CHAPTER II
GRAMMAR AND REALITY

The problem of this chapter is: what is the nature of reality as represented in language? The internal relationship between grammar and reality is the central focus of Wittgenstein philosophy of grammar. I shall explore this relationship and its various logical features in course of this chapter. I shall show that Wittgenstein is committed to the thesis that reality is ultimately grammatical in its essential structure.

I. Grammar, Reality and Logical Form

Wittgenstein defines reality within the framework of grammar. Wittgenstein's investigation into the structure of reality, therefore, is a grammatical investigation. Its focus is "the essence of reality, not reality as it is contingently structured. Essence is expressed by grammar (PI, Sect.371). Grammar is said to determine what is meaningful or what is meaningless in our uses of language. Language is constituted by grammatical rules. In the structure of rules of grammar, the concepts that we use regarding reality, e.g. "object", "fact" etc. and their relations are reflected. For example, to talk about a physical object like chair is to station the concept in our grammar and give it determinable use. Thus grammar is in constant harmony with reality.

For Wittgenstein, any kind of investigation into the nature of grammar leads to the knowledge of reality. But grammar not
only takes account of rules of languages but also shows that reality is amenable to rules i.e. rules apply in the world. Grammar provides a way of looking at things. As Hacker points out; "grammar is the network of concepts and conceptual connections formed by the rules determining the use of language as well as those rules themselves".¹ A grammatical form stands for a conceptual connection and so grammar provides the conceptual structure that represents reality. Wittgenstein writes:

You have a new conception and interpret it as seeing a new object. You interpret a grammatical movement made by yourself as a quasi-physical phenomenon which you are observing.... what you have primarily discovered is a new way of looking at things. As if you had invented a new way of painting; or, again, a new metre, or a new kind of song (PI, Sect.401).

So, grammar provides a logical form or a form of representation to apprehend reality. Wittgenstein gives considerable scope to logical form as the essence of language and reality. Logical form of language is the same as the form of reality (TLP 4.12). Logical form is the foundation of logic and language insofar as it constitutes the essence of all that logic and language do. Logical truths and relations are the ramifications of the logical form of propositions in the language. Thus logic and the logical forms are the most essential aspects of language. Wittgenstein accords the primacy of place to logical form in the understanding of the grammar of language. Language reveals the logical form (TLP 4.121), since the home of logical form is language itself.
The logical structure of language is its logical form. Every symbol system, i.e. language has a network of structural rules and relations. These can be called the essences of symbolism and representation. Philosophy has only to show what those forms are and how they work. Hence, philosophy becomes a description of logical forms. Wittgenstein writes,

> Since language stands in internal relation to the world, it and these relations determine the logical possibility of facts. If we have a significant sign it must stand in a particular relation to a structure. Sign and relation determine unambiguously the logical form of the thing signified (NB, pp.42-43).

Thus the internal relations of the signs mark the internal relations of the things. That is, the logical form of signs is the logical form of reality. This is not only true of the logically defined symbols but also of all natural symbol-systems. Logical form is therefore the global feature of the symbol systems. Grammar in this sense is the doctrine of logical form* Grammar is a "theory of logical types" (PR, Sect.7).

Of course, neither logical forms nor grammatical rules can be constituted by extra-logical devices. In the other words, there is no extra-logical device to constitute the logical forms of the language and its rules. Because logical form of language is a basic non-derivable fact. That is shown by logical syntax through internal connexions of the grammatical rules.

Wittgenstein appeals to the ultimacy of logical form. This appeal must not be taken as Frege's logical method which appeals
to Platonic realism. Frege's logical method is a method of discovery as he assumes that logical form is independent of language and mind. For Wittgenstein philosophy and logical grammar are declared not to be sciences which can discover the logical forms (TLP, 4.111, 4.112). Both are only explications of logical form. Logical form is not fact of any kind because it comes along with language itself. The rules of grammar which define logical forms are apriori rules and they determine what language can express, i.e., what can be said and what cannot be said. These logical forms and rules of grammar are apriori and transcendental.²

