PART - II
Text 1: पक्षरम्य व्याविद्विषिष्ट्यानमणुमितिहतुः।

Translation: The knowledge of the property of the subject as qualified by the invariable concomitance is the cause of an inferential cognition.

Note: Anumāṇa or inference is an important source of knowledge. Almost every logical and philosophical system has accepted inference. But the Navya-Nyāya system of logic mainly deals with inference technically and systematically.

According to the system inference is the instrument of an inferential cognition and inferential cognition arises from parāmarśa. This parāmarśa is a unique step in the process of inferential cognition. There is a lot of discussion between Nyāya system and Mīmāṃsā system, about parāmarśa. The present text
i.e. a small chapter/part of Tattvacintāmani by Gangesopādhyāya describes this process of knowing very elaborately. He starts with the definition of *parāmarśa* i.e., "Pakṣdharmasya vyāptiviśṭatā jñānam anumitihetuh." The knowledge of the property of the subject is qualified by the invariable concomitance is the cause of an inferential cognition. To explain the definition let us consider the well known example.

A man who has noticed in the kitchen etc. that smoke is concomitant with fire, happens to see afterwards on a mountain. Then he remembers the invariable concomitance i.e., 'where there is smoke there is fire'. Then he has the knowledge that this mountain is possessed of such smoke which is pervaded by fire. This is what is called 'parāmarśa'. Because *parāmarśa* means the knowledge of the property of the subject as pervaded by fire. In brief, knowledge of such probans which is qualified by the invariable concomitance and which exists on the subject, is called *parāmarśa*. In the example knowledge of such smoke which is pervaded by fire and which exists on the mountain is called 'parāmarśa'. The form of *parāmarśa* will be 'There is smoke on the mountain or the mountain possesses the smoke which is pervaded by fire'.
Translation: Well, the remembrance of the invariable concomitance in the form of the delimiter of the state of being pervaded and the knowledge of the existence of the pervaded on the subject (should be the cause of an inferential cognition). Because this is the simpler (cause and effect relationship) and (these two factors) are required for parāmarśa also. Thus, let the inferential cognition arise from these two knowledges namely 'smoke is pervaded by fire' and this (mountain) possesses smoke.

Note: In the text No. 1 the Navya-Nyāya system stated its view. But the Māṇḍūkya system opposes that view in this text. The objection of Māṇḍūkya system starts from this text. The Māṇḍūksakas are of the opinion that for the inferential cognition, remembrance of invariable concomitance in the form of the delimiter of the state of being pervaded and the knowledge of the state of being existent on the subject are sufficient to generate an inferential cognition.

In the example of smoke and fire, the smoke is pervaded and fire is pervader. So, pervadedness is in the smoke. The delimiter of
pervadedness will be smokeness. So the remembrance of the invariable concomitance in the form of delimiter of pervadedness means the remembrance of the invariable concomitance in the form of delimiter of pervadedness means the remembrance of invariable concomitance as smokeness. It means the present smoke possesses the smokeness which is pervaded by fire; and the knowledge of the state of being existent on the subject i.e., the mountain possesses smoke, these two knowledge are sufficient to give rise to inferential cognition namely, the mountain possesses fire. For that (inferential-cognition) the third one viz., \textit{parāmarśa} i.e., the qualified knowledge is not necessary. Because it leads to cumbersomeness. Moreover, the \textit{Naiyāyikas} also need these two knowledges as a ground for the knowledge of \textit{parāmarśa}. \textit{Parāmarśa} means nothing but the combination of these two distinct knowledge. It means the knowledge of \textit{parāmarśa} is covered by these two knowledges. Then why should \textit{parāmarśa} be accepted as a separable step? So the cause of \textit{parāmarśa} is enough but not the \textit{parāmarśa}. Therefore, \textit{parāmarśa} is not the cause of inferential cognition. The inferential cognition will arise from the two knowledges viz., the smoke is pervaded by fire and this mountain possesses smoke.
Translation: It can not be argued that let only the knowledge of pervadedness be the cause for inferential cognition, because it is simpler also because it is necessary and also because it is a cause. Because it is not present before the inferential cognition and simultaneously (these two knowledges) can not arise.

Note: Naiyāyikas can raise the issue that for the inferential cognition even the knowledge of property of subject is not necessary, only the knowledge of pervadedness (i.e. invariable concomitance) is the necessary cause of inferential cognition. Therefore, if only the knowledge of pervaded is accepted as the cause of inferential cognition, it will be simpler. Mīmāṃsakas say that it is not possible because knowledge of pervadedness does not arise.

Translation: Well, if you say that as after remembering qualified by thatness and when the same thing comes in contact with the sense-
organs there arises the knowledge of identity relation i.e. 'He is the same (Devadatta)'; in the same way after seeing the smoke there arises the remembrance that smoke is pervaded by fire and also perception of universal property smokeness, the knowledge of identity relation that this (smoke) is pervaded (by fire) will arise, because all the required factors are present, therefore that (knowledge of identity relation) should be the cause of inferential cognition, it is not correct.

**Note:** When somebody remembers an object qualified by 'thatness' and when the same object comes in contact with sense organs immediately the knowledge appears that 'This is the same (qualified by thatness), i.e., there arises the knowledge of identity relation e.g., if Devadatta is seen before and afterwards whenever he comes in contact with eyes immediately the perceiver remembers that he is the same Devadatta. Thus, there arises the knowledge of identity-relation between 'this and that Devadatta'. It means, at that time there arises the remembrance of previously seen Devadatta and after the perception there arises the knowledge of identity relation i.e., 'This is the same Devadatta'.

In the same manner whenever one perceives the smoke on the mountain, immediately he remembers that, 'this is the same
smoke which is pervaded by fire, which has common property
smokeness and which was seen in the kitchen etc. exists on the
mountain.' This is also identity relation, because all the factors
required for identity relation viz., the remembrance of previously
seen smoke, knowledge of common property smokeness and
perception of smoke on the mountain are present, then naturally the
knowledge of identity relation i.e., 'this is that smoke' will arise and
through this knowledge inferential knowledge will take place.
Therefore, this knowledge should be the cause of inferential
cognition.

The form of this knowledge of identity relation is equal to
the form of Parāmarśa. So, if one will accept this knowledge of
identity relation as the cause of inferential cognition, it means he
has accepted the Parāmarśa. Then the purpose of Naiyāyikas will
be achieved.

Text: 5: प्रत्यक्षसामग्रीत: अनुमितिसामग्रिः: बलवत्यात् अनुमितिरेवोर्त्तछते न तु
व्याप्तमेदप्रत्यक्षम्।

Translation: Because, the factors which are involved in the inferential
cognition are stronger than the factors which are involved in the
perception, there will arise the inferential cognition only and not
the perception of identity relation of the pervaded.

Note: But Mīmāṁsakas are not ready to accept this view. According to
them when one says 'ayam dhūmaḥ vahūvyāpyah' - 'this smoke is
pervaded by fire', it makes an assertion like 'parvato vahnimūn' -
'the mountain possesses fire'. Therefore, this knowledge can not be
called as identity relation but it is an inferential cognition. Because
it is not the direct process of knowledge but indirect, as the process
of inferential cognition. Because, the factors involved in the
process of inferential cognition are many more than the factors
involved in that of perception. Hence, in this case inference is
stronger than perception. Therefore, in this case there will arise the
inferential cognition and not the knowledge of identity.

Text: 6. अन्यथा तथापि परामर्शानलोर तदनुवचायो भवेत् न तु अनुमिति: ।

Translation: Otherwise, in your case also, after the parāmarśa, there will
arise mental perception and not inferential cognition.

Note: Mīmāṁsakas point out one more difficulty that if the knowledge of
identity relation is accepted as the cause of inferential cognition
then as, in the case of 'so'yam Devadattaḥ' there arises the mental
perception and not inferential cognition, because there Devadatta is the object of cognition and is perceived, and not inferred. Similarly after the *parāmarśa* there will arise the mental perception viz., 'This is the smoke which is pervaded by fire, and it exists on the mountain,' as the smoke is the object of cognition.

In this instance, smoke is not the object of cognition, but fire. But if the knowledge of identity relation of pervaded is accepted as the cause, then, instead of the fire, smoke will be the object of cognition. Because in the instance *so'yam Devadattaḥ*, the process of knowledge terminates after the knowledge of Devadatta and in the instance of smoke through the mark of smoke, the fire is inferred and not perceived. Hence, if the knowledge of identity accepted as the cause of inferential cognition then after the *parāmarśa* there will arise the mental perception and not inferential cognition. Therefore, the knowledge of identity relation is not the cause of inferential cognition.

*Text 7*: अथ वमिक्षायो धृष्टं इति स्मरत: पर्वतीयोपनिशार्यतलिकरणं प्रथमत: एव
व्यापतिधृष्टस्मिरीशशिष्यं जन्म भास्ते, विशेषणानाथ्य पूर्वे भूत्व, तत्र, जन्म
या आत्माव्यायानमिति ज्ञानं तत्रोभयापि लाभात्
पश्चायत्यायानं हेतुव्यक्तिनात् अन्त्यापि वर्णेति चेतु न।
Translation: Well, while remembering that smoke is pervaded by fire there takes place the contact of one's sense organ (eyes) with the mountain-smoke; in such a case where at the beginning itself both, the invariable concomitance and smokeness appear in the knowledge because the knowledge of the qualified has already taken place or where one acquires knowledge from the statement of a trustworthy person, such as this (mountain) has smoke pervaded by fire, in both the cases the knowledge of the property of the subject as being pervaded should be accepted as the cause of inferential cognition for logical economy and in the same way in other cases too (the qualified knowledge i.e., the *paramāra* should be the cause). If this is your argument it is not correct.

Note: *Naiyāyikas* try to overcome the problem. They give a new alternative i.e., if somebody has already the remembrance of invariable concomitance viz., smoke is pervaded by fire, due to some other awakener, then he sees smoke on the mountain. At time he has the knowledge that, the mountain possesses smoke which is pervaded by fire. This is the knowledge viz., *parāmarśa*. In this case knowledge of adjective i.e., knowledge of invariable concomitance already exists in the knower and therefore, after the contact between eyes and mountain smoke, immediately there
arises the knowledge of \textit{par\text{"a}marśa}. In this case and where some one utters the sentence i.e., the mountain possesses the smoke, which is pervaded by fire, for the sake of others inferential cognition, in this case also the knowledge of \textit{par\text{"a}marśa} is the cause of inferential cognition. In both these cases qualified knowledge can not be avoided. Hence, the acceptance of something which is the cause in one case should be the cause in all the similar cases. Thus, if an universal statement i.e., the knowledge of \textit{par\text{"a}marśa} is the cause of inferential cognition, is made it will be logical economy as it includes all the cases of inference. And if it is not accepted then these two cases will be excluded. Therefore, \textit{Naiy\text{"a}yikas} insist that \textit{par\text{"a}marśa} should be the cause of inferential cognition.

\textbf{Text: 8.} इन्द्रियायासन्निकृत्ततीनिमृये च छिन्ने प्रत्यक्ष विशिष्टज्ञानसामग्रीविरहात् तेन चिना अनुमित्यनुसादित्ये: अस्मित्तसामायाध्य तत्त्वगी सत्त्वाः।

\textbf{Translation:} When the mark is not in contact with the sense organs and when it is beyond the reach of sense organs, because there is lack of factors which lead to the qualified perception and without that there will arise the contingency of non arising of inferential
cognition. But the factors proposed by us are present in those cases also.

**Note:** Māṃśaṅkṣa refutes the former argument. As per his opinion, there is not only one case of fire and smoke for the inferential cognition. Some such other cases are there in which the mark can not be perceived, as it is beyond the reach of sense organs or it is not in contact with the sense organs. In such cases *parāmarṣa* will not work. Because for perception, existence of mark on the subject is necessary. Suppose, the instance is ‘idam laghutvam, paramāhyutvam.’ In the instance, the probans viz. the *paramāru* is not perceptible, then how one will be able to see the existence of mark on the subject. Therefore, *parāmarṣa* can not be the cause of inferential cognition. But in such cases also the factors proposed by Māṃśhakṣa viz. the remembrance of invariable concomitance and knowledge of property of subject, are present. And through them the inferential cognition will take place.

**Text:** 9. न चानुमानानिन्तं तत् परामर्शः | अनवस्थानात् |

**Translation:** One need not argue that there *parāmarṣa* can be obtained through inference etc. because this will lead to an endless regression.
**Note:** Naiyāyika may argue that in such cases parāmarṣa might be inferred. But for that inference again some other ground i.e., perception is necessary. Then the difficulty remains as it is. If in the again inference will be used then again some other inference is necessary. In this way there will arise the endless regression and hence, parāmarṣa can not be considered as the cause of inferential cognition.

