INTRODUCTION

The present essay is a study of Wittgenstein's concept of grammar. It aims at bringing out if there is anything called Wittgenstein's philosophy of grammar. The concept of grammar seems to be one of the key concepts in Wittgenstein's philosophical vocabulary. Though apparently the concept of grammar remains unexplained and without a sharp definition in Wittgenstein's writings, it is obvious that it plays a crucial role in Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations. There are two main questions which Wittgenstein raises concerning grammar, viz (i) How is grammar possible? (ii) What are the logical limits of grammar? The first question is answered by the fact that language is itself a rule-governed system of symbols. The possibility of language as a rule-governed activity shows that grammar, as a study or rules, is possible. The second question concerns directly, the question of the limits of language. The limits of grammar are the limits of language itself. According to Wittgenstein, grammar is the grammar of language. Therefore, the investigation into the structure of grammar is the investigation into the structure of language.

The grammar Wittgenstein talks about is nothing other than philosophical grammar which is to be distinguished from the linguistic (empirical) grammars. Philosophical grammar is exclusively the grammar of the logical possibilities of language.
According to Wittgenstein, philosophy is the custodian of grammar in the sense that philosophy gives it a status equal to its own. Philosophy and grammar do not have a subject matter of their own except that both are concerned with language. Philosophy and philosophical grammar have the same interest in language, i.e., to study the logical essence of language. So the gap between philosophy and philosophical grammar is ultimately abolished. They become one.

According to Wittgenstein, philosophy is a grammatical investigation. That is to say, philosophy can give us only a perspicious representation of language and all that language is about, i.e., the world. Philosophy and grammar are both concerned with the world. Language which is the subject matter of their study is linked with the world. Wittgenstein's grammatical investigations are constantly aimed at the understanding of the world through the understanding of the structure of language.

The divide between language and the world is only a divide at the level of empirical study of language. But at the level of philosophical grammar the so called divide between the two is dissolved. Language and the world present themselves to the philosophical grammar in the same framework of logical possibilities. Therefore there is no ultimate distinction between the grammar of language and grammar of phenomena.

In Chapter I, I will argue that Wittgenstein entertains no
dichotomy between language and phenomena i.e., between language and experience. He reduces the phenomenology of experience into the grammar. The grammar tells us what constitute the logical possibilities of the experience of the world. In this connection, it is imperative to study the structure of philosophical grammar. In this Chapter I will examine the structure of grammar in the light of Wittgenstein's calculus and game model analysis of language.

In Chapter II my effort is to come back to the problem of reality. The structure of grammar can be explained only with reference to the representational function of language. As I have indicated earlier, language is basically a phenomenon in the world. Therefore, the philosophical understanding of grammar cannot but be concerned with how the world is projected by language. Grammar is concerned with the projection-relations. Wittgenstein has never ceased to be concerned with the projection relations between the language and world even in his later philosophy. Therefore, even though there is no picture theory in his later works, philosophical grammar is still concerned, with the problem of how the world can be tamed by language i.e., how it can be made intelligible in language.

In Chapter III, my problem is the structure of grammar. Therefore here I shall discuss up the nature of grammatical propositions and the grammatical rules. The grammatical propositions express what grammar is about. Since the grammar expresses the essences of language and the world, the grammatical
propositions are concerned with the logical essences of language and the world. In this connection I shall argue that Wittgenstein's grammatical propositions are identical with grammatical rules. I shall also show that Wittgenstein maintains the distinction between the grammatical propositions and the empirical propositions in order to establish that grammatical proposition have a unique status in our language. Grammatical propositions include the propositions of logic, mathematics and all those propositions which are concerning the logical form of language. In this connection I shall add that, for Wittgenstein, logic and grammar become identical since both are concerned with the essence of the language.

In Chapter IV my major concern is with the concept of rule-following. The problem of rules and rule-following has exercised Wittgenstein's mind so deeply that it is impossible to talk about grammar without taking into account what is to apply and follow the grammatical rules. Wittgenstein believes that there is no gap between rules and their applications. Their relations are internal and necessary. So, Kripke's sceptical interpretation of Wittgenstein's concept of rule-following needs to be re-examined in view of the corpus of Wittgenstein's writings on rule-following. My argument will be that there is no room for the Kripkean scepticism in the framework of language and grammar. The so called Wittgensteinian rule-paradox is only a reduction proof to show that language is based on rules and that our rule-following behaviour is sound and rational.
In Chapter V I will take up the question of autonomy of grammar and the grammatical rules. The autonomy question is implied by the fact that we consider our rule-following behaviour rational. The rationality in the rule-following would not have been possible if grammar had not been an autonomous system. The autonomy of grammar means its freedom from contingency of the actual world and the rule-application in this world. Grammar is autonomous to the extent it precedes the facts in the world. Grammar therefore has a legislative function with regard to the actual world. However, I shall argue that autonomy does not lead to a kind of Platonism and to a transcendent metaphysics of logical possibilities. The autonomy is realised in the peculiarity of grammar that it is arbitrary. The concept of arbitrariness has a deeper sense in Wittgenstein philosophy. My effort is to bring out the significance of this notion and to show that arbitrariness of grammar coincides with its necessity. The necessary truths which grammar expresses are bound to follow from the fact that our grammar would not have been otherwise than what it is.

In Chapter VI I will come back to the notion of philosophical grammar and attempt to relate 1+ to other conceptions of grammar such as Chomsky's empirical grammar, Quine's and Strawson's logical grammar. In this connection I shall show that Husserl's notion of logical grammar can be compared and contrasted with Wittgenstein's philosophical grammar. This chapter is not exactly a comparative study between Wittgenstein
and other philosophers. It intends to show the similarity of structure between philosophical grammar and the logical grammar and the contrast between the philosophical grammar and empirical grammar. Wittgenstein's decisive assertion in this regard is that empirical grammar is not the philosophers' concern. It is interesting to note, therefore, to what extent the empirical grammarians can follow the lead of the philosophical grammarians.

To conclude, I would suggest that Wittgenstein's notion of grammar has deeper significance than generally realised by the Wittgenstein interpreters. This work is an humble effort towards making clear Wittgenstein's concept of grammar.