeated again and again. They argue that the recognition (Pratyabhijñā) of the same letter as (soyaḥ

1 शब्दमेः पदम्, एकं वाक्यम्, हति प्रत्ययः स्फोटस्ये तचेष्ये च प्रमाणम्।

Uddyota on the M.Bh. 1st Āhnika (N.S. ed.), p.18 and also फिः च शब्दाश्च प्रतिपदामहेः, एकं पदम्, एकं वाक्यम्, हति चावार्तिता प्रतितिः सवार्तावसिध्याः। ततो शब्दाविच्छेदः-कल्पः न स्फोटाः-स्वागमम्-तेरिष्ठपपाचिष्ठयं उक्तम्। कर्मनां चाक्ष्यते फिः अवेशितं शङ्कनीतं पादम् न शब्दाविच्छेदःक्ययने। एवमेः पदम्, एकं वाक्यम्, हत्यापि स्फोटमन्तरा नौपपाचिष्ठयं उक्तसे।

kakṣaḥ) bears testimony to the sameness of the letters. Jaimini has expressly said that "the case of the letter is similar to the sun" which is one, but which can be perceived by many at different places at the same time. So the individual letter, though it is one, can be uttered by many at different places at the same time. This argument denies the plurality of the same letter. Hence the Mīmāṃsakas maintain that an individual letter is single and eternal.

A close study of the M.Bh. clearly shows that the argument mentioned above cannot establish the singularity or oneness of an individual letter. Patañjali has obviously proved that the case of the letter is quite different from that of the sun, which is one. Patañjali has argued that the same observer does not find the sun in different places at the same time, but he finds the same letter in different places at the same time. He has given the example of the

1. MS. I.1.5.

2. M.Bh. on Ś.S. I (N.S. ed.), p. 97.
letter, 'a' and has pointed out that the letter 'a' is found at different places at the same time by the same observer in the words - arkaḥ, aśvaḥ, arthaḥ etc. It is also not correct to think that the same letter 'a' which is found before the letters rka, śva and rtha in the words mentioned above, is also found after the letters rk, śv, rth in the same words. If this is so, says Patanjali, then letters must be non-eternal, which is quite against the Mīmāṃsakas' theory of the eternal nature of letters. Patanjali has defined nityatva (eternity) in the following words:

A thing which is subtle, motionless, without origin, without any modification and indestructible is nitya.

Hence if a letter moves from one place to another, it cannot be regarded as eternal.

To sum up the view discussed above according to Patanjali the individual letter which is uttered by vocal organs and which is capable of being heard even by others, is not one but many. He has also stated

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1

M.Bh. on Sūtra I (N.S. ed.), p. 97.
that letters are uttered by a speaker one after the other and as soon as their utterance is complete they are destroyed. The Naiyāyikaś and the Vaiśeṣikaś hold the same view. But unlike them, grammarians maintain that such momentary letters cannot reveal the sense of a word either singly or jointly, nor even that eternal letters are capable of denoting the sense of a word in any way. Grammarians therefore go a step further and maintain that śabda or word is something over and above the sound, which is heard. Patañjali has expressly distinguished between dhvani and śabda and shown that sphaṭa is the proper śabda and dhvani is the attribute of śabda or the manifestor of śabda.

**ETYMOLOGICAL EXPLANATION OF THE WORD SPHAṬA**

The etymology of the word can be given in two ways which reveal two different senses of the word. The first etymological explanation of the word sphaṭa is as follows - स्फोटस्ते व्यास्ते व्यङ्गित स्फोटः। This refers to its being suggested or revealed by letters or dhvani. It indicates that sphaṭa is an eternal śabda different from dhvani or sound and is suggested by dhvani. Hence sphaṭa is the appropriate name for that śabda, which is manifested and which causes the
cognition of the meaning. The second derivation of the word sphoṭa can be given as follows:

‘स्पृहति बःः श्लोकः इति स्पृहति वाकः: श्लोकः इति वाकः’ This refers to its characteristic of conveying the sense. Hence it is called sphoṭa causing the knowledge of the meaning. As Patanjali has said in the first Āhnikā of the M.Bh. “Sabda is that the manifestation of which produces the correct knowledge of the object which has dewlap, hump, hoofs, horn, etc.

Similarly the etymology of the word dhvani can be given as “ध्वनिः ध्वनिक्षति स्पृहतम् or ध्वनिक्षते ध्वनिक्षते स्पृहेके अनेनेति या ध्वनि” This indicates that the letters or sounds, which suggest or reveal the sphoṭa are designated as dhvani.

The etymological explanations of the two words: dhvani and sphoṭa clearly show that the sphoṭa is real and always present within the speaker and the listener and several non-eternal sounds called dhvani in the language are its manifester (vyanjaka). The sphoṭa is uncaused, since the sound or dhvani only manifests it, and whatever is uncaused cannot be destroyed.

THE NATURE OF SPHOTA

Patanjali's remarks made incidentally about sabda reveal the true nature of sphoṭa. He has stated that
śabda has two aspects - eternal and non-eternal. He has further stated that śabda is heard by the ear, comprehended by the intellect, manifested by the sound and it has for its place only ether. He has also used the following epithets with regard to śabda: Kuṭastha (indestructible) avicāli (immovable) and unapayopajana-vikāri (not undergoing any loss or increase or modification). To distinguish sphota from the ordinary sound, he has pointed out that it is sound (dhvani) alone that is cognizable by the sense of hearing: it is either short or long. Sphota never undergoes any change. According to Patanjali sphota is not only eternal but also only one.
Following the footsteps of Patanjali, Bhartrihari has developed this doctrine at great length and has ultimately proved sphota as identical with Brahman, which is without beginning or end. From this proceeds the whole creation of the world in the form of all manifested objects. He has clearly stated that out of the two kinds of śabda, one is the manifester (vyanjaka) and other is the manifested (vyānyya) the latter expresses the sense. The relation therefore between dhvani and sphota is one of the manifested and manifested (vyāngyavyānjakabhāva) while the relation between sphota and meaning is one of the denoter and the denoted (Vācyavācakabhāva). Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa has maintained that Sphota is another name of śabda, which is really one, indivisible and formless. It is called sphota, because the sense is expressed by it and not by sounds or dhvanis which are only momentary and manifesting medium of sphota. He has further defined

1 वनाधिनिमयं श्रस्स श्रव्यतां यवदार्थनुः।
   निवृत्तेऽस्मायायमेन प्रक्ष्ययं जगते। यतः॥

VP.I.1.

