CHAPTER 3
RUSSIA- CHINA STRATEGIC COOPERATION
One of the most notable developments in the post Cold War period is the gradual elevation of Russia-China relations into successive higher levels. By 1996 and 1997 confidence building measures and demilitarisation agreement were signed with China after a series of negotiations. In 2001, a Treaty of Good Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation was signed. Clause 9 of this treaty is particularly important which says that in case of a threat arises both the countries should enter into contact and hold consultations with each other to deter the threat that has arisen.

A major achievement in their relation is the settlement of the border. There has been extensive arms transfer to China from Russia. This along with trade remains two major areas of cooperation between the two countries. Trade between the two countries has reached $14 billion. The worldview of both the countries is near similar. Cooperation in the field of energy, new transport routes are notable. The development of the scarcely populated Russian Far East requires foreign investment and there, Chinese is contributing to its development. There is also some concern that Chinese migration to the Russian Far East may create problem in the future. In spite of high level of official relations and arms sales, Russian perception of China remains contradictory with many advocating a cautious approach to China.

Russia’s strategic cooperation with China has to be seen in the backdrop of a history of conflicts and existences of diverse perceptions among the Russian elite. The arms trade following the normalisation of relations in 1990s has become an important factor in their relationship. What are the motives and extent of such a strategic cooperation? What are the Russian and Chinese objectives in developing a multifaceted relation? How far they have gone in their relations and how external
developments influenced their relations? The forthcoming discussion focuses on these issues.

**Changed International Context**

The break up of Soviet Union changed the political map of the world. New states came into existence. These are the five Central Asian, three Caucasian and three Baltic states. For neighbouring countries like China, Iran and Turkey and European countries in the West, a new situation had emerged. Great powers like US and countries with great power ambitions like China realized the strategic importance of the region and started asserting their influence. The presence of vast natural resources in the form of oil, gas and hydro carbons in Central Asian and Caspian region has brought geo economic competition in the region. Russia’s influence in this region declined, it was reduced to the status of a regional power and its economic levers were non existent. These newly independent countries opened themselves up for countries other than Russia. As a result, many Central Asian countries joined NATO’s partnership for peace programme in 1993. European, US and Chinese companies started commercial ventures in these countries. However, Russia in its initial pro Western orientation neglected these countries. Russia soon realised that the Central Asian states, which are close to Pakistan and Afghanistan, are becoming breeding grounds of religious extremism which could cause instability in the region.

In the Western side two notable things happened, NATO kept on enlarging and the Baltic States were included in April 2004. The US has made an attempt to unipolarise the world belittling the importance of the UN Charter as a basis for inter-
state relations. Rather, the US started using force as a means of achieving its foreign policy objectives. Iraq war of 2003 was a demonstration of such a policy. Although many countries including Russia and China as well as allies of US-France and Germany, strongly object to it, in final analysis all countries have accommodated this behaviour. The European Union has also expanded by including the countries of Central and East Europe and the Baltic States. In the post cold war period, Russia has developed healthy relations with all the leading countries of the world. The cold war rivalry has gone. However, many international developments are seen by Russia as hampering its security (discussed in chapter 2). In response, Russia showed sign of assertion from 1996 in its foreign and security policies by developing closer relations with China and India. When Putin became the president in 2000, Russia started reasserting its influence and identity in the region by constructively engaging all major powers and dealing with disagreements boldly, but not permitting any disagreements to take the shape of cold war politics.

Russia's identity as a Western power or Eurasian power still remains unsettled with majority of the Russians thinking their civilization is the best. There are civilization differences that make it difficult for Russia to integrate fully with the West (Europe or USA) or with the East (China).

Basis of Russia-China Relations

Irrespective of Russia's conflicts over identity as to whether it is European or Asian, there exist some objective conditions for Russia-China interaction, which lay the
foundations and provides opportunities for further interaction. These factors are primarily strategic and economic in nature, which has so far augured well for Russian—Chinese relations.

Russia is the only country that gives modern weapons to China, which helps the latter in its effort at military modernisation. Russia in turn gets the much-needed hard currency. Both Russia and China had similar positions in international relations—both stands for increased role of the United Nations and multipolar world. Attitude to the Iraq war and Korean were also similar.

Externally, China's struggle with the US is to be noted. In US-China relations, Taiwan is a solid issue. Russian position is very important for China. Russia supports China in this regard. Russia is the only country valuable for China as it has nuclear power. The contradictions between China and US are greater than between Russia and US. Russia is important for US for two reasons—it is a nuclear power and strategic partnership with China.

NATO'S third round of expansion, which has become a reality with the inclusion of seven more members, three of which are Baltic States in March 2004 is seen by Russia and China with great concern. Russia and China are also critical of the military presence of US in the Central Asian region.

Economically both Russia and China are useful to each other. Russia can give what China has not and China can give what Russia has not. That is China can supply consumer goods while Russia can give manufactured goods to China. Russia

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1 Discussion with Prof. Boris Kulik. Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow on October 13, 2003.
is developed in technology. Historically also, in the Tsarist period, there was intensive cooperation. This experience can also be used to advance the relations. China’s Western region, Xinjiang is underdeveloped. Russia can help solve its backwardness. Also, Russian industrial output may not have markets in Europe or may not be good for them. But for China it is good and there is a market.

Both the countries are facing the same problems of transition to the market economy. China has become much more advanced in the economic sphere. Market economy has already formed there. Russia can use the Chinese experience for its development especially, the Chinese way of establishment of free trade zones.

Both Russians and Chinese have similar features in their mentality—collectivism etc. i.e. to safeguard state interests more than individual interests. Though the Europeans criticise this aspect in the name of human rights, the attitude of Russia and China towards human rights is similar. For the people of Russia and China, the state was the institution they look upon or depend on. This is true for China also.

**Russia China Relations: A Historical Background**

The Russian Chinese interaction has been a turbulent one throughout history. The Russian revolution of 1917 inspired the May 4th Government of 1919 in China and the formation of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921. Subsequently, Soviet Russia trained and organised Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang Army in the 1920s. During the Chinese civil war, Stalin maintained good relations with China. Stalin and Mao closed ranks in their struggle for socialism in China and against world
imperialism. Stalin formed a military alliance with the Kuomintang Government against the Japanese in 1937.

Although the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership had good reason to be suspicious regarding the intentions of the Soviet leaders, they were highly sensitive nonetheless both to Stalin's position as the leader of world communism and to the legitimacy that the new Chinese regime could gain from an alliance. The Soviet Union had the power and capability that was better than that of China. In the same manner, in the Soviet view, association with the new Chinese state was both a practical way of defending its eastern flank, and thereby countering increasing American influence in Asia. So bringing politically unorthodox ideological brother under the wing of Soviet leadership became important. The suspicions and misperceptions between China and the United State that became so evident during the Korean War, underlined the objective convergence of Soviet and Chinese policies during the early 1950s.

The 30 years Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance by the Governments of the People Republic of China (PRC) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) was signed at Moscow on 14th February 1950. On 27th March 1952, the PRC and Soviet Government signed an agreement to set up joint ventures for the survey and explorations of oil and other resources in Xinjiang. A number of documents were signed on economic and technical co-operation at Beijing on 12 October 1954. An agreement to construct railway lines to link PRC and the Soviet Union, especially the Alma-Ata-Urumchi railway link was also signed. The Sino-Soviet agreements of 1954 marked the high point of cooperation between the PRC and the Soviet Union. As
per the agreement of 1950, Soviet Union handed over all the rights in the Sovsinoil and Sovsinmental joint companies to China.³

The late fifties saw the beginning of a rupture between the two countries, which culminated in military clashes in the late sixties. The discord began with the Chinese concern about growing Soviet influence in China. Stalin surrendered control of Xinjiang after the communist victory in China, but retained Port Arthr and Dairen, which were returned by his successors in 1954 only. The ideological differences came to the surface in 1956 at the time of Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Matters came to a head when on 16 July 1960, Moscow recalled its specialists from China. That event may well be looked upon as marking the point of no return in Sino-Soviet relations. At the Moscow Conference of the communist Parties in 1961, the Sino-Soviet rift came open.

China abandoned its policy of friendship with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Indeed, the Chinese Government of the PRC took a stand against them. The border dispute between the Soviet and China became the issue of Sino-Soviet relations. China made it public on 7 March 1963 while responding to an attack by the Communist Party of the United States of America. It described the Treaties of Aigun, Tientsin and Pecking as "unequal treaties" forced on China by imperialist and colonial powers in the second half-of-the nineteenth century. It also said that it would "recognise abrogate, revise or re-negotiate them according to their specific contents."⁴

⁴ Ibid.
According to First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, the Sino-Soviet border had taken shape historically. He dealt with the border question in a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) on 29 Nov 1963. He wrote: “Naturally we will not defend the Russian tsars who permitted arbitrariness in laying down the state boundaries with neighbouring countries. We are convinced that you too do not intend to defend Chinese emperors who by force of arms seized not a few territories belonging to other.”

There were clashes along the Sino-Soviet border in the late 1960s. Premiers Alexei Kosygin and Zhou Enlai met at the Beijing airport on 12 September 1969 in an effort to break the stalemate that had come about in the wake of the conflict on the ChenBao / Damansky Islands in the Ussuri River on 2 March 1969. The border clashes between PRC and the Soviet Union ceased. However, the Chinese continued to talk of an impending war with the Soviet Union. The Soviet and Chinese Governments held border talks in Beijing from 20 October 1969 onwards, intermittently and sporadically. From 1969 to 1973, Moscow made a series of proposals dealing with all aspects of the Sino-Soviet relations, including their border and territorial concerns in Central Asia. The Soviet Union persisted with the talks even in the face of Chinese hostility.