2. Reality and Pictures

We know reality as we think it in language. We can picture it in language. Grammar, for Wittgenstein, provides the logical representation of facts. Facts are the existence and non-existence of states-of-affairs (TLP, 2). Facts constitute the world (TLP 1.1). Wittgenstein thus provides a logical map of the world in the network of grammatical relations of sentences which are constituted as representations of facts. The Tractarian metaphysics of the world is a grammatical representation.³ "Picturing" is a method of our linguistic representations of the world. For Wittgenstein, language is a logical picture, i.e., a logical model of reality (TLP, 4.01) by which he means that language represents the logical structure of the world. It is language that represents reality. Grammar only provides the conditions for the possibility of the picture.
The fundamental thesis of picture theory is that the language and the world have a common logical form (TLP. 4.12). Language displays the logical form of reality in its own form (TLP. 4.121). The picture theory does not demonstrate the actual identity of language and the world. But it lays down the conditions of representation of the world in language. In other words, it transcendentally unfolds the conditions of logical reconstructibility of the world in language. These conditions belong to the grammar (logic) of language. Wittgenstein suggests that we picture facts to ourselves (TLP, 3.001) only by being able to think and reconstruct the facts in language. So, ultimately, Wittgenstein's picture theory lays down the forms of our thought of the world and the logical conditions which make the thought possible. The conditions which make the thought possible are linguistic since there is no thought without being expressed in language. Thought and language have the identical logical structure. All the forms of thought, according to Wittgenstein, are forms of language (TLP 3.03).

The internal relationship between language and reality shows that pictorial relationship is not an external relationship. As we know, language is logical picture of reality because language and reality share the common logical form. So, we can say that logical form of language is collateral with the form of reality but it cannot be justified by the later. In simple words, one can say, if a proposition agrees with a fact in its logical form, it does not necessarily follow that it is justified by the fact.
The fact is constituted through its linguistic representations. There are, therefore, no non-linguistic facts. In the logical scheme of the calculus model the notion of correspondence ill fits. The question of correspondence does not rise at all. The sense of propositions consists in their being logical pictures of possible states-of-affairs. It is internal to the propositions and can be demonstrated within the calculus of language itself. The possible situations which constitute reality are themselves possible moves in the calculus since they have the same logical multiplicity (TLP. 4.04) as that of the propositions. In that sense, the limits of language are limits of the world (TLP 5.6). Grammar determines what is possible and what is not possible (PG, Sect. 82). Wittgenstein writes.

The connections between "language and reality is made by definitions. These definitions belong to grammar. So, language remains self-contained and autonomous.(PG, Sect.55)

The picture theory contains the basis of the autonomy of language in that language and reality have logical agreement and that language is the picture of reality. Language internally imposes its structure on reality. In that sense, language contains the image of the world.

Wittgenstein's model of explaining the relations between language and reality is not causal or empiricistic, because he never felt it necessary to justify language externally through appeal to experience. What we call experience is itself constituted by the rules of grammar. The causal conditioning of
the rules of grammar is ruled out since there is no need for deriving them from our experience of the world. Wittgenstein, however, is not a Humean in proposing that there is no justification for our representation of the world. For logical forms and rules of grammar do not need any justification at all. They are not matters based on Humean conventions.

3. Logical or Grammatical Essence

Grammar does not create reality. Reality as such is pre-linguistic. Its ontological significance, however, is inferred by grammar. We cannot describe and even think of reality if the latter does not fulfill the basic grammatical conditions of being meaningfully represented. In the other words, grammar constitutes the logical essences of the world Wittgenstein's writes: "Essence is expressed by -grammar" (PI, Sect.371). The logical essences are the logical possibilities or forms that are the constitutive conditions of the empirical world. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein called these essences the "objects" that underlie every possible state of affairs. Objects constitute the substance of the world (TLP 2.021). Substance is "the form and content" (TLP. 2.025) of the world. From the logical or grammatical point of view the objects are the formal concepts (TLP. 4.1272) and are the marks of conventions in language. The "objects', therefore, can be called a grammatical category. It derives its significance from grammar itself.

In this context, Wittgenstein observes: "Grammar tells what
kind of object anything is (theology as grammar)" (PI, Sect.373). The grammatically of object is the hallmark of the later Wittgensteinian concept of object and the world. The grammaticization of every ontological category deepens the Tractarian view of world and objects rather than rejects it.⁵

4. Objects, Facts and Complexes

Wittgenstein's early theory of the world is that the world is a totality of facts and these facts in the ultimate analysis are concatenations of objects. These objects are simple. They make up the substance of the world. They are combined with each other in different ways so as to form facts. The totality of facts is limited by the totality of objects that can serve as ingredients of facts. An object is represented in the language by a name. With the combination of names we can form propositions. Thus the totality of propositions representing the totality of facts makes up our language. Language as a whole mirrors the world.

