CHAPTER VI

PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR: NATURE; STRUCTURE AND LIMITS

1. EMPIRICAL VS PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR

In this chapter I will attempt to bring out a comprehensive outline of Wittgenstein's philosophical grammar and draw the limits of such a grammar vis-à-vis the empirical grammar and their logical counterparts in linguistic theory. My main contention is that philosophical grammar is not bound by the empirical constraints which appear in the structure of a non-philosophical linguistic grammar.

Wittgenstein distinguishes between two sorts of grammar, the one of the traditional linguistic variety to be called the empirical grammar and the other one of the logical variety to be called philosophical grammar. Traditional descriptive grammar concerns parts of speech (such as nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs, etc.). It examines forms of pluralizing nouns, regularities and irregularities in the conjunction of verbs and so on.\(^1\) All the above problems seem to have nothing to do with philosophy. Philosophy is concerned with philosophical grammar. As Moore\(^2\) puts it, grammar is a sort of thing one teaches small children at school e.g. we do not say "Two men was in the field but "Three men were in the field". And what has that to do with philosophy? According to Wittgenstein, the above example has
nothing to do with philosophy. It only tells what people do in a particular language. It only describes the particular grammar e.g. English grammar. It has nothing to say about what grammar is all about or what one does in following a grammatical rule. Philosophical grammar is concerned with the latter issues in that it is a reflection on grammar itself. Philosophical grammar therefore, is a reflection on grammar. In this sense philosophical grammar is more general and comprehensive than traditional grammar. It contains no information as to how a particular grammar works but concerns itself with the general issues relating to the availability of grammar as such. We may say here that there are not two kinds of grammar but two approaches to the study of grammar. They represent two kinds of interests in the rules of a language determined by different purposes. Philosophy is concerned with rules of grammar, i.e. rules for the use of expressions. It sheds light upon these problems. So, the range of its concern is wider and more comprehensive. Philosophy thus concerned with rules is philosophical grammar itself. Philosophical grammar is as wide as the concept of rule itself.

A grammarian in a narrower sense concerns himself with a particular natural language or languages and its forms and structure. A philosopher of language, on the other hand, is typically concerned with forms shared by many languages. Of course, it precludes language-specific enquires like to syntactic structure of sentences of a particular language, e.g. English,
Sanskrit, etc. Philosophy does not aim at producing a universal grammar; it even does not aim at producing a grammar at all. Rather it aims at resolving philosophical issues concerning grammar, its structure and limits.

The grammarian classifies parts of speech into noun, adjective etc, and states rules for them. The philosopher will typically concern himself with different classifications, e.g. sensation words, words for feelings, emotions, moods, attitudes etc. The philosopher can resolve conceptual puzzles concerning these words and resolve confusions arising out of their (mis) uses. He can clarify our knowledge of the world by arranging and contrasting the different rules for the use of perception words. An example of the philosopher's concern is: "I see better, more distinctly, than you" makes sense but, "I feel pain better, more distinctly than you" makes no sense. What is philosophically important here is the rules of use (grammar) of the words 'see' and 'feel'.

Grammarioan's interest fall outside the interests of the philosophers, since while the latter's interest includes issues of more general kind, the former's interests do not go beyond what is interesting for a particular language or all languages taken together. The more complex problems concerning the nature and limits of language do not concern the empirical grammarian. For Wittgenstein, philosophical grammar is an account book of language (PG, Sect.44). It determines the limits of sense by
examining the nature of rules. The philosopher is primarily interested in the limits of sense in so far as they are determinable by examining the rule-structure of the languages concerned. Wittgenstein's notion of philosophical grammar is aimed at solving the problems of the limits of sense.

Wittgenstein, in a general way, may differentiate philosophical grammar from empirical grammar in the following ways: Firstly, philosophical grammar is concerned with rules for the use of words just as ordinary grammar is, except that where ordinarily grammar specifies and classifies those rules, philosophical grammar examines their structure. Philosophical conclusions about rules affect the very concept of language we have. Philosophical grammar does not discover anything new. It only puts language in a certain logical perspective. Secondly, the important difference between grammarians' interest in the use of words and philosophers' lies in their purposes. Though grammarians may concern themselves with meaning, they hardly raise questions, about whether meanings are at all possible, whereas philosophers do raise fundamental questions about the possibility of meaning e.g. whether meaning is extensional or intensional or whether meaning itself is an ontological entity, etc. Thus the grammarians' distinction between syntax and semantics which separates meaning from the structure of language is hardly binding for the philosophers. Philosophers do see the whole problem as one. Wittgenstein clearly thinks that there is no essentially dividing line in the patterns of the use of words.
between the 00 called syntax and semantics. For him the study syntax involves the study of the semantical questions and vice versa, as the philosophers' goal is to study the whole of language.

Lastly, Wittgenstein takes grammar as covering, in the widest sense, all the conditions and methods necessary for comparing the propositions with reality (PG. Sect.88). Philosophers' interest is in the language-world relations; therefore, for him, grammar must take into how language, though autonomous and self-contained, is yet related to the world. Language becomes a significant phenomenon only against the backdrop of the phenomenal world of which it itself is a constituent. The signs are spread over the world. So the study of the signs is a study of the world. What is, however, philosophically significant is that for grammar studies "the harmony between reality and thought to which indeed a form of our language corresponds" (PG, Sect.88).