2 श्वायपाण्यवन्यं श्रव्यम् श्रव्यकथो बिन्दुः।
   एको निमिैस श्रव्यनामपराधं रूपं विवः॥

VP.I.44.
sphoṭa in brief terms as "sphoṭa is such a śabda which is manifested in the region of the heart of both the speaker and the listener by Madhyamānāda and denotes the sense of a word." Such a phase of śabda as is manifested by the Madhyamā Nāda is called eternal and Sphoṭātmaka Brāhmaṇa and is experienced in the process of japa or meditation.

DIFFERENT STAGES OF ŚABDA

A hymn from the R.V. quoted in the M.Bh. is taken to refer to the four stages of śabda. It further says that Brāhmaṇas who are wise enough know them all. Three of them are not cognizable by ordinary men, since they are hidden inside the body. Human beings speak out only the fourth. The hymn does not mention the names of śabda at the different stages. Patañjali has also not expressly said whether the first quarter of the

1 तस्म नवल्मनादोवर्ष्मांवाचकस्फोटात्मकस्ब्रह्मणि
तामुखग्रामयोणांवयक्रमं। केंद्रः स्फोटात्मको ब्रह्मणो नित्यं।

PL.M. 17

2 दत्तार्ति वाक्यारितिका पदार्थं, ताति विद्वार्थ्यमेव मरोपिणि
युहार्याः श्रीपि निहितानेनपर्यं, दुरीयं वाचो गुह्यम् पदार्थं।

RS I.164.45 quoted in the M.Bh. 1st Āhnika.
hymn refers to the four stages of śabda. He has merely explained it as "catvāri vākparimitāpadāni as catvāripadiāpadajātāni - nāmākhya topasarganipātāśca (noun, verbs, prepositions and particles).

In later times various explanations of the first quarter of this hymn were given by different scholars. In the opinion of Nāgęśa Bhṛṣṭa the words Catvāripadajātāni refer to the four stages of śabda, hence the particle 'ca' he thinks is used in the M.Bh. in the explanation of those words", otherwise it would be superfluous. In support of this view he has quoted the vākyapadiya, where a detailed account of these four stages of speech is given.

Uddyota on the Bhāṣya 1st Āhnika (N.S. ed.), p.41. 

VP. I.144. Quoted in the Uddyota (N.S. ed.), p.44.
Following the view of Bhartrhari, Nāgėśa Bhaṭṭa maintains that sābda passes through successive stages in the course of articulation. Although it is one, eternal and indivisible, yet due to the difference of upādhi (attribute) its transition from the uncognisable stage to the audible word is described as made up of four stages. These four stages of sābda called Vāk are technically known as - Parā, Paśyanti, Madhyama, and Vaikharī. It is said that when the Mūlādhāra-cakra is made active by coming in contact with a certain stimulus, some impulse is caused and a quantity of air is pushed upwards within the body. Thus the imperceptible sound comes gradually into the range of perception. The first viz. Parāvāk resides in the Mūlādhāra, in the shape of a motionless Bindu subtle.

2

परावाक मूलाधारम् पद्मनाथं नामित्स्थित्वात्
हस्तिस्य गत्वा मध्यमा तेस्वं वेदिते कथावेदना ||
केसरा वि वृत्तो नावः परक्षमगोचरःः
मध्यमा तृतीये नावः स्फोटेऽन्त् बकं द्वाले ||
PLM. p.27.

3

उष्णश्रीस्वान्ते अक्षमायारङ्ग भुवनस्
उष्ण कुण्डलिनि
ब्रह्मकिरियायारंप्रक्षे
बायाराद वयुश्रिवाद्वर्यः भेवनास्व भयुविशार्दः
पिकासुल्क बेहमवः त्रितीयस्वृद्धिं प्रमुः
ैवेदिश्च मृणाप्रारंभकं सम्पर्कति
Sāṅgītaratnākara 1, 2, 120, 121, 145 and 146 and

Footnote continued on next page.
entity and is known as śabda-Brahman. It is beyond comprehension. When the internal air comes to the region of the navel the Paśyanti-vāk is manifested which is attainable only by Yogins. Both Pārāś and Paśyanti are very subtle and hence they are called sūkṣma-sphoṭa. When that air reaches the region of the heart it reveals Madhyamavāk. It is also regarded as sūkṣma-sphoṭa, since it is not heard by others, but it is grasped by the intellect and is audible only to one's own innate power of hearing. In the fourth stage, the śabda is manifested in the region of the throat and is called Vaikharīvāk. It is capable of being heard by others. In the third stage, the word or śabda is

Footnote continued from previous page.

4 ibid.

5 ibid.

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called sphoța, as the meaning is ultimately expressed by it and not by sounds of momentary existence. It may be urged here that the sphoța theory of the grammarians also is not altogether free from faults. The same difficulties which have been raised with respect to the theory of letters expressing the meaning, appear in the sphoța theory also: the manifesting letters can apply their power separately or jointly and neither of the alternatives is tenable as stated above. If a single individual letter has the capacity to manifest sphoța, the first letter of the word will do so, and the remaining letters of it, will be superfluous. The second alternative is also not possible because a combination of the momentary letters is quite impossible.