Wittgenstein includes properties, relations and functions in his notion of objects. He writes, "Relations and properties, etc., are objects too" (NB, p.61). In his middle period Wittgenstein demonstrates in his Philosophical Grammar that properties and relations are included among objects and that objects are the all-embracing logical ingredients of facts and complexes. He writes:
A complex is a compound of its parts, the things of a kind which go to make it up. (This is of course a grammatical proposition concerning the words 'complex', "part" and 'compose'.) (PG, Appendix p.200).

In the *Tractatus* also there are enough of evidences to show that objects have replaced the so called properties, relations and functions. There is only one category of reality and that is the 'objects'. Objects account for all the possible states of affairs (TLP. 3.1432, 3.2, .- 221). Objects make up the substance of the world. Substance is what subsists in the world independently of what happens in the world. There must be objects, if the world is to have alternative descriptions. Objects are the ingredients for the unalterable form of the world. (TLP, 2.0271). Objects constitute the unalterable form. They are subsistent. Their configuration produces states of affairs which are changing and therefore are contingent. Wittgenstein's search for the objects was the search for the necessary and logical conditions of our language and the world. Objects thus being the basis of our meaningful representation of the world in language have the characteristics of being simple, such that (1) they do not have a structure like the physical objects, and (2) cannot be further analysed and so are the end points of the process of analysis. Accordingly, we can say objects constitute the limit of the empirical world and the empirical discourse. Objects are proxied in the discourse by the logically simple and semantically primitive simple symbols or names (TLP. 3.22). Objects are, therefore, necessarily named and
thus are discourse-dependent for their formal or grammatical nature.

5. Phenomenological Vs Grammatical

As I have indicated in Chapter I, the objects of the Tractatus have been supposed to be phenomenological - the items given to our immediate experience. The following remark is adduced as an evidence.

As examples of simple I always think of parts of visual space. (NB, p.45).

It seems to me perfectly possible that patches in our visual field are simple objects .... the visual appearances of stars even seen certainly to be so. (NB. p.64).

The following remark from the Tractatus may be taken as supporting the above claim:

2.0131 A spatial object must be situated in infinite space. (A spatial point is an argument-place). A speck in the visual field, though it need not be red, must have some colour; it is, so to speak, surrounded by colour-space. Notes must have some pitch, objects of the sense of touch some degree of hardness and so on.

It is compatible with the character of simple objects that Wittgenstein should countenance complex physical objects. Complex physical objects can be taken as the configuration of simple objects. As Wittgenstein remarks at TLP 6.3431 "the laws of physics, with all their logical apparatus, still speak however indirectly about the objects of the world". The language of physics is descriptive of the so called phenomenological world and a purely fictitious world. Wittgenstein remarks:
Let us not forget that the language of physics too, again describes only the primary [i.e. phenomenological] world and not a hypothetical world. The only hypothesis (of physics) is an assumption concerning the practical method of description.\textsuperscript{9}

However, phenomenological description of the physical world does not fit the description of the Tractarian objects. As argued in chapter I, the objects which constitute the essences of the world are logical (formal) and so grammatical in character. They are not given in immediate experience as objects of consciousness. In fact, they constitute the limits of all empirical reality and so cannot themselves be empirical. "Empirical reality is limited by the totality of objects" (TLP, 5.5561). Objects are the non-empirical and therefore the grammatical essences of the world. It is therefore a grammatical statement that any possible world must have the same objects (the logical form). (TLP 2.022 – 2.0231).

6. The Objects in the Later Philosophy

In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein is explicit that grammar determines the essences or the objects of the world. Grammar tells us "what kind of object anything is" (PI. Sect.373) and to which category of descriptive language it belongs. So one can say object is constituted in grammar. E.K. Specht, expressing such a view writes,
Language is not abstracted from objects; but drawing up language-game creates a new articulation and organisation of phenomena, simultaneously with the introduction of the new linguistic sign. In this way a new group of objects is "constituted" in a language game simultaneously with new linguistic sign.

