The availability of rules in language explains the possibility of grammar. As one can see, logical syntax is possible because rules demand a perspicuous representation. Similarly, in the context of language-game, the syntax of language-game is possible so far as the language-game is rule-bounded. In that sense, grammar, providing a syntax, assumes the role of "an account book of language" (PG, Sect.44) which shows the actual transaction of language. Grammar therefore is a rule-book representing its rules in a systematic manner. It consists of conventions (PG, Sect.138) which determine what is sense and what is non-sense in a language.

The primary concern of Wittgenstein's grammar, however, is not to raise an account book of language in an empirical manner but to examine the conditions for the possibility of grammar itself. Therefore, Wittgenstein addresses himself to the foundations of normativity or grammaticality which consists in the availability of rules.

1. Rules in Grammar

Now assuming that language is constituted through rules two main questions arise.
i. How are grammatical rules constituted?

ii. What is the foundation of rule-following?

The first question relates to the central theme of the concept of language-game; the second one relates to the significance which rule-following has in language-use. Both are, however, inter-connected.

The grammatical rules are manifested in the language game. They define the possible moves in a language-game and therefore, set the limits of our thought and experience. They set the limits of empiricism (RFM, III, Sect.71; IV, Sect.2,3,4,5). Rules are like channels through which we are permitted to move; they are like rails on which our language moves. (Z, Sect.371). In that sense, the rule-book, that is, the grammar is "for us a pure calculus (not the application of a calculus to reality"
(PG, Appendix, 15, p.315). Thus grammar can still retain its purity or rigour without losing its foothold in the reality of natural language. All the while, it is assumed that the grammar we are talking about is the grammar of natural languages, that is, languages considered as natural phenomena, not as merely a formal system.

Bow are rules to be constituted then? For Wittgenstein rules have their home in language. Rules only matter in language and not anywhere else. Rules abstracted from language do not mean anything at all. In that sense there is no grammar unless it is located in the ongoing business of language. That is to
say, rules emerge only when the question of correctness of use of language arises. Rules, as I have already indicated in Chapter III, are like rules or laws. They are rules of use, or the laws of correct application. They come into being as soon as a language-game comes into being.

Rules govern language-games and the possibility of language games presupposes the possibility of the rules. That is, according to Wittgenstein, our uses of language can broadly be called rule-bound. We follow rules since we use language, i.e. play a language-game. The basic problem that arises is: could language use be possible without rules and rule-following? This issue suggests well for philosophical discussion on this concept of "rule" and "rule following".

Now the problem is: where do rules emerge? For Wittgenstein, language resembles a game (Spiel) as both have employment of rules and thus are rule-governed (PG, I, Sect.26). Basically, we get a clear idea about rules in games e.g. chess-game, ball game etc. The chess-game is played in accordance with certain rules. Rules define the possible ways of moving the pieces on the chess board. In this sense, rules are important and essential (PI. Sect.567). It is true that without players and chess board, the game cannot be played. On the contrary, without rules both players and chess-board have no function. No sense can be given to a game merely having certain players and the required apparatus of the game. The basic requirement is to do something with the apparatus, that is, to move pieces in
certain ways which lead to a particular end, for 'the game, one would like to say, has not only rules but also a point' (PI, Sect.564). The game is to be played and to play is to achieve some goal. That is to say, the players have to obey certain rules which they engage in the game. Thus rules make a game possible.

Rules do emerge in language too. Rules of language, for Wittgenstein, constitute its syntax, its grammar. Grammar describes the ways in which words can be used. According to Wittgenstein, rules of language are not fixed and given once for all. In the use of words and expressions in the proper human context, that is, in the stream of life, rules come into being and become known (PG, I, Sect.26). For example, we use colour words such as "red" blue, "green", etc. and recognize samples in a colour-chart because they are based on certain established conventions, e.g. "Standard sepia" or "paradigms" (PI, Sect.50-53). A rule is a paradigm.

