The task undertaken against foundationalism, in this chapter and in the next chapter, is to show that foundationalism has two fundamental false presuppositions. Determinacy of meaning in language, one of the two false presuppositions, is to be refuted in this chapter. Thus this chapter can be viewed as an exposition of Quine's indeterminacy thesis but an exposition with an orientation against foundationalistic semantics. Or, to put it in positive terms, the thrust is basically on a conclusion that semantics is to be naturalised analogous to naturalized epistemology. That is, to be more precise, it is an anti-foundationalistic qua naturalistic interpretation of Quine's indeterminacy thesis. An absolute determination of reality, the other fundamental false presupposition of foundationalism, is to be refuted in the next chapter.

A lay man's conception of Indeterminacy of Translation (IT) would be the conception that a manual of translation cannot be correctly constructed and all available manuals are wrongly constructed. He can easily refute IT by his own ground that we find many manuals of translation which are correctly constructed. The philosophical insight sustained in IT, the insight that literally haunts many philosophers, is that no manual of translation can, in

1Hereafter "indeterminacy of Translation" is abbreviated as "IT"
principle, be said to be the correct one.

Refutation of the IT amounts to accept that a manual of translation can be constructed as the 'reference point' for the evaluation of other alternative manuals which might have been supposed to be correctly constructed for our practical purposes but none is the correct one. Such an acceptance tends to be foundationalistic. The tendency to uphold an absolute "reference point", even if it is neither a traditional metaphysical one to determine reality nor a Kantian transcendental one to determine true scientific knowledge but an analytical or semantic one to determine meaning, compels it to be foundationalistic. For reality and knowledge are construed, by these adherents of the 'reference point', to be determined and justified by language. If the 'reference point' is tenable, reality can be absolutely determined as well as a complete justification of a knowledge claim is possible. The IT argues against the possibility of such a 'reference point' and espouses that 'there is no fact of the matter', there is nothing objectively there, about which a translation can be right or wrong.

In short, if a lay man's mocking at IT is due to the fact that many manuals of translation are there and supposed to be correctly constructed, a philosopher's seriousness is due to a methodological dispute based on the question that whether a 'reference point' is possible or not for those available manuals to be evaluated as right.

An introductory exposition of IT in terms of 'reference point' can be found in Roth, P.A. (1978), "Paradox and Indeterminacy", Journal of Philosophy, 75, pp.347-367.
or wrong. The IT advocates that there is no such 'reference point' and right translations can sharply diverge.³

The methodological dispute – between foundationalism and naturalism – is epistemological. It is, to wit, whether epistemology-can set a priori epistemic principles to evaluate any knowledge claim (as being a justified or unjustified one) or not. An apriority of epistemological normativity is sought by semantic absolutism through the determinacy of meaning. Viability of semantic absolutism is completely dependent upon the tenability of determinacy of meaning.

Determinacy of meaning and the possibility of a 'reference point' qua the correct manual of translation are closely associated. So also is the association between IT and meaning-skepticism. A manual of translation connecting the linguistic elements of a source language to that of a target language connects 'meanings' associated with the respective linguistic elements. To accept an absolute determination of the former connection in terms of a linguistic or extra linguistic 'reference point' amounts to accept determinacy of 'meaning'. It illegitimately licenses a curious entity between a linguistic element and what is meant or communicated by that element. No such entity is called for the explanation of 'linguistic activity' when

³Commenting on Katz’s "The Refutation of Indeterminacy" Quine Writes, "the fact remains that lexicography lives, and is important. Translation is important, often right, often wrong. The indeterminacy thesis denies none of this, but tells us that right translations can sharply diverge". [In Barrett, R.B. and Gibson R.F. (Eds.) (1990) Perspectives on Quine, Basil Blackwell, p.198 (Hereafer references to this book is mentioned as PQ)].
meaning-skepticism is advocated. It explains in behaviouristic terms and a behaviouristic explanation of our linguistic activity establishes IT more explicitly than the theoretical ground on what IT is established as a 'natural conclusion' of Peircean thesis and Duhemian thesis.

The IT is a thesis of naturalized epistemology as well as an antithesis to foundationalism. The former aspect is worked out by a behaviouristic explanation of IT. The antithesis is made out of the theoretical explanation of IT which, precisely, consists of the following argument:

"If we recognize with Peirce that the meaning of a sentence turns purely on what would count as evidence for its truth, and if we recognize with Duhem that theoretical sentences have their evidence not as single sentences but only as larger blocks of theory, then the indeterminacy of theoretical sentences is the natural conclusion".

Quine's notion of 'Scientific skepticism' which remains vital for his naturalized epistemology can be put forward here to explain meaning skepticism advocated in terms of the IT. An analogy can be drawn between the two varieties of skepticism. Bar-on Droit (1990), "Scepticism: The External World and Meaning", Philosophical Studies, 60, pp.207-231 argues 'that, not only is such analogous treatment possible', between external world skepticism and meaning skepticism, 'but that it may be philosophically more interesting'. However, here, our immediate concern is to establish 'meaning skepticism'. Hence what follows is Quine's arguments in favour of that.

OR, pp.80-81 (Emphasis added).
The importance of recognizing Peirce, the originator of pragmatism, is not merely historical but has some conceptual affinity with the empiricism of Quine. The empiricism Peirce represents through his pragmatic brand, unlike the traditional empiricism, permits thought or reason to be an indispensable factor of our growth of knowledge. However, admitting that thought is void without observation and observation is blind without thought (which comes parallel to Kant's saying: "thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind"\(^6\)), he is not committed to the 'architectonic' theory of philosophy/knowledge. On the contrary, having a "laboratory mind", contra "seminary minds" of most professional philosophers, he regards a question or solution significant only when it can be 'brought' to the test of some observations or experiments such as we find in the research practices and techniques of scientists and analysts. Peircean empiricism, unlike logical empiricism, does not commit the mistake of accepting single isolated theoretical sentences for their confirmation to empirical evidence. It avoids 'single experiments or of single experimental phenomena' accepting 'general kinds of experimental phenomena'.\(^8\) For what an experiment signifies has its bearings only in relation to the future predictions made out of it. And the suitability that holds for the future on the basis of present or past, between a belief or theory (by observation or experiment) and the empirical world we have around, cannot be conceived of by isolated

\(^{6}\)Critique, A-51/B/75.


\(^{8}\)Ibid., p.144.
Thus the empiricism represented by Peirce sustains a naturalistic flavour of the Quinean kind as far as it pleads for no verification in terms of experiment or observation of *isolated* kinds and aspires for an investigation with a 'laboratory mind', upholds no *a priori* foundational doctrines but some revisable (hypothetical) statements made on the basis of 'sensible' effects of observation. However the objectivity retained of truth on the basis of experimental agreement in Peircian pragmatism (distinguished from Jame's conception of a subjective psychological satisfaction in relation to pragmatic truth) is acceptable in a Quinean framework only with some reservation. "Scientific method is the way to truth, but it affords even in principle no unique definition of truth." The method to be adopted in epistemology is scientific par with methods applied in natural sciences and, thereby, meaning of a sentence ultimately depends upon the evidence of its truth parallel to the significance of a hypothesis (made in natural sciences) depends upon the evidence of its truth made out on experimental basis. But the experimental basis cannot afford an hypothesis to be uniquely true because many possible alternative hypotheses may become true on experimental basis. So also, our observation or experience cannot provide us any sentence with an uniquely determined meaning; because, on the basis of some observational data many possible alternative meanings can be put up equally. Thus the constraint to the Peircean pragmatism is that no truth can be incorrigible and, thereby, no meaning can be uniquely

\(^2\)WO, p.23,
determinated although it is firmly endorsed that truth must be having some evidence (the 'sensible' effects by observation or experience) and 'meaning' ultimately depends upon the evidence of truth.  

