CHAPTER - I

WITTGENSTEIN'S CONCEPT OF GRAMMAR

Wittgenstein in his entire career devoted himself to methodological enquiries into the nature and structure of language and grammar. Interestingly enough, he had never attempted to build up a science of language or grammar. He attempted a reflective understanding of grammar. Thus he presented a philosophical grammar. The main structure of the philosophical grammar is the subject matter of this chapter. I shall explore the concept of grammar and its multifarious uses in Wittgenstein philosophical works in this chapter.

In Section 1, I shall discuss in general the concept of grammar in Wittgenstein's philosophy. There are, two models of grammar found in Wittgenstein's works: One is the calculus model and the other is the game model. These models are examined in the above section.

Section 2, brings out the main features of philosophical grammar particularly with reference to the Philosophical investigations and the Blue and Brown Books. The different aspects of this concept are discussed.

In Section 3 I discuss the notion of depth grammar and in section 4 and 5 I raise the question of whether the Wittgensteinian grammar is phenomenological.

In Section 6 I conclude that Wittgenstein has a distinctive
1. TWO MODELS OF GRAMMAR

Wittgenstein has worked out two models of grammar: the calculus model in the early period and the game model in the later period. Many believe that the two models are at cross purposes and sometimes contradictory to each other. In fact, there is an underlying unity of Wittgenstein's two models.

My effort in this section is to reconstruct the underlying unity of the two models. The reconstruction of the concept of a grammar will result in a number of significant issues which will be discussed in the subsequent chapters.

I. The Calculus Model:

The model of grammar presented in the Notebooks and Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus can be characterised as the calculus model as distinguished from the model presented in the Blue and Brown Books, Remarks on Foundations of Mathematics, Philosophical Investigations. The latter can be called as game model. However, it is not that both have not simultaneously existed in the Philosophical Remarks and Philosophical grammar.

The idea of calculus

According to Wittgenstein, every syntax can be conceived as a system of rules i.e., as calculas. Syntax is a formal notion of philosophical grammar that goes beyond the so-called phenomenological and empirical notions of it.
structure of rules. Syntax reveals that language is calculus-like. Wittgenstein calls language a calculus (PG, X, 140). Be also says,

"when some one interprets, or understands, a sign in one sense or another what he is doing is taking a step in a calculus (like a calculation). What he does is roughly what he does if he gives expression to his Interpretation" (PG, I, 140).

A calculas is a formal or logical system. This notion is found predominantly in Wittgenstein's early logico-linguistic investigations which consider language as a formally structured system or calculus. It can be represented as a logical or formal syntax with a set of defined rules. The rules are such that they can be surveyed completely without ambiguity and indeterminateness. Let us take TLP 3.325 for consideration:

In order to avoid such errors we must make use of a sign language that excludes them by not using the same sign for different symbols and by not using in a superficially similar way signs that have different modes of signification: that is to say, a sign-language that is governed by logical grammar - by logical syntax.

The proposed logical syntax with a neat rule structure excludes all errors of ambiguous use of expressions. It is designed, besides, to generate all the propositions of a language from a set of elementary propositions. Logical syntax thus carries out two tasks: first, it disambiguates language and second, it constructs it out of a given set of primitive signs. Wittgensten thus announces at TLP 4.51. "Suppose that I am given all elementary propositions; then I can simply ask what propositions I can construct out of them. And there I have all
propositions, and that fixes their limits".

In this model, the elementary propositions are the basic syntactic units from which all the propositions of natural language can be derived. This is possible through a systematic rule application e.g. truth-operation.

TLP 5.0 A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions.

TLP 5.01 Elementary propositions are the truth-arguments of propositions.

The truth-operational method in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* is the basic device through which all propositions including the general or quantified propositions can be generated. Thus, syntax can be called generative in view of the fact that it maps out all the possible structures in language. Wittgenstein's idea of logical grammar encompasses the creative aspect of every language logically conceivable. It presents the grammar of all languages perspicuously. Language is a system of propositions all unified in a calculus-like structure. The task of grammar is to make perspicuous the rules which systematically define all possible structures of language. Grammar represents the internal relations amongst propositions in a transparent notation.