A careful scrutiny, however, discloses the subtle difference between the theories held by the Mimāṃsakas and the grammarians. According to the grammarians every letter of a word manifests the whole word, but the first letter of a word reveals sphoța vaguely and

Footnote continued from previous page.

6 Ibid.

तत् बाल्यवर्धनानागच्छाति तैन चाउनोर्ध्यामाध्यमति च मुखानागच्छाति पराशुराम च तत्क्षतानेत्रभविष्यताः परवैशेषिकपरमां माया भैपापातुते। भैपापातुते शुक्लाप्रकाशः सक्षण श्रूक्षममाध्यमी नेयर्णवचनयुग्मार्थकः। p.27
each successive letter of that word makes this sphota clearer and clearer. It is the last letter of the word, that manifests sphota finally.

Following the view of Bhartṛhari, Mādhavaśārya, the writer of the 'Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha' has rightly compared the process of the manifestation of sphota with the study of the Vedas or with the inspection or test of a jewel. He has stated that just as a passage or portion of the Vedas after one reading is not memorised, but it is fixed in the mind by repetition or just as the real nature of the jewel is not clearly seen at first glance, but it is finally realised after repeated viewing, likewise the initial letters of a word do not reveal the clear nature of a word but what brings out the clear nature of sphota to the hearer, is the final letter of a word.

1 यथवान्वितसः ज्ञातब्रह्मवाचलवायम्।
वातियसनव तस्मात् प्रत्यावृत्त्वा प्रियोप्यके ॥

VP.I.83.

नाशे राशितवी जायामस्तेन ध्वनिना सह।
वातितिसतिपावायां वृद्धो ज्ञानोऽवियाते ॥

VP.85.

Footnote continued on next page.
KINDS OF SPOHTA

Sphota is single, unique, and real. As it is manifested by sounds and is one and indivisible, there should be, it might be argued, no possibility of its being divided into various kinds. Yet the individual differences, which are commonly found between one letter and another, between pada and vākya, etc. are considered to be due to the difference in sounds. These divisions of sphota are merely apparent and can be explained on the analogy of time and the sky.

Footnote continued from previous page.

2

Pāṇini-darśana in the Sarvadarśana saṅgraha.

2a औपाफिको मेवस्था भाकाल्पे य ज्ञवस्ताप्येकत्से वाक्यः।

Uddyota on the M. Bh. on Ś. S. I (N. S. ed.), p. 98 and

क्रियर्वं व मृणकोऽव: वक: सन्न

पुस्थित:। S. M. Kārikā 44.

वर्णिनः, वयम्पुष्यिति:। S. M. Kārikā 45.
Although time is single and indivisible, yet due to the existence of the differences in its attributes (उपाधि) it has many names viz. moment, hour, day etc. and past, present and future. So also the sky is differently named as चटाकाश, नाटकाश etc.

Similarly one and indivisible sāhoṭa receives several names due to the differences existing in its manifesting media. They are generally classified in eight categories:— (1) Varṇa, (2) Varṇa-jāti, (3) Pada, (4) Pada-jāti, (5) Vākya, (6) Vākya-jāti, (7) Akhaṇḍa-pada and (8) Akhaṇḍa-vākya. Hence the manifested sāhoṭa, although essentially one, is divided into eight classes. Patanjali himself has not expressly stated such divisions of sāhoṭa in the M.Bh. yet during his discussions, he has expressed ideas, which throw sufficient light on each division of sāhoṭa. Bhaṭṭoḍi Dīkṣita in his Ṣabda Kaustubha' has divided sāhoṭa into eight categories and has tried to prove their existence and validity on the authority of the M.Bh. and the Pradīpa thereon. They are as follows:— (1) Varṇa-sāhoṭa, (2) Pada-sāhoṭa, (3) Vākya-sāhoṭa, (4) Akhaṇḍa-pada-sāhoṭa, (5) Akhaṇḍa-vākya sāhoṭa, (6) Varṇa-jāti sāhoṭa, (7) Pada-jāti-sāhoṭa, (8) Vākya-jāti sāhoṭa.

1 वसुन्तस्य वाककाति स्वरूपेक्षिता। तत्र वाक्तो पता:।
वर्णस्कोटः पदस्कोटः वाकस्कोटः अक्षरपदस्कोटः ततुष्क
वाक्षक्षोटः। इत्यथे पदस्कोटः। वर्णस्कोटादेन
नितोषधर्मवातिक्षोटः। १ Sabda Kaustubha.
Konda Bhatta the author of the M.Bh and Nāgeśa Bhatta have completely followed the view of Dīkṣita in classifying sphota and has stated and discussed all these varieties of sphota in their works.

It has to be stated in this connection that Rāmājñā Pāṇḍeya has classified sphota into sixteen varieties in his book named 'Vyākaraṇadārāsana-Bhūmikā'. They are as follows:—


Footnote continued on next page.
A critical study of this view clearly shows that the main difference in regard to the classification of sphota between the view of Pândya and that of other grammarians lies in the fact that the former has classified sphota on the basis of the sense denoted by sphota as he himself has stated that Vyakti sphota and Játí sphota mean Játibodhaka sphota. On the other hand, other grammarians classify sphota according to differences existing in the manifesting medium of sphota. They mean by Vyakti sphota, Vyaktabhivyangya sphota and by Játí sphota, Jatyabhivyangya sphotah and so on.

Footnote continued on next page.