Another dimension to the growing hostility between Russia and China were the serious ideological differences. Their interpretation of the ideology differed a great deal. The leftist communism of Mao Zedong, eventually damaged relations not only with the Soviet Union, but also with all the ruling communist parties except Albania, Vietnam and North Korea. Mao rejected, as mentioned, Khrushchev’s “de-
Stalinisation” at the Twentieth Soviet Party congress in 1956, as well as the reforms in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. China objected bitterly to the Soviet reconciliation with “revisionist” Yugoslavia.

China also regretted Khrushchev’s cooperation with the nationalist leaders of the newly independent nations of Asia and Africa. In the Sino-Indian border clashes of 1962 Soviet support to India was resented by China, a fraternal ally of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev’s insistence that nuclear weapon had made general war unthinkable and peaceful co-existence was imperative led Mao to seek accommodation with the United States.

The Chinese claims were accompanied in the middle and later 1960s by claims against Soviet territory in the Far East-claims that led the Soviets to increase their military deployments along the border with China from fifteen to forty five military subdivisions within a few years, and to expand their regional air and naval forces. During the height of cultural Revolution (1966-69), the severity of Chinese verbal attacks on the Soviet Union greatly increased, as did that of Soviet responses, and the Border conflict in March 1969 at Damansky (or Chenpao) Island were followed by a broadcast statement from China affirming, Soviet Union as China’s “principal, most dangerous enemy”.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union started a campaign against the Chinese Communists Party (CCP) leadership in 1969, seeking to separate-it from Peoples liberations Army (PLA). The PLA was urged to disobey orders to attack the party apparatus, and the native peoples of Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet were urged to

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“Struggle against Mao’s inhuman chauvinism”. The Soviet propaganda meanwhile was exceedingly hostile.

The Chinese challenge to existing borders in the 1960s, repudiation of the “unequal treaties” of the nineteenth century-implied potential territorial claims. After the border clashes of 1969, the Soviet Union began a huge build-up of border forces in the late 1960 and 1970s, and often led to a feeling of possible preventive actions against the Chinese nuclear facility at Lanzhou. For the Soviet Union a heavily armed China conventionally and developing nuclear weapons, was a great danger. Unfortunately, such a response served only to militarise the conflict, adding to the Sino-Soviet tension that continued to increase during the 1970s.

In the 1980s Sino-Soviet relations changed for the better again as the post-Mao leadership concentrated its priorities on modernization of the country, an objective that required a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. It was during the last days of Brezhnev’s regime that the Soviet Union also began to reconsider its stand vis-à-vis China. It was Brezhnev who first extended a hand of friendship to China in his speech at Tula in March 1980.

On assuming power Mikhail Gorbachev expedited the process of normalising relations with China. He addressed the three obstacles listed by China for an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. These obstacles were Soviet withdrawal of support to Vietnam and Afghanistan, and a solution to the border question. The result was that in May 1989, Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping met in Beijing and announced full normalisation of bilateral relations. When Chinese troops put down a pro-democracy demonstration in Tiananmen Square a month later it did affect the Sino-
Soviet relationship. Soviet Union and China once more moved in opposite directions, relations cooled, and mutual suspicions resurfaced.  

However, while Soviet and Chinese governments were moving apart ideologically and politically, communist party apparatchiks in the two countries closed ranks. Beijing was eager to help the communists to retain power in Soviet Union. Conservatives surrounding Gorbachev used this “China Card” to try and persuade their leader to retreat from perestroika and to “put the Soviet house in order “.... Nevertheless, China heartily welcomed the abortive Soviet coup of August 1991 (with out publicly admitting it)”.  

**Russia -China Relations in the Post Soviet Period**

It has become imperative for Russia to settle the border with China in the context of its declining military power. The border between Soviet Union and China, which is above 7000 kilometres, has been reduced to just over 4000 kilometres with the break up of Soviet Union. However, the border still remained militarised and mutual suspicions were high. Negotiations on border settlement, which started earlier, therefore continued in the post Soviet period. Securing the border was also one of the pertinent foreign policy objectives of China which aimed at building good relations with neighbouring countries and settling border problems to facilitate the final unification of Taiwan with the mainland. 

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9 Discussion with Prof. V.S. Myasinikov, Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow on November 26, 2003.
As discussed in chapter one, the disappointments in Russia's relations with the West and the US in the initial period made Russia look for partners in Asia especially China and India. By 1996, Russia and China have developed confidence and China accepted President Boris Yeltsin's proposal to develop their relations to strategic partnership. As an alternative to the unipolar world, the new Foreign Minister of Russia, Yevgeny Primakov advocated multipolar world, which China agreed. The expansion of NATO, US plans to modify ABM, NATO bombing in Yugoslavia in 1999 without UN approval brought further convergence of interests between Russia and China. However, multipolarity meant two different things for Russia and China. For Russia it gave more flexibility in dealing with other countries. For China, the purpose was to reduce the US influence in the Asian region. The events of 9/11 has shown the ad-hoc nature of Russia- China relations with Russia siding with US and was mild in its response to NATO expansion and the end of ABM security framework.

For China, which has entered, the phase of military modernization has been subject to sanctions after the Tianamen massacre in 1989. So it found Russia as the only willing supplier of weapons. More over China's military is based on the Russian technologies of the 1950s and its indigenous military modernization programmes were not so successful. China's nuclear capability is also of Russian origin. The growing Chinese economy requires undisrupted supply of energy. In 1993 China became a net importer of energy and most of it was shipped generally from the Middle East. So it requires sufficient naval power to prevent any blockade.
to transport routes. For Russia weapons were the only marketable commodities in the initial Post Soviet phase and so it was looking for clients. As defence production was the leading industry, in the Soviet period, its products were still the best, which could sell in the market. Moreover, domestic compulsion of keeping the industries going were other factors that made the supply of arms an important item of export. Since defence spending was drastically cut, sales were the only means to maintain the industry and China was found to be a new client for Russia.

A stable Central Asia is in the interest of both Russia and China. The disintegration of Soviet Union has brought three new states between Russia and China. China found them to be sources of energy and natural resources and that of geopolitical influence in the region, which were otherwise sphere of former Soviet influence. Russia also tried to retain control over this states and led the border negotiations with China in the 4+1 formula and in 1996 confidence building measures were signed. These informal meetings were later institutionalized in the form of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Though there has been considerable loss of territory by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to the Chinese advantage, these Central Asian states are cooperating with Russia and China through SCO in areas of countering terrorism, trade and security (Uzbekistan joined in 2002). The Central Asian states also welcomed US forces and western

10 China foresees a blockade if it attempts to forcefully unify Taiwan.
11 Maratha Brill Olcott, Taking Stock of Central Asia. Journal of International Affairs 2003 pp.6-7 The concession of territory by the central Asian States was a recognition of China’s potential for hegemonic power in the region and all of regions leaders were eager to ingratiate themselves with leaders in China. Well before 9/11 Russia has been overshadowed in the region by the US and Central Asian states own broader engagement with European and other Asian states. After 9/11 Russia reinvigorated collective security arrangements involving Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan as well as those of SCO.
investment as a policy of diversifying their foreign relations. Terrorism emerging from this region has been considered as a threat by Russia and China. Though China and Russia dislikes the US force presence in Central Asia they are not complaining. In fact the presence of multiple entities in the region prevents the domination by any particular entity.

For China, Russia can be a source of energy. The 2001 trey provides plans for building an oil pipeline from Angarsk in Siberia to Daqing in China. On May 28, 2003 While China’s president Hu Jintao was visiting Russia, the heads of the state owned CNPC and Yukos signed a 25-year general agreement for the supply of $150 billion worth of crude oil to China from Eastern Siberia. But Japan has also come up with an alternate plan, which will connect Angarsk with Russian port Nakhodka in the Japanese sea and a sub pipeline to Daqing. This will give Russia access to more markets. Building pipelines has strategic importance and the route still has not been finalized. Economically and strategically the second one is better for Russia.

The country that gets the main pipeline Japan or China has great advantage over the other who gets the sub pipeline. If Russia chooses Japan in this regard, it will dilute

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12 Ibid, Olcott argues that the US force presence has not challenged the Chinese confidence of regional influence and the war on terror helped to advance some foreign policy objectives by inducing US to add Uighur groups to the list of foreign terrorist organizations.

13 David Murphy, Asia’s Pipeline Politics, Far Eastern Economic Review, July 24, 2003, p.13-16. China’s total oil needs are expected to grow from 34% in 2002 to 80% by 2030. Russia and Central Asia are particularly attractive because they share land border with China and offer secure access to energy. They are the top areas identified by Beijing for investment and sourcing of overseas energy resources. It is also aimed at making China less vulnerable to a perceived US threat to its energy security. China does not have the naval power to ensure safe passage of its oil imports in case of a flash point in China-US relations over Taiwan issue. Another dimension is that US has built a strong security presence in Central Asia after 9/11 and has established military bases in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and a limited military relationship with Kazakhstan. To counter the US influence China has worked hard to breathe a new life to SCO. China hopes its role in the SCO will further its economic objectives.

14 Interview with Prof. Sergei Lounev, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow on 10 October, 2003.
the partnership with China. But China also behaves with Russia in economic matters with market spirit than partnership spirit. It is reported that the recent antidumping duty on Russian steel imported to China during Russian foreign ministers visit to China in January 2004 is for pressuring Russia on pipeline routes. This also conveys the message that China doesn’t want to mix political relations with economic interest.