**Text:** 10. अथ यथा स वैद्यतो गौरे न वा, परमानि: गुप्तवाधिकरणं न धैति संशयं:।
बहिःश्वात्तर्यं गापि मनसा कोटिस्मरणविशेषाद्वेशनाविदिष्ठकारिवानावन्त्यते
यथा वा निद्रासहकारेण बाह्यस्वाभावावनुभवं तदेहापि सानात्तरोपनीतिविशेषे
व्याप्त्तिस्मरणसहस्रोते मनसा परामशी जन्यते तदन्तरमुनितिद्वेशनाविदिति
शंकः न।

**Translation:** Well, if you say that, as in the case of whether that Devadatta is of white complexion or not, whether paramāṇu is the locus of heaviness (gurūṭva) or not, this type of doubt the mind generates with the help of the auxiliary factors such as the remembrance of two possibilities and observance of one out of the two when it has no freedom to verify externally; or as in the case where there is an experience of dream of external objects with the
help of sleep (through mind only); similarly here also paramārṣi
can be generated through the mind with regard to the qualified and
presented by the knowledge with the help of remembrance of
invariable concomitance and since the inferential cognition is seen
to arise after that. If you argue in this way, it is not proper.

Note: Naïyāyika tries to answer the objection raised in the former text.

Suppose, some one is remembering Devadatta and at the time he
has a doubt that whether Devadatta is of white completion or not!
or some one has doubt that whether paramāru possesses heaviness
or not? How do these types of doubt arise? Because there is no way
to decide or verify externally as Devadatta is not in contact with
eyes and the paramāru is invisible or beyond the reach of sense
organs. The doubts arise through the mind with the help of some
auxiliary factors such as remembrance of two possibilities and
observance of one out of two e.g. Sthāṇurva puruṣa va whether it is
a pillar or this is a man? In the instance there are two possibilities
one is vakrakotārādīmāṇa sthāṇuḥ that which possesses vakrakoṭāra
is pillar, and another is karacaraṇādīmāṇa puruṣaḥ that which
possesses hands and legs is man i.e., if some one could not find out
any clue, by which it can be decided whether it is a pillar or a man,
then there arises the doubt.
Similarly, in the instances of Devadatta and paramāru the doubt arises through the mind (because there are two possibilities in these two instances also viz. either Devadatta is of white complexion or the black complexion and either paramāru is the locus of heaviness or not). Moreover, some one is in a deep sleep and he dreams some external objects. That means the mind generates the dreams of external objects, with the help of sleep. The logician says that like the above cases, viz. when the mark is not in contact with the sense organs or it is beyond the reach of them or if it is seen in the dream, the mind generates the parāmarśa with the help of remembrance of invariable concomitance and hence the parāmarśa will be the cause of inferential cognition.

**Text:** 11. व्याजित्वमचाद्व: प्रमाणान्तरवतप्रे: | तदेव हि प्रमाणान्तरं वदसाधारणं, 
सहकार्यसाध मनो बाहिरायाप्रमाणं जनवति, यथेन्द्रियादि ।

**Translation:** Because then there will arise the contingency of accepting the remembrance of invariable concomitance as a separate means of knowledge. That which is uncommon is to be treated as a separate source of knowledge. The mind produces a cognition of an external object with the help of auxiliary factors or sense organs etc.
Note: Mīmāṃsakas disagreeing with this view as stated in the earlier text (No. 10), argue that, if this view i.e., the mind produces the parāmarṣa, is accepted, then there will arise the contingency of accepting the remembrance of the invariable concomitance as a separate source, or means of knowledge. They define pramāṇa i.e., means of knowledge as follows ‘That which is uncommon and the mind with the help of that produces a cognition of external object with the help of auxiliary factors’ e.g., sense organs. This definition can be applicable to the sense organs. The mind produces the perception of a pot, taking the help of auxiliary factors like contact etc. through the sense organs. In the same manner, if the mind produces parāmarṣa with the help of auxiliary factors like impressions (sāṅskāras) etc. through the remembrance of invariable concomitance, then the remembrance of invariable concomitance will be the separate means of knowledge. Then the motive of establishing of parāmarṣa will be fruitless.

Text: 12. संशयस्वनी तु न प्रमेयो इति न निग्रायेः: प्रमाणात्तरस्यम्। न च कथं तत्रापि स धृत्से वहितव्याप्य इति व्यवहारः, तवानि तद्वाच्यात्त्वानुभावाभास्यावदिति शास्त्रम्। तत्र स्मृतत्वमेव धृतपत्यात्त्वात्त्वानुभावातु। न च तवन्ते ध्येत्यते धृतत्वे व्याख्यात्त्वानुभवः सम्भवति।
**Translation:** Doubt and dream are not true cognitions and therefore, sleep etc. cannot be called as a separate source of knowledge. One cannot argue that, how there (in doubt or dream) will be an experience, that smoke is pervaded by fire, though there is absence of *anubhāvaka* of the state of being pervaded that. Because there smoke appears as remembered smoke and (in that smoke) through smokeness, the state of being pervaded by fire can be inferred. But according to your experience of the state of being pervaded is not possible through smokeness.

**Note:** As the perceptual cognition or the inferential cognition, doubt and dream are not considered as two cognition by logicians. Therefore, sleep etc. cannot be called as a separate source of knowledge. Because, the mind produces the doubt or dream through the sleep etc. with the help of auxiliary factors such as *samāskāra* or the noticing of the possibilities i.e., the sleep is the instrument of dream knowledge, likewise the perception of inference are the instruments of *pramāṇa* or definite knowledge. But this type of knowledge viz. doubt or dream knowledge is not a true cognition. Therefore, the sleep etc. cannot be included in the category of *pramāṇas* as *pramāṇa* produces only *pramāṇa* i.e., definite knowledge. And hence, the knowledge of *parānāra* is a definite knowledge and it cannot
be compared with these false knowledge i.e., doubt or dream knowledge.

Naiyāyikas argue that well, the doubt and dream are not true cognition but then also how there arises the knowledge namely the smoke is pervaded by fire? Because at that time there is absence of the factor which will give the experience of pervadedness i.e., there in the dream etc. The experience etc. of invariable concomiance has not taken place.

The answer is, that, in the dream etc. smoke appears there as remembered smoke, since smokeness is in that smoke, therefore, through smokeness one can acquire the knowledge of pervadedness. It means that one can infer that, where there is smokeness there is state of being pervaded by fire, through smokeness only. Thus through the remembered smoke there arises in the dream the experience of pervadedness and therefore, there is the experience i.e., the smoke is pervaded by fire.

But according to logician only smokeness is not sufficient for the knowledge of pervadedness. For the knowledge the observation of concomitance of smoke and fire is necessary and then there will arise the knowledge namely the smoke is pervaded
by fire. But in the Māṁśāsaka's opinion through the smokeness one can obtain the knowledge of pervadedness.

**Text: 13.** अत एव यो वाहिकक्यायानु सोःशवं वाहिकमाणित व्यातिष्ठात्वर्ती नुमितिन्न्याया।

**Translation:** Therefore, one who has the knowledge that whatever possesses that which is pervaded by fire, definitely possesses fire, will have the inferential cognition and not otherwise.

**Note:** It is stated in the former text according to Māṁśāsaka one can obtain the knowledge of pervadedness through the smokeness only. Therefore, one who has the knowledge such as whatever possesses that which is pervaded by fire definitely possesses fire i.e., one who has the knowledge of invariable concomitance will have the inferential cognition and no otherwise.

On this issue objection raised by Naiyāyikas. Viśvanātha says that if this view is accepted then there will be endless numbers of cause and effect relationships. Because there are infinite number of persons to make inference. He says, "if the knowledge of property of subject existing in that particular person, which is qualified by the delimiter of the state of being pervaded, being perceived by that particular person, is the reason for inferential
cognition, cognised by the particular person, then there will be endless numbers of cause and effect relationships".

Text: 14. अथ पर्यंतीयपाय धूमस्त्रेण शालं वक्ष्यापः न वेति संशयेवसिपि अनुमितं: स्थदिति चेन । धूमो विष्ण्या इति स्मरणे विशमाने धूमस्त्रेय विशेषद्विश्वसे धूमस्त्रेण संशयावः, अन्यथा परमाधुरं धूमो न स्थान । संशयेन प्रतिवंशाधिति चेतुः तुत्वम्।

Translation: Well, now if you say that, after knowing the mountain smoke through smokeness there will arise the doubt that whether this (mountain-smoke) is pervaded by fire or not (and after this doubt also) there will arise the inferential cognition, then it is not correct. Because, smoke is pervaded by fire (this) remembrance has already taken place (and after that) through the darś ana of particular case of the knowledge of smokeness, there is absence of doubt. Otherwise (after the doubt) why parāmarṣa will not take place? (If you say that) there doubt is as an obstructing factor then it is same (i.e., the doubt will be obstructive factor for the inferential cognition also).
Note: *Naiyāyika* objects that as stated in the former statement, the mountain smoke is known through smokeness. But it is not known as it is pervaded by fire, therefore there can arise the doubt that whether this mountain-smoke is pervaded by fire or not? It means that if one can have the knowledge of smoke through smokeness (after perceiving the mountain-smoke) doubt does arise, and after this doubt inferential-cognition will take place. But it is the condition for inferential-cognition i.e., the knowledge of probans as pervaded by probandum i.e., the knowledge of invariable concomitance, must be a definite knowledge. Because if the knowledge of invariable concomitance is itself doubtful, then how it will give rise to the knowledge of effect namely inferential cognition. But in the present case, the knowledge of smokeness has taken place and then there is doubt and after that doubt also there arises the inferential cognition.

*Māṁārṣaka* answers that it is not the first time that smoke is seen and conclusion has been drawn. Before this particular noticing, the smoke is observed as concomitant with fire for many times. Through this observation, since the remembrance of smoke (*Naiyāyika* also says, 'remembrance of smoke') already exists, there is no opportunity of arising the doubt, therefore after seeing the
particular-smoke there will not arise the doubt but inferential cognition.

Further, if it has been objected, then after the doubt why parāmarśa should not arise! Because parāmarśa also occurs after the remembrance of invariable concomitance and it is confirmed knowledge. Now, if it is said that for the knowledge of parāmarśa doubt is an obstructive factor then the same rule can be applied in the case of inferential-cognition, i.e. for the inferential-cognition the doubt will be obstructive factor. Thus the objection raised by logician is improper.

Text 15 : न च सामान्यनिष्कृतमथ सामान्यसंशयनिष्कृतकत्वात, धृष्टसामान्ये संशयवो भा भूल, विशेषसंशयस्तु पिशेषनिष्कृतस्मिर्तिन्यायः, इति धृष्टनिष्कृते संशयनिरासाराध पृथक् व्याप्तिनिष्कृतेऽवाच्यः, इति वाच्यम्।

Translation : Do not argue that, let there not be any doubt regarding universal smoke, because universal ascertaintment removes general doubt, but particular doubt should be removed through the particular ascertaintment, therefore, to remove the doubt regarding the particular smoke there should be a separate ascertainment of invariable concomitance.
Note: The Naiyāyikas give another argument. In accordance with him, it is accepted that there should not be any doubt regarding the smokeness in general, as 'smoke pervaded by fire' is a general statement. Therefore the doubt regarding universal is removed. But there can arise the doubt with regard to a particular case, whether this particular smoke is pervaded by fire or not. To remove this type of doubt one should accept a separate ascertainment of invariable concomitance i.e., this particular smoke is pervaded by particular fire. Then for every particular case one should have accept the particular invariable concomitance, then there will be as many particular cases, so many invariable concomitance i.e., there will occur gaurava. But if parāmarśa is accepted it will include all the general or particular cases. Therefore, parāmarśa is essential as the cause of inferential cognition.

Text: 16. यद त्रि योज्यापरिगृहीतमण्डलां तत्र न तत्संवेद, तद्य सामान्य विशेष वेति।

Translation: (Because) where there is knowledge of the differentiating property of that, there is no doubt of that. (The differentiating property) may be a universal or a particular.

Note: Māṇḍaripaka does not agree with this view. He sys, whether the smoke is particular or universal, it has property of smokeness,
which excludes the smoke from everything which is other than smoke. That means the smokeness is differentiating property of smoke. After seeing the differentiating property, there is no opportunity of arising of the doubt whether this particular smoke is pervaded by fire or not. Because it is the peculiarity of property of smoke i.e., smokeness that it must be pervaded by fire, whether it is general or universal. Therefore, there will not arise the doubt regarding the particular case of smoke.