Now what Quine denies of Peircian pragmatism and, hence, of any pragmatism that uniquely determines meaning is based on his recognition of Duhemian holism. The Duhemian holism basically argues against the so called "crucial experiment" which is supposed to provide a conclusive evidence against one hypothesis as well as a supporting evidence for another. Duhem argues that the two conditions presupposed for the tenability of 'crucial experiment' which, in turn, simultaneously falsify one hypothesis and verify another cannot be fulfilled. The two conditions are (i) that an unambiguous falsification procedure exists (ii) that reductio ad absurdum methods be applicable to scientific inference.

If unambiguous falsification procedure exists, that is, if an hypothesis, \( H \), is refuted by an observation, \( ~O \), then it is presupposed that scientific reasoning follows the simple schema \( H ~\) 

In a sense, from here, Davidson's holism deviates from Quinean holism. The former emphasizes more on 'truth' than on 'evidence' such that, even if 'meaning' is determined only in relation to a system of language \( L \), it is 'determined by the best theory of truth for \( L \)' that maximises the 'truth' of what the respective speakers say and believe. On the otherhand Quinean 'immanent holism' emphasizes more on 'evidence' than on 'truth' and, accordingly, 'meaning' is determined in relation to \( L \) but 'by the translation from \( L \) into our own language that maximizes our agreement with speakers of \( L \)' . A good discussion of this difference between Davidson's 'transcendent holistic approach' and Quine's 'Immanent holistic approach' can be found in Harman Gilbert (1990) "Immanent and Transcendent approaches to the Theory of Meaning" in PQ, pp. 144-157 (See.pp. 153-154).
But scientific reasoning does not follow it. For every scientific prediction is based on several hypotheses, not on a single hypothesis. The scientific reasoning follows the complex schema, \([(H_1 + R_2 + \ldots + H_n) \rightarrow 0]\); not the simple schema, \(H \rightarrow 0\). Thus by confronting a recalcitrant experience, \(\sim 0\), we cannot falsify a single hypothesis, \(H\), but the conjunction of several hypotheses (i.e. \(H_1 + H_2 + \ldots + H_n\)). Thus there exists no unambiguous falsification procedure.

Reductio ad absurdum methods be applicable to scientific inference means that one hypothesis can be said to be verified on the basis of a contradiction inferred from the acceptance of another hypothesis. For, it is supposed here, falsification of one particular hypothesis implies the acceptance of an alternative one. Duhem argues that, even if a particular hypothesis is said to be falsifiable (which is not possible at all), there is neither such implication (said above) nor one can enumerate the possible alternative hypotheses which can explain an event. The falsification of a particular hypothesis, \(H\), does not imply the acceptance of another particular hypothesis, \(\sim H\), but the acceptance of several assumptions, hypotheses, even theories, on which \(\sim H\) is based. Furthermore, the alternative assumptions, hypotheses and theories on which \(\sim H\) can be based to explain an event is not fixed, nor it can even be fixed so. Since there can be no such fixity of alternatives and falsification of an hypothesis, \(\sim H\), means verification of no particular hypothesis but an indefinite number of hypotheses, reductio ad absurdum method cannot be applicable to scientific inference.

Quine does not claim the Duhemian arguments against *crucial
experiment' to be correct; nor he is interested enough to show the non-triviality of such arguments. On the contrary, in a letter to Grunbaum,\(^\text{11}\) he admits that he has 'probably' used the Duhemian thesis in a 'trivial' way although, arguments apart, the thematic conclusion abstracted from Duhemian thesis is very much persuasive to Quinean holism that makes the ground for his challenge against the 'cleavage between meaning and fact'. "Actually", he writes, "my holism is not as extreme as those brief vague paragraphs at the end of "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" are bound to sound."\(^\text{12}\)

The problem ahead is, then, what exactly is Quine's holism? To show, in connection with the Duhemian thesis, what is the restricted version of Duhemian thesis that Quine does uphold? The restriction is put forward in view of the fact that observation sentences are immune from revision even if it is said that 'no statement is immune to revision'.\(^\text{13}\) Quine explicitly expresses that 'the Duhemian thesis would be wrong if understood as imposing an equal status on all the statements in a scientific theory as thus denying the strong presumption in favour of the observation statements'.

The strong presumption is that the 'observation sentence is the


\(^{12}\)Ibid.

\(^{13}\)FLPVV, p.43.

corner stone of semantics'. For it fundamentally acts as 'the repository evidence for scientific hypothesis' and as 'the only entry to a language'. These two fundamental roles are directly connected with epistemology in view of the fact that the two basic aspects - the doctrinal aspect and the conceptual aspect - are mainly concerned with truth (or evidence) and meaning (or analysis of language). The naturalistic orientation that observation sentence does highlight is clear from its primacy in both the dimensions - doctrinal and conceptual - of epistemology explored with an 'enlightened empirical spirit'. Its primacy in doctrinal aspect is made out of its becoming 'the repository evidence for scientific hypothesis'. It is 'the repository evidence' by virtue of the fact that it is the 'minimal verifiable aggregate' having empirical content of all its own. Like an occasion sentence, for example, "there goes John's old tutor." it is intersubjectively observable and it has no truth value apart from the occasion. And, at the same time, it possesses the general adequacy to elicit assent to the sentence (e.g. "There goes an old man"). Being occasion dependent for its truth it is distinguished from standing sentences which are true 'regardless of occasion of utterance' and having the 'general adequacy to elicit assent' it is a distinct kind of occasion sentence.


16 OR, p.88.

17 OR, p.89.

18 In Quine's words: It [the occasions sentence] is a sentence like 'This is red' or 'It is raining', which is true on one occasion and false on another; unlike 'Sugar is...
However, even if the observation sentences are the minimal verifiable aggregates, they are not compounded to justify the truth of all other sentences (eternal or non-eternal standing sentences, for example, '3 + 3 = 6' and 'The post man has passed by'). They are incompatible with Russell's atomism. Although Russell's atomism is naturalistic to the extent the atomic sentences, even if they are not about experience, acquire their use 'by direct conditioning to the stimulation of sensory reports', the connection between observation sentences and other sentences and the connection between atomic sentences and other sentences differ profoundly. This connection in logical atomism is simple conjunctual and put forward to have a sweet', whose truth value endures regardless of occasion of utterance., "Nature of Natural knowledge" (in Guttenplan (Ed.) (1975) Mind and Language See p.72.) [Hereafter this paper is abbreviated as "NNK"]. Such, then, is an observation sentence, it is an occasion sentence whose occasion is not only intersubjectively observable but is generally adequate, moreover, to elicit assent to the sentence from any present witness conversant with the language ["NNK" p.73].