**China’s Security Concerns**

As noted by Prof. Sergei Lounev, China plans for long term while the Europeans plan for tomorrow.\(^{15}\) China’s ultimate goal is parity in economic, political and military strength with the world’s leading powers by the middle of the 21\(^{st}\) century and predominance in Asia. In this context Taiwan and US poses serious concern for China.\(^ {16}\)

The unification of Taiwan with mainland remains the near immediate objective of China. China considers this as its 23\(^{rd}\) province. To attain this objective, China has adopted a policy of settling all its outstanding border disputes with neighbouring countries.\(^ {17}\) China fears that if Taiwan acquires the latest types of weapon systems from US and is also covered by missile defence; it might be encouraged to declare independence. To thwart any such move, China is concentrating on building up its missile forces. It expects to achieve naval and air

\(^{15}\) Ibid.

\(^{16}\) Ibid.

\(^{17}\) Interview with Prof. Boris Kulik, Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow, on 13 October, 2003.
superiority over Taiwan straits by the end of the decade.\textsuperscript{18} It is widely believed that China would not do anything in the international scene that would reduce the chances of attaining this objective. This aspect reduces the chances of China posing as a threat to Russia in the near future.

China has deep suspicions about the US role in Asia. The US has acquired military presence in Central Asia, Afghanistan and Caucasus. It has also forged security relationships with Pakistan and India. China sees these developments as a kind of encirclement. China’s goal of becoming the pre-eminent power in the continent requires weakening of US influence in the region.\textsuperscript{19} Security analyst, Prof. Bolyatko notes that, “My Chinese brothers do not agree that force is essential to maintain peace in Afghanistan.”\textsuperscript{20} The Chinese are much more worried than the Russians in this regard. Note that NATO forces entered Asia for the first time, in Afghanistan in 2001.

To deal with these issues, China took a series of steps. It has become important for China to settle the border issue with Russia. Through a series of negotiations, this has been achieved and the 2001 treaty declared that the entire border has been settled except two tracts of territory, which would maintain status quo i.e. currently under Russian jurisdiction. This has secured China in the Western front.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
Military modernization was also essential to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence.\textsuperscript{21} China is making large-scale purchase of weapons from Russia. In 2001, China became the largest recipient of Russian weapons. Every year, China buys more than $1 billion worth of weapons from Russia.

\textbf{Russia’s Security Concern in Respect of China}

While Russia is building confidence in its relations with China, it has some security concerns with that country too. According to Alexei Arbatov, a Russian analyst, “the development of relations with China serves as an important triumph card for Moscow in its relations with USA, but undoubtedly, Russia’s national interest should occupy the first place. Moscow has no obligation to protect the deterrent potential of China. China on its part too doesn’t consider the Russian Federation as a military political ally and in every case clearly defends its own national interests.”\textsuperscript{22}

Surely, Russia China relations are not an alliance and are not directed against the US.\textsuperscript{23} The Russian perception of China itself is contradictory with many in Russian

\textsuperscript{21} Ravinder Pal Singh, Arms Procurement Decision Making. Vol 1 China, India, Israel, Japan, South Korea and Thailand. P.36-42. While analyzing the factors influencing China’s arms procurement policy the author notes the following points-A US policy of confrontation will strengthen its arms procurement; If Taiwan declares independence, China may resort to military force. After 1991 Taiwan increased its arms imports mainly from USA. It aims to possess 340 fighter aircraft including 150 F 16s, 60 Mirage 2000-5s and 130 indigenous ones. It has also leased frigates, landing ships and mine sweepers from USA. The author argues that only way to prevent Taiwan from becoming independent is to maintain China’s military advantage over Taiwan; 85% of China’s foreign trade is by sea. It has become a net oil importer in 1994. So protecting sea lines are important for economic security; PLA is at least 15 years behind Russia and 40 years behind USA. In order to ensure the security of the country’s economic achievements the PLA must commit itself to keeping the enemy outside China’s territory. This strategy is active defence. The author concludes that arms procurement will be maintained at current levels if Taiwan restrains efforts for independence. Economic development priorities will be maintained for at least 15 years and so China is likely to increase arms procurement steadily, but not drastically.

\textsuperscript{22} Alexei Arbatov, Ballistic Missile Defence and prospects for Strategic Stability in Russia and Arms Control. IMMEMO Contribution to Sipri Year Book 2001(Moscow: Institute of World Economy and International Relations, 2002) p.31.

elite consider China as a potential adversary. Then why does Russia develop the military capability of such a neighbour? Since 1991, there has been extensive arms transfers and technology to China, which includes air defence systems, fighter aircrafts and naval systems. In the year 1992-96 China became the largest recipient of major conventional weapons from Russia.

The reasons for this sale are that (1) the Russian defence budget has been drastically cut and so sales is the only means to maintain the industry and employment opportunities, it has lost (2) Arms sales to China brings hard currency and consumer goods, (3) arms sales could strengthen the bilateral relationship, China and India is the largest recipient of Russian weapons, (4) it could make Russia aware of China’s military strategies.  

(2003) 709-732 The authors argue that Russian arms sales to China represents the main link between the countries and forms the basis of their deepening relationship. The authors answers the question why Russia would sacrifice its long term relative position vis a vis China to make short term gains- the decline of Russia’s position, the pragmatic nationalistic position advocated by Primakov to combat US hegemony by way of combination of Russia, China and others, to save the collapse of an industry crucial to its economy and security and to earn urgently needed hard currency, and identity issues like fear of US domination mixed with wounded pride and resentment. To stress the weakness of their alliance the authors point out that there is no evidence of high level efforts by Russians to coordinate policies with China even three months after the treaty of friendship has been signed in 2001 when Putin renewed interest in NATO or he didn’t raise voice against US withdrawal from ABM. The authors identifies the only external factor that could transform the weak alliance into a stronger one. I.e. “if US dashes Putin’s expectations and denies Russia the anticipated benefits of bandwagoning, Moscow could still return to a balance of threat strategy” In such a situation the mutual determination of Russia and China to counter American threat would replace arms sales as the foundation of the relationship. 

24 Alexander A Sergounin and Sergev V Subbotin. Sino-Russian Military Technical Cooperation: a Russian View in Russia and the Arms Trade edited by Ian Anthony. (Oxford: SIPRI/Oxford University Press,1998) p.194-216. The authors argue that the need for Russia to support its defence industry, the hope that their bilateral ties will provide them with strategic counterweight to US hegemnism, the rise of Japanese power, or militant Islam were the reasons for the reopening of military ties between Russia and China. The authors also note that this could have a destabilizing effect on the regional security debate. Kortunov notes that the end of East West confrontation reduced the arms market and safeguarding defence industrial interest became the dominant interest in the military industrial complexes of arms exporters. In Russia arms production dropped over 60% in 1992 and huge number of employees lost their position. Since 1992 a framework for export control has started to take shape in Russia which pays due regard to country’s military economic
The Russian arms sales to China are primarily economic but it is not the only element in its arms transfer policy and it partly fulfils the foreign policy objective of building a multipolar world.\textsuperscript{25} However, their desire for multipolarity stems from their own security interests and largely rests on the political declarations. For Russia, a strategic understanding with China helped to integrate into the East Asian political and economic institutions like ASEAN.

The Far Eastern region of Russia is scarcely populated and underdeveloped though it is rich in natural resources. But on the other side of the border with China is heavily populated and large-scale migration is taking place. The number of Chinese in the Far East is hotly contested; estimates vary from 100000 illegal Chinese in the region to millions. In the past 25 years, public opinion was that China is an enemy and a danger. The Chief of the Russian Federal Migration Service has warned that Chinese immigration and Russian emigration could lead to the Chinese becoming the dominant ethnicity in the Far East.\textsuperscript{26} According to Alexei Bogaturov, deputy director of the Institute of USA and Canada “What we see in the Russian Far East is the peaceful and slow colonisation of all Russian territories in the area by the Chinese. We have a great problem, I think.” Litalji Vitaliji Alvestovich, Prof of economics, Institute of Asian and African Studies also raises concern about the declining Russian population, which may result in loss of Russian control in the

\hspace{3cm}and military political interests. (Sergey Kortunov, The Influence of External Factors on Russia’s Arms Export Policy in. Russia and the Arms Trade. pp.93-105).
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid p.196.
\textsuperscript{26} Sue Davis, The Russian Far East the Last Frontier? (London; Routledge, 2003) p.92.
region in the future.\textsuperscript{27} However, Prof. Kulik of Institute of Far Eastern Studies agrees with the Chinese stand on the issue that they are not deliberately prompting migration and if Russia considers it as a problem, Russia has to enforce law strictly and take preventive measures.\textsuperscript{28} Till date, the illegal migration of Chinese into the Far East has not become a major issue between the two countries. It could, if Russia does not take measures to halt illegal migration.

\textbf{Military Cooperation}

Defence is one of the major areas of cooperation between Russia and China. There have been extensive arms sales to China from Russia. The sales involved latest defence technologies also. Around 1500 Russian specialists are working in Chinese defence establishments. This means that the Russian government is not considering China as a threat in the immediate future. Such cooperation is serving Russia’s national interests also.

The first discussion on arms sales began during a June 1990 visit to Moscow by Gen Liu Huqing, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Central Military commission.\textsuperscript{29} The deal for 24 Su 27 fighter aircraft with 2 Su 27 UB trainer versions was signed during the Soviet period but received after the fall. During Yeltsin’s visit to China in 1992 most extensive military agreements were concluded with China since the 1950s and he promised to sell “the most sophisticated armaments and weapons”. On

\textsuperscript{27} Discussions with Prof. Litali Vitaliji Alvestovich, Institute of Asian and African Studies, Moscow State University, Moscow on September 26, 2003.
\textsuperscript{28} Discussions with Prof. Boris Kulik, n.1.
\textsuperscript{29} Alexander A Sergounin and Sergey V Subbotin, \textit{Russian Arms Transfers to East Asian the 1990s}, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), P.70.
December 18, 1992 an intergovernmental memorandum on military technical cooperation outlining the principles of cooperation was signed.

