The general theme of this chapter can be indicated in the following terms.

(i) There is foundationalism beneath the Analytic - Synthetic Distinction (ASD)\(^1\).

(ii) ASD is untenable because it lacks sufficient explanatory basis.

(iii) The underlying epistemological import of the ASD can be established only when ASD can be sufficiently explained.

(iv) Thus the untenability of the ASD questions the viability of foundationalism which is presupposed there in the ASD.

Kant is sparsely spared whenever there is any discussion on the ASD. It seems to be ironical that the search for 'synthetic a priori', instead of the ASD, forms the core of Kant's epistemological enterprise undertaken in his *Critique*.\(^2\) However, although synthetic a priori is explicitly said\(^3\) to be the genuine problem under consideration, a particular conceptual framework is implicitly presupposed for the ASD which, in turn, supports the possibility of

Hereafter 'Analytic-Synthetic Distinction' is abbreviated as 'ASD'.


\(^2\)In the *Critique* B-19, Kant says "the proper problem of pure reason is contained in the question: How are a priori synthetic judgments possible"?
If analytic truths are simply truths independent of experience and a priori knowledge is just prior to experience, the compound 'analytic a priori' is not problematic. Synthetic truths and a posteriori knowledge being the opposite of analytic truths and a priori knowledge, the compound 'synthetic a posteriori' also creates no problem. It goes without saying that the truths independent (or dependent") of experience are known prior (or posterior) to experience. The possibility of 'synthetic a priori goes against such an exclusive bipartite division: 'analytic a priori' and 'synthetic a posteriori'.

Note it from the beginning (a) that 'a priori' and 'a posteriori' are, as Bennett. J. (1966), Kant's Analytic, Cambridge University Press, p.8 says, 'Kant's hardest worked technical terms' (b) that Kant provides no clear-cut theoretical account of the distinction between analytic and synthetic a priori and, hence, one [particularly, an eminent philosopher like Strawson, P. F. (1966), The Bounds of Sense : An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1982 reprint, p.43] can go to the extreme of saying 'Kant really has no clear and general conception of the synthetic a priori at all'; (c) that, even if it is true that (b), it is clear that 'Synthetic a priori' has "a distinctive character or status, and Kant's Copernican theory is an attempt to explain that status" [Ibid., p.443 such that the 'a priori character of analytic proposition presents no profound philosophical problem, it is far otherwise with a priori synthetic proposition' [Ibid., p.43]; (d) that the immediate purpose of discussing the synthetic a priori is two fold: to show it as an answer to a Cartesian doubt, and to show the support it obtains from the ASD and; (e) that the later purpose is to show that this profound philosophical problem, as a foundationalistic problem, of the synthetic a priori remains in analytic philosophy. Of course, it remains in a different way.

Considering the above mentioned points of note-4, besides the point that there is ambiguity in using propositions, statement, sentence or judgment to be analytic or a priori (though Kant mainly uses 'judgment'), I have used 'truth' and 'knowledge' to be analytic or synthetic and a priori or a posteriori respectively.
Thus, if 'synthetic a priori' is possible, either the analytic truths are not simply truths independent of experience or an a priori knowledge is not just a knowledge prior to experience. It is, for Kant, both that the analyticity and the apriority are uniquely qualified on their own grounds over and above their insulation from the world of experience. In other words, the reasons behind (or the conditions determining) analyticity's becoming independent of experience and that of apriority's becoming prior to experience are so different that it is possible to compound experience dependent truth (synthetic) with a knowledge prior to experience (a priori).

The a priori concerned is due to the transcendental categories of human understanding that underlies any construction of proper knowledge about the external world. The syntheticity concerned is due to the significance or non-triviality sustained in any scientific claim of knowledge. Since scientific knowledge essentially requires some stuff anew and syntheticity of a statement fulfills it and further more, apriority guarantees the universal validity as well as necessity of a knowledge claim owing to the transcendental categories; synthetic a priori is construed to be the 'true scientific knowledge'.

"Transcendental" is obviously distinct from "transcendent". The former is the kind of investigations made to track on the framework of ideas and principles (the categories) which limit the human understanding. Transcendental categories are construed to be the conceptual structures presupposed in all empirical inquiries. On the other hand, "transcendent" is metaphysical and inaccessible to empirical experience.

If syntheticity can be called as 'the principle of significance', apriority can be called as 'the principle of universalization'. The former calling is due to Strawson, (Op. Cit).
Of course, the universalization is made by virtue of delimitation: delimiting human understanding to the categories or frameworks of ideas and, then, demanding a knowledge claim (to be a proper knowledge claim) to fit into those categories or frameworks which are said to be already there with every human being's understanding. Again, of course, the significance is made by virtue of 'containment': presuming, more or less, the significant meaning of a concept and, then, observing a concept (predicate) not to be contained in another concept (subject) in order to render significance of the statement they belong to. Yet, barring these drawbacks, the advantage of Kant's epistemological analysis is that it tries to justify our belief in the objective world by investigating the experiences (to lay out the conceptual framework that limits human understanding and to find space and time as the preconditions of any sense experience).

If the conventional rules of a language (ordinary, formal or artificial) is employed as the criterion to determine the status of the truth of a statement, i.e., analytically true or synthetically true, and if the criterion for the distinction between a priori and a posteriori is retained as that of knowing something prior to experience or posterior to experience; then, Kant assimilates a logico-linguistic distinction with an epistemological distinction. The reverse would be true of logical positivism, it espouses a 'linguistic

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8 Cited by many, including Quine (FLPV, p. 21), with the comment that this term is 'metaphorical', vague or obscure.

9 Kant views that to question as well as to answer, to doubt as well as to prove, something beyond experience is a 'scandal to philosophy and human reason'. See Critique, Bxl.
"5 + 7 = 12", for example, would be analytically true if the conventional rules of arithmetic constitute the criterion of the ASD for any statement of arithmetic. But, for Kant, "5 + 7 = 12" is synthetic. "All mathematical judgments, without exception, are synthetic". However, even if the term 'containment' is metaphorical, it is the term 'containment' that gives some sense (though an obscured or vague one) of making "5 + 7 = 12" synthetic. It is synthetic because the concept of the sum of two numbers (5 and 7) does not contain the concept of one number (12) resulted out of the sum. And, of course, the sense of 'containment' is quite metaphorical.