Vyākaraṇa-darśana-Bhūmikā by Rāmājñā Pândeya
It is not necessary to go into details and prove that the classification of sphoṭa given by Pāṇḍeya is not free from fault. In the first place it goes against tradition, since right from Bhartṛhari to Nāgęśa Bhaṭṭa every thinker of this doctrine has used the words Vyakti-sphoṭa and Jāti-sphoṭa in the sense of Vyaktyabhivyangya sphoṭa and Jātyabhivyangya sphoṭa respectively and nobody has taken the sense of those words as Vyakti-bodhaka-sphoṭa and Jāti-bodhaka-sphoṭa as given by Pāṇḍeya. Secondly, if sphoṭa be classified according to the sense denoted by itself, the kinds of sphoṭa given as eight by Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita and followed by Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, Nāgęśa Bhaṭṭa and others, would not only increase by eight as Pāṇḍeya has stated in his book, but it would be increasing considerably the kinds of sphoṭa. For instance, he has taken Akhaṇḍa Pada Jāti-sphoṭa and Akhaṇḍa Vākya Jāti-sphoṭa as separate from Padajāti-sphoṭa and Vākya-jāti-sphoṭa respectively but there is no reason why there should not be taken Akhaṇḍa Prakṛti-jāti-sphoṭa and Akhaṇḍa Pratyaya-jāti-sphoṭa as different from Prakṛti-jāti-sphoṭa and Pratyaya-jāti-sphoṭa respectively.
NECESSITY AND VALIDITY OF EACH KIND OF SPHOTA

Varna-sphota :- Varṇa-sphota does not mean (though it appears to do so) that letters convey the sense either singly or jointly. It is needless to repeat here that neither of the two alternatives is free from defects and Patañjali has shown that letters cannot convey the sense. Hence Varṇa-sphota here denotes that both the Prakṛti (the base) and the Pratyaya (the suffix) have expressive powers separately. Although the base and the suffix cannot be used separately to denote their different senses yet they are regarded as significant for the sake of grammatical operation. Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita thinks that Patañjali’s statement in the M.Bh. on I.3.10 clearly

1 तत्समाः मयाः शर्मका गच्छति

M.Bh. on 35.

2 तत्र प्रत्ययस्य क्रमसंयया बाक्याः न्यास्त्य

PLM.p.2

3 तत: “स्या न कार्यादिशां समयेको वेदवेदां” हिति “स्याः

निर्वचितो न तस्य “व्यासेन्द्रम्” नारदवेदसारिते माध्यमिकः मुखे अः प्रकाशः
throws light on the existence of varṇa-sphoṭa.
Patanjali has maintained that only those, which are capable of denoting the sense of the sthāmin can be substituted in the place of sthānin. Hence the singular suffix will have similarity (Āntarya) with the singular one and dual suffix with the dual one and plural suffix with plural one and hence in the case of the sūtra "स्त्रस्त्वनिगमापू " III.3.101 the purpose of the sūtra I.3.10 would be served by I.1.50 and for that the sūtra I.3.10 of Pāṇini is not necessary. This statement of the M.Bh. proves that Pratyayas (suffixes) convey their sense. Again in the M.Bh. on P.I.2.45, Patanjali has proved, on the basis of the logical method of agreement and difference, that both Prākriti (base) and Pratyaya (suffix) have their own separate senses. Taking the words Vṛksah, and Vṛksau, as instances, he has pointed out that the base Vṛksā, which remains unchanged in both cases, denotes a thing having roots, branches, fruits and leaves and the suffixes which change in each case denote singular and the dual number respectively.

Footnote continued on next page.

1 इह वृक्षारुपवर्तितरुपः कृष्णवक्रमः कृष्णस्य कारानां: सकारात् प्रज्ञान: | अव्याकृति कृष्णवक्रमः पुरुस्त्रनवक्रमः प्रभृतिकालेनेककृत् | वृक्षारुपवर्तितकृष्णवक्रमः कृष्णस्य, कृष्णवक्रमः कृष्णस्याकार: | सकारात् अर्थहीनः।
It deserves to be noted in this connection that there is a great controversy with regard to the point whether the sthānīn or the ādesā (substitute) has expressive power. The view of the Naiyāyikas is that in the form subanta like Vṛksah and tiṁanta like 'pacati', the visarga and ti have no expressive power, since ādesās (substitutes) are more in number than their sthānīn and hence much more expressive power will have to be accepted. In that case, it will be open to the objection of prolixity (gaurava). Therefore sthānīns like sup and lakāra of which visarga and ti are substitutes should be taken to have expressive power. To this view, they think the sutra 'lah karmanī ca' P.III.4.69 is in accord. There is no sutra in the Aṣṭādhyāyī which states that substitutes possess sense like sup and lakāra. 

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M.Bh. on P.I.2.45.
-sphota therefore is not acceptable, since letters like visarga and tip, which are heard have no expressive power. But the argument mentioned above advanced by Tārkikas, is not very sound. In the case of the subanta form Vṛkṣaḥ the sthānini of the visarga is given differently in different grammars. According to Kālāpagrammar here the suffix is, si, and according to Pāṇinīan the suffix is 'su' and according to some others the suffix is 'ru'. Hence even according to the view of the Tārkikas on account of the difference of attribute (śaktatāvacchādaka), the assumption of different expressive powers for the different sthānins is absolutely necessary. In the case of the form of the verb (tīnanta) if the lakāras have the expressive power, then one who does not know grammar at all, would understand nothing from the tīnanta forms like paca'li. Therefore it is absolutely necessary to accept expressive power in the substitutes

1 राम इत्यादि ५ तिवारिन्येति, स्थार्यनां पच्यनन्तकर्मा अनंतर्किल्लिन्त्यमेककप्यनप्रसलस्य स्त्रिया पुल्लेन उदिक: दिनिग्नमातिरत्ति।

Sphotavada of Nāgęśa Bhaṭṭa, p. 6.