Text: 17. वस्तुतः घूमत्वपुरस्कारण व्यापितिमरण पश्चाधर्मताज्ञाने वज्ञानमितिबायते।

Translation: Really speaking inferential cognition arises after the knowledge of existence of the probans on the subject and after the remembrance of invariable concomitance is accepted in the form of the smokeness.

Note: In the text the Miśraṇsakas again assert their view. Actually, after the remembrance of invariable concomitance qualified smokeness and the knowledge of property of subject i.e., where there is smoke there is fire and the smoke exists on the mountain, after these two steps there occurs inferential cognition i.e., the mountain possesses fire.

Rucidatta explains in his prakāśa commentary, that "not
only due to seeing the differentiating property there arises the absence of doubt but also due to the factors involved inferential cognition are stronger than the factors involved in the perception."

Once the cause is there effect has to follow.

Translation: Well, if you say that whether it is positive entity or a negative entity in both form it is knowable, in this case there will not be the inference because there is no knowledge of both the delimiters of the state of being pervaded by both i.e., positiveness and negativeness, because there is absence of the state of being the mark of either of the two which will be in the form of different from different from that, then it is not correct.

Note: According to logicians positive entity is knowable and negative entity also is knowable. It can be said that whether it is negative entity or positive entity in both the form it is knowable e.g., mountain is knowable, because it is positive entity or it is a negative entity. In this instance that will be the delimiter of
pervadedness? Because in this instance, both the properties are together. Therefore, one should know such a delimiter of pervaded, which will include both the cases. Because both the properties are pervaded, so the state of being pervaded resides in both the entities. Therefore, delimiter of both of entities is unknown. Because, one property is positive entity and another property is negative entity and in the world there is no such a object which is the positive entity and another property is negative entity and in the world there is no such a object which is the positive entity and at the same time it is negative entity or which is different from positive entity and at the same time it is different from negative entity. Therefore there is no common property which will be the delimiter of the pervadedness. If the delimiter of pervadedness is not available, then how the remembrance of invariable concomitance will arise in the form of delimiter of pervadedness and if it will not take place, inferential cognition will not arise.

Text 19: भावत्वभावत्वात्याभ्यर्मित्वत्वतव लिङ्गत्वात्

Translation: Because, that which possesses the property of being different from different from negativeness and positiveness, will be there as the mark.
Note: *Mīnārīsaka* says, in such cases also, the property of delimitor of pervadedness can be available. There, in such cases 'that which possesses the property of being different from different from negativeness and positiveness, will be the mark i.e., a *vyāpya* pervaded and the property of being delimitor will be the 'bhāvatva-abhāvatva-anya-anya dharmavatva'. Thus, the property is available, therefore remembrance of invariable concomitance will take place and then inferential cognition will arise.

**Text 20:** एवं धूमालोकान्तरत्वमेि रिञ्जगम्

**Translation:** Similarly, the state of being either of two namely, smoke or light will be the mark.

**Note:** Similarly, if there is doubt regarding smoke etc. because, fire is the pervader of both light and smoke. So when, whether it is smoke or light which is pervaded by fire, this type of doubt arises at that time the pervaded or mark will be the state of being either of the two i.e., smoke or light will be the mark. Then the property of delimitor of pervadedness will be 'धूमालोकान्तरत्वम्'
Well, the knowledge of absence of that is the obstructer for the knowledge of existence of that, that (i.e., the knowledge of existence of that) is attainable through the ascertainment of that only. Similarly the knowledge of difference of pervaded will be the obstructer for the inferential cognition, so it is proved that the knowledge of identity (relation) of pervaded is the cause of that (i.e., inferential cognition). If you say so then it is not correct.

Note: The knowledge of absence of 'x' is an obstructive factor for the knowledge of existence of 'x'. This is a general rule. With the help of this rule Naiyāyika is raising new objection or rather trying to prove the parśmarśa, as the cause of inferential cognition.

For the inferential cognition of fire, knowledge of smoke, which exists on the mountain (i.e., which is the property of subject) is necessary. But if there is only the knowledge of smokeness and the knower does not know whether (his particular) smoke existing on the mountain is pervaded by fire or not, however, he knows that the light is pervaded by fire. But in the present instance light is not the property of the sunlight but smoke is such property and the
knower has the knowledge of difference of pervaded (i.e., he knows light is pervaded by fire, but which does not exiting on the mountain in the present case. The knower has no knowledge of smoke as pervaded by fire but it exists on the mountain. Therefore, it can be said that he has the knowledge of difference of pervaded). It implies that there is absence of knowledge of fire pervaded smoke then in which way there will arise the knowledge that smoke is qualified by invariable concomitance. (Because the rule is 'yadvyatirekajāśānm, yadutpatti pratibandhakam). If the knowledge of pervaded will not take place then inferential cognition will not take place.

Thus if the dhūmālokānyatataratva is accepted as a mark, this type of difficulty occurs. Therefore, to remove the difficult the acceptance of the identity relation of pervaded is necessary. Because the knowledge of 'x' is attainable through the ascertainment of 'x' only, this is the rule. Thus, according to this rule the knowledge i.e., this is the same smoke which is pervaded by fire and the fire is pervader of smoke exists on the mountain will give rise to the inferential cognition. Hence, the knowledge of identity relation of pervaded (i.e., parāmarṣa) should be the cause of inferential cognition.
Translation: Because if there remembrance of invariable concomitance as accepted in the form of smokeness and knowledge of property of subject, are present, then after the seeing of particular (case of smoke) there will not arise the knowledge of difference of pervaded, but there will arise the inferential cognition, because all the factors required for inferential cognition are present. Hence, the knowledge of difference is not the obstructor for the inferential cognition therefore the knowledge of identity (relation) of pervaded will be the cause of that.

Note: Mīmāṃsaka refutes the objection. According to him, when there one sees the smoke, at that time only there arises the remembrance invariable concomitance. Because the knower knows that all the smokes possess smokeness and those who are possessed of smokeness are definitely possessed of fire pervadedness. Therefore, taking into consideration smokeness, the remembrance of invariable concomitance occurs and then the knowledge of property of subject takes place. After these two knowledge there arises the inferential cognition and not the perception of the difference of the
pervaded. Because the factors required for the inferential cognition, proposed by Mīmāṃsaka are present.

Hence, the knowledge of difference of pervaded does not take place, then there is no question of becoming the knowledge (i.e., the knowledge of difference of pervaded) as the obstructive factor. Therefore, the acceptance of the knowledge of identity relation with the pervaded is not essential for the inferential cognition.

Text 23 : न च धूमप्यपुरस्कारण व्यासितमणकथमंत्रांजाने इत्य धूमप्यकितिदिहित्यायो नेति

Translation: One need not argue that there will arise the contingency of getting the inferential cognition by one who has the confusion whether this individual smoke is pervaded by fire or not (even if he has) the knowledge of property of the subject and the remembrance of inferential cognition as accepted in the form of smokeness, therefore qualified knowledge will be the reason for that (i.e., inferential cognition).

Note: Naiyāyikas again object that, well, somebody has the knowledge of property of subject and remembrance of invariable concomitance, taking into account smokeness. But then he has confusion that this individual smoke has smokeness, but whether it is pervaded by fire
or not? However, he has the knowledge of smokeness, therefore after this type of conclusion also he can acquire inferential cognition. But it does not happen. After the confusion the definite knowledge does not whether it is a perceptual or inferential cognition. But in this present case conditions for inferential cognition mentioned by Mānāhsakas are fulfilled. Therefore, after the confusion also there should arise the inferential cognition. To avoid this type of contingency, it is better to accept the qualified knowledge i.e., parāmarśa as the cause of inferential cognition. Because parāmarśa is a sort of confirmatory knowledge, after the confirmation i.e., the smoke which is pervaded by fire exists on the mountain, there is no chance of arising of any type of confusion. Thus the qualified knowledge should be the cause of inferential cognition.

Text 24: धृतस्तव विशेषतः दर्शिन ताइश्यभमागुप्तसौ। तवानुमितिस्तमादाय म। अन्यथानित्यसामग्रां सत्यां भ्रमानन्तरं परामर्शं एव कुतो न भवति।

Translation: Because due to the knowledge of particular smoke, there will not arise that type of doubt (because) inferential cognition is (already) present there. Otherwise if all the factors required for
definite knowledge are present then why \textit{paramārśa} should not take place?

\textbf{Note:} \textit{Mimāṃsaka} answers that, after seeing of specific smokenes\nness there does not arise the confusion, but only inferential cognition can arise. In fact, smokenes\nness is pervaded by fire. If the knowledge of smokenes\nness is illusory, then the inferential cognition will be illusory. But in the present case, if all the factors of definite knowledge are present then how can the illusory knowledge take place. Moreover, if a \textit{Naiyāyika} says that after the presence of all the factors of definite knowledge if there arises the confusion and then inferential cognition, then why \textit{paramārśa} will not occur in the same situation. Because \textit{paramārśa} also takes place after the remembrance of invariable concomitance and knowledge of property of subject. As after the confusion \textit{paramārśa} can not take place, the same manner, inferential cognition will not take place after the confusion or doubt. Really speaking, remembrance of invariable concomitance and knowledge of property of subject are the factors of ascertained knowledge and therefore, after these two knowledge there will occur inferential cognition and not confusion.
Text 25: अस्तु या व्याप्तत्वा पक्षर्थमत्त्वा च अवगतस्य भेदार्थः एव अनुमितेऽस्तु, परंशिष्ठत्वा तत्वाकृतिक्षेत्रतः। अतः एव अस्तनिकृत्यायामानवेद्यनिर्विचित्तम, न चैव गीतव, तदा विशिष्टानाद्यनिर्पिष्टते।

Translation: Or, let the non-knowledge of the difference (of smoke) which is known as existing on the subject and which is known as pervaded by fire be the cause of inferential cognition because it is necessary as the cause of parāmarśa, that is why there arises the inferential cognition through the knowledge of smoke which is not in contact (with the eyes). This will not lead to any gaurava because the qualified knowledge is not present at that time.

Note: This text may be opinion of Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas. Because in the commentary 'Tarkachudamani' on Rucidatta's 'Prakāśa', the commentator Dharmarājādhvarin says 'Jayadevanatanukivā Prabhākṛṣṇanmatamāha' Mīmāṃsakas say that well, according to Naiyāyika agraha of difference of pervaded, which is known as concomitant of fire and existing on the mountain i.e., the knowledge of identity relation of the probans, should be the cause of inferential cognition, because it is known through the remembrance of invariable concomitance and through the knowledge of property of subject. Moreover, the
knowledge is necessary as the cause of parāmarśa. Also because of acceptance of the knowledge inferential cognition will take place through the smoke which is not in contact with eyes. Because it is not the case that always inference will occur on the basis of present mark only. It can arise on the basis of a future or a past mark also. Therefore, if the knowledge of identity relation will be accepted as the cause of inferential cognition then it will include above said cases.

But knowledge of identity relation is accepted by Mīnāśaṇaka as the cause of parāmarśa and not parāmarśa itself. Otherwise opponent can object that, now Mīnāśaṇaka is accepting the qualified knowledge. Thus, there will arise the gaurava. Therefore Mīnāśaṇaka says that instead of accepting qualified knowledge it is better to accept the knowledge of identity relation as the cause of inferential cognition.

Text 26: न च जनक्षणाविरोधिनः शास्त्र अप्रतिवंधकत्वात् बेदिनः न प्रतिवंधकः
वाप्यम् | अवेद्यान्स्याश्चात्तिकत्वात् | लोकपि विद्वाकारास्य
तादशाप्रतिवंधकस्यकाराः |

Translation: The knowledge which is not contradictory to the knowledge which produces (the inferential cognition) is not considered to be
an obstructing factor and therefore knowledge of difference is not an obstructor. One should argue this way. Because the knowledge of identity is not (the knowledge) which produces (the inferential cognition). You also accept that type of obstructor in the case of liṇga- parāmarṣa.

Text 27: अथ गोत्वं मधुरत्वाचाररुपार्जुलितार्थी गुणं न स्वातु तद्विच्युतर्मानस्तक्षामात्रं अत एव तत्त्व विद्याधिक्षेतास्य चैन्य | व्यक्तेर्यं तत्र प्रकारत्वाल | ।

Translation: Well, if you say that the cowness or the generic property such as the sweetness will not be the mark because there is absence of any other property possessed by them and therefore it is unique, it is not correct. Because in that case individual itself is the qualifier.