**Syntax and the Perspicuous Notation**

Syntax takes care of the logic of the propositions. It is concerned with the network of their internal relations. It
displays their logical form. Thus Wittgenstein identifies syntax with the logic of language, that is, the logical structure which all meaningfull propositions share. Wittgenstein tells us the broad framework of syntax in the following remark:

TLP 4.5 It now seems possible to give the most general prepositional form: that is, to give a description of the propositions of any sign language whatsoever in such a way that every possible sense can be expressed by a symbol satisfying the description, and every symbol satisfying the description can express a sense, provided that meanings of the names are suitably chosen.

The basic structure of syntax is the logical form of propositions which is the primary desideratum of their sense. Sense is ingrained in the syntactic organization of a proposition. Therefore, for Wittgenstein, there is no independent theory of sense except the theory of syntax that specifies the general logical form. Logical grammar, in this sense, is the grammar of propositional-logical form. Syntax is the theory of possibility— the theory of form of all that could be said. The semantics of sense is an extended image of the syntax of form. The so-called meanings (bedeutung) are the bedrock of sense and so they are taken care of by the syntax. Wittgenstein writes at TLP 3.33:

In logical syntax the meaning of a sign should never play a role. It must be possible to establish logical syntax without mentioning the meaning of a sign: only the description of the expression may be presupposed.

The main thesis of calculus model is to show the symmetry between the logical syntax and the language-world nexus. The
task of syntax is to bring out the identity of logical multiplicity of language and reality. Waismann in his book *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle* has aptly expressed this point in the following passage;

Syntax hence becomes requisite where the nature of signs is not yet adjusted to the nature of things, where there are more combinations of signs than possible situations. This excessive multiplicity of language must be confined by artificial rules; and these rules are the syntax of language.

Wittgenstein continues,

The rules of syntax assign to combinations of signs the exact multiplicity they must possess in order to be pictures of reality.

You could say that a system of signs which is perfectly suited to its purpose renders syntax superfluous. And conversely - syntax renders such a system of signs superflous. Each of them deputizes for the other.⁵

Syntax is ultimately superflous because language can take care of itself. Nevertheless if we have logical syntax we have rules of calculus from which we can derive the propositions and their possible moves in language in so far as they are internally related amongst themselves.

Syntax contains the possibility of the world; it reflects the latter. The logical form of the world is the desideratum of syntax. Syntax provides the perspicuous notation for expressing logical form. "The rules of syntax assign to combinations of signs the exact multiplicity they must possess in order to be pictures of reality".⁶
THE GAME - MODEL OF GRAMMAR

For Wittgenstein, language resembles a game as both employ rules and thus are rule-governed (PG, I, Sect.26). Basically in the uses of words and expressions in the proper human contexts, that is, in the stream of life, rules come into being and become known. (PG, I, Sect 26). For example, we use colour words such as "red", "blue", "green" etc. and recognise samples in a colour-chart because they are based on a certain established conventions e.g. "standard sepia" or "standard metre" (PI, Sect.50-53). Rule-governed language thus gives rise to the grammar of rules. This is the crux of a game-model grammar.

The Concept of Rule

A language-game i.e. language use is bounded by rules which define what is a possible move within the language-game. A language-game is always constituted by rules. Language-game is so called because there are a set of rules underlying it. Without rules language-game is inconceivable, although the rules may not be codified into a recognizable grammar. A language without grammar is not a language without rules. This point is made explicit in the following passage in the Philosophical Grammar, I, Sect 32:

We are interested in language as a procedure according to explicit rules, because philosophical problems are misunderstandings which must be removed by clarification of rules according to which we are inclined to use words.
The game-model features rules as formally rigid bodies. These rules are rules of use regulating all possible moves (PI. Sect. 82-85, The BBS, p.95).

The form of contingency that hovers around the notion of rules brings to mind that rules may be arbitrary. But the implication is wrong. The rules in language-game are completely bounded by the use of symbols. They are fashioned the same way as in a calculus. They are needed in the everyday use of language. The use is completely laid down. The only difference between a language-game and a calculus is that rules are more prominent in a calculus than in a language-game, or so it appears. That is, in a language game rules have loose ends. They can have a certain kind of flexibility about their formulations. But this does not mean that Wittgenstein abolishes rules and grammar (cf.PI. Sects. 108, 292) but only that he brings rules back into language-game. Rules are entrenched in the language-games without being on the surface. They fill the grammatical space without dramatization. As Wittgenstein views it, rules come into being as we go on in the use of grammar. Their "must" is a 'normative "must". (RFM, III, sect. 26,28,30) about the employment of language that accounts for the acceptability of linguistic transactions. What does then the absence of rules lead to? In the absence of rules which constitute the structure of language-games we feel not only being without a standard or norm but we feel helpless without any fixed guidance. Language is made possible, as it were by a
Wittgenstein also writes at Philosophical Investigations Sect.240:

Disputes do not break out (among mathematicians, say) over the question whether a rule has been obeyed or not. People do not come to blows over it, for example. That is part of the framework on which working of our language is based (for example, in giving descriptions).