Philosophical grammar studies primarily "the question of sense as we have indicated earlier. Hence the distinction of sense and non-sense is fundamental for philosophical studies of grammar. There is a distinct idea of grammatical nonsense. The sentences, 'Green ideas are 'idle', 'Socrates is identical', etc. are philosophically nonsense, though they may appear as well-formed. Philosopher's major concern with grammar lies in detecting well concealed form of nonsense. It is this nonsense which pervades language and the philosopher's task is to bring
them to light. Wittgenstein writes,

The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language. These bumps make us see the value of the discovery (PI, Sect.119).

2. DEPTH STRUCTURE AND DEPTH GRAMMAR

a. Surface Structure and Deep Structure

Chomsky\(^7\) has formulated two distinct types of sentential structures. These are surface structure and deep structure. Surface structure, according to Chomsky, is the observable grammatical structure of a sentence. The phonological component of a generative grammar operates on surface structure. This is a product of syntactic rules and is responsible for the phonological representations of the sentence. Depth structure is distinct from phonological representation. It is associated with the underlying grammatical form of sentences.\(^8\) Depth structure accounts for the grammatical relations which are not observable on the surface structure. It explains how the infinite sentences of the natural language are generated. Thus Chomsky's generative grammar has a stake in the concept of depth structure of sentences.

Chomsky has given an interesting example\(^9\) to support the above point: (i) "John is eager to please." (ii) "John is easy to please." Both the sentences have the same surface
structure. They have the form "Noun + Verb + Adjective + infinitive". But there is an underlying grammatical difference between the two. We cannot paraphrase (i) in the following way. (i) "It is eager to please John"; though we can paraphrase (ii) as (ii) "It is easy to please John". Thus the sentences (i) and (ii) are different though their surface structures are alike because they have different deep structures. Chomsky's theory explains the similarity of the surface structure in terms of the operation of transformational rules which convert the deep structure into the respective surface structures. Surface structures are derivatively linked with the depth structures.

b. The Model

The distinction between surface structure and deep structure is introduced in the transformational model of grammar. This distinction is a part of the syntax of language. According to Chomsky, syntax is logically prior to semantics. In other words, meaning depends on the structure of the sentences. The semantic component of language depends upon the deep structure postulated by the grammarian. The transformational generative grammar has the following model built into it.
SYNTACTIC COMPONENT

base rules

Transformations

depth structure > rules > Surface Structure

Phonological component > Phonological Spellings

Semantic component

Lexicon > Semantic amalgamation rules > Semantic interpretation

In this model the base rules generate the fundamental grammatical relations of the language and produce deep structure of the sentences. There are transformational rules which convert the deep structures into surface structures. The phonological and morphological component operates on those structures to produce 'phonological representations. Besides, the amalgamation rules operate to produce semantic interpretation. The surface structure of language resulting in semantic interpretation accounts for meaning. Meaning (semantics) is thus linked with the depths-structure (syntax). 

C. Structure and Meaning

From the above description of the TG model one can find that Chomsky makes a clear-cut distinction between structure and
meaning. The semantic theory is built upon the theory of structure proposed in TG grammar. The significant semantic relations are derived from the nature of the dictionary entries and their interpretation. Lexical entries are specified by the deep structure. The semantic interpretation is the built-in device of language to generate meaning out of structures.

Chomsky says rules and categories of deep structure are universal. That is to say, they are universally applicable to the structure of sentences in any language. Universal grammar is the underlying reality of all the languages. It is the common structure of all empirically available languages. Universal grammar is the core of Chomsky's model of grammar, since it explains how the particular languages and their particular grammars are possible. (We shall have more discussions on this later).

Another significant aspect of Chomsky's theory is that universal grammar is mental, since it is the innate feature of human languages. Language in this sense is out and out internal regardless of the external features which vary spatio-temporarily. Universal rule-structure is the innate as well as the normative feature that describes how language is possible.

d. Wittgenstein on Depth Grammar vs Surface Grammar.

The philosophical distinction between depth grammar and surface grammar is a basic feature of Wittgenstein's philosophy.
of language. Wittgenstein writes,

In the use of words one might distinguish "surface grammar" from 'depth grammar'. What immediately impresses itself upon us about the use of a word is the way it is used in the construction of the sentence, the part of its use-one might say - that can be taken in by the ear - And now compare the depth grammar, say of the word "to mean" with what its surface grammar would lead us to suspect (PI, Sect.664).

As already discussed in Chapter I this passage is crucial to understanding Wittgenstein's distinction between depth grammar and surface-grammar. The surface grammar, in short, represents the observable features of a sentence while the depth grammar represents the logical features.

It can be argued that depth grammar can be determined by going beyond linguistic signs. In that sense, depth grammar is the logical grammar reflecting the logical form of sentences that is exclusively the philosopher's concern. On the contrary, the observable grammatical features which include the grammatical rules must bewith in the preview of the grammarian. This may be called surface grammar according to Wittgenstein. Grammar philosophically stands for the necessary conditions of language-use i.e. the rules which non-contigently determine the significance of language-use. The rules which constitute the groundwork of semantics of language are not themselves products of semantic theory but are the presuppositions of semantics as such. The logical rules including truth, reference and meaning are the apriori features of all semantic systems. Wittgenstein's depth grammar, in contradistinction to Chomsky's, stands for
these logical rules which are the necessary conditions of meaningful use of language.

e. Ineffability of Semantics

It has been suggested that Wittgenstein's concept of grammar is exclusively semantical since he fails to recognise the importance of syntax in understanding language. This suggestion is based on the assumption that Wittgenstein makes a clear-cut distinction between syntax and semantics in the grammarian's sense. However, according to Wittgenstein, grammar includes both syntax and semantics. Although Wittgenstein is interested in formulating a depth grammar in contrast to surface grammar, he is not concerned with either syntax or semantics in the grammarian's sense. Syntax, for him, is logical syntax that specifies the rules of grammar for making sentences meaningful.