Note: According to the Mīmāṁsakas the knowledge of invariable - cocomitance in the form of delimiter of pervadedness, is enough for the inferential - cognition. According to logicians if this knowledge is accepted as the reason of inferential cognition then in the case ‘अथ तत्त्वादितानु गोत्वा’ there arises the difficulty, because in this case the mark is Gotva. When the mark is like this then there, no other property is available which can be the delimiter of pevadedness. Therefore gotva can not be the mark. Moreover, in
the case 'idam phalam madhuram madhurtvāvāntarjate' also another property is not available and the same difficulty arises. These two properties namely gotva and madhuratva are called akharādopāḍhi, they do not have any other property they are unique. So in both of these cases delimiter of pervadedness is not available then how will the knowledge of invariable concomitance arise?

Mīmāṁsākā answers that, in such cases individual will be prakāra i.e., qualifier itself. So the knowledge of invariable concomitance will be in the form of gotva or madhuratva i.e., gotvavyāpya or madhuratvavyāpya. Thus the above raised difficulty solved.

Text 28: न हि गौत्तममिति ज्ञानयोगबिशेष: । अन्यथा गौत्तममिति ज्ञानयो निर्दिष्टक्तक्तथा व्याप्तिज्ञ हर्मणोऽयोगान्तः। गौत्तमसिद्धसंस्कत्विस्तित्वं गौत्तमसिद्धं नुभवाय। । नैवेद्यतत्त्वस्य तद्वित्तत्त्वस्य तत्

Translation: Do not say that there is no difference between the two knowledge viz. cow and cowness, otherwise there will arise the contingency (of saying) that the knowledge i.e., the knowledge of cowness is indeterminate knowledge which is not useful for the
knowledge of parāmarśa, and also because there is a definition of that, namely, which does not exit in other than cow and which exits in all cows is gotvatva. One need not think that this will lead to endless regression because there is no possibility of denying the experience namely, that which does not exist in other than that, and which exists in all the cases of ahat'.

Note: Well, on the former text an objection can be raised, that if individual itself is qualifier then there will not remain any difference between the knowledge viz. cow and cowness. But one should not object like this, otherwise the knowledge will be indeterminate knowledge, which is not useful for the knowledge of pervadedness and for the knowledge of parāmarśa also.

Mānārṣaka mentions a new property i.e., gotvatva, which will be delimiter of pervadedness. Further, there is a common experience namely, that which does not exist in other than cow and which exists in all cows is gotvatva. This experience can not be denied and one cannot argue that there will be endless regression, if somebody will ask what is gotvatva? Then the above answer can be given. Because if somebody will ask what is gotvatva? Then answer will be 'That which does not exist in other than cow and
which exist in all cows’. Hence, the delimiter of pervadedness is available, the knowledge of invariably concomitance can occur. Thus, the knowledge of invariably concomitance in the form of the delimiter of pervadedness and the knowledge of property of subject are the causes of inferential cognition.

Text: 29: अनोच्चयते। अयमालके धूमो च उभयदापि चिह्नित्यमा इति ज्ञाते। ततो नुमिति:। न ध धूमवेनालोक्येन वा तत्र निष्ठयः।

Translation: Well, It is to be said here. Whether it is light or smoke in both the cases there is knowledge i.e. (both) pervaded by fire and after that there arises inferential cognition. In this case no conclusive knowledge is possible on the basis of lightness of smokiness.

Note: The Siddhānta-pakṣa starts from this text. In the former text on objection is raised by Fūrvapakṣin that tadanyāyatva should be the mark of inferential cognition. So there will not remain the necessity of acceptance of parāmarsa. Now in this text Siddhāntin answers that whether it is smoke or light, first there is knowledge of their pervadedness by fire. And after that there arises the inferential cognition namely there is fire on the mountain.
Merely the knowledge of smokeness or lightness does not help in grasping the inferential cognition.

**Text 30:** अथ तद्व्यायत्तमेव तत्र विह्रागम्। न च तद्व्यायनदशायामान्वितदव्यायां नतथेति चाच्छाम्। धृतीमालाकायायत्तमांद्रव्यां दिना तत्तथापि तत्र व्याप्तविशिष्ठ्येन तद्व्यायं तद्व्यायवशेषवटवान्विति चेतुं।

**Translation:** Well, the state of being different from that which is different from that will only be the mark there in this case.

It should not be argued that it can not be like that because there arises inferential cognition (even) in the absence of knowledge of that. (Because without the knowledge of the state of being different that which is different than smoke and light, you also cannot have a conclusive knowledge of the state of being pervaded.

**Note:** Well, now an option proposed by *Mīmāṃsakas* is that instead of "fire-pervaded". The "different from that which different form That "should be the mark there. It means that different from that which is different from that" is either smoke or light should be mark there, and if *Naiyāyika* will argue that even without the knowledge of such mark there arises inferential cognition merely from the knowledge of smoke or light both are pervaded by fire, there arises
inferential-cognition then it is not correct. Because Naiyāyika also
cannot have the definite knowledge of pervadedness without
having the knowledge of different from that which is different from
that (means either smoke or light) and therefore the mark should be
that only proposed by Mīmāṁsakas only. But logicians say it is not
correct.

Text: 31: न हि धूमलोकान्यायतवं धूमान्यायतवं वा व्याख्यातव्येदकम्, गौरवतः.
व्यभिचारार्थकविन्दःशाोर्वत्वां कि तु धूमतवदिकं, तद्य तत्त संदिग्धमेव।

Translation: Neither the state of being different than that, which is
different than smoke and light or the state of being different that
which is different than smoke is the delimitor of state of being
pervaded because of cucumber someness and because its not
possessing a qualifier which discards the deviation.

But the state being smoke etc. (is) and that is doubtfull there.

Note 31: According to logicians if the proposal of Mīmāṁsakas is
accepted then there arises the problem. If different from that which
is different from that is accepted as a probans then what should be
the delimitor of pervadedness? It will be the state being different
from that which is different from that. But it is not proper, because
it is an heavy-property which delimits the pervadedness. And if the simple property is available then heavy - property should not be accepted as a delimiter. Further, the property neither gives the proper idea of smoke nor of light i.e. which one reason pervaded by fire exactly exists there on the subject. Moreover, it is not such a qualifier which can avoid the contradiction. Because in such cases smoke or light both are doubtful.

Thus, taking into account all these difficulties, proposed of Mīmāṃsakas cannot be accepted.

Text : 32: नन्तु तदन्वान्यन्त्रेऽर्थमेव व्यविचाराभावेन व्याप्तिविरहसाधनस्य बाधित्वात्। पुनरस्तु तत्र नीलधुमवत्त्यात् इत्प्रेयेवातिकै निगुङ्खते न तु व्याप्तिविद्यतः येतात।

Translation : Then it cannot be said that (because) that which is different than that which is different is pervaded by fire only (therefore) due to the absence of contradiction the factor causing the absence of invariable concomitance is (automatically) debarred. But a knower is obstructed their (in the case of the state of being different from that which is different from that) as in the case of the state of being possessed of blue-lotus by the cumbersome property, but here is not a logical fallacy namely vyāpyatvāsiddha.
Note: It is clear.

Text: 33: तदन्यान्तः धूमालोकवर्षयमेव तत्च व्याप्तिः सत्यम् ।

Translation: That which is different from that which is different than that is the nature of smoke and light (in the form of smoke and light.) an that is pervaded it is true.

Note: Actually what is the nature of the state of being different from that which different from that? Either it will be in the form of smoke i.e. different from that which is different from smoke or in the form of light i.e. different from that which is different from light. But both of them are pervaded by fire only, and from this knowledge there arises inferential cognition.

Text: 34: न च वसुगत्व व्याप्ततावादन्तुमिति, अति प्रसङ्गातः । कि तु व्याप्ततावशेषकपरामर्शानात् ।

Translation: In fact the inferential cognition does not arise from the knowledge of pervaded, because of patiprasaniga, but (the inferential cognition arises due to ) the knowledge of qualifier of delimiter of pervadedness.

Note: In fact merely knowledge of pervaded is not sufficient to give the rise to the inferential cognition, i.e. if one has the knowledge in the
form that smoke is qualified by smokeness, then this knowledge will not give rise to the knowledge of inferential cognition. When one can have the knowledge namely the smoke is pervaded by fire and thus the smokeness is the property of delimitor of pervadedness. Then only he can acquire inferential cognition.

Thus, the inferential cognition will arise only from the knowledge which is in the form of property of delimitor of pervaded.

Text: 35: न च तदन्वायतः विभिन्नात्मातः स्वतःस्वेतकमित्युक्तम्।

Translation: It is not said that the state of being that which is different from that which is different from that is the delimitor of the state of being pervaded by fire.

Note: Well now one can say it is all right if the property of delimitor of pervadedness is necessary. Then one can take state of being different from that which is different from that as the property of delimitor of pervadedness. But it is not possible, because the state of being different from that which is different from that is a cumbersome property. Hence, it should not be a property which will delimit the pervadedness.
Text 36: न च एवं तदन्यात्तथात् विशेषणद्वयमधि तत्र नात्मकम्, व्ययविशेषणादिति वाच्यम्।

Translation: One cannot say that there the state of being pervaded by fire cannot be inferred from the state of being different from that which is different from that because the qualifier is insignificant. (Because) perception generates the knowledge of pervadedness through the seeing particular State of being different from different from that.

Text 37: प्रत्यक्षं हि तदन्यात्तथाभिशेषद्वय व्ययविशेषण ज्ञाति। विशेषणाद्वयविशेषणद्वयस्मृतिः विशेषणाद्वयविशेषणद्वितिः सत्त्वकं संस्कारं संस्कारं अवशेषद्वय नास्ति।

Translation: Because perception generate the knowledge of pervadedness throughout the seeing a particular(case of) state of being different from that, due to the existence of particular observations of non-knowledge of non-relation of that contact of sense-organs (with) qualifier and qualificand and the knowledge of qualifier, the perception of pervadedness of fire exists.

Note 36 & 37: Now again one more option is given by पुर्वपाक्ष in that one can infer the property being pervaded by fire. On the basis of
the state of being different from that which is different form that because the qualifier is insignificant.

But this is not proper according to logicians. They say that there is not need of inferring because the purpose is served there by perception only.

For example when a person perceives a particular smoke existing on a particular smoke then he has the knowledge there, that smoke is qualified by fire. So knowledge of qualifier is already there. Then he has the knowledge of relationship between qualifier (fire) and qualificand (smoke). He had also the contact of sense-organs with qualifier and qualificand (obviously, the sense-organ-contact with the qualifier is not now present but before it was and of course he has the non-knowledge of non-relationship between smoke and fire) All these factors generate the knowledge that whether smoke or light both are pervaded by fire through the perception.

Text 38: न चैवं न प्रत्यक्षेऽपि तत्त्वान्यत्तचज्ञां सहकारीति वाचयम्।

Translation 38: You should not argue that the knowledge of state of being different from different from that is auxiliary in perception.

Text 39: अन्वयच्यतिरेकाभ्यां पुरोरिणि तत्य विशेषद्विन्दनेन प्रत्ययक्षसहकारित्वाऽपि।
तत्त्वान्यत्तचज्ञां तत्र व्याप्तताहानोपक्रोणं न तु सतत्त्वानुमितिहेतुतथ।

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Translation: Because it is an auxiliary cause of perception, due to an auxiliary cause of perception due to its particular seeing, though it is cumbersome through the *anvaya-vyatireka*.

Therefore, the knowledge of the state of being different from different from that has exhausted its purpose at the time of knowledge (perception) of the pervadedness so it is not direct cause of perception.

Note 38-39: Well, one cannot say that in this way if the knowledge of the state of being different from that which different from that cannot be accepted as auxiliary cause in the perception.

Suppose when one has the knowledge of book it means he must have knowledge of non-book, or that which is different from book. In the same way when one has the knowledge of the state of being different from that which is different from that will be the auxiliary cause in perception of smoke or light. It is true that the acceptance of the knowledge of the state of being different from that which is different from that is cumbersome in the process of perception but since, it leads to result it is not a fault.

And thus, the purpose of the knowledge the state of being different from that which is different from that is served after giving the
knowledge of pervadedness therefore, it be the direct cause of inferential cognition.