1996 began with a $2 billion contract to co-produce the Su-27 (Flanker) fighter aircraft in China. In 1996, Russia delivered arms and ammunition to China worth $728 million.\(^3^0\)

Sale of a second batch of 24 Su-27 (plus two twin seated trainers) was reported in early 1995. Some Su-27 aircraft from the second arrived in China to coincide with Yeltsin’s visit in April 1996. That time he agreed that Russia would transfer a third batch. The joint statement signed that time expressed their intention to further “friendly exchanges between their military force at various levels and strengthen their military cooperation in military technology.

In 1996 Russia agreed to produce and assemble in China 300 Su 27 SK Flanker aircraft. Their Chinese designation is J11. The first two locally made Su 27 aircraft made first flight in December 1998.\(^3^1\)

In 1994, China bought 4 kilo class [877EKM] submarines from Russia. The first was delivered as early as February 1995, the second and third in 1996-97. The fourth was expected in 1998. A deal for sovremenny destroyers worth $800 million was finalized during visit to Moscow by Chinese Prime Minister Lee Peng in December 1996. The first was delivered in 2000. The two destroyers will substantially enhance PLA surface strike capabilities and its ability to deploy over long distance.

\(^3^0\)ibid. P.71.
In August 1999, there were reports of sale of two-typhoon class nuclear powered submarine deal when Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov visited China. It is capable of launching nuclear warheads.

It is reported that Sukhoi Plans to sign new contract with China for supply of 24-28 Su-30MKK Multi role fighters. This is the third such agreement since 1999. The first contract involved 38 platforms, all of which have been delivered. The second deal signed in 2001 involved 38 aircraft. Each deal was worth $1.5 billion and $1.8 billion. Out of the 60 combat aircraft exported by Sukhoi in 2002, 19 Su-30 MKK was to China and 10 Su-27 UBKs and 10 Su-30 MKIs were to India. 

In 2002, all Russian exporters of weapons delivered $4.8 billion worth military equipment and their profits came up to $4.5 billion, according to Chairman of Russian Federation Committee on Military Technical Cooperation Mikhail Dmitriyev. Director Gen. of Rosoboroexport told that his company exported $4 billion military equipment. Independent exporters exported $800 million. India and China were the main recipients.

Sukhoi wants partners to reduce the burden of financing and developing cost effective war aircraft to compete with its American counterparts. Russia has expressed willingness to include China in developing fifth generation Sukhoi fighter planes along with India. India, China, European Union and Israel are successful in implementing joint projects with Russia. But China’s ability to invest considerable

34 Asian Age, Feb 9, 2003.
funds in joint programmes is devalued by high military and political risks upon
Russia.\textsuperscript{35}

The defense acquisition also shows China’s intention to modernise its
military capabilities along with economic development. Russia is also interested in
seeing China stable and technologically and militarily developed. This ensures the
possibility of Multi dimensional cooperation for Russia, which is consistent with the
foreign policy concept and the national security concept of the Russian Federation.

\textbf{TABLE 3.1}
\textbf{TRANSFER OF MAJOR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS BY RUSSIA TO CHINA 1992-2002}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No ordered</th>
<th>Weapon designation</th>
<th>Weapon description</th>
<th>Year of order/ licence</th>
<th>Year of deliveries</th>
<th>No delivere d</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>IL-76M Candid- B</td>
<td>Transport aircraft</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Barter deal worth $200m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>Ka 27PL Helix-A</td>
<td>ASW Helicopter</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Su-27 SK Flanker – B</td>
<td>FGA aircraft</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Deal worth $2.4 b; incl.6 Su 27UB trainer version</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(288)</td>
<td>AA-11 Archer/R -73</td>
<td>Air to air missile</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>(288)</td>
<td>For 24 Su 27 fighter aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Su 27 SK Flanker – C</td>
<td>FGA/ trainer aircraft</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Original order for 12 Su-27 SK FGA aircraft reduced to 2 Su 27-UBK trainer version</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{35} Daily Review, Jan 9, 2003.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(96)</th>
<th>Archer/R -73</th>
<th>Missile</th>
<th>1992-92</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AA-8 Aphid/R-60</td>
<td>Air to air missile</td>
<td>(96) AA-8</td>
<td>For 24-Su 27 fighter aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>SA 10 d/s-300PMU-1</td>
<td>SAM system</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>No. delivered could be 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>36D6/Ti n shield</td>
<td>Surveillance radar</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>For use with 4 SA-10d/s-300PMU SAM systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>76N6 Clam shell</td>
<td>Surveillance radar</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>For use with 4 SA-10d/s-200PMU SAM system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(144)</td>
<td>SA-10 Grumble/5v55R</td>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>(144)</td>
<td>For 4 SA-10d/s-300PMU SAM systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kilo class/Type 636E</td>
<td>Submarine</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kilo class/Type 877E</td>
<td>Submarine</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sovremenny class</td>
<td>Destroyer</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Originally ordered for Soviet Navy, but cancelled before completion and sold to China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Top plate</td>
<td>Surveillance radar</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>On 2 Sovremenny class destroyers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Brass tilt</td>
<td>Fire control radar</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>On 2 Sovremenny class destroyers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Front dome</td>
<td>Fire control radar</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>On 2 Sovremenny class destroyers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kite screech</td>
<td>Fire control radar</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>On 2 Sovremenny class destroyers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Palm fond</td>
<td>Surveillance radar</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>On 2 Sovremenny class destroyers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ShAMS/</td>
<td>7Gadfly/</td>
<td>ShShM</td>
<td>Sunburn/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ShAMS</td>
<td>Smerch</td>
<td>ShShaM</td>
<td>P-80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>system</td>
<td></td>
<td>system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>On 2 sovremenny class destroyers</td>
<td>for 2 sovremenny class destroyers</td>
<td>for 2 sovremenny class destroyers</td>
<td>for 2 sovremenny class destroyers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>AA-12 Adder/R-77</td>
<td>BVRAAM</td>
<td>(2000)</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>SA-10e/S-300PMU-2</td>
<td>SAM system</td>
<td>(2001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SA -10 Grumble/48N 6</td>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sokol</td>
<td>Combat ac radar</td>
<td>(2001)</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Zhuk</td>
<td>Combat ac radar</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2001-2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>As-17/kh-31 Al</td>
<td>Anti ship missile</td>
<td>(1997)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Kilo class/Type 636E</td>
<td>Submarine</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sovremney class</td>
<td>Destroyer</td>
<td>(2001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132</td>
<td>SA-17 Grizzly/9 M38M2</td>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>(2001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sipri Year Book, various years.
TABLE 3.2
OTHER SUPPLIERS OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS TO CHINA (1998-2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>France</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>For 2 Luhu class (Type 052), 2 Luhai class and modernisation of 2 Luda-1 Class (Type 051) destroyers and for 8 Jiangwei-2 class frigates; probably assembled in China; for use with crotale EDIR SAM System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(336)</td>
<td>R-44 Crotale</td>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1990-2001</td>
<td>(270)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>For 2 Luhu class (Type 052), 2 Luhai class and 2 modernised Luda-1 Class (Type 051) destroyers and for 8 Jiangwei-2 class frigates; possibly assembled or produced in China</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Italy</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>For 2 Luhu, 1 Luda-3 and Luhai class destroyers and 7 or 8 Houjian Class FAC; more produced for export</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UK</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>(Search water)</td>
<td>AEW radar</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Deal worth $62-66m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>For some 310 Su-27SK and Su-30 MKK FGA aircraft; supplier could be Russia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Border Agreements

In the evolving ties between Russia and China, the settlement of the lengthy border played a crucial role. The USSR shared 7000 kilometres of border with China. In May, 1991, an agreement was signed delimiting the eastern border which, defined largely by the River Amur and River Argun in the North and the Ussuri in the East, stretches 4200 km from the Russian – Chinese Mongolian three-way junction to an
area just South West of Vladivostok at the River Tuman. The Russian and Chinese Parliaments ratified this agreement in February 1992. However, the Chinese have claimed the two Ussuriyskiy (Heixiaxi) and Tarabarovskiy islands in the region of Khabarovsk, and Bolshoy Island in the upper reaches of the Aigun River have yet to be settled. This is because the islands are of strategic importance to Russia. In early 1992, negotiations began on the unsettled islands and the western sector of the border, which after the fall of the Soviet Union was shared by the PRC with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

In seeking the Supreme Soviet's ratification of the 1991 Russian-Chinese border agreement on 13 February 1992, the then Foreign Minister Kozyrev argued that it did not envisage any alteration of today's borderline on land nor 'any [Russian] territorial concessions'. Following Chinese ratification, the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that 'the whole borderline between Russia and China ... except for its Western section and three islands in the Eastern side' was settled. In 1993, a Russian-Chinese Joint Border Demarcation Committee began its deliberations, to demarcate the border with completion envisaged within five years. Further progress was made on 3 September 1994, when agreement was reached between the Russian and Chinese Foreign Ministers on the 55 km western section of the border. At the same time, Jiang and Yeltsin witnessed a protocol covering joint navigation guidelines for Chinese shipping using the Tumen River. Since then, the

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two sides have issued a series of statements pledging to complete demarcation on time and in full accord with the 1991 arrangement. On 24 June 1996, these agreements were supplemented by deals between Russia, China and Mongolia preparing for final demarcation of the three countries' border intersections.

Despite Russian Foreign Ministry confidence, the 1991 and 1994 deals did not cover all disputed areas. As already mentioned, agreements in 1991 was reached by omitting three islands – Bolshoy Ussuriisk and Tarabarov at the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri rivers near Khabarovsk, the site of border clashes in the late 1960s, and Bolshoy in the upper reaches of the Argun River in Chitinskaya Oblast– whose return was adamantly opposed by Russian regional and military leaders. President Yeltsin had made clear that they are non-negotiable. President Yeltsin reiterated this view just before his April 1996, summit with President Jiang. It was reported that when Gorbachev accepted the mid-ship channel principle these islands would remain with the Soviet Union because of the strategic significance. “There are instances in which we can agree to no compromises. For example, the issue to whom the three islands ... in the Amur River not far from Khabarovsk and the ... Bolshoy island in the Argun River in Chita should belong. With regard to this our position remains firm: the border should be where it lies now.”39 China is keen to recover these islands and talks continue, but Russian officials hope that they would be dropped once agreement is reached on the 1991 demarcation. However, the details of the 1991 accord have proved troublesome, providing the basis for campaign by Governor Nazdratenko. Although the precise principles by which disputed areas

were to be demarcated have never been made public, basic elements and disputed areas are well known. Gorbachev broke the stalemate in 1986 by agreeing that the basis for demarcation should be ‘the middle of the main navigable channel in navigable streams or the middle of the river in non-navigable streams’.\textsuperscript{40} The 1991 agreement enshrined these principles and provided for the Joint Border Demarcation Committee to determine the national status of the hundreds of disputed islands in border rivers. At least 11 areas have proved contentious, but as a result of a regional governor, Nazdratenko’s campaign, three areas between 2 km-and 10 km-square in the Khankaiskii, Ussuriiskii and Khansanskii districts have attracted the greatest attention.

In preparing for the April 1996 summit, President Yeltsin issued statements and decrees requiring strict conformity with the 1991 agreement and promising that demarcation would be complete by the end of 1997. In mid-1997, with Primorskii Krai in economic crisis, the Russian President attempted to strip Nazdratenko of his powers. Finally, during a summit between Yeltsin and Jiang in Beijing in November 1997, the two leaders declared the border dispute resolved.

However, the summit concealed Russian and Chinese differences over border demarcation. Although the two Presidents pronounced disputes at an end, no precise details of a final demarcation were released. No mention was made of the Tumen River, and the islands omitted from the 1991 agreement were again excluded. In the short term, this appears to be the best arrangement. Yeltsin has avoided risking his political legitimacy by insisting on an agreement, which might

see land being returned to China. In the long term, it remains unclear whether competing Russian and Chinese claims would be laid to rest.

The Treaty of 16 July 2001, proclaimed the absence of any mutual territorial claims between Russia and China and the desire to continue negotiations on those areas, which remain unresolved. Until the resolution of these issues the two parties pledged (in article 6) to observe the status quo that is the currently valid Russian jurisdiction. The two tracts of territory that have not been demarcated are-Big island in the Argun river in the area of Abagatui, and Tarabarov and Big Ussuri islands, in the Amur near Khabarovsk.

**Trade**

In the sphere of trade and defence there is extensive cooperation between Russia and China. In fact China is a neighbouring country and therefore there is more scope for cooperation in the area of trade between them than with India. However, except for nuclear programs and military technical cooperation the structure of Russian-Chinese trade is antiquated. Russia supplies China with ferrous and nonferrous metals, timber, and fuel with a shrinking share of machinery and equipment. China exports to Russia foodstuffs and consumer goods. In 1996, Russia’s trade turnover with China stood at $7 billion. However official two-way trade has increased during Putin’s period. In 2001 it was 10.67 billion and Russia became China’s eight largest trading partners. Machines and equipment rank first (29 percent) in Russia’s exports to China, ferrous metals 15 percent, mineral fuel 10 percent, Chemicals 9 percent, timber 8 percent, fertilizers 7 percent, fish and sea food 6 percent, nonferrous metals 5 percent, and cellulose 5 percent. Consumer goods such as leather goods, shoes,
clothes, and foodstuffs constitute 80 percent of Russian imports from China.\textsuperscript{41} Russia’s trade with China in 2003 was worth $13 billion to 14 billion. China’s emphasis is on improving border trade than on high tech projects. Prime Minister Mikhael Kasyanov during his visit to Beijing in September 2003 set out a list of priorities for foreign economic relations with China which are designed to improve the structure of trade. Within SCO as a whole, he singled out areas of economic cooperation as development of transport infrastructure, the energy sector, environmental protection and drinking water problem. Another priority is creation of timber, fish and seafood processing enterprises in border areas. He mentioned oil and gas as the third priority in Russia’s economic relations with China.\textsuperscript{42}

From the very beginning, China’s nuclear facility was developed by Russia. Currently, one nuclear plant is under construction, which may take three years to complete. In 2003, the Seventh session of the Russian-Chinese sub commission on nuclear matters discussed joint building of a floating nuclear power station using Russian atomic shipbuilding technology. It also discussed construction of the Tiaanwag nuclear power station and a uranium enrichment plant. Other joint priority includes high capacity computers and laser and material technology.\textsuperscript{43}

There is possibility of constructing new transport routes between Europe and Asia that can drastically change international trading routes in favour of Russia. The market situation is conducive to the development of the Trans Siberian railroad for

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[41] Mark a Smith Current Russo Chinese Relations, January 2003, Conflict Studies Research Centre, F 81 p.8. (internet file)
\item[42] M. Margelov, Russian Chinese Relations at their Peak, \textit{International Affairs}. 2003,Vol, 49 No.6, p.86.
\item[43] ibid p. 85.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
transportation of cargo from Europe to Asia and from Asia to Europe. Cargo shipment by rail from Europe to the Far East is 40 percent faster than by sea. Development of the Trans Siberian railroad is necessitated by China's plans to build a new silk route to Europe bypassing Russia and Kazakhstan. It is 1300 kilometre shorter than the trans Siberian route, beginning at Shanghai and leading on to Turkey and Eastern Europe. These two lines are complementary and connect different parts of Europe and Asia. In the words of Prof. Boris Kulik of Institute of far eastern studies, in matters of trade and economics, China often behaves in market spirit than in partnership spirit. That is not the partnership spirit. For some major contracts, China opted for Western companies than Russian companies. However, this issue cannot be a limitation on bilateral relations as in a free market economy, corporate governments look for profits.

**Summit Diplomacy**

Another dimension of the Russian-Chinese relations is the regular exchange of high level visits. This diplomatic exchange has added substance to the relationship. In mid December 1992, President Yeltsin paid his first visit to China. President Yeltsin and President Jiang agreed that the stability and prosperity in China is an essential part of world peace stability and prosperity. The two sides issued a joint statement highlighting the imperative need for "good neighbourly relationship". The two countries would develop their relationship according to the UN charter and on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for each others sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each others internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit,

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44 ibid p.68.
peaceful co-existence and other universally recognised rules on international relations. They signed more than 20 agreements on co-operation in science and technology, culture, peaceful use of space, mutual reduction of military presence along the border and building up confidence.

President Yeltsin’s visit marked a significant milestone in Sino-Russian relations. Subsequently, high level visits become frequent. Foreign Minister Andre Kozyrev, Chief of staff of the Russian Armed Forces Mikhail Kolesnikov, Chairman of the state Duma Ivan Rybkin and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin visited China with the objective of furthering Russian-Chinese relations. Chinese dignitaries visiting Russia included Liu Huaqing, Vice Chairman of Central Military Commission, Zhang Wannian, Chief of the General staff of the people's liberation Army, Defence Minister Chi Haotian and Foreign Minister Qua Qichen.

The second summit meeting between the two leaders was held in September 1994 in Moscow. Chinese President Jiang Zemin became the first Chinese leader to visit Russia since independence. They signed the Joint Statement outlining a constructive partnership. Russia and China pledged their determination to look towards the Twenty First century. The statement described the new relations as a constructive partnership of equality, mutual benefit and friendship. It is neither an alliance nor geared toward a third party. "Neither confrontations nor alliance is in the fundamental interest of our peoples. Only a relationship of friendliness and mutually beneficial co-

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47 Ibid.
49 Jennifer Anderson, n.38 p.20.
operation based on the five principles of peaceful co-existence best serves our two nations and world peace and development".\(^51\)

President Yeltsin and President Jiang and exchanged views on a number of issues of world significance and reached a consensus. These issues were recognizing the diversity and originality of nations, co-operation based on equality, opposition to power politics, opposition to antagonistic political, military and economic blocs, peaceful settlement of disputes, Asian-Pacific cooperation and support for nuclear non-proliferation. Discussion of these issues indicated that both Russia and China were seeking a reassurance from each other. There was a trend of disappointment in Russia vis-a-vis the West and China’s relationship with the U.S. remained uneasy.

In addition, the two sides signed a document agreeing not to target their strategic missiles at each other. This suggests that the two countries have officially ended the long-standing hostilities.\(^52\) Apart from improving bilateral relations, the move also clearly contributes to regional and global peace. Importantly, the two foreign ministers also signed an agreement on the demarcation of the Western section of the Sino-Russian border. With this accord, a major portion of the border has been settled legally. Now the border region once beleaguered with disputes and even military conflict has become a symbol of peace, stability and prosperity. Progress has also been made in reducing the military presence along the border and the building up confidence in the military field.

The 1994 Yeltsin Jiang Summit signalled a limited consensus within the two countries on the value of elevating bilateral relations to a new level. In Russia, support

\(^52\) Ibid.
for closer ties with China was approved by all shades of opinion; nationalist, communist and centrist political groupings. Nevertheless, the past historical experience and suspicion about China's long-term intentions, amidst an awareness of Russia's declining economic and strategic position in world affairs often came up for discussion within Russia. On the other hand China's commitment was pragmatic and limited. China had little faith in Russia's economic prospects and was wary of the implications of closer links for its independent foreign policy.53

As a result, China resisted Russian attempts to enhance the relationship. It insisted on the September 1994 formulation that the constructive partnership did not have the nature of an alliance and is not directed against any third country, but merely outlined broad parameters of co-ordinations on bilateral and international issues. Despite intensive talks over the meaning of the constructive partnership, the bulk of bilateral relations remained devoted to resolving outstanding normalisation issues.54 China's concern was not to jeopardise its uneasy relationship with the US and its allies in East and South East Asia.

Elements within Russia, however, continued to press for a more expansive relationship. As early as January 1994, Foreign Minister Kozyrev spoke of 'Strategic' rather than simply 'constructive' partnership. President Jiang told Chernomyredin in May 1994 that China looked to relations with Russia from a Strategic point of view whereas a constructive partnership, which has yet to be built, entails strengthening of


mutual trust co-operation in the UN security Council and a qualitative shift in trade and economic co-operation, including cooperation in the border provinces. The strategic partnership formula was an ambitious notion. China was in no hurry to embrace this formula and preferred to move more cautiously.

As for military ties during this period, the achievements were substantial. Sino-Russian military ties and co-operation have resumed after decades of interruption. The shift began with an official visit to the PRC in 1992 by the Russian Chief of general staff of the CIS United Armed Forces, V. Samsonov. During the visit, he confirmed (officially) for the first time that the PRC wanted to obtain not only SU-27 fighters, but also other types of arms from Russia. The PRC is concentrating on a so-called “Building of military quality,” which required a large amount of modernization of military hardware and technology. The “Agreement on sending experts of Russia to work in China” was signed during President Yeltsin’s visit to Beijing in 1992, when he also made it clear that arms sales would be an important component for developing bilateral relations based on economic benefit, not ideology. Less than a year later, in November 1993, Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev paid his first visit to the PRC and signed a five-year military cooperation accord between the two defence ministries. Among other things, the accord provides for consultations at ministerial and military regional levels and exchanges of information and experience in the military field. According to an analyst of the Sino-Russian relation, military co-operation also

allows the PRC to learn about the military doctrines and management methods of the Russian Federation.56

In May 1995, Russians Defence Minister Pavel Grachev once more visited to Beijing with military delegations, including nine Generals in order to strengthen mutual understanding, promote co-operation, build confidence and develop friendship between the armed forces of the two countries. It appeared that the Russians are interested in intensifying military relations with China. The highlight of the visit was the desire of Russia to broaden its military relationship with China by including considering their mutual security problems. Reportedly, during his visit to Beijing, Russian Defence Minister Grachev proposed to the PRC leaders “to solve the problems of security together”. It appeared that China did not show the same degree of enthusiasm as Russia. In their view, China would never enter into any alliance or bloc and would not create such as alliance”, and reiterated that the two countries would become “good neighbours, good partners and good friends”.57

In April 1996, Russian president Yeltsin paid his second official visit to China in four years. Originally, it was expected to be a venue for signing the five nation CBM agreement. However, by the time, the summit took place in April 1996, the atmosphere between Russia and China had changed. Just 24 hours before the meeting, President Yeltsin telephoned President Jiang from his stop-over in Khabarovsk, formally proposed that the two would establish a 'strategic partnership for the twenty-first

57 Ibid., p.24.
century'. Jiang immediately accepted the proposal. The key elements of this partnership were:

1. deeper political and economic ties;
2. increased two-way trade (to $20 billions by 2000);
3. multilateral security arrangements, possibly serving as a model in the Asia-Pacific regions;
4. Co-ordinated positions on the UNSC; respect for national sovereignty and non-interference in each others domestic affairs and;
5. A commitment to a multi-polar world order.  

During the third summit meeting in April 1996, the third joint statement was signed announcing the two countries resolve to develop a strategic partnership of equality, mutual confidence and mutual coordination directed toward the 21st century. In this, the two sides reiterated their strict adherence of the various principles set forth in the Joint Statement on the Basis of Relations with the People's Republic of China and Russian Federation and the Joint Statement by the Peoples Republic of China and the Russian Federation signed on September 3, 1994.

The partnership with China reduced Moscow's sense of abject dependency on the West. The Western attempts to marginalize Russia in international politics had not succeeded much. Ties with China, perceived as a resurgent power of Asia gave Russia a new confidence. Turning to each other, Russia and China could reactivate at least the skeletons of the strategic triangle and could preserve through multi-polarity the image, if not the essence, of their previous positions anchoring the global order. China's sudden decision formally to adopt a strategic partnership was promoted by heightened

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58 Jinnifer Anderson, 28, p. 22.
concern over US power and Moscow's determination to place its relationship with Beijing on the same footing as that with Washington. By early 1996, what support remained in Russia for stronger relations with the west had been undermined by NATO's decision in December 1994 to consider including former Warsaw Pact States and the weakening and the eventual dismissal of Foreign Minister Kozyrev in favour of Yevgeny Primakov. As former head of the Foreign Intelligence Service, Primakov had been a central figure in galvanising early opposition to NATO enlargement.

With the appointment of Yeugeny Primakov as the foreign Minister in January 1996, Russia explicitly advocated balancing US power through relations with China and developing parallel strategic partnerships with India and Iran. At the same time voices of concern continued to be expressed. Defence Minister Igor Rodinov's December 1996 suggestion that China was enlarging its influence at Russia's expense and might be a future threat was followed by a series of denials and public statements supporting the relationship. China became part of a Russian Policy of 'equal partnership' with all major powers. Links with China would improve Russia's trade balance, open markets for high technology exports and provide leverage against the US in Asia, Europe and international organisations. Behind both countries conception of their relationship is a common desire to counter balance US power. The Agreement on strategic partnership with China signalled that Russia and China were determined to

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63 Jennifer Anderson, n.38. p.27.
64 Ibid, p.23.
forge close ties. To a certain extent the external environment was responsible for the closeness that was becoming evident.

The April 1996 summit invoked the backdrop and imagery of the cold war strategic triangle; the meeting took place less than a week after a visit to Moscow by Clinton and within a month of the re-affirmation of the US-Japan alliance. Some Russian strategists believe that Russia has a historic opportunity to exploit Sino-US tensions to foster ties with China and the US simultaneously:

'...military co-operation with Moscow enables Beijing to bargain confidently with the US and to get what it needs - including economic assistance from America. Naturally, such a role constitutes very valuable political capital for Russia and it can be exploited. But, it can also be lost if we conspicuously turn our relations with China into something secondary, into a bargaining chip in dealing with the West (even if only in word).'

In April 1997, President Yeltsin and President Jiang held their fourth summit meeting in Moscow and signed a joint statement on the Multi-polarization of the World and the Establishment of a New International order, expounding their views and opinions on the current world situation and international relations. This agreement on the multi-Polar world highlighted Russian frustration with the West and the proposal to expand NATO by including countries belonging to the former socialist bloc. Russia perceived it as an attempt on the part of NATO to marginalize it in Europe. Having the ambition to emerge as a great power, Russia wanted to counter this move. In this attempt China was willing to support Russian aspirations.

During Jiang's visit to Moscow, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrghistan and Tajikistan signed the agreement on the mutual reduction of military forces along the

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border areas. This was another major achievement for both the countries. Peaceful borders imply they could turn their energies to internal task. The Sino-Russian Committee for Friendship, Peace and Development was formally set up.\textsuperscript{67}

During the fifth Sino-Russian Summit in Beijing in early November 1997, Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Russian President Boris Yeltsin exchanged views and reached a consensus on a wide range of issues.

During the Summit in 1997 President Jiang said the two countries’ relations enjoyed a solid political foundation. “Through various joint statements and other documents, the two sides have committed themselves to strictly observing the principles of mutual respect, equality and trust, mutually beneficial cooperation and common development.” The two countries had also adopted an effective mechanism, for carrying out the relationship, namely, a regular meeting exchange of visits at the highest level. On the question of the Friendship committee set up President Jiang Zemin Said the Sino-Russian Committee for Friendship, Peace and Development, offered people from all walks of life in the two countries an opportunity for strengthening their friendship and mutual understanding, further deepening the social foundation for Sino- Russian friendly relations and cooperation.

The leaders of the two countries agreed, “The Chinese and Russian sides will collaborate on moving the strategic cooperative partnership forward into the next century. Currently, President Jiang said, there were no unresolved issues between China and Russia, and this meeting would continue to push ahead the relations between the two countries. During the summit, the two heads of state announced

officially that the demarcation of the eastern border between China and Russia had been completed. President Jiang noted this was a matter of great significance for Sino-Russian relations. The two countries had already signed two border agreements, as well as important documents on confidence building and disarmament along the border areas of five countries. The resolution of border issues set an example for settling problems left over from history, Jiang said. Yeltsin pointed out that the two countries had highly complementary economies. The two countries had entered a number of economic cooperation and trade projects and had put forward many proposals in this regard. The two sides should further strengthen cooperation and implement the proposals as soon as possible, he said. The two leaders expressed full confidence that it was quite possible for the bilateral trade volume to reach US$20 billion by 2000 through continued joint efforts. During his visit President Yeltsin signed a Sino-Russian Joint Statement. Chinese Vice-Premier Li Lanqing and Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov signed a number of other documents on economic and technological cooperation, including a memorandum of understanding on the basic principles for laying gas pipelines and developing gas-condensate wells, an agreement on the principle of cooperation between Sino-Russian local governments, and a memorandum of understanding on the basic orientation of economic and technological cooperation.

Officials from relevant Russian and Chinese departments also signed a series of agreements on the joint economic development of individual islands in border rivers and surrounding waters, cooperation on diamond mining, protection of tigers and
supervision over financial institutions. During the meeting, both sides set the goal for raising the bilateral trade value to US$20 billion by the year 2000. The two countries will enter into larger scale cooperation in the future in areas such as petroleum, natural gas, electric power, aviation and space, machine building and high technology. As the two largest neighbouring countries and permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations, China and Russia bear especially important responsibilities for world peace and development. The joint declaration signed between the two countries in April last year was considered the “best formula for international relationship for the next century.” Over the past year and more, particularly through the recent summit meeting, the meaning of a strategic cooperative partnership has been enriched. In 2001 the Treaty of Good neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation was signed between Russia and China. The regular exchange of high level visits indicates the existence of commonality of interests between Russia and China in large measure. Whether this commonality will continue in future is difficult to say at this juncture.

**Russian Perception of China**

Perceptions influence policies and conduct of international relations. This is especially so in the present post bipolar period where major powers consider pre-emption as a national security strategy.

**The Official Perception**

The Russian perception of China varies at different periods of time. Changes in domestic and international politics influence this change of perception. The perceptions of various sections in Russian society towards China vary. At the

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governmental level, it was a period of intense activity. At the level of security, the border issues were settled and renewed arms sales to China. At the international level both countries were seen taking coordinated positions at UN on international issues. The official perception is that China is a partner of Russia for mutually advantageous reasons.

Numerous high level visits have been made between leaders of both the countries since 1991. During these meetings, documents were signed for strengthening cooperation and mutual confidence. Yeltsin made his first state visit to China in December 1992. The joint declaration on the basis of Sino-Russian relations signed during visit provided that Russia and China are obliged not to take part in any military political alliances against the other side or allow a third party to use territory to the detriment of the other sides security. The two countries would develop their relationship according to the UN charter and on the principles of mutual respect for each other. This positive perception towards China continued and described their relations as constructive partnership of equality, mutual benefit and friendship during Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s visit to Moscow in September 1994. The joint statement stated that, “It is neither an alliance nor geared toward a third party... Only a relationship of friendliness and mutually beneficial co-operation based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence best serves our two nations and world and development.”

On April 25, 1996, the leaders of both the countries met in Beijing. The joint declaration signed in Beijing announced their resolve to develop a strategic
partnership of equality, mutual confidence and mutual co-ordination directed toward 21st century.

The joint statement on the Multi-polarisation of the World and Establishment of a New International Order was signed by President Jiang Zemin and Yeltsin in Moscow on April 23, 1997. Yeltsin and Jiang, when they met in Beijing in November 1997, officially announced that the demarcation of the eastern border between Russia and China has been completed.

A Treaty on Good Neighbourliness, Friendship and co-operation between Russian Federation and Peoples Republic of China was signed on July 16, 2001. It reflected the shared views of the two countries on issues relating to strategic concerns and security. The treaty states that in case of a threat to peace the other party shall immediately enter into contact with one another and hold consultations aimed at eliminating the threat that has arisen. The Joint Declaration of December 2, 2002 underlines both countries willingness of to co-ordinate their positions and to support one another in issues that raise concerns of both the parties.

These official declarations show gradual elevation of Russia-China relations to successive higher levels. At the global level this is an expression of Russia's interests in building a multipolar world. At the bilateral level it means willingness to forget the past rivalries and settle all outstanding disputes in favour of better economic ties and regional stability. In short at the governmental level, Russia perceives China as its ally and a close partner in the present context.
Non-official views of China

Based on the views expressed by scholars, academicians, political party members and government officials, we may broadly classify their perceptions as follows.

1. Those who advocate greater ties with China
2. Those who favours a balanced policy with the West and the East, especially China
3. Those who consider China as a threat

Before we analyse these perceptions it must be borne in mind that it is difficult to bring the perceptions of people strictly under the above heads. For instance, some people favour greater ties with China but are not against relations with US. Currently no major organized group in Russia is against some kind of cooperation with China.

Those Who Advocate Greater Ties with China

Mikhail Titarenko, a highly renowned specialist on China and Director of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences and many scholars of that institute favour greater ties with China. According to Titarenko, the construction of friendly relations between the two countries on the basis of non-confrontation, non-alliance and non-targeting against third states serves a model of the new type interstate relations. To him the major circumstances which refute the idea of Chinese threat is that China's national leaders draft the programs to resolve the problems of their country on the basis of the even more profound policy of openness and cooperation with world community. The democratization of the very complex, multilayer and multinational Chinese society is also an important factor.  

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According to V.S. Myasnikov, Deputy Director of Russian Academy of Science Institute for Far Eastern Studies, the joint declaration signed on 25 April 1996 at Beijing set forth the idea of a possible Russia–China strategic interaction in the twenty-first century.\(^{71}\) The Russian-Chinese Treaty of 2001 is ‘to close the past’, including the twenty years of confrontation, and to sweep out the graffiti of the cold war. The Russian and Chinese stances coincide or are similar with respect to many key issues of contemporary life as to what the world structure would be like in the 21 century. Myasnikov’s earlier views were different. Earlier he claimed that “the very transformation of the border into a zone of active economic interaction radically diminishes the level of its security.”\(^ {72}\)

Alexander Yakovlev, Institute of Far Eastern Studies, is very much critical of Russia’s pro Western policies. He says Russia and China can act as inspirers and organizers of a new anti-hegemonist, anti-Western international front, which is to form eventually for purely objective reasons.\(^ {73}\) There are more than enough grounds to claim that despite possible tactical overtures to Russia in the future, the west will essentially in no way pursue a friendly strategy toward Moscow and consequently will force it again and again to take a more sober look at the role of the East in the struggle for sovereignty and independence of Russian state.\(^ {74}\) B.T. Kulik also believes that any act that undermines Russian-Chinese ties are to be resolutely and

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\(^ {74}\) Alexander Yakovlev, The Third Threat, China as Russia’s No 1 Enemy: How and Why a Prospective Strategic Partner is Being Made into a Strategic Adversary, *Far eastern affairs*, Vol. 30, No 2, 2002, P.40.
consistently opposed. He views ties with China as a vital element of state policy and an effective instrument for counteracting the cultural imposition of western values during globalization. Former Defense Minister Pavel Grachev was in favour of greater ties and in 1995 he called for Russia-China alliance as in the 1950s.

Regarding economic reforms the, the Popular Patriotic Union headed by Communist Party of the Russian Federation supported the view that the Chinese model of reforms is advisable for Russia. Most of the supporters of Oleg Rakhmanin belong to this group and most of them now work at the Institute of the Far East. The mainstream view of the Institute of Far East was that the aim of reforms in China was to achieve economic boom and to transform China into a modern, prosperous country with high living standards within a concrete and realistic period of time. The views of most of the nationalists are also close to this group. Alexander Prokhanov, editor in chief of patriotic newspaper ‘Zavtra,’ believes that the main achievement of the Chinese communists was finding the right balance between market and planned economy. Many non communist economists and politicians like Anatoliy Shatalin and Arkadiy Vol’skiy as well as Asian experts like Nodari Simoniya, deputy director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences have spoken in favour of the Chinese way. In Simoniya’s view, “the main principle of the economic strategy of the Chinese leadership was not allowing a decline of the existing production level in the process of reform, thus insuring that reforms were associated in mass consciousness

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76 Alexander Lukin, n.72, p.11.
78 Ibid.
with higher living conditions by means of which the societal support of the reform was secured. 79 According to A. V. Otrovsky, the most important thing for Russia in the Chinese experience is the comprehensive and integrated approach to the reform of the economic system, which ensures gradual transition without shock therapy from the command system to market economy under state control. He believes that the Chinese experience is preferable for Russia since it focuses on a rational combination of the state and the market. 80 But Boris Kagarlitsky, notes that there are fundamental differences between the two countries… In China it is the huge disciplined workforce that attracted foreign capital…. The orientation toward the west has to give way to a strengthening of economic, political and cultural links with the majority of humanity—the third world. 81

Balanced Policy

Some scholars and officials hold the view that Russia should follow a balanced approach in dealing with other countries. That is improving relations with West should not be at the expense of neglecting the East completely. According to Vladimir Rakhmanin, Deputy Director of First Asian Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, by expanding co-operation with China in military hardware, Russia is guided by the priority interests of its own security and its commitments to

79 Ibid, p.16.
international treaty and agreements. Safeguarding its own security is a keystone of Russian policy toward China.\(^{82}\)

According to Gregory Karasin, the then Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Russia-China interaction was profitable because the domestic industry could get badly needed support at a time when the country’s economy is struggling to put itself on the market track, and its design offices can keep their research potential…. Inferring the threat from a gap between the economic standards and population density in China and Russia’s Far East is an obvious mistake, a propaganda trick pursuing opportunist aims or else malicious intent…Russia and China have and will always have, their national interests that do not coincide in every particular. The relationship formula worked out by the two countries’ leaders presupposes active development of ties and cooperation with third countries by both Russia and China.\(^{83}\)

According to Igor Rogachev, Russia’s the then ambassador extraordinary to China, the declaration that neither has any territorial claims on the other made at the top governmental level put an end to the prolonged period of doubt and misunderstanding that have been fostered by certain individuals in both the countries. This will create a positive backdrop for the definitive resolution of all remaining border disputes between Russia and China.\(^{84}\) To him, “In their actual politics both Russia and China proceed from the priority of their national interests,

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not from some abstract categories. .... Our Chinese partners too make no secret of
their pragmatism acknowledging that their national interests will come first for
them.\textsuperscript{85}

Neither Moscow nor Beijing will under any circumstances allow cooling of
in their relations, no matter how the pro-Western officials in one country or the
other would like it. Each of them is tied to the other by deep-rooted interests, each
values the other as a reliable rear guard in their relations with the west. Neither of
them have any reason to reject these political and economic benefits.\textsuperscript{86}

According to Vassily Mikheev, Russian-Chinese relation is partnership as
well as rivalry. It partnership in the areas of security and global stability and rivalry
in areas of credit market, energy equipment and regional politics. Although
politically, Russia recognizes that it is not only European but also Eurasian, this is
not considered when developing economic strategies.\textsuperscript{87} To Mikheev, Russia is
declining and China is rising, so it cannot maintain the traditional apprehension of
China as potential threat. Thus a new perspective i.e. mutually beneficial co-
operation is required.

