In this chapter I seek to explore the grounds on which Wittgenstein's so called theory of autonomy of grammar is based. The chapter IV has shown that the sceptic's challenge to grammar, and its rules has made no dent in the latter's structure. Grammar remains immune to the sceptic's anti-foundationalist attack, since there is no possibility of proving that grammar lacks foundations. However, this does not entail that philosophy needs to provide foundations for grammar. Philosophy has no such project to defend grammar against scepticism. According to Wittgenstein, grammar, like logic, must speak for itself. This thesis may broadly be called the autonomy thesis. I will make a modest attempt to entangle the issues involved around the concept of autonomy which has a wider usage in the literature on Wittgenstein.

1. Autonomy and the Language-world Nexus

The question of autonomy arises exactly where language seems to be free of the control of the facts in the world. This is how majority of Wittgenstein interpreters have taken this question to have arisen. According to this view, language is autonomous to the extent there is no factual or natural constraints on language. That is to say language is liberated from the clutches of the world. P.M.S. Hacker writes,
The doctrine of the autonomy of grammar is closely related to the doctrine of the autonomy of language. If language had foundations in metaphysical simples, grammar could not be autonomous. The doctrine of the autonomy of language is a repudiation of the Tractatus conception between language and reality. The consequent doctrine of the autonomy of grammar is a dramatic transformation of his earlier views.

According to Hacker, if language has foundations in metaphysical simples grammar could not be autonomous. He suggests that the theory of autonomy of grammar is an heir to the doctrine of (a) indescribability of limits of the thought (b) inexpressibility of essences (c) the distinction between saying and showing.

The formal isomorphism between language and reality - the fact that language is the mirror of the essence of the world - can only be shown in language but not expressed by means of it. This is the central thesis of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language in general. The doctrine of autonomy is logically derivable from this. Hacker explains this in the following passage.

We are continually tempted to take our grammar as a projection of reality, instead of taking our conception of the structure of reality to be a projection of grammar. For we are driven to justify gramar by reference to putative facts about the world, e.g. 'But there really are four primary colours'. So, we think of our concepts of colour justified, for they characterize the world as it is. For I would look in vain for a fifth primary colour; we put four colours together because they are similar, and we contrast colour with shapes and notes because they are different (Z, 331). It is against the conception of this sort of justification, which is analogous to the idea of justifying a sentence by pointing to what varifes it, that the claim that grammar directed (Ibid). The relevant sense in which grammar is arbitrary is the doctrine of autonomy of grammar.
This thesis, however, rests on the idea that autonomy of language and grammar precludes the fact of the world being the basis of the former. This indirectly shows that autonomy is not possible as long as language is projected into the world. However, I shall try to show that Wittgenstein is very much concerned with the autonomy question in the *Tractatus* itself. Wittgenstein asserts: "Logic must look after itself" (TLP, 5.473).

2. Tractarian concept of Logic and Autonomy

What Wittgenstein says about logic in the *Tractatus* applies to grammar in his later works. Wittgenstein holds that logic and application of logic cannot overlap; they must be kept separate. Second, that nothing can come between logic and its application; they must be side by side (T.5.557). In case of grammar, the use of signs or possible use of signs cannot determine the actual occurrence of language. Besides, nothing can mediate between grammar and its actual application, because that which mediates must itself belong to grammar. Wittgenstein has supposed that logic, like grammar, does not depend upon its application. Application is external to it, since it only tells us at what point it can come into contact with the world. The world, according to Wittgenstein, is contingent whereas logic and grammar are necessary. Thus logic has to be self-contained. Wittgenstein writes:
Men have always a presentiment that there must be a realm in which the answers to question are asymmetrically combined - apriori - to form a self-contained system:

A realm subject to the law: Simplex sigillum veri. (TLP 5.4541).

This has the further implication that logic must have its own laws which safeguard it against any possible mistake, e.g. contradiction, etc. The illegitimacy of the syntactic construction is ruled out by the logical syntax itself. Wittgenstein very clearly puts this autonomy thesis as follows:

Logic must look after itself. If a sign is possible, then it is also capable of signifying. Whatever is possible in logic is also permitted (The reason why "Socrates is identical" means nothing is that there is no property called "identical. The proposition is non-sensical because we have failed to make an arbitrary determination and not because the symbol, in itself, would be illegitimate.) In a certain sense we cannot make mistakes in logic. (TLP, 5.473).

Thus the Tractarian autonomy thesis has the peculiarity of making logic autonomous of reality and it then extends the same to language. Autonomy of logic entails the autonomy of language. That is because language having logic as its essence cannot but be independent of the world so far as its logical form is concerned. The following passage tells this:

Although there is something arbitrary in our notations, this much is not arbitrary - that when we have determined one thing arbitrarily, something else is necessarily the case. (This derives from the essence of the notation) (TLP 3.342). Again he continues:

A particular mode of signifying may be unimportant but it is always important that it is a possible mode of signifying. And this is generally so in philosophy; again and again the individual case turns out to be unimportant, but the possibility of each individual case disclose something about the essence of the world (TLP 3.3421).
The autonomy thesis thus earmarks the room for the logical structure of language speaking for the structure of the world also.