**Text 40:** कि च विजिवाचत्तात्त्वकता विद्यमानानि शाब्दिको व्याप्तिबल्लान्ति कारणमित्यत्यत्रापि तथा।

**Translation:** Moreover, 'This is pervaded by fire' in this verbal cognition, the knowledge of pervadedness is cause, therefore, elsewhere also the same (can be cause).

**Note:** Suppose, a person who has inferential cognition, wants to say it somebody then he utters the sentence 'the smoke is pervaded by fire; Then from this sentence the verbal cognition arises through the knowledge of pervadedness. it means in the verbal understanding viz. the smoke is pervaded by fire.' The fire-pervadedness is the cause of inferential cognition. Therefore, in other places also the same knowledge should be the cause of inferential cognition.

**Text 41:** अथ विजिवाचत्तात्त्वकता विद्यमानानि विद्यमाणानि विभिन्न व्याप्तिप्रमाणानि च सकलः व्याप्तिप्रमाणालाभातानि तथा।
Translation: Well, if you say that the state of being pervaded by fire is also the delimitor of the state of being pervaded by fire. Similarly, the existence of each smoke described by fire is invariable concomitance and (that invariable concomitance) is the delimitor of invariable concomitance existing in all smokes in the form of the state of being invariable concomitance, (also) because of difference of locus and difference of delimitor there is difference of invariable concomitance, then it is not correct.

Note 41: An objection is raised by opponent that will the delimitor of pervadedness is the cause of inferential cognition. (But not parāśara), because the state of being pervaded by fire itself is the delimitor of pervadedness (of fire). Moreover, the invariable concomitance is nothing but existence of each and every smoke qualified by fire, thus, the invariable concomitance is the delimitor of existence of each smoke is the delimitor of existence of each smoke. Naturally, the substratum of each smoke is different. Therefore, the invariable can concomitance will be different and if there is difference in delimitor then also invariable concomitance will be different. After that one can differentiate the object in this way, then it is not correct.
Because, there is no proof for the existence of single invariable concomitance existing in all smokes.

Where there is pervaded by fire (smoke) there is fire, in the knowledge of invariable concomitance and also in the verbal understanding of pervadedness. There object of knowledge is substratum of pervasion existing in each. So, without the knowledge of pervasion existing in each the knowledge of that (pervasion) is not possible.

Note: Because for understanding such a single invariable concomitance existing in all smokes there is no proof for it. Moreover, in the knowledge of invariable concomitance. Namely `where there is smoke, there is fire' and in the verbal understanding, each and every substratum will be object. Then without the knowledge of all these objects there will not arise the knowledge of invariable concomitance and therefore, one cannot accept a single invariable concomitance existing in all smokes.
Translation: In the beginning where there is knowledge of vaiśistya (relation) of smoke and invariable concomitance simultaneously arises through perception, there (in such cases) state of being the knowledge of pervadedness is the delimiter of causeness, because of logical simplicity.

Note: Thus, when one has the knowledge namely smoke is qualified by invariable concomitance i.e. invariable concomitance and smoke are co-located then there the knowledge of pervadedness is the cause and hence, the state of being knowledge of pervadedness will be the delimiter of the state of being cause.

Translation: And in this way the cumbersomeness in the (accepting) of state of being cause of knowledge of qualified by atirikta is not a fault, because there is proof for this, and in the state of knowledge acquiring of causeness, the cumbersomeness which leads to the result is not a fault in the case of establishment or non-establishment.
Note: Well now one can raise an objection here, that if one will accept this knowledge of pervadedness as a delimiter of state of being the cause then he has to accept an extra knowledge in the process of inference. So it will lead to cumbersomeness.

But according to logicians it is not a fault because the result is achieved by it and such a cumbersomeness is not a fault.

Text 45: न चासनिक्रेत धूमस्त्वद्वारः। भवन्ततानुमिनितिहृद्यविज्ञाप्रत्येकवृत्तिभावानसहितेन मनसा तदुपादात्।

Translation: And though if the smoke is not in contact with your eyes then also there is no absence of that (pervasion), because according to you that arises through mind having the knowledge of smokeness and remembrance of invariable concomitance.

Note: One cannot say that there is absence of invariable concomitance in smoke which is not in contact with sense-organs. Because according to opponent remembrance of invariable concomitance and knowledge of smokeness are the causes of inferential cognition. So though the mind which has the knowledge of smokeness and which has remembrance of invariable concomitance, one can have the knowledge of invariable
concomitance existing in the smoke which is not in contact of sense-organs

**Text 46:** यथा परमाणुपरिनिर्दयवट्टवायु नित्यपरिमाणावस्थातु आकाशायतृ हत्वादी
प्रत्येकानुपादनीतीतीतीत्रियात्र्याक्षरोवाक्षरीतिततस्य स्वरस्य व्यभिचाराःस्य नकसा
व्याप्तमभवेत, अनुमानोऽपैश्च: प्रत्येकानुपादनस्यरथन्योग्यस्यव्याप्तमावतातुः।

**Translation:** As in the case of the example (namely) *paramānu* is substance which has no parts because it has *nityaparimāṇatva* like sky etc. There is experience of pervasion through mind, due to non knowledge of contradiction and due to the remembrance of reason and probans as the existence of sky. Which are beyond the reach of sense organs and which is known through the inference of each. Because of state of being non-object of co-existence of both of them each of both the inferences, they are not the elements through which invariable concomitance should be known.

**Note:** It is clear

**Text 47:** न चातीलिनित्रियात्र्याक्षरोवाक्षरीतितस्य स्वरस्य नकसा। तत्रापि व्ययिनिष्केषिनवायतुः।

**Translation:** One should not infer the pervadedness which is beyond the reach of sense-organs in the case of the probans which is also beyond the reach of sense-organs, because there is also absence of
a factor which will give rise to the knowledge of invariable concomitance.

**Note:** Without the knowledge of invariable concomitance one cannot have the knowledge of inferential cognition. Therefore, in the case of such cases in which probans and probandum are beyond. The reach of sense organs one cannot say that there is in such cases knowledge of pervadedness also will be beyond the reach of sense-organs then it is not proper, because in such cases there is not factor through which one can have the knowledge of invariable concomitance. And if there is no knowledge of invariable concomitance then there will not arise the inferential cognition.

**Text 48:** न च तद्दुपपरस्फूर्ति मनसी श्लेष्मर्यंग्राहर्यां विप्रयान्तरवचनम्।
इय्यायेत: सत्तर्यान्यस्य नियत्यापाराभावेन ज्ञ्यायामकरणत्वात्।

**Translation:** One should not argue that because of causeness the mind having (the knowledge of) parāmarsa in the case of correct knowledge of external object, the parāmarsa will be another/separate means of knowledge, because like the contact of sense organs etc. parāmarsa does not have an intermediate function therefore, it cannot be an instrument of right knowledge.
Note: Well, now suppose somebody will argue that O.K. *parāmarśa* will be a separate means of right knowledge, because when mind has the knowledge of *parāmarśa* then it can acquire the knowledge of external objects. But this argument is not possible. Because *parāmarśa* does not have any intermediate function but *parāmarśa* itself is intermediate function, as in the case of perception contact of sense-organs is the intermediate function and thus, it cannot be a separate means of right knowledge. In the same way *parāmarśa* cannot be a separate means of knowledge.

Text 49: सहकारिता च तदभावेदिपि भवति ।

Translation : But the state of being an auxiliary cause is possible without that (without the regular intermediate function) is possible.

Note: As stated in the former text *parāmarśa* cannot be separate means of right knowledge but it can be an auxiliary cause in the process of inferential cognition, because for an auxiliary cause. There is no necessity of any type of intermediate function.

Text 50: बधिरिनिब्यविहाराः साध्वद्विद्वायाः किर्तिपि विष्टीपनीतपदवर्षां बाध्यकान्ताः नानसा संसागानुभवाः सकलमनसिद्धचाराः । कथनन्यथा कान्ताकार्यादिकर्मिन्ति ।
Translation: It is known to all the persons that there is experience of relationship of the objects through the mind which are remembered even without the bahirindriyaliṅga sādṛṣṭyādīvīyāpāra (because) there is nothing to contradict it. Otherwise, how the poetry of poet is possible?

Note: One can have the knowledge of relationship through mind. It is always not necessary that the knowledge of invariable concomitance can be acquired through perception only. Sometimes, in the case of such objects which are beyond the reach of sense organs, one can have the knowledge of vyāpti. Through mind only. In the case of paramāṇu and sky one has the knowledge that both of them are such substances which do not have any parts and which are nitya-parimāra one can conceptualize the knowledge of invariable concomitance that where there is state of being substance having no parts. There is the state of being nitya-parimāna. And from this mental-knowledge of invariable concomitance, one can have the inferential-cognition. It cannot be said here that through conception it is not possible. Then it is not correct. If through conception any type of knowledge is not possible then there is no scope for poetry. So it is well known to all that mental cognition is possible and thus, with regard to the...
probandum which is beyond the reach of sense organs and the probans which is also beyond the reach of sense-organs knowledge of invariable concomitance is possible.

**Translation**: It may be so, (but) the knowledge of pervadedness of property of subject is not possible through the sense organs (because) fire is not in contact (with eyes) and therefore, there is no invariable-co-location of that (fire) without the pervadedness.

**Note**: One can have the knowledge of invariable concomitance in kitchen etc., because he has perceived there both smoke and fire. But now in the present case he cannot acquire the knowledge because thought that property of subject i.e. smoke is in the contact of sense organs but fire is not in the contact of sense organs. So, how one can get the knowledge of co-locusness of both of them which means the knowledge of invariable concomitance only.

**Text 52**: न च धूमातनेन सकलधूमध्यान्तःधूम‍विशेषः संकारातुः स्मरणावा।

उपनीतज्ञानेन तताविषिष्टयेवति वाचयम्।
Translation: One cannot argue that as in the case of re-collection (the knowledge of object) qualified by thatness (is the cause); (similarly in the present case) the knowledge of identity of pervader which is presented to the mind is possible either through the remembrance (of fire) or through the impression of particular smoke, or because of knowledge of pervadedness of all smokes through smokeness.

Note: The Mūlaṅgāsaka argues that well, whenever one perceives smoke he has the knowledge of all smokes through the smokeness. Similarly, when he perceives or understands that the smoke is pervaded by fire then he has the knowledge that smoke is pervaded by fire. And through the knowledge of pervadedness of one particular smoke he can have the knowledge that all the smokes are possessed of the quality namely pervadedness. Then again when the same person perceives a particular smoke existing on the mountain from the prior impressions he remembers that "Oh! this is the same smoke which I have seen before." This the knowledge like re-collection as "This the same Devadatta, have seen before" which arises from prior impressions. Therefore, from the prior impressions or remembrance there will arise the knowledge of identity of pervaded, and the knowledge of invariable concomitance will take place.
But Naiyāyikas do not accept this view. In the text also there is one objection raised by Mīmāṃsaka.

**Text 53:** एवं हि धृष्टवत्ते वहिमत्वच्छासानात् धृष्टविभिक्षेपे पर्वते संस्कारवशातः प्रत्यक्षेण व्याविभिक्षेपेयेव वहिमत्व(संसर्ग)घातस्तु निरुपनन्त धृष्टतत्त्वस्मात् तत्र नासिन्तिः किमतु व्याविभिक्षेपकतेयति चेतृ न

वहिमान्नेव वेति संशयनुरोधेन स्वतन्त्रविभिक्षेपस्मात्।

**Translation:** Well, like this let there be knowledge of (relationship) of state of being possessed of fire or the knowledge of difference of (the object) possessed of fire in the context of knowledge of invariable concomitance which is perception (and which is arised) because of impression of particular smoke on mountain because of knowledge of fire through the smokeness. Why inference is necessary? Or what is the need of inference?

Because, there is no rememberance of separate fire but (there is rememberance of fire) through the state of being delimitor of invariable concomitance.

Because there is rememberance of separate fire as per the doubt that whether (this mountain) is possessed of fire or not!
Note: Similarly, if Naiyāyikas insist on the knowledge of pervadedness then let there arise the knowledge namely 'whatever is possessed by smoke also possessed by fire' from the perception or from the prior impressions which are acquired from the observations of many such places which are possessed of smoke and also possessed of fire, as kitchen etc. Because according to logicians there is no knowledge of separate fire after seeing the smoke on the mountain but, there is knowledge of fire on as describer of invariable concomitance. So there is identity in the fire which is perceived before and the fire which is not in the contact of sense organs in the present case. Thus, from the identity there should be the knowledge of fire, why inference is necessary?

But logicians say that the argument is not correct. Because, there is a doubt regarding the particular subject (i.e. mountain) that whether it is (the subject) possessed of smoke or not? And in this way there is remembrance of separate fire. Therefore, identity is not the cause of knowledge of fire.

Text 54: न च विशिष्टाः प्राम्ण विशेषणात्मकः न हृदत्तमेऽ गौरववत् ।
Translation: There is no state of being cause because of the knowledgeness of qualifier independently in the case of qualified knowledge, because there will be cumbersomeness.

Note: One can not say that the qualifier independently will be the cause of qualified-knowledge, because there will occur cumbersomeness. In the knowledge ‘Daṇḍī prurṣaḥ’ mere stick is not the cause of the qualified knowledge but the knowledge of state of being possessed of stick (associated with the particular person is the cause of qualified-knowledge. Therefore, the qualifier namely fire will be cause independently one cannot say like this.

Text 55: अथ यो यत्र विशिष्य पूर्वमवगत: स तत्र संस्कारवशाः स्यायेः प्रत्येके भासते, यथा तत्ता प्रत्यपन्धाने। न च पर्यथे विशिष्य पुरां बहिरवगत:। यत्र च चन्दने सौरभपुलवं तत्र संस्कारवशात्तथा सुरभिष जन्यमिति ज्ञानम्। अन्यथा अनुभवितिति वेतु।

Translation: Well, if you argue that whatever is particularly appeared as a qualifier (to something) that appears there (on the subject) in the true perception due to impressions as in the (case of) re-collection. But the fire is not known earlier particularly. Where there is fragrance of sandalwood is known there (arises) the knowledge that
sandalwood is fragrant through eyes of (prior) impressions. Otherwise, there is will be inferential cognition, then ..........

**Note:** Well, it as a rule that whatever appears as a qualifier to something particularly earlier that again appears. In the true perception because of prior impressions, as in the case of recollection Devadatta is seen before elsewhere. Again when he comes in contact with eyes then there arises the knowledge Oh! this the same Devadatta, I have seen before."

But it is not case of fire. Because fire is not known as existing on mountain particularly earlier. Hence, there is not prior impressions then how one can have the knowledge of fire on the mountain? And if somebody says like this then in the case of 'The sandalwood is fragrant' instead of saying that there arises the knowledge of fragrance of sandal through eyes (because of prior impressions generated by nose, but know nose is not in contact with the sandalwood) but eyes are and hence, there is knowledge of fragrance of smoke through eyes. One can say the knowledge (of fragrance of sandal arises through inference and not by impressions. Then it is not correct.
Translation: Then, in the smoke which is property of subject the invariable concomitance is not understood particularly before then how there will be knowledge of invariable concomitance existing in that (mountain-smoke) because of impressions through the perception.

Note: One can not argue in this way because then thee will arise a difficulty. If you say that one has not seen fire on the mountain particularly therefore, there will not arise the knowledge of fire on the mountain then it can be said here that one has not acquired the invariable concomitance particularly existing in the smoke which is property of subject. Then there are no prior impressions. But then also there is knowledge of invariable concomitance in the smoke. How this knowledge takes place?

Translation: Do not argue that there is knowledge of invariable cognition regarding the mountain-smoke as the kitchen-smoke.
through the sense-organ which is having impression produced by co-location and the absence of knowledge of deviation, but (there is no knowledge of) fire because there is absence of contact (of sense organ with fire) the factor required for the perception.

Because without the perception of probans (pervaded) and probandum (pervader) there is knowledge of invariable concomitance is not possible.

Note: The answer can be given here in this way that there is perception of smoke on the mountain through the sense organs which have prior impressions generated by previous observations made in kitchen etc. Hence, there is knowledge of smoke having the invariable concomitance on the mountain. But it is not possible in the case of fire existing on mountain because the fire is not in contact with sense organs. Therefore, there will not arise the knowledge of fire on the mountain particularly. But one cannot argue in this way. Because when the knowledge of invariable concomitance takes place? After the perception of probans and probandum. If there is not perception of both of them then how knowledge of invariable concomitance will take place?
Text 58: न च पद्धति विहिसाशास्त्रकारः | न च पश्चाद्य साध्यसामानाधिकरणाद्विषेषो व्यास्तः: पश्च साध्याचार विनेतुकाम् ।

Translation: There is no perception of fire on the mountain, moreover, there is no (knowledge of) invariable concomitance (namely) particular co-locusness of probans, without the knowledge of probans on the subject, it is not said.

Note: There is perception of fire on the mountain and not there is no knowledge of invariable concomitance means a particular co-existence of probandum with the property of subject i.e. smoke, without the knowledge of probandum on the subject. Then how one can have the inferential knowledge?

Text-59: उच्चये | विशेषणां तथ विशेषां तस्माद् ततोऽसंसर्गान्त्रि विशेषका | विशेषणविशेष्येन्द्रियसन्निश्चयं गौरवनित्यादिविद्यायविविष्यो विशिष्टप्रत्यक्षारणम्, अतिर च चात्रापि व्याविष्टरणं स्मृतिवृत्तमेव सत्वान् ।

Translation: Well, here is one answer; knowledge of qualifier, the relation of that (qualifier) with the qualified, non-knowledge of non-relationship (i.e. knowledge of relationship) of both of them, particular seeing, the contact of sense-organs with qualificand and qualifier (as) 'this is cow' etc. are the causes of perception qualified by trueness. And here (in the present case) also the rememberance
of invariable concomitance and the existence of remembered concomitance in the smoke which is existing on the subject.

Note: In the text the author gives the least of factors which are required for the right perceptual cognition/or the qualified perceptual cognition.

The knowledge of qualifier, the knowledge of relationship of qualifier and qualified then non-knowledge of non-relationship of both of them i.e. non-knowledge of an contradictory example. Then the seeing of an object(qualificand) particularly and then the contact of qualifier and qualificand with sense organs are the necessary factors for the perceptual knowledge. For example, when one has perceptual cognition of cow, Then he must have the knowledge of cowness existing in the cow. Then only he will have the perceptual knowledge of cow qualified by rightness.

Similarly, in the present case also there is remembrance of invariable concomitance and existence of such invariable concomitance in the smoke which is existing on the mountain.
Translation: The invariable contact is only one, the non-knowledge of non-relationship of both of them (i.e. smoke and fire), the seeing of particular smokeness and the contact of sense-organs with the smoke qualified by invariable concomitance are the reasons for the knowledge of particular invariable concomitance. (And) the factors qualified by fire are not there because there is no contact of fire.

Note: So the invariable concomitance is only one. And the knowledge of relationship of both of them namely smoke and fire, then the particular seeing of smoke and then the contact of smoke qualified by invariable concomitance with the sense organs are the factors for the knowledge of (smoke) qualified by invariable concomitance. But there is no knowledge namely 'The smoke is qualified by fire' because there is no factors required for such knowledge i.e. there is no sense-organ contact of fire and in this way there is not further knowledge.

Text-61: कश्यप पूर्वमेव परमरासम्बन्धेन विक्षिप्तायां पूर्वांग्नीत तथा च संस्कारोपनीतविक्षिप्तायां परमरासम्बन्धेन पश्चात्तिमुखाय प्रत्यभिज्ञायते, तद्युक्तिस्वभेद पूर्वनतुष्टात्। एवं च धृतत्वमिथाय वादिगृहिणितिरिति प्राह।

Translation: Somebody has said that in smoke pervadedness of fire is known earlier through the indirect relation and therefore,
the pervadedness of fire which is presented by (earlier) impressions is re-collected in the smoke existing on the subject because of prior experience (acquired) by the existence of that, and thus, there is inferential cognition because of paramārśa pervaded by smokeness.

**Note**: Some body or some logicians say that there is knowledge of pervadedness of fire in smoke indirectly which known earlier, through the observations on many places. And then there are impressions of this knowledge in the mind. When the knowledge of pervadedness is known indirectly in the smoke which is existing on the mountain then there is recollection of the smoke which is pervaded by fire now existing on the mountain. This is the knowledge of paramārśa and in this way from the knowledge of paramārśa pervaded by smoke there arises the inferential cognition.

**Text 62**:  
भवतु तादर्शं तथापि जातिरेष लिङ्गं, स्थातू न तु व्यक्ति। तथा च सत्योपपंखरण:  
भाष्टिविशेषार्थसामान्यविभागप्रत्यासासिद्धान्तन्यन्तरैर स्थातू।  

**Translation**: Let it be as it is, then also only class is the reason and not individual. Further, if all (the things) are included in one individual then employment of super-normal-perception will be futile.
Note: Though there is inferential cognition arises from the *parāmarṣa* pervaded by smoke then also the individual smoke will not be the mark of inference but the class of smoke, Otherwise through the super-normal perception inclusion of all class in one individual for the knowledge of invariable concomitance will be futile.

Text-63: दृष्टवते च परम्परास्पन्नन्याण्य विना जातिव्यासिताविविधश्रेणि धृतावृहत्यन्नुसन्मान्।

न हि यायताकाच्छेदनकाया भास्मात्साध्यक यायतायः भास्माभावात्।

तत्सात् पक्षेण व्यासितविविधतानां तदन्तरं विविधश्चित्तकानां पक्षे वा तुतीयालिङ्गपरमेश्वरः।

Translation: It is observed that without knowing pervasion in the universal there arises the knowledge of indirect relationship even in uneducated person (one through that) he can have inference of fire on the basis of smoke. (One cannot say that) whatever appears as the state of being delimitor of pervadedness (will always lead) to the knowledge of pervadedness because there is no proof for it.

Therefore, in the property of subject there is knowledge of qualified by pervasion after that there is knowledge of *visista-vaiśitya* on the subject or *parāmarṣa* of third reason.

Note 63: It is clear.
Text-64: अन्ये तु स्वस्मानाधिकरणात्मकताभावात्मकतिमोगितेव व्यापकत्वम्, तत्सामानाधिकरणं च व्याप्तित्वम्। तथा च लाघातु, व्यापकताज्ञाननुमुन्निति:। साध्यस्य पक्षधर्मव्यापकताज्ञानं च परामर्शः; न तु साध्यव्याप्तस्य पक्षधर्मताज्ञानं ताध्यव्याप्तस्यपक्षधर्मताज्ञानं या, गौरवत्।

Translation: Others say that pervadedness is not being counterpositiveness/non-counterpositiveness of absolute absence coexisting on its own locus and co-locuseness of that is pervadedness and also the reason of inferential cognition is knowledge of pervaderness, the knowledge of pervaderness of property of subject of probans is parāmarśa and not the knowledge of property of subject of pervaded by probans or the knowledge of state of being the property of subject possessed of pervaded by probans because of cumbersomeness.

Note: According to some logicians the knowledge of parāmarśa means not the knowledge of property of subject pervaded by probandum but the knowledge of poervaderness of property of subject of probandum.

For example, in the case of smoke and fire, fire is pervader and such a fire exists on subject therefore, it is the property of subject. so "Such a pervader fire is existing on the mountain" this wil be the
form of parāmarśa. And not that "There on the mountain smoke which is pervaded by fire exists." This will be the form of parāmarśa because it is cumbersome.

Text 65: अत एव यो यो धूमवानु स सोडुर्ग्रामानु इत्यदाहरणवाक्य वाद्योगविवधेतेन धूमवायपक्तता बहेतुपदशर्ते। अन्यथा वाद्याग्नेव धूमवायत्वयोगविवधेदोनोदाहरणातरखिरी स्वात्।

Translation: And hence only 'whatever is possessed of smoke is possessed of fire' in this sentence of example the smoke-pervaderness of fire is shown without any gap in the connection/conjunction of probans, otherwise, whatever is possessed of fire is possessed of smoke due to the gap of connection of another knowledge this will be the form of example.

Note: Because of the form of parāmarśa mentioned before, there is knowledge of pervaderness of fire can be seen.

Text-66: दौरोपि व्यवस्थार्थिनि पवधार्मिकं साध्यमित्वोद्भव:।

Translation: Then the fault of deviation will arise as the probans is not pervader of property of subject.

Note: In the former texts the logician is stressing upon the knowledge of probandum. But then question arises if one will focus on
probandum and not on probans then one cannot justify the logical fallacies as they are concerned with the probans only. (Therefore, \textit{pāramarṣa} means nothing but the knowledge of probans which is pervaded by fire and which exists on the subject)

\textbf{Text 67}: \textit{अथ पर्वतायुक्तधूमव्याप्को वहीरिति परामशों यदि तदा पर्वतीयधूमं प्रति व्यापकताया: पर्वतायुक्तधूमसामानाधिकरणप्रभावितयत्यात् पर्वतविश्वविषय यथेष्टि किमहुमेयनिति चेतु - तथिः पर्वतीयधूमे निव्रत्साध्यसामानाधिकरणवस्य व्यापत्वत्य भानं साध्यसामानाधिकरणप्रभावानियततमिति व्यापत्वत्यभाने।}

\textbf{Translation}: Well if you argue that, if 'the fire is pervader of smoke existing on the mountain' this is the \textit{parāmarṣa} then to the mountain-smoke, because of regularity of colocusness of mountain-smoke of pervaderness the mountain-fire is the object of \textit{parāmarṣa} and then what is to be infer?

Then in the case of mountain-smoke knowledge of pervadedness which is regularly co-located will be same as in the (case of) knowledge of pervadedness the regular knowledge of colocusness of probandum (arises).

\textbf{Note 67}: Well, if the argument made in former text is accepted them. There arises a difficulty. If it is to be said that 'The fire is pervader of smoke existing on the mountain' this the form of \textit{parāmarṣa} then
fire will be the object of parāmarśa and not that of inferential cognition, and in this way as the knowledge of parāmarśa if there occurs the knowledge of fire then what should remain to infer. But if somebody will argue in this way then the answer is given.

The person who argues he has the knowledge of pervadedness by fire of mountain-smoke, he has also knowledge of co-locusness of both of them. Obviously, he has the knowledge of fire which is pervader of smoke and which co-exists with smoke. It means the person has also the knowledge of probandum already (like us only). Then how does he infer the fire on the mountain.

Thus, if both the options are examined then there is no difference between them.

Text-68: यदि च स्मृता व्याप्तिमेडविकलिते तदा व्याप्तकालेनि समानम्।

Translation: If you say that remembered invariable-concomitance is known in smoke then in the pervader also it is same (i.e. there is also knowledge of remembered invariable concomitance.).

Note 68: This is the answer given to the objection raised in former text.

Well, now if somebody will say O.K. there is smoke the invariable concomitance is remembered. If this is the answer the O.K. in fire
also invariable concomitance is also remembered. So there is no any difference.

Translation: In fact pervadedness means not being counterpositiveness of absolute absence residing on (the place) possessed by that (fire) and colousness of smoke (and) pervadedness means a particularity of co-locusness, in this way your inferential cognition is futile.

Note: According to logician on the view expressed in former text is not correct. Because the state of being pervader means not co-locusness with probans (smoke). Because always it is not the case that probandum and probans will be co-located. In the example of smoke and fire smoke is always co-located with fire but not vice versa. Therefore, one cannot define pervaderness and means co-locatedness with probans (smoke) but it is object which is not counter positive of absolute absence existing on the subject. For example, fire is pervader (of smoke) means where there smoke exists there does not exist absence of fire, i.e. fire definitely exists on the place of smoke.
But pervadedness means the co-locatedness with the probandum and in this way the inferential cognition arises through the way proposed by us only and all other inferences are futile.

Text-70: न चैव परामशीय चाक्षुषनं न स्यात् व्यापकत्व विशेषश्चेतिन्यवासनिक्षिप्तिः।

Translation: One should not argue that parāmarśa is not perceptible because there is no contact of sense-organs with the pervader which is qualifier. Because it is desired (by us).

Note: Again the opponent argues. O.K if this view is accepted the knowledge of parāmarśa will not be perceptual knowledge, because there will not occur the contact of pervader which is qualifier with the sense-organs.

Then the answer is well, if you say so then we well-come it, because we went it.

Text-71: असारसिध्यतंदृशयादयाय गानस एव हि सर्वत्र परामश:।
चाक्षुरन्द्रयतिरिक्ततास्तुकु निश्चित: च पक्षेषु जीवनशुद्धिपुष्पास्थान:।

Translation: As in the case of smoke which is not in the contact of sense-organs (one perceives it mentally) (in the same manner) parāmarśa is also (seen by) mental (perception)
everywhere. The purpose of (contact of) eyes through anvaya and vyatireka is exhausted after the perception (of upanaya) of the smoke existing on the subject.

Note: As in the case of past-smoke or future-smoke i.e. the smoke which is not in contact with the sense-organs there arises the knowledge of parāmarśa.

How does it arise? It arises through mind only. In the same manner the knowledge of parāmarśa should arise everywhere through mind only. So it will be mental perception and problem is solved.

Translation: Well, in the inference neither there is prominent knowledge of subject i.e. mountain etc. which is appeared subordinately in the knowledge that produces (janakaiśana) nor the produced knowledge is known prominently which is known subordinately in the knowledge that is producer, because it is seen so. And it is not that the validity of inferential-cognition is not known/is unestablished, because 'the mountain is possessed of fire' this
inferential-cognition is well known to all people. One cannot argue in this way.

**Note:** Well, the argument by opponent is, as follows; when you have inferential-cognition then it arises in the form namely 'Parvato Vahnimān'. In this knowledge the mountain is qualificant i.e. it occurs in the resultant knowledge prominently as it ends in first case. But in the former knowledge namely in parāmarṣi it does not occur as a qualificand but as a qualifier. It means it occurs there subordinately. But in resultant knowledge it appears as prominent one. But generally what appears in the knowledge that which produces another knowledge subordinately it appears subordinately only in the produced - knowledge. But here it is not the case therefore, the validity of inferential-cognition is not established.

But the logician says, one cannot agree in this way. He answers the query raised by opponent in the next question.

**Text-73:** पुरुषस्य दण्ड इति ज्ञानान्तर दण्डी पुरुष इति ज्ञानज्ञानेतरणात्। अनुपदा
तवापि कर्म पदविभेद्यकल्लिनयम्।
Translation: After having the knowledge that the stick is of a man there arises the knowledge that the man having a stick (in this way) it is seen that there is knowledge produced by another knowledge. Otherwise, in your case also how the subject will be viṣeyaka?

Note: So when one has the knowledge namely 'Daṇḍi - puruṣaḥ' the knowledge is generated by the knowledge 'puruṣasya daṇḍah'. What does it mean? In the knowledge which is producer namely 'puruṣasya daṇḍah' the daṇḍa appears there as qualificand i.e. prominent. But in the resultant knowledge it appears as a qualifier i.e. subordinate. Therefore, there is any harm in accepting the mountain as prominent one in the resultant knowledge.

And what about your case?

You also make first the mountain as a qualifier "(parvata-viṣṭa-vahniḥ)" and then in the resultant knowledge as a qualificand. "(Parvato Vahrnīmān)". So what is the difference in your and our process?

Text-74: न हि कारणीभूतज्ञाने यदू विशेषत्तत्त भास्ते ततु कारणीभूतस्ति तथा । इह भूतले वदो नास्तेवति ज्ञानजये ध्रुवाधव्यद्वूतिमित्वज्ञाने तत्त्र च व्यविचारात् ।
**Translation**: It is not the rule that whatever appears in the cognition which is cause, as a qualificand will also appear as a qualifier in the resultant knowledge. Otherwise, in the knowledge that the ground is possessed of absence of pot which is produced from the knowledge namely there is no pot on the earth, there will arise the contradiction or deviation.

**Note**: It is not the rule that whatever appears in the cognition which is cause, as a qualificand will also appear as the same in the qualificand knowledge. If this is accepted then there will arise a fault of contradiction in the case of "earth possesses absence of smoke."

Because when one has the knowledge namely 'there is no pot on the earth' then in this knowledge 'pot' appears as a qualified i.e. prominent but from this knowledge when there arises another knowledge namely 'earth possesses absence of pot'. It is product knowledge In this knowledge pot appears as a qualifier i.e. subordinantly. So in this way many cases can be shown in which the above-said situation arises. So there is no harm in accepting mountain as a qualificand in the resultant knowledge.
Moreover, if the view of opponent is to be accepted, then there will arise the fault of deviation in such cases. Therefore, the view of the logician is correct.

Text 75: तस्मात् परस्ययिल्लक्षणपरामर्शकार्य र्याभावे वल्ल सँवश्च्यविशेषिकामुन्नितिजनवति नात्तामभूताम् एवं सःमाभियुज्जामिति

Translation: Therefore, this is the nature of parāmarśa (knowledge) of reason which exists on the subject that it produces such inferential-cognition which is viśeyika of its own substratum and not which not like that. In this way my (statement) is equal (to your statement).

Note: Hence, it is established here the parāmarśa which exist on the subject generates the inferential cognition qualified by its own substratum and not otherwise.

Text 76: एवं हिंदुपरामर्श एवं कारण न तु परामृतमार्जन हिंदुमू

Translation: In this way parāmarśa (knowledge) of mark is the reason and not the mark itself which is known at moment of present time.

Note: Thus, the knowledge of parāmarśa of the mark is the cause of inferential cognition and not the mark which is known at the
present moment. Otherwise, the past and future mark will not be the cause, instrument of inferential cognition.

Text 77: अथ परामर्शात्र न हेतुरिपि तु शिल्पपरामर्श सत्याच च शिल्पार्श्वपि हेतु: विशिष्टकारणातःहक्मानानं बाधकं विना विशेषणस्वापि हेतुत्तत्

Translation: Well, simply parāmarśa cannot be cause, but the confirmation of mark (is the cause). Moreover, mark is also cause. Because due to means which gives the knowledge of qualified causeness, the qualifier also can be accepted as a cause if there is contradiction.

Note: It is not the case that merely parāmarśa is the cause of inferential cognition, but the parāmarśa of mark is the cause.

Obviously, the mark is also a cause. Because, it is qualifier of parāmarśa. When somebody asks parāmarśa of what? Then naturally answer is parāmarśa of mark. So, for the qualified knowledge, knowledge of qualificnd and that of qualifier both are necessary.

Therefore, not only 'liṅgaparāmarśa' but the mark is also the cause of inferential cognition.
Text 78: न च लिङ्ग परमश्चिरिच्याकलेनान्यायासिद्धं, परिच्छेदे विशेषणान्तराभवन लिहित्या विशेषक तथा धान्यविसिद्धत्वात् तद्विष्णु हेतुः। अन्यथा परिच्छेयकत्वा संयोगवायाध्यात्मिकिनिर्भरायं करणं न स्वातः।

Translation: (One cannot argue) that the mark becomes anyathāsiddha after making known the paramāraṇa, because while making it known there is no other qualifier (of paramāraṇa) only mark is qualifier (distinguishing feature of paramāraṇa) and further, it is ananyathāsiddha therefore, it is the reason of (inferential cognition).

Otherwise, sense organ will also not be instrument (of perception) (because it becomes) anyathāsiddha after making known the contact (of object and sense-organ.).

Note: One may ask, that O.K. if linga or mark is qualifier of paramāraṇa.

Then after introducing the paramāraṇa its function is over, so let it be anyathāsiddha. But it is not possible. Because after making it known there is no other qualifier to the knowledge of paramāraṇa.

Since, paramāraṇa is a qualified cognition, the mark will be the qualifier of that knowledge. Hence, it is not anyathāsiddha.
Moreover, it is not redundant. Therefore, it is a cause of inferential cognition.

If this view is accepted that parāmnara is 'anyathāsiddha' then sense-organ also will be anyathaśiddha. Because after the contact with an object the function of sense organ is over and then it is of no use. However, one cannot say that sense organ is anyathaśiddha. In the same manner the mark is not anyathaśiddha.

Text-79: अष्टि च धृष्टवान् विभिन्नतिः धृष्टसमस्मानकालविभिन्नतिः धृष्टविशेषणिकानुमिति: नामानविशेषणमात्र विशेषणसमस्मानकालतः विशेषविषयेष्याद्विद्विषयत्त्वाण्वन्तात् दण्डी पुरुष इति प्रत्ययीतः।

Translation: Further the inferential cognition i.e. (the mountain) possessed of smoke therefore, (it is) possessed of fire, which has smoke as a qualifier and which has the object namely fire existing in the same time of the smoke is produced by the qualifier which is being known at the present time, as there arises the knowledge namely 'Daṇḍipuruṣah' because of knowledge of qualified by non-verbal (knowledge) in the case of qualified (which is existing) in the same time of qualifier.
Note: Moreover, in the knowledge 'the mountain possesses fire because it possesses smoke', the content of knowledge is fire, which is existing in the same line in which smoke also is existing i.e. the smoke is qualifier of fire. It occurs from the qualifier which is to be known at the present time. Therefore, it is qualified cognition, but not a verbal understanding.