On the other hand, if to adopt a convention is a natural or psychological phenomenon with human being and a convention is a matter of fact or experience, the logical positivists are no less in trouble. If the conventional rules of arithmetic are not prior to experience but a matter of experience then, the knowledge of "7 + 5 = 12" is not a priori. But the logical positivists would accept "7 + 5 = 12" to be a priori.

If by 'synthetic a priori' Kant illegitimately conflates a linguistic distinction (the ASD) with an epistemological distinction (the a priori - a posteriori distinction) then the logical positivists' denial of the synthetic a priori is no less grounded on

10 Which holds that a truth is a priori because it is analytic and, all a priori truths being analytic, there is no possibility of 'synthetic a priori'.

11 Critique, B-14.
an illegitimate conflation. The positivists conflate the epistemological distinction with the linguistic distinction.

The "If ..., then, ..." said above is due to the untenability (yet to be shown) of the ASD and, hence, with every doubt to the categorization made, from the beginning, for the two distinctions under the name of "linguistic" and "epistemological". However, even if the ASD is untenable, the initial categorization we have made hints it well that the Carnapian foundationalism is more sophisticated than the Kantian foundationalism. The former emphasizes on the a priori itself such that the syntheticity cannot be completely a linguistic kind and the latter emphasizes on a linguistic framework such that the epistemic a priori becomes identified with linguistic a priori. If, like Kant, the positivists urge apriority for the sake of epistemic normativity, presupposing a privileged status for epistemological norms and principles, they presuppose the same in a sophisticated manner.

Kant's use of "judgment" instead of sentence, statement, proposition, belief or truth veils the assimilation he maintains. So also is the case with positivists' use of "truth" in connection to a priori. A judgment is more epistemological than linguistic, unlike a sentence, such that it can have an a priori foundation as well as the possibility of conveying synthetic truths. So also, for the positivists, a truth being founded on meaningfulness (i.e. on a linguistic ground) a priori (in its linguistic sense) epistemic norms can be maintained.

The foregoing discussion aims at an initial clarification of ASD's epistemological import: connecting the ASD with Kant's
epitomised epistemological problem of 'synthetic a priori' which roughly runs parallel to the positivists' 'linguistic a priori', and showing the obscurity of the ASD due to the conflations illegitimately made to uphold a priori epistemic normativity. A priori, as an epistemic concept, is the epistemic necessity that urges the foundation—transcendental or linguistic—that renders the distinctiveness of epistemic norms. The conceptual clarification or explanation of that distinctiveness is supposed to be obtained by means of the ASD.13

Using Kantian terminology, if analyticity is the relation of 'identity' between the subject and predicate of a judgment, the fact independent 'necessity' of that judgment 'contains' no ingredient of 'significance'. On the other hand, since syntheticity is a 'contingent' connection between the subject and predicate of a judgment, 'syntheticity' does not 'contain' the kind of 'necessity' embodied with the relation of 'identity'. But, even if a true scientific judgment is more than just the relation of 'identity' between the subject and the predicate, it is no less necessarily true (i.e. it 'contains' no less fact independent 'necessity' associated with analyticity or the relation of 'identity'). Hence, if the a priori is adduced to go beyond fact independent 'necessity' as well as

12 Although the illegitimate conflations are in reverse directions—epistemology to language and language to epistemology—both are foundationalistic.
13 Kant says: "analytic judgments are very important and indeed necessary, but only for obtaining that clearness in the concepts which is requisite for such a sure and wide synthesis" (i.e for a priori synthesis) [Emphasis added] Critique, A-10.B-14.
to open the possibility of 'significance' in terms of 'synthesis', it is analytically true that a true scientific judgment is a synthetic a priori judgment. The subject, "true scientific judgment", 'contains' the predicate (i.e. synthetic a priori) and the relation becomes a 'necessity' of the kind associated with 'identity'. For the conceptual analysis of "true scientific judgment" enables to derive both the 'necessity' and 'significance' associated with 'synthetic a priori'.

If this argument is correct, if the Kantian explanation (of true scientific knowledge) ultimately amounts to an analytic truth, then Kantian explanation becomes self stultifying. For, by identifying knowledge with synthetic a priori, the analytic judgment it presupposes fails to be an instance of true scientific knowledge due to its very nature of being analytic (instead of being 'synthetic a priori'). Thus a block to the scientific pursuit of truth, to the objective of significance, is created in the very way of the epistemological analysis which results into a so called analytic truth.

The said block unravels the self created fatal consequence of a foundationalistic approach's response to a Cartesian doubt. The doubt allegedly knocks down every knowledge claim and, hence, to dissipate that doubt from any knowledge claim is to search for a unique foundation. That uniqueness consists of the epistemic normativity: something which is not a knowledge claim but stands as a norm to every knowledge claim such that it allays the Cartesian doubt. Thus the response to the Cartesian doubt, an epistemic normativity placed outside a 'Neurath's boat' must be a priori – transcendental or linguistic – not simply due to a sort of fact-independent truth it requires but, more importantly, due to the very nature of the doubt it
attempts to respond.

Granted that the Cartesian doubt wins the epistemological game and foundationalism loses, we cannot claim that we know that we know something. For 'knowing' of something is, first of all, defeated; it leaves no ground to know of a 'knowing'. And, again, adding to that that we cannot know that we are 'believing' something; it results into a pernicious situation that we cannot distinguish 'knowing' from 'believing'. Similarly, it can be said of 'thinking', having an 'opinion', being 'convinced' of something and so on that we meaningfully distinguish from 'knowing' as, for example, in cases like "I think so but I am not sure", "I believe it to be so but I don't know," "I am convinced by your arguments but I doubt" and so on. Thus if we let the Cartesian 'rot to begin, and once it is allowed to start, it cannot be prevented from going on indefinitely'.