3. Autonomy Thesis in the Calculus Model

Wittgenstein's calculus model which I have discussed in Chapter I entertains the possibility of the autonomy of language and grammar. First of all, language conceived as a calculus must follow the lead of logic and declare itself autonomous of all the epidemic and metaphysical supports. Like logic language must take care of itself. Secondly, the calculus model claims that language is something already given as a part of human organism and is endowed with a logical structure or form entirely underived from anything more ultimate. The logical form of language is the basic nonderivable fact which logical syntax shows through internal connexions of the grammatical rules. Therefore, neither logical form or nor the grammatical rules can be constituted by metalogical rules. The rules of the calculus are internally possible as the constitutive principles of symbolism. There is no external mechanisms for the generation of such rules.

The thesis as regards the internal relationship between language and reality reinforces the autonomy thesis insofar as the latter proposes that the relationship is not an external relationship. Language and reality share common logical form
because of which alone language is a logical picture of reality (TLP 2.17, 2.16, 4.12). Thus we can say that the logical form is colateral with the form of reality. That does not entail that the reality is the source of the logical form. The form of reality is logical and is revealed in language. So the logical form is independent of the fact that the world shares the same with language. It is a logical fact that language and the world have the same form. Now, according to Wittgenstein, the sense of a proposition consists in its being a logical picture of a possible situation (TLP 4.027, 4.03, 4.031) and that is internal to the proposition and can be demonstrated within the calculus of language itself. The essence of a proposition reflects the essence of the situation it speaks of, and so its sense follows from its essence. Grammar tells us how sense and essence internally constitute the use of a proposition. The autonomy of language-use follows from the autonomy of sense and essence. This is reflected in Wittgenstein's idea that the notion of possible is grammatical. As he puts it, "so it depends wholly on our grammar what will be called possible and what not i.e., what grammar permits." (PG. Sect. 82). This shows that what is possible is grammatically permitted owing to the fact that there is nothing left either ontologically or epistemically except what is permitted by grammar. This supremacy of grammar over what is the case (fact) and what is likely to be the case (possible) is the basis of autonomy thesis. The grammatical purview includes the language-world relations as well. Wittgenstein writes,
The connection between "language and reality" is made by definition of words, and these belong to grammar, so that language remains self-contained and autonomous (PG, Sect.55).

The autonomy of language originates in the fact that the definition of words already logically establishes the word-object relations. Objects are not external to grammar - they must already inhere in the grammatical structure of words (including the Tractarian 'names'). In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein called objects formal concepts (4.1272) and thus indicated that the formal syntax itself takes care of what objects there are in the world (Cf. TLP 3.33). Syntax or the logical grammar is, therefore, autonomous.

4. Autonomy and Non-Justification of Grammar

Wittgenstein's way of looking at language throughout his career may be summed up in a formula: Grammar comes before facts. Grammar in turn does not depend upon facts. Grammar itself is not a fact. The principal thesis is that grammar constitutes facts and therefore does not depend upon facts. Grammar is world-constituting. As Finch rightly points out, for Wittgenstein, grammar presupposes the existence of the world which is unsayable in itself and therefore does not determine it. It determines all that can be said. In Finch's words, "since it gives all the ways of speaking about the world, there is no further way by which we could say how the world itself is so that grammar might conform to it. The world is having an ultimate
character in itself".¹¹ In fact, for Wittgenstein, world and language have the identical structure, and therefore, one cannot go beyond grammar to tell what the world really is. Grammar tells what the world really is by permitting the different ways of speaking about it. For Wittgenstein world and reality are the same because there is no metaphysical gap between what is the case and what is really the case.

The facts, i.e. the world as what is the case is intertwined with our ways of speaking. A fact is a way of speaking, that is, a method of representation. It requires a language game in order to talk about the world. Language-games are, therefore, ways of speaking and acting in the world. The world is a partner in the language-game as Hintikka¹² has said in his theory of game-model semantics. This partnership is due to the fact that language logically needs the world though it is not dependent on it. Wittgenstein argues that there is an intimate bond between what we say (i.e. our concepts) and what there is (i.e. the objects). That is a deep fact. Wittgenstein articulates this in the following passage.

If any one believes that certain concepts are absolutely correct ones, and that having different ones would mean not realizing something that we realize—then let him imagine certain very general facts of nature to be different from what we are used to, and the formation of concepts different from the usual ones will become intelligible to him (P.I., p.230).

This does not suggest that the concepts which constitute our grammar are dependent upon the very general facts. It only
suggests that there is a "correspondence" between concepts and
the general facts about nature. The general facts of nature
include the regularity of natural phenomena which obey the laws
of nature. Our natural world is a systematic and orderly cosmos.
Therefore, it perfectly fits our linguistic framework that
evolves the method of grammatical representation of nature. Our
speaking, knowing and acting all together make it obvious that
the world is perfectly a partner in our language-game. World is
the other side of grammar. They make one whole.

The autonomous character of grammar means not only that
grammar comes before facts and cannot be justified in terms of
facts. Grammar has no justification as such since grammar is
fundamental and ultimate. Facts need justification, that is,
they need connections amongst themselves. The scientific
explanation of nature is a justification of facts. For example,
it can be justified why the sun appears to rise in the East and
why the sun emits rays. But it needs no justification that the
statement "The sun apears to rise in the East" states the fact
that the sun appears to rise in the East. That a statement
states (pictures) a fact is grammatical in character. That is
something fundamental so far as our ways of speaking are
concerned. The autonomy Wittgenstein is concerned with is that
of speaking rather than of what is spoken about. Autonomy
resides in the ability to represent, that is, in the speech. The
world, on the other hand, is impervious to this question.
5. Saying and Showing

The autonomy thesis is closely related to the Tractatus thesis of the ineffability of what is shown by language. In the Tractatus, logical syntax shows the logical form of language and the world. It cannot say what the logical form is like, since in saying it already presupposes it. Wittgenstein writes.

Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it - logical form. In order to be able to represent logical form we should have to be able to station ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic, that is to say outside the world (TLP 4.12).

The presupposed logical form or structure of language and the world is an ultimate fact about language and grammar and cannot therefore itself be said in another language. The logical structure is displayed in language itself. The structure is part of grammar of language and so cannot itself be justified. What seems to be the structure of the world is itself determined by grammar. So the question of grammar being justified by the world does not arise. Any attempt to justify grammar by appeal to the world will yield nonsense.

Grammar can have no more tightness or wrongness than the choice of a unit of measurement. Grammar cannot also be justified by an end, goal or purpose, which is external to language itself. In that sense the grammar of language is autonomous. Wittgenstein writes.
The rules of grammar are arbitrary in the same sense as the choice of a unit of measurement. But that means no more than that the choice is independent of the length of the objects to be measured and that the choice of one unit is not "true" and of another "false" in the way that a statement of length is true or false. Of course, that is only a remark on the grammar of the word 'unit of length' (EG, Sect. 133).

The unit of measurement is a standard or norm accepted independently of the things measured. So, it can be said that the unit of measurement is 'arbitrary', that is, it is chosen prior to measuring anything. The rules of grammar reflecting the logical form of language and the world are part of the very framework of language that makes intelligible the concept of rule and its application. In that sense, it is neither true nor false. It is arbitrary (I shall discuss in detail the concept of 'arbitrary' later). This continues the Tractarian idea that logical form expresses or shows itself in language. Language shows its rules and thus the logical form of propositions. There is no other language in which the rules themselves can be embedded.14 So, they are autonomous. This explains why Wittgenstein's calculus makes language a self-explainable system of rules which makes our notion of reality itself intelligible.

6. The Game Model and the Autonomy Question

The game-model addresses itself to the autonomy question as the central question relating to the language-world nexus. Autonomy is an integral feature of language-games and their rules. A language-game, i.e. a language-use is a determinate
form of activity bounded by rules which define what is a possible
move within the language-game. As we have already discussed in
Chapter IV without rules, a language-game is impossible
Wittgenstein writes,

We are interested in language as a procedure according to
explicit rules, because philosophical problems are misunder-
standings which must be removed by clarification of the
rules according to which we are inclined to use words (PG,
Sect.32).

The availability of rules as a part of language-games is the
basic-notion of grammar in the game-model. Rules consitute the
inner mechanism of grammar so as to make it the all-embracing
framework of language. The autonomy of the rule-structure
derives from the fact that without rules no language-game is
possible. This is connected with the fact that, like logic,
grammar is an internal feature of language. Wittgenstein writes,

There cannot be a question whether these or other rules are
the correct ones for the use of "not" (that is, whether they
accord with its meaning). For without these words the word
has as yet no meaning; and if we change the rules, it now
has another meaning (or none), and in that case we may just
as well change the word too. (PG. Sect.133).

Thus rules are internal to the language-game and speak for
themselves. There is nothing else that we can do about them
except that we record what they are. That the rules of grammar
or syntax enjoy autonomy is the legacy of the calculus model
which we have already seen. The same appears relating to the
availability of grammatical rules in the language-games. The
grammatical rules define the possible moves in a language-game
and therefore set the limit of our thought and experience, they set the 'limits of empiricism' (RFM. III, Sect.71).

Now the question is: Is there an ultimate justification of rules? Wittgenstein has always struggled with this question and ended up with a negative answer. Grammatical rules along with the language-games which they define are not to be justified. Wittgenstein thinks that no justification can ever be provided for the rules in grammar. Grammar must take care of itself. Wittgenstein says,

The danger here, I believe, is one of giving a justification of our procedure where there is no such thing as a justification and we ought simply to have said: that is how we do it. (RFM, III, Sect.74).

What prompts Wittgenstein to reject justification of grammar is his conviction that grammar is autonomous and that it can hardly be justified through any external facts such as the facts of the world. As we have already said, grammar must come logically before facts. So the question of empirical justification of grammar does not arise.

For Wittgenstein, the rules of grammar are arbitrary in the way rules of cookery are not. When the rules of grammar are violated we play no game or we play a different game. The rules of cookery are fixed by the goal of making good dishes. They are our creations or at best justified by our culinary habits. But not so are the rules of grammar. These rules have no other
purpose than speaking or using language. They are not regulated by our linguistic habits, they constitute them. Thus there is no logical gap between following a rule and using language in a certain way. Hence, rules of grammar are beyond justification. Wittgenstein writes,

Why don't I call cookery rules arbitrary, and why am I tempted to call the rules of grammar arbitrary? Because I think of the concept of "cookery" as defined by the end of cookery, and I don't think of the concept "language" as defined by the end of language (PG, Sect.133).

This is connected with the fact that in instituting the rules of language there is nothing else that is at stake 'except the language itself. But in cookery what is at stake is the eating and the related ensuring taste, but not cooking itself. Cooking is a means of satisfying taste. The following passage tells us the importance and the uniqueness of rule of grammar. Wittgenstein says,

The rules of grammar may be called "arbitrary" if that is to mean that the aim of grammar is nothing but that of the language. If someone says "if our language had not this grammar, it could not express these facts" - it should be asked what "could" means here (PI, Sect.497).