This example is from Gochet, P. (1986). Assent to Truth : A Critical Examination of Quine's Philosophy, p.45. The table below is due to Gochet, P. (1986) Op.cit., p.45. Quine's classification of sentences can be presented in the following manner.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standing Sentences</th>
<th>Occasion Sentences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>eternal</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 + 3 = 6</td>
<td>Dog (Here-is-a-dog)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The postman passes (tenseless) by on the 9-8-1980, at 9 A.M. GMT</td>
<td>Rabbit (Here-is-a-rabbit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>non-eternal</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The crocuses have come out. The postman has passed by.</td>
<td>Spy (Here-is-a-spy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bachelor (Here-is-a-bachelor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Observational</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20 TT, p. 181.
foundational approach to epistemology whereas the 'connection with the observation sentences is more tenuous and complex'\textsuperscript{21} and put forward to have a naturalistic approach to epistemology.

Observation sentence's primacy in conceptual aspect of epistemology is made out of the fact that it is "the only entry to a language." It is an 'amorphous unstructured unit' and it is an 'intersubjective unit'. The observation sentences, for example, "This-is-red", 'It-is-raining', 'That-is-a-dog' etc.; are not learnt as different structured wholes out of the words like "This", "That", "is", "it", "a", "raining", "red", "dog", etc. Those are learnt by ostension, by the reception of natural stimulations to the nerve endings of the subject, as unstructured units. And, not only that they are received as unstructured wholes but received so also by all the speakers of English happen to be present there. That is, an observation sentence is true (or false) in a situation if all speakers would assent to (or dissent from) it when asked in that situation. This 'intersubjective' character of observation sentences well indicates the social character of Quine's conception of language. And the character of 'unstructured whole' amounts to say that the observation sentences are learnt individually taken as wholes.

They stand for the 'sentences at the periphery' in the metaphor Quine extends in his argument for universal revisability. An adjustment in the interior of the theory can save an observation

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
sentence (peripheral statement) conflicting with experience. Quine acknowledges:

\[\text{"the experimental periphery in " Two Dogmas" takes form in Word and Object as the triggering of nerve endings" and statements near the periphery are recognizable in Word and Object as the observation sentences."}\]

Naturally 'the triggering of nerve endings', in response to the physical objects outside, amounts to the basic factor of what it is traditionally known as empirical experience. And, statements made of those basic experiences are observation sentences. But our language is not so crude that one can venture to put the observation sentences sanctified and, at the same time, make up a theory by observation sentences. What the observation sentences make up is the intermediate between bare physical objects and the statements interior to a theory; what a theory tends to express or explain becomes impossible without the observation sentences. The natural connection between a theory and the observation sentences makes truth immanent in a theory. But the certainty of the theory is not warranted because the observation sentences are never theory independent.

The natural relation between a theory and the observation sentences enables the possible transition of each other's traits. Truth of a theory, which explains some aspect of the observable world

\[22\text{TT, p. 180.}\]
outside, becomes immanent in the theory itself. And, the certainty is
denied even of the observation sentences which really stand as the
closest possible linguistic items to the physical objects experienced
outside. For 'immanent truth, a la Tarski, is the only truth'\textsuperscript{23} that
Quine recognizes and we cannot know one theory to be true with
certainty and infallibility.

Thus the conception of an observation sentence avoids a full-
blooded holism of the Duhemian kind - acceptance of what does impel,
to abandon the special status assigned to observation sentences. In
fact acceptance of an unrestricted Duhemian thesis amounts to accept,
what Dummett describes, an 'explosive mixture' of two conflicting
views that (i) all sentences are theory-ladden to a certain extent
(Holism) and that (ii) some sentences, namely observation sentences,
are the checkpoints for all theories of the world (empiricism). "If
the system confronts experience only as wholes", argues Dummett, "then
there is no periphery and no interior".\textsuperscript{24} If there exists, in a strict
sense, two kinds (not of degrees) of susceptibility to experimental
conditions and, there by, the interior and periphery of a theory;
then, in fact, holism cannot be intact. For the truth conditions of
the periphery statements being directly connected with experience
negates the holistic claim that no sentence's meaning, thereby, also
the truth conditions, is possible without being related to the other

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{24} Dummett, M. (1973), Frege, Philosophy of Language, 2nd Edn.
But the restricted form of the Duhemian thesis allows degrees of susceptibility to experimental conditions. The observation sentences are privileged to have such susceptibility to the highest degree in the sense that they are in the periphery of a theory-circle and experience directly impinges on them. The privilege of getting the highest degree of susceptibility is obviously different from the privilege of getting a different kind of susceptibility such that it exists invulnerably.

In the context the observation statement is said to be immune from revision is different from the context in which it is said to be otherwise. The difference is, precisely, the difference between structured observation sentences and the structureless observation sentences. The former aspect can be well instanced when it is a part of a theoretical sentence, the latter aspect can be exemplified when it is beyond such theoretical participation. For example, (a) 'lo! water' is a structureless whole whereas (b) 'water is H\textsubscript{2}O' is a structured whole, though the observational term 'water' occurs in both sentences. When the term 'water' belongs to a structured whole i.e.; 'water is H\textsubscript{2}O', it can be changed to another structured whole. If, for example, in remote future, scientific discoveries establish that, it is not water but some other basic element of our atmosphere that really causes to calculate, mistakenly, one hydrogen as two hydrogens

\textsuperscript{25}Gochet, p.(1986)., p.33.
in water molecule; then, it would be said that 'water is HO.' Or, suppose, the imagined element is named as 'Gibon', then it would be said that 'Gibon-water is H\(_2\)O'. However 'LO! water' cannot be changed so because it is structureless. Another very common example can be cited for illustration. A straight stick seen as bent in water can elicit the observational sentence 'This-is-a-bent-stick' but becoming aware of the illusion we put it to a structured whole and can say 'The immersed stick in water is not bent'. The point is that the sentence is theory dependent in the latter case whereas it is not so in the former case. But the former case is also related to a theory in the sense that unless until we master the former use we cannot understand or use the latter. The conceptual difference between the two aspects — structureless wholes and part of a structured whole — of observation sentences is very common in the sense that we step to the structured whole only after crossing the unstructured wholes and what makes sense of 'changing' a whole is the 'structure' that changes. So a structureless whole has to be shifted to a structured whole to have a change. Such shifting is essentially made in relation to certain theoretical constraint. Viewing from such an angle every thing can be seen as theoretical. That is why Quine says ".... I see all objects as theoretical".\(^{26}\)

An unrestricted Duhemian holism corresponds to an extended sense of the term 'theory' whereas the restricted sense supports the

\(^{26}\text{TT. p.22).}\)
naturalistic epistemology in terms of a technical sense of 'theory'.

A theory, in its extended sense, contains all sentences observational and standing— with an equal susceptibility of their meaning and truth to the theory as a whole. Thus it counts nothing called as unstructured wholes. In this sense there is no distinction between 'language' and 'theory'. For all the sentences of a natural language which enjoy community-wide acceptance turns to be the constituents of a theory. The observation sentences do characteristically enjoy a community-wide acceptance as well as all other sentences of the natural language do. Such contexts where the distinction between language and theory is insensitive, are the contexts where Quine speaks of language or theory as a fabric or 'network of sentences associated to one another and to external stimuli by the mechanism of conditioned response'.

But it becomes sensitive once a language is construed to be containing many theories, once we allow different structures to accommodate different aspects of the world for explanation, "when we allow the imaginary man full logical acumen". In this technical sense a set of sentences can be characterized as a theory iff 'it consists of some subset S of sentences together with all the further sentences that are logically improved by S and do not exceed the vocabulary of S'.

The contained

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29 Ibid.

30 Quine, W.V.O. (1975), "On Empirically Equivalent Systems of
sentences are well defined and so also their implied sentences, the structureless observation sentences are not being implied by any theoretical sentences, a theory is not susceptible to indeterminacy though it is underdetermined by the data given. For indeterminacy makes sense only when there are alternative ways of relating the observation, the unstructured observation sentences to the theory, so as to construct alternative but incompatible theories by means of shifting the structureless wholes to certain mutually conflicting structured wholes those are compatible to the unstructured wholes.

Stimulus meaning plays a major role in IT's behaviouristic explanation. It is 'meaning' defined in terms of sensory stimulations and verbal reactions. The name itself suggests the empirical import sustained in this theory of meaning provided that 'stimulation' is not meant as a mental content.\(^\text{31}\) For 'stimulation' the World", Erkenntins, 9. See p.318.

\(^{31}\)It is notable that a philosopher like Searle misunderstands the IT on this ground that, even if he views language is indeed public and it is not a matter of meaning-a-introspectable-entities, private objects, privilaged access or any of the Cartesian paraphernalia', he views that it is a mistake to think 'that the understanding a speaker is a matter of constructing a 'theory' that the theory is based in 'evident', and that the evidence must be 'empirical' [John R. Searle (1987), "Indeterminacy, Empiricism, and the First Person," The Journal of Philosophy, 84, pp.123-46; See p.146]. He does so in favour of his notion of 'intentional content'. In this connection, to defend Quine against Searle's criticism, the importance of 'evidence' and 'holism' - the two factors corresponding to the Peircian thesis and the Duhemian thesis - of the theoretical explanation cannot be overlooked. Particularly, it is the 'evidential behaviourism' (as Follesdal distinguishes it from 'ontological behaviourism') that gets the central importance in IT. For detail clarification of this point and for a defence of Quine against Searle's criticisms see Follesdal, D. (1990) "Indeterminacy and mental
conceived of so spoils all the interest this theory keeps to ensure. The primary interest kept by Quine in envisaging such a theory is a behaviouristic explanation of "meaning" which, in turn, ensures the indeterminacy of empirical meaning and translation.

The affirmative stimulus meaning of a sentence S for a speaker a at time t is defined as 'the class of all the stimulations', £, 'that would prompt' a's 'assent' at t. The negative stimulus meaning of S is likewise "the class of all the stimulations", £₁, 'that would prompt' a's "dissent" at t. And stimulus meaning is defined as the ordered pair of affirmative stimulus meaning and negative stimulus meaning, (z, z₁).

(z, z₁) signifies the unit of stimulations, relative to a limit or modulus (of time), that has two mutually exclusive aspects. That is, if a speaker would assent to (or dissent from) S in the presence of z then he would dissent from (or assent to) S in the presence of z₁. It is conspicuous that understanding of a sentence consists in its proper use and reaction to such proper uses in all possible circumstances. Proper use cannot be sensed of unless it is contrasted to improper uses. However, as a particular proper use cannot determine all the improper uses, nor it is so conversely; so also, 'the affirmative and the negative stimulus meaning do not determine each other'.\(^{32}\) But a stimulation must not be conceived 'as a

\(^{32}\)WO, p.33.
dated particular event but as a universal, a repeatable event form. Parallel to the fact that from a particular use of a token of sentence it must not be conceived that the use of the sentence is exhausted, the sentence can be used repeatedly, it is a type of what innumerable tokens can be instanced. Thus it is not to be said 'that two like stimulations have occurred, but that the same stimulation has recurred.' The strong conditional "that would prompt" in the definition of stimulus meaning signifies the dispositional character of stimulus meaning. A disposition is a physical trait (e.g. solubility in water) which can be disjunctive in the sense that 'like effects can come of unlike mechanisms' (e.g. solubility in water can be of salt or sugar or any thing like that). And 'what makes it a disposition is no significant character of its own, but only the style in which we happen to specify it' (e.g.; solubility in water can be described "in terms of the relative positions of small particles", it can also be described by putting an object in water and see if it dissolves). In short, a disposition is a specification of disjunctive physical trait. In stimulus meaning, the specification is carried out by assent-dissent mechanism and the physical trait under consideration is the sensory stimulations given to the subject.

'It is primarily by querying sentences for assent and dissent that we tap the reservoirs of verbal dispositions'. Without being queried, for example, "This is red" cannot be affirmed whenever 'red'

33 WO, p.34.
is present nor it can be denied wherever 'red' is absent. This querying (for assent/dissent) signifies that the disposition in question is basically under social assessment, bound to be communicable. If communicability would have been lacking in this primary verbal dispositions then language could not have been handed down from generation to generation, nor there could have any hope for 'breaking into newly discovered language'.

The said behavioral disposition is a correlation between assent and the presence of stimulations of the object and between dissent and the absence of stimulations of the object. "In experimentally equating the uses of 'gavagai' and 'Rabbit' it is stimulations that must be made to match, not animals". Since the particular occasion of querying that really amounts to extend the verdict on the sentence in question, standing sentences cannot bear such a verdict directly from the occasion of querying. Thus understanding as well as equivalent of meaning of a standing sentence cannot be identified with a particular occasion of assent/dissent disposition. Thus 'a proper semantical analysis of standing sentences, in terms of behavioural disposition will be primarily occupied with the interrelations of sentences rather than standing sentences one by one'. In view of the fact that different systems of such interrelations is possible and there exists no objective reference to claim a particular system to be the correct one, IT becomes inevitable.

36 WO, p.31.
37 "Mind and Verbal Dispositions", p.89.
Although 'dispositions are indeed physical states', at the level of behavioural explanation, Quine identifies them with their behavioural manifestation when he illustrates the notion of stimulus meaning. However, he concludes his discussion in "Mind and Verbal dispositions" with the remark that 'the so called identity theory of mind: mental states are the states of body' is what he looks ahead of the present epistemological investigations. That is what he aims to further in future days of investigations.

Nonetheless, he expresses cautions against the construal of identity theory as a repudiation theory. That is, behavioural explanation is not to be repudiated due to the fact that it does not specify actual physiological terms. For, as Quine remarks, "To cite a behavioural disposition is to posit an unexplained neural mechanism, and such posits should be made in the hope for their submitting some day to a physical explanation."\(^{38}\) Thus to what really a behaviouristic explanation of meaning or language via the notion of stimulus meaning (and, thereby, via the IT that indispensably keeps stimulus meaning in it's behaviouristic explanation) aims at is to submit the philosophical problems, especially epistemological problems, to a physical explanation with a naturalistic spirit. Philosophers who fail to appreciate behaviouristic explanation and move towards the mentalistic explanation by means of their dogmatic adherence to an unanalyzed notion of meaning are primarily so interested due to their 'despair' of a naturalistic trend in philosophy.

By the help of stimulus meaning we can try for 'radical translation' instead of normal translation; because, the former kind of translation explains the rudimentary stages of working out a normal translation. Moreover, the latter kind cannot be directly connected with stimulus meaning due to the fact that it is mostly carried out in terms of non-eternal standing sentences. Radical translation is the 'translation of the language of a hitherto untouched people'\(^{39}\) where the possibility of 'help of interpreters is excluded' and, moreover, the assumption of a 'shared culture' between that of the translator and of the native speakers is forbidden. Thus the only way left for the translator is behaviouristic as well as naturalistic. That is, on the basis of certain observable behaviour the translator has to formulate certain hypotheses which are, in turn, confirmed or infirmed in the way of developing the translation manual.

A radical translation is fruitlessly undertaken by the field linguists if there exists a 'shared culture common to the speaker of each and every possible pair of languages or if there exists, at least, one interpreter to help the translators for every possible pair of languages. However, the philosophical point concerned here is not about the controversy over the existence or non-existence of such common 'shared culture', nor about that of such an interpreter. The interesting consequence (to be shown) is that the least of language 'can be made sense of in terms of its stimulus conditions' and the most is left for 'empirically unconditioned variation in one's

\(^{39}\text{WO},\ p.28.$
conceptual scheme'. In other words, indeterminacy of translation roughly starts from the notion of 'radical translation' if one faithfully adheres the tools available for stimulus meaning.

Let us consider the scheme of radical translation with the help of Quine's famous example of the "Gavagai". "Yes" and "No" are the two words conceded to be the translation of corresponding native words in order to have a working hypothesis, to allow the linguist to settle on native signs of assent and dissent. Having the working hypothesis in hand, the linguist translates "Gavagai" to the sentence "Rabbit" on the basis of accumulating inductive instances - that is, 'roughly that the native will assent 'Gavagai?' under just those stimulations under which we, if asked, would assent to 'Rabbit?'; and correspondingly for dissent'.

Supplemented by prior collateral informations, in many possible ways, the native speaker may be prompted to assent or dissent by the stimulation unusual for the linguist. This completely disrupts the linguist's aspiration of a stimulus synonymy between "Gavagai" and "Rabbit". What discrepancy the collateral information creates is basically the difference of positions (spatial, temporal, cultural etc.) between the native speaker and the linguist such that the linguist is not in a position to correlate the information he gathers from the environment with the truth that there is a rabbit nearby whereas the native speaker is in a position to correlate so. For

\[\text{WO, p.26}\]
\[\text{WO, p.30.}\]
example, as Davidson imagines, it is possible for the native speaker to assent to 'Gavagai?' just by having the poor glimpse of the long wings and erratic movements of a local 'rabbit fly' unknown to the linguist. Again, collateral information can be provided by native kibitzer and such a 'verbal intervention' of a by-stander gets no place in stimulus meaning of 'Rabbit' (of the linguist) but it gets a significant place in that of 'Gavagai' (of the native speaker). It is also possible that an alert speaker may be stunned, due to certain stimulations such that he would be precluded to any assent to or dissent from the ensuing 'Gavagai?' at time t. In this case, the stimulations do not belong to the affirmative stimulus meaning, nor to the negative stimulus meaning of 'Gavagai' for him at t.

Thus the discrepancy observed between the stimulus meanings of 'Gavagai' and 'Rabbit' on the basis of collateral information, helpful for the native speaker but not for the linguist, shows that translation is not made on the basis of 'identity of stimulus meaning', nor on the basis of 'sameness of stimulus meaning', but on the basis of "significant approximation of stimulus meaning". Such is the implication we get from 'collateral information' mainly due to two reasons. One reason is that 'stimulus meaning' is the only 'objective reality that the linguist has to probe when he undertakes radical translation. For stimulus meaning of an occasion sentence is by definition the native's total battery of present dispositions to be

\[\text{WO, p.37.}\]
\[\text{Ibid.}\]
\[\text{WO, p.40.}\]
prompted to assent to or dissent from the sentence; and these dispositions are just what the linguist has to sample and estimate'. \(^{45}\) Since we find discrepancy, in stimulus meanings, when we hope for stimulus synonymy on the basis of identity in stimulus meaning; due to the examination of possible collateral informations said above, the best we can hope for is 'significant approximation of stimulus meaning'. The second reason adduces to such significant approximation. The reason is, roughly speaking, the linguist can 'dismiss' collateral information 'as effects of unidentified interferences (as in the case of 'rabbit fly' and 'kibitzer') or by 'varying his times and informants' \(^{46}\) (as in case of 'stunning').

The difficulty is aggravated if we hope for synonymy of terms, translating 'gavagai' to 'rabbit' as two terms instead of two occasion sentences 'Gavagai' and 'Rabbit'. For 'who knows but what the objects to this term [gavagai] applies are not rabbits at all, but mere stages, or brief temporal segments, of rabbits? In either event the stimulus situations that prompt assent to 'gavagai' would be the same as for rabbit'. \(^{47}\) It can be the same, even, for rabbit hood. For the 'distinction between concrete and abstract object as well as between general and singular term, is independent of stimulus meaning'. \(^{48}\)

Thus, even if there is uncertainty, we can have 'significant approximation of stimulus meaning'.
approximation of stimulus meanings' in case of observation sentences like 'Gavagai' and "Rabbit'. For there exists "an objective matter to be right or wrong about"; although there are situations of uncertainty due to the collateral informations those can be overcome in various ways. Thus translation of observation sentences is possible.

By this querying of assent and dissent on selective native sentences after the passive observation of native utterances and circumstances, the linguist can select and succeed for the translation of truth functions like negation, conjunction and alternation. The semantic criterion on which it is possible by means of the assent-dissent mechanism is as follows:

The semantic criterion of negation is that it turns any short sentence to which one will assent into a sentence for which one will dissent and vice versa. That of conjunction is that it produces compounds to which (so long as the component sentences are short) one is prepared to assent always and only when one is prepared to assent to each component. That of alternation is similar with assent changed twice to dissent.

Simulus-analytic sentences can be recognized, so also the stimulus contradictory sentences — the former kind commands

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49 For the details of Translating Truth functions, see pp. 57-61.
50 WO, pp. 57-58.
irreversible assent and the latter kind commands irreversible dissent. However the said kinds are 'not behaviouristic reconstruction of intuitive semantics, but only a behaviouristic ersatz'. For, in this 'behaviouristic ersatz', analyticity applicable "as well to 'There have been black dogs' as to "2 + 2 =4' and 'No bachelor is married'.

In view of the fact that standing sentences lack stimulus meaning, to translate them otherwise, the linguist can take all the standing sentences into account and make certain hypotheses by confirming the conditions already availed as the secondary data in hand. These hypotheses are called as analytic hypotheses. For these are the assumptions for equivalents between sentences of the source language and sentences of the target language with no legitimacy within his hitherto accepted procedure. The conditions or the secondary data in hand are (i) observation sentences <ii) truth functions and (iii) sentences those are stimulus-analytic or stimulus-contradictory. These are said to be the conditions because an analytic hypothesis is to confirm these in the way of providing certain clues for consistent translation. For these conditions nearly exhaust the part of a language that can be translated on the basis of stimulus meaning.

But 'the most notable thing about the analytic hypotheses is that they exceed anything implicit in any native's disposition to speech

\[^{51}\text{WO, p.66.}\]
\[^{52}\text{Ibid.}\]
behaviour. For the main function of such hypotheses is to inter-animate the sentences of a language for translation. Inter-animation is the provision of certain internal structure to the sentences of a language such that they can be related and, thereby, inter-animate each other. The meaning of one particular sentence can be understood by the help of its structure which cannot be independent of the structures of other sentences. This internal structure can never be found in any native's disposition to speech behaviour. For the native's disposition to speech behaviour is essentially external in the sense that whatever he responds he responds so by certain speech behaviour always made out of the external stimulations. He uses his language, not a so called meta-language. For, on the basis of stimulus meaning, when he is unable to convey the meaning of the standing sentences it is conspicuous that he cannot convey the internal structure of these sentences.

From the illustration of radical translation, it is fairly understood that, if at all, with a true positivistic spirit, one can determine the meanings of sentences singly, then the only tools which he has to adhere faithfully is exclusively that of the assent-dissent mechanism. And such a mechanism runs smoothly for the observation sentences and also, with little difficulty, for the occasion sentences and truth-functional connectives. It breaks down for standing sentences and analytic hypothesis comes to rescue. But use of analytic hypothesis amounts to assume a non-empirical basis for the determination of cognitive meaning and, thereby, contradicts to the

\(^{53}\) Wo, p.70.
positivists' notion of empirical meaning. That is, indispensability of analytic hypothesis proves the dispensability of the method of verification - the VTM which credits a sentence's meaningfulness on the basis of its being confirmed or infirmed by observable verification.

In fact, if VTM is correct then language becomes derivative in the sense that a statement's meaning consists in its being confirmed or infirmed by experience and presupposes no infrastructure of a language that is non-empirically inbuilt in language. The use of analytic hypothesis shows that language is not derivative and presupposes certain infrastructure which is non-empirically inbuilt in it. However, 'non-empirical' does not ensure a mentalistic basis. As it is discussed before, Quine views a mentalistic explanation as a superficial level of explanation.

The inbuilt infrastructure is there on a pragmatic basis with a naturalistic spirit. That is, neither it is empirical by which it can bifurcate truth to analytic and synthetic, nor it is non-empirical by which it can explain language in terms of certain innate holistic principles which cannot be based on correlation with empirical stimulations. On the other hand, it is naturalistic like all other principles of natural sciences - concede, first of all, certain non-empirical assumptions or hypotheses on pragmatic ground as well as exclude anything unviable to correlate with environmental stimulation on an empirical ground. This pragmatic empiricism, distinguished from logical empiricism, is called by Quine as the "enlightened empiricism".
The fact that analytic hypotheses exceed anything implicit in any native's disposition to speech behaviour and, thereby, exceeds the given empirical data: a translation-manual being highly dependent on such hypotheses has no objective ground to be judged as the 'correct' one. For many such different incompatible hypotheses can be made with confirmation to the conditions availed by the given empirical data. For example, to decide between 'rabbit' and 'rabbit stages' for the translation of the 'Gavagai', 'if by analytic hypothesis we take 'are the same' as translation of some construction in jungle language we may succeed in translating 'Gavagai' to 'rabbit' by knowing that it is the sameness of gavagais or rabbits that the native is disposed to assent. But equally fits the rival analytical hypothesis vis. 'are stages of the same animal' to the same data and. putting forward the same questions to the native to assent or dissent as it would nave been done before to succeed in translating 'gavagai' to 'rabbit' we can succeed in translating 'gavagai' to 'rabbit stages'.

Note that the success obtainable for the two different translations 'rabbit' and 'rabbit stages', of 'gavagai,' owes more to the corresponding analytical hypotheses, 'are same' and 'are stages of the same animal', than to the fact that we are at loss to scrutinise what object the native really refers to. For even if we cannot scrutinise the reference, logically equivalent translations can be found on the basis of some analytical hypothesis such that there can

\[54\] WO, p.72.
be no question of Indeterminacy. Consider the case, for example,\textsuperscript{55} that A and B are two linguists who are prefacing 'yeg' or 'neg' and the mappings they give are

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A's Mapping</th>
<th>B's Mapping</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yeg = Yes</td>
<td>Neg = Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neg = No</td>
<td>Yeg = No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabbit = Rabbit</td>
<td>Rabbit = Non-rabbit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V = V</td>
<td>V = &amp;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3x) = (3x)</td>
<td>(3x) = (x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(x) = (x)</td>
<td>(x) = (3x)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

When the native speaker utters "Yeg; (3x) (Rabbit x)'", A's translation would be "It is the ease that (3x) (Rabbit x)'", whereas B's translation would be "It is not the case that (x) (non-rabbit x)'. It is an example of the inscrutability of reference, not an example of indeterminacy of translation. A and B have the rival theses about the reference of all general terms - when A maps 'rabbit', B maps 'non-rabbit' - but they give logically equivalent translations. This shows that A and B are in illusion when they want to scrutinise the reference of 'Yeg; (3x) (Rabbit x)'. But, more importantly, they would be in more illusion if they would have taken the analytical hypotheses 'are the same' and 'are stages of the same animal' to succeed in translating 'gavagai' into 'rabbit' and 'rabbit stage' and yet, want to determine whether A is correct or B is correct.

Meaning is illusive and, in a sense, it is more illusive than the illusion of an immersed stick in a glass of water. For there is nothing stick like that can be layed bare before us as the meaning. This is the striking sense in which under-determination of a scientific theory is distinguished from indeterminacy of translation.\(^{56}\) Translation manuals, unlike the scientific theories, are not the alternative descriptions of the structural relations of the objects in this world but the alternative descriptions of the correlation among those scientific descriptions: "Rabbit" and "Rabbit stages" are not the descriptions of the correlation among rabbit and stages of rabbit, when "gavagai" is translated into either of those two, these are the descriptions of what a native really describes by 'gavagai'. Thus a translation, a correlation between 'gavagai' and 'rabbit', is a correlation of two linguistic descriptions; it is not a relation between words and objects but a correlation among words themselves. The illusion of the meaning arises when a fundamental misunderstanding of this correlation is adhered.

The false presumption that 'gavagai', for example, has the same meaning that 'rabbit' has leads to say that translation from one language to another is determinate. For the determinacy of translation is nothing but the correlation of linguistic expressions belonging to any two different languages (or, even, that of any two different expressions belonging to one language) but having the same meaning. The same meaning, sameness of two linguistic expressions on

the ground that they have the same meaning, and, determinacy of translation due to a misunderstood correlation of two expressions (that a viable linguistic or extra linguistic 'reference point' determining the meaning stands as the intermediate factor for the correlation) are all in the same boat. All of them rely on an impossible fact that a 'reference point' is there for meaning determination.

Note that the point emphasized here is not, for example, "The sky is blue" itself owns nothing to be called as the meaning. The point to be emphasized is that there is nothing to be called as the meaning owned or disowned by "The sky is blue". It is very clear that there is nothing extra linguistic in "The sky is blue" itself to mean something but the meaningless ink marks on the piece of plain paper. The point is that there is nothing called to be the meaning owned by the utterance or by an utter or, even, by the language the utterer uses and the utterance belongs to. For there is nothing to be called as the meaning., the question of owning or disowning the meaning does not arise at all. Thus, even if we do and can ever mean something by an utterance only in relation to that language the utterance belongs to, or in relation to that system of beliefs in which the belief communicated through that utterance belongs to, there is no sense of a claim that some thing we meant by that utterance is the meaning (that we or our language, though not the utterance itself, have ever possibly determined it to be so). There is no determinacy of meaning.

A doubt on the use of an utterance is due to an acceptance of meaning determination along with a recognition that each linguistic
expression functions in a multifarious ways. My utterance of "The sky is blue", for example, is intended to initiate a conversation yet to be started between me and my fiancee near a dining table. One can doubt on the use of my utterance, "The sky is blue", amounts to that the use of "The sky is blue" must be made in a determinate way, that "The sky is blue" has a determinate meaning, which conflicts with the way (circumstances) in which I have used that utterance.

Since a particular utterance can be used in different circumstances to convey different things, like a particular ray of light can be passed through different combinations of dissimilar mediums to produce different angles of refraction, a particular use can be doubted and this doubt is no less scientific than the doubt on the bending of a stick in water, brought about by everyday experience or scientific experiments. But, to distinguish it precisely, it is a scientific doubt on the use of an utterance and not on meaning of an utterance. It presupposes the determinacy of meaning and, recognizing that meaning is in use instead of in the utterances themselves, it doubts on a particular use. What it recognises is an antithesis to essentialistic meaning determination, a thesis of relativistic (language-game relative) meaning determination. This thesis makes it scientific in the sense that, to the extent use is plausible not withstanding the indeterminacy of meaning, plausibility of relativization of meaning ensures the plausibility of doubt on a particular use of an utterance.

A true scientific doubt on meaning advocates that any account of meaning determination, essentialistic or relativistic, is untenable.
because, in principle, there is no determinacy of meaning. On the contrary, a Cartesian doubt on meaning advocates determinacy of meaning. It is a doubt on every possible empirical meaning, analogous to its epistemological counterpart that doubts the very possibility of knowledge, it doubts on every possibility of determinate meaning in semantics. An essentialistic or a relativistic account of meaning determination runs as an appropriate response to the Cartesian doubt on meaning. Granted that a Cartesian doubt on meaning is a pseudo doubt in semantics, that there is no sense of a doubt on every possible empirical meaning, there is no need of any metaphysical or transcendental principles (rules) which can presumably determine the meaning and govern over every possible empirical meaning. In this sense, analogous to foundationalism in epistemology, any system that concedes a Cartesian doubt in semantics and seeks after the meaning can be described as foundationalistic semantics. Thus the indeterminacy thesis can be described as a thesis for naturalized semantics.

A naturalised semantics begins the thought experiment in the reverse way. Instead of doubting every possible empirical meaning with the presumption that there must be a determinate meaning for a linguistic expression, it relies on empirical meaning and comes to the conclusion that there can be no determinate meaning for any linguistic expression. Since the indeterminacy of meaning is the conclusion of its thought experiment, the doubt it can impose on empirical meaning is not a pseudo doubt. It cannot doubt on every possible empirical meaning.

Bar-On, D. (1990), has indicated this point,
meaning in order to find out any principle (rule) to determine the meaning, it maintains that 'there is no fact of the matter' to determine that and thus it is hopeless to find out any such principle: What it can doubt instead are particular instances of empirical meanings in order to find more clarity or explanation for the nature of empirical meaning communicated in the network of a particular language or different languages. Thus the philosopher working on meaning or language can legitimately use the theories and methods of natural sciences, especially, that of psychology, anthropology and linguistics in order to clarify his doubts on empirical meaning itself. A semanticist and a natural scientist are in the same boat (if we remember Neurath's boat for the philosophers and natural scientists).

One of the important misunderstandings on indeterminacy that becomes hazardous to this move of naturalized semantics is that the indeterminacy can hardly be true in case of 'normal meaning' though it perfectly works for empirical meaning.\(^{58}\) This conception of indeterminacy narrows the implications of IT by maintaining it to be a conclusion for a particular empirical theory of meaning instead of for any empirical theory of meaning. In a sense it is an acceptance of IT to be true of verificationistic theory of empirical meaning but false for many other alternative theories of empirical meaning. Such an acceptance is based on the idea that even if the formula "Duhem plus

Peirce yields *indeterminacy* is correct, the premise associated with Peirce is too narrow to give the conclusion that indeterminacy accrues to meaning determined by any empirical theory of meaning. Consequently, it is mistaken, the stimulus response theory of meaning advanced by Quine in its behaviouristic fashion is a trivial one on the ground that in no way it undermines an empirical theory of meaning determination which is neither verificationistic non behaviouristic. The sense of 'normal meaning', taken up here, is really very crucial for the indeterminacy thesis when the sense is not identified with an implausible mentalistic account of meaning and, hence, nor with 'the museum myth theory of meaning'. The sense expressed here does approximate to what is *standardly* known as meaning, that is, to meaning as something in mind; but it threatens to the indeterminacy when the standard account is somehow claimed to be supported by empirical evidence.

This sense of 'normal meaning' is considered to be an important misunderstanding because its removal results in seeing the IT afresh in its broader perspective. Thus what is to be shown below are the arguments extendable against the viability of a distinction between normal meaning and empirical meaning; accounting Quine's naturalized epistemology as the broader perspective in that regard. To the extent the arguments can be satisfactory it becomes worth pursuable to draw an analogy between naturalized epistemology and naturalised

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60 Cf. *OR*, p.27.
semantics, besides the fact that the indeterminacy is true for any semantic inquiry in general. For the basic idea behind the said analogy is that a scientific doubt on meaning has to be maintained parallel to a scientific doubt on knowing. That is, in other words, 'meaning skepticism' and 'external world skepticism' are undertaken in a scientific way, not in its Cartesian way and, thus, indeterminacy advocates for the 'scientific meaning skepticism'.

First of all, there is no sense of a normal meaning with some normative ingredient of its own that can govern on but, by no chance, be governed by an empirical theory of meaning. Such a sense (a normative one) of normal 'meaning is untenable on the ground that it dogmatically adheres a Cartesian doubt on meaning. Normativity, imputed transcendentally or conventionally, is supposed to be a priori in character if it must govern over every possible conveyance or understanding we do through linguistic expressions. But this conception of apriority is already shown to be untenable in course of our discussion on the untenability of the ASD. A Cartesian doubt on meaning presupposes determinacy which may, in turn, tempt one to adhere an a priori normative ingredient intrinsic to meaning. Abandonment of such a doubt in semantics results in indeterminacy of meaning and, there by, acceptance of no such a priori normative ingredient.

Moreover it can be inferred from Quine's arguments for naturalized epistemology that no such a priori normativity is possible. Upholding Quine's argument to be right, a genuine doubt to know something can be proved to be pertinent only to the descriptive
aspect of knowing and, hence, to the meaning of an utterance. No
normative aspect, if there can be any at all, can be genuinely
doubted, nor can that be answered as well. Thus the normative sense
ascribable to normal meaning becomes unscientific, such a meaning is
neither doubtable nor answerable and, thereby, held without sufficient
explanation. Consequently, as a criticism to analyticity, analytic
truths can be shown to be implausibly distinguished from synthetic
truths. No normative ingredient can plausibly be there in meaning so
as to extend a privileged epistemic status to any sentence even if it
is granted that analytic truths are truths by virtue of meaning.
Quine's argument against the ASD is not to be identified with a charge
merely against the well known vicious circularity he has explicitly
pointed out against the definitions of analytics. For it should not
be overlooked that the root of much nonsense is in the acceptance of a
semantic normativity, the acceptance of a linguistic conception of a
priori, alleged to be conferring that privileged epistemic status to
the analytic sentences.