This indefinite going on is two fold: doubting each of the criteria that can be linearly adduced for knowledge and distinguishing one of the indefinite possible concepts simulating 'knowledge'. A line representing the justification of one criterion for a true claim of knowledge by another (meta) criterion and that, in turn, by another (meta-meta) criterion gets no end unless a particular criterion is granted to be the foundation. Such a grant is prevented once the Cartesian doubt is allowed to start. The other indefinite going on can be constructed as a corollary to the first one since a clear cut distinction of knowledge and its kindred depends on a prior acceptance.

of a criterion for knowledge. But, more importantly, the second fold of the indefinite going on pertains to the conceptual dimension of epistemology whereas that of a 'criterion' pertains to the doctrinal dimension - i.e., to the explanatory and justificatory aspects respectively. Nevertheless, since the two aspects are complementary to each other, the 'indefinite going on' of one aspect supports and is supported by the other.

The foundationalists (Kantian or Carnapian) attempt to have foundation (transcendental or linguistic) in order to stop that indefinite going on but it is done so at the cost of the reciprocal support that an explanation and a justification do have. Before discussing how the reciprocal support is checked in the very way of a defensive response made against the Cartesian rot's threat, we can put forward Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions for the sake of some groundwork.

The ASD gets its epistemological import in a more sophisticated and stronger way in Carnap's distinction between internal questions and external questions. In his paper "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology" he suggests that a philosopher should work for the development of semantical analysis, to know the reality of the world. "Appeal to ontological insight will not carry much weight."\(^5\) It is the system or the framework of language that determines ontology. Our language says what there is. Thus what we can say, at all, about an

ontological question is predetermined by our language itself.

Questions 'of the existence of certain entities of the new kind within the framework' are called the internal questions and 'questions concerning the reality of the system of entities as a whole' are called the external questions. For example, "Is there a piece of white paper on my desk?" is an internal question in the framework of a thing language. Its answer is testable, said to be right or wrong, by empirical investigation. On the other hand, since the validity of the empirical investigation is no less questioned in questioning the things of the world as a whole, "Is the thing world real?" cannot be answered by empirical investigation; it is an external question in relation to the thing world. Once a system itself is questioned, its regulating or constituting rules are also questioned.

An internal question is a theoretical question; it is committed to the ontology of the theory. The answer can be tested, to be right or wrong, on the basis of their abidance or violation of the grounding laws, definitions or rules constituting that theory. No relation to the grounding semantics that determines the ontology amounts to say that the answers are untestable and, thereby, the question is not meant to obtain any right or wrong answer. Thus an external question is a pseudo question and any answer produced, defended, refuted or problematized on that ground turns to be a fake of our intelligence. It is not scientific; it hovers in air without any ontological commitment. The best we can describe it is that it is a practical question; though it has no theoretical significance, it is a question on the adequacy of a system taken as a whole and their adequacy is quite dependent on our practical considerations of taking up a theory.
Thus a bifurcation is created in the epistemic status of statements. The statements pertinent to an internal question become cognitively contentful. The other-class of statements, related to the external questions, are alleged to be cognitively contentless. For the respective questions themselves, internal and external, are cognitively meaningful and cognitively meaningless.\(^{16}\)

Kant's characterisation of an analytic judgment as a judgment empty of 'significance' simulates Carnap's characterisation of a statement's becoming empty of cognitive content. When the former emptiness is due to the 'identity' relation between the subject and predicate, the latter is due to an 'external' relation between the statement and a particular linguistic framework. The difference between the two varieties of emptiness is something like the difference between the truth of "a - a" and "(a = b) is true in a language L for any value of 'a' and 'b'." \(^{17}\) That is, in a sense, the difference between absolute identity and linguistic absolute identity.

By "for any value of 'a' and 'b'" it is meant that the meaning postulation decided for 'a' and 'b' in a language is not dependent on any knowledge or belief of 'a = b'. On the contrary, it is on the

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\(^{16}\) Cf. Carnap's characterization of 'cognitive meaning' in Carnap, R. (1947) p.237. It is suggested to be roughly characterized as "the meaning component which is relevant for the determination of truth" (and the non-cognitive meaning is important for 'the psychological effects of a sentence on a listener' though it is irrelevant for 'questions of truth and logic'). Thus the class of statements completely scrutinizable as being true or false turns to be cognitively contentful and the counterpart is cognitively contentless.

\(^{17}\) Not quoted. Interpreted with somewhat over simplifying Carnap's view that 'L-truth in L is the explicatum for analyticity'. See Carnap, R. (1947) p.226.
basis of that decision we are holding that 'a = b'.

How does one know, for example, that the 'properties' of bachelor (B) and married (M) are incompatible and that therefore has to lay

Thus it is the decision or the 'method of intension' that stands at the root of a statement's becoming analytically true unlike the Kantian 'identity' relation itself. Nonetheless the import of this relation is sustained by making it to be language-relative or system-relative but relative in an absolute sense.

Now, let us resume our discussion about the mutual support between explanation and justification (truth). A conceptual framework provides some scientific explanation of a 'judgment, 'statement', 'propositon' or a 'sentence' that we make in effect of knowing something. This knowing something becomes unscientific if it lacks a conceptual framework in its background. And, of course, it is the constituting rules of that framework which can be necessarily (supposed to be 'analytically') true and therefore justified, in relation to that framework but, without any scientific explanation unless another conceptual framework is adopted as the background of the former one. But, on the other hand, any belief can obtain an explanation from the system or background system it or its system belongs to but this explanation is without any sense of justification

\(^{18}\text{Carnap, R. (1947), p.225.}\)
unless there are certain explicit constitutive rules of that framework confirming to what a belief can be said to be justified.