7. The Notion of 'Arbitrary'

Wittgenstein writes:

Consider: "The only correlate in language to an intrisic necessity is an arbitrary rule. It is the only thing which one can milk out of this intrisic necessity into a proposition" (PI, Sect.372).
This statement has far reaching implications so far as the autonomy question is concerned. First of all, an arbitrary rule is intrinsically necessary. Secondly, that is the only thing that a rule-like proposition can tell us about language. Wittgenstein insists that rules of grammar, that is, 'the necessary propositions' are arbitrary "Grammar is not accountable to any reality. It is grammatical rules that determine meaning (constitute it) and so they themselves are not answerable to any meaning and to that extent are arbitrary". (PG, Sect.133). That is, there is nothing that the necessary propositions in grammar are accountable to. They are what they are and not otherwise.

As Baker and Hacker\textsuperscript{15} have rightly pointed out, the rules of grammar are not arbitrary in the ordinary sense of the term. Ordinarily 'arbitrary' means capricious. A capricious government may be irrational and unfounded. Arbitrariness is a matter of irrationality in the ordinary sense. It is either a fact or convention (without reason) that stands for an arbitrary rule. But grammatical rules are not a matter of caprice and cannot be irrational either. Far from being capricious they are absolutely inexorable and inviolable. Nor need grammatical rules be arbitrary in the sense of being unimportant.\textsuperscript{16} To say that a system of rules is arbitrary does not mean they are unimportant. The importance of grammatical rules is too obvious to be proved otherwise. In this sense, only the most fundamental rules are called arbitrary. Besides, rules of grammar are not arbitrary in the sense of being a matter of individual choice or decision.
On the contrary, we are constrained by the rules to make a particular move in language. We are almost bound by the rules. We are not free to decide that $2 + 2 = 5$ or that white can be darker than black. Rules determine what we can or cannot do. Hence they are necessary. They constitute the language-game.

There is another sense in which rules can be arbitrary. That is that there may be alternative system of rules just as we have alternative units of measurement. For example, there are different ways of measuring time. The ancient methods have been replaced by modern methods of measurement. This applies to all methods of measurement. There is nothing final about them. Thus one can argue that there is arbitrariness about these methods. But grammatical rules are not arbitrary in this sense. Though Wittgenstein argues that there is parallelism between the rules of grammar and the units of measurements (cf. PG, Sect.133), yet the rules of grammar determine the meaning of the sentence and so are more fundamental. In that sense, they cannot be arbitrary. There are no alternative ways of constituting meaning. We mean in one way rather than in another. So, we cannot say that a different grammatical structure can serve certain purposes better than the present one. A different grammatical structure will mean a different language. So, "arbitrary" does not mean 'dispensable' in this sense. Alternative possibilities themselves are the creations of rules of grammar. Wittgenstein writes,
Compare a concept with a style of painting. For is even our style of painting arbitrary? Can you choose one at pleasure? (The Egyptian, for instance.) Is it a mere question of pleasing or ugly? (PI, p.230).

The claim that rules of grammar are arbitrary is aimed at disproving that "our grammar, our rules for the use of words, our rules of inference or of mathematics are answerable to some kind of reality". We are misled into thinking that our grammatical propositions such as "Red is darker than yellow" or "They are only four primary colours" correspond to the reality of colours. We are grammar is a reflection of an independent colour-reality. This supposition leads to the conclusion that colour-grammar is at the mercy of the world. This speaks of their heteronomy. But Wittgenstein argues against this empiricist doctrine. He believe that grammar is not a kind of science. Its truths are not contingent and so dependent on the world. Thus, for him, that grammar is arbitrary is one and the same thing as that grammar is autonomous. Autonomy follows from grammar's independence of empirical world. Wittgenstein writes:

"One is tempted to justify rules of grammar by sentences like "But there really are four primary colours'. And the saying that rules of grammar are arbitrary is directed against the possibility of this justification, which is constructed on the model of justifying a sentence by pointing to what verifies it. (Z., Sect.331).

Thus we come to the conclusion that our colour-grammar, does not reside in the nature of colours (Z, Sect.357), since it is our rules for the use of colour-words which determine what we call the essence of colour as such. The colour-grammar tells
us what colour is and how they have a role to play in our life. That is to say, colour-grammar is rooted in our nature, rather than in the nature of colour itself. Thus in the Zettel, Wittgenstein makes the remarkable statement that colour-system is rooted in us. He writes,

Do the systems reside in our nature or in the nature of things? How are we to put it? Mot in the nature of numbers or colours (Z., Sect.357).

He further continues.

Then is there something arbitrary about this system? Yes and no. It is akin to what is arbitrary and what is non-arbitrary (Z., Sect.358).

Thus the disassociation of grammar from empirical reality is complete, since this explains both what is arbitrary as well as what is non-arbitrary in Wittgenstein's sense. Grammar is arbitrary in that sense that there is no independent metaphysical support for it. Secondly, it is non-arbitrary because it is necessary as determining the very structure of reality. This is the peculiarity of grammatical propositions,21 as we have seen in Chapter III.

As we have already said, the rules of cooking are not arbitrary (autonomous) because cooking is defined by its goal which is here the production of good food. The latter is causally dependent upon the former. But rules of grammar are not conditions by any such external goal. The goal of language is language itself. In speaking a language we may communicate but
that is what language is all about. Besides, communication is not external to language. Language determine itself, its activities and its goals. One does not stand outside language to point out what its goal is. By going outside language one does not speak another language but no language at all.