2 कारणकिवियां वोपायायथेष

ibid., p. 5.
which are seen in the fully formed words. Patañjali in his M.Bh. on P.I.1.69, has also stated that that which is uttered is capable of denoting the sense and not that which is comprehended.

Moreover, usage is regarded as the best means, which leads us to determine the expressive power. The usage clearly shows that substitutes (visarga and ti) have their own expressive powers.

Thus an account of the arguments adduced above, the grammarians have determined that expressive power resides in the substitutes and not in the sthānins, which clearly supports the existence of varga-sphota.

Pada-sphota is a kind of sphota which is finally manifested by the last letter of a pada (subanta or tiṇanta). It is a matter of common observation that people use expressions such as “पदावधायनं प्रभृतिम्” which clearly prove the existence of Pada-sphota. Kaiyaṭa thinks that the use of the

\[1\] \text{उत्तरायणम्: ज्ञात: प्रभृतिम् वर्णिन न सेविताम्:}

M.Bh. on P.I.1.69.
singular number in the expression of the M.Bh. clearly indicates the existence of Pada-sphota. Otherwise the singular case-termination after the stem uccārita would not be justified.

Again in the M.Bh. on P.I.2.45, while presenting the words kānde and kuḍaye as counter examples of the word 'apratyayah' of that sūtra, Patañjali has clearly accepted that subantas have separate expressive power of signification. Moreover, if it is proved by the arguments given above, that substitutes have an expressive power, then thereby the Pada-sphota is also proved. For instance, in the padas like ghaṭena it would be difficult to determine, which is the base and which is the case suffix, whether ghaṭa

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1. प्रादपा on the 1st अङ्क of the M.Bh.

2. Uddyota.

3. M.Bh. on P.I.2.45.

| भाषारेखा | पादस्लोक्यः | पदस्लोक्यः | वाच्यः | काण्डः | कुड़े |

प.भ. S. कारिका-62.
is the base and āna is the suffix or ghatā is the base and nā is the suffix. There is nothing to determine that granting that on the basis of Pāṇini 'रागिनक्ला' VII.1.12 in the particular instance of ghatena the base and the suffix can be determined, still in the case of such words as vah, nah, where vah and nah are substituted for the whole collection of letters (yuṣmāṇ and asmāṇ respectively) the determination of the base and the suffix in them is utterly impossible. Of course, as the sense from the words vah and nah is universally understood, an expressive power in the Padas has to be accepted.

In fact, both the varṇa sphota and the pada-sphota are in a way artificial, since it is the sentence alone, which is used in the world to express ideas. The Padas are accepted not as ultimate elements, but as means which help to grasp the sense of a sentence. Just as Padas are analysed into roots

1 वर्णस्वादिक अर्थप्रदेशः विचारमयी प्रकारस्य लक्षणः शिवाहुस्वसक्यन्तरं, जैवाधिशेषम् अव्ययायुक्तस्य कायायुक्तस्य अवस्यहुभवत: जैविको अवस्यस्य अस्यहुभवतः।

Sphoṭavāda of Nāgēśa Bhaṭṭa, p. 10.
and suffixes so as to make the sense of Padas easily understandable, similarly the sentence is split up into Padas, merely to facilitate the understanding of the sense of a sentence. There is no separate existence of Padas apart from the sentence, of which they form integral parts. In short, all these processes, namely the splitting of a sentence into Padas and Padas into roots and suffixes adopted by grammarians are merely to facilitate the understanding of the sense of a sentence.

Vākya-sphoṭa means that sphoṭa which is finally revealed by the last letter of a sentence. Patañjali in the M.Bh. on P.I.2.45, after a long discussion, has accepted that the sense of a sentence is different from that of the Padas. He has stated that it would not be proper to say that the meaning of a sentence is no other than that of words. The meaning of a

1 ब्रम त सं स नापणे नुस्तर: जयव्रौ, वाक्स्यार्थ् एव बुल्ल: जयव्रौः। ताहुः प्रायन्त्वृच्छ मित्रसिद्धि पदपदा प्रायन्त्वत्त्वापं निक्षः। प्रातिवेदि यवमहंस्के धर्मचारणारामायस्मधुः।

Pradīpa on the M.Bh. on P.I.2.45 (N.S. ed.), Vol. II, p. 45.

2 ने पदा संस्कृत्त्योपपलिक्षणयुक्त वाक्ये।

M.Bh. on P.I.2.45.
sentence is something more than the mere sum-total of the signification of its component parts viz. the various words. The meaning of a sentence, says Patanjali, is a separate entity, which specially arises from the correlation of the meaning of the constituent words and which is distinct from the sum-total of the senses of isolated words. Kaiyata says thereon that the sentence alone is the main sabda and its meaning alone is the main sabdartha. The assumption of the analytical method by grammarians and the splitting up of a sentence into its constituent padas with senses assigned to them on the basis of agreement and difference (anvaya and vyatireka) are merely devices for the purpose of grasping easily the meaning of a sentence. Moreover, Nagesa Bhatta in his sphotaavāda has maintained that in words like

1 यथा पदानि सामान्ये कोम्यान्ये ययुः केवलेः सक्त्या-मेवं स वाक्यांशः।

M.Bh. on P.I.2.45.

2 चेतनिक्षुणी निपद्य विशिष्टस्य विशिष्टस्य पदार्थे-लग्नेवेवस्य वाक्यां। अन्यप्या एव व्याख्याने नात्त्वाः सघनः।

Pradipa thereon.
hareva and viṣṇova, the final and the initial vowels of the different padas in each are joined together by P.VI.1.109 in such a way that the Padas are not distinctly known. The meaning of the words joined together is, however, understood on account of the expressive power residing in the words joined together. Hence it is absolutely necessary to believe that the sentence has an expressive power. Kṛṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, the author of the Vāyukarana-īṣṭasāra has tried to prove the significance of the sentence on the analogy of the signification of the Pada (word). He has maintained that just as the sense of a word (Pada) is known from the word even without knowing the sense of the base and the suffix, so the sense of the sentence is also known from the sentence even without the knowledge of the sense of its constituent words.