Secondly, if there exists no epistemic distinction between a
language and a theory, it makes no sense of a normal meaning even if
empirical meaning is allegedly identified with a verificationist
theory of meaning. S is meaningful, by a verificationist theory of
meaning, if there can be possible differentiable experiences
corresponding to ~S and ~S. But neither S nor ~S can face the
'tribunal of experience' in isolation from the system of beliefs they
belong to. That is why, for the sake of holism, Quine considers the
verificationist theory of meaning to be false. Nevertheless he finds
that certain aspects of the verificationist' theory of meaning are
indispensable. For it is 'empirical meaning and nothing more' which is "basic to translation and the learning of one's own language" and empirical meaning of a sentence is completely dependent on 'what would count as evidence for its truth'.

The restricted versions of Peircean thesis and Duhemian thesis maintained in a Quinean framework are due to the emphasis Quine gives on evidence rather than on truth itself. Any scientific study is a relation between our sensory stimulation and a systematic theory and this relation is an evidential one. That is, an 'evidential support' instead of the so called truth qua certainty is sought through a scientific study and this 'evidential support' is nothing but the 'relation of stimulation to scientific theory'. Since a theory is a logical connection of sentences, requirement of an 'evidential support' amounts to a requirement of a relation between stimulations and some sentences. The sentences those come very nearer for such a relation are observation sentences. In fact the notion of observation sentences can be substituted for the notion of evidence'.

It is not only that the observation sentences serve 'as vehicles of scientific evidence' but also that they serve 'as entering wedge into language'. We have already discussed on these two epistemological perspectives, the doctrinal perspective and the

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62 OR, p.81.
63 OR, p.80.
64 PT, p.2.
65 PT, p.5.
conceptual perspective, of observation sentences. Thus evidential support' associated with any scientific study can be explained in terms of observation sentences. However, since observation sentences are indispensably associated with both the scientific evidence and language learning, the said 'evidential support' cannot be equated with a truth or certainty determined by language. Evidence and explanation, experience and language, go together. An evidential support cannot be made determinate by language because, not that language lacks some such determinacy that otherwise could have been made possible, evidence is indeterminate by its very nature. The notion of observation sentence alias the notion of evidence plays a crucial role in a Quinean framework mainly due to its double function which, in turn, characterizes Quine as a modest foundationalist.  

Although observation sentences serve as 'entering wedge into language' they are, in a sense, barrier to the determinacy of meaning. For, instead of generating the truth or certainty, they simply serve as the vehicles of evidence. If certainty could have been attained in place of the finding of sheer evidence, the stimulus response theory of meaning would have been failed to demonstrate the indeterminacy of meaning. The field linguist's 'rabbit' for 'gavagai' would not have been a translational relation supported by some evidence he could get through the assent dissent mechanism but, instead, an identity relation like 'rabbit' = 'gavagai' which would be independent of the native's disposition to the assent or dissent because the observation sentences would have somehow guaranteed their relations by themselves.

For Quine's acknowledgement see PQ, p. 128.
" 'Same' 'another', 'that'. 'it' and the plurals 's'" and many others which can be accounted for individuation "are inaccessible at the level of observation sentences". Thus the truth or certainty about the descriptions, informations or knowledge of the objects qua individuated things of the external world is not claimed in an observation sentence, it provides the evidential support to the theories as well as beliefs of systems that allegedly claim of a truth which falls short of certainty. It is notable that by bringing the observation sentences into force, into the center of epistemological investigation, the pursuit of truth has accordingly become a pursuit of evidential support and thus plausibly a scientific pursuit.

On the other hand, though observation sentences, unlike the analytic sentences, do not become true by their linguistic elements themselves; whatever guarantee we make out for a theory or system of beliefs or, even, for a theoretical sentence or a belief of a system is ultimately dependent on the evidential support provided by the observation sentences which are, in turn, the entry to language. That is, in a sense, observation sentences become foundational to our scientific evidence as well as to our linguistic activity. But the foundation retained is of a peculiar kind. Neither it puts forward a semantic absolutism by keeping language as the foundational base to represent the reality in a determinate way, nor does it put forward any doctrinal account so as to concede certain privileged epistemic status to certain statements or beliefs based on intuition, reasoning, rules of inference, rules of language or, even, on pure observation.

\[RR, p. ix.\]
That is, observation sentences are neither the determining factors of meaning nor the ultimate certainty-endowing elements of any statement. They are, in fact, basic but evidential to both meaning and truth. Since they are basic to both meaning and truth, to language as well as to knowledge, language and knowledge go together. Language does not have an upper hand over knowledge. Thus the foundationalistic move in terms of a determinacy of meaning results into nowhere.

The foregoing discussion on evidence qua the primacy of observation sentences, in language as well as in theory or scientific knowledge, does indicate the untenability of an epistemic distinction between language and theory. Since no apriority is conceded to any linguistic function, nothing is left for language so as to be intrinsically there per se independent of a theory or system of beliefs to convey something. Language cannot be epistemically distinguished as to be providing the so called a priori norms of a theory. The dependency on a theory is rooted from the primacy of observation sentences. Besides the fact that both a language and the evidence for a theory ultimately get the support from observation sentences, both become meaningless if they are independent of each other.

If meaning were determinate then theories would have no problem for unique comparisons in order to bring about the viability of an absolute truth expressed by the best of the possible theories. For determinate meanings could have enabled us to translate [determinately] one theory into another and, also, to translate determinately, one theory into its back-ground theory. Such
determinate intertranslations between theories could have easily facilitated the viability of determining the best possible theory and, thereby, the Absolute truth too. Thus a theory is completely dependent on language, it has to pay for its dependency, the indeterminacy of meaning restrains it to claim anything to be absolutely true. It simply, therefore, seeks for an evidential support.

On the other hand, language depends on systems of beliefs. If meaning of a linguistic expression were independent of every possible system of beliefs then, in fact, either there would have been the possibility of the extreme of determinacy of meaning or there would have been the negative extreme of nothing to be meant by any linguistic expression. Since neither of the alternatives is tenable it becomes evident that language is dependent on theories qua systems of beliefs.

A Prima facie distinction between language and theory, in terms of their superficial range of application, that the former subsumes the latter whereas the latter does not, is not a qualitative distinction and, thereby, it cannot support an argument for semantic foundationalism. For semantic foundationalism, to speak it in a rough way, separates language from scientific theories with the false

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68 Even the Transitivity Law could have hold good for the 'general fluency of dialogue' from $L_1$ to $L_n$. [Tanji, N. points out this to show the 'quasi-sameness' of language. Tanji, N. (1989), "Quine on Theory and Language", *British Journal of Philosophy of Science*, 40, p. 233-247.
presupposition that a look into the deep of language can enable one to provide the a priori norms of scientific theories because language allegedly determines reality which is described by the theories. That, language comprises of all the theories and no theory is coextensive with language but every theory is a part of language makes "no epistemic distinction between language and theory. Both do get the same epistemic status being dependent on each other and having the observation sentences as the evidential support from the root.

The indeterminacy thesis clearly shows the dependency of language on systems of beliefs and thus the untenability of foundationalistic semantics. The other part of the interdependency between language and theory is the dependency of theory on language. This is to be discussed in the next chapter. It is to be found that, as a result of that dependency, Linguistic Absolutism is untenable apart from the fact that Absolutism is untenable due to the dependency of reality on language.