Baker and Hacker summarize the point in the following way: "Grammatical rules are arbitrary, autonomous. There is no such thing" justifying grammar by reference to reality. For grammar determines the bounds of sense, what it makes, sense to say. Hence it determines what is to be called a "description of reality", (whether that description is true or false is another matter, which is settled by reality). That is to say that grammar is not dependent on empirical facts. As we have put it earlier, grammar can never retain its necessity if it were derived from reality. The necessity of grammar lies in his non-justifiability and non-derivability. That is its ultimate character and also its autonomy. That is what it is. It could not have been otherwise. Wittgenstein expresses this as follows.

If I could describe the point of grammatical conventions by saying they are made necessary by certain properties of the colours (say), then that would make the conventions superflous, since in that case I would be able to say precisely that which the conventions exclude my saying. Conversely, if the conventions were necessary, i.e., if certain combinations of words had to be excluded as non-sensical, then for that very reason I cannot cite a property of colours that make the convention necessary, since it would then be conceivable that the colours should not have this property, and I could only express that by violating the conventions (PR, Sect.4)
8. Alternative Grammars

Alternative grammars are possible. Now the question is whether there is always the possibility of there being alternative sets of rules and concepts. Wittgenstein conceded the possibility of different forms of life which do not share the features of ours. To say that grammar is arbitrary may suggest that our grammar is not unique and so not necessary. But we have seen that Wittgenstein has rejected this suggestion. But the question of possible grammars different from us has not been settled.

In a deeper sense, according to Wittgenstein, our grammar is final for us. It is deeply rooted in our nature, that is, in our forms of life. Therefore, there cannot be grammars which we understand to be utterly different from ours. If they are different we do not understand them at all. Bernard Williams has very aptly argued that there are no genuine alternative forms of life. William writes,

The imagined alternatives are not alternatives to us; they are alternative for us, markers of how far we might go and still remain within our world - a world leaving which would not mean that we see something different, but just that we ceased to see.

This only suggests that the idea of alternative grammars is of limited availability. It has only a heuristic value. It only shows that we cannot say that ours is the absolutely correct one. Wittgenstein tells us that there are underlying natural limits to
our grammar. Bad the world been different, our grammar could have been differently constituted. Grammar is in someway "responsible to reality" in the sense that were the world different in some specific ways, our grammar would have different structures. Similarly, if human nature were different some parts of our grammar might be no more in use. And if we had a different grammar we would say and do quite different things. Wittgenstein makes this clear in the following passage from the Philosophical Investigations:

I am not saying: If such-and-such facts of nature were different people would have different concepts (in the sense of a hypothesis). But : If anyone believes that certain concepts are absolutely the correct ones, and that having different ones would mean not realizing something that we realize - then let him imagine very general facts of nature to be different from what we are used to, and the formation of concepts different from the usual ones will become intelligible to him (PI, II, XII).

Nevertheless the grammatical structures that we have told us something about the world which we describe in our grammar. Our grammar tells us about the necessary structure of the world. Wittgenstein writes,

In a way ... you might say that the choice of units [of measurement] is arbitrary. But in a most important sense it is not. It has a most important reason lying both in the size and in the irregularity of shape and in the use we make of a room that we do not measure its dimension in microns or even in millimetres. That is to say not only the proposition which tells us the result of measurement but also the description of the method and unit of measurement tells us something about the world in which this measurement takes place.  

This idea has a striking resemblance with the Tractarian notion
that the alternative scientific descriptions of the world only present a priori insights about the forms on which the propositions of science can be cast. Wittgenstein writes,

Similarly the possibility of describing the world by means of Newtonian mechanics tell us nothing about the world but what does tell us something about it is the precise way in which it is possible to describe it by these means (TLP, 6.342).

Thus the alternative descriptions are ultimately based on the precise idea of the world. Grammar allows for the possible descriptive systems insofar as form remains the constant feature. Hence it is misleading to argue that alternative grammars are possible in any absolute sense. Only alternative structures are possible to the extent they agree on the common form that the alternative systems share. Besides, the world and its logical structure impose a great constraint on these possible systems. Thus the arbitrariness of grammar is constrained by a non-arbitrariness or necessity of the logical form that grammar and the world share.\textsuperscript{28} Wittgenstein therefore talks of the kinship between the arbitrariness and non-arbitrariness of the system in the following passage:

Then is there something arbitrary about this system? Yes and no. It is akin both to what is arbitrary and to what is non-arbitrary (Z, Sect.358).

9. Grammar As Non-arbitrary

The non-arbitrary character of grammar follows from the deep necessity it presents as a structure of rules and concept
formations. Non-arbitrariness is the inner truth about grammar whereas arbitrariness is its outer form. To be what it is and not otherwise is grammar's being arbitrary, whereas grammar's telling us what must be the case if any thing is possible and thus dictating to nature is its non-arbitrariness. Thus non-arbitrariness is really the other face of necessity. By accepting a grammatical rule we commit ourselves to a certain form of action and are under the logical obligation to follow a pattern of life. A rule is a normative commitment, it is a standard procedure that controls all future use of language. Language becomes a timeless structure with its future use captured by the rule. But there is still the contigency that is attached to the application of rules. Grammar is not affected by this contigency. Hence grammar is timeless, normative and logical. That is its non-arbitrariness.²⁹

The second aspect of non-arbitrariness can be brought out as Hacker³⁰ points out, by bringing into view the social aspect of language. The social aspect of language is its being independent of the individual speakers. Grammar is not anybody's personal creation. It is socially eternal and beyond anybody's guess. Yet it is a shared phenomenon; it is deeply rooted in the social practices and behaviour. Grammar is the storehouse of common experience, standards and norms. It is the commonly acceptable and accessible domain of rules and conceptual connections. The rules represent the limits of our thinking as human beings. Thus grammar is bound to be non-arbitrary.