The semantical issues of meaning and truth are taken for granted in formulating the logical syntax. Merrill and Jaakko Hintikka have rightly pointed out that for Wittgenstrein, semantics is ineffable in that meaning or sense and the language-world relations are the underlying presuppositions of understanding of language. If syntax takes into account the formation of sentences and their employment in language-game, then semantics dealing with sense must be already shown the use of sentences. Sense, therefore, is not a further desideratum for grammar. Syntax mirrors sense and other semantical rules that
Ineffability of semantics is directly linked with the fact that we can adduce the syntactical facts about language but we cannot mention the semantical facts in the same way. Hence they must be presupposed in the language we study systematically.\textsuperscript{18}

In the transformational linguistic theory, syntax and semantics stand in separate footing. While syntax is concerned with the syntactic components and their rules, semantics is concerned with the interpretation and endowment of meaning on the structures. Therefore transformational grammarian brings semantics into existence by providing the theory of semantic interpretation of syntax. Unlike in Wittgenstein the grammarian's semantics is a part of surface grammar, so semantics is posterior to the analysis of the syntactic deep structure. For Wittgenstein, on the contrary, semantics is presupposed in the depth grammar. It is co-eval with depth grammar.

The transformational linguist requires that "grammar" be interpreted univocally. Secondly, he demands that language functions according to the principle of creativity which explains
how an infinite number of rules of sentences can be generated from a finite rule-structure. This principle is a psychological principle explaining the existence of the complex structures of language. Depth grammar, according to Wittgenstein, is concerned with neither of these goals. Depth grammar, is the logic of language and so goes beyond the empirical demands of grammar. Thus the chief difference between depth structure and depth grammar lies in the fact that what constitutes deep structure is narrower than the scope of depth grammar. Semantic interpretations depends on prior specification of deep structure. But depth grammar accounts for the logical structure of both the syntactic and semantic facts. Depth grammar is the logical basis of both syntax and semantics. Thus, for Wittgenstein, grammar is not syntactical nor is it semantical. It is the presupposition of both. It studies rules or norms that explain how syntax and semantics are possible.

3. LOGIC AND GRAMMAR

Wittgenstein's concept of grammar reflects the universality and necessity of logic. Logic and grammar become one in their normative structure. Neither logic nor grammar is concerned with the empirical facts of syntax and semantics. So Wittgenstein writes,

Grammar does not tell us how language must be constructed in order to fulfill its purpose, in order to have such-and-such an effect on human beings. It only describes and in no way explains the use of sings (PI. Sect.496).
This explains how the need of grammar arises from the need of the knowledge of the use of language. The factuality of use is not the object of grammatical description; it is its essentiality that matters for grammar. The essence of use is its rules or norms. These are the underlying logical features of language. As logical, they are universal and so must precede the description of linguistic facts. In that sense, though use is language-specific, its rule-structure is universal and necessary. This fact is captured in the following summary statement by Wittgenstein:

Grammar does not address itself to empirical universality but to a universality of the ultimate rules of the game whose validity is beyond appeal (See PG, p.215).19

The dividing line between logic and grammar is completely blurred if grammar is taken as a normative structure.20 Otherwise the empirical grammars have to be backeted along with other empirical sciences in order to distinguish between grammar in the logical sense and grammars of the descriptive kind.

The issue of grammar being logical is itself decided by the way grammar is being defined. If the object of grammar is to seek the empirical foundations of language, then grammar is bound to be hypothetical. If, on the contrary, its aim is to see the essence of language and its rule-structure, then it is trans-empirical and so logical. Itkonen writes.
A grammar is a theory of language. A theory is empirical if and only if, it is testable on the basis of space-time entities, i.e. events or actions. There are two ways in which the theory may be non-empirical: Either it does not deal with space-time entities at all, ... or it deals, at least apparently, with space-time entities, but is formulated in such a way as not to be falsifiable by them.  

Wittgenstein's grammar in non-empirical in the former sense. It has nothing to do with spatio-temporal entities. Its subject matter is rules and not the factuality or contingency of language-use. The conditions of significant use i.e. criteria are the concern of logic and grammar. Use as such is a phenomenon which grammar takes note of but that is not what grammar talks about. As it has been summarily put,  

The foundation of grammar is the distinction between sense and non-sense. I would like to say: 'I must begin with the distinction between sense and nonsense. Before that nothing is possible. I cannot justify it (PG, 81) Having presupposed this foundation grammar consists combinations (See PG. 138).  

Grammar seeks to understand how signs, being what they are, are employed as symbols in a meaningful discourse. It is solely concerned with the possibility of language and thus demands to be non-factual.  

4. COMPETENCE AND PERFORMANCE  

The linguist's approach to language stands in sharp contrast to the philosopher's approach. The linguist is primarily interested in how the sentences are produced out of a finite base
through recursive rules. It provides a model which relates signs to one another and explains how complex systems come into being. The grammarian takes depth structure as a completely syntactic notion and this abstracts language from the world and the linguistic community. Hence, the concept of empirical grammar fails to explain how it itself is possible. It not only fails to relate itself to the world but definitely makes language self-closed and insensitive to the world.