Wittgenstein's main contention is that rules presuppose language-game and vice-versa. The question of priority of one over the other does not arise, since there is no sense in calling rules pre-linguistic. Rules are linguistic par excellence. So, language is rule-bound. In this context, it is bound to follow that rules are always followed in the use of language. Rule-following is a sine qua non of there being rules at all. This satisfies the requirement that rules are grammatically accessible
2. The Paradox

Recently Saul Kripke\textsuperscript{2} has raised the issue that sceptical paradox underlies the Wittgenstenian conception of rule-following. Wittgenstein himself hints at the paradox in the following passage:

This was our paradox: No course of action could be determined by a rule because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule (PI, Sect, 201).

Kripke thinks that this can undermine the so called foundations of rule-following and language use on two grounds: (i) In rule-following any rule could be followed since there is no objective ground of knowing what is the correct rule to be followed; (ii) The sceptical solution of the paradox commits us a communitarian view of language and rules which reduces rules to agreed social practices.

According to Kripke, one's previous knowledge of the application of a rule gives no guarantee that he will apply the same rule in future. This is called the sceptical problem. One's past history and external behaviour cannot tell us whether one is following the same rule or some other rule. Let us take as an example, the continuation of an arithmetical series such as "1002, 1004, 1006, 1008,_____. Here one follows the rule '+2'. For the sceptic, however, there is room for doubt as to whether
one is following the same rule at different stages of the continuation of the series. Be raises the following questions:

a) How do we know that one is following the particular rule '+2'?

b) How do we know that our way of understanding the rule is correct?

c) What is for an action e.g. continuation of a series, counting, calculating to be in accord with a rule?

According to the sceptic, there is nothing in any instruction given to one which justifies him to write 1002, 1004, 1006, 1008 __, rather than "1004, 1008, ..." Equally nothing in one's mind constitutes the fact of his meaning to go on in this way rather than in any other way. Kripke\(^3\) raises the following questions on rule-following?

1) Suppose God looks into our mind at some such moment when we are following a rule. What fact would God observe in our mind?

2) What happens in our mind that was our meaning 'addition' (plus) rather than "quaddition (quus) or some other function by +?"

3) What is the mental state at the moment in the past which makes it correct for us to cite "125" rather than "5" as the value of '57 +68'?

Kripke believes that no definite answer can be given to
these questions, and that there is a sceptical paradox underlying all the supposed answers. The paradox is: no answer as to why "'57+68' is 125" rather than '5' can be given by an act of 'meaning' addition '+' because any answer can be made out to accord with the act i.e. addition function. It leads to scepticism about our being able to know whether we are following a rule in accord with what we meant by the rule. As a result, we are not certain about what rule we appear to follow. Any rule appears to be alright as any other rule. This is the crux of the paradox Kripke extends the same to all aspects of language use and rule-following and concludes that there can be no such thing as meaning by an expression. Every new use of a word is a leap in the dark.

Though the sceptical problem has wide ramifications and implications, fundamentally it involves two questions such as (i) what is the fact that constitutes the meaning of plus by '+'? (ii) what is the fact that forces me to follow a particular rule in a new instance?

Kripke's sceptical question demands that there should be a definite answer to these questions, so that rule-following is founded on solid grounds. The fact that is being demanded is that which necessitates to follow the same rule in new circumstances. According to Kripke, this fact does not consist in dispositions which the rule-follower nay acquire in course of his rule-following practices. According to him, no one is disposed to give correct answers to the questions. Most of us
are disposed to give mistaken answers to some questions. The dispositions are causal happenings and not normative principles. So, they cannot determine whether a rule-following is correct or incorrect. Kripke therefore concludes that the standard answer to the sceptic's doubt in terms of dispositions is out of reckoning because it does not supply the normative fact that the sceptic demands.

Kripke argues that a dispositional account confuses the factual question i.e., "what answer would be given? with a normative one, i.e., what answer should one give? The factual questions do not concern the normative conditions of rule-following. To describe under what factual conditions a man follows a rule is not to tell why he does so. The later is the main problem of philosophy of rule-following whereas the former belongs to descriptive psychology. We do not want to say that "whatever is going to seem right to me is right" (PI, Sect.258). For Wittgenstein the relation of meaning and intention to future action is normative, not descriptive. Accordingly the rules of language are communal norms for how one should go on rather than a mere description of communal dispositions. For example, when as rule-followers we intend to write 125 as the result of '58+67' rather than '5', it is not the case that we are naturally disposed to do so, rather we are taught to follow the rule of addition that way. The normative aspect is revealed to us in the "must" of the rule of addition. Kripke's account thus allows for there to be a difference between what one does in following a
rule as opposed to what one should do. This enables us to
distinguish between thinking we are following a rule and actually
doing so. The former occurs when one intends to follow a rule
and the latter is confirmed when one's rule following activities
conform to the standard or norm already set in the language
concerned.