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Wittgenstein gives another proof in the *Philosophical Investigations* for the non-arbitrariness of grammar. According to him, grammar is no more arbitrary than a style of painting is (PI, II, XII). As we have already seen, a style of painting reveals the inner depth of a culture or tradition. Therefore it is not arbitrary in the ordinary sense. A style of painting is the language of the soul of the people. So also grammar by analogy is far deeply rooted in the life and mind of the people. Grammar transcends the temporality of the style of painting. Grammar is, therefore, ahistorical whereas style of painting is historical. Even then they share a common character they are non-arbitrary.

However, as we have already noted in Chapter III, grammar, though ahistorical, is not completely indifferent to natural history. Grammar is responsible to nature and natural history. Wittgenstein writes,

> Yes, but has nature nothing to say here? Indeed she has — but she makes herself audible in another way. "You'll surely run us against existence and non-existence somewhere! But that means against facts. not concepts (Z., Sect. 364).

Thus nature has a subtle way of telling us that our grammar is in large measure in conformity with nature. The existence of the world is the absolute presupposition of grammar (Cf. *Tractatus*. 5.552, 5.55521).

The natural limits of grammar are facts which are grammar's
absolute presupposition and yet grammar is independent of them. This point is emphasized by Wittgenstein to remind us of the fact that grammar is normative and so comes before facts. Grammar has the dignity of the rule and the law. So, its autonomy is guaranteed by its status. Wittgenstein writes.

The rules of grammar cannot be justified by shewing that their application makes a representation agree with reality. For this justification would itself have to describe what is represented (PG, Sect. 134).

The agreement with reality is internal and so is taken for granted. There is no question of justifying grammar by sanctioning it through the facts.

Wittgenstein convinces himself of the autonomy of grammar and also of language by arguing that our experience of the world does not finally explain the possibility of grammar and therefore cannot provide any justification for the latter. It is true that rules of grammar are constrained by the facts of nature, but that does not mean that rules of grammar are justified by the latter (PI. II, XII). They, in fact, lay down the conditions of the use of language and also of the facts which language describes. Rules are, as Wittgenstein metaphorically puts it, like the rails on which our language moves (Z, Sect. 375). Thus the possibility of grammar is not explained by the world. Rather grammar tells us what the world is like. That only suggests that grammar must have an origin in the normative functioning of the human reasoning. Grammar is the product of the self-generating linguistic habits of man. This is not to ascribe to
Wittgenstein's grammar the status of a natural science. It is not a science of nature since it does not describe nature but rather provides methods of description for the latter. As Finch puts it,

—Wittgenstein's conception of grammar as a description of the use of signs (PI, 496) does not mean a description of grammar as fact (in the way that a linguistic might describe it), but rather means a description of grammar as normative or supplying the basis for the distinction between correct or incorrect.

Grammatical rules as paradigms are neither true nor false and hence cannot be characterised as right or wrong, correct or incorrect, because they set the standard of what is right and correct. For example, the standard metre cannot be said to be a metre long. So, too, it is false to say that it is a metre long, (cf. PI, Sect. 50).

Wittgenstein characterizes the rules in grammar in the following way:

To accept a proposition as unshakable certain - I want to say - means to use it as grammatical rule. This removes uncertainty from it (RFM, III, Sect. 39).

It follows that, unlike empirical proposition, rules of grammar are unshakable truths. A grammatical proposition like "Every rod has a length" states an unshakable truth about the fact that we cannot imagine the opposite of what a grammatical proposition expresses. It does not make any sense to assert the opposite of "Every rod has a length" (PI, Sect. 251). We cannot conceive of
a possible rod which has no length at all. We have discussed this point at length in Chapter III.

Thus the ultimacy of grammar as the framework for understanding language and the world has the status of logic which is employed to bring the basic features of normative discourse. Grammar thus reflects the necessary structure of our language and the world. Therefore, it does not share the contigency occurring to particular language-use and the changing features of the world.

10. Concept of Criteria and Autonomy

For Wittgenstein, grammatical rules as norms function as criteria of the use of language. They constitute the semantic aspect of the use of language. They constitute, as P.M.S. Hacker points out, the criterial semantics which specifies "the conditions which non-inductively justify the assertion of a sentence and in terms of which the sense of the sentence is to be accounted for."32

The concept of criterion33 introduces a new aspect of semantical analysis by determining the justificatory ground of the statements we make in our language-games. According to Wittgenstein, criteria represent rules of grammar which justify the use of linguistic expressions. The criteria are the defining grounds of linguistic expressions because they mention the grammatical conditions of the expression (BB, p.25). The
criteria of a given assertion define the limits of our language-game. So, in this sense, criteria are not the causes of our cognitive statements but their logical grounds which justify them. Wittgenstein makes this distinction between causes and criteria in the following passage:

The causes of our belief in a proposition are indeed irrelevant to what we believe. Not so the grounds which are grammatically related to proposition and tell us what proposition it is (Z_, Sect. 437).