1

हरेवाय, विष्णौः वै नादगरीत्वा पदोः।
स्मात्माखात्या वोपातु, समवास्थैर्विश्वस्य-वाक्यायो अविद्यातिता वाक्यस्तोऽपि।

Sphoṭavāda of Nāgęśa Bhaṭṭa, p. 10.

2

वस्तु: पदे: पदवार्थोपयत् वाक्येन वाक्यार्थोऽथ होि पदवार्थैकित: पदेकैव वाक्यार्थैकित: वाक्येवः पदमेवैते पदस्तोऽपि वाक्यस्तोऽपि।

V. Bh. S. on the Kārikā 64.
He has further maintained that just as the power to express the sense belongs to the words, so the power to express the sense belongs to the sentence. Nāgęśa Bhaṭṭa stated that the doctrine of the expressive power of the sentence is supported by Patańjali in the M. Bh. on P.I.1.1 where the latter has observed that there are sentences with meanings and without meanings. Again Nāgęśa Bhaṭṭa in the Uddyota on the M. Bh. on P.I.2.45 has quoted the Vākya-padīya of Bhartṛhari, who supports the existence of Vākyā, sphiṭa apart from Pada-sphiṭa on the basis of counter-arguments. He states that, if the meaning of a sentence is considered not to be derived from the sentence, then the meaning of a Pada (word) would have to be so. That is to say that just as the meaning of the Pada is considered to be derived from the

1 "अर्थवास्तम्भाकारानि च वाक्यारानि इत्यादि" हत्याविना "प्रवावतवै" (I.1.1) सप्तावाकाराप्रवीपेतपितः

Sphoṭa-vāda of Nāgęśa, p. 10.

2 अर्थादो विद्व वाक्यारः पवाविकापं तथा मनेत

VP.II.16.
word, so the meaning of the sentence should be considered to be derived from the sentence. Interpreting the sūtra II.1.55 in the Nyāya Bhāṣya Vātsyāyana has also accepted the existence of the Vākyasphoṭa. He has stated that in a sentence, which is made up of words, which are mutually expectant, their collection as a composite unit, is alone capable of denoting the complete sense. Jāti-sphoṭa means that the genus belonging to the individual śabdas is sphoṭa which is manifested by individual sounds. In other words, some scholars hold the view that the expressive power resides in the jāti (class) belonging to the śabda-vyakti or the individual śabda. They state, in support of their view, the principle set forth by the Mimamsakas in jātyadhirāṇa, where the latter have decided that words denote classes and not individuals, because if they denote individuals, as individuals are innumerable, the expressive power

1.

"पवस्तूलो वाक्यमन्युञ्जातो" (II.1.55)

अत पवस्तूलो यावन्तो तिक्ष्णं च, तेन तत्समुह इत्यवः। अतस्म पवस्तूलो वाक्यमन्युञ्जातायाय विवक्षकियायायाय अविवाहीयायाय सम्बन्धमित तुअः।

V. Bh. on न्यायभाष्यम् II.1.55.

2.

जातिस्फोटांर्विन्द्वानां - आकृतिविकारणवावेत-पवस्तूलायेण अवाय जातिरित्र इवतारं दैव।

Sphotaśvalāda of Nāgeśa, p.96.
of śabda would have to be assumed as infinite in number and there would be a great prolixity (gaurava). The Mīmāṃsakas, therefore, accept that words denote classes and not individuals. Following the same reasoning it is also proved that individual words (śabda vyaktis) have no expressive power because individual words are infinite in number or endless and if expressive power is accepted in the individual vyaktis, then due to differences in the individual vyaktis, the expressive power also would have to be assumed as infinite in number per individual, which would lead to a great prolixity (gaurava). Therefore, some grammarians maintain that the expressive power should be accepted in the genus belonging to the individual words (śabda-vyakti). Bhārtṛhari also favours this view. He says that the jāti (genus) suggested by many individual letters is known as jāti-sphota.

Although Patañjali has not used words like jāti-sphota Vyakti-sphota etc. in the M.Śh. yet commentators have

1

VP. I. 94.
tried to prove that both jāti-sphoṭa and vyakti-sphoṭa are in accordance with the M.Bh. Patanjali has stated that the genus 'a' when mentioned comprehends the whole family of the individual ākāras viz. udāṭṭa, anudāṭṭa, svarita, hrasva, dīrgha, and pluta. Kāyaṭa says thereon that setting aside vyakti-sphoṭa the Bhāṣyakāra has followed jāti-sphoṭa. Again on another occasion, Kāyaṭa says that here Patanjali has established jāti-sphoṭa. Thus it is clear that later grammarians have developed and dealt with the problem of sphoṭa at/length; but they have always tried to follow the foot-steps of Patanjali.

It might be said here that if letters manifest jāti belonging to śabda, and that jāti has the

1

नस्मादु रिन्नना चनानितन्यं चयाकाराः प्रम्परिक्षा

Padipa on the M.Bh. on  śl.Ś. I. (NS ed.), Vol. I, p. 97, and

एवं व्यासस्कोटें निराकृतेन जातिस्कोटस्मयेशवर्षके

Padipa on the M.Bh. on ŚŚ.I. (N.S. ed.), Vol.I, p. 99 and

स्कोटमार्गार्थति - जातिस्कोट इत्यः

Padipa on the M.Bh. on ŚŚ. 3 (N.S. ed.), Vol.I,p.120
expressive power, then in cases such as kapi and pika, where the manifesting medium of pada-jāti in both is the same, there would be no difference in the sense conveyed by them.