"Wittgenstein never gives the impression that language-games are normatively arbitrary or blind. They are based on the fact that language-use is an institution or practice. The practice is a form of life. Forms of life are determinately given as the common ground of universal agreement manifested in language (PI, sect.241).

III. UNITY OF THE MODELS

The following features of the game-model can be exhibited in the structure of the calculus.

a. A language-game, is like a calculus, is constituted through rules, so that rules define what is possible or permitted in the language. This feature highlights the institutability of both language-games and the calculus.

b. Language-game has internal moves within it in the way there are moves in the calculus. In both cases, the moves come into being along with the rules that permit them. Rules in
both cases pre-exist the linguistic moves. They are tracks making language-moves possible.

c. The rules are laid down in the language use. Use is primary in both models. Rules are internal. Therefore, there is no external justification of the rules. This brings out the autonomy of rules insofar as the rules are not justified by any appeal to metarules or even to empirical experiences (The autonomy question will be discussed in detail in Chapter V).

d. The rule following is a public activity, since it is learnable in a community and therefore, publicly checkable. Private rule-following is impossible. This feature brings out the social character of rule-following and the conditions of learnability. The social character of rule-following is the common feature of the game-model and calculus-model of analysis of language.

The game-model thus enlarges the scope of the calculus model and the rule structure assimilates the idea of calculus into that of a language-game. So the concept of rule is the continuing underlying unity between calculus model and game model. The calculus is itself a kind of language-game just as the language-game itself is a calculus. The rigid distinction between the two which is supposed to divide the two models is dissolved in the grammar of rules that underlies Wittgenstein's philosophy of language. Rules define the activity of logic-shaping as much as the shaping of an ordinary language-use. The transition from
logic and syntax mirroring logical form to the network of language-games shaping and mirroring the form of all reality is the transition recorded in the change of the contours of grammar. Grammar, however, remains structurally identical.

2. THE STRUCTURE OF PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR

Wittgenstein introduces the concept of "grammar in various ways. In the Philosophical Investigations the usage has four aspects: The traditional, the non-empirical, the sentential and the non-linguistic. The discussion resolves round these four aspects incorporating the various meanings the concept has in its usage.

The Traditional A Spect

The usage of the expression "grammatical form" in the Philosophical Investigations sect.21 and Part II, sect. X, reveals the traditional grammatical form. The traditional "grammatical form" is in focus in these usages. The traditional grammar distinguishes between an "order" and a "command" and introduces many other distinctions amongst parts of speech. In a language-game these parts of speech get their functional role fixed eg. in the "builders' language game the report "Five slabs" and the order "Five slabs". The difference between report and order lies in the "part which uttering these words plays in the language-game" (PI sect. 21) Wittgenstein continues:
(of course we might use the word "statements" and "commands" to stand for grammatical forms of sentences and intonations; we do in fact call "isn't the weather, glorious today?" a question although it is used as a statement) (PI, Sect. 21).

The traditional classification is not always based on use but is otherwise determined by the verbal form and intonation. Wittgenstein disowns the traditional classification in view of the fact that the real test of a grammatical form is the use and not the verbal form.

The Non-empirical A Spect

In the Philosophical Investigations (PI, Sect, 251, 295, 458) there are remarks about the "grammatical propositions" which stand for a kind of propositions which are different from experiential or empirical propositions. The sense in which a proposition is called grammatical is not the same as that in which the word "grammar" used in the sense of "grammatical form". The later usage is based on the traditional grammar. But when Wittgenstein says a proposition is grammatical he assigns it a logical status. Grammatical proposition is a logical proposition of which the opposite cannot be conceived (PI, sect. 251).

It has been demonstrated that "grammatical", for Wittgenstein, is synonymous with "non-empirical". In the sense of "grammatical" and not "grammatical forms", it is inconsistent to hold that a proposition is grammatical but is empirical. Wittgenstein's example, "Every rod has a length" demonstrates
that it is a grammatical predication to say that a rod has a length. Its opposite cannot be imagined (We will have detailed discussion on grammatical propositions in Chapter III).