According to A. Mazin, supply of arms to China will help in getting control
over defence production. Otherwise some other sellers will be filling the gap.
According to Russian Ministry of Defence official’s Russia ahead of China by 15
years. Therefore China is not an immediate threat.

\textsuperscript{85} Igor Rogachev, Russia –China: The Principles and Parameters of Partnership, \textit{Far Eastern Affairs},
No. 3, 1997, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{86} Alexander Larin, Russia’s Chinese Policy Under President Vladmir Putin, \textit{Far Eastern Affairs}, No.
The deputy director of the Institute of the USA and Canada of the Russian Academy of sciences (ISKAN), Mikhail Nosov agrees that the Chinese population in the Russian border areas will continue to grow. But there is no danger of any Chinese territorial claims because the border demarcation has been already determined, and both sides are interested in better bilateral relations and stability in the border regions. 88

Yevgeniy Bazhanov, Deputy Rector of the Russian Diplomatic Academy, advocates a balanced approach to the West and the East and criticizes those who advocate military-political alliance with China. Such alliance would not be feasible and is prejudicial to Russia’s interests. 89 Regarding reforms he says, “our reforms could not follow the Chinese scenario by virtue of enormous differences between the two countries.” 90 In Leonid Vasil’ev’s view the starting conditions in the USSR were very different: the rural population was much smaller and the military industrial complex occupied a much greater share of the economy 91. So the Chinese model may not be useful for Russia. According to Sergey Trush, researcher at ISKAN, Russia should use Chinese foreign policy experience, which allowed China to “effectively co-operate with the USA within the framework of open door policy and at the same time maintain independence and originality of its own foreign strategy” 92.

88 Alexander Lukinn, 72, p.23.
90 Ibid, p.17.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid, P.25.
To Anatoly Bliatko, given the past experience of Soviet-Chinese military and technological cooperation, one should bear in mind that it has bounds, it would be unwise to cross.... Broad military and technological cooperation, including supplies to China of military technologies and equipment could strengthen the spirit of constructive strategic interaction in both the countries. His earlier view was that, "an imaginary threat may be turned into something perfectly real".

Regarding some media projection of China as a threat, Vladmir Lukin, Chairman of the International Affairs Committee of the State Duma says, "as it was in the past, there are bound to be problems in the future as well. In politics you can look only 10 to 15 years ahead. I am convinced that our relations with China may be very good in the next 15 years.... Our historic destiny is to become a bridge, to link whatever is the best in the West and in the East."94

P.B. Kamennev, military analyst from RAS Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Sinologist holds the view that China is not going to be a military threat because spending of China with respect to GDP in 1992-95 decreased and in 1989-92, 1995–98 remained same level. Taking into account, defensive nature of Chinese military doctrine it can be presumed that in the foreseeable future China's military spending will be determined in keeping with the principle of self-sufficiency. China is spending less than 2 percent of GDP on defence while Taiwan is 3.5 percent.

Foundation for long term research and Initiatives, which consists of representatives of Russian scientists and political and business circles jointly with

94 Vladmir Lukin, Russia-China Strategic Partnership: A Predictable Reality, Far Eastern Affairs, No. 3 1997, pp.63-64.
Institute of the world Economy and International relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences in its forecast of Russian foreign policy says “For Russia, it is important that rapprochement with China be a controllable process, which does not complicate the western vector of its foreign policy.”

China as a Threat

According to Victor Larin of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies, to the people of Far East memories of numerous border incidents are quite vivid. Trust need not be backed by arming one’s next door neighbour and potential rival in international politics.... Can a few billion dollars made from the sale to China of aircraft and technologies be really worth worsening of relations between Russia and East Asian countries alarmed by China’s growing military potential and ambitions?

According to Vassily Likhachev, (Vice Chairman of the Federation Council of Russia’s Federal Assembly), the current military doctrine of Russia differentiates between military threat as a possibility and an intention of another state to commit an act of aggression against Russia on the one hand and military threat as a real capability to commit such aggression irrespective of the aggressors intention to do it at a particular movement. As a matter of fact China is the only country among Russia’s next door neighbours which possess an appropriate military capability in this respect... It is just impossible to speak of strategic partnership in conditions when China’s real strategic interests are indeterminate, and will largely depend on

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the strength of the Russian positions in the far east, inherited from the Russian empire and the Soviet Union, and viewed by the Chinese as historical injustice.97

To Alexander Rannikh, director of the foreign ministry security department, "the world around views us from the commercial standpoint due to our size and economic possibilities inherent in our territory. If we cannot realize and develop what we have ourselves, if we are ready to give it away, people will simply line up to take advantage of it ... They will take advantage of any opportunity offered without batting an eye".98

To K. Kosachev, Vice Chairman of the State Duma International Affairs committee, Beijing is playing its own complicated game in which strengthening economic relations with the US and the complicated relations with Japan and India and much more are to be taken into account. The Chinese leaders can talk about multipolarity, the threat of American hegemony and so on but this is only moves in their game, so there is no point in deluding ourselves.99

According to political scientists in Russia, “if the current trend continues, China will become increasingly stronger and Russia will weaken and then relations could begin to get complicated. It is difficult to say how China will behave when it becomes a super power. We know from history that when China was stronger than its neighbours, it considered them barbarians and vassals. We are loath to maintain

97 Vassily Likhachev, Russia- China Strategic Partnership, Far Eastern Affairs, No2, 1997, pp.39-41
that China will act the same way in the future. But we need to be wary of such a turn of events.”

According to A Sharavin, Director of the institute of political and military analyses Russia need not to fear a military clash with NATO as they are concerned with human loses and military hardware. The resources in the Far East are countless “A billion Chinese are still living in poverty... the country has nothing to lose. The war looming on eastern boarders is one involving nuclear missile. It is no less realistic than a war with NATO or Islamic extremism.

But the defence minister Igor Rodinov in December 1996 said that China is potential adversary.

**Perception of Some Russian Political Parties Towards China**

To Vladmir Shirinovsky, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), in contrast to his deputy Mitrofanov, “today Russia has two main adversaries -the USA and China-who want to destroy us. To Aleksander Dugin, the chief theorist of National Bolshevik party, “China is dangerous to Russia for two reasons- that China has joined the structure of Atlantist geopolitics and is also a country of high demographic density in search of no man’s lands. To confront this he proposes to weaken china by supporting separatist movements and eventually to tear away Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Manjuria thus depriving china of a base for a potential “dash at the north”.

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100 Ibid p.15
102 Alexander Lukin, n.72, pp. 30-31.
The communist party had 125 members and was the single largest party in the Duma in 1998. Leonid Ivanchenko, Vice President of the communist party of the Russian federation and Sergei Afnaseev, member of Duma, during a discussion said that though they have not forgot the past, Russia has its own interest in developing strategic cooperation with China. According to Mitrofonov, deputy to the leader of LDPR, Russia “must do its utmost to strengthen China’s military might by selling arms to China”. That is, to him Russia and China “share a common interest in combating Anglo Saxon and Islamic influences.”

Some leaders and members of the liberal Yabloko party included China on the list of potential military threats to Russia. According to Aleksey Arbatov, a specialist in security and a deputy from Yabloko movement, in the future China can be a serious threat to Russia since its undemocratic political structure makes its development unpredictable.

Leader of Russia’s Choice Party and former acting prime minister, Yegor Gayder also wrote extensively on the necessity for Russia to depart from its oriental past and its Asiatic mode of production and to join the Western civilized world. To him, Moscow should transfer its military attention from the friendly democratic West to the hostile East.

Whatever be the objective motivations guiding Russia-China relations, the fact of extensive arms transfer had already made an impact on India. The events

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103 Ibid, p. 22.
105 Alexander Lukin, p.28.
followed by 9/11 also showed how Russia and China agreed to a world order, which recognizes the superior military power of the US.

The diversity in Russian perception of China is an indication of a cautious approach in Russia's relations with China. At the same time their relations cannot be reduced to mere arms transfer relationship. It is possible that the Western countries lift the sanctions imposed upon China and Russia has to face competition from Western suppliers in the Chinese arms market in the future. However there is improvement in trade relations year by year. Though contradictions and imprints of history exist, Russia China relations are guided by the perception that this is actually advantageous. Peace with China is very much essential for the stability of Russia. Having achieved complete normalization, together Russia and China is solving their common problems of terrorism, desire for influence and balance US interests in Central Asia through enhanced cooperation in SCO, cooperation in developing energy markets and transportation roots. However, while following a balancing approach, Russia under Putin administration is cautious that this would not lead to anti Americanism which may result in return to cold war which Russia can't afford. Good relations with China are ensuring Russia's participation in ASEAN and other East Asian economic institutions. But the specific problems and threats of each country like, for example China's plan to unify Taiwan or for Russia, the way NATO evolves in the coming years, ie whether Central Asian states also will be included, the threat of Missile defence posed on its security etc. are being met individually.