But this argument is not sound because according to jātisphota-vādin, the ānupūrvi (the order of letters) which is different in kapi and pika is taken as attribute (upādhi). Thus a difference in jātis belonging to kapi and pika would arise as caused by the difference existing in their attribute (upādhi) which would result in a difference in the senses conveyed.

This jāti-sphota is divided into three categories in accordance with the existence of jāti in the three viz. Varṇa, Pada and Vākya. Hence the sphotas are called respectively as (1) Varṇa-jātisphota, (2) Pada-jātisphota and (3) Vākya-jātisphota.

Some scholars hold the view that both words and sentences, are indivisible units. They think that

\[\text{V.Śh.S. 69.}\]
a pada may have different parts with different senses in the form of base and suffix, when they are separately known, but as soon as those parts are united in the form of a pada, they lose their separate individual nature. The word as a composite whole denotes something which is different from the individual senses possessed by the base and the suffix. Similar is the case with a sentence. Padas may have senses, when they are individually known, but as soon as they form a sentence, the individual words lose their sense and come to possess another sense, which is expressed by the sentence. Thus a sentence as a whole denotes the sense, which is distinct from the sense of its component parts. Hence these two sphotas viz. pada-sphota and vākya-sphota are called Akhaṇḍa-pada-sphota and Akhaṇḍa-vākyasphota respectively.

Bhaṭṭoṇḍaji Diśkīṭa thinks that while interpreting the passage of the M.Bh. "केनोम्वारितेन ो" Kaiyaṭa has used "कर्णातिरिक्तस्य पदस्त्व वाक्यस्य बां, where the use of the singular case-suffix after the stem pada and vākya clearly shows that he has accepted the existence of Akhaṇḍa-Padasphota and Akhaṇḍa-vākyasphota.

1

कर्णातिरिक्तस्य पदस्त्व वाक्यस्य वेति च चता कैयटे दिक्षितानि
तयोरस्त्रिन्दुप्फलता। S.K.
Similarly commenting on the passage of the M.Bh.

“श्रोत्रेष्ठप्रवृत्तिः।” Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa states that by using the singular case suffix after the word śabda, Patañjali has indicated the existence of Akhaṇḍa sphoṭa. Again in the sphoṭa-vāda Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa says that in the popular usage, people commonly use ‘ekam padam’ (one word), ‘tadevedam padam’ (the same word). Similarly they also use ‘ekam vākyam’ (one sentence), ‘tadevedam vākyam’ (the same sentence) etc. In the above expressions the knowledge of the word and the sentence arises as a whole. These general expressions, says Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, can be proved only after accepting the existence of Akhaṇḍa-pada-sphoṭa and Akhaṇḍa vākya-sphoṭa as otherwise, the word, ekam, in the

1

अनुभव इत्यक्षरितेन स्प्रोटवादः सहायतात्।

Uddyota on the M.Bh. on Ś.S. I (N.S. ed.) Vol.I, p.98.

2

वर्णाकारानि पदम् ‘पंक्व भाषयु’ इत्याभाषातः।

caritārthānārthānāriṣṭvāt, tadbhavān paryantam vāgyam itivākāraśeṣeṣu sarvaśatūrtam sarvah paryantasyam vāgyam tvah sa te paryantasyam sarvākāram. tvah vākṣyasya tathā pravāhyam ayuktān. vāgyavākyartha nirvāhyam tvah sarvākāram.

Sphoṭavāda of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, p. 71.
above expressions would not be connected with the words pada and vākya there being no single letter either in pada or in the vākya, Bhartrhari has also expressed a similar view in his vākyapadīya. He says that as letters like 'a', 'i', 'u', etc. cannot be further divided into parts, so also there is no existence of letters apart from the padas and words, again, have no existence apart from the sentence. One may raise the objection that according to the theory of the Akhaṇḍa-vākya-sphoṭa grammar would be useless, since the main purpose of grammar is to analyse Padas into bases and suffixes and not to teach the construction of the sentence. As Patañjali has stated that "the order of words is not taught in grammar, but grammar teaches only how words are formed. Words may be arranged in any way." In the doctrine of Akhaṇḍa-

1 पदे न कर्ता विषये वर्णव्यवस्था न च।
वाक्यातू पदवाचार्यत्वान्तः प्रविष्टते न कष्ण

VP.I.73.

2 नन्येच वास्त्वग्रामणप्रसूत: पदवस्याक्ष्यत्वात्।

V.Bh.S. on the कारिका 67.

3 नेत्र प्रयोगधिनयु भारर्थस्य किं तर्कसंस्कृत वाक्यें पदवायुस्वस्थेऽति।
तेन्य यष्टिममिति बहुताय।

M.Bh. on P.I.1.1.
padasphoṭa is a Pada that cannot be analysed into the base and the suffix because Padas in this view, are considered Akhaṇḍa (indivisible unit).

In answer to the above objection, it may be stated that the analysis of words given in the grammar is not real. It is assumed in treatises on grammar in order to enable the readers to comprehend the sense of sentence easily. The science of grammar starts with the analysis of padas into bases and suffixes only because there is no other alternative than this in order to make the sense of words easily intelligible to others.

From this brief discussion of the various kinds of sphoṭa, it would be found that all different forms of sphoṭa can be traced directly or indirectly to the M.Bh. Later grammarians, while discussing the several forms of sphoṭa, have taken their clue from the M.Bh. and have developed the doctrine of sphoṭa more clearly.