Kripke considers the suggestion that meaning "addition" by
'+' and not 'quaddition' should be analysed by appeal to some
special introspectible experience. That is the proposal to
justify rule-following by the internal evidences. Wittgenstein
himself repeatedly discussed this issue in PI, Sect, 152-155, and
167-177 in order to show that the so called internal evidences
themselves need outward criteria and cannot be taken as evidences
for rule-following as such. Kripke endorses Wittgenstein's anti-
introspectionist argument and shows that rule-following is not
given as an act of consciousness nor as revealed to us in a flash
of introspection.⁶

Finally, Kripke discusses and rejects the Platonist
suggestion that rules are laid down in a non-physical and non-
psychological domain of reality. For a Platonist rule-following
is derived from the fact of rules being eternally and infinitely
contained in the metaphysical domain of possibilities. A
realist therefore presupposes that a rule is potentially followed
by a person in an infinite logical space, so that each particular
instance follows from it as a matter of necessity. Wittgenstein
has rejected this conception of rule-following as a picture of rule-following containing all the possibilities before the instances take place. (Cf. PI, Sects, 193, 194).

Kripke thus concludes that scepticism about following a rule virtually leads to the fact that language-use as a rule-governed activity is impossible. According to him, there are no facts (or substantial contents) with which meaning a certain word in a certain way can be identified. So, one cannot know that in the current application of a rule one is following the same addition rule. The application of rule, for Kripke, is an unjustified stab in the dark.

3. The Sceptic Solution

Kripke characterizes the solution of the paradox as the sceptical solution because it admits the validity of the sceptical premise regarding rule-following. It admits that there are no facts of the matter that determine our rule-following and that we could follow any rule in any manner we like. Thus Kripke admits that there is no such thing as using a word in accord with a rule and no such thing as meaning something by a word. This sort of scepticism, however, is a theoretical one without affecting the practical business of our language-use. In a manner reminiscent of Hume, Kripke's Wittgenstein offers a practical solution of the paradox. The paradoxical conclusion that we follow no rule is restrained by our practical rule-following considerations. It is a social fact that we follow
rules successfully and that too with a greater degree of consensus. That is a standing guarantee that we follow rules in a linguistic community. To follow a rule is a matter of a social consensus which is quite advantageously exploited to safeguard the practical rule-following.

As Wittgenstein remarked in the *Tractatus* 6.51, scepticism is not irrefutable though it is meaningless. Ultimately universal doubt regarding rule-following can be refuted as of no practical concern, since it leads to the impossibility of rule-following. Doubt is possible if there is certainty. Without presuppositions of certainty, even doubt becomes meaningless (OC, Sect., 115). Wittgenstein, Kripke believes, has not despaired of the practice of rule-following at all though he is unable to provide any justification at all. Hume has in a similar vain said:

> We may ask, what causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? But it is vain to ask, whether there can be body or not? That is a point which we must take for granted in all our reasoning.  

Wittgenstein, Kripke says, could say the same about rule-following. The fact remains that we all follow rules but without theoretical or rational justification.

Kripke makes a distinction between a sceptical solution and 'straight solution.' According to him, a sceptical solution is a solution to a sceptical problem. It does not solve the problem, but avoids it. The sceptical conclusion is avoided. It
is thus a solution that admits the cogency of the sceptic argument but denies that this invalidates the beliefs which the sceptic has set out to demolish. According to Kripke, Wittgenstein's solution is a sceptical solution because he offers a solution where the sceptical counter-arguments still remain irrefutable. The sceptic's conclusions are not invalid but are ineffectual. Let us illustrate this in the following way. For example, in mathematical calculation one follows the rule of addition (the meaning given, to '+') and gets '125' as the sum of 68+57. But no apriori argument is possible against someone who claims to follow the rule of quaddition i.e., (+*) and get '5'. However, as a matter of practice, we all follow the rule of addition. It is a fact of our form of life. There is no necessity in following the rule of addition. Thus the sceptical solution lies in admitting the contingency in our rule following behaviour. It does not invalidate the sceptical argument that there is no logical necessity in following the rule of addition rather than the rule of quaddition. This, however, does not deny the possibility of rule-following in the contingent sense. Kripke rightly shows that there is Humean contingency in our rule-following activities.