Katz has advocated that semantic interpretations provided by the semantic theory are in no way contextually controlled. Syntactic context alone is relevent to semantic interpretation. The social or natural contexts of use do not enter into consideration. Thus language-world link is snapped and language remains immersed in itself. Grammar becomes a systematic exposition of the underlying structures. Semantics becomes a matter of structural interpretation.

Transformational grammarians further claim that they are interested in a speaker's ideal competence of language-use and not in his actual use. As Chomsky has made clear, grammar is interested in competence and not in performance. Competence is regarded as prior to performance, and in that sense performance requires the competence. Language-use is thus embedded in the network of competence packed into the language user's mind. Chomsky writes,
Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogenous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly, and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance.\(^{27}\)

Transformational grammar while defining competence of the speakers presupposes that there is an innate grammatical structure that lies packed in the speaker's mind. This mentalistic hypothesis is a *sine qua non* of the competence model. Performances which consists in actual language use are underrated for the reason that a competence speaker under ideal conditions knows the language so perfectly well that there is little that can be added by the use of that language. Our knowledge of grammar is the competence of internalizing rules that manifest in performance under suitable circumstances. As Chomsky claims,

> Any interesting generative grammar will be dealing, for the most part, with mental processes that are far beyond the level of actual or even potential consciousness ... Thus a generative grammar attempts to specify what the speaker actually knows, not what he may report about his knowledge.\(^{28}\)

Wittgenstein, quite obviously, has no interest in the mental picture (model) of grammar since it, according to him, produces no explanatory hypothesis. All explanation of grammar fail to situate it in the proper perspective. This is one of the reasons why Wittgenstein emphasizes the *application* or *use* of language in the world. Use is neither a unilateral feature nor is it manifesting a hidden mental mechanism. Therefore the mental

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The mental processes, if there are any, are purely external to what rules are internalized and followed. Rules, according to Wittgenstein, are the regular practices that we are trained to adopt in the relevant world-situations. Therefore rules are rules of use rather than mentally transparent structures. Wittgenstein dismisses the very idea that rules are present in the mind prior to their application in the language-use. Wittgenstein writes,

The grammar of a language isn't recorded and doesn't come into existence until the language has already been spoken by human beings for a long time. Similarly, primitive games are played without their rules being codified, and even without a single rule being formulated. (PG, Sect.26).

But does this mean that Wittgenstein rejects competence in favour of performance? Obviously not. The reason is that this distinction does not bother Wittgenstein. In fact, his emphasis is on the ability to learn a language and the consequent mastery or the application of language. Competence arises in collaboration with performance. There is a unitary situation that makes a holistic frame of competence-cum-performance available. Language use bears this dual relationship. A competent speaker is one who can perform successfully and similarly a successful performer is a competent speaker who has mastered the language. Thus Wittgenstein presents a holistic grammatical model that gives a total view of language.
5. UNIVERSAL LANGUAGE AND UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR

Chomsky makes a distinction between language and grammar. He considers grammar as a theory of language. He makes a further distinction between particular grammars of particular languages and the universal grammar. Universal grammar (UG), according to Chomsky, provides the basic structure or system of rules innately built into mind or brain. UG is a bilogically innate language faculty given to the human species. It can be activated through experiences and other environmental factors, according to Chomsky. Thus the biological model of UG stands in sharp contrast with Wittgenstein's notion of grammar.

Chomsky takes language as a derivative and epiphenomenal concept and makes it rather less important and less revealing a term in his linguistic theory. For him, UG is the bedrock phenomenon (biologically speaking), and so the particular grammar (p-grammars) are the evolutes and branches of universal grammar. P-languages are twice removed from UG and thus partake of the accidental features of the factual natural epiphenomena. There are two points to be noted.

1. Language is a natural phenomena and is a part of the world. But it is less an original phenomenon. It is only a particular organisation of the UG, the bedrock phenomenon.
2. UG as the ultimate bedrock of the natural languages is also a natural phenomenon. It is the origin of all P-languages. So UG has dual status, the ontological one of being the
genetic source of languages and the epistemic one of being
the source of the derivability of P-grammars and their P-
languages.

The consequence of this way of looking at grammar and
languages is that grammar becomes a naturalistic theory of
language. Besides, UG becomes a universal phenomena without
being a universal medium of anything, while language becomes a
particular phenomenon without being any particular entity.
Languages have restricted scope since they are accidental in
comparison to the biologically embedded universal grammar.

The duality of UG and P-languages throws up many other
consequence which we shall discuss now. UG as a theory of
languages (P-languages) provides all that we wish to know about
language. Knowledge of languages consists in the knowledge of
competence as distinguished from performance. That is, knowledge
of rules and their application. This distinction between
competence and performance remains us of the rationalist
distinction of reason and experience. It suggests that
competence (rules) is a matter of rational (conscious) knowledge
while their application or use is a matter of experience
dependent on the environment, linguistic conventions, and
practical abilities. Thus, knowledge of language, truly
speaking, is not the knowledge of use, performance and rule
application and of so called linguistic habits. It is state of
mind for two reasons; namely.
a) It is the initial state, state 0, which evolves with the steady state $S_s$ of the mind though it is largely unconscious.

b) It is the faculty of language, the 'mental organ' deeply seated in the central mechanisms of the brain.\(^2\)

Chomsky thus takes knowledge of language as implicit in the mechanism of the brains. Thus he abolishes the possibility of learning language altogether because learning is ultimately possessed by the language faculty which is already biologically accomplished. So, learning a language is not a skill or ability. It is innately given in the brain.