The sense or meaning of these statements is defined by these criteria which constitute the only semantical grounds of any knowledge claim. Thus the objectivity of rules of grammar as criteria or paradigm remains "unshakeably certain".

The identification of criteria with rules brings into consideration the fact that the so called criterial grammar is a rule-structured or normative grammar. This presupposes that the criteria and symptoms are veritically devided criteria alone belong to grammar whereas symptoms are the contingent features of our symbolism. Symptoms are the causal conditions which may accompany any language-use. But they do not make difference to grammar. The criteria, however, do make a difference Wittgenstein says,

The criteria which we accept for 'fitting' 'being able to', 'understanding', 'are much more complicated than might appear at first sight. That is, the game with these words, their employment in the the linguistic intercourse that is carried on by their means, is more involved - the role of these words in our language other-than we are tempted to think (PI. Sect.182).
Thus we arrive at the following conclusions regarding the criteria.

a) Rules of grammar function as standards or criteria by which particular cases are judged.

b) Agreement on them is necessary for engaging in any practice i.e. playing language-games which employ them.

c) They cannot be explained or justified since they set the limits of what can be said and thus nothing can be said about them. They are shown in the very rule-following activity i.e. practice.

It is (c) that is most important in this context, since it holds that criteria are autonomous. Criteria *qua* rules are not justified by any meta-criteria or meta-rule. They themselves make all justifications possible. Wittgenstein does not accept hierarchy of rules as criteria. Hence they are expressed in application or practice and are shown in our language-use. Language use takes care of what criteria (rules) govern its meaning or sense. There is no additional element called 'criterion' to be added to the already known practice of language. Criteria and practice go together. Hence the autonomy of language-practice and the criteria thereof.

11. Autonomy of Language and Autonomy of Grammar

The question that remains still to be resolved is whether the autonomy of language and the autonomy of grammar are distinct
and if so, how they are distinct. This question is related to the distinction between language and grammar. It is well known that Wittgenstein makes distinction between language and grammar. Whereas language is a spatio-temporal phenomenon, grammar is not. Language is the actual application of rules of grammar. Thus there is a conceptual distinction between rules (grammar) and application (language-use). But it cannot be the case that rules and its application are externally and so contingently related as Finch\textsuperscript{35} has advocated. This thesis has been foisted on Tractatus 5.557 where it has been maintained that logic and its application must be independent of each other. But Wittgenstein's intention here is to show that logic has to be applied in the world where application has to take into account the contingent features of the world. But this does not rule out the fact that logic can be applied according to its inner necessity and so must "pervade" the world' (TLP 5,61). Application in that sense must be determined by logic. This is evident in the case of rules of grammar which internally determine the use of language. The rules and rule-following are internally related as has been emphasized by Baker and Hacker.\textsuperscript{36}

From this it follows that language and its grammar are internally related. Grammar is only the account book of language (PG, Sect.44). Grammar has no other subject-matter than the rules of language. Its entire concern is language and not anything that transcends language. Grammar therefore is language-immanent. On the other hand, language is grammar-embedded. Its
historicality is harmonized with the ahiatoricality of grammar. Wittgenstein writes,

The thing that's so difficult to understand can be expressed like this. As long as we remain in the province of the true-flase games a change in the grammar can only lead us from one such game to another, but never from something true to something false. On the other hand, if we go outside the province of these games, then we don't any longer call it 'language' and 'grammar', and once again we don't come into contradiction with reality (PG, Sect. 68).

This reflects the distinction between language-use (true-flase game) and grammar as such. The latter is what determines the language-game itself. Beyond grammar there is no language just as there is no grammar beyond language. Thus autonomy of grammar is related to the autonomy of language. If grammar is autonomous, so is language.

That is to say, if grammar cannot be determined by extra-grammatical reality, language also cannot be determined by anything beyond itself. Language and its use are all that we have and so we can at best say: Language is used this and this way. That is to leave language as it is (Cf. PI, Sect. 124). Hence language is autonomous.37

12. Anti Foundationalism and Autonomy

Wittgenstein's autonomy doctrine is associated with his anti-foundationalism in philosophy. Anti-foundationalism is the Hallmark of his philosophy in general according to which philosophy does not provide foundations for language or logic or
mathematics. Philosophy describes the uses of language and systematizes them without providing any explanation. He writes,

philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language.; It can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is. It also leaves mathematics as it is, as no mathematical discovery can advance it. A "leading problem of mathematical logic" is for us a problem of mathematics like any other (PI, Sect. 124).

That is, philosophy has no goal of presenting the explanation or justification of what happens in language. It only notes what languages does. Wittgenstein further claims

What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of human beings; We are not contributing curiosities however, but observations which no one has doubted, but which have escaped remark only because they are always before our eyes. (PI, Sect. 415).

These remarks on natural history amount to philosophical description of what Wittgenstein calls the grammar of our language. Grammar is all that matters in that it describes the use of language, and also the practices and customs that constitute language. As Wittgenstein puts it,

Grammar does not tell us how language must be constructed in order to fulfill its purpose, in order to have such - and - such an effect on human beings. It only describes and in no way explains the use of signs (PI. Sect. 496).