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1

व्यवहाराच मन्यते जात्यान्त्रिक्रिया यतः।
हास्येनु प्रक्रियाग्रेष्टंबैशैवोपवर्तते॥

VF.234.

उपायः बिक्षमाणां बालानानुपकल्यानः।
अस्तये जन्मभृं रिख्यत्वा तत्रः सत्ये समीक्षते॥

VF.240.
Grouping sphoṭa into eight categories Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita has clearly traced the origin of each form of sphoṭa to the M. Bh. or to the interpretation of the Bhāṣya passages given by Kāyaṭa in the Pradīpa.

In his concluding remarks, Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita has stated that of the different varieties of sphoṭa, it is the vākyā-sphoṭa alone that is accepted by all grammarians as the really significant one.

Commenting on the verse 2.57 of the vākyapadiya, Puṇyarāja has tried to prove that according to Patañjali, vākyā-sphoṭa alone is real and indivisible. He has stated that Patañjali has used the word Padākāra

1

बण्डाकार्यामें पक्षाः सत्यावादिन्यं येषु तत्र तत्तत्त्वाक्षरं।
तयार्थ त्वार्थात्क चूळे "सर्वं सर्प्पवेदिका" हति ज्ञानप्रमृः।
पक्षे बर्त्तावेदिन्यं, "अर्थइति" इस पव न दुः धृत्याक्षरं, तत्तता
व "पूर्व्यस्य सार्ववर्त्त्यम् हति ज्ञानोर्धम्यत्वं ज्ञात्स्रोतेऽ
अनुभूतं। ................. हति थ्यात्सायेन सर्वेन पक्षाः।

Śabdakaustubha.

2

वष्णिकाहार्यां पक्षां उक्तात्वायापि वाक्स्त्रोतेऽ
तत्त्यं प्रकृतं तत्तत्त्यं जात्सर्वेऽ जात्स्रोतं इत्यवस्तेमुः

Śabdakaustubha

Continued on next page.
in the M.Bh. on P.VI.1.207 to refer to grammarians.

The etymological explanation of the word Padakṣra can be given as 'padam karotir' in the sense of 'one who makes pada'. It clearly shows that according to Patanjali pada is artificial and hence it cannot be the real element of speech. Puṇyarāja has also quoted another passage from the M.Bh. which clearly shows that pada is unreal and vākya is really indivisible and single. The assumption of other sphiṭas than vākya sphiṭa is useful only for facilitating the understanding of the vākya-sphiṭa.

Nāgaraśa Bhaṭṭa holds also a similar view. He

Continued from previous page.

3

Puṇyarāja on VP.II.57

1

Puṇyarāja on VP. II.57
saying that in daily life people commonly use a sentence to communicate their ideas to others and words are never found to be used singly in their speech. Therefore it is just proper to assume that the whole sentence taken as a single unit is expressive of the particular sense. He says that not even 'Akhanda Vākya-sphoṭa' but Akhaṇḍa Vākya-jāti-sphoṭa alone is really expressive of the sense and that other sphoṭas are accepted only in order to enable readers to understand the Vākya-sphoṭa which is the real sphoṭa.

Bhartṛhari has dealt with the doctrine of sphoṭa in minute details. He has proved that even Vākya-sphoṭa is as unreal as pada-sphoṭa, since both refer to the world of appearance. He has finally identified sphoṭa with the Brahman. The ultimate truth according to him is Sabda Brahman out of which all cognisable phenomena evolve and in which they are finally merged. He has established sphoṭa in the same way as the Vedāntins of the Śaṅkara school have established Ātman as the sole reality.

\[1\] वाक्यस्थितिः वाक्यस्थितिः वाक्यस्थितिः। तत् पव भोकेचर्यवेष इत्यादुक्काल।

PL.M. p. 33.
Commenting on the M.Bh. I.I.1 and following the view of Bhartrihari, Kaiyata has stated that even jātisphoṭa is unreal, since after realization of the Brahman, all things disappear. Again, he has identified śabda-tattva with Brahman. It is very interesting to know that in the Śrīmad-Bhāgavata the word sphoṭa is used in the sense of Brahman.

Bharata Mishra in his sphoṭa siddhi has stated that the object of his work is to prove the identity of the universe with the eternal sound called sphoṭa which is different from letters.

1 ब्रह्मदृष्ट्ये च गोत्वार्थवचारतन्त्रवचारानात्मकत्वम्।
भात्तेष्वेषं सर्वोपास्त ज्ञातिष्णानां।

Pradipā on the M.Bh. 1st Āhnika (N.S. ed.), p. 63

2 चिह्नम् त्वमकायोऽसि चिह्नं लोक स्वोट भावम्।
नामे वर्षस्वर्यांकोर भविष्यतिः प्रयत्नः॥

Pradipā on Ś.S. 8 (N.S. ed.) p. 147.

3 एवं प्रत्यक्षार्थविद्यमानयांसदृष्टं ज्ञाततत्वसंक्षेपं
तत्त्त्वं विषयव्यय समयविद्ये प्रकरणं बुद्धिफलस्तु॥
समयविद्यं हति

Śrīmad-Bhāgavat-Skandha 10 Chapter 85, verse 9.

Sphoṭasiddhi of Bharata Mishra, p. 37.
Konda Bhatta quotes the Kārikā of Bhaṭṭojī Dīkṣita, which identifies the eternal sabda called 1 sphoṭa with Brahman. The Kārikā means - the reality of sabda-tattva, which is thus to be drawn out is called by the learned scholars Brahman the indestructible and the unmodified. Bow to that Supreme Being.

1

इत्यर्थ निन्द्रियमां चच्चश्चतत्त्वं निन्द- जनाम।
श्रेपतेस्यस्मां प्रामाणे तत्त्वेऽप्यैवामि नमः॥

V.Bh. Kārikā, 72.