**The Sentential Aspect**

There is a group of remarks especially at PI Sect. 90 which gives a broader usage to the word "grammatical", PI, Sect.90 characterises philosophical activity as "grammatical". "Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one." This usage has following implications.

a. The sentences upon which the investigation is focussed are empirical.

b. The negation of such grammatically investigated sentence is conceivable.

c. The results of such investigations are themselves grammatical propositions.

The word 'grammar' used in PI Sect. 90 has dual characterization of the grammatical investigation: first, "we remind ourselves... of the kind of statement we make about phenonena" and secondly, it is "directed.... towards the possibilities of phenomena". Both aspects take care of the statements we make about phenomena and the possibility of phenomena. For Wittgenstein, both language and phenomena which language is about are within the purview of grammar.
One may then ask in what sense grammatical investigations differ from other philosophical investigations. Grammar could be taken in the sense of philosophical statements that we make about phenomena i.e. their possibilities e.g. 'The world is all that is the case' (TLP, I). In that sense grammatical sentences would be demarcated from the statements that describe the phenomena e.g. "This rose is red'. Wittgenstein offers a distinctive kind of space to grammar as a network of statements differing from statements of natural language. In that sense grammar becomes near synonymous with philosophy. Philosophy becomes philosophical grammar.¹²

The grammatical reflection on the kind of statements we make about the phenomena can be viewed as being "directed towards the" possibilities" of phenomena" in the following ways:

1. The connection between the "kind of statements" we make about "phenomena" can be seen when one looks at sentences from the point of view of their construction, the combinations of signs they contain, and also from the point of view of the function they perform in our lives. Thus sentences are marked intelligible when they make syntactically perfect combinations and also are assigned a role in use. Grammar describes the use of signs and their function in the total context of life.

2. If a sentence has a use, this will be correlated with the fact that what the sentence says is something that is
possible in our experience. For example "He was depressed the whole day" makes sense. The remark has a use for us in circumstance normal to our lives. It is correlated with the fact that depression is a phenomena whose persistence throughout a day is a possibility of our experience. The connection between the statement that has a use and the possibility of experience holds, whether or not the statement is true or false on any given occasion. What is possible in phenomena is not discovered by means of empirical enquiry, but by what Wettgenstein calls the grammatical investigation. The possibility question is thus central to the idea of philosophy being a kind of a priori grammar. It is debatable whether Wettgenstein's a priori grammar has any parallel with Kant's transcendental method of investigation of the possibilities of phenomena.

The non-linguistic aspect

In the Philosophical Investigations Sect 182 the concept of grammar is to be explicated as the relation of an expression in language to the circumstances in which it makes sense. In this context, the problem of grammar of 'to fit', 'to be able', 'to understand' is raised and discussed. The central issue is the nature of criteria that define when the expressions like "to fit" "to be able" etc are intelligibly used in language. The problem of criteria is a grammatical problem.
In the Philosophical Investigations. Sect.664, Wettgenstein distinguishes between two kinds of grammar: "surface grammar" and 'depth grammar'. He suggests that surface grammar be understood as the aspect of the use of a word in the construction of a sentence. Wettgenstein writes:

In the use of words one might distinguish, "surface grammar" from "depth grammar". What immediately impresses itself upon us about the use of a word is the way it is used in the construction of the sentence, the part of its use - one might say - that can be taken in by the ear. - And now compare the depth grammar, say of the word "to mean", with what its surface grammar would lead us to suspect. No wonder we find it difficult to know our way out. (PI, Sect 664).

The surface grammar relates to the external aspects\(^{15}\) of the use of an expression that can be taken in by the ear. Such features are contingent. Depth-grammar in contrast must show the necessary features that any use of an expression must have e.g. the rules. Surface grammatical features thus relate to those features which are for the most part perceptible in the expressions themselves. It could also be argued that surface grammatical structure of a sentence does not fully reveal the logical form of the sentence and the form of reality the sentence is about. Sentences are used in relation to the world. Depth grammar reveals this necessary relation between sentence and the world. Surface grammar may at best be a formal construction of a sentence without revealing its inner dynamics.

In PI Sect.182 Wettgenstein discusses the conditions in which the use of an expression is appropriate. There are
indications that the organic relations of the expressions, the linguistic discourse and the language-game are included in depth grammar. The notion of criteria (PI, Sect.354) and the notion verification of a sentence (PI, Sect.353) all belong to the depth grammar of a sentence. These do reveal the logical form of the sentence. Thus depth grammar seems to be more complicated and therefore more substantial than surface grammar. Depth grammar reveals the underlying reality of language.