The knowledge 'Daṇḍi puruṣaḥ' will arise only when a person has the knowledge of qualifier. It means a knower must have the knowledge of stick, the knowledge of purusa and the knowledge of relationship of both of them. Then only he can have the knowledge of qualified knowledge. And if, at the time of qualified knowledge if qualifier is not there then qualified knowledge will not take place. Therefore, the mark is not anyathāsiddha but it is a cause of inferential cognition.

Text-80: अत एव ज्ञात विशेषणज्ञायत्वेन विशेषणकालवृत्तित्वा विशेषणानामकाल: यथा दण्डी पुरूष इति प्रत्यक्षे, तेन धूमसमानकालीनविनसिद्धि: | अन्यथा
तत्त्वाध्यक्षकारवृत्तिकारणमान न स्यात् | समयविशेषणल्पप्रभाव्य व्याप्तग्रहात् |

Translation: Therefore, since it is produced by a qualifier which is being known and also it is existing at the same time of the qualifier (there is) regularity of knowledge of object (as in the case) of perceptual cognition i.e. "Daṇḍi puruṣaḥ", in this way there is establishment of fire existing at the same time of smoke.
Otherwise, there will not be inference of fires existing at the same time of that particular smokes. Because there is no knowledge of invariable concomitance due to inclusion of qualifier of time.

**Note**: The mark is qualifier, therefore, there arises the regular knowledge of qualificand at the same time when qualifier also exists. As in the case of 'Daṇḍi puruṣah' the knowledge of qualificand i.e. purusa arises at the same time when the knowledge of Daṇḍa arises. In the same way there arises the knowledge of fire existing in same time of smoke.

Otherwise, there will never arise the inference of fire, existing in the time of that particular smoke function therefore again it has no any other function. Thus, it is the last cause of inferential cognition, and not the instrument.

**Text-81**: किज्ज विद्रोहकरणव्यंक्षपरमर्षां एवं तद्वापर: परामर्शेत तु न व्यापारातर 
मात्र चर्मकारणांविविधति न तत्करणम्।

**Translation**: In the case of accepting the mark as an instrument parāmarśa is the intermediate function of that, but parāmarśa does not have any different intermediate function because it is the ultimate reason, therefore, it (parāmarśa) is not an instrument (of inferential-cognition).
Note: According to new logicians the mark is the instrument of inferential cognition and parāmarśa is intermediate function. The knowledge of parāmarśa itself is intermediate.

Text-82: अत्तीतान्तरणाय विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां

Translation: Well, it is to be said here. Though there is knowledge of past smoke and future smoke (and due to that) there is noticing of inferential cognition, the mark is not the reason of that (inferential-cognition) because there is absence of intermediate function before both of them (i.e. the post-smoke and future-smoke.).

Note: It is clear, that the past or future mark is not the cause because it has no existence before the intermediate function.

Text-83: न च विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां विषयानां

Translation: One should not argue that the another present cause will be the cause of that, because at that time it has not parāmarśa and that which is not the objet of parāmarśa cannot be called as cause.
Note: One cannot say that another mark will be cause there because at that time it has no parāmarśa and that which is not the object of parāmarśa cannot be accepted as the cause of inferential cognition.

Text-84: भाविनिष्के व्यक्तौपक्षेत्वा यत्र लिंगं तत्र लिङ्गान्तरारामायाद्य । यदि च वर्तमानपेष्ट तत्र लिङ्गं तदा वर्तमानवहङ्कर्मनुमानोत्पत्तिः ।

Translation: And for the future where there is the same individual is the mark there is absence of another mark. If the mark is present only then there will arise the inferential cognition of present fire.

Note: One more cause is given here as a justification of the former text. When in the future-subject there is only one individual mark as a cause, definitely there will be absence of another mark, then inferential cognition will not arise.

Therefore, if the mark (smoke) is in the present time then there will arise the inferential cognition of fire existing in the present time and not future or post.

Text-85(a): अथ भावधि भूतं द्वा भूभवि न लिङ्गं किंचतु तत्रायापश्चतद्ध्वस्तव वर्तमान एव, तत्वेषां वहितमानदेशान्तःनिवर्धितिः चेन्न ।

Translation: Well, if you say that the past or future smokes are not mark but there pre-absence and pro-absence are present only (therefore,
they will be the marks), moreover, both of them have invariable co-
existence with fire then it is not correct.

**Text-85(b):** अतीतमविदितवृत्तितत्वा निश्चिततातु वर्तमानतत्वा सन्दिग्धातु धूमादनुगतिः हि न
प्रागाभावधर्ष्यी हिंदौ, तयोः सन्दिग्धत्वात्। नापि धूम, तत्वावर्तमानत्वात्।

**Translation 85(b):** In the inferential cognition that which arises from the
smoke which is doubtful in the present time and which is definite
in existing in future and in the past, the pre-absence and pro-
absence are not marks, because they are doubtful. And not the
smoke also, because it is not present.

**Note 85(a) & 85(b):** On the statement stated by logicians in the former
text an argument can be taken that future or past smoke will not be
the reason but the pro-absence of smoke or pro-absence of smoke
will be reason for future and past inferential cognition respectively.
Because both the absences are present. And from present mark
there will arise present inferential cognition.

But it is not possible, because if somebody knows definitely that in
the past there was smoke and in future there will be smoke. But he
is not sure about the fire existing in the present time. But he knows
past and future smoke. Therefore, the pre-absence and pro-absence should not be the cause of inferential cognition.

Translation: Moreover, where there is inference from the knowledge ‘parvata vahnih’ without any reference to present, future and past tense, then who will be (the explanation) there?

Note: One more problem is there in accepting the pre-absence and pro-absence of smoke as the cause of inferential cognition. Suppose somebody will say that ‘parvate dhūmāḥ’ then in the sentence no tense is mentioned. Then how one can have the knowledge that whether it is a future smoke, or past smoke or past smoke or present smoke. But from this knowledge there arises the inferential cognition i.e. ‘parvate vahnih’. So if pre-absence or pro-absence of mark is accepted as a cause then one cannot justify the above said situation and hence, the mark is the cause of inferential cognition.
Translation: Well, if you say that the state of being either of the pre-observe etc or the state of being absence of absolute absence of smoke will be mark everywhere, then it is not correct, because there is no state of being mark in them because of there meaningless-qualificationness. Where there is no knowledge of either of them there is inferential cognition because of the knowledge of smoke.

Note: Well, the opponent argues further, that precisely I am not saying pre-absence, pro-absence or absolute absence will be the mark but what we say is that either of them should be the cause. Or let the absence of absolute absence of smoke will because of inferential cognition.

The answer is not it is not possible. Because all these qualifications are meaningless and no one can achieve from such qualifications.
Further, it is seen that without the knowledge of above said absences there arises inferential cognition from the knowledge of smoke only. Therefore, the smoke (mark) is the cause of inferential cognition.

**Text-88:** अपि च न धूमप्रागभावादि हङ्कर्षं न या तद्धीरनुमितिकारणं, प्रागभावादिनां व्यवहारात् आवश्यक्त्वंड्वनः नद्वनुमितिसम्भवात।

**Translation:** Further, neither the pre-absence of smoke not the knowledge of that is not the cause for inferential cognition, because the pre-absence etc., are useless and inferential cognition is possible only through the necessary knowledge of smoke.

**Note:** As it is stated in the former text the pre-absence etc. cannot be the cause of inferential because they are redundant but the knowledge of smoke (mark) is must then only inferential cognition will arise. Otherwise not.

**Text-89:** किंव लिङ्कं नागुनिमित्ताय येः, लिङ्कं चिन्न्यां धूलीपदाभि
लिङ्काध्येयप्रागुनिमित्तायपि: नापि लिङ्कं प्रागुनिमित्ती, प्रतापां सुगुनिमित्तायं येः।
तां समानान वस्त्रात्यामित्तिसम्भवात्, वस्त्रानां वस्त्राय प्रयोजणां तत्तिष्ठे
लिङ्कामनवय प्रयोजकत्वात्।
Translation: Moreover, mark is not the cause for inferential-cognition in general, because without the mark (when there is) erroneous cognition of mark (smoke) because of (seeing of) beam of dust, further, mark is not true cognition in the case of inferential cognition, but parāmarśa is the cause for inferential cognition in general. Because of inferential cognition is valid because of both the true knowledge qualified by that. To general whatever is the general cause is the particular cause for the particular.

Note: It is not the case that only mark is the cause for inferential cognition. Because sometimes there is a curtain of dust and when somebody perceives it from distance he feels it is smoke and then in him there arises the inferential cognition. Moreover, only the mark is not correct knowledge here. But only parāmarśa is cause of inferential cognition and because of the right knowledge arise from the knowledge of parāmarśa inference becomes valid. Because parāmarśa is a confirmatory cognition. Through this knowledge one can confirm the existence of mark on the subject and through that one has the 'inferential cognition'.

Text-90: अध परामार्शाय प्रमाणवत् विधानान् हिंदुस्तानवत् तथा चायात्म हिंदुस्तान
प्रमाणमितीहुत्तुमिति शेषतु न। भाविन भूतेन वा चदाकातविविधमानेनापि हिंदुन
Translation: Well if you say that true cognitionness of parāmarshalla and the cognition of mark has reasoness of inferential cognition. Then it is not correct. Because (with the help of) future mark, past mark or the mark that which is simply present in some time the knowledge of parāmarshalla is possible. (And therefore, it is not proper to say that) before an inferential cognition, on the basis of truthfullness of the knowledge of parāmarshalla. The state of being existent of mark or the state of being causeness of mark (is the object of parāmarshalla) and the inference of fire at the time of smoke arises only from the knowledge of invariable concomitance namely - when where smoke exists then there fire exists.

Note: Well, what is the object of parāmarshalla? The object is mark existing at the present moment. Therefore, to understand future and past inference mark must be the cause of inferential cognition.
Because whenever there the it can produce parāmarśa, then it may be future, past or present. And through that one can have the inferential cognition.

Obviously the knowledge of fire existing in the same time of the smoke arises through the invariable concomitance i.e. 'where there is fire, there is smoke'.

Text-91: अथ वा धूमकालः पक्षतात्वकधर्मसमानाधिकरणानि पक्षधर्मबलात् साध्य सिद्धात्तित धूमकालीनतःकिस्मतिः

Translation: Or the time of smoke is the delimitor of subjectness and the prabandum is co-locusness of the property of delimitor of subjectness that is established on the basis of property of subject (and in this way) there is establishment of fire at the time of smoke.

Note: The explanation of the view is given in another way. The time of smoke or the time in which smoke is existing is the delimitor of state of being subject. Then the property of delimitor of subjectness will be 'kālatva'. In the kāla each and everything exists. Therefore, the co-locusness of such property is prabandum and it is existing in the same time of property of subject, in this way one can establish
the fire existing in the same time in which smoke also exists, without considering that whether smoke is past or future or present.

Text-92: यथू व्यापाराभावान परामर्शं करणमिति तबैव, किन्तु व्यापिज्ञानं करणं परामर्शं व्यापारः।

Translation: Thus, paramarśa is not instrument because (it has) absence of intermediate function, it is like that only, but the knowledge of invariable concomitance is the instrument and paramarśa is intermediate function.

Note: As it is stated before, that there is no any intermediate function for paramarśa therefore, there paramarśa is not the instrument for inferential cognition but the knowledge of paramarśa is intermediate function and knowledge of invariable concomitance is the instrument for the inferential cognition.

Text-93: न च परामित्वां संस्कारे व्यापारं, परामित्वां च दरम्कारण्तेन संस्कारोत्साहनमेवादिनुमित्तुत्साहानात्। नापि तर्कः, व्याविद्याहकत्व विषयपरिशोधकत्वात् वा तत्त्व तद्यथाविदित।

Translation: And not the impression of paramarśa is intermediate function, because due to the last causeness of paramarśa, there
arises inferential cognition at the time of arising of impressions. Even *tarka* is also not (the intermediate function of *paramāraśa*) because it is the means of knowledge of invariable concomitance or it makes an object clear and thus, it is not produced from that (*paramāraśa*).

**Note 93:** One can say that O.K. the impressions made by *paramāraśa* knowledge should be the intermediate function *paramāraśa*. But it is not correct. As it is stated before that *paramāraśa* is the last cause of inferential cognition therefore, after the knowledge there immediately arises, the inferential cognition instead of impressions, so the proposal cannot be accepted.

If you say *tarka* is the intermediate function for *paramāraśa* then also it cannot be accepted. Because *tarka* does not generate from *paramāraśa*. Therefore, the knowledge of *paramāraśa* is intermediate function in the process of inferential cognition.