Thus a conceptual framework provides the theoretic reason as well as the relative justification obtainable for a belief belonging to that framework. But, more importantly, the relative-justification cannot derive any conceptual explanation unless another background system of beliefs is there. For the relative-justification is obtained due to the basic (constitutive) rules of the framework which, in turn, cannot be explained by the framework itself but instead by another framework (the former's background) as much as a question cannot be explained by the framework to what it is external but only to what it is internal. On the other hand, since a justification is no less relative to the basic rules of a framework than an explanation is so to the whole body of beliefs in the system, the explanatory import of a conceptual scheme runs arbitrarily unless certain basic rules do govern\(^\text{19}\) that system.

The above said mutual support is broken down, in response to Cartesian doubt, by the foundationalists. And, since the mutual support is very natural and scientific\(^\text{20}\), the foundationalists as the defenders of epistemology against the Cartesian doubt adopt some artificial or unscientific move to deviate themselves from their scientific pursuit of truth or knowledge. The rot of indefinite going on threatened them and forced to have a self-created obstacle on their


\(^{20}\) This point is further discussed, in details, in Chapter V.
way to conceptual clarification or scientific investigation.

We have already discussed about the blocking made by transcendental foundationalism. It epitomizes epistemology as the problem of synthetic \textit{a priori} and, a meta-epistemological looking into it shows that in doing so it amounts to an unscientific investigation based on a so called analytic truth. Carnapian foundationalism or 'Linguistic Absolutism',\textsuperscript{21} suffers on a parallel way. An internal question obtains some scientific explanation but, since a conceptual framework is supposed to be absolutely determining the truth of a proposition in terms of the semantic rules, the relative-justification obtainable for an answer to the internal question is not explained, further, by a back-ground system. This conceptually unexplained relative-justification concedes a limited number of statements and their 'interpretations' an epistemic privilege of becoming analytically true in relation to a language. Thus the theoretic reason for the analytics is not there, they lack conceptual explanation.

It is precisely this lack of conceptual explanation that fundamentally destroys the foundationalistic moves. To point out that lacking is the central epistemological theme that underlies Quine's refutation of the ASD.

\textsuperscript{21}Romanos distinguishes 'Linguistic Absolutism' from early Wittgenstein's 'picture theory'. It is with the reason that the latter is compatible with 'metaphysical Absolutism' when the former is not so. For Wittgenstein leaves reality independent of language although it is language through what we comprehend reality. Carnap concedes no independent status to 'reality'. See Romanos, G. D. (1983) \textit{Quine and Analytic Philosophy}, The MIT Press, pp. 31–40.
It is well received that Quine argues, in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (TDE),\textsuperscript{22} against the ASD that analyticity as well as its family concepts like 'synonymy' and 'semantical rules' lack sufficient explanation. Explication or explanation of any of these concepts becomes viciously circular in view of its presupposition of one or other concept of the same family.

If a genuine explanation of a concept is said to be circular by means of a pessimistic allegation that, since each and every other concept in terms of what a concept can be explained belongs to the same family, no concept can be explained without any circularity, then Quine's position can be made clear as it follows.

All systems of definitions must, in a sense, be ultimately circular, and, hence, the complaint is against 'vicious circularity'. It is against foundationalistic connections between meaning and knowledge; between the ASD and the synthetic a priori, between the ASD and the semantic determination of ontology. It is true that the allegation of 'circularity' is tenable only when it is made in relation to some viewpoint on the basis of what the 'family-membership' is to be determined. On the same coin, an explanation is genuine only in relation to a conceptual framework. The viewpoint accounted in Quine's TDE is purely epistemological. In other words, the complaint is that each of those proposed definitions or explications of analyticity presuppose the same epistemological blunders that analyticity does—'in every case the definitions

\textsuperscript{22}Hereafter "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" is abbreviated as "TDE".
invariently involves the same epistemological problems that the definiendum was subjected to'. It is a 'confusion' to think that the ASD's explanation can be brought about in terms of explicit 'semantical rules' by discarding the vagueness of ordinary language which might be making the distinction hazy. For the clarification required is the conceptual clarification of ASD itself and not of any mechanical classification, say, ticking some statements to be analytic and others as synthetic. When Quine says he • does not understand whether the statement "Everything green is extended" is analytic; "the trouble is not with 'green' or 'extended' but with 'analytic'". Moreover, it goes without saying, one can understand some distinction (say, the ASD) if he fails to decide a particular sentence, S, is analytic or synthetic. An instance of indecisiveness to classify something does not amount to say that such a classification cannot be understood.

Using Frege's terminology, if neither the sense nor the reference of the ASD can be available then; it is no wonder that Quine does not understand the ASD and; hence, he does not understand that "Everything green is extended" is analytic. Granted that by referring

24 FLPV, p. 32.
25 Cf. Mates, B. (1951) "Analytical Sentences", The Philosophical Review, 60, pp. 525 - 534. See p. 529. For example, from "Jones is not able to decide whether Fermat's conjecture is a theorem" it would be paradoxical to conclude "Therefore, Jones does not understand the term 'theorem'".
26 Due to Mates, B. (1951), However Mates interprets the matter in a different way and criticizes Quine's stand point. See pp 527-529.
the ASD it is not meant to refer sheer noting down of sentences under two columns - analytic and synthetic - on a piece of paper such that repeatedly going through that can create different 'feelings' or 'attitudes' towards analytics and synthetics\textsuperscript{27}, a conceptual framework must be referred to bring about the distinction. So also, it is not the sense of the sentences themselves but, the conceptual framework which feeds the ASD must be having some sense.

Again, to go with Frege, the need of a \textit{Bergriffsschrift} or a 'conceptual notation' of the ASD, without any other suppressed tacit assumptions like transcendental \textit{a priori} conceded in the way of some metaphorical saying like 'containment' to explain the ASD, calls for a conceptual framework. The ASD, like a number, is not a 'property of external things' like written or uttered sentences or that of a man (bachelor and unmarried, sitting on that chair). Nor is it 'an object of psychology' which can be established by our sheer strong feeling or attitude of accepting the ASD. A conceptual framework is to be assumed for the ASD if, at all, the ASD amounts to serve any epistemological interest of bifurcating the epistemic status of our statements. It is precisely an argument for the unavailability of any such conceptual framework for the ASD underlies Quine's complaint of the 'vicious

\textsuperscript{27}Appeal to such feelings and attitudes is an important factor in Mates' criticism.

\textsuperscript{28}'conceptual notation' and 'conceptual framework' should not be confused. The former presupposes the latter, not the vice versa. The Fregian enterprise of 'conceptual notation' has "produced the profound discoveries in formal logic upon which Frege's posthumous fame ultimately rests: the theory of quantifiers and variables and the modern theory of prepositional operators". Quoted from Harrison, B. (1979) \textit{Introduction to the Philosophy of Language}, MacMillan Press, London, p. 52.
circularity' in relation to the explanation of analyticity.

Separating 'meaning' from 'reference' - that is, meaning of a singular concrete or abstract term is not the 'object' it refers to and that of a general concrete or abstract term is not the 'extension' of the term to what it is true of - the ASD can be thought of as based on "synonymy". But, as Quine argues, synonymy is 'best understood only by dint of a prior appeal to analyticity itself'.

Prima facie, "No bachelor is married" seems to be changed into the logical truth "No unmarried man is married" by replacing "bachelor" with its synonym, i.e., "unmarried man". But this notion of synonym needs clarification. Appeal to lexicography serves no purpose in this respect. For lexicographical substitutes are not the synonyms we are concerned here. Lexicographical substitutes are meant for 'teaching the use of sentences' and, thereby, the lexicographer presupposes the knowledge of the use of the substitutes made for the entries. It is roughly that knowledge, the two different status of knowing two different connections - between the substitutes and between the non-substitutes - maintained in analytic and synthetic truths, on the basis of what the lexicographer is supposed to work it out is our concerned.

Again, synonymy cannot be explained in terms of interchangeability salva veritate, i.e., interchangeability of two linguistic forms in all contexts without the change of truth value.

\(^{29}\)See Quine, S.V.O. Pursuit of Truth (PT)
"Cordates", "renates", "man" and "feather less biped" etc., are interchangeable \textit{salva veritate} due to mere accidental agreements and, thereby, are not the required interchangeable synonyms in terms of what analyticity can be explained or defined.

Analyticity can be proposed to be defined in terms of synonymy as it follows. If 'A' is cognitively synonymous with 'B' (where 'A' and 'B' are two predicates) then 'A is B' is analytic. 'A' is said to be cognitively synonymous with 'B' if 'A' is substitutable \textit{salva veritate} for 'B'.

If 'A' is extensionally equivalent to 'B' then 'A' is substitutable everywhere for 'B' and vice versa. But the ASD cannot be sufficiently explained in terms of such extensional equivalences. For example, in both (i) 'All bachelors are unmarried men' and (ii) 'All cordates are renates' 'A' and 'B' are extensionally equivalent—and, hence, 'A' is substitutable everywhere for 'B' and vice versa. But '(i)' is supposed to be analytic whereas '(ii)' is not supposed to be so. Thus the extensional equivalence between 'A' and 'B' is not a sufficient condition for the ASD. That is, no difference can be made about the epistemological status of '(i)' and '(ii)', about how the two happen to be true in two different ways — analytically and synthetically — in an extensional language. What exactly accrues the ASD as well as its explication in terms of synonymy is the insufficient explanation of that supposed epistemological distinction.

\footnote{"Cordates" is not to be confused with "Chordates". \textit{FL}, P. 8, fn.}
The problem is not overcome in an intensional language (where provision for modal contexts like 'necessarily ...', 'possibly ...' etc. are laid down) too. Take the adverb "necessarily" for meaning something as in "Necessarily all and only 'A's are A and an intensional language is the union of the extensional language, L, and the set of formulae obtained by prefixing sentences with the adverb "necessarily". In short, it is L U {"necessarily'}. By the help of this intensional system it can be said that "Necessarily all cordates are cordates" is true but it cannot be said that "Necessarily all cordates are renates". For if, at all, it is said so due to the co-extensiveness of "cordates' and."renates' it damages the supposed epistemological distinctiveness retained in "Necessarily all cordates are cordates". (L U {"necessarily'}) is a good test of "synonymy' but, unfortunately, the term 'necessarily' demands explanation. It is a good test because it attempts to qualify the "coextensiveness' with an epistemic distinctiveness of a kind that concerns us for the "synonymy'. But the qualifying term, "necessarily', is in need of explanation. Properties of predicates like "necessarily" cannot be characterized independent of notions like true by meaning as opposed to contingently true.

It is neither in an extensional language nor in an intensional language that the ASD can be explained. It cannot be explained in an artificial language too. For example, if L_0 is an interpreted first order calculus containing both the name 'John' and the meaning postulate

\[ P_1(x) \ ( (x \text{ is a bachelor) } \Rightarrow x \text{ is unmarried}) , \]

then the sentence, S, "If John is a bachelor, then John is unmarried" can be passed off as analytic for L_0.
However, $S$ cannot be passed off as analytic for-$L$ where $L$ stands for $L_0$, $L_1$, $L_2$ ... $L_n$, i.e., for an $n$ number of languages. For the meaning postulate, $P_1$, is confined to $L_0$ and to discover a meaning postulate which can govern over all languages is self-stultifying besides the fact that there is no such discovery till today.’ It is self-stultifying because it tends to be absolutistic, it makes no sense of a 'decision' which really matters the most for meaning postulations.

Thus analyticity cannot, in general, be defined in terms of semantical rules though it can be defined separately in different particular languages. And, again, the possible definitions undertaken with the strategy of meaning postulates can be construed to be arbitrary or non-arbitrary. It can be arbitrary in the sense that there may not be any constraint for keeping a particular statement in a particular framework. For the said rules are artificial (contra natural), it can be revised accordingly, for an arbitrary inclusion of any statement in the framework. Thus what is defined as analytic-in-$L_0$ is arbitrarily defined and it can be defined as synthetic with some changes in $L_0$. On the other hand, it can be construed to be defined non-arbitrarily in the sense that the completeness of a framework or language system, $L_0$, objectively determines the truth of a statement (although the semantical rules constituting the completeness of $L_0$ can be arbitrarily fixed so due to their sole dependence on our decision or intensional method). The objective determination of truth by the semantical rules of $L_0$ without presupposing the belief or knowledge of any thing experienced in this world amounts to say that a sentence, $S$, determined so is analytic-for-$L_0$ because any interpretation of $S$ in confirmation to $L_0$ becomes true. But such a strategy makes the definition 'viciously
The sense of 'objective determination' which enables to turn any interpretation of S to be true presupposes the ASD instead of explaining the epistemological problem that what really makes sense of such a fact-independent 'objective determination' of truth as distinguished from the contingent truths.