A straight solution is a solution to the sceptical problem according to which scepticism proves to be unwarranted. The notable example is Descartes's cogito-ergo-sum. Descartes's cogito-ergo-sum argument makes him sure about the existence of his own self and consequently proves that universal doubt is not
justified. This is, according to Kripke, a straight solution where scepticism is proved unwarranted and ultimately groundless. Kripke's argument is that Wittgenstein's argument is not a straight solution in the Cartesian sense. According to him, Wittgenstein did not attempt to refute scepticism, rather he circumvented it by appealing to the communitarian basis of rule-following.

Kripke poses the following questions as a matter of inviting the communitarian solution to rule-following. They are

i) How can one tell whether I am following the rule of 'plus' or 'quus'?

ii) What are the circumstances under which one can meaningfully ascribe rule-following to me?

iii) When can one claim that this particular application of rule is justified?

There is no straight solution to these question in the sense of finding a necessary fact which can be the basis of answering these questions. Only there is a communitarian solution to these problems. If we take the rule-follower as a member of a community there will be no problem left. One can easily tell whether one is following a particular rule correctly or incorrectly. We follow rules as a member of a community and not in isolation. Hence the relevance of the communitarian solution.

If a rule-follower is a member of community the notion of
rule and its application get its significance. One will be in a position to tell whether I am following a rule or not, if he finds (i) that the response which I give i.e. the way I use the sign agrees to his response; (ii) if I interact with other fellow members of the community to which he belongs; (iii) if the rules which he ascribes to me have an application in our shared communal life, and (iv) if a person is said to follow a rule only when his/her behaviour conforms to the behaviour of other fellows of the community.

The so-called behaviour of the community is a form of life. So, following a rule and making an application of it in an actual case is constitutive of the custom or practice of the community. Following a rule is therefore a communal practice (PI, Sect.202). As a practice it has the implications of being shared, publicly checkable and also followed with communal agreement.

Wittgenstein makes it consistently clear that rule following in isolation is an unintelligible concept, because, this institution of rule-following does not have any 'substantive content'. It becomes meaningful only when we regard the rule-following as a member of a wider community communicating with one another. Others will have justification for attributing correct or incorrect rule-following to the subject, provided he belongs to their community or at least follows the rules which they themselves follow. In the circumstances they have a shared response to the rule-following situation. This response makes the rule-follower confident that what he does is a rule-following
activity and not a wishful thinking of rule-following. Similarly other members of the community are entitled to say that the rule-follower means, for example, addition by 'plus' if they find that the rule-follower's behaviour agree with theirs. So, whether one follows the rule correctly or incorrectly has to pass the test of community. His response has to agree with those of the community. The way they check this is, in general, a primitive part of language-game.

However, the communitarian solution thus outlined has its limitations. The fact that community ratifies a linguistic practice i.e., the practice of rule-following does not rule out that the norms of ratifications are not themselves not communal practices. Norms are practices in a general logical sense but, when the norms are for evaluation of other practices, they cease to be contingent like the practices which are assessed. As Wittgenstein has pointed out, the standard metre in Paris is not itself one metre long or not one metre long. It has a special status in our language-game (PI. Sect.50). It is a paradigm, so it is non-contingent. It is a grammatical rule. In that sense, it is difficult to argue that communitarian solution rules out the possibility of a straight solution. Kripke in his exploration of the communitarian view has further proposed that rules are contingent upon the assertion conditions of the statement of the rule. The communitarian view squarely depends upon whether a rule-application is communally assertible or not. This follows from the fact that one follows a rule when his or
her behaviour conforms to the behaviour of other fellows of the community that is, its 'form of life'. The form of life is the basic frame of reference within which alone we can understand the rule-following.