3. DEPTH GRAMMAR : THE SYNOPTIC VIEW OF LANGUAGE AND PHENOMENA

Surface grammar deals with utterances "that can be taken in by ears!" Phonology, morphology and syntax are concerned with those features of utterances. Depth grammar is an appropriate method of "finding our way about" in philosophy. That is to say, depth grammar gives the overview or the perspicuous representation of language and reality. The surface grammar i.e. syntax by itself does not ensure this perspicuity. As Wittgenstein writes;

A main of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words. Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in "seeing connections" (PI, Sect., 122).

Grammar has to do with the way we put words together to form sentences. For example, as Wittgenstein puts it,
We do not say that the man who tells us he feels the visual image, two inches behind the bridge of his nose is telling a lie or talking nonsense. But we say that we do not understand the meaning of such a phrase. It combines well known words, but combines them in a way we do not yet understand. The grammar of this phrase has yet to be explained to us (BBB, p.10).

In this aspect Wittgenstein's conception of grammar as concerned with the combination of words is intelligible to the traditional gramarian. But he might not call it a synactically deviant case, as Wittgenstein calls it, since the notion of the grammar of the traditional kind does not include what Wittgenstein calls depth-grammar. According to depth grammar, the sentence "one feels the visual image two inches behind the bridge of the nose" is as much deviant as "colourless green ideas sleep furiously".

Grammar is also concerned with the relationship between the word we use and other forms of human behaviour. The other forms of human behaviour include (a) physical activity such as 'to sit on a chair' (BBB, p.24) (b) the mental activities called "expectation", "hoping", "knowing", etc (PI, Sect 572). (c) seeking evidence in support of statements (BBB, p.11) (d) setting up of conceptual structure for understanding the tenses (BBB, p.109). These activities constitute the various forms of life which are embedded in language. Grammar studies the internal relationships between the uses of words and the embedded forms of life.

Depth grammar is directly involved in the forms of life that
constitute the bulk of human activities i.e., language-games. As Wittgenstein puts it so clearly, a language-game involves both the use of words and the actions undertaken by such use (PI, Sect.7). Wittgenstein's depth grammar internalises the relation between language, life and world insofar as language reflects the essence of life and the world. Forms of life are the basic or ultimate bedrock of all significant structures of language and logic. But this is not to suggest that language is a derivative event in the cradle of forms of life. Language provides the outer limit of all human life and its activities. Language and life are one and the same.

4. GRAMMAR OF LANGUAGE AND GRAMMAR OF PHENOMENA

There is a distinct sense in which we can distinguish between (1) grammar of phenomena and (2) grammar of language. The question has been raised whether Wittgenstein's philosophical grammar is a grammar of language or grammar of phenomena. As Spiegelberg points out, Wittgenstein's grammar is a grammar of language insofar as it stresses the question of rules for the use of words. It is more than what is traditionally called morphology and syntax. Wittgenstein calls grammar the "account book of language". (PG, Sect.44) in that sense grammar is concerned with language since the object of grammar is language itself (PG, Sect.109) Grammar is autonomous in that it is language-centric rather an incomplete socio-anthropological phenomenon. I shall discuss the concept of autonomy of grammar in Chapter V).
However, grammar is equally a grammar of phenomena, i.e. colours, natural histories and physical order of space and time. Thus grammar treats of the phenomena and their logical possibilities (PI, Sect.90). It has been suggested that grammar is phenomenological\(^{24}\) since it deals with phenomena in the immediate experience Wittgenstein suggested the possibility of integrating phenomenology with grammar in the following passage in the *Philosophical Remarks*, Sect.1.

Physics differs from phenomenology in that it is concerned to establish laws. Phenomenology only establishes the possibilities. Thus, phenomenology would be the grammar of the description of those facts on which physics builds its theories.

Thus it is correct to say that, for Wittgenstein, grammar includes the so called description of phenomena, even those presented in our experience.

Description of Essences

In the *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein was interested in exploring what is possible in the phenomena. In other words, he was interested in determining the essence of the phenomena. This is evidenced in the most significant remark: "The essence is expressed by grammar" (PI, Sect.371). The essences are not Platonic entities to be located in a mysterious realm of possibilities, but are to be deposited in language. As Hallorn puts it, "Essence is expressed by grammar because essence is not some mysterious entity lurking inside things, but rather
something given to things by the dynamic participation of linguistic statements in human life." That is to say, "grammar tells us what kind of object anything is" (PI, Sect. 373). Thus Wittgenstein conceives of grammar as a description of essences of human language. Philosophical grammar is a philosophical description of the essences of language.

However, Wittgenstein is no less interested in reality than in language. He is as much interested in the essence of the reality as that of language. In this sense, one could argue that his investigation into the essence of language and reality is phenomenological. This is reflected in Von Wright's following remark:

Perhaps it is of some interest to mention here that Wittgenstein in the last years of his life did much work on a problem-complex which had always greatly interested him, viz. colour-concepts. He was at the time reading Goethe's Farbenlehre, and we had discussions on it and on his own problem and views. He then often used to say that what he was doing was a kind some philosophers call "phenomenology". But he did not himself want to call it by that name - and I think I can partly see why. His attitude is connected, I believe, with the stress he wanted to lay on language in his philosophical enquiries. For this reason, incidentally, Wittgenstein's use of the term "grammar" (or "logical grammar") should be of great interest to phenomenologists. (Italics mine).

The construction of language and the construction of phenomena run parallel in the sense that the forms of language reflect the forms of reality. The rules of language and their inherent network project the possibilities of phenomena. This tends to be a phenomenological description. This is the same
as Wittgenstein's grammatical descriptions. The notion of a phenomenological language is of importance in this connection. It is in fact the language of phenomena. Grammar is concerned with this language insofar as it is concerned with every possible move in language. So it involves in the language the construction of phenomena. Phenomenological language is the bed-rock of all human experience. But that is within the limits of its grammatical description of rules and their interconnexions. The following passage from Wittgenstein gives a glimpse of his project of grammatical descriptions:

"Assume that there are in my visual field two red circles of equal size on a blue background. What is it that is present here in duplicate and what is present only once?.... One could say: we have here one colour but two locations. But it was said that reness and circularity are properties of two objects (GEGENSTANDE) which one could call patches and which have certain spatial relations to each other. The explanation ("there are here two objects - patches - which ....") sounds like a physical explanation. Like somebody's asking "what are the red circles that I see over there?" and my answering "there are two red laterns, etc" such an explanation nevertheless not required here (To want to resolve our dissatisfaction by means of an explanation is the mistake of metaphysics). What worries us here is the unclarity of the grammar of the sentence," I see two red circles on a blue background", especially its relation to the grammar of the sentence "There are two red balls on the table' and again "I see two colours in this picture. I can naturally say, instead of former sentence 'I see red patches with the properties Red and Circular in (this) spatial relation to each other' - and equally well 'I see the colour red on two circular locations next to each other' - If I stipulate that this sentence is to mean the same as the sentence above. Then the grammar of the words 'patch', location, 'colour', etc must adjust to the (grammar) of the words in the former sentence. The confusion arises here because we believe that we have to decide the presence or absence of an object (thing), viz. the patch, in the same way as one decides whether what I see is (in a physical sense) red paint or a reflection."
What the passage points to is the nature of phenomenological objects e.g. patches of colour presented in immediate experience. The phenomenological objects have a grammatical locus in that they are a part of the methods of description of the world. How one describes one's colour-experience depends upon one's colour-language, i.e., grammar of the colour-words. What is more important here is the grammar (i.e. logic) of the phenomenological sentences depicting the objects of experience. However, it must be noted that for Wittgenstein the domain of phenomenological objects is not independent of the language in which we describe them. Descriptions of the phenomenological objects is the task of language. Thus grammar is a kind of phenomenology of the objects given in one's experience which is filtered through one's language.

Logic, Grammar and Phenomenology

At TLP 5.552 Wittgenstein writes:

The experience that we need in order to understand logic is not that something or other is the state of things, but that something is; that, however, is not an experience. Logic is prior to every experience - that something is so. It is prior to the question 'How?', not prior to the question 'What'?

This is a prolegomena to Wittgenstein's use of logic and grammar as being prior to all experience though they are essentially related to the latter. The only experience that is a presupposition of all logic and grammar is that there is a world. (It is not an experience in the ordinary sense). Logic in the
Tractatus presents a grammar of objects which constitute the domain of the possible phenomena. There is no domain called the domain of experience that is given to phenomenological description except the one presented in logic. Logic is a description of logical form of all experience i.e., the 'what' of all possible experience. Speigelberg’s²⁹ idea that Tractarian logic is a kind of phenomenology is right only to the extent that experience is not taken in the ordinary sense. Wittgensteinian objects are not empirical and so not phenomenological in the usual sense of being given in experience. Wittgenstein does not admit a separate domain of experience independently of language. So, the socalled objects are presented in the network of language. Thus logic alone provides the description of those objects. Logic becomes at best a grammar but not phenomenology in the accepted sense.³⁰

But, for that matter, need grammar be phenomenological? The later philosophy of Wittgenstein was a step towards a rediscovery of the phenomenologicality of logic and grammar. His analysis of colour-experience, and also the experience of physical objects raised the question how far we can concede independence to experience. In Moore's notes³¹ in 1930–32, there is a record of grammar being constantly posed against experience. Moore notes that the arrangement of colour in the colour octahedron "is really part of grammar, not of psychology."³² This indicates Wittgenstein's general philosophical interest in grammar and not in experience as such as. However, it is the grammar (including
logic) that is not absolutely unconcerned with experience.

Wittgenstein carried the Fregean legacy of anti-psychologistic view of logic and language to its logical conclusion. Frege founded the philosophy of language and logic on the Platonist theme that logical forms are real along with logical truths. Hence there is no psychologist need to open up this domain of truths and forms to our consciousness for it is far removed from our thinking and experience. This transcendent domain of logic must be based on its own autonomous reality. Wittgenstein tried to bring Frege's autonomous domain of logical reality into the heart of grammar. This needed a revision of the Fregean logic and grammar. Wittgenstein brought into view the inner bond of logic and grammar by demonstrating that the logical forms are only grammatically describable, that is to say, are only revealed in grammar. Grammar is not merely a tool as in Frege for revealing the logical essences but is itself autonomous as logic. This led Wittgenstein to view both logic and grammar as the autonomous domain of transcendental (not transcendent logical forms).

Grammar describes the logical form which consists in the logical form of simple objects. The very fact that logical forms of objects open all the possibilities of arrangement of objects, i.e. the possibilities of phenomena, shows that the grammar of language of physics is the grammar of all possible objects. Physics therefore is as much grammatically structured as geometry insofar as logic provides the logical form of all that is real.
For Wittgenstein, both physics, geometry and logic (in the narrower sense) are all parts of grammar (conceived in the wider sense). Even if we take grammar as phenomenological, we must make a distinction between empirical phenomenology (especially the Machian variety) and the grammatical phenomenology of objects in the *Tractatus*. Russell's simple objects had a Machian root in their being conceived as the logical atoms of the empirical world. For Russell, logic is based on generalizations like physics' except that the logical truths are more abstract and independently valid. Wittgenstein rejects this notion of logic as a domain of truth and takes it as a rigorous domain of non-empirical forms which explain the possibility of the empirical world. In that sense, "in logic nothing is accidental" (*Tractatus*, 2. 012). Besides, logic is transcendental (*Tractatus* 6.13) in that it brings out the a priori possibilities of all empirical objects. Thus the logical forms of all empirical objects are presented in a perspicuous representation of the language. Logic is committed to the reality of logical forms but not their independence from grammar. Grammar thus is the indispensable home of all logical forms and their logical articulation.

6. PHILOSOPHY AS CUSTODIAN OF GRAMMAR

The argument whether Wittgenstein's grammar is grammar of language or grammar of phenomena is misplaced. Actually, for Wittgenstein, the entire philosophical investigation is a grammatical investigation. Philosophy is study of grammar of
reality. Wittgenstein writes:

'For what belongs to the essence of the world simply cannot be said. And philosophy, if it were to say anything, would have to describe the essence of the world. But the essence of language is a picture of the essence of the world; and philosophy as custodian of grammar can in fact grasp the essence of the world, only not in the propositions of language, but in the rules for this language which exclude nonsensical combinations of signs (PR, Sect.54).

Thus philosophy can provide a grammar of the essences of the world. In that sense it is a custodian of grammar. It holds grammar as its own mirror. It can grasp the world only in so far as it is mirrored in language and grammar.

Grammatical analysis is a kind of conceptual analysis. As I have argued earlier, grammatical analysis can assimilate all phenomenological analyses qua conceptual analyses (RC, II, Sect.16). Phenomenological analysis implies analysis of the phenomena of the world. All grammatical insights are therefore deep insights into the conceptual connexion of phenomena e.g. colour. The essences which are the grammatical philosophy's exclusive concern are the logical essences or the grammatical essences deposited in our language. As Wittgenstein put it, essences are ultimately deep conventions of language (RFM, I, Sect.74). Grammatical analysis therefore need not look beyond the rules of language to understand the essences of reality.

According to Wittgenstein, in philosophy there are no theories, no explanations, no definitions. It is purely
descriptive. (BBS, p.18, PI, Sect.123). It describes the essences of phenomena. Its fact it describes only the essences of the use of language itself. The essences of language are the essences of the world. Thus the construction of language runs parallel to the construction of phenomena. It is not true that a construction of language implies construction of phenomenological language. Rather the construction of language and construction of phenomena collapse into each other. Grammar includes everything i.e. language and the phenomena. It studies both. Once we make this point clear there is no distinction between 'language' and 'experience'. Let us take some of the remarks of the Big Typescript:

Why do we sense the investigation of grammar as being fundamental?

The investigation of grammar is fundamental - in the sense in which we may call language fundamental - say its foundation.

Our grammatical investigations differ from those of the philologists and empirical grammarians. What interests us, for instance, is the logical rules that fundamentally matter to language. Philosopher's concern is the use of language and its constitutive rules. The philologist is an empirical grammarian who cannot look beyond what happens in languages. Be cannot see the essentials of grammar. Bis business is with the accidentals of language. Wittgenstein says,

But that is only an external differentiation// an external difference// I believe there is no other.
Rather we could say that we are calling something else grammar than he is. Even as we differentiate kinds of words where for him there is difference (present).

The importance of grammar is the importance of language.\textsuperscript{38}

This is an attempt to see that Wittgenstein's multifaceted use of the concept of grammar has an underlying unitary theme that grammar is concerned with essences whether it is a study of language or of phenomena. Grammar is the guide to both language and reality.
NOTES


2. The term logical syntax has a Fregean origin. Frege attempted to construct a logical syntax or begriffsschrift in his Begriffsschrift (1879). The concept-script constructed therein presents a new model language based on the principles of logic and mathematics. Wittgenstein acknowledges his indebtedness to this Fregean idea (also found in Russell) in Tractatus 3.325.
   (The conceptual notation of Frege and Russell is such a language, though, it is true, it fails to exclude all mistakes).

3. The notion of generative grammar is due to Noam Chomsky according to whom syntactic structures are generated from a base-structure with transformational rules. See Chomsky, Aspects of a Theory of Syntax (The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, 1965).


5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Merrill and Jaakko Bintikka have claimed that the rules give way to the linguistic activity in the language-games. That is, rules lie submerged in the cluster of linguistic


10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.


14. The problem of grammar is the problem of use, the criteria and rules thereof. See EBB pp.23-24 for an understanding of the grammar of the word "know". The words like 'thinking,
'believing' etc. can have their grammar. i.e. the criteria of use (See PI, Sects.360, 410, 574, 613, BBS, pp.47,63).


17. Wittgenstein writes, 'The criteria which we accept for "fitting", "being able to", "Understanding" are more complicated that might appear at first sight. That is, the game with these words, their employment in the linguistic discourse that is carried on by their means, is more involved, the role of these words in our language other than, we are tempted to think (PI, Sect.182), (Italics mine).

18. See Oliveri "Depth Grammar" as a Methodological Concept in Philosophy" for a comparison of Wittgenstein's surface grammar with Chomsky's surface structure of grammar. It is. argued that Witgesntein's depth grammar has no similarity with Chomsky's depth structure of grammar.


20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p.215. Wittgenstein writes, "What has to be accepted, the given, is - so one could say - forms of life, (PI, p.226).

24. Ibid. See also Merrill B. Hintikka and Jaakko Hinttika, Investigating Wittgenstein.

25. Hallorn, p.216.


27. See Wittgenstein's Big Typescript (No.213) in Von Wright's catalogue) entitled "Phanomenologie 1st Grammatik".


30. Merrill and Jaakko Hintikka have argued that the Tractatus presents a phenomenological account of objects, See their Investigating Wittgenstein Ch.6. However, there is a difficulty in accepting that the Tractarian objects are given in experience. Rather they limit all experience and are therefore prior to all experience (Cf. TLP, 5.5561, "Empirical reality is limited by the totality of objects").

32. Ibid.