According to Wittgenstein objects are articulated and signified in language. A language-game as a grammatical move articulates the object into a new form. The constitution of the objects is only grammatical or conceptual. This does not imply that objects are created in language. Wittgenstein was never concerned with the origin or creation of the world. His problem was concerning the logical possibility of the world or the way it can be made intelligible. To put it in his words, ".... our investigation, however, is directed not towards phenomena, but, as one might say, towards the possibilities' of phenomena" (PI, Sect. 90). As I have argued, this is the most important motivation of the grammatical investigation that Wittgenstein undertakes in his later philosophy. All conceptual remarks on the nature of objects and the world are descriptions of the paradigms in our language. Wittgenstein explains:

What looks as if it had to exist, is part of the language. It is a paradigm in our language-game; something with which comparision is made. And this may be an important observation; but none the less an observation concerning our language-game-our method of representation (PI, Sect.50).

The paradigm - setting in the object-description is grammatical in the sense that whenever we talk about objects and their being 'simple' or 'complex' we make grammatical remarks about certain
language-games. The object is simple or complex relative to a language-game (PI, Sects.47). Wittgenstein writes,

The question "Is what you see composite?" makes good sense if it is already established what kind of complexity - that is, which particular use of the word - is in question (PI, Sect.47) (italics mine).

The attribution of the property of existence (being) or non-existence (non-being) to objects (elements) is a matter of grammar, since within language alone is it considered what a particular object is or is not. "The standard metre in Paris" is Wittgenstein's notable example wherein the grammar of the word "metre" is laid down. Wittgenstein says,

There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris. — But this is, of course not to ascribe any extraordinary property to it, but, only to mark its peculiar role in the language-game of measuring with a metre-rule. (PI', Sect.50). (Italics mine).

What, according to Wittgenstein, is important now is the language-game and its grammatical structure. That alone decides what objects we are referring to or describing. The objects have their grammatical proxies in the paradigms of language-games. They become part of the method of representation.11 (PI, Sects.50-57).

7. Ontology of essences

Wittgenstein addresses himself to the question: Are the essences objectively real? That is, are the so called grammatical essences objectively true of the factual world? This
is a fundamental question regarding the ontological reality of grammar itself.

There are essences in the objective domain of language according to Wittgenstein. We know them through an eidetic-intuition,\textsuperscript{12} i.e., the intuition given to us in language-use. These essential structural properties are mirrored in the structure of language. Wittgenstein claims in the \textit{Tractatus} that the structure of the world is reflected in the structure of language (TLP. 4.124). He also claims that the formal properties are objectively located in the world. The world shares with language the formal properties or essences. So the formal properties are a feature of world itself (TLP 4.1221-4.123). Wittgenstein has no other world than the world of language to locate the formal elements of reality. The formal or grammatical essences are the essential conditions of reality.

The word "mirror" perhaps brings us a feeling that there is a gap between language and reality. Pictureing of reality by language is a kind of bridging this gap. For Wittgenstein, language and world are structurally identical in the sense they have same logical form. Structure of the world cannot be conceived without domain of language.

If we accept the view that Wittgenstein takes the notion of the form of the world to have an ontological significance, in the way the Platonic forms have, then it is difficult to accommodate the transcendental framework\textsuperscript{13} of the \textit{Tractatus}, which claims to
lay bare only the apriori conditions of the possibility of language and the world. We can show that these formal properties or essences attributable to reality are contained in logic. So, they have been derived from logic and not from reality itself. They are true of the world, since the latter conforms to the forms of logic. This shows the co-existence of realism and the transcendental framework in the Tractatus without undermining the logic-dependence of essences. The later works can be deemed to be following the Tractarian reconciliation of realism of essences with the transcendental standpoint of grammar. Since grammar expresses the essences, it is quite right to say that they are real in language without being derived from the world itself. They provide the conceptual moulds in which the world itself could be made intelligible.

8. Grammatical Illusions

According to Wittgenstein any pointer to reality beyond grammar is completely deceptive. That grammar represents a pre-linguistic reality is only a grammatical illusion. Wittgenstein writes,

'You a have new conception and interpret it as seeing new object. You interpret a grammatical movement by yourself as a quasi-physical phenomenon which you are observing (PI, Sect.401).

It is an illusion to say that grammatical forms stand indecently of grammar. What is illusory is not the reality of
the world itself, but the logical form of the world standing independently of the grammatical form. It does not amount to a denial of those forms themselves but their independence of grammar. The logical form of the world has its source in grammar and in language-use. The structure of the world has no ontological foundations. It is decided ultimately by grammar. Limits of grammar are also co-terminus with the limits of the world.

