Chapter I

GHANA'S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE CONVENTION PEOPLE'S PARTY REGIME
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Ghana was the first state in Africa to emerge independent from the colonial rule. Its independence was considered to be an example for other colonies which were to gain their independence shortly in Africa. Whatever the course in its foreign policy adopted by the leadership was also to be significant not for Ghana alone but for the entire continent. The leadership of the ruling Convention People's Party (CPP) also acknowledged this role for Ghana. At the very outset, three goals were declared by the CPP government for Ghana's foreign policy. These were:

1) Total liberation of the continent from colonial rule.
2) Unity of all independent African states.
3) Positive Non-alignment to introduce 'African Personality' in world affairs.

1 On the eve of Ghana's independence Africa Today commented "... Ghana is the first of the truly African nations. In a sense, Ghana presents the face of the new Africa in the world.... It strikes great hope into the hearts of all the rest of the suppressed that their turn for independence will come." Africa Today, vol. 4, no. 2, March/April 1957, p. 1.

2 A noted writer thus reflected: "Ghana's foreign policy will be judged very largely on the extent to which its leaders and representatives succeed in identifying themselves with the principle of Negro-African Liberty.... The way in which Ghana handles its relations with other African states and peoples (it) matters a great deal because of Ghana's unique position as the first liberated Negro African state whose foreign policy will be of direct concern to Africans throughout Africa which remains colonial and voiceless in the world affairs." Thomas Hodgkin, "Ghana in the African Setting", United Asia, vol. 9, no. 1, February 1957, p. 301.
As the first Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah declared on the eve of independence: "Ghana's own independence is meaningless unless it is linked with the total liberation of the continent." The implication of this declaration to which subsequently was added the goal for a Union of African states was that Africa emerged as the primary concern of Ghana's foreign policy. The leadership made a commitment according to which Ghana was cast in a role that itself denied and transcended the frontiers of a nation-state -- a framework which otherwise was accepted on the independence. Adherence to positive non-alignment was with a view to assert independence of judgment and action and to introduce 'African Personality' in world affairs to work for world peace. Foreign policy of Ghana had thus, two aspects, one was Africa which emerged as the primary area of concern for its leadership and second its links with and role in the external world.

The commitments spelled out by leadership in designing Ghana's foreign policy were due to the fact that leaders like

3 Addressing the public rally on the eve of independence, Nkrumah declared "The sacrifices made by the people of Ghana in their struggle for independence are only the first stage in the common advancement of their brothers all over Africa... We have done with the battle and we again rededicate ourselves in the struggle to emancipate other countries in Africa." Kwame Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom (Panaf, 1973), pp. 106-7.

4 Speaking on African Unity Nkrumah stated "So deep is our faith in African Unity that we have declared our preparedness to surrender the sovereignty of Ghana in whole or in part in the interest of a Union of African states." Radio Broadcast, 6 March 1960.

Nkrumah had a long experience of pan-African affairs during their stay abroad. As the advocate of African independence and unity, Nkrumah evolved a perception and an ideology that found its reflection in defining Ghana's role in Africa. Under the spell of this perception Nkrumah made the foreign policy of Ghana operative in Africa.

Initiatives on Close Coordination Among African States

First initiative of Nkrumah after independence was to call for a summit conference of independent African states to discuss plans for the continent's liberation as well as to establish a net-work of diplomatic contacts for concerted efforts towards the realization of these goals. The summit was followed by the All-African People's Conference to express solidarity with the nationalist leaders of Africa. Both these conferences were held in Accra in 1958 within a year of Ghana's independence.

The First CIAS

The Conference of Independent African States (CIAS) held during 15-22 April 1958 was attended by representatives of eight African governments. The conference was noteworthy as the first

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6 Nkrumah's biography released in 1957 is a statement of his perceptions of Ghana and Africa. He pointed out "... nationalism is not confined to the Gold Coast. From now on it must be pan-Africanism... African political emancipation must spread throughout the whole continent. I have never regarded our struggle an isolated objective... When I returned to West Africa it was with the intention of using Gold Coast as a starting off point for African independence (and)... work for the establishment of a Union of West African States." Ghana - An Autobiography (New York, 1957), p. 47.


8 States who attended the conference included Ethiopia, Egypt, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia.
summit where leaders of independent African states met in order to exchange views to evolve a concerted plan to end colonialism in the continent and to agree on certain common principles of foreign policy like non-alignment. Along with the consensus reached in the conference on these common principles, the summit was equally significant for the disagreement expressed by delegates on various issues raised by Ghana during the deliberations.

One of the major area of disagreement between Ghana and other states related to the idea of a permanent machinery for the continued cooperation among the African states. Ghana's draft proposal to the conference favoured a permanent secretariat with a secretary-general but the participants showed no readiness to establish such an institutional framework. Finally, the proposal was turned down.


11 The rejection of the proposal revealed a fundamental difference of approach between Ghana and other African states on the question of the future conduct of inter-state relations in Africa. The aim of Ghana was to bind the existing African states as well as those to become free in the near future within an institutional framework of relations, the other states insisted, in spite of their commitment to the common issues of Africa, to base their future relations on the fact that these were independent sovereign nation-states allowing not merely a degree of disagreement among each other but also encouraging voluntariness or open options in their involvement with the continental problems. W.S. Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy (Princeton, 1969), pp. 37-38.
The AAPC

The delegates from twenty-eight territories representing various national liberation movements and trade unions in every part of Africa gathered in Accra during 5-13 December 1958. George Padmore, the President of the Preparatory Committee and Nkrumah's adviser on African Affairs, declared pan-Africanism as the ideology of the conference with freedom and unity as its main objectives. The conference was the beginning of a pan-African movement at the continental level. The main problem facing the delegates was achievement of independence and, thus, the slogan given out at the conference was "Africa for Africans". Explaining the slogan Nkrumah commented that it was not another kind of racialism but only meant that the Africans who naturally were in the majority in Africa shall and must govern themselves in their own countries.

The most important resolution of the conference from Ghana's point of view concerned the achievement of a "Commonwealth of free African States". This was clearly a triumph for Ghana and Nkrumah once again declared that he would commit all the resources and energies of Ghana towards achieving Africa's independence and unity. Ghana, thus, vowed to provide both a form and a forum of African liberation.

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13 Address to the Conference (Accra, 1958).
14 Resolutions of the AAPC, Accra, 1958, Legum, n. 9, pp. 228-36.
Promise and Challenge of Ghana's Foreign Policy in Africa

After the two conferences, Ghana emerged as the chief spokesman for African liberation and unity. But in order to sustain that role, Ghana's contiguous environment, West Africa occupied crucial significance for Nkrumah's Africa policy.

Ghana-Guinea Union

Nkrumah stood for the formation of a "Federation of States in West Africa". Since prospects of independence were brighter in West Africa after 1958, it made Ghana's involvement in the region all the more imminent. The opportunity for taking initiative in this direction for its Africa policy came with the independence of Guinea. First, the leadership under Sekou Toure was the most radically pan-Africanist in the entire Francophone Africa. Secondly, independence itself was granted under such conditions that Guinea desperately needed help for its survival and stability. Ghana readily came out to Guinea's aid and both the countries resolved to form a union between the two states as the "nucleus of the West Africa Commonwealth".

The Ghana-Guinea Union (later joined by Mali in 1961) was a definite move towards the creation of a United States of Africa. Though no rigid institutionalization of the Union could emerge, which led many to point out that the achievement remained on the

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paper, the real significance of the step cannot be minimised. It was the first attempt to check the process of disintegration in West Africa and an experiment in inter-state cooperation in Africa in combating colonial influence. It set an example for the newly independent states to emulate and join in such a union with all its advantages of collective development. It was the first time that the linguistic barrier between two African states was overcome, fostering a common front on major African issues during 1960-66 on ideological grounds.

The other African states, disagreeing with the perception of pan-Africanism which gained momentum with the support of Ghana and Guinea, tried to restrain this movement. As an alternative to the Union of African States, for example, President of Liberia William Tubman proposed a plan for "Associated States of Africa" and a meeting with Nkrumah and Sekou Toure to discuss the matter. The communique issued after their meeting at Sanniquellie, Liberia, spoke only of a "community" of independent states which was to be achieved according to principles adopted in the Sanniquellie Declaration. Nkrumah's agreement to this declaration was apparently a step backward in his pan-African policy. But he described it as greater than the atom bomb in force as he had succeeded in at least committing Tubman to the

18 Ghanaian Times, 29 July 1959.
19 These principles are: i) name of the organization shall be The Community of Independent States, ii) All people shall have right to independence, self-determination and to decide form of government under which they wish to live, iii) Separate identity of each member nation, iv) non-interference in internal affairs etc. See Légum, n. 9, pp. 162-3.
idea of African unity to which he was so lukewarm. There can be another explanation for Nkrumah's acceptance of Sanniquellie Declaration at this time. Throughout 1958-59, Nkrumah was guided less by pan-Africanism than by the need for a broad consensus among the already independent states to agree to some form of African unity. A compromise between the two extremes did provide a loose framework for a Union of African states. If there was a framework for a "union in the form of a community" of African states, each new state could at its inception be compelled by a fait accompli either to join the community or be isolated. The Sanniquellie Declaration though a check on the militant pan-African movement, nevertheless, brought a consensus over the issue of African union at the governmental level. Only the machinery was to be evolved within Africa in the form of an association.

To the dismay of Nkrumah, even this was not to be realized as Liberia did not stick to its commitment and other independent states went the way of Liberia. Moreover, Nkrumah, though he talked of a united Africa, was himself not clear on the form that it might take. It was his practical experience in pan-African policies which gradually evolved his ideas on African unity.


21 At the end of 1958 Nkrumah had said that it was impossible "to predict the form a union would take until we have given careful consideration to it". Speech to the Indian Council of World Affairs, 29 December 1958. But by 1960 that clarity in conception and scheme was there as he could state. "There is strength in the political unity of our continent...all independent states of Africa should work together to create a union of African States." Quoted in I Speak of Freedom, n. 3, p. 131.
The Challenge

Ghana's perception on African unity, however, was unacceptable to other African states. This was apparent at the second CIAS held in June 1960 in Addis Ababa where Ghanaian delegates presented a case for the political union as major issue for the conference. The opposition to the proposal among others was spearheaded by Nigeria, which considered the idea of a political union of African states premature. The schism that emerged at this conference was all the more significant for its timing for both Ghana and Africa. For the first time since independence Ghana faced crisis in its economy which subsequently resulted in significant changes in the domestic set up. In Africa, a wave of independence was sweeping the whole continent. About 15 states achieved independence soon after the second CIAS. With this upsurge, Africa also witnessed the problems of decolonisation, all mirrored in one single crisis -- in Congo.

22 Ghana's Foreign Minister Ako Adjei tried to get Sanniquellie Declaration adopted at the Conference but his efforts failed. He said at the conference "To us in Ghana the concept of African Unity is an article of faith. We sincerely believe that independent African states can form a real political union - no matter from where we start." Quoted in Legum, n. 9, p. 48.

23 Maitama Sule, Chief Nigerian delegate at the conference said that idea of such a union is premature...Nigeria will not enter into any union while surrendering its sovereignty. In a direct attack on Nkrumah he said "if anybody makes the mistake of feeling that he is a Messiah who has got a mission to lead Africa whole purpose of Pan-Africanism will be defeated." Documents on International Affairs (London, 1960), p. 363.
Congo Crisis and Ghana

Ghana's involvement in Congo was in keeping with its pan-African role. Nkrumah pointed out the significance of the Congo crisis for independent Africa in these words:

This is a turning point in the history of Africa. If we allow the independence of the Congo to be compromised in any way by the imperialist and capitalist forces, we shall expose the sovereignty and independence of all Africa to grave risks. The struggle of the Congo is therefore our struggle. It is incumbent on us to take our stand by our brothers in the Congo in full knowledge that only Africa can fight for its destiny. 24

The disturbances broke out in Congo on 5 July 1960 and Katanga's secession was declared by Moise Tshombe on 11 July. Patrice Lumumba, the Congolese Prime Minister, appealed to the United Nations on 12 July for aid to restore law and order in the country. Nkrumah announced to send a mission to the Republic of Congo to offer all possible aid including, if desired by Congo, military assistance. Lumumba appealed to the Ghana Government for such assistance. Nkrumah contacted the UN Secretary-General and expressed the willingness of Ghana government to provide as an African state military aid to Congo. On 14 July, the Security

Council resolved to establish a UN force in the Congo. The first troops of UN force from Ghana and Tunisia, thus, arrived in Congo on 15 July 1960.

Ghana's immediate objective in Congo was restoration of law and order, suppression of the Katanga secession and complete withdrawal of Belgian troops from all parts of Congo. This objective was to be achieved with the help of all African states, within the framework of the UN. The long-term objective for Ghana was strengthening the movement of African unity for which the independence of Congo and its struggle for a unified state became symbolic.

Nkrumah failed to achieve any of his objectives in Congo. He could not restore peace and unity in Congo, he could not effectively defend the legitimate government of Lumumba or his life, and, most important, the Cold War finally entered Africa.

The reasons for Ghana's failures can be viewed from two related angles. First, Ghana's own role, policy and mistakes committed in Congo and, second, the hostile environment in which Ghana operated its policy. The major mistake of Nkrumah in Congo was his too rigid a commitment to the UN which worked at cross-purposes with Ghana. He could neither agree to withdraw Ghana's forces from the UN Command nor place them entirely at the disposal of Lumumba. He thus brought himself into conflict with the established leadership in Congo, creating thereby an awkward position for the Ghanaian forces in Congo. The course of

28 SCOR, n. 26, p. 16.
withdrawal would have been preferable, as it would have laid the responsibility for failure on the UN. Of course, the advocacy by the other African states on withdrawal from Congo, while Ghana insisted on non-withdrawal was in no way a positive solution. What was required was an alternative strategy of the African states to meet the situation there so that sovereignty of Africa was in no way compromised and a mechanism was evolved to meet any such problem in Africa.

Ghana offered such an alternative when Nkrumah floated the idea of an African Joint Military High Command associated with the achievement of political union of African states. But the response of the other African states was negative to the proposal. They were also deeply divided among themselves as revealed by the November voting of the UN General Assembly on the issue of credentials of Congo’s delegation.

The Congo crisis had a threefold impact on Ghana’s politics in general and its conduct of foreign policy in particular since 1960. First, the Congo crisis and the involvement of Ghana in it brought immense experience to the leadership in the techniques of actual diplomatic deals. Ghana was the focus of the world during entire crisis and its delegation at the UN was the pivot of diplomatic consultations

30 Thompson, n. 11, p. 138.

31 UN General Assembly resolution on the credentials of Kasavubu Mobutu delegation against Lumumba’s presentation on 22 November 1960 was voted 53 for, 23 against with 19 abstentions. Ghana along with non-aligned and socialist bloc states supported Lumumba whereas all states from French speaking Africa except Mali and Guinea voted for Kasavubu. The resolution sealed the fate of Lumumba. General Assembly Official Records (GAOR), 15th Year, 94th Meeting, 22 November 1960, p. 979,
at every level. Second, during the crisis, Ghana found the western policies against the interests of Africa whereas the role of the east was favourable. The Congo crisis put Ghana in close contacts with the east. Third, as for Africa, Nkrumah was more convinced than ever before that challenges like the Congo crisis could be fought only when the African states would form a political union. Ghana pursued the policy of uniting Africa into a political union with a new militancy. But the majority of African states disagreed with such a policy, resulting in widening schism that went against Ghana. In the post-Congo crisis period, the conflict between Ghana and other African states divided them into two blocs of radicals and conservatives.

There was yet another impact bearing directly on the domestic scene where the Congo crisis did not directly cause the change but inspired it indirectly. After independence, the CPP leadership considered the condition of the economy sound as there were sufficient resources and the rate of economic growth was considered impressive. There was, thus, a continuation of colonial policy of economic development. The country was, however, faced with a crisis in the economy by 1960 due to a steep fall in the export price of cocoa—the mainstay of Ghana’s economy. The leadership tried to abandon old policies. Changes, as a result, were introduced both in the economic and political set-up not only to cope with the crisis but to effect a total reorientation of ‘development’ in Ghana. These changes were also considered necessary to sustain an active foreign policy both in Africa and the world. The Congo crisis was a turning-point for Ghana in this sense.
Ghana and the Newly Emergent African States

After the Congo debacle, Nkrumah campaigned with added vigour for a political union of the African states. But the environment in which Ghana's foreign policy operated after 1960 had changed substantially. With many independent states in the continent that emerged mainly in 1960, in the midst of the Congo crisis, a new phase of inter-state relations opened in Africa. Many of these states were in West Africa. The system of nation-state which Nkrumah attempted to redefine in the context of Africa became more rigid. But before it was finally established, there was a force to counter it i.e. the movement for a political union of African states spearheaded by Ghana. The struggle between these forces, splitting the African states into two rival blocs, determined Ghana's foreign policy in the next few years.

Africa was to be the primary concern of Ghana's foreign policy. In order to concentrate more on African developments and effective implementation of its policy, important changes were introduced in the decision-making structures of the government. The African affairs were removed from the jurisdiction of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a separate African Affairs Secretariat was created in order to coordinate all foreign policy and diplomatic affairs concerning the continent. The Bureau of African Affairs (BAA) was one of the most important non-governmental agencies to provide aid and assistance to the nationalist leaders from different territories of Africa.

The re-structuring of the decision-making machinery was itself part of the larger changes taking place in the domestic setting, affecting and being affected by the foreign policy goals of Nkrumah after the Congo crisis. Ghana's economy faced a severe crisis in 1960 resulting in depletion of foreign exchange reserves and increases in deficits and the cost of living. The crisis compelled the government to adopt a new economic policy of development which envisaged an active role for the state as vehicle of bringing socio-economic development through industrialization. Under the new strategy establishment of a socialist society was declared as the ultimate goal. For the realization of this task, it was considered essential to tone up the political set up. Efforts were made to extend control over the political apparatus while centralizing all powers within the party and government machinery. Ghana was declared in 1960 as not only a Republic under a presidential form of government but also as a single-party state. The CPP found a new role as a vanguard to mobilize and educate the masses in order to infuse them with the ideology of socialism. As a result of these changes which included active role of state and party for socio-economic development, Ghana acquired a direction which was missing in the early period.

Ironically, it was also during this period when Ghana pushed its pan-Africa policy ahead and met with increasing opposition from the African states resulting in deterioration of relations among them.

**Ghana and Francophone States of West Africa**

Two factors determined Ghana's relations with the other states of Africa and particularly with the states of West Africa
after their independence. One was the attitude of these states towards the movement for a political union of the African states; and secondly the nature of relationship between these states and former colonial powers. The position adopted by these states on both the issues was contrary to that of Ghana. Interestingly, these states whether previously governed by Britain or France followed identical policies with each other on both counts. They opposed any political fusion of the African states and advocated fraternal relations with the former metropolis, treating them as natural and cherishing them proudly. Nkrumah's concept of a 'client state of neo-colonialist powers' emerged precisely from this understanding of such African regimes.

The most viable challenge to Ghana's foreign policy was posed by the 'Francophone states of West Africa'. Twelve former French African colonies emerged independent in West Africa and all of them, with the exception of Guinea and Mali, formed a well-knit bloc adopting common and identical policies towards France and African issues. They entered into economic and defence agreements with France and opposed any idea of forming a Federation of West African states. The position taken by the nationalist leaders in the Francophone Africa and mainly of the group led by President Houphouet Boigny of Ivory Coast was, thus, contrary to the basic policies of Ghana. Nkrumah's axiom, 'See ye first


the political kingdom and the rest shall be added into it -- that sums up the priority and significance attached to political independence of a colony -- was refuted by these leaders who instead supported 'dependence' on metropolitan France.

They took pride in being part of French empire and this intellectual outlook of 'being more French than the Frenchmen' was predominant in the leadership of French Africa. De Gaulle's referendum of September 1958 in which eleven out of twelve territories voted 'yes' to the 'French Community' further confirmed this outlook. The parochial and hostile response of the leadership in Francophone Africa towards developments in the rest of Africa was clear even before the first AAPC: not only did these leaders decline the invitation to the conference but some of them even took the lead in criticising its very objective i.e. the liberation of the continent. An interesting factor, which became increasingly important in the context of Ghana's relations with these states, was that, whereas the

35 As West Africa remarked "when Ghana was celebrating the first anniversary of her 'independence' in 1958 the neighbouring Ivory Coast was celebrating inter-dependence with France." West Africa, 29 March 1958, p. 7.

36 President Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal commented on Africa's association with French Community "presented as a dynamic entity...is the ideal framework for an effective coalition and association. Africa cannot do without Europe except at the price of increasing its relative backwardness." African Socialism (London, 1962), pp. 64-65.

37 While declining to attend AAPC Houphouet Boigney said "AAPC was destined to produce only idle talk and demand for illusory independence. Ivory Coast must concentrate to build the prosperous 'republic' made possible by the advantages of membership within the Franco-African Community." Africa Report, vol. 4, no. 2, February 1959, p. 9.
political parties in power refused to attend the conference, the
Opposition political groups were largely present and supported
the federation of West African states. Nkrumah increasingly
regarded these leaders in power as serious obstacles to a
political union of African continent. Just as the opposition to
Ghana's policies from these states mounted, Nkrumah became more
sympathetic to the opposition groups from these states and took
asylum in Ghana. This gave the opportunity to the leaders of
Francophone Africa to accuse Ghana of subversion. They used the
presence of political refugees in Ghana to intensify their
opposition to Nkrumah's regime till his overthrow in 1966.

Emergence of Rival Blocs Among African States

The African members of the Francophone community, whose
leadership has been assumed by H. Boigny, took steps to counter
the movement for a federation or political union in Africa. They
formed the Conseil d'la Entente in 1959 comprising Ivory Coast,
Niger, Dahomey and Upper Volta. After entering in the UN in
October 1960, these states met in Abidjan to decide their common
stand on issues like Congo and independence of Algeria. Invitations
were issued only to the former members of the community. An
important outcome of this conference was the birth of a United
African Front, a group alongside but not subordinate to the Afro-
Asian Group. The front was to have a common policy and this was

38 The emergence of Ghana-Guinea Union meant for Ivory Coast
"a realignment of integrationist forces, one of the
important setbacks to Houphouet's policies". Virginia
Thompson, West Africa's Council of Entente (London, 1972),
p. xx.
demonstrated in the UN in November 1960 over Congol. In a subsequent meeting held in Brazzaville during 15-19 December 1960 the Francophone states formalised their association based on a clearly laid down principles. The Brazzaville Declaration ruled out any political union and instead urged economic cooperation, retaining the political identity of each of the member-states. A formal bloc was born in Africa with a distinct orientation and the basic intention of checking the movement for a political union of the African states.

In the same month when the Brazzaville Group was formed, Ghana had another breakthrough in its policy for a United States of Africa when Mali offered to join the Ghana-Guinea union. The Conakary Declaration, pleading for higher and healthier conception of African unity, deplored all forms of African regroupment based on the languages of the colonial power. However, just as the two distinct approaches towards African unity emerged, so were the blocs on the similar lines. The states supporting the principle of a Union of African states met at Casablanca (immediately after the formation of Brazzaville group) in January

39 The French African states voted en bloc in support of Kasavubu's recognition at the UN General Assembly. GAOR, n. 31. The voting was in accordance with agreement at Abidjan Conference which resolved "to adopt common attitudes in international politics" and specifically present a unanimous viewpoint at the UN which was exhibited at the 15th session of the UN in 1960. Le Figaro, 27. October 1960. Also Luisignan, n. 33, p. 277.

40 Brazzaville Declaration 1960 signed by Ivory Coast, Gabon, Dahomey, Central African Republic, Congo (B), Upper Volta, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Tchad and Madagascar. Legum, n. 9, p. 178.

41 Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union, 24 December 1960, Legum, n. 9, p. 175.
1961 to coordinate their policies towards problems facing Africa. The conference was an important landmark in Ghana's foreign policy as the states participating agreed on the principle of political union and created a chain of committees to achieve this goal. Ghana consolidated its support to political union of African states through Casablanca group but other African states found themselves in agreement with the Brazzaville approach rather than that of Casablanca. A common link was forged between the Brazzaville Group and many Anglophile states of Africa whose representatives first gathered in Monrovia during 8-12 May 1961. The Monrovia Group that emerged as the largest of such formations in the continent and the resolutions that the two conferences adopted were, in spirit, against a political union of the African

42 Casablanca Conference was attended by Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, UAR and Provisional Government of Algeria whose representatives declared "to liberate the African territories under colonial domination...liquidate colonialism and neocolonialism...remove foreign troops and bases...and rid the African continent of political and economic interventions." The leaders of the conference were i) extremely critical of UN's failure in Congo and 'decided to withdraw their troops from UNOC', ii) accorded de jure recognition to Algerian Government (GPRDA), and iii) condemned French nuclear tests in Sahara. On each issue the Casablanca Conference expressed a different stand from that of Brazzaville's Group Casablanca Charter. Legum, n. 9, P. 147.

43 At Casablanca four committees were constituted i.e. political, economic, cultural and committee on 'joint military high command' with a view to form African Consultative Assembly. There was no direct reference, though, to Union of African States but the most important result of the conference, according to Nkrumah was that 'it expressed a common belief in the need for African unity.' Kwame Nkrumah, Challenge of Congo (London, 1967), p. 98.

44 The states who attended the Monrovia conference included, besides Brazzaville Group were Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo and Tunisia.
Ghana's policies in Africa had rejected by a large number of African states. Simultaneously, the CPP Government confronted the economic and political tensions in its domestic scene in Ghana.

On 1 August 1962, there was an attempt on Nkrumah's life at Kulungugu where he had returned after a meeting with the President of Upper Volta. The incident has been regarded as point of departure in Ghana's foreign policy before August 1962 and after. It has also been pointed out that Nkrumah's attitude became accommodative and moderate and conciliatory towards other African states in regard to the political union of the continent after this incident.

The conciliatory attitude was actually evident ever since Ghana adopted independence and unity of the continent as the goals of her foreign policy. Sanniquellie Declaration was a testimony to this approach. There was, no doubt, an added militancy in the pursuit of these goals after the Congo crisis but that was required for emphasizing the necessity of unity and to make Ghana's voice heard in the continent. It became all the more necessary because of the unresponsive and even hostile attitude towards the idea of a political union. But this extremism

45 Declaration at Monrovia emphasized 'economic cooperation' among African states based on certain principles clearly elaborated in the Charter. These included i) absolute equality of all states, ii) respect for sovereignty, iii) non-interference in the internal affairs, iv) outright condemnation of subversion and support of dissident elements and v) non-acceptance of any leadership. Monrovia Charter, Legum, n. 9, p. 148.

46 Ghanaian Times, 2 August 1962.

47 Thompson, n. 11, p. 265.
was always compromised at the actual negotiations for the union at the conference tables. The Guinea-Ghana-Mali union was the only instance where political unity was accepted in principle. Even at the Casablanca Conference, where Nkrumah came nearest to success in this regard, the charter did not specifically lay down the political union of African states. Nevertheless, conciliation in no way meant 'giving up' which was the most dominant trend in the Brazzaville group as well as in the enlarged Monrovia bloc. The Conference called in by Monrovia Group and held in Lagos in January 1962 was to be attended by Ghana in an attempt at reconciling the two blocs. But the members of Monrovia bloc and particularly the Brazzaville group took an uncompromising attitude towards the invitation to the Algerian Provisional Government which had been accorded the status of a full member at the second conference of African states at Addis Ababa. Ghana along with other members of the Casablanca group declined to attend the conference.

Towards the Formation of OAU

The efforts to reconcile the rival blocs continued throughout 1962. Ghana supported the initiative of Ethiopia and Guinea for a merger of the two rival blocs. Nkrumah also took an initiative in July (before the Kulungugu incident) towards uniting the two blocs when he wrote to the President of Liberia asking for the "maximum cooperation in securing that the independent states

49 Thompson, n. 16, p. 174.
will forget the past and meet in an atmosphere of harmony and brotherhood”. He favoured the framework of the CIAS as an appropriate platform for reconciliation. As an evidence of his desire for reconciliation, Nkrumah refused to hold a meeting of the Casablanca bloc in order to discourage such grouping at a time when reconciliatory trends were gathering momentum.

There were signs at the conference of foreign ministers held in Lagos in December 1962 that the basis of discussion at the ensuing Addis Ababa conference would be the Casablanca and Monrovia Charters. Nkrumah, thus, formulated a plan for an African Continental Government, which he wanted to present to all Heads of Government on the New Year Day. But the proposal of Nkrumah was not agreed upon to be included in the Agenda for final meeting of the Heads of States to approve the Charter. Yet he signed the Charter considering it a definite advance towards the ideal of unity.

The creation of the OAU had envisaged that all the existing blocs and political groupings in Africa would be disbanded to enable the states to coordinate within the framework of the new


51 Ibid., 8 November 1962.

52 Ibid., 1 January 1963.

53 Nkrumah arrived in Addis Ababa on 19 May 1963 and as \textit{The Times} remarked later "few delegates failed to take him seriously who in any case remained the most conspicuous leader of Black Africa.” \textit{The Times}, 27 May 1963.

54 On his return from Addis Ababa he stated "We have for the first time created a continental organization of African Unity". \textit{Ghanaian Times}, 29 May 1963.
organization. As a result the Monrovia and Casablanca blocs were dissolved. But the French-speaking states refused to dissolve the UAM as Senghor said that it was a "regional organisation confining itself to socio-economic activities". The statement was not correct as the UAM had been a political forum for Francophone Africa and the member-states had military alliances with France, which certainly violated the principle of non-alignment as adopted in the OAU Charter.

The OAU Charter had tried to achieve a compromise between two important trends in African politics -- the extreme nationalism of independent sovereign states maintaining their separate identity and radical pan-Africanism advocating one continental government for entire Africa. The charter recognised the separate entities of sovereign independent states with no interference in internal matters and yet committed the states to coordinate their activities and policies to project a united stand on issues concerning Africa. The coordination was envisaged at several levels -- political-diplomatic, economic and socio-cultural. This commitment amounted at one level or the other to looking beyond the interests of a single state or group. But many of the states, though party to the commitment in 1963, continued with their regional groupings. The radical pan-Africanists, on the other hand, while ready to work within the OAU framework for the time being, pressurised the organisation to enhance the commitment. The OAU was, thus,

56 The Charter of the OAU, Thompson, n. 16, pp. 369-75.
subjected to conflicting pressures. For similar reason hostilities between Ghana and other African states particularly French African states took a more critical turn.

Second Congo Crisis. The OAU and Ghana

Just a few days before the opening of the second conference of OAU in Cairo, M. Tshombe became the Prime Minister of the Congo. His accession to power was so startling that the Council of Ministers meeting just before the summit unanimously recommended his exclusion from the conference. The reaction was very sharp even at the summit but there were some who opposed his exclusion and regarded it as an interference in the internal matters of a member country. There was mounting resistance to Tshombe particularly in eastern Congo and he in retaliation started recruiting White mercenaries from Angola and South Africa backed up by material assistance from outside, especially the United States. This was the first open involvement of Americans in Africa. According to the US News and World Report the US mission in Congo was a minor version of the American military mission in South Vietnam.

57 Tshombe as Prime Minister. On 10 July 1964, Moise Tshombe became the Prime Minister.


59 The President of Malagasy argued "We all deplored the death of Lumumba but that does not give us the right to interfere in the Congo affairs." Quoted in Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa : The Politics of Unity (London, 1968), p. 84.

On 24 November 1964 occurred the Stanleyville incident. Eighteen African states filed a complaint to the Security Council condemning the Belgian-African intervention. Ghana led in reactivising the African group in the UN, but the UAM members refused to sign the complaint. Ivory Coast which at that time was the member of the Security Council joined the United States in defending the aggression. In order to avoid a split and gain further support of the African states, another extraordinary session of the OAU Council of Ministers was convened in New York on 1 December 1964 at the request of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Tanzania and Kenya. But the division continued. The end-result was a weak resolution adopted by the Security Council which merely "deplored recent events in Congo and encouraged the OAU to pursue its efforts to achieve national reconciliation". Meanwhile, the military success of Tshombe earned increased African diplomatic support for him. The OAU was a failure and the former UAM

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61 400 Belgian paratroopers parachuted in Stanleyville, the centre of rebellion and handed over the city to Tshombe. The act was regarded as "humanitarian" to save hostages held by rebels." Department of State Bulletin, 27 September 1964, p. 198.


64 UN Document S/6076.

65 Ghana's move to get Tshombe excluded from the UN Scientific and Technical and Research Committee in January 1965 was defeated by 17 to 3 votes. Wallerstein, n. 59, p. 90.
members had contributed to its weakening by extending support to Tshombe and thus in a way to the foreign powers. This was the only group of African states which was clearly identifiable at the OAU and at the UN because of its voting pattern. The efforts of Ghana were to project a united stand which could have strengthened the OAU and brought greater coordination among the African states.

But such a trend was unwelcome to the former UAM members that by the close of 1964 had renewed attempts to organise themselves into another group both to check the growing affiliation with the OAU and to counter the movement of pan-Africanism advocated by Ghana at that time. Opposition to Ghana was a prime concern of those states who gave the utmost publicity to their accusation that Ghana was organising "subversion" against them while providing asylum to the outlawed opposition groups. After OAU's formation French speaking states of Africa had picked up the plank of 'subversion' by organising Ghana against other states in expressing their opposition to Nkrumah.

In a meeting on 10-12 February 1965 at Nouakchott, Mauritania, the former members of the UAM created another organisation called the Organization of the Community of Africa and Malagasy (OCAM). A tacit recognition to Tshombe was given as a Congolese delegation attended the conference along with a Belgian diplomat who was the only foreigner allowed to be present.

66 "Since Brazzaville Conference, the French African states like Ivory Coast, Niger, Upper Volta and even Nigeria consistently accused Ghana of giving asylum to opposition elements from these states to organise subversion and overthrow the governments." Cervenca, n. 58, pp. 4-5.
at the deliberations. The major purpose of the participants was to divert Africa's attention from the Congo problem and to mobilize opposition against Ghana. The official communique of the OCAM strongly condemned the action of certain states, notably Ghana, 'in welcoming the agents of subversion and organising training camps on their territory'. A major offensive against Ghana had, thus, begun. The occasion chose by these states was the proposed summit of the OAU at Accra in 1965. The OCAM states threatened to boycott the summit unless all refugees were sent from Ghana. The aim of this anti-Ghana campaign was to isolate Ghana in Africa and to weaken the movement for an African union.

The aim coincided with that of the western powers which increasingly found in Nkrumah's Ghana a potential threat to its interests. By 1965 Ghana had travelled a long way in its relations with the non-African world. A discussion of Ghana's extra-African relations under Nkrumah is relevant for a thorough understanding of Ghana's foreign policy, its role in the world affairs and the challenges and limits that it faced during 1957-66.

Ghana's Foreign Policy in Relation to Non-African World

In its relations with the non-African world, the role of Ghana was characterised by the pursuit of positive neutrality.

67 Le Monde (Paris), 13 February 1965. By April Congo (B) became a formal member of OCAM.


69 President Tsiranana said after the conference "Ghana must give guarantee that it will cease its nonsense because now our timidity is at its end... We are tough enough to retaliate against anybody." Le Monde, 14 February 1965.
The aim of the policy was projection on the international scene of a distinct 'African personality', contributing to the world peace.

There were various reasons advanced by leadership for adopting the policy of non-alignment. Among these was the hesitation on the part of Ghana to commit itself to the world affairs because of its small size as also being too new to presume to judge the issues between the super powers. There was also, as a newly independent country, a strong desire to pursue an independent foreign policy and widen its relations. But the most important reason, as stated by Nkrumah, was that since "super-power conflict is of no interest or benefit to Africa, it is in the interest of peace that Africa should be saved from becoming a convenient arena of fighting the Cold War".

The policy of non-alignment was, thus, considered relevant for the entire continent. Ghana's adoption of this policy as a guiding principle in its relations with non-African nations held great significance for other African states. In all the conferences of independent African states, beginning from the first CIAS in 1958, the policy of non-alignment found very few opponents after Ghana had set an example.

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70 The aim of the Government has been to follow an independent foreign policy, a policy that is not committed ideologically or militarily with any particular power or political bloc. This policy of non-alignment we have interpreted simply that the Government would act as it sees best on any issue... to safeguard our independence and sovereignty... Our aim is to work with others to achieve an African personality in international affairs..." Quoted in I Speak of Freedom, n. 3, p. 151.

The policy of non-alignment, however, remained a mere posture or belief for Ghana during the early years of independence. This was because of the nature of its relationship with the West. The "political kingdom" had been sought and won in Ghana and now the search was on for economic development so that "we can show to our people how meaningful was the political independence".

The need for economic aid, assistance and investment for development emerged as an important factor in determining Ghana's relations with the non-African states. As to the source of such assistance, the option was limited for Ghana. Its colonial heritage bound Ghana to the west in general and to Britain in particular. Ghana's cocoa which accounted for 65 per cent of its total export earnings was mainly consumed in the European markets. Moreover, Britain had an investment of £6,200 million in Ghana, dominating almost every sector of her economy. The Ghanaian leadership not only accepted this dependence but, in its task of modernizing Ghana, it preferred to look towards only west for the development capital and technical know-how. The existence of strong and intimate links with the west led the Ghanaian leadership to the view that "in the long run the interests of Ghana as a result of her history, economic system, particularly procedures and education lie with the Western democracies".

72 Ibid., p. 52.
73 J.G. Amamoo, "Ghana and Western Democracies", African Affairs (London), 1959, pp. 7-16. Though Nkrumah had also cautioned that "if the West fails to respond, Ghana would be compelled to look elsewhere". n. 71, p. 53.
Ghana and France

In the early years of independence, Ghana cultivated close relations with the west ignoring Soviet Union. Only exception was France. The first conflict of Ghana with a western state was the result of the French decision in 1959 to choose Sahara for atomic tests. The Government of Ghana protested against it. According to Nkrumah, France had chosen Sahara to show to African states their weakness and thus the decision was an assault on African dignity and sovereignty. But Ghana failed to persuade France which went ahead with her nuclear tests. The failure was not of Ghana as such (as Thompson has implied) but of all those powers that could not influence France to withdraw its decision. Ghana in any case broke diplomatic relations with France and froze the French assets in the country. These were bold steps for a small state of Ghana's size to take against a big power and could not be effective without the other African and non-African states' support for them.

Again Ghana was in forefront against the French colonial policy in Africa and particularly in Algieria. The FLN was present


75 On 3 July 1959 Ghana Government handed over a note of protest to French embassy saying "Motivated as we are by the spirit of humanity...we feel it our duty to speak not only for the people of Ghana but also for all African peoples." Ghanian Times, 4 July 1959. In reply France asked "it was not understood why Ghana took upon itself the right to speak in the name of other African states." Ibid., 7 July 1959.

76 I Speak of Freedom, n. 3, p. 171.
at the AAPC. In 1959 Ghana accorded full diplomatic recognition to the PRGA, represented by Franz Fanon in Accra. Nkrumah had also appealed to other African states to accord such recognition. The invitation to the PRGA to the second CIAS at Addis Ababa was mainly due to the efforts of Ghana which also amounted to its de facto recognition by all the participating states.

Ghana's anti-colonialism was thus most concretely represented in her attitudes and actions only towards France during this period.

Ghana and Britain

The relations between Ghana and Britain on the other hand were most cordial and intimate during 1957-60. Ghana had entered the sterling area and its dependence on Britain was not only confined to the economic sphere but extended to education and training of civil servants and the military. The old colonial Ghana became the first African member of the Commonwealth and Nkrumah viewed his role in this organisation in a much larger context. The Commonwealth for Ghana was a ready-made platform for Ghana to participate in the world affairs and cultivate relations with the members of the organisation. Ghana as the only African member also saw her nomination to the Commonwealth Committee on Constitutional Development in dependent territories as an opportunity to influence the British policy in the African

77 Viewing the evolving form of Commonwealth "which can work profoundly for peace and international cooperation" Nkrumah urged that the Commonwealth as an "association of equal and free nations" could help in ending "the colonialism peacefully from the continent, while maintaining the cordial relations with the imperial power." Nkrumah's Address to the National Assembly, 5 May 1957.
The first AAPC had already extended Ghana's influence throughout East and Southern Africa. Besides, Britain was generous with gestures to retain the trust of Nkrumah who was nominated to the Queen's Privy Council as the first African member in August 1959. Ghana's civil servants and the army were entirely trained in the UK and, in 1959, Nkrumah requested the British Government to send a British general to be appointed as the chief of Ghana's armed forces. Moreover, the government welcomed the British investments which were given adequate safeguards in the country.

The relations between the two remained cordial at the official level as British found their interests safe in Ghana. But the British press adopted a critical attitude towards the developments within Ghana since independence. The way the Nkrumah Government handled the disturbed domestic situation in 1957-58, that led to harsh legislation like the Preventive Detention Act and arrests of the opposition leaders, convinced the Fleet Street of the failure of parliamentary democracy which "Britain took long to introduce in Ghana". Even such moves like Nkrumah shifting into Listlow Castle, the former seat of Governor-General were considered as pointers to the emergence of a one-man dictatorship.

78 The Times, 8 July 1959.
79 Nkrumah regarded it as "the greatest honour not only to himself but for Ghana". Ghanaian Times, 17 August 1959. Evening News saw the nomination as a slap to the opposition in Ghana as "it was the recognition to Nkrumah by the greatest democracy in the world", 27 August 1959.
80 General Alexander was appointed as the Commander-in-Chief of the Ghana Armed Forces on 5 January 1960.
in the new state.

Ghana's Africa policy also came under attack by the British press. The Ghana-Guinea Union was considered "a breach of faith in the Commonwealth ranks". Colin Legum saw it as "precipitating Commonwealth's greatest crisis". The West Africa reflecting more the official view, though considered it as "little more than the consolidation of an alliance". The concerns with regard to the Union had been expressed in Parliament as well.

Such reactions of the British press with regard to the domestic and external development in Ghana were viewed by the Ghanaian leadership and the press with suspicion. Generally the press in Ghana was uncritical of Britain; yet, on occasions, while justifying acts like PDA as necessary for inner stability and maintaining proper environment for investments considered so important for Ghana's economy, Nkrumah portrayed such criticisms as unrelenting campaign of the British press to bring about disintegration of the young nation. Specific note was taken of such reports as by Economist Intelligence Unit stating that, due to developments in Ghana, the foreign companies were already

83 Sunday Express (London), 30 November 1958.
85 West Africa, 29 November 1958, p. 2.
86 Replying to a question from the opposition, the Prime Minister stated that the British Government was in close touch with the Ghana Government and that "the Union is not to affect Ghana's relations either with Britain or the Commonwealth". Quoted in African Affairs, vol. 58, no. 230, January 1959, p. 54.
deciding to postpone their investments. It was in the wake of such criticisms that a British reporter was deported from Ghana for writing that the Ghana Government had decided to take over the foreign firms. This led the Government to issue a statement on its economic policy in which the foreign firms were assured against any such takeover. All this contributed to mutual suspicion, which grew steadily.

Following the declaration of Republic in Ghana, which was again criticised in the British press, and then the Congo crisis in which Britain and Ghana found themselves in the opposite camps, the relations gradually deteriorated. The Ghana press became increasingly critical of Britain, and Nkrumah even threatened to leave the Commonwealth if Britain did not change its policy toward Congo. The Congo crisis in particular proved to be a "liberating force" from British influence for Ghana.

But the economic dependence, which had continued after independence, restrained Ghana from going any further. Till 1960, Nkrumah had no deliberate policy of diverting its dependence from Britain or the west.

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87 Economist Intelligence Unit, West African Series, no. 18, 30 May 1957.

88 Norman Clark, in News Chronicle (London), 7 October 1960. He was declared "a prohibited immigrant" in Ghana on 17 October 1960.

89 Refuting the story as pernicious, wicked and deliberately calculated to damage the good reputation of Ghana, Nkrumah stated that Ghana's economic policy did not aim at crippling the private sector. Radio Address, 8 October 1960. Quoted in Africa Report, vol. 4, no. 10, November 1960, p. 7.

Ghana and the US

Ghana moved swiftly to establish relations with the United States immediately after independence. The imbalance of Ghana's non-alignment can be seen from the fact that it showed no such keenness to establish contacts with the east. It took two years for Ghana to have full diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The American policy in Africa during this period was itself conditioned by the direct presence and involvement of the western powers which were its allies in the NATO. The main foreign policy objective of the United States in Africa was confined to curtailing the encroachment of the Communist bloc and this was efficiently carried out by its allies themselves. This led the United States to avoid any direct commitment in Africa which to some measure could have created resentment among its own allies as well. The official American policy towards Africa and, as more specifically outlined with regard of West Africa was that the USA must play a role in providing assistance to West Africa but, equally obviously, should not play this role alone. Instead, "as a given country emerges to full self-government it is our sincere hope that its economic ties with the Western Europe will not only be maintained but also broadened

91 On its part United States showed keen interest in the emergence of Ghana as an independent state. Vice President Richard Nixon represented United States on the eve of the Ghana's independence and "welcomed Ghana on behalf of President Eisenhower to the community of sovereign states with a promise to help the new nation." Africa Report, vol. 1, no. 3, March 1957, p. 2.


by multilateral approaches including a role of the USA". The policy recommended even for Ghana was to be based on three principles -- a major US effort at economic assistance through Britain and the Commonwealth in the origin; by involvement of organised international agencies; and preference in economic assistance for the private sector.

There was, thus, obvious lack of interest on the part of the US Government to finance the Volta River Project (VRP) considered by the Government of Ghana as the most important undertaking and for which aid was sought only from the United States. Ghana had given enough proof of its desire to remain firmly in the western bloc in spite of its policy of non-alignment. Nkrumah's statements such as "colonialism might come to Africa from other quarters", and significantly in the presence of a Soviet delegation at the AAPC in 1958 pointed towards this. Ghana had no diplomatic links with the Soviet Union till April 1959 and, though the trade increased marginally with the Soviet bloc (a negligible percentage compared to the west), no formal trade agreement was signed till late 1961. There actually existed

94 Joseph C. Satterthwaite, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Bulletin of State Department, May 1959, p. 749.


96 Ghanaian Times, 18 December 1958. United States was the first country visited by Nkrumah after 1957. He had said "Our indigenous institutions do not allow the growth of Communism. Communism is no danger to Ghana" - Remarks of Nkrumah at a Press Conference during his visit to United States, quoted in Africa Report, vol. 2, no. 8, August 1958, p. 11.
no deliberate policy in Ghana to deal with the eastern bloc. But all this was not sufficient enough to generate interest in the United States to the extent of speeding up negotiations over the VRP. Moreover, Ghana's anti-colonialism within the continent and in the UN caused concern in the US, finally leading to a rift between the two.

Ghana's experience in the UN was that the United States in the company of western Europe was aligned with the colonialists and voted against the resolutions of the African states to end colonialism in the continent. The American voting behaviour clearly favoured such colonial powers as Portugal and the racialist regime of South Africa. The Soviet bloc, on the other hand, not only supported the resolutions of African states but took the lead in proposing to end colonialism in racialism in Africa. The rift between Ghana and the US occurred openly over the developments in Congo. The US policy, governed by the chief consideration of 'containing communism', helped Belgium, Katanga and Mobutu-Kasavubu against the policy of objectives of Ghana and other African states. Even Nkrumah's speech in the General Assembly on 23 September 1960 was interpreted by the State Department as a definite sign of Ghana moving into the Soviet bloc.

Such reactions pushed Ghana away from the west. One practical lesson that Nkrumah learnt from the Congo episode for

97 "Remarks of the Secretary of State Christian Herter", in New York Times, 24 September 1960. Nkrumah, in his speech besides offering solution to the Congo problem, reflected on other world issues and stated that Africa should be declared a non-nuclear zone in the world. "The speech was at the most a statement of African and Ghanaian interests." Thompson, n. 11, p. 165.
his own foreign policy was that to depend on one bloc entirely was neither necessary nor beneficial. In 1960, Ghana's trade delegations visited various capitals of the eastern Europe to explore the markets for its cocoa. The major breakthrough in Ghana's relations with the Soviet Union came in August 1960 when latter offered a long-term loan of 160 million rubles for building its fishing industry along with other industrial enterprises. Thompson pointed out the importance of Soviet offer to Ghana while saying "Since her independence Ghana had indulged in negotiations with the West for the Volta scheme, with not much progress. Suddenly £14,700,000 was offered to develop Ghana "almost without asking" and apparently with no strings attached."

Ghana's Non-alignment, the West and Volta River Project (VRP)

The west lost much of the credibility in Ghana because of its own policies as most clearly represented in the Congo crisis, on colonialism in the UN and the American hesitation to finance the Volta River Project. Ghana's opening with the east, however, cautioned the west. The United States thus, reconsidered its attitude towards Ghana. The change became possible because

99 Thompson, n. 11, p. 164.
100 "Today American interests in Africa have become even more immediate for the continent is in danger of becoming a battleground between East and West.... In the light of recent changes, American policy towards Africa is therefore being reconsidered. Colonialism should be denounced; America should back the nationalist movements in Africa, even at the expense of existing good relations with its allies who still hold colonies in the continent." "A Different View of the United States Policy in Africa", Peter Duignan and Lewis Genn, Western Political Quarterly, December 1960, p. 918.
of the new administration in Washington under President J.F. Kennedy who had made America's Africa policy a major issue in his campaign.

Kennedy assured Nkrumah of America's help to build the VBP. But, between June and December when the final agreement on the project was signed, the American participation was in doubt, because of Ghana's international stance. Nkrumah toured the east Europe and China from July to September during which he signed various agreements. What was more disturbing to the US was that during the entire tour, he had repeatedly condemned colonialism and imperialism. Though this was nothing new from Nkrumah, it embarrassed the west because of the platform.

The prospects of American participation in the VBP became more bleak after the Belgrade Conference of non-aligned nations in September 1961. Nkrumah presented seven proposals to the Conference which coincided with the Soviet policy stance but were against the American international policy. The reaction

101 Nkrumah acknowledged the change in America and thus wrote to Kennedy, "it provided fresh hope and confidence for the promotion of better relations between Africa and the Western powers." Nkrumah to Kennedy, 23 January 1961, quoted in Thompson, n. 11, p. 170.

102 Ibid., p. 171.

103 1) General and complete disarmament
2) Two German states to be accepted and recognized
3) Great powers to be urged to sign a peace treaty with Germany without further delay
4) Complete liquidation of colonialism by 31 December 1962
5) Three deputes to be appointed under Secretary General of the UN, representing east, west and non-aligned countries
6) Admission of China to the UN
7) Africa to be declared nuclear-free zone.

Most of the proposals were a part of Nkrumah's anti-colonial stance. "But Nkrumah's non-alignment came into question". Ibid., p. 182.
from Kennedy was clear when he stated that, "in the administration of (foreign aid) funds, we should give great attention and consideration to those nations who have our view of the world crisis." At the same time the USA was in a tight corner because of the Cold War. Any backtracking by it at this stage could have altered the Ghana-US relations drastically. It could have affected adversely Ghana's entire pattern of relations with the western bloc as well.

Nkrumah was in a strong position to use the American fears in furtherance of Ghana's interests. Impresit, the Italian construction firm that won the dam contract, had imposed a deadline -- 17 October -- for a Ghanaian green signal. Nkrumah thus wrote to Kennedy, "if your government wishes to send a further mission to Ghana (to review the project), I should be grateful if it could come in sufficient time to inform me of US Government position... by 13 October." The letter was an ultimatum and it was considered to be so. The option was limited for the USA. The final decision came on 16 December. On 22 January 1962 Volta scheme was formally inaugurated by Nkrumah.

The Volta scheme was a triumph for Ghana's non-alignment but it also strengthened its economic ties with the west. The


105 "The Aswan and 1956 were in every one's mind in the State Department. Ghana had already established close links with the East and Khrushchev had promised to build the Volta Project if the West failed Nkrumah." Thompson, n. 11, p. 190.

106 USI Despatch, Ghanaian Times, 2 October 1961.

conflict between the dependence on the west's economic support and pursuit of an independent foreign policy for Ghana surfaced in the remaining years of Nkrumah's regime.

Ghana and Britain's Entry into European Common Market (ECM)

Ghana's pursuit of an independent foreign policy as a result of active non-alignment stance was more vigorously reflected in its relations with Britain. The links between the two were both numerous and strong. The presence of large British firms with huge capital investments had made Britain sensitive to developments in Ghana whether on the domestic or the international front. Available, too, were various restraints which could be effectively applied to destabilize the regime. Among these were a credit, squeeze, withdrawal of capital or, what even an individual company could do to unnerve the leadership. Yet, Nkrumah showed a remarkable independence in taking positions on various issues which were a direct challenge to Britain. Two major issues brought Ghana into conflict with Britain.

Ghana had consistently denounced the European Common Market (ECM) and the associated membership of many African states which, according to Nkrumah, was a French device designed to maintain French influence within its former colonies. In the ECM, he saw the perfect working of neo-colonialism. As an alternative Nkrumah had suggested an African Economic Community (AEC) for collective bargaining with the industrial states. The

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108 "The Treaty of Rome...can be compared to the treaty that emanated from Berlin in the 19th century. The former treaty established the undisputed sway of colonialism in Africa, the latter marks the advent of neo-colonialism in Africa." Address to the National Assembly, 3 May 1961. Ghanaian Times, 5 May 1961.
proposal was in consonance with Ghana's policy for a political union of the African states and the Casablanca Charter had incorporated it. In October 1961, the African members of the Commonwealth were faced with a crucial crisis when Britain applied for EEC membership. It was feared that British entry into the EEC would drastically affect their economy. In an address to the EEC Council of Ministers, Edward Heath stated that British plan to involve Britain's African colonies and ex-colonies in the Common Market is designed to preserve the imperial tariff preference system and at a stretch to share it with the six countries of the EEC. The African states were to be offered membership of the EEC as Associated Overseas Territories (ACT) on the same terms as other members of the organisation. The status was unanimously rejected by all African members of the Commonwealth. Ghana, Nigeria and Tanganyika found themselves united on a common platform.

Ghana, of course, was in the lead denouncing the association with the EEC and Nkrumah threatened "to withdraw from the sterling area if Britain joins the EEC". Though the other states also denounced the association but there was a difference between their opposition and Ghana's. As Observer noted, "For Nigeria and Sierra Leone, for example, the major concern related to the economic repercussions and, if somehow, a satisfactory arrangement is arrived at, they will be ready to give up their opposition."
In other words, their emphasis was on the economic aspect alone. But Ghana was more concerned with the political consequences of such an association. As Nkrumah stated: "It is easy for anyone who studies the ECM closely to realize that it is aimed at harnessing the African countries to satisfy the profit lust of the imperialist bloc and to prevent us from following an independent neutralist policy."

At the Commonwealth summit held in September 1962 British entry into EEC was opposed tooth and nail. All the African member-states rejected the associated status and yet qualified their rejection with the demand that some suitable arrangements be guaranteed by Britain to ensure their interests in case Britain enters the CM -- implying their readiness for the ACT role. But Ghana's rejection was unqualified. As its Finance Minister stated, Ghana still thought that the Rome Treaty would prevent the complete political and economic emancipation of the African continent. He further expressed his doubt that the Commonwealth could survive the dramatic change which would be inflicted on it by Britain's entry into the EEC in which case Ghana might withdraw if Britain entered the Common Market. Ghana's stand was the most uncompromising over the issue of EEC and Nkrumah refused to sacrifice political objectives for economic gains. The forum to which Nkrumah attached so much of value became secondary when it conflicted with the policy objectives of Ghana in Africa.

113 The Times, 12 September 1962.
The entire controversy yielded not merely an assertion of Ghana's independent course but its concrete demonstration. However, the matter was dropped as France vetoed the British entry into the EEC. But the concept that the Commonwealth was the British sphere of influence had been substantially changed and Ghana made its own contribution to that change.

Ghana and the Sino-Indian Dispute

The second issue which revealed Nkrumah's concept of the Commonwealth as different from Britain's was Ghana's stand on Sino-Indian conflict. In October 1962, open hostilities broke out between India and China. It was for the first time since the World War II that a Commonwealth country was in open armed conflict with a non-Commonwealth state. Britain was prompt to grant military aid to India. Nkrumah's reaction to this was very sharp. He wrote to Macmillan:

Are you sure that by giving support, whatever this is, to one side against the other, you will be able to increase the chances of bringing an end to hostilities? Assistance by way of arms and equipment to any country engaged in a conflict with another, in my view, is likely more to occasion a counter-offer of assistance to the other party to the dispute. The balance of military strength therefore remains the same but the dispute is made much more difficult of solution through the investment of outside powers. 114

MacMillan's reply to Nkrumah revealed the British understanding about the Commonwealth which was unacceptable to Ghana. Expressing his inability to understand Nkrumah's objection to British sympathy for India, he argued that, when the territory of a Commonwealth people was invaded, it was surely right and

114 Ghana Today (Accra), vol. 6, no. 18, 7 November 1962, pp. 2-5.
natural that Britain should be sympathetic and helpful. This line of argument implied that Britain had a duty to help India militarily because India was a fellow-member of the Commonwealth. In this way the Commonwealth became a de facto military alliance and its rallying to India's defence was automatic. This view of the Commonwealth was sharply criticised by Nkrumah who held that "the Commonwealth is not a military alliance and it would be most detrimental to its progress if the impression were created that Commonwealth members did not judge each issue independently or its merits, but instead automatically sided with a fellow-Commonwealth country when that country was engaged in a dispute with an outside power." 115

This view of Nkrumah clarified Ghana's perception of the Commonwealth as a multi-racial and multi-ideological organisation of sovereign states (a view which was absent in African members of the French Community). It also explained Ghana's understanding of non-alignment as a criteria either to judge its relations with the Commonwealth or any other issue in the world with a great degree of independence.

**Domestic Constraints on Ghana's Foreign Policy**

The continuance of an independent stance in the foreign policy demanded the support of the domestic structure. Nkrumah had undertaken significant measures to reorient the domestic structures to strengthen their capacity to play their potential role in compliance with his foreign policy goals. But it was precisely in the process of such a reorientation that Nkrumah

115 Ibid.
faced the most serious constrains on the conduct of his foreign policy. The cause lay not in the measures but in the strategy and the environment in which these were implemented. Instead of providing an impetus to an independent foreign policy, the domestic factors weakened the regime's pursuit of its external goals.

As a consequence of the economic crisis that Ghana faced in the 1960, Nkrumah revised his economic planning strategy and laid down the twin objectives of industrialization of the economy and establishment of a socialist society. Accordingly the state was to play the leading role in developing a public sector and the CPP was assigned the role of mobilizing the masses in order to educate them in the ideology of socialism. The Seven-Year Plan for Work and Happiness was introduced in 1962 to achieve these two objectives. But the Plan sought resources for economic development from the foreign capital, the major part of which was expected to flow from the western countries whose interests had been seriously threatened both within Ghana as well as in the conduct of its foreign policy. By the end of 1965, due to this strategy and worsening economic conditions, the regime had to very often compromise with the western interests.

The Failure of CPP as a Political Party

As the state assumed an active economic role, bringing all the economic resources and awards within its direct control, the CPP whose task was mass mobilization and socialist education found itself divided. The resulting power struggle by different
groups was apparently based on ideological considerations, but in reality the aim of these groups was to control the party and state machinery in order to secure access to state patronage and serve their respective interests. The struggle between the so-called 'Conservatives' and the 'Radicals' made the CPP a platform for conspiracies by the contending groups. The conflict within the CPP led to confusion and incoherence in the performance of the party. There was increasing disenchantment of various sections from the regime. In this environment the incidence of violence against government became frequent.

**Fallout of Domestic Constraints on Ghana's Foreign Policy**

The constraints placed on the conduct of foreign policy by the domestic factors became more visible after 1 August 1962, when an attempt was made on the life of Nkrumah at Kulungugu near the border of Upper Volta. Ghana's press openly accused the west of complicity. On the other hand, west was sceptical of Ghana's domestic and international stance. The ideological fervour that swept the whole mass media in Ghana had convinced many westerners that Ghana had 'gone Communist'.

**Aggravation of Ghana-US Tensions**

Such a conviction in particular led to a rift between


Ghana and the US conditioned to the idea of 'containing 118 Communism'. The relations deteriorated further between the two states as Johnson took over as the President after Kennedy's assassination. Unlike Kennedy, he had secondary priorities for Africa and was "a man who particularly disliked courting or even appreciating the sensibilities of leaders, of small states with whom America had policy disagreements".

In January 1964, when CPP was getting ready to make Ghana a one-party state, there was another attempt on the life of Nkrumah. Several hundred CPP militants marched towards the US embassy and the demonstration turned out to be quite 120 violent. Ghana's press blamed the CIA of conspiring 121 against Ghana. In retaliation the American administration resorted to pressure tactics. The United States had committed itself to build the dam but not the smelter without which the VRP was unproductive. Harriman, the US Secretary of State made it clear that the United States was not about to proceed with

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118 A Senate Report published on 14 July 1963 stated: "The testimony and documentation presented to the Committee strongly suggests that Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana has become the first 'Soviet satellite' in Africa, just as Cuba is the first Soviet satellite in the Americas. It is the focal point of subversion of Africa, just as Cuba is the focal point for the subversion of the Americas. Foreign Affairs, vol. 42, no. 3, 1963, pp. 269-71.

119 Thompson, n. 11, p. 301.


121 "The dopes and drunks who run the Murder Incorporated called the CIA are after the blood of Osagyefo." Ghanaian Times, 5 February 1964.
further cooperation on the Volta scheme if Nkrumah were to "steer Ghana down on the road that is hostile to US or American interests there". 122 Nkrumah succumbed to the American pressure and anti-American articles disappeared from Ghana's press. The CPP Government also had to convince Harriman that their use of socialism had no Cold War relevance and that it sprang from their own traditions rather than adopted from any alien ideology. Such justifications for socialism in Ghana were in sharp contrast to the strong ideological trends which had emerged in Ghana. For the first time since 1961, Nkrumah accepted the foreign pressure so overtly. His position had grown precarious as he found himself under pressures from the foreign powers to restrain the ideological course adopted in Ghana and from the radical forces within Ghana who became critical of his weakness before the imperialist powers. 124

The pressures on the government became all the more threatening because of the escalating economic crisis within Ghana. At the end of 1964, the success of Seven-Year Plan was in doubt. The economy had been deeply affected because of lack of foreign exchange, exhaustion of foreign reserve and steep decline of cocoa prices in the world market.

The Accra Summit - A Finale to Nkrumah's Policies

In the midst of the multifaceted crisis that Ghana faced, a well organised challenge had also emerged to Nkrumah's Africa

122 Guardian, 10 July 1964.
123 Ghana's Foreign Minister Krobe Edusie's speech, Ghanaian Times, 21 March 1964.
124 Ghanaian Times, 22 May 1964.
policy. For Nkrumah the Accra summit of OAU to be held in October 1965 had become the paramount concern of Ghana's Africa policy -- almost an issue of prestige for the regime faced with grave challenges. He could certainly not tolerate the disintegration of the OAU at Accra where the plan for such a continental organisation were first laid in 1958. Moreover, as the OCAM states had made the vilification of Nkrumah's regime their chief policy concern and had called to boycott Accra summit, the success of the Accra summit was expected to enhance the prestige of Ghana in Africa. Nkrumah undertook elaborate arrangements for the conference. Ghana's diplomats made every attempt in the next few months before the summit to clarify issues and forestall the fears and complaints of other members of the OAU in order to eliminate any excuse for boycotting the meeting. But OCAM states were bent upon embarrassing and alienating Nkrumah.

On 13 April 1965 President of Niger escaped a bid on his life and Ghana was charged of the plot. Subsequently the Presidents of Upper Volta and Niger visited Nigeria to enlist its support against Ghana. At their instance Nigeria was asked to convene an emergency meet of the OAU Council of Ministers in which Kojo Botsio assured the members that all refugees would be disbanded permanently. The OCAM was, thus, successful in

125 West Africa, 20 February 1965, p. 203.
126 Nkrumah called the allegation 'monstrous fabrication', and Ghanaian Times stated "the attack on Hamani Diori was the work of agents of imperialism and neo-colonialism aimed against Ghana and through Ghana against OAU." Ghanaian Times, 23 April 1965.
127 West Africa, 1 May 1965, p. 479.
putting Ghana in the dock. Ghana had been alienated, if not in Africa, certainly in West Africa due to the OCAM's policy and attitude. Though Diallo Telli, the Secretary-General of the OAU, confirmed that the refugees had left Ghana, OCAM states with the exception of Senegal and Congo (Brazzaville) refused to attend the meeting held during 21-25 October 1965 at Accra.

Nkrumah, in the conference, did not talk of the continental government. He instead proposed a permanent executive council within the OAU. He had revised his original proposal which he so emphatically advocated in Africa. The proposal, however, was merely submitted for the consideration of the members whose views would be heard in the next OAU meeting in March 1966. The direct opposition of the OCAM states and the indifferences of other African states created an environment under which Ghana was compelled to seriously compromise its Africa policy.

This happened at a time when Ghana's revenues had steadily fallen and vast investments had been made in the infrastructure of its economy for which the capital had been borrowed from the western private firms under the terms of 'supplier credits', most of which was granted as short-term loans. The result was that Ghana was in debts to the tune of £500 million by 1965, while the foreign exchange reserves had been exhausted and the cocoa price had been slashed to its lowest since 1960 in the world market. Ghana's repeated requests to extend the period of repayment of debts had been rejected by the western governments. The result was a serious shortage of consumer goods, creating

great resentment among the populace. The United States had preferred to totally ignore Ghana's requests for food supplies.

Despite these constraints, Ghana under Nkrumah did not abandon an active role both in Africa and in the world. This can be illustrated by a major event in the last days of Nkrumah's regime -- the Rhodesian crisis.

Soon after the summit, Africa was faced with another crisis when Southern Rhodesia declared Unilateral Independence (UDI) on 11 November 1965. As Nkrumah was already apprehensive of such a crisis (and the problem had been discussed during the summit), he had emphasized that Rhodesia was the responsibility of Britain in the wake of the UDI, and that the action had to come from Britain or else, the African states would be compelled to resort to collective methods. While urging military sanctions against Rhodesia he asked for the mobilization of an African force to be guaranteed by the permanent members of the UN Security Council. After UDI, Nkrumah declared to form a militia in Ghana to help fight the nationalists in Southern Rhodesia and announced that recruitment would start immediately. In an extraordinary meeting of the OAU held during 5-10 December 1965, the members asked for immediate action by Britain and declared that, otherwise, the African states would be asked to sever diplomatic relations with Britain. Tanzania and Ghana took the lead in breaking diplomatic relations with Britain. But while Tanzania broke with Britain, Ghana withdrew from the Commonwealth also,

130 Statement of Ghana Government on Rhodesian Crisis.
131 Ghanaian Times, 24 November 1965.
Nkrumah holding that the organisation had failed in its mission. For the last time, Nkrumah established the primacy of African interests over any foreign affiliation.

It was during these critical days, when the whole continent was engulfed in the Southern Rhodesia issue and Ghana was in the forefront of a campaign to pressure Britain and other states for quick action, that the military officials moved to overthrow Nkrumah's regime in Ghana. At the time of coup Nkrumah was busy in fulfilling his mission to bring peace in Vietnam. With his fall, the era of radical pan-Africanism, which envisaged a closer union and common outlook towards political-economic issues of the continent and present a distinct 'African Personality' abroad thus came to an end.

After the coup, the new government of the NLC changed Ghana's priorities. Their responsibility to the people of Ghana was primary and accordingly Africa became of secondary importance to them. The movement of individual nation-building, with a grudging concern for the national sovereignty and territorial integrity where the states would not interfere in each other's internal affairs, that implied in the context of Africa a withdrawal from continental issues, has finally been enthroned in Ghana.

Conclusion

Nkrumah faced a triple challenge to his regime towards the end of 1965, emanating mainly from his foreign policy.

First was the west's opposition. Nkrumah continued to hold strong economic links with the west and adopted such postures

132 Ibid., 19 December 1965.
in his foreign policy as were against the western interests. So long as Nkrumah's non-alignment was heavily pro-west, the west was appeased. But the moment it started gaining an independent stance while being critical of the west, the latter became disillusioned and finally opposed to Nkrumah. The economic strings were finally pulled. But Nkrumah by then had established himself as a leading African leader seeking to project an "African personality" before the non-African world. The successors to Nkrumah also relied heavily on the west but not merely in the economic but in the politico-diplomatic sphere as well. Ghana was, thus, cut to its own size under the new leadership.

The second challenge to Nkrumah's regime was built up by the African states, for which he oriented his entire foreign policy to achieve a single goal -- a Union of African States. Ghana's 'national interests' were defined in this context under him and so it resumed a role according to which no problem was purely Ghanaian but African. The environment in which he sought his goal was not only allergic but inimical to his cause. One cannot escape a moral judgment over Nkrumah's policy of 'political union' for collective development of the continent vis-à-vis the policy of other African states for individual nation-building. The principle that he presented was certainly of a higher value and created a militancy in Nkrumah's advocacy for its fulfilment. He exposed the real enemies of the African independence and asked those who paid lip-service to pan-Africanism to come out and combat them in unity. In this he created more enemies than supporters. But he kept the entire
issue alive during his tenure in power. Neither the African states nor the western powers were interested in unity and their interests thus coincided against those of Ghana's. His successors emulated the other African states and asserted the autonomy, national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ghana as one state among many. 'Non-interference', which for Nkrumah might have meant indifference, became the cardinal policy objective. Ghana became a part of the nation-state system in Africa.

The third challenge was on the domestic front, where Nkrumah tried to end tribalism, regionalism and feudalism in order to build a modern society under one national party. The economic policy was to develop Ghana industrially without a capitalist class but based on the foreign capital and credits. The colonial institutional arrangement was not disturbed and so, in spite of Nkrumah’s efforts to decolonize various sections of the society, the standard-bearers of colonial outlook survived and thrived. The civil servants, the military and the opportunist liberal-democratic intelligentsia remained basically conservative. The radical superstructure could not grow as the basis was absent. The same elements overthrew Nkrumah and laid policies that served their interests and represented the values professed in the metropolis in both the political and economic spheres. The period following the coup d'état saw not merely the introduction but the practice of these policies.