Now the question arises, Is Chomsky's cognitive linguistics based on the idea that the theory of language (grammar) is a psychological theory consistent in exploring the knowledge of language as we understand it? Chomsky's answer is that he is not concerned with ordinary knowledge of language, that is, the notion of language as an ability or practice. He is concerned with what we have in our cognitive possession of language and grammar and what we become when we acquire a language. Hence his idea that grammatical knowledge is a state rather than process, a competence rather than performance, and ultimately a faculty of the mind or brain which is richly endowed with a rule-structure.

Chomsky calls grammatical knowledge unconscious. It is unconscious because it is an innate rule-structure that yields a
rich variety of the humanly accessible grammars and so cannot be the object of metagrammar. It cannot, therefore, be the object of a grammatical enquiry. Thus, a question arises: Is there any meta UG? Chomsky says 'NO', because as soon as he admits that it is there then UG cannot be a universal grammar. It will become the object of a higher grammar. For Chomsky, UG is the base-grammar and so it is unconscious. By 'unconscious' he means that the possessor of UG, say a child, is not aware that it possesses UG though it is having it as the built-in system of its brain. That is, UG is not an item of consciousness, since, for Chomsky, consciousness is only a fraction of the vast store of human mind/brain structure. Thus in a sense there is no contradiction in saying that inmate knowledge is not necessarily a conscious process.

The impossibility of metagrammar leads to a lot of difficulties. We will not have a language in which we can express UG itself. UG is not itself a language, UG is the rule-structure of all humanly possible grammars i.e. the P-grammars. If we admit a language to express, UG, then UG becomes a P-grammar and if we don't, UG is inexpressible and unconscious. Chomsky has the second option because he cannot admit higher-order grammar than UG. UG is universal in the sense that it is the common root of all P-grammars and it itself contains the possibility of language and so it cannot be a language as such.
6. Is UG is unconscious or ineffable?

Chomsky's answer would be UG is not a matter to be acquired or empirically learnt. Of course, it is to be *empirically discovered* and there is a grammatical theory to embed it. The grammatical theory is an innate structure in the human brain. So, one can conclude, UG is a system of a universal rule-structure. The thesis of unconscious UG only implies that it is not an item of consciousness and possibility there is not higher order of language that can include UG homophonically. It stands for rules that explain how language as such is logically possible. So there is a difference between the universality of logical grammar and Chomsky's physicalistic - mentalistic theory of grammar.

Wittgenstein proposes a theory of universality of language which contains a universal grammar. Wittgenstein is concerned with the universality of grammar which is the logical grammar of the language. Logical grammar begins with Frege and continues in Wittgenstein's work. It stands for rules that explain how a language as such is logically possible. So there is a difference between the universality of logical grammar and Chomsky's physicalistic - mentalistic theory of grammar. Chomsky downgrades language and thereby the so called logic of language. Wittgenstein's universality claims for outstrip the empirical boundaries of UG. For Chomsky, language is an epiphenomenon. So the so called logic of language is nothing but a pale shadow of what he calls universal grammar. For Wittgenstein, however, the
logic of language is more universal than universal grammar because UG itself conforms to the principles of logical grammar. The logical grammar is normative and so is more basic than empirical grammars, including universal grammar. The duality between logic and empirical grammar is marked in the nature of the two disciplines.\textsuperscript{35}

From Wittgenstein's point of view, Chomsky's model of grammatical can be considered inadequate for the simple reason that Chomsky has no notion of universal language. He has no conception of language as a universal medium. The notion of language is foundational and universal for Wittgenstein. He considers grammar as derivative and expressible in the language itself. Although grammar is rule-structured according to Wittgenstein, it has no peculiarities of Chomsky's universal grammar e.g. its being an innate endowment of the brain. For Wittgenstein, language is universal not because it is an innate structure of the brain but because it is the medium of everything including logic, grammar and philosophy. It expresses all that is effable i.e. what can be said. Natural language is the great home of all that could be talked about, acted upon or played with in an unbounded way.\textsuperscript{36}

Thus, from Wittgenstein's point of view, Chomsky's theory of language gives us a picture of the accidental characteristics of language. Language, is at best a mental feature of human beings. Nonetheless, it is accidental because nan's brain could have been otherwise. So language looses its universality. Besides, UG,
being an innate endowment, becomes a mystery of mysteries UG, remains, however, the background phenomenon, i.e., the ultimate genetic code of all languages and so it is the only natural phenomenon which brain sciences must discover through empirical means. Wittgenstein has nothing to do with brain sciences. He has therefore no conception of an empirically discoverable universal grammar of the Chomskian sort.

Wittgenstein would reject any distinction between I-language and E-language37 which Chomsky makes because he believes language is itself a unitary, a holistic phenomenon. For Wittgenstein there is no distinction between competence and performance because he does not admit a gap between rules and their applications Wittgenstein believes that there is no competence (rule-structure) unless that is exactly displayed in the complex network of performances (Use/language-games). Competence is not a deep mental occurrence which has no correlate in the use of language. Use involves competence just as competence is expressed in language-mastery. Chomsky cuts off the inner chord between language and grammar because he makes grammar contingent. Besides, he makes UG unconscious, though mental, because language is not considered as a universal medium. UG has no language to express itself, since it is the physical root of all languages. Wittgenstein makes the distinction between language and grammar in language itself. For him language and grammar are in the same logical space. Wittgenstein is not against mental as such but against the mental which is queer,
inscrutable and unconscious. That is why he cannot accept anything which is laid in the dark chamber of the mind and can never be expressed in language itself.