P.M.S. Hacker writes,

"In the investigations the structure of language is still the subject of investigation. Moreover, it is still isomorphic with the "structure of reality", not because language must mirror the logical form of the universe, but because apparent 'structure of reality' is merely the shadow of grammar."

What does Hacker mean by the "shadow of grammar"? Perhaps he means that the structure of reality has no ontological basis in the world but is ultimately based on grammar. This is a plausible construction of the above statement. Shadow of grammar is merely a shadow, it is not an illusion. The structure of reality is as real as that of language. Reality as such is formless. Its forms are derived from grammar. So, the structure of reality is also real. But it is a grammatical reality. Thus ontology collapses into grammar. The universe as a vast panoramic existence derives its essential structure from the inner necessities of grammar.
9. Language-games

The notion of language-game seems to provide answers to the following questions in Wittgenstin's later philosophy:

1. How are the pictures, which our sentences are supposed to be, compared with reality?
2. How do we establish whether they are true or false?

In Wittgenstein's later philosophy, the relation between language and reality is established not through "picturing" but through language-games. But the transitions from "picture" to language-game is found in remarks like the following:

My leading idea is that a proposition is compared with the reality (MS. 107, p.155).

I must after all be able to compare reality with a proposition. (MS 107, p.153)

In the Tractatus, language-world relations through the picture model are simple and straight-forward. Language establishes projective relations with the world with the intermediary of names and objects. The Tractarian projective relations are logically neat and syntactico - semantically transparent. Language-reality relations are, however, not so simple in the model of language-games. The relations are diverse and they can be effected only by means of rule-governed activities on the part of the language-users. The rule-structure of language use contains the diversity of the relation; they reveal that language keeps contact with reality not simply
as a description. Sometimes language contains predictions, suppositions, hypotheses and sometimes, orders, commands, or simple guidelines for future descriptions. In any form, language is always compared with reality if not as a measure or map, but at least as a system of rules, conventions and repeated practices.

Wittgenstein continues to hold the idea that it is the use of a picture that mediates between the picture (a sentence, a thought, a blueprint, or an order) and the reality it represents. In the later works the term 'language-game' can be taken to constitute the basic semantic relations between language and the world. When this fact is noted, the picture idea is vindicated. The semantic projections in an appropriate language-game remains pictorial even though in a minimal sense. As Wittgenstein puts it:

So I am imagining that the difference between proposition and reality is ironed out by the lines of projection belonging to the picture, the thought, and that no further room is left for a method of application, but only for agreement and disagreement.  

Thus what may look like ensuring the rejection of the picture theory is in fact an underlying continuity of the semantics of pictures and its grammatical reincarnation in the theory or language-games.\textsuperscript{17}

This interpretation is confirmed by Wittgenstein's own statements such as follows:

Like everything metaphysicall the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language. (PG, Sect.112).
In other words, Wittgenstein is not denying the agreement between language and reality, but asserting the relation in the forms of language-game. The agreement is grammatical, since what is demanded is the agreement in form, not in content. Language is in the last analysis related to the world, not by name-object correlations, but by language-games. These language-games contain the symbols of our language under the control of the network of rules and also determine the application or use of these symbols in the world. It is only the language-game that first determines what the symbol is and then how it is used to represent an object or phenomenon in different situations.  

10. Language-game As a Method of Representation

Forms of representation, according to Wittgenstein, evolve out of our actual ways of using language for describing the world. The forms of representation are the language-games with which we represent the world. At PI Sect 50 Wittgenstein says:

We can put it like this: This sample is an instrument of the language used in ascription of colour. In this language-game it is not something that is represented but is a means of representation. - And just this goes for an element in language-game;...when we name it by uttering the word "R": this gives this object a role in our language-game; it is now a means of representation. And to say "If it did not exist, it could have no name" is to say as much and as little as: if this thing did not exist, we could not use it in our language-game.

The language-games as the forms of representation are the ways we describe the world or talk about it in various ways. Describing is not mapping but bringing the world into our
cognitive network. Our fundamental relations with the world are accentuated in our linguistic network, i.e., in our grammar. Our experience is dependent on our grammatical modes, that is on our methods of representation.

We have a world-picture which is present in our language. The world-picture is grammatical. It lays down the conditions of all linguistic description. Wittgenstein says,

I have a world-picture. Is it true or false? Above all it is the substratum of all my enquiring and asserting. The propositions describing it are not all equally subject to testing. (OC, Sect.162)

The world-picture is not something which we acquire as a matter of pragmatic choice but it is basic to our thinking. It is the substratum of our ways of thinking and acting. It is neither true nor false, reasonable nor unreasonable—"It is there—like our life" (OC, Sect.559).

Now the question is: can we call our forms of representation apriori? Of course, they are not apriori—in the sense that Wittgenstein's early logical system is: nevertheless, they can be called apriori in the sense that they are prior, to any form of experience. They are not based on the experience of the world. Their source is language, rather than experience. Ultimately they lie in our forms of life.

What do these forms of language represent? Do they represent facts or possibilities of facts? Wittgenstein answers
these question in a novel way. They no doubt represent the
world, but the world is already given to us in language. The
world is grammatically located in our linguistic network. So the
world that we seem to represent is a fact of language. These are
ultimately linguistic facts. No other facts are recorded.

There is a widespread view that Wittgenstein has given up
picture theory of language that he had put forward in the
Tractatus. Name-object relation is the main thesis underlying
the picture theory. Later this idea of 'picturing' is missing in
his writings. There are important changes found in the attitude
of Wittgenstein towards picture idea in the middle period and the
later period of his life. What are those changes? Let us
briefly discuss the following points in order to support the view
that Wittgenstein continues to believe that picture theory was
basically alright.

1. The primary evidence is that pictorial relation between
language and reality lost its primacy in his later theory of
language apparently because picture theory was very much
idealized and was far removed from ordinary language. The
relation between sentences and facts was based on idealized
name-object relationship. It his later period, Wittgenstein
says nothing about naming relations except that they are
there, and can be taken care of in our ordinary language-
use. In the Notebooks Wittgenstein declares: "Logic takes
care of itself!". What he is concerned about there is the
primacy of logic. However, the change in the order of
conceptual priorities greatly reduced the importance of the picture-view. Logic in the transcendental sense gave way to logic as the description of language-games.

2. In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein proposes that the basic language-world relations are not one-to-one relations. One and the same language-game can, as Hintikkas observe, mediate the connection of several different words with reality. This makes the application of the idea of picture grossly inadequate, if not wrong.

3. Language-games have assimilated the naming relations into their descriptive structure without presenting the one-to-one relationship. Language is related to reality in diverse ways rather than in one paradigmatic way.

These evidences are not sufficient to draw the conclusion that Wittgenstein has given up 'picture theory forever. Picture theory has reincarnated itself as theory of language-games. Language now is the all comprehensive universal medium which encompasses all possible relations with the world. Our new pictures of the world are the blurred and hazy images reflected in our linguistic medium.

There are several notebook entries in the MS to show that Wittgenstein evinced much more interest than before in the idea of picture: "A proposition is not simply a picture but a portrait". (MS 107, P.155, 7 Oct., 1929).
My idea that a proposition is a picture was a good one. It is said that thinking is the same as, or something similar to, making a picture for oneself, and thinkable is the same as, or similar to, what is imaginable. And as undetermined as the concept of proposition, is as undetermined is also the concept of picture i.e. a picture is nevertheless a perfect guidespot to the understanding of how a proposition works. (MS 219, p.14). (Italics mine)

11. Assertions, Propositions and Language-games

According to Wittgenstein, propositions are articulate. This conception of proposition is found in Wittgenstein's 'early philosophy and also continued throughout the middle period. Propositions have never lost their primacy in Wittgenstein's thought. The connection between language and reality is established through propositions. Propositions express sense and have use or employment in language-games. Besides, propositions have sense because they have articulated structure. The world they represent has an identical structure. Language and the world have the same logical multiplicity (PR, Sect. 32). The problem of assertions was an ever continuing problem with Wittgenstein. For him, there are no unassorted propositions. So he considered the assertion sign as redundant (TLP, 4.442). The later theory of language-games fully demonstrates the superfluity of assertion sign as a logical category. All propositions are assertions and they show that they are such. Wittgenstein's picture theory contains the logic of assertions. The following remark is worth noting:
If we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no similarity with its object, the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence and reality loses all points. For now the sentence itself can serve as such a shadow. The sentence is just such a picture, which has not the slightest similarity with what it represents... This shews you the way in which words and things may be connected (BBS, p.37).

To entertain a shadow between sentence and reality is to require an additional device called assertion-sign. But the sentence itself contains the shadow and so the assertion-sign. Propositions are articulate. They show what they assert and so contain their sense. The idea of picture continued to haunt Wittgenstein even in the late middle period. G.E. Moore has correctly noted down the struggle with this idea which Wittgenstein has in his Lectures in 1930-33.24

True propositions describe reality whether it is called a picture or not. Propositions have little similarity with reality except in the logical form. This logical fact is mirrored in the grammar of a proposition. Wittgenstein's talks about the general notion of picture that clarifies the grammar of pictures. He writes,

Let us imagine a picture story in schematic pictures, and thus more like the narrative in a language than a series of realistic pictures. Using such a picture - language we might in particular e.g. keep our hold on the course of battles. (Language-games). And a sentence of our word-language approximates to such a picture in this picture language much more closely than we think (PG. Sect.123). (Italics mine).

Thus the idea of picture gets a grip over language inspite of
the fact that language is not actually a picture. Only logically it is so.

Wittgenstein uses in his later writings one characteristic idea. It consist in comparing some sentence not with portraits (historical pictures) but with genre pictures In PI, Sec.522 he writes:

If we compare a proposition to a picture, we must think whether we are comparing it to a potrait (a historical representation) or to a genre - picture and both comparisons have a point.

The genre-pictures tell us something about the world. They keep themselves rearer to reality. Wittgenstein writes,

I should like to say, "what the picture tells me is itself". That is, its telling me consists in its own structure, in its own lines and colours (PI, Sect.523).

Thus pictures are always gramatically relevant. The rigid determinants of a picture have withered away but the essential grairanticality of a picture is still intact.

12. Picture Theory : The Grammatical Requirement

In the above example of genre pictures Wittgenstein is talking of more than basic name-object relationship and their independence of two-place relationship. The name - object relationship is constituted in language games. Not only that, the picture idea itself arises out of a grammatical requirement. Picture is a particular grammatical move that is independent of
our experience of the world. It does not require name–object relationship at all for its possibility. The grammatically required picture precedes our names–object relationship. The picture is a fundamental notion. But it is no more a single notion.\textsuperscript{25}

The claim that Wittgenstein gave up the picture theory of language can be understood only depending on in what sense we are ready to consider the word 'picture'. If the word 'picture' stands for a single name–object relationship, then the later Wittgenstein has the option not to go in for such a standpoint. If it means a general agreement between expressions and reality then 'picture' remains at the core of language theory. Wittgenstein has no objection to the idea that language and the world have an internal harmony. The language–games perfectly represent the inner harmony between language and the reality. As Wittgenstein has made it clear, we could not use such expressions as 'belief, "expectation' and "command' without presupposing that what we expect must itself be expressed in language.\textsuperscript{26} There must be an internal agreement between belief and what is believed. As Wittgenstein says, "what is essential to intention is the picture: the picture of what is intended" (PR. Sec.21). He further says:

If there were no connection between the act of expectation and reality, you could expect a nonsense (PR Sect.33).

What gives us the idea that there is a kind of agreement between thought and reality. Instead of "agreement" one might here say with a clear conscience "pictorial character;."
But is this pictorial character an agreement? In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus I said something like: it is an agreement of form. But that is an error (PG I Appendix 4B, p.2.12).

The mere agreement of form is of course an erroneous notion. It goes with application. 'Form' is an incomplete notion without 'use' or application. That is what Wittgenstein says when he talks of the blue-point plus the method of projection (application). One can see that both picture and its application were already in the Tractatus. However, the Tractarian concept of use had not been sufficiently enriched like the later concept of use. The picture is a blue-print and it can be used only in a language-game. The language-game contains both the picture and its possible application. The projection lines still take direction from language to reality. Thus the notion of picture survives inspite of the various changes in the picture theory.

13. Convergence of Language and Reality

Although the notion of picture is absent from the scene Wittgenstein has always talked of reality in his later writings. What does he think about the relation of language and reality?

In his earlier writings Wittgenstein has thought of a gap between language and reality. That gap has to be mediated by picture. It seems that gradually the gap has been bridged and the differences between them narrowed. Ultimately, Wittgenstein
finds no ontological gap between the two. For him language and reality occupy one single logical space. Language and reality go together in a single logical space. Language is part of reality and reality is part of the linguistic continuum. How does this convergence of language and reality take place? It takes place in the concept of grammar. Grammar tells what the reality is and how to represent it in language. Grammar is the decisive element. Grammar encompasses both language and reality. The point of "convergence of language and reality is found in grammar. Wittgenstein hints at this inward convergence in the following passage:

The rules of grammar cannot be justified by one's shewing that their application makes a representation agree with reality. For this justification would itself have to describe what is represented (PG, Sect.134).

Reality first becomes something represented in the process of representation. The fundamental question therefore is How do we represent anything? This requires a grammatical determination. We can say: grammar tells what kind of object anything is (PI, Sect.373).

14. Conclusion

All roads in a sense lead to grammar. The facts of language and its functions are characterizable in grammar. Grammar tells what is having sense in our language-use, and what is not. Grammar, therefore, is the accounts book of language (PG, Sect.44). On the other hand, grammar also tells us what reality
is (PI Sect. 373) and what agreement or harmony it has with language (PG, Sect.112). Reality thus becomes an additional dimension of grammar, grammar being the source of the letter's intelligibility. As Wittgenstein puts it.

The connection between "language and reality" is made by definitions of words, and these belong to grammar, so that language remains self-contained and autonomous. (PG, Sect.55).
NOTES


2. See David McCarthy "The Philosophy of Logical Wholism", *Synthese* 87 (1991), 51-123.

3. Ibid..

4. The problem of the relation of language and thought is tackled by Wittgenstein at various stages in a uniform manner. For him thought is logically structured and so it is linguistic out and out. Thoughts are the linguistic articulations manifested in language use. See PI. 330, 332.

5. The prevalent idea that Wittgenstein rejected his Tractarian ontology in his later works is wrong, since instead of rejecting it he only removed the consistencies surrounding the concept of the object and facts. The notion of fact was slowly found redundant, since the concept of object sufficed to take account of all linguistically possible states of affairs. The 'world' of the PI. is a dynamic constellation of objects grammatically stationed in the representing mechanism of the language-games. See Merrill Hintikka and Jaakko Hintikka, *Investigating Wittgenstein* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1986) for a view reaffirming the continuity between the *Tractatus* and the PI world-views.

Objects are the result of a transcendental deduction rather than a simple logical analysis. The deduction is of the character of an apriori or logical analysis of the possibility of sense. Wittgenstein's following remark at Tractatus 2.0211-2.0212 is worth considering: "If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true. In that case one could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false)".

8. See Merrill Hintikka and Jaakka Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein. Hintikkas argue that the objects in the Tractatus are phenomenological as they are the objects of acquaintance given in the domain of experience.


11. For detailed discussion on the method of representation as part of grammar, see P.M.S. Hacke, Insight and Illusion, Chapter VI.

12. Eidetic intuition is remarkably an apriori intuition much favoured by the phenomenologists. It is essentially a direct apprehension of essences. However, Wittgenstein does not call it an epistemic process at all. It is linguistic
in character, since language ultimately provides the apprehension of the grammatical essences. At Tratatus 5.4731 Wittgenstein wrote: "Self-evidence, which Ressell talked about so much, can become dispensable in logic, only because language itself prevents every logical mistake*" (Italics mine).

The logical essences are self-evident in a characteristically grammatical manner.

13. See P.M.S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion for discussion on its transcendental framework of the Tractatus. The following remark is worth considering:

   Logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror-image of the world. Logic is transcendental (TLP. 6.13).


16. cf. Hentikka and Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein. They maintain that the language-world relation the main focus of the notion of language-game.

17. Ibid.,

18. The idea of picture eurviews the many changes that have definitely taken place in Wittgenstein's picture theory. However, it has taken a more informal turn insofar as 'picture' has shed its rigid format. Language-games contain the surviving element of pictorial/projective relations between language and the world. See Hintikka and Hintikka,

19. See Investigating Wittgenstein

20. Ibid. p.234.

21. Ibid.,


23. See Big Typescript (MS 213) Sect.43.


This would show that "fact" need not refer to any entity above and beyond those referred to by a sentence used to assert that such and such is the case without the word 'facts'... If expressions of facts are always assertins or indirect discourse reports of assertions, then to express a fact is to make or report an asertion about entities which are not facts (p.125).


28. Bogen is of the opinion that picture though essentially depends on the internal relation whereas the use theory is basically dependent on the notion of contingent relationship between language of reality. I think this is not correct. Language-reality relationship has to be internal and so necessary. See Bogen, Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language. pp.102-119.