4. Forms of Life and The Anti-Thesis of Private Rule-Following

The fact that the rationality of rule-following is embedded in the forms of life of the rule-followers proves itself to be the anti-thesis of private rule-follwing. Private rule-following, according to Wittgenstein, is a misnomer. He writes,

And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately'; otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it (PI, Sect.202).

This is to suggest that a private rule is much grammatically repugnant as private rule-following, since a private language is impossible to conceive. To think of a private language is to think of a sham form of life. A form of life and language not sharable and understandable by many is inconceivable. As Wittgenstein puts it,

But could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences - his feelings, moods, and the rest - for his private use? Well, can't we do so in our ordinary language? But that is not what I mean (PI, Sect.243).

Such a language is obviously impossible to imagine. The reason is that even if we imagine one, it will not be called a
language in an accepted sense. The form of life which language represents is totally missing in this case. For example, in our language when I have pain and I express it in so many words, others respond to me in many ways. This response is institutionalized in language. But in a private language this institution is missing. Hence, there is nothing called following a rule there. The private rules are no rules at all since there is no ratification of such rules in an exclusively private language. Wittgenstein puts this as follows:

Are the rules of private language impressions of rules? — The balance on which the impressions are weighed is not the impressions of a balance (PI, Sect.259).

In other words, the distinction between a rule and a sham rule is abolished in a private language. Therefore the distinction between right and wrong application of rule is abolished. (PI, Sect.262-69). A private language is an anti-thesis of the general rule-following behaviour of mankind.

Kripke's communitarian interpretation of rule-following has shown why the possibility of private language is sharply opposed to the very concept of language we have.\textsuperscript{12}

.5. Forms of Life and Rule-Following

As Kripke has said, a person is said to follow a rule when his/her behaviour conforms to the behaviour of other fellow members of the community, that is, their form of life. The form
of life is the home of all rule-following. A form of life is a form of activity, i.e. a way of using language. In PI, Sect.23. Wittgenstein says:

Here language-game is meant to bring into prominence the fact that speaking of language is a part of an activity or of a form of life.

Each language-game is a form of life. Each is related to a form of using language i.e. doing something with the language. Language is intimately related to life. Each activity in a language is a kind of life. It is related to a life situation. In order for an expression to be meaningful it is not essential that it is governed by rules of syntax alone but also it must be employed in appropriate contexts or circumstances, and its various uses make up our natural history. It is in this sense that Wittgenstein says "to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life" (PI, Sect.19).

Kripke agrees with Wittgenstein's idea of "form of life" in a communitarian sense when he says "the set of responses in which we agree, and the way they interweave with our activities is our form of life". That is, language is embedded in the network of activities that we happen to undertake in the communal life. For example, 'How are you?' is meaningful in the context where one greets somebody. We follow the rule '+' and arrive at '125' (not '5') as the result of calculating '57+68' because we are the same form of life in making such a calculation. A form of life implies a way of life that every one shares in a community.
Forms of life differ just as language-games differ. That is to say, human beings have the option of having alternative forms of life. There are natural constraints on our forms of life, though. These, however, do not prevent there being language-games which we have never played. Wittgenstein seems to contemplate the availability of alternative natural histories which explain the nature of forms of life and language (PI, II, X; Z Sect.38).

However, this fact does not rule out the necessity ingrained in our present forms of life. The fact that they are the forms of life we are constrained to accept as given (PI. II, p.226). suggests that we are bound to accept them as necessary. Hence the rule-following entailed by the present forms of life have the potentiality of being the constitutive conditions of language-use. The communitarianism of Kripke fails to explain how forms of life apparently taken as contigent can also be taken to be necessary. This also tells why the communitarian solution can at least explain the contigency of rule-following and not its necessity.

6. Limitations of Communitarianism

A critical understanding of communitarianism reveals the fatal flaws it suffers from. Communitarianism depends on premises which presuppose a behaviouristic understanding of rule-following. These presuppositions are as follows:
a) Rule-following is socially assented to and ratified in the behaviour of the community

b) Community behaviour is itself not subject to further non-communal test.

Wright puts it as follows:

It is a community of assent which supplies the essential background against which alone it makes sense to think of individuals' responses as correct or incorrect ... None of us unilaterally can make sense of the idea of correct employment of language save by reference to the authority of securable communal assent on the matter, and for the community itself there is no authority so no standard to meet.\textsuperscript{14}

According to Wright the totality of community's dispositions determine the norm of correctness of an individual's response to the rule-following situations. The community is the supreme ratifier\textsuperscript{15} of an individual's behaviour. There are two ways in which an individual can feel assured that he is following a rule correctly: (i) he has deliberately chosen to participate in the community's forms of life, and (ii) the community has the final authority of sanctioning what is right or wrong in one's public behaviour. Both ways there is responsible public behaviour, since there is a strong appeal to communal assent. If communitarianism is right, then it shows that the truth of rule-following has no intrinsic merit and must be derived from a more authoritative source found in the linguistic community.

Now one can argue, will the communitarian proposal serve the purpose of explaining the normative character of rule-following?
The communitarianism can easily explain whether any given actual communal disposition is itself correct. The normative elements defy the communal constraint. So the problem is: Does communal consensus command the sort of respect which is characteristic of truth as a cognitive value? Blackburn⁶ for instance, argues that communal consensus does not have the same respectability as truth because there is no in coherence in the suggestion that all the members of a linguistic community have collectively gone wrong in the' application of a given rule, say '+'. Blackburn does not rule out the possibility of the community itself facing the private linguist's dilemma regarding the correctness of rule-following. The suggestion is that what Wittgenstein can at best hold is that rule-following is not systematically a communal practice but rather a practice as such so that the individual can participate in it in a pre-communally given normative sense.¹⁷

Communitarianism is offering an analysis of the ordinary notion of truth which amounts to a displacement of it. So one can doubt whether the communitarians are subscribing to any kind of truth at all because they are not committed to the truth and falsity of any communal consensus in relation to rule-following.¹⁸ Communitarianism, as Kripke envisages, is committed to justification-conditions of assertions and not to their truth conditions. Truth-conditions are replaced by justification-conditions.¹⁹ Thus communitarianism fails to explain how truth can be accounted for. Besides, it is problematic how there can be any objective meaning determination in the communitarian
account. To say that meaning is that which is communally determined is to Bay that meaning is reducible to community judgements. This may result in a reductionist theory of meaning.\textsuperscript{20}

McDowell\textsuperscript{21} has an interesting analysis of the communitarianist viewpoint. According to him, communitarianism is a product of misunderstanding. He recognises that Wittgenstein presents the model of a 'bed-rock' that is co-lateral with the notion of the normative. That normative bedrock is not the same as communitarian agreement. McDowell writes, 

\begin{quote}
By Wittgenstein's lights, it is a mistake to think we can dig down to a level at which we no longer have application for normative notions (like "following according to the rule").\textsuperscript{22}
\end{quote}

Accordingly, grammar provides us the meaning of any discourse because that shows the correct and incorrect use of an expression. So, McDowell warns us not to form a picture of 'bed-rock' that goes beyond language and grammar. The bedrock is part of language itself.\textsuperscript{23} It is the moral of rule-following considerations that correctness of rule-following can exist only in the practice of language and not in anything that excludes our normal use. McDowell expresses this point in the following way:

\begin{quote}
Wittgenstein warns us not to try to dig below 'bed-rock', but it is difficult, in reading him, to avoid acquiring a sense of what, as it were, lies down there: the web of facts about behaviour and "inner episodes", describable without using the notion of meaning. One is likely to be struck by the sheer contingency of the resemblances between individuals on which, in this vision, the possibility of meaning seems to depend.
\end{quote}
This should result in making a distinction between the normative bed-rock and the natural and behavioural one. It is the former that matters for meaning and rule-following.

The communitarian proposal that communal practice and behaviour is responsible for the meaningfulness of our discourse shows that rule-following is said to consist in the conformity with our fellow beings' responses. This is at best a partial fulfillment of the condition of meaningfulness of an expression. McDowell's\textsuperscript{25} rejection of this partial condition of meaningfulness is the result of his appreciation of the fact that normativity is substantially different from communality. Communality is factual but normativity is logical.

The problem is: How is the necessity of 'orderly communal' practice to be defended? From what does the demand for orderliness flow? McDowell's answer is that necessity is a feature of the normative structure of rule-following and not of its communal meeting of minds. Communitarianism fails mostly for softpedalling the notion of necessity.

Baker and Hacker\textsuperscript{26} point out that necessity flows from the grammatically of the rule and not from the contingent communal agreement. For them, rule-following is internally related to rules and rules are prétences in the irreducible sense of being embedded in language. Grammar tells us when rules of grammar are correctly applied. In that sense, grammar provides the criteria of correctness of rule-application, not their a communally agreed
character. Language is normative at least in its rule-structure. 27

The opposition to the communitarian view is very strong because grammatical norms function to establish the criteria of use and the meaning of expressions without bringing into consideration the facts of communal agreement as the determinant of meaning. 98 Meaning is factually communally shared, but that is not a logical fact about meaning. The internality of the rule to language-use is the sufficient logical fact that meaning is independent of the communal decisions.

7. Harndess of Natural Facts: From Grammar to Natural History

Kripke's argument for communitarianism faces rough weather as we recognise the hard natural facts of language use and forms of life. Wittgenstein's supposed paradox at PI Sect.201 gets dissolved as we take into account the fact that we cannot misinterpret our rule-following behaviour. That is why Wittgenstein rules out interpretation as a method of understanding rule-following. The rule-following facts speak for themselves. They are what they are and are invested with a natural necessity. The grammatical necessity of rules is dependent on naturally necessary facts. This is emphasized by Wittgenstein in his insistence that the facts of rule-following are all that there are for philosophers to take account of. These facts are the hard data presented to us without the
mediation of any interpretation. Philosophy puts them as they are without interpretation and therefore without distortion. As Wittgenstein puts it,

Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything - Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us. (PI, Sect.126).

Thus philosophy puts a premium on facts, but these facts are not hidden nor are they anything other than what language presents to us. The facts of rule-following are the interpreted forms of life which come imposingly forward for recognition. Philosophy needs no special intuition to recognize them. The following passage makes the point clear:

The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique, for a game, and that then when we follow the rules, things do not turn out as we had assumed. That we are as it were entangled in our own rules (PI, Sect.125).

Wittgenstein's rejoinder to the sceptic, therefore, is that our grammar is not in constant risk of breaking down since grammar itself tells us what the facts are. Grammar is not based on those facts. It only presents their internal connexions. Besides, grammar itself is not based on a thin layer of common agreement, so that there is the possibility of its breaking down by a slightest sceptic touch. As Wittgenstein, repeatedly reminds us, the agreement is not an agreement in opinion but in forms of life. (PI, Sect.241). Grammar represents the basic agreement in our rule-following and forms of life which constitute the bed-rock of our thoughts and actions. (PI,
Sect.217). Hence it is hardly convincing to Bay that there is a communitarian foundation for our rule-following. Communitarianism does not solve the problem. It is another name for scepticism. The fact that grammar represents the facts of rule-following and that it shows the necessary roots of common agreement in rule-following it becomes obvious that the communitarian argument gets defeated. The agreement is a fact but grammar which shows the agreement is not factual. Grammar is the common ground of our rule-following behaviour.

8. Grammar and Natural History

In the view of above, it is imperative that Wittgestein must relate grammar to the natural history of man. What is natural history? The natural history of man consists in our natural activities like thinking, speaking, commanding, and counting (PI, Sect.25). The following passage makes the point clear:

What we are supplying are really remarks on natural history of human beings; we are not contributing curiosities however, but observations which no one has doubted but which have escaped remark only because they are before our eyes. (PI, Sect.415).

The remarks intended here are quite expectedly the remarks on the forms of life of human beings i.e. the language-games that reflect their activities. These remarks are not explanations or justifications but only descriptions of language-games. In this sense by bringing the natural history to the fore we can make our grammar more perspicuous since the more the natural history is
open to view the better the understanding of language and grammar is.

Natural history is the common background of both philosophy and grammar but it does not justify either philosophy or grammar. Grammar cannot be derived from natural history. Grammar is the formal account of our natural behaviour; it presents the calculus of our natural language. The following passage from Wittgenstein is revealing:

Our interest certainly includes the correspondence between the concepts and very general fact of nature. (Such facts mostly do not strike us because of their generality). But our interest does not fall back upon these possible causes of the formation of concepts; we are not doing natural science; nor yet natural history since we can invent fictitious natural history for our purposes. (PI, II, XII).

Philosophy, like grammar, is not a natural science nor a natural history. It is always a grammatical investigation into the facts of nature (PI. Sect. 90). That is to say, it investigates grammar, the calculus of our natural life and language. However, it is the forms of our language and life that matter for philosophical grammar. The forms can be described in the syntax with elaborate rules. Therefore, the description of the rule-structure is the core of philosophy and grammar.

9. Natural Facts and Rule-Following

The concept of natural history brings into prominence the natural facts about language-use. But the grammatical remarks on
these facts cannot be anthropological descriptions because they are grammatical propositions which define our natural activities themselves. Wittgenstein thus offers the grammar of natural history of man as a normative enterprise which not only describes what happens or takes place in our natural life but also what can happen. That is to say, grammar does not tell only what happens, but tells what are the possible happenings (PI Sect.90). Thus grammar presents us the domain of possibilities of natural facts. Grammar presents the essence of reality.

The propositions which describe the world-picture constitute a kind of mythology (OC, Sect. 98) in which their role is that of grammatical rules. This mythology containing grammatical propositions may change its course by allowing the fixed propositions to become shifting ones and shifting ones to become the hardened propositions (OC, Sects. 96.97). But, even then, there will be a mythology containing a world-picture which the grammar projects through its rules. The mythology which the grammar describes contains the principles which constitute reality. Therefore, it is ultimately grammar which determines what reality is (Cf. PI. Sects. 371, 373, 383, 401). Thus our grammar tells us the possibilities of natural history.

The facts of rule-following are facts of natural history. These facts constitute the bulk of linguistic data. Grammar shifts the facts into those which are essential and those which are inessential. The essential facts of rule-following are those which we cannot imagine to be otherwise. That 2+2 = 4 is
an essential fact and needs no special justification for being true. It is true as a matter of grammar and as a fact of our being human at all. Therefore rule-following considerations are so intimately ingrained in our being human at all. The rules do not tell about our cognitive interests or non-sceptic resistance to rampant scepticism. They tell us what we basically are. Forms of life involving rule-following are autonomous and are closed to any external justification. That alone tells why our grammar is not contigent. Grammar is necessary for us because we cannot really understand the alternative forms of life and the alternative grammars. What we can understand is really part of our grammar and so it is necessarily part of our natural history. The necessity of rule-following is the result of the internal correlation between grammar, and natural history, and so between language and world. Rule-following would have been contigent and so sceptically threatened, if it were not rooted in our forms of life, that is, in natural history and if our grammar would not have been a guarantee against the sceptics attack.

Thus to follow a rule is to participate in language and be part of a natural history. This has the additional guarantee that grammar is on the side of the rule-follower.
NOTES

1. This question is raised by Hintikka and Hintikka in their *Investigation Wittgenstein* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1986), and according to them the language-games are prior to the rules.


3. Cf. Ibid., pp.7-54.

4. Ibid., p.

5. Ibid., pp.22-37.

6. The introspectionist approach seems to push rule-following back into the realm of consciousness which decidedly abolishes the descriptive - normative distinction. Wittgenstein writes at PI, Sect.191:

   "It is as if we could grasp the whole use of the word in a flash", Like what e.g. can't the use - in a certain sense - be grasped in a flash? And in what sense can it not?".


8. Ibid.,


10. Ibid., Book I, Part IV, Section II, p.187.


12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., p.96.

15. Ibid.. p.102-103. See also C. Wright, Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics (Duckworth, London, 1980) Chapter II.


17. Ibid.


19. See Kripke, pp.72-85.


22. Ibid., p.341.

23. Ibid., p.341.

24. Ibid., p.348.

25. Ibid., pp.325-363.


30. Wittgenstein's notion of world-picture and mythology have only heuristic interest since they suggest us that our conception of the world has a root only in grammar. Grammar contains the world pictures which compete amongst themselves to give the essence of the world. Rules are situated at the heart of the world-view that gives the essence. These rules are grammatical propositions.