7. QUINE ON LOGICAL GRAMMAR

Among the champions of logical grammar Quine is most prominent. Quine, like Wittgenstein, proposes a grammar that can be the logical basis of all languages. He agrees with Wittgenstein on the rejection of the mentalist-empiricist grammar of Chomsky. For Quine, grammar includes the logical structure of language.

Quine makes a distinction between immanent and transcendent grammars. Immanent grammar is a particular grammar of a particular language. The immanents e.g. der words in German are peculiar to a particular language. Lexicon can be taken as an example of an immanent notion. Lexicon simply comprises those words or morphemes that are assaigned to particular languages. On the contrary, the transcendent grammar, according to Quine, is concerned with grammaticality in general. It is directed to languages generally. It is related to the formal structure of languages. So, it is applicable in advance to any unspecified language. The logical grammar is therefore a transcendent grammar since it applies to all languages.

Quine's notion of transcendence, as he admits it, is of the Husserlian type. The notion of grammatical category is a
transcendent concept. We have to define the grammatical category by interchangeability \textit{Salva Congruitate}. As Quine writes.

If, having started with some satisfactorily transcendent notion of grammaticality we were to proceed to define the notion of a grammatical category simply by interchangeability \textit{salva congruitate} in Husserl's way then the notion of a grammatical category would likewise be transcendent.\textsuperscript{41}

Quine has taken logic as grammatical category. It is a kind of grammatical analysis. Grammatical categories, however, can be demarcated strictly on the basis of interchangeability \textit{salva congritate}. Grammar considers the logical categories viz., two-place predicates, quantifiers and so on. Quine gives the example of variables, like 'X;', 'Y', 'Z' etc. as part of the logical vocabulary. The rest of the logical grammar consists of further grammatical constructions. Quine gives a map of logical grammar. It consists of two-place predicates, logical connectives like conjunction and negation and existential quantification. Thus the logical map of language presented in the logical grammar provides the clue to our understanding of the structure of all languages. Quine accepts the universality of logical grammar.

8. QUINE VS WITTGENSTEIN ON GRAMMAR

The following observations can be made on Quine's vs Wittgenstein's notion of logical grammar.

Firstly, Quine is a logician. He is concerned with the logical study of language. Logic is important for him, not
language. Although he takes all logical notions as grammatical categories, nevertheless he thinks logic is a device to solve all problems of language. Wittgenstein is on the contrary, concerned with language primarily and so deals with logic as a method of understanding language. He thinks that logic is a part of grammar. There is no logic without language, according to Wittgenstein.

Secondly, Quine does not give importance to the transcendent notion of grammar although he admits that study of the 'grammatical' is the philosopher's concern. Here, he subscribes to the Wittgensteinian view that logic is transcendent or transcendental in the sense of the Tractatus, 6.13 because its truths are outside the domain of accidentality or contingency. Wittgenstein agrees with Quine that grammar is transcendental because in grammar we are seeking the underlying conditions for the possibility of language i.e. the essence (logical) of languages. Lastly, interestingly enough, Quine thinks grammar is a logical product of language. This means his notion of logical grammar vindicates Wittgenstein's view on language and grammar. For Wittgenstein, grammar is comprehensive enough to include logic in its domain. However, according to him, both logic and grammar are contained in language, language being the universal medium. Logic and grammar reveal the rule-structure of language. Quine cannot, however, deny that language is pre-logical and pre-grammatical in the sense that without language we cannot just think of what logic can be. Unlike Frege, Quine did not
conceive of logic as a universal language, since he could realize, like Wittgenstein, that language is the universal medium and logic is contained in language.

9. STRAWSON'S NOTION OF PERSPICUOUS GRAMMAR

Strawson\(^4\) in his conception of grammar stresses the importance of non-empirical character of grammar in contradistinction with Chomsky's empirical grammar. Non-empirical grammar, according to him, demonstrate the logicality of its rules and their consequent universality.

Let us consider first what Strawson means by perspicuous grammar. A perspicuous grammar represents the ideal speaker's ability to understand, produce and criticise indefinitely many new sentences of his language. Grammar ideally represents the various components viz (a) the ontological vocabulary (b) a semantic vocabulary (c) functional vocabulary for combining different elements (d) a vocabulary of formal devices.\(^4\) An ideal grammar is perspicuous for the reason that it throws light on what languages of certain type must broadly share in the structure. Strawson names this condition as the condition for the possibility of perspicuous grammar. The perspicuous grammar, to say the least is non-empirical.

According to Strawson perspicuous grammar needs true explanatory foundations. Philosophers are ready to accept grammar if it is provided with true explanatory foundations.
Philosophy tries to reach the grammatical form of sentences which lies deep down the surface structure. As Strawson says, the philosophical investigations of the foundations of grammar are non-empirical.45

Philosophers are generally concerned with the logical conditions of meanings and not with the formal arrangements by means of which functional relations are actually represented. He will have a conception of meaning element on the one hand and of systematic modes of combination of them (syntactical relations) on the other. The semantics and syntax are within the philosophers purview in a logical sense.