Thus the explanation of the ASD attempted in terms of synonymy (accounting an intensional, extensional or an artificial language) is proved to be circular. Verification theory of meaning (VTM)\(^\text{31}\) may be called for breaking the circularity.

In Section 5 of the TDE, Quine asks to look beneath the VTM - the 'catch word' of logical empiricism - 'for a possible key to the problem of meaning and the associated problems' in relation to the ASD. The key, immediately comes to hand, is that a statement is analytic if and only if it is confirmed 'no matter what' because (i) "the meaning of a statement is the method of empirically confirming or infirming it' and (ii) a statement is supposed to be analytic if its truth is determined solely by its meaning such that it is true 'no matter what' happens in this empirical world.

The advantage of this strategy - to define analyticity in terms of the VTM - is that it is not circular and it seems to be more empirical in spirit, than the system relative determination of meaning, due to the notion of 'confirming' a statement with empirical observation. The circularity is avoided by avoiding an explanation in

\(^{31}\)Hereafter "Verification Theory of Meaning" is abbreviated as "VTM".
terms of any concept or notion which, in turn, depends on the explanation of meaning (as it is with 'synonym') or system of language (as it is the case with semantical rules) in order to distinguish the statements true in terms of meaning or language from contingent statements and, thereby, explaining the epistemic discrimination that can be made out of the ASD. It is an attempt to explain the notion of meaning itself.

It is fine as far as it can avoid the circularity but, in fact, this theory is not correct and; hence, the given possible definition (i.e. S is analytic if and only if S is confirmed 'no matter what') is untenable. Tenability of such a theory is dependent upon the tenability of reductionism in empiricism. In other words, a statement can be said to be analytic if it is confirmed 'no matter what' but whether the statement can be confirmed so (individually in isolation from the other statements of the language system) is a question to what the reductionists affirm and the VTM is largely indebted to reductionism. Quine counts reductionism - 'the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience' - as the second dogma of empiricism. Thus, in effect, recourse to VTM for the explanation of the ASD means to explain one dogma in terms of, not even another dogma but, a dogmadedependent theory.

The two dogmas - the ASD and reductionism - are intimately connected, supporting each other: If it can be significantly talked

\[^{32}\text{FLPV, p. 27.}\]
about an isolated (system independent) statement as having been individually confirmed or infirmed, it makes enough sense of talking about a particular limited class of statements to be 'vacuously confirmed, ipso facto, come what may; and such a statement is analytic' as distinguished from synthetic. On the other hand, if the ASD is tenable, the presupposition of the duality that each individual statement has a linguistic component and a factual component becomes indispensable to conceive of certain statements as being devoid of factual content (to become analytically true). Once this duality inside a statement is there, it makes enough sense of confirming or infirming of individual statements and, thereby, the ASD supports the dogma of reductionism.

Thus, from an epistemological point of view, the root of the two dogmas lies in the belief of individual statements as the units of truth or verification in isolation from the system, language or theory to what the statement belongs.

"The two dogmas are, indeed, at root identical... it is nonsense, and the root of much nonsense, to speak of a linguistic component and a factual component in the truth of individual statement. Taken correctly, science has its double dependence upon language and experience; but this duality is not significantly traceable into the statements of science taken one by one." 33

In fact, sentences meet experience as a 'corporate body'. In

33 FLPV, pp.41-42.
positivist's framework the relation between theory and experience (or, in general, between language and experience) is carried out in terms of a "mixture account" of truth. That is, an additive account of sentences (like particles of a mixture) comprising a theory (the mixture) assigns each sentence, individually, with a truth value by the method of each one's confirming or infirming some fixed individuated ranges of experiences of the world. Contrary to it, a "compound account" of truth advocated by Duhem and Quine considers language or theory as the unit of truth. Given this latter account, it makes no sense of confirmation or information of a statement in isolation from the system of statements it belongs to and, hence, no epistemological foothold on which rests the ASD.

Universal revisability becomes a natural outcome of the rejection of empirical reductionism in favour of the epistemological holism common to Duhem and Quine. Since no statement is granted of the so-called truth based on one-by-one verification of isolated statements due to the rejection of empirical reductionism, truth of a particular statement depends upon the truth of its fellow statements as much as it depends upon the world outside. Once this interdependence is accepted, no statement can have an absolute truth for itself. No statement is true or false by itself, solely by its own individual confirmation or infirmation to the experience, any statement can be

35 Note that this "system-relativeness" is more advanced than that of Carnap. For further discussions see chapter IV.
36 Epistemological holism is distinguished from semantical holism. See Gochet, P. (1986), Ascent to Truth: A Critical Examination of Quine's Philosophy, Philosophia Verlag Miinchen Wein, p. 35.
made true or false by making adjustments in the system for the
required confirmation or infirmation. Thus 'any statement can be held
ture come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in
the system... no statement is immune to revision.' And,
consequently, any statement can be made analytic if un revisability of
the truth is what characterizes analyticity. Thus the ASD becomes
meaningless.

Quine's seminal paper, "TDE", has provoked many to defend against
his refutation of the ASD but the most important one is that of Grice
and Strawson (GS) Even revisionists of Quineanism, like Putnam do
refer and commend GS. For GS do not render mere counter examples
against the refutation of ASD but, what is not found in majority of
the criticisms against Quine's refutation of the ASD, a theoretic
reason is supplied by them in their arguments in defence of the ASD.

37FLPV, p.43.
38Grice H.P. and Strawson, P.P. (1956). "In Defence of a
Dogma", The Philosophical Review, Vol. 65, no. 2, pp. 141 -
158. Hereafter 'GS' stands for 'Grice and Strawson'.
40GS's attempt to provide a theoretic reason is explicit
from the very way they begin their arguments in saying that
'Quine's objection is not simply to the words "analytic" and
"synthetic", but to a distinction which they are supposed to
express, ... so Quine is certainly at odds with a
philosophical tradition which is long and not wholly
light of the theoretic reasons they provide, they amend
Quine's thesis by saying that it 'might be better represented
not as the thesis that there is no difference at all marked
by the use of these expressions (i.e "Analytic" and
"Synthetic"), but at the thesis that the nature of, and
reasons for, the difference or differences are totally
misunderstood by those who use the expressions, that the
stories they tell themselves about the difference are full of
illusion' [Op cit., p.143]. [Cf. Putnam's saying, "I do not
understand what it would mean to say that a distinction
The main arguments of GS can be pointed out as

i) the argument from consensus

ii) the argument for intelligibility

iii) the argument in terras of concrete counter-example

iv) the argument for the definition of synonymy by verification

v) the argument for the compatibility of the ASD and Quine's 'universal revisability'.

The argument from consensus is roughly an appeal to the agreement of the philosophers, to the ASD in their application of "analytic" and "synthetic", from a long philosophical tradition to present day. This argument is fruitfully directed to the epistemological issue in question by means of a distinction between 'open class' and 'closed class' - the former class potentially contains an infinite membership whereas the latter class does not. The ASD is an open class distinction, it is preserved till today and, hence, a common between two things that different does not exist" However, those who agree with Putnam's revisionistic thesis of Quine 'have often overlooked', as Putnam apprehends, the fact that Quine can be wrong in his most 'shocking' thesis and still right about very important and very pervasive epistemological issues. Putnam tries "to reconcile the fact that Quine is overwhelmingly right in his critique of what other philosophers have done with the analytic-synthetic distinction with the fact (as Putnam holds) that Quine is wrong in his literal thesis, namely, that the distinction itself does not exist at all'. Thus the thesis Putnam defends is "ignore the analytic-synthetic distinction, and you will not be wrong in connection with any philosophical issues not having to do specifically with the distinction. Attempt to use it as a weapon in philosophical discussion, and you will consistently be wrong". (Putnam, op cit., pp. 36, 54, 42 and 36 respectively).
characteristic or a theoretical reason (rationale) must be behind it to sustain and perpetuate discussions, disputes and developments over it.

Thus the argument displays that there must be a rationale behind the ASD even if we fail to supply that. This is the consequence faced by many 'philosophers who do not agree with Quine'. This is a position, as Putnam aptly describes, that 'they know that there is an analytic - synthetic distinction but they are unable to give a satisfactory account of its nature.'\(^{41}\) It is, after all, that presupposed rationale (even if it is construed to be hidden there though not clarified) that Quine challenges when he challenges against the ASD. The question is on the *point of the game* we play by the ASD and, not on the game played in terms of 'meaning' and understanding.\(^{42}\) Moreover, the existence of a game is not guaranted by an illusion that we are playing that game. The ASD as well as the theoretic reason presupposed for the ASD due to the fact that it is an open class distinction are dogmatic.

Misconception of a non-existing epistemological distinction to be an open class distinction can be well traced out of the positivistic ingredient retained in the ASD. Except some border line cases, the class of statements belonging to mathematical truths, logical truths and theoretical science can be distinguished from the class of

\(^{41}\) Op. at., P. 35.

\(^{42}\) This analogy of game is due to Putnam, Op. Cit., p.38.

statements belonging to simple observations like "It is raining", "The book is on the table" etc. And, statements of metaphysics are "swept under carpet" due to its unsuitability to belong to any of the above said classes. But even if one claims that analytic truths consists of mathematical, logical and highly theoretical truths this claim makes sense only when the open subclasses of mathematical truths, logical truths etc. are bound together by some common characteristic feature. Without some common characteristic, to bind the open subclasses but claiming it to be one open class, amounts to an arbitrary class of statements devoid of any rationale behind that.

The argument for the intelligibility of the ASD finds Quine's requirement of sufficient explanation or clarification too hard to make out anything. 'Too many words would fail', it is argued, "to meet Quine's standards of intelligibility."\(^{44}\)

We have already discussed that the Quinean requirement of sufficient explanation for the ASD is an epistemological obligation, it is the 'point of the game' for what we play the ASD and not the usual way of playing it that requires the explanation; it is an extended sense of 'synonymy' that needs explanation and not its ordinary sense. Appeal to ordinary usage for the explanation of synonymy in which "bachelor" and "unmarried man" are safely believed to be synonymous can be ruled out of consideration. For the notion of synonymy employed to define 'analytic' is in an extended sense, beyond its ordinary usage. Its ordinary use does not seek for the coextensive

range of verification, nor is it assured of a reductionistic account of viewing statements in isolation of its fellows and, thereby, it does not have the potentiality of explaining certain statements which are alleged to be true 'what may come'. Thus GS's argument against Quine's standard for clarification or explanation is uncalled for. They argue it in terms of the ordinary use of 'synonymy' but 'synonymy' is introduced in an extended sense with certain epistemological interest.

There are two possible ways in which a counter-example can have an epistemological interest against Quine's refutation of the ASD: (a) breaking the circularity in an inductive manner, i.e. rendering some concrete examples for sufficient elucidation of any of the concepts in the same family such that instancing more and more of that kind of elucidatory examples one can inductively prove that the concept is sufficiently clarified to break the circularity; (b) breaking the circularity by certain conceptual clarification of any of the concepts of the 'family' and extend some concrete examples in support of the conceptual clarification,

GS's argument in terms of the example of logical impossibility, vis., "My neighbour's three year child is an adult" is aimed in the first possible way because the second way is almost blocked by Quine. Consider GS's example of logical impossibility. Consider the following two cases:

1. 'My neighbour's three-year-old child is an adult'.
2. "My neighbour's three-year-old child understands Russel's theory of Types.

By a freak of nature, \(^{46}\) (1) becomes true if the neighbour's child happens to be well counted as an adult. Even if it is born just three years back, its unbelievable physical and mental growth can enable it to be well counted as an adult provided that there holds no rigid synonymity between "more than three-years-old" and "adult". But GS explicitly exclude 'freak of nature' from their example. On the same ground, they cannot allow the chances of a three year old child's becoming an adult by being victimized by a sorcerer or by being a sibling of a 'bernmy' or by becoming a time traveller or by the law of a state (that whoever understands Russell's Theory of types is an adult) etc; because such chances do really amount to be the counterexamples to the examples they provide to elucidate the notion of logical impossibility. GS have tried to reduce logical impossibility (i.e., it is analytic that not ...) to logical contradiction through the substitution of synonym ("three-year-old" and "not-an-adult"). But the notion of 'synonymy' is no less in need of clarification than the notion of logical impossibility accounted to explain the ASD.

GS attempt to defend synonymy, admitting no determinate range of verification conditions (i.e., refraining from a reductionistic viewpoint), by keeping certain assumptions for what a candidate pair of

\(^{46}\)Pigden (Op. Cit., p. 186) considers such freaks of nature.
statements are equally confirmed or infirmed—This is not acceptable. Any two consistent statements (e.g.; 'X is a renate' and 'x is a cordate') can be turned to be synonymous by means of certain assumptions (e.g., coextensiveness). On the other hand, if the definition is amended and 'any assumption' is taken into account, instead of 'certain assumptions', then the definition becomes too tight to allow any synonymy. For, in such an amended account, even the paradigm cases like "bachelor" and "unmarried men" fail to be synonymous. If, in an island, or even in our society in some future, the wedding ceremony happens among the monkeys and the monkeys get the legal and social status of what the married couples do get, the unmarried male monkeys are well counted as bachelors, "bachelor" cannot be synonymous to "unmarried man". Unmarried male monkeys are there to be called as bachelors too. Thus neither 'any assumption' nor 'certain assumption' can explain the 'synonymy', because, there is no such 'synonymy' but dogmatically held to be there along with analyticity.\(^{47}\)

GS's argument for the compatibility of 'analyticity' and 'universal revisability' consists of the following steps.

a) There is a difference between 'rejecting a proposition' and 'dropping the concepts involved.'\(^{48}\)

b) When a formerly analytic statement is dropped, the form of words in question changes from expressing an analytic statement to


\(^{48}\) GS, Op. Cit., pp. 156 - 158
expressing a synthetic statement, that is, the analytic is 'metamorphosed' into a synthetic falsehood.

c) If the concepts of formerly analytic statement is revised, the statement or its equivalent would again be true.

The difference between 'rejecting a proposition' and 'dropping the concepts involved' is roughly like a difference between '(2 + 2 = 5) is false' and "it is meaningless to talk about our currently used concepts like 'plus' and 'equal to' if it is true that (2 + 2 = 5)'.

The former interpretation is in relation to a particular conceptual framework currently held from generations and, accordingly, (2 + 2 = 5) is rejected in relation to that conceptual framework. The latter interpretation is in relation to a possible framework in which (2 + 2 = 5) becomes true and, accordingly, the age-old concepts expressing '+' and '=' is dropped and revised for the sake of that possible framework. Thus '(2 + 2 = 5)', or any proposition to that effect of having a truth condition, can be interpreted in two different ways which can be resulted into true (false) in relation to a currently held framework and false (true) in relation to a revised (conflicting) framework.

GS argue that if a proposition is analytic then it cannot be rejected, it can be 'revised-in-principle'. And, at the same time, the proposition that becomes synthetic in relation to the revised conceptual framework remains analytic in relation to the formerly held conceptual scheme. Thus revisability makes sense only when a sense is

\[49\text{ Cf. Campap's distinction between 'internal questions' and 'external questions'.}\]
made of conceptual schemes and the sense of the latter, in turn, makes
sense of the ASD. That is, coinciding GS's terminology with Carnapian
terminology, a 'method of intension' is vital for the 'dropping' of
concepts to 'revise' a proposition; a 'method of extension' is
employed for the "rejection" of a proposition. However, if such a
distinction is shown to be untenable, the compatibility between the
ASD and the thesis of universal 'revisability' (of Quine) becomes
unviable.

In the 4th Chapter, among other things, it can be found that
Carnap's 'method of intension' is unviable. Before that, in the 3rd
Chapter, it is attempted that a wholehearted positivistic method of
empirical investigations prevents determinacy of meaning and on that
ground it can be safely concluded that, since no determinacy of
meaning is possible, there is no truth determined solely by virtue of
meaning and, thereby, no ASD is tenable. It is argued that the
indeterminacy thesis is neither a doubt on the meaning nor a sheer
positivistic assertion of empirical meaning. It is a thesis of
empirical meaning by the method of scientific doubt and, thereby, a
thesis for naturalistic semantics. The scientific doubt, analogous to
the scientific doubt in naturalized epistemology, replaces a Cartesian
doubt in semantics. Another important problem that Quine's
indeterminacy thesis solves, shown in the 3rd chapter, is the problem
that if "determinate meaning" is there then how to overcome the
'intimate' relationship between reductionism and the ASD?

The holism Quine advocates is undoubtedly antagonistic to the
system-neglecting VTM but in TDE he has not extended sufficient
reasons for the untenability of VTM and, hence, for the acceptance of
the Duhem-Quine thesis (i.e., epistemological holism) even though he
explicitly expresses that the VTM is false. From his indeterminacy thesis it can be observed that it is not only a thesis towards naturalism but also a thesis that can be suitably 'employed for the falsification of VTM, with an epistemological point of view, in order to completely destroy foundationalism beneath the ASD. For the two dogmas - ASD and redactionism - are intimately related and VTM is dependent on reductionism. Thus what is accomplished so far, in our anti-foundationalistic move is, in a sense, a partial maturation of the anti-foundationalistic theme potentially there in Quine's TDE.