Since grammar has no foundation except those of language, there is no philosophical foundation for grammar. Similarly, since language itself is a matter of practice and is like our form of life, it has no foundation in the sense that there is
nothing hidden which philosophy has to find out. So, as Wittgenstein says, "we must do away with all explanation and description must take its place" (PI, Sect. 109).

Wittgenstein makes a radical distinction between explanation and description. Description is putting everything clearly before eyes, so that a perspicuous representation of grammar is possible (Cf. PI, Sect. 122). The concept of perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us (PI, Sect. 122), since it gives the overview of language and grammar. Explanation, on the contrary, is a search for ultimate causes which are lurking behind a phenomena. This is the peculiar method of science which Wittgenstein considers empirical (Cf. BBS, p. 18 and PI, Sect. 122, 128). Thus philosophy dispenses with all scientific explanations and opts for the description of grammatical phenomena. He writes.

Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. - Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us (PI. Sect.126).

The argument Wittgenstein offers in defence of language and facts look like a commonsensical argument, answering the sceptic by stressing the fact that philosophical doubt does not get a hold in our ordinary way of behaviour. Philosophical explanations are ruled out because there is no room for philosophical scepticism Wittgenstein points out that if everything were doubted, understanding would be impossible. We
do presuppose some kind of certainty which is presupposed in our language and life. The examples Wittgenstein offers include such statements as "12 x 12 = 144" "I have just had lunch" "I have never been on moon." These examples show that the sceptical doubt about everything is impossible for "the game of doubting itself presuppose certainty (OC, Sect.115). These 'undoubted truths' are the grounds of all that we assert. They provide objective grounds for our system of beliefs. They come directly into play in our knowledge -claims. They constitute the justification conditions of all our language uses. They are the undoubted truths which philosophy wants us to takes note of.

Wittgenstein can be a Kantian up to the point that both of them recognise grammar as transcendental. Kant, however, goes to recognize the categories as the conditions of all facts and provides transcendental justifications (deduction) for them. Hence Kant's grammar is theoretical and must be justified by philosophical reflection. But Wittgenstein's grammar takes care of itself. Wittgenstein does not take recourse to experience to justify grammar. For Wittgenstein grammar constitutes experience. Experience does not justify grammar; rather experience is intelligible due to grammar. Grammar is autonomous. This point is expressed by Guignon in the following way.
In so far as our grammar constitute what can count as reality for us, there is no exit from language to non-linguistic "facts" about ourselves or our world which could ground the grammar we have. But neither is it correct to think we create our language-games or grammar: "a language game does not have its origin in considerations (or reflection). Consideration (or reflection) is a part of a language game (Z, Sect. 391) ... A language-game is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable) It is there like our life:" (OC, Sect. 559).  

Thus the autonomy of grammar results from the fact that grammar is not in need of foundations which could be provided by philosophical explanation.
NOTES


2. Ibid.


4. Ibid., pp.159-161.

5. Ibid., p.160.

6. The autonomy question in the Tractatus is linked with the idea that logic is a self-contained system and so must be governed by its own laws independently of what the world happens to be. In the *Notebooks* (22-8-14) Wittgenstein wrote:

   Logic must take care of itself. If the syntactical rules for functions can be set up at all, then the whole theory of things, properties, etc. is superfluous. It is also all too obvious that this theory is not what is in the question either in the *Grundgesetze* or in *Principia Mathematica.* Once more: Logic must take care of itself. A possible sign must also be capable of signifying. Everything that is possible at all, is also legitimate. Let us remember the explanation why "Socrates is Plato" is nonsense. That is, because we have not made an arbitrary specification, MOT because a sign is, shall we say, illegitimate in itself.


8. of. Ibid., p.154.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., p.154-155.


13. See Finch, P.155.

14. Hintikka and Hintikka have argued that Wittgestein held fast the doctrine of ineffability of semantics throughout his career. According to this doctrine, the semantical relations between language and the world are shown and not said in another language. Language, accordingly, is a universal medium. If expresses its own internal structure. See Hintikka and Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein (Blackwell, Oxford, 1986), Chapter I.


17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. cf. Ibid., p.331.
20. Ibid.
21. In this connection Baker and Hacker quote and translate an apt passage from Wittgenstein's unpublished writings:

"The rules of grammar are arbitrary means: their purpose is not (e.g.) to correspond to the essence of negation or colour - but is the purpose of negation and of the concept of colour. As the purpose of the rules of chess is not to correspond to the essence of chess but to the purpose of the game of chess. OR: the rules of chess are not to correspond to the essence // the nature// of the chess king for they give it this essence, but the rules of cooking and roasting should indeed correspond to the nature of meat - This is, of course, a grammatical remark (MS, 160, 6)."

(Quoted in Wittgenstein: _Rules, Grammar and Necessity_, p.331).


25. Ibid., pp.91-92.


27. MS, 166, 12 off. Quoted in Wittgenstein, _Rules, Grammar and Necessity_, p.333.
28. cf. Ibid., pp.334-338.


30. Ibid., p.166.

31. Finch, p.158.


33. For detailed discussion on initerion, see P.M.S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion, Ch.X.

34. See Milton K. Munitz, Contemporary Analytic Philosophy, pp.302-3.

35. cf. Finch, p.156.


37. cf. Munitz, p.273. Munitz writes, "Grammar is autonomous, thought (and the language that conveys it) has its internal structures as articulated by the grammatical rules that belong to it. Thought (language) is structured by human conventions; it brings to reality its own structure. In order to describe reality (one must use the pre-established "forms of thought" (rules of grammar)", (p.273).