Strawson always stresses perspicuous conditions for meaningfulness of language. Naturally that leads to the conception of non-empirical linguistics. It involves a theoretical model of language. Thus perspicuous grammar is closely similar to the ideal language of the logician. Like a logician, the philosopher-grammarian exposes the ideal structure of language. So, non-empirical grammar will be concerned with every point at which structure is needed to contribute to the overall meaning of language. Structure must be exposed at every point and understood.

Strawson distinguish two types of grammar one is the intristic or essential grammar of language-type and the other one is the alternative invariable grammar of language type.46 Strawson defines language-type as specifying (i) the semantic or
broadly logical type of meaning elements it contains and (ii) the
types of significant combinations into which they enter to form
sentences. Essential grammar is apriori since its components are
ideally determined. The rules of essential grammar show that
all combinations are perspicuously laid down. According to
Strawson, the essential grammar is of the subject-predicate type which is the underlying grammar of ordinary language.
Subject-predicate structure holds the key to the perspicuous character of grammar.

There are similarities between Strawson and Wittgenstein approaches to grammar. Both Strawson and Wittgenstein are
interested in the perspicuity of the conditions of the meaningfulness of linguistic units. They want each and every
linguistic unit to be clear and well-defined in order to present the logical conditions of language-use. Secondly, for
Wittgenstein a linguistic unit gets its meaning in the form-of-life embedded in a language-game. Forms of life can provide the
basic conditions or locus standi of all grammatical rules constituting the structure of language. For Strawson, language is remotely modelled on forms of life, and so he will argue that grammar indirectly represents the essential features of our conceptual system.

Both Wittgenstein and Strawson lay stress on the grammar of ordinary language and both believe that philosophy can only
describe the essential structure of language. Strawson's claim
that there is a central ahistorical\textsuperscript{48} core of our conceptual scheme can be compared with Wittgenstein's idea that ordinary language is our form of life and involves the constitutive elements or categories of our thinking.

**10. HUSSERL ON PURE GRAMMAR**

The concept of ideal or pure grammar finds a bold echo in Husserl's philosophy. Husserl spoke of "pure grammar" analogous to Kant's "pure science' of nature. For Husserl, pure or formal grammar comprehends the entire domain of apriori structures of language and experience. The assumption behind this conception of grammar is that there exists a common grammatical form which is valid for all languages and which can be determined apriori. According to Husserl, natural languages obey certain apriori laws and manifest an ideal framework' which is stable inspite of the empirical and accidental differences proper to each particular language.\textsuperscript{49} Language has thus both essential and inessential elements. It is with the essential elements, i.e., apriori laws that grammar is concerned. Grammar, for Husserl, is the theory of the apriori laws of meaning and the syntactic combinations.\textsuperscript{50}

Husserl shares with Wittgenstein the concept of the grammatical. He makes it clear that he is not concerned with the empirical grammars. The grammar that he deals with is apriori and purely logical. Husserl, like Wittgenstein, explores the conditions for the possibility of grammar. He explores the possibility of a universal grammar.\textsuperscript{51} That represents the
apriori features of all possible experience. It is universal in the sense that all apriori representations are universal and necessary in Kant's sense. Husserl has the Kantian concept of the apriori as his model. In the sphere of grammar, Husserl finds standards or apriori norms. As in logic apriori elements are distinguished from the inessential features, so in grammar the so called purely grammatical i.e. the apriori elements are separated from the empirical ones. In this respect, logic and grammar are both concerned with the apriori structures. In both cases the empirical element is determined by the universal and necessary structures of language. The apriori in either case is demonstrated in the fact that language embodies the experiences that concern the natural world. The apriori is not divorced from the empirical and natural.\textsuperscript{52}

Husserl located the apriori grammar in the logical structure of language. The structure of language is the guide to the structure of experience according to him. Experience, phenomenologically speaking, is the bedrock level of our reconstruction of the world. The reconstruction involves language. So, grammar studies the basic structure of experience by studying the apriori structure of language. As Husserl points out, the study of the grammatical is the first level of the logical reflection.

Now there are two aspects of the phenomenon of experience, viz. (i) the experience of the world and (ii) experience of language,\textsuperscript{54} for the reason that experience is itself structured
through language. The experience in language is the experience of the world. For Husserl, experience of language is the experience of meaning itself. Experience of language requires a phenomenological reduction of the world. So there is the full concentration on the meaning themselves as separated from their empirical instantiations. They construct the domain of the significations\textsuperscript{55} - the apriori domain of the "sense" or 'the meant'.

Formal logic studies this apriori domain of meanings. Grammar supplies the categorial framework for understanding these meanings. Now, the implicit phenomenological reduction takes a linguistic turn as it turns away from the world towards language itself. Thus it results in the discovery and analysis of the grammatical. Husserl calls it the study of the pure morphology of significations - 'pure apriori logical grammar'.\textsuperscript{56}

11. HUSSERL VS WITTGENSTEIN ON THE GRAMMATICAL

Husserl's concept of grammar has close affinity with that of Wittgenstein's. Grammar is the structural description of the apriori rules in both Husserl and Wittgenstein. In this sense, "the study of grammar is purely logical and apriori. Pure logical grammar, according to Husserl, is the first branch of formal logic which establishes the formal grammatical rules necessary for any statement to be meaningful at all; it is prior to the question of the truth-value of sentences. Grammar is concerned with meaning and hot with truth.
Both Husserl and Wittgenstein agree that a judgement must instantiate an apriori grammatical rule in its well-formed structure. A sentence is well-formed if it is grammatically sound and therefore embodies a grammatical rule. The following sentences do not have meaning since they are not well-formed. The statements are

1. Kings but where seems end
2. This frivolous is green
3. Red is world.
4. A man is end.

The above stings of words are devoid of any unified meanings. The words have individual meanings, but when they are arranged ungrammatically they have none. It is the task of pure logical grammar to derive from the original form of judgements the laws which govern the potentially meaningful sentences of various forms. Wittgenstein would agree that the logical form of a sentence must be derivable from the underlying grammatical rules. Accordingly, the purely formal grammatical rules are independent of truth or falsity of statements. The sentences which are grammatically permitted are meaningful; otherwise, they are meaningless. Formal grammar saves us from meaningless ness (unsinn).\(^58\)

Wittgenstein comes very near to Husserl when he says that grammar is the analysis of the formal conditions of thought. Both take the study of grammar as anti-psychologistic. The main
task of grammar is to study the apriori rules which explain the formal structure of sentences. Wittgenstein has been insistent on the view that rules are not accidental to a language-system. They are the formal and necessary features of any symbolism. Therefore, for both Husserl and Wittgenstein, logic is a grammar of rules and their application in the construction of symbol systems.

However, Husserl's concept of grammar fails to be free of phenomenological rootedness in human experience. Though grammar is transcendent still its connection with the empirical domain is preserved, though bracketed. Wittgenstein makes grammar completely transcendental for the reason that for him grammar is autonomous and so is free of all causal and empirical connections with the world. In Wittgenstein, grammar constitutes the world, while in Husserl, the world is reduced to an empirical and contingent set of experiences. Thus the Husserlian grammar is still Platonist and fails to overcome the dichotomy between grammar and the world.

12. PHILOSOPHY, GRAMMAR AND THE SCIENCE OF TRIVIALITIES

Pure grammar establishes rules which are always understood and already taken for granted in all formal systems. These rules establish the necessary and sufficient conditions for meaningful expressions. Philosophy, therefore, as deeply interested in grammar, states the necessary and the grammatical in language.
Husserl takes special interest in the fact that philosophers are concerned only with apriori and the logical in our experience. This makes him closer to Wittgenstein on the conception of philosophy as the study of grammatical, i.e. the logical and the apriori. Both believe that philosophy discovers nothing new. It only describes the essential structures of language and experience. Hence philosophy is acceptedly a description of essences of grammar and the world. But this is not philosophy of novelties but of the trivialities\textsuperscript{60} that are so obviously true.

The nature of philosophy as a study of grammar becomes nondistinct from logical grammar itself. Philosophy as the reflection on the grammatical is itself a grammatical enterprise. Wittgenstein therefore calls philosophy a philosophical grammar. The philosopher's interest in the logical and the apriori as found in Husserl, Quine and Strawson, reiterates the fact that the limits of philosophical grammar are those of philosophy itself. There could not be an extra-grammatical philosophy at all since grammar extends to the domain of the intelligible and formally possible. In that sense, both grammar and philosophy are transcendental. They do not occur in time nor are they on the same level as the linguistic activities. Language is historical and therefore subject to change and evolution. But philosophical grammar, like philosophy, is self-contained and independent of the historicity of language. We can therefore Bay that language can never be perspicuous; only grammar can be BO. It is the task of philosophy to make grammar perspicuous.
The dichotomy between pure logical grammar and the empirical grammars is the dichotomy between philosophy and natural sciences. Grammar logically structured belongs to the heart of philosophy. Empirical grammar is the subject-matter of the science of language. Wittgenstein, commenting on the nature of grammar, says,

One can discover nothing in grammar. There are no surprises. When we formulate a rule, we always have the feeling: You have always known that. All we can do is to formulate clearly the rule that we have applied unconsciously. If I understand the sense of a sentence at all then I must understand the syntax of the expressions occurring in it. There is nothing to be discovered in grammar, all we can do is to clarify."
NOTES


5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.


15. cf. Oliver, p.120.


20. Esa Itkonen has extensively argued that Chomskian grammar is a nomrmatve structure and is closer to logic. However, Wittgestein's notion of grammar completely dissolves the distinction between grammar and logic. Both are normative. See Itkonen, *Grammatical Theory and metascience*, Chs.6,7-10.


23. cf. Oliver, pp.113-129.
25. See Oliver, pp.113-129.
27. Ibid., p.3.
28. Ibid., p.8.
29. See Chomsky, Rules and Representations and also his Knowledge of Language.
30. Ibid.
31. See Chomsky, Knowledge of Language.
33. Ibid.
35. For further discussion on the relative similarity and disimilarity between logic and grammar, see Itkonen, Grammatical Theory and Metascience. pp.276-293.
37. See Chomsky, Knowledge of Language.
38. For discussion on Quine-Chomsky's differences on the nature of language, see Words and Objections, eds. Davidson and Hintikka, (D. Reidel, Dordrecht/Holland, 1975).


40. Ibid.

41. Ibid., p.19.

42. Frege believed that logic is a language and not a mere calculus. He believed that logic is universal. See Van Heijenoort, "Logic as Calculus and logic as Language", Syntheses. 17 (1967), pp.324-330.


44. Ibid., p.144.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.


50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. For further discussion on the comparison between Husserl and Wittgenstein see Don Isde, Wittgenstein's "Phenomenological Reduction" in Phenomenological Perspectives, (Martinus Nighoff/The Hague, 1975), pp.47-60.

60. See J.M. Edie, "Husserl's Conception of "The Grammatical" and Contemporary Linguistics" in Readings on Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations.