State and Development

The state in developing countries occupies a pivotal position in welfare, redistribution, rebuilding and modernisation. Although this interventionist role of the state renders it omnipresent, it does not however always ensure its omnipotence. No definition of the state has stood the test of time and it is constantly redefined to suit changing conditions. In the West for instance, globalisation has resulted in the state withdrawing from its protectionist and welfarist functions and surrendering issues of economy to the market. Scholars have tried to define the state by stressing on its capability, its institutional organisation, state agenda, responsibility and priority. In emphasising what the state does for its people, importance has also been given to the responses that people have towards the state: the question of identity. Feelings of nationalism and patriotism are not mere emotions, they have served to influence state policy and relations with other states. State autonomy and its capacity to be influenced from social forces has also been a defining factor. In this regard, the state has been seen in relation to other institutions within society and has also been viewed as being above all societal linkages. State-society linkages have thus provided an interesting insight into the exploration of associational behaviour. With state membership and citizenship, there are associated values of equality, liberty, justice and freedom. Regime types also determine the nature of the state: the democratic state seeks to ensure equality, justice and similar liberal ideals to all its citizens.
This chapter discusses varying notions of state and society and the linkages between the two.
This is followed by a brief discussion on democracy and development with special reference to India. Given the fact that the Indian state has a developmental promise to fulfil in a diverse multicultural society, negotiations with dominant classes were necessary in order to ensure continuing legitimacy accorded to the state. However, these negotiations served to protect only the elite and vast tracts of deprivation and neglect soon became obvious. While analysing the nature of the developmental state in India, a discussion is also undertaken on New Social Movements: protests over the redistribution of essential resources, protection of livelihoods and natural habitat. The chapter provides a theoretical argument that holds that faced with a situation where the state fails to perform its avowed functions of either development or welfare, the society reacts to the situation in two ways. The first of these is protest. An effective method, this draws wide attention to the issues at hand, though they are at risk of being appropriated by political parties seeking mileage and legitimacy. In the second instance, drawing upon local knowledge and practice/s, society might revive traditional institutions modifying them to suit present needs or alternatively, breed new institutions, independent of the state that seek to take over the function of development and welfare. The sustainability and success of these institutions in filling the gap depends on the continued faith vested in them by the society, their performance and ironically also, acknowledgement (and subsequent patronage) by the state. Such movements and developments determine the nature of the state and contribute to enriching the study of Political Science.
State and Society

Political Scientists have been preoccupied with defining the nature of the state, identifying its capacities and limitations and indeed, analysing its significance in modern times vis-à-vis other organisations within society. The state has been variously defined: from Max Weber's oft quoted definition that identified the state as being different from other organisations due to its monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force, the definition is constantly under scrutiny and revision. Theorists such as John Stuart Mill have emphasised on the institutional character of the state: as an organisation or a set of organisations. Through most of these definitions however, the importance of the use of force and the authority to exact compliance from the citizens by virtue of the same is emphasized. The concept of territory is inherent in the definition since its subjects needless to add occupy a prescribed area over which its jurisdiction extends. Thus, according to Reuschemeyer and Evans (1985), the state is a 'set of organisations invested with the authority to make binding decisions for people and organisations juridically located in a particular territory and to implement these decisions using, if necessary, force'. Veering from the institutional approach is the one provided by Michael Mann who views the state as a power organisation that engages in 'centralised, institutionalised, territorialized regulation of social forces' (Mann 1986: 26). The need for the state to control society through its various institutions and agencies is brought out further when he adds that the power of the state is reflected in its capacity to penetrate civil society in order to ensure that its decisions are implemented without contestation in the realm. Some scholars also see the state as a culmination of 'a process transcending the old localised organisations in society that had previously made the rules' (Migdal 1994:12). It is a more
'impersonal and public system of rule over territorially circumscribed societies, exercised through a complex set of institutional arrangements and offices, which is distinguished from the largely localised and particularistic forms of power that preceded it' (King 1986:30). In Migdal's opinion, since the 16th century, the nature of the state has undergone change: the emergence of the state as a public power with its large standing armies, formidable bureaucracies and codified law has made the old forms of rule antiquated. The state has forged close-knit nations out of people who were earlier loose associations of local groups. In the view of Anthony Smith, the nation-state is the only permissible and recognised form of political power that prevails in modern times (Smith in Hall (ed.): 228).

The above definitions have been criticised for being exceedingly one-dimensional in stressing the rule adjudicating power of the state. In emphasising the rule making and implementation function of the state, these theories tend to ignore the manner in which policies, goals and ends of the state are formulated and transformed. It is when this aspect of the state is taken into consideration, that the role of the state as part of the society becomes important. As an organisation that belongs essentially to the society, the state engages continuously with social forces and its policies are a result of such negotiations as may occur between the two. Alfred Stepan maintains that the state must be 'more than the "government". It is the centralised administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive system headed by an executive authority that attempts not only to structure relationships between civil society and public authority in a polity, but to structure many crucial relationships within civil society as well (Stepan 1978: xii). Timothy Mitchell insists that the state should not be taken as 'a free-standing entity, whether an agent, instrument, organisation or structure located apart from and opposed to another entity called society' (Mitchell 1991: 81). The Marxist view of the state is inextricably
connected with society, more specifically with class. Marx and Engels view the state as a coercive apparatus or as the 'concentrated and organised violence of society'. The state is seen as an instrument of class domination, where the 'executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie' (The Communist Manifesto). Viewed thus, the state assumes a status subordinate to that of civil society that is seen to control it. The state as a 'coercive, particularistic and subordinate apparatus' is therefore not the final phase of historical process instead; it is a 'transitory institution intended to be transcended'. Gramsci carries the idea a little further: the state is not an end in itself, he opines. It is an apparatus, an instrument. It does not represent universal interests but particular ones; it is not a separate and sovereign entity set above the underlying society but is conditioned by and thus subjugated to society. Neither is it a permanent institution as it is bound to disappear with the transformation of the underlying society.

The state as Migdal puts it, is not a 'fixed ideological identity'; instead, it 'embodies an ongoing dynamic, a changing set of goals, as it engages other social groups' (Migdal ibid.). Migdal goes on to add that these engagements might not occur directly: they might come in the form of representation by elected legislators or through political parties. He adds further, that as a result of the interactions of the state with social forces, the policies of the state might alter considerably. On the other hand, it is possible that some of these forces might get incorporated within the state thereby reflecting their agenda from a different angle. The policies of the state are therefore not the policies of a neutral organisation, rather, they are formulated by leaders who represent the interests of their constituencies and are part of the society. The influence of the state in modern times has exceeded its geographical limits: it has penetrated the social fabric so deeply as to formulate identities of people, and shape their
moral orders. State leaders in fact, are concerned that the state is so deeply entrenched in the lives of the people that it becomes something to die for (hence nationalism is hailed as a virtue) and they are keen to see that any form of dissent does not go uncontested. He adds that political leaders keen on ensuring their survival insist that rules are sacrosanct. Moreover, the penetration of the state in the economy is seen in the recent case of privatisation and liberalisation where it is commonly argued that the state should not abandon all control over the markets. It should, on the other hand, prescribe the limits of market autonomy and should 'authorise, regulate and defend their operation' (Migdal *ibid*: 14). The need for the state to maintain its primacy over all other organisations has therefore been emphasised by all political leaders.

The state has not been untouched by religious issues either. Increasing conflicts within multicultural societies have greatly enhanced the role of the state as a neutral arbiter that stands apart and above all religious issues. Such positions of the state imply its invincibility: a feature most leaders would want to attribute to the state. This implies that the dictates of the state are accepted without question by all those who are governed by it.

However, Migdal and others argue that even though the state leaders would like to imagine that the state indeed is an invincible authority that demands unquestioning obedience from its subjects, imposing domination over them is a Herculean task. They argue that recent literature has greatly overestimated state power and autonomy by focusing on the very top leadership and ignoring the nitty-gritty, as though 'its collective will is recreated faithfully throughout the labyrinth of state branches and bureaus'.
It is important therefore, to study the various rungs of the ladder that comprise the state in order to see how the collective will of the people is reflected in state policies and programmes. Such disaggregation of state can lead one to ‘dismantle it analytically and to discern the different structural environments of its different components and the interactions among them’. Viewed in this light, Migdal holds that the state can be broken down into four components that differ in the kind of pressure that is exerted upon them from other state and non-state components. These are: the trenches where the officers are faced with tremendous societal resistance as they deal directly with the people; the dispersed field officers who rework and organise state policies and directives for local consumption. They are likely to face large, well-organised social forces, as well as direct intervention from the capital cities than those in the trenches. Another notch above these are the agency’s central offices where national policies are formulated and enacted, where resources for implementation are marshalled. These agencies face strong pressure from the top political leadership as well as from well-organised interest groups at the national level. Finally, the commanding heights form the pinnacle of the state and comprises of the top political leadership. These leaders do depend on the lower rungs for everything ‘from tax collection to keeping order’ but may not fully identify with them. In addition to these pressures, the higher echelons are also subject to international forces seeking to influence decision making within the state.

Within each level of the state organisation, there are pressures at three fronts: from supervisors, from the underlings (or those that are directly or indirectly supervised) and from peers. All such pressures go on to influence state policy. Understanding the impact and nature of these forces is essential in understanding the nature of the state, something Migdal defines as ‘anthropology of the state’. Scholars assign to the state an ontological status that sets it
apart from the rest of the society. He adds that the more heterogeneous a society, the more
diverse and intense the pressures from its components will be and the more difficult it will be
for the state to ensure ‘complementary behaviour by its many parts’ thereby conveying a
coherent system of “legitimating universes”’ (Migdal ibid: 18).

It becomes essential therefore to understand the nature of society and what it constitutes and
most importantly, how collective will is reflected in the wider public realm in its dealings with
the state. Indeed, the state has to deal with social forces in a traditional society where
traditional social relations are deeply entrenched in the minds of the people and the state is
seen chiefly as a rule-enforcing organisation. Leah Greenfeld and Michael Martin accord a
very limited role to society. Society’s ‘only definitive character is that it is the outermost social
structure for a certain group of individuals who, whatever might be their attitude towards it,
view themselves as its members and experience their identity as determined by it’ (Greenfeld
and Martin 1988: viii). Scholars influenced by Marxism have noted the importance of
recognising a central guiding force within society that brings it together and helps in
identifying its objectives. Thus, the different components of society can be seen to be
different social classes and the hegemony and domination by a ruling class over society and
state defines the dynamics between the two. The struggles within society are thus seen to be
class struggles where the dominant class and other classes pull in different directions. The
liberal standpoint is somewhat similar: in their view social struggles occurring as a result of
plural interests. They envisage a rather limited view of the state and presuppose a hegemonic
domination of one class/interest over the others. For them, the contest is always over the
resources that the state has at its disposal and the determination of ‘who will get what’ (Migdal
ibid: 18). Unified social classes, however, seldom exist at all times. In EP Thompson’s view,
they exist only in a historical context at a given place and time. Liberal theorists feel that the
battles over the distribution of authority have not always produced dominance for specific rules of competition. The struggles in societies have often been over who establishes procedures rather than competition on the course of public policy within an overarching legitimate framework for all of society (Migdal, *ibid*: 22). Such claims are substantiated by examples from various countries, notably that from India where the granting of privileges to the historically deprived sections of society in government branches has produced new alignments that create pressures of a different kind on the state. This has led to the perpetuation of what Migdal calls a 'fragmented politics' and has done little to provide a long-term solution to the management of conflict within a democratic system. Viewed in this light, Migdal identifies social forces as representing powerful mechanisms for associative behaviour. They encompass both formal and informal organisations and can even be social movements (including those that are ideologically motivated). They do not function in a social vacuum: they are in fact propelled into motion in a society that is vibrant and has competing social groups. Social groups engage one another over various issues, material, symbolic, even moral, including that of supremacy. Various social forces endeavour to impose themselves in an arena in order to prescribe to others their goals and their answers to these related questions. It is interesting to note that social forces seldom function independently: they are constantly on the lookout for allies; they form coalitions and accept accommodations. In such dealings, the aims and goals of these social forces is also continuously transformed\(^1\) and expanded. Since power and influence guide social forces into action, they attempt to appropriate the resources and symbols at hand to further their goals. The stakes involved are pretty high since they

\(^1\) Migdal notes three dimensions in which social forces expand their domination and control: first, within an arena, social forces can dominate in an increasing number of issue areas, from dictating to where crops grow, through providing credit, to defining the nature of salvation. Second, arenas themselves can grow to incorporate a larger share of the population and a larger territory. Third, a social force can use the resources it garners in any one arena to dominate the other arenas, with different sets of social forces. Chiefs in some countries of postcolonial Africa, used their command in tribal territories to catapult themselves into national questions such a issues of family planning (Migdal 1994: 22).
concern vast human, material and natural resources, physical arena, beliefs and value systems that determine social groupings.

It is in the context of state society relations that the question of whether a state can truly be autonomous becomes important to address. Very often, transformative strategies pursued by the state might not be reflective of the needs or goals of the social forces and might even face resistance and opposition from them. Similarly, the basic needs for states to maintain control and order may spur state-initiated reforms, as well as simple repression (Skocpol, 1985: 10). In Trimberger’s view, a state or part of its bureaucratic apparatus may be considered to be autonomous when those who occupy high civil or military office fulfil two conditions: (1) they are not recruited from the dominant landed, commercial or industrial classes; and (2) they do not form close personal and economic ties with those classes after elevation to high office (c.f. Skocpol, *ibid*). Trimberger also examines the relationship of state’s elite with the dominant economic classes in order to predict the extensiveness of socio-economic changes a state may attempt when faced with a crisis situation, i.e. when the existing political, social and economic order is threatened by revolution from below. He holds that state initiated authoritarian changes may occur when the members of the bureaucracy retain ties with the dominant economic classes. However, the more sweeping reforms occur when the bureaucratic elite is free of these ties. This he terms ‘revolution from above’ and maintains that this might also lead to the dispossession of a dominant class. In Nordlinger’s view, the distinction between state and society ‘enables us to assess the impact of the state upon public policy independently of the constraints and supports of societal actors, and thereby allow a case to be made for its
autonomy. State autonomy thus becomes a function of how its policies conform to the 'resource-weighted preferences' of the public officials. Public officials have at least as much independent impact or explanatory importance as any and all private actors in accounting for the public policies of the democratic state. The democratic state is regularly, though by no means entirely, autonomous in translating its preferences into authoritative actions, and markedly autonomous in often doing so even when they diverge from societal preferences.

State autonomy is operationally defined in terms of the overall frequency with which state preferences coincide with authoritative actions and inactions, the proportion of preferences that do so, the average substantive distance between state preferences and authoritative actions, or sometimes a combination of the three (Nordlinger, 1981: 20). In so far as the state is able to resist the pressures exerted to it from society, it is considered autonomous and hence, strong. Stephen D Krasner (c.f. Nordlinger, 1981) suggests a three part continuum in analysing the power of the state vis-à-vis domestic society: the state is able to resist societal

2 Nordlinger's (1981: 7) state-centred model is based on the following six proponents:
1. Among the panoply of state preferences many converge with, many are compatible with, and many diverge from societal preferences.
2. When state and societal preferences do not diverge, public officials invariably translate their own preferences into authoritative actions, and their preferences have at least as much explanatory importance as societal preferences.
3. When state and societal preferences do not diverge, public officials periodically capitalise upon their autonomy-enhancing capacities and opportunities to reinforce societal convergence, deference, and indifference so as to forestall the emergence of preferences that diverge from the state's.
4. When state and societal preferences diverge, public officials periodically capitalise upon their autonomy-enhancing capacities and opportunities to bring about a shift in societal preferences and/or the alignment of societal resources in order to make for non divergent preferences, and they then translate their own preferences into authoritative actions.
5. When state and societal preferences diverge, public officials periodically capitalise upon their autonomy-enhancing capacities and opportunities to free themselves from societal constraints, and they then translate their preferences into authoritative actions.
6. When state and societal preferences diverge, public officials periodically rely upon the inherent powers of the state to translate their preferences into authoritative actions.
pressures, but unable to change the behaviour of private actors; the state is able to resist societal pressures and change private behaviour but is unable to change the social and economic structure; the state is able to resist private pressure, change private behaviour and change the social and economic structure.

With changing political and economic equations, lobbying by different social forces, voting blocs and business groups, it is difficult for the state to continually project itself as being entirely autonomous. Indeed, very often pulls and pressures exerted from various directions do have the desired effect, the state does however manage to legislate reforms that have long lasting impact in affecting socio-economic change. Skocpol holds that the state can never be ‘disinterested’ in any meaningful sense. This is true not only because all state policies might not work to the benefit of all sections at all times but also because these also ensure the authority, political longevity and social control of the state organisations (Skocpol, *ibid*: 15).

*State Society Interactions*

To assume that state society interactions are usually based on contest and conflict would not entirely present an accurate picture: the meeting grounds between the two differ with time and situation. Also, these interactions are not random or intermittent: they occur almost every day and result in different outcomes. States do exercise social control3, but this too varies. Eric Nordlinger sees the state as comprising individuals and holds that the engagements between state and society are those over preferences. In so far as the state consists of officials, state preferences, consequently suggest unity of the same. He warns that this indeed is not always

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3 For Migdal, social control is the currency over which organisations in an environment of conflict battle with one another. This battle is manifested in the way people are mobilised and public opinion garnered which determines the strength of these organisations (Migdal 1988: 32).
the case and these preferences are often the outcome of conflict, competition, and pulling and hauling (Nordlinger, *ibid*: 15). Migdal notes three levels at which social control can be observed: the first is compliance; this occurs at the most elementary level, when the state attempts to obtain conformity by using the most basic of all available sanctions: force. At another level, leaders of state organisation seek more than compliance; they seek to secure their position by ensuring that more and more people are involved in implementing state projects and policies. Participation thus forms the second level at which social control is exercised. Finally, more than either compliance or participation is acknowledgement of the state's authority as uncontested and given. This is reflected in the need for the state leadership to warrant legitimacy of its organisation and their policies. Legitimacy includes 'the acceptance of the state's symbolic configuration within which rewards and sanctions are packaged. It indicates people's approval of the state's desired social order through the acceptance of the state's myths' (Migdal, 1988: 33). Needless to say, the extent to which the state receives compliance, participation and legitimacy determines the level of social control it wields in a given social and political environment. This does not necessarily imply that the state is the only organisation that seeks to exercise social control: leaders of other social organisations are also active players and act as checks and balances in ensuring that the state does not become too authoritarian. Very often, they also resort to similar modes of compliance, participation and legitimacy to strengthen their enclaves.

Seeing that leaders of both realms: state and society seek similar objectives i.e., the legitimisation of their avowed objectives; and proceed to achieve the same through similar means i.e., mobilising constituencies in their favour, relations between the two range from conflict to contestation and even at times co-operation. States and social forces, according to
Migdal are both mutually empowering and transforming. In the multiple meeting grounds between state and social forces, Migdal notes four ideal outcomes that can occur. The model proposed by Migdal assumes the struggle for domination between the two; however, the possibility of co-operation is not entirely ruled out. Also, since ideal situations are hard to come by, what is presented should be seen as a continuum on which state-society relations can be mapped.

The first outcome is total transformation. This is seen when state penetration leads to destruction, co-optation, or subjugation of local social forces and to the state's domination. This affects the manner in which people perceive their identity and can be achieved through forced migration, replacement of locals by a settler population, the use of violence and so on. Total transformation necessarily entails severe social dislocation, i.e. Tibet.

The state can also attempt to incorporate existing social forces. Herein, the state might introduce new social organisation, resources, symbols and force and seek to oust ones that already exist in order to achieve a new pattern of domination. However, this might also result in changes within state components as well thereby altering the state's overall coherence: its ability to reallocate resources, establish legitimacy and achieve integrated domination.

A third outcome of state-society interaction is the incorporation of the state by existing social forces. Here, the presence of the state's components initiates adaptation by dominating social forces but does not produce radical changes in the pattern of domination. It is also possible that in the tussle for achieving domination, the non-state forces might stand to gain, leading to outcomes that were not envisaged by the state leadership. Moreover, the dominating social
forces might appropriate the organisation and symbols of the state’s components. In this scenario, the transformation of the local components of the state is so extensive as to significantly harm the state’s overall chances of achieving integrated domination.

Finally, the state might fail altogether in its attempt at penetration. This occurs when disengagement or lack of engagement by the state in the local arena results in little or no transformation of society and vice versa. This failure also affects the overall working of the state and thus integrated domination.

The interactions between state and social forces in fact serve to define the limits of state power and authority thereby ensuring that the state does not become absolute. States across the globe have had to face different obstacles in ensuring their domination. In the third world, in particular, the state has had to contend with being one among many organisations within the boundaries where it seeks to rule, for instance in Bangladesh where the state is only one of the many organisations (Gramin Bank, World Bank, the UN) that looks after the needs of the citizens. The struggles resulting therein have led in many cases to the survival of ‘weblike societies’ with social control ‘dispersed among various social organisations having their own rule rather than centralised in the state or organisations authorised by the state’ (Migdal, 1988: 40).

_Civil Society_

In analysing state society interactions, a common assumption made is that both forces aim for ‘integrated domination’. Although the concept of civil society has been used by liberals and Marxists alike; scholars agree that a definition of what constitutes civil society ‘remains elusive’
(Sharma, 1999: 4). Marx accords civil society great importance and omnipotence: 'civil society embraces all material relations of individuals within a definite stage of development of productive forces. It embraces the whole commercial and industrial life of a given stage and, hence, transcends the State and the nation, though, on the other hand again, it must assert itself in its foreign relations as nationality and inwardly must organise itself as a state (The German Ideology in Selected Works, vol. 1, pp 38-76)

For Gramsci, Civil Society does not belong to the structural but to the superstructural sphere. According to him, the superstructure consists of two levels: the civil society, which is an ensemble of organisms commonly, called 'private' and that of political society or the State. These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of 'hegemony' which the dominant group exercises over the other through society and on the other hand to that of 'direct domination' or rule exercised through the state and the juridical government (Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. & translated by Q Hoare & G Nowell Smith, London, 1971).

Civil Society can be said to consist of all non-state actors including mass media of communication i.e., the radio, TV, press and films as long as they are free of governmental control; educational institutions including crèches, schools, universities, museums, libraries and monuments; interest groups such as trade unions and chambers of commerce; churches and other religious bodies; organised leisure and free time activities such as sports groups, clubs, neighbourhood organisations and so on. There is no agreement among theorists as to whether political parties and economic groups also form part of civil society. According to Gellner: Civil Society is that set of diverse non-governmental institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the state and, while not preventing the state from fulfilling the role
of keeper of peace and arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless prevent it from dominating and atomising the rest of society (Gellner, 1994: 5).

Scholars have contended with more than the content and composition of Civil Society: they have analysed the emergence of civil society in the public realm as a result of the historical processes of modernisation. These processes facilitated the growth of autonomous social spheres, which ‘function according to distinct rationalities in the pursuit of commensurable goals not reducible to a single overarching standard of utility,’ (Cohen and Arato in Scheter, 2000: 5). Despite the apparent watertight compartments into which the components of civil society can be confined, there is co-operation and mediation among them. However, Elitists like Mosca, Pareto and Schumpeter have highlighted the gulf that exists between civil society and the political class and maintained that this will always remain unbridgeable. They are sceptical about parliamentary elections which they feel are more likely to resemble symbolic and populist plebiscites rather than anything reflective of the ‘general will’. Since at a given time, only a few people can actually participate in governance due to the limited number of public offices available, theorists argue that the civil society is instrumental in sustaining democracy. This responsibility can be performed by encouraging public criticism, democratic accountability of power and participation. Civil Society thus works as a safeguard against state tyranny and protects liberty. State and civil society are mutually reinforcing even when differences prevail among them. Conflicts might exist on particular issues, but there is an implicit agreement that prevails between the two, allowing the state to rule without challenge.

Migdal views Civil Society to consist of various social forces that pull Civil Society in different directions. He thus maintains as with state structures, in Civil Society also, there is never any
agreement leading to a ‘hegemony of fundamental ideas’ (Migdal, 1994: 29). He criticises the general view that Civil Society consists only of interest groups and voluntary associations that tend to create a ‘harmonious consensus in society’. In fact this view ignores cases of dispersed domination. Society and Civil Society should not be seen as synonymous: there exist dispersed struggles that affect the state profoundly. These struggles address the state in their own way and strive to make their own rules and institute their own moral order. Many contemporary societies have contained elements that have struggled against the state over its claim to be the supreme authority within society. In the course of these struggles, they have also pitted themselves against elements that are said to constitute civil society. In the process, they have sought to transform the state or appropriate it for their own purposes. In Migdal’s view, these struggles should not be looked at in an isolated fashion since in their interactions with state forces (and also with civil society) they succeed in affecting accommodations within the system. A democratic state is in fact known for the adjustments that it permits due to its struggles and the autonomy granted to society is a product of the multiple meeting grounds between the state and society. The domination of the state does not occur by default; instead it is a result of these contests, contests that alter both state and social forces.

In plural third world societies, the state takes on the role of ensuring development and welfare, redefining the notions of power and society in the modern age. Kothari points out that there have been three critical shifts in this direction: first, there emerged a territorial ‘centre’ in each major juridical-political entity around which identities were built, with which political affiliations (of various ‘peripheries’ and ‘sub-centres’) were structured, and which became the primary source of legitimacy. Second, the new state centre became the spokesman of the emergent political form everywhere, namely the nation, defining both its internal and its
external boundaries. Third, as the state centre began to extend towards the peripheries and lives of the people in an attempt to deal with economic and social affairs and to 'manage' diverse forms of conflict, there emerged the phenomenon of mass society with its inherent tendency towards homogenisation and standardisation. In turn this led to a continuing expansion in the function of the state and paved the way for its increasingly managerial and bureaucratic as well as merchantilist and welfare orientations (Kothari, 2001: 102-103).

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Development and Democracy

A study of the nature of state at any point in the history of Political Science has not been divorced from analysing the importance and feasibility of democracy. Viewed as a means devised by the state to expand its legitimacy by extending franchise to all, democracy was often dubbed as the most perverse form of government. However, democracy does entail inclusion and increased participation, marking thereby a move from state forms that were exclusive in nature to those that were all encompassing. Indeed, it has been argued that the study of liberal democracy has prioritised the study of liberalism over that of democracy, implying that the latter cannot be sustained without the former. Seen also primarily as a state form, the existence of democracy is presumed to exist only in certain economic systems. A popular example to illustrate this point is the democratic transition of Eastern Europe that

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4 The method of expanding franchise to include people who had hitherto been excluded from exercising this right is a common practise adopted by a given regime in a democratic state that fears its ouster in an election. A populist measure, in recent times, the reduction of voting age from 21 to 18 in 1989 in India was successful in garnering votes for the Congress (I) that feared suffering reverses at the hands of the electorate. Arguably, the rationale cited for this move was the increasing awareness and voter maturity of the concerned age group.

5 Bhikhu Parekh(1993) opines that the theory of liberal democracy has suffered from the limitation of interpreting democracy primarily as a regime form of the state or a principle of representative government, rather than as a way of constituting society.
resulted in a corresponding transition from a command to a market economy. Seen in a broader view, democracy is a 'self-appraisive concept' that encompasses formal democratic procedures and institutions on the one hand and a 'critical-evaluative aspect' that underpins claims for a more participatory and substantive form of democracy which would be manifest in the consequences of a democratic process rather than solely its procedures (Jayal, 1999: 22).

Seen in this light, the notion of democracy encompasses related concepts of justice, equality, rights and freedom. Added to these is the notion of citizenship that enables the realisation of these concepts. It is important to note that just as the relation between state and society can be seen to be mutually reinforcing, similarly, democracy can only be sustained in a state where the Civil Society or social forces are highly developed and responsive. Similarly, a weak state cannot ensure vibrant democratic structures since it will always be subject to pressures from various social forces, thereby compromising on principles of justice, equality, freedom and so on. Democracy is an ideal most states hope to achieve as it entails the development of personal freedoms, the improvement of social life, the preservation and expression of diversity and the representation of varied opinion/s. However, both state and society, as much as they can preserve and promote democracy, can prove to endanger the same. Jayal notes six ways, three external and three internal, in which the state can work to influence the erosion of democracy within their sphere of influence. The external factors consist firstly in the struggle between state and society to bring into the public sphere issues that have thus far been considered private. Negotiations between the state and society on such issues have worked to redefine the realms of state intervention and the extent to which it is possible and permissible. These have ranged from issues regarding contraception, abortion, reproductive rights, divorce laws to property and inheritance. The state is also dependent on the process of capital accumulation for 'efficient and optimal extraction of revenue'. In addition, state personnel are
also dependent on capital for financing elections of the political elite and to even bribe the
state officials. Finally, democracy is also inhibited by the insufficient development and decline
of political parties. The three internal factors inhibiting democratisation consist of the
increasing concentration of power in the executive branch of the government. Added to this,
the fusion of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary leads to increasing centralisation
thereby inhibiting democratisation. Jayal notes that the expansion of law and order machinery
within a state has also entailed a contraction of its welfarist functions. The rolling back of such
commitments has been marked by a corresponding increase in outlays on surveillance and
policing mechanisms (Jayal, ibid: 23-24).

Society too, on its part can inhibit democratic process in two ways: firstly in perpetuating
unequal social relations and second, by the logic of democracy itself (Jayal, ibid: 25). Unequal
relations within society of caste, gender and race work in tandem with the democratic project
that aims at ensuring equality, hindering thereby the representation of the weaker sections of
society. This leads to unequal distribution of resources within society that further explains the
'logic of democracy'. Although channels of participation are created, this limits their targets
and controls their impact. According to Kaviraj, there exists an incompatibility between the
institutional logic of democratic forces and the logic of popular mobilisation that the
realisation of one part of the democratic ideal automatically undermines the other (Kaviraj
1991, Jayal 1999). This is amply illustrated in the political mobilisation of the backward castes.

Undermining democracy results in the long run to 'effective disenfranchisement of large
sections of the citizenry' defeating thereby the democratic project of inclusion and
participation. In Jayal's view, citizenship can be undermined in two ways: the first is the
absence of the public enforcement of a universalistic legal order. This results in a failure on the part of the state apparatus to protect citizens or to ensure the enforceability of their constitutionally guaranteed rights. The second way in which citizenship is undermined is the absence of social conditions that facilitate the exercise of the same. Thus, the presence of sharp economic disparities and social inequalities contribute to hinder public participation. On the other hand, the presence of welfare measures such as public health and education might contribute to producing an informed and enlightened citizenry, capable of exercising their franchise intelligently and also bringing their representatives to book (Jayal, 1999: 26-27).

An interventionist democratic state in a multicultural polity that takes up the responsibility of fulfilling development and welfare for its citizens who are largely backward, rural and illiterate cannot fulfil its mission adequately without compromising on one of the two ideals it seeks to establish: democracy and development. This is not to suggest that the two goals work to undermine one another, what is implied is that there are constant negotiations between state and social forces that lead to a perpetual flux delaying thereby both real democracy and development. The State as the vehicle for development, allocates resources in order to ensure

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6 Sorensen (1993) provides economic and political reasons to argue that democracy impedes as well as promotes economic development. On the economic front, democracy impedes economic development since it is unable to reduce consumption in favour of demand. On the other hand, development is promoted since investment in basic human needs is encouraged in a democracy. On the political front, democracy increases the pressure on weak institutions and weakens the state as concerted state action becomes difficult. Thus, economic development is also affected. However, it provides a stable political environment and the basis for economic pluralism and maintains legitimacy, both of which are essential for economic development.

7 Development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom, writes Amartya Sen (1999: 3-4): poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivations, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or overactivity of repressive states. He adds further that despite unprecedented increase in overall opulence, the contemporary world denies elementary freedoms to vast numbers – perhaps even the majority – of people. Sometimes the lack of substantive freedoms relates directly to economic poverty, which robs people of the freedom to satisfy hunger, or to achieve sufficient nutrition, or to obtain remedies for treatable illnesses, or the opportunity to be adequately clothed and sheltered, or to enjoy clean water or sanitary facilities. In other cases, the
that the weaker sections receive their share. The developmental in the developing world has encompassed two components: comparative and evaluative. The yardstick for development and the models adopted therein have almost always been borrowed from the West. In addition, the goals sought to be achieved have been somewhat unrealistic since they have aimed to bring about radical economic growth. Developmental projects also aim mainly at enhancing capital assets at the expense of the social. This is amply reflected in the Indian context, where issues of health, environment and education received comparatively less importance in the planning process than heavy industry, transport and agriculture. Further, as will be seen in the next section, heavy political concessions had to be made in order to ensure development: the emergency, that curbed political liberty of the people and the media as well as the economy well illustrates the point. In addition, developmental projects in these countries tend to be governed by populism and political exigency rather than ground socio-economic realities. This is evidenced in the fusion of welfarist and developmental programmes that aim at killing two birds with one stone. The Food for Work Programme in India for instance, aimed at resolving three problems simultaneously: unemployment, hunger and development. Interestingly the West continues to contribute in influencing priorities and changing conceptions of development. The shift from development implying purely economic

unfreedom links closely to the lack of public facilities and social care, such as the absence of epidemiological programmes, or of organised arrangements for health care or educational facilities, or of effective institutions for the maintenance of local peace and order. In still other cases, the violation of freedom results directly from a denial of political and civil liberties by authoritarian regimes and from imposed restrictions on the freedom to participate in the social, political and economic life of the community.

8 The Petit Robert Dictionary (1987) defines a developing country or region as an economy that has not yet reached the level of North America Western Europe etc.

9 Not only have developmental models been inspired by the West, but also the culture of conspicuous consumption that follows 'economic growth'. The success of developmental projects has encouraged populations in Third World countries to spend their natural resources wastefully on items that are not essential to human existence leading to problems of sustainability. Redclift adds, 'Underdevelopment is not just an effect of capital's rapaciousness; it is an effect of our consumption habits and the technologies used to feed these habits (Redclift, 1984: 17).
growth to encompassing all spheres of human life: health, nutrition, population, demography, literacy and the move towards sustainability which implies democracy from below is a product of similar initiative from the West.

State, Society and Development in India

At the time of independence, the leaders were faced with the mammoth task of governing a country that was not only greatly impoverished (from the excesses of colonial rule, or as the popular nationalistic critique maintained, from a gravely backward mode of production that allowed a superior colonial power to dominate) but also high levels of illiteracy, high birth rate, ignorance, disease and social oppression. Given the situation, Nehru maintained that the fundamental task of the new political leadership would be to "build the noble mansion of free India where all her children may dwell and prosper." Thus, a democratic polity was envisaged that would not only stand apart from a plural society, but would also maintain neutrality if called upon to act as a mediator in the conflicts that emerged within various social forces. As a vehicle ushering social change, the Indian State emphasised on its autonomy by undertaking projects of a social and developmental nature. In addition, the state took on the project of economic reconstruction, redistribution and welfare simultaneously. As compared to the West, where these roles were taken up by the state at various historical junctures, the nationalistic elite took these on in order to guide the post colonial state in a manner that would avoid the 'painful vicissitudes of capitalism and socialism' (Sharma, 2000: 1). This expanded role of the state was made easier by the fact that the nationalistic elite built on the 'inherited structures of the supervisory state, superimposing on it elements borrowed from the West' (Jayal, 1999: 20). In addition, the nationalistic bourgeoisie was aided in the sphere of industry by the state: the model of a mixed economy allowed the public and the private
sectors to flourish. Also, the state kept within its control the key sectors of iron and steel, transport and so on. Influenced by the Soviet model of the command economy, the state also initiated plans stating goals for economic and human development. These goals clearly portrayed the priorities of the state: to reduce poverty through rapid economic growth (Sharma, op cit.). The role of the state thus envisaged was that of a strong unitary one within a federal polity. In its multifarious functions that ranged from democratic governance to development, the state permeated every section of society. Added to this, the Indian state was for the first two decades after independence, sheltered from any political upheaval from within. The hegemony of the Congress as the unchallenged political party ensured least opposition to any developmental plan.

However, over the past five decades, the state has been critiqued both for failing to usher in development\footnote{It is worth noting that development in India is accepted as a legitimate activity promoted by the state. Yet, as Rangan (2000) aptly notes, its complex meanings, values and benefits are constantly negotiated and contested in the public realm so much so that political parties seeking power have ‘found it necessary to employ the language of development to mobilise support among the country’s vast rural constituencies’. Also, the discourse of development carries with it a broader symbolism of social justice and economic well being, often condensing with it the conceptually rigid boundaries between state, markets and civil society.} in the real sense of the word and for not being as neutral and impartial as it projected itself to be. The model of a mixed economy necessitated the increased participation of the state on an equal footing with the private sector, allowing elites to lobby and influence state policies. The involvement of the state in every sphere ensured that it would be reproduced and would permeate through every region within its political realm, but its ‘instrumental hegemonic trajectory and omnipresence have not rendered it omnipotent’. Sharma notes that the state has become increasingly attenuated and segmented with its reach and capacities severely constricted (Sharma, ibid: 6). Part of this reason could lie in the nature
of newly independent postcolonial states. Faced with the problem of securing their legitimacy as well as the need to ensure stable economic growth, these states take on too many developmental challenges that they are not always equipped to meet. Scholars have noted that the 'Indian state's inability to escape from its more unpropitious historical legacies undermined efficacious state building'. In addition, overcentralisation resulted in 'feeble political institutionalisation' leading to the emergence of a 'soft' democratic state (Sharma, *ibid*.). Dominant castes and classes were able to capture and co-opt the state, undermining its reformist and redistributive capabilities requiring the state to make constant alignments and negotiations. Bardhan (1984) has argued that the Indian state serves the interests of three dominant proprietary classes: industrial capitalists, rich farmers and professional bureaucrats. The industrial capitalists have benefited from the government's import substitution policies, industrial licensing system and restrictions on foreign investment. Rich farmers have profited from agricultural subsidies in the form of electric power, irrigation, fuel and fertilisers, and subsidised credit. The bureaucratic elite that was envisaged to be impartial has emerged as the third dominant proprietary class through the accumulation of power and income through its control over an elaborate system of patronage and rent seeking. In Bardhan's view, despite the competing interests of all three classes, neither is able to oust the other/s since they are not individually powerful enough to impose their will upon India's economy and polity and they all benefit from state subsidies. Bardhan holds the alliance between these classes as responsible in adversely affecting developmental plans of the country since these classes have perpetuated a network of subsidies and patronage undermining thereby, the state's resources for development and welfare. He argues further, that this process has contributed to a deceleration in public revenue and capital formation as well as eroded the state's capability to meet even the most basic and fundamental developmental needs. He holds the elite
dominated democratic polity to be at the root of India's backwardness and adds that the accommodations between them contribute to institutionalising their power and privileges. Thus while India's democratic regime has 'served as an arena for conflict resolution and provided a resilient mechanism for relatively stable governance, it has nevertheless also found it difficult to muster the political autonomy necessary to pursue its reformist and distributive agenda' (Sharma, *ibid*).

Analysing the role of what he identifies as civil society in India, SD Sharma maintains that despite its empowerment it has failed to perform its progressive mission of being the guarantor of public accountability and civil probity. Civil society in his view is deeply fragmented and the high levels of political mobilisation in the absence of a strong and responsive state and political parties have only served to fragment rather than unite society. The weak political institutions of the country have only served to deepen socio-economic and political cleavages within society and efforts by NGOs and other voluntary organisations to build durable and representative institutions that can unite society have not been successful. The existence of deep primordial links of caste, community, kinship and so on combined with weak political institutions have 'worked in tandem to undermine the ability of state and civil-society to act as constituent parts of a common civic realm or public sphere' (Sharma, *ibid*: 9).

Needless to say, the weakness of political institutions is reflected in the democratic structure of the country. Most of the developmental plans of the state are aimed at ameliorating the conditions of the 'weaker sections of society'. However, the failure of the state to adequately do so has been the focus of much study. The Rudolphs (1987) opine that the capacity and autonomy of the Indian state has not declined due to the class alliance as propounded by
Bardhan, instead, it is the result of the wasting of political assets and from the dismantling of Congress Party institutions by self serving and unscrupulous leaders. The Rudolphs feel that the situation can be resolved by rebuilding the legitimacy and effectiveness of the democratic state. They thus recommend the introduction of principled politics by rebuilding institutional and political structures along the lines of the Nehruvian state. They emphasise this point by adding that only a party that permeates the grassroots, based on liberal democratic norms and procedures of governance and accommodating the political and economic aspirations of all sections can provide stability, the prerequisite for development.

For Kohli (1990), state autonomy vis-à-vis society is dependent upon the ideological orientation of the leadership, the organisation of state power or ‘regime types’ and the composition and structural relationship between the state and dominant classes. As these variables are continuous and vary in degree so does the capacity of political authorities to define and implement state goals. The final analysis of state capacity and autonomy however, lies in the type of regime wielding state power. In India, the nationalist democratic regime that took over power upon independence was too closely tied to the dominant classes and did not

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11 The Rudolphs assess the economic development and performance of the state according to the regime type. They have developed four models of regime types and polity to analyse 35 years of state performance politically and economically. The regime types are distinguished as being authoritarian and democratic and the economic models pursued are command polity and demand polity. Whereas a demand polity is characterised by the expression of organised interests of classes and interest groups, these tend to be short term, even at times myopic. Further, competition within a demand polity is intensified since there are competing demands for the allocation of resources. In a command polity on the other hand, the state determines long-term goals for development and public interest is the guiding force. Further, the ends of the state are calculated to fulfil long-term goals and are not subject to incremental change. Based on these regime and polity types the combinations thus arrived are: democratic regime / command polity (1956-7 to 1965-6), democratic regime / demand polity (1966-7 to 1975-5), authoritarian regime / command polity (1975 to 1977) and democratic regime / demand polity (1977 to 1980). They conclude that there is no consistent time-bound association between type of regime and economic performance. They admit that although performance did improve under an authoritarian government led by Mrs Gandhi during the emergency, the increasing mobilisation of various sections of society has also contributed significantly to poor economic performance in democratic regimes.
have the organisational capabilities to ‘tame’ powerful propertied interests. The goal of independence having been achieved, politics became dominated by interest groups competing for resources. He dubs the problem in India’s democracy a crisis of governability which emerges from the personal rule replacing party rule at all levels. In addition, he notes increasing politicisation of civil and police forces. Further, the erosion of a dominant political party has led to a plethora of demands and interests that cannot always be catered to. Weak political institutions are incapable of sustaining demands and meeting with challenges adequately. The problem also lies in the leadership that in his opinion is incapable of initiating meaningful change. He feels that the democratic structure of the country was not allowed to develop to its fullest because the process of democratisation was top-down. In addition, Mrs Gandhi’s regime did all it could to curb dissent in the process undermining democratic structure and processes. To add to the political turmoil, the mobilisation of formerly weak socio-economic groups has brought them into the political arena in a manner such that the limited capacity of the state for the redistribution of wealth is constantly renegotiated. The constant demand for increasing seats in government offices for the backward classes has increased insecurities among the forward castes that have appropriated the agenda for political mobilisation. In addition, several leaders have also appropriated primordial identities of ethnicity, language, geography and so on to sustain their political survival. The crisis can be resolved in Kohli’s opinion by reconciling the fact that a cohesive one-party system is not possible given the diversity of the country. Again, charismatic leadership does little to sustain developmental programmes; instead, it seeks its own survival by curbing political and democratic institutions. In his opinion, grass root parties with clearly identifiable goals, objectives and programmes should be encouraged that can reflect the real needs of the people and initiate development.
The view that 'there is a deep-seated elitism... in conceptions of political economy that does not systematically integrate the lowest levels of the political system... (therefore) denying agency to the subaltern' has been noted by Akhil Gupta (1989). According to Sharma, this holds true for India where the state is far from strong and autonomous but is imperfectly consolidated, weak and retreating. A preoccupation with the upper rungs of the state structure therefore might project an incorrect picture of the real situation at the ground.

The importance of elites in the process of redistribution of income, wealth and status has not been totally uncontested. In fact, the Indian state is subject to pressures from various sections: social and ethnic groups, interest groups and social classes. These pressures have also served to undermine the centralising nature of India's democratic polity. In Jayal's view, there are three counterweights to the centralisation of power: the decline of the Congress Party from its pre-eminent position and the subsequent federalisation of the polity; the growth of Panchayati Raj Institutions and the decentralisation of power and authority and finally, the emergence of environmental and other movements protesting against the dominant strategy of development (Jayal, 2001: 30-32). These developments indicate 'tremendous increase in political participation and contestation, measured not only by voter turnout and formal political competition, but also by the various social movements that have drawn in large numbers of the dispossessed and marginalized social groups'... indicating that 'democracy has firmly taken hold of the political imagination' (Jayal: *ibid*).
At this point, a discussion on the nature of new social movements in India would not be out of place. In Rajendra Singh’s view the cause of the rise of New Social Movements lies in the ‘relatively permanent, generally inevitable and stubborn social structural contradictions and conflicts in the make up of society (Singh, 2001:23). The expansion of the state and the market into realms occupied by the civil society, has also led to the emergence of these social movements. Social movements are therefore, attempts by the society to renegotiate the spaces that have been encroached upon by the state and the market, a resistance that involves questions and conflicts over rights and ‘claims to the share of the people on the resources of the state on the one hand, and on the other, by their growing awareness to collectively contest, compete and even enter into conflict and confrontation, even the use of violence against the state or against any other adversary collectivity’ (Singh, ibid: 192-193). Indian society, he goes on to add, is a diverse mix of social forces. Singh identifies the modern state to be influenced and dominated by sections of the rich, the neo-rich, both products of the urban-industrial capitalist forces; the political class and bureaucracy, products of the post-colonial political and administrative processes; and a substantial section of the emerging rural rich. Beneath these sections, he adds further, are ‘the faces of the poor, the unemployed or underemployed bulk of rural tribal collectivities’ (Singh, ibid: 194). In India, these New Social Movements have not

12 The newness of these social movements can be seen in three spheres: in the first place, these movements are situated in sites that go beyond traditional notions of the workplace. In resisting the increased influence of the state and market over human autonomy and freedom, they question the interference of these institutions in the private domain. Secondly, they are far removed from the Marxist paradigm of explaining all conflict in terms of ‘class’ relations and the resultant conflict between them. In viewing conflicts as existing apart from class and within wider realms such as gender, environment, race and so on, they collapse the class paradigm. Being above any considerations of class, most New Social Movements also do not seek to alter the existing power structure, nor do they aspire for state power (there have been some exceptions, such as the Green Party in Germany). These movements are restricted to the grassroots and the issues they address are primarily local. In accepting the state structure as given, these movements further, also accept the market as an unchallenged given. They are merely a reaction to the increased interference of the two structures. Finally, New Social Movements, unlike classical movements, have plurality of pursuits and purposes, goals and orientations and have a heterogeneous social base.
always been led by the deprived sections of society: they find leadership and support in a form of ‘conscience collectivity’ which Singh terms a new social formation. These conscience collectivities consist of professionals, educated men and women who rebel against the materialism of the dominant sections resulting from uncontrolled industrialisation and market economy (Singh, *ibid*: 195). Although this section has had much to gain from the welfarist order brought about by the democratic-social planning, they seek to ‘mediate, moderate and fight’ between the state and the civil society for the establishment of a ‘new social order’ that is characterised by post-material, equalitarian and humanistic contents (Singh, *ibid*). Such an order would take into consideration the requirements of nature, environment and ecology and would transcend confines of class, caste, ethnicity and race, ushering real equality.

Providing a critique of the developmental model adopted by the Indian state, Pramod Parajuli views both the developed and the developing worlds as constituting their own First and Third Worlds. By using this metaphor of Third World as existing in both developed and developing nations, he highlights the existence of a class of indigenous people that is dispossessed by the current agenda of development. The difference between First and the Third world he argues is not only that of domination, dispossession and suppression by one of the other, but also that of ideology. For the marginalized, dispossessed Third World also possesses its own knowledge and value system. At another level, he argues, it is the imposition of a singular ideology of development over the rest of the world, undermining traditional knowledge systems. Using the colonial backdrop to explain the adoption of the developmental model in the Third World Parajuli goes on to add that couched in the benevolent, welfarist, democratic idiom, the state in the Third World in fact perpetuates the capitalist economic system and subordinates women, dalits and tribals. By claiming to be the sole guardian of the interests of the
dispossessed and the marginalized, the state also ensures that each ‘social entity is defined by the state and ordered in relation to the state’ (Parajuli, 1991). As the official guardian of the development of these groups, the state thus denies them any ‘creative alternative’. Parajuli sees state reaction to the emergence of new social movements by way of its co-optation of the movement. This method is a manner of addressing the problems of the affected section within the current developmental paradigm. Critiquing the reductionist approach of the developmental logic, he goes on to add that social movements do not seek to ameliorate the conditions of the dispossessed by seeking funds so that ‘women catch up with men’ or the fact that apportioning funds towards a certain section implies consequent treatment of a malaise that affects society. Instead, these social movements provide a critique not only of development¹³ (by providing alternatives to the same that need not necessarily be co-terminus with the mainstream world view) but also of democracy (that transcends the political and economic and encompasses the personal, ethnic and cultural). Since social movements have several core centres, they imply decentralisation within the democratic system. Democracy is understood as being not only representative, but also participatory and consultative. By thus expanding the notion of the public to a realm that was once considered private, these social movements have sought to redefine prevailing notions of power and restructure ‘the state so that it can be accommodated within the civil-society’ (Parajuli, ibid). Further, social movements show the path of evolving a ‘distinctive knowledge system’ that can represent the ‘experiences of subaltern groups by producing alternate ways of producing and validating knowledge’.

¹³ In the same vein, Rangan (2000) argues that the far-reaching scope of developmental policies of the Indian state in addition to the obliteration of boundaries of civil society, market and so on have created spaces within which social movements provide a radical critique of development. These movements have however, not argued against development (Emphasis added).
Social Movements are effective in eliciting responses from the state. Krishna notes three ways in which the state seeks to appropriate a social movement: in the first place, law and order machinery may be employed to falsify the character of the movement. The second method: that of co-optation occurs when the state officials establish links with the leaders of the movement, thereby controlling the movement from within. Finally, the state might employ a more subtle tactic, that of controlling the movement from within. These modes of appropriation will be restated and discussed in the next chapter with special reference to the Chipko movement.

From Development to Sustainable Development

Two factors can be seen to have directly affected a change in the developmental policies of the state leading to an emphasis on sustainability. On the global front\(^{14}\), the growth of environmental concerns that rendered the current practice of large-scale development adopted by the North and replicated in the South as wasteful and harmful resulted in debates on sustainability. The implications for the South that was emerging from a colonial past were that it was obliged to slow its pace of development and atone, as it were, for the mistakes made by the North. On the home front, the growth of New Social Movements as discussed in the previous section, led to issues of environmental protection and the consideration of this important variable while framing policy. It would be difficult to determine which pressure was greater, suffice to say that environmental concerns became part of the primary agenda of

\(^{14}\) Elliot (1996) has outlined the evolution of sustainability in the discourse of development. Stating that the seeds of sustainability were sown in the 1970s, she demonstrates that the UN Conference on Environment and Development held in the decades of the 70s and the 80s (that culminated in the Earth Summit at Rio de Janeiro in 1992) were infact precursors to the larger movement towards Sustainable Development.
development. In addition, another important facet in this developmental discourse was the shift in the manner in which development was now calibrated. Judged largely in terms of economic growth, the sustainability factor brought with it increasing concerns of human development as determinants of the same. Thus, literacy, health, status of women became added indicators of assessing the development of a society. An important aspect of Sustainable Development was that whereas it stipulated the importance of the ecological factor in determining growth, it did not provide a model whereby this could be achieved. Thus, developing societies\textsuperscript{15} had the flexibility to gauge what they would consider as leading to sustainable development. In addition, the social reach of a developmental project became an important determinant in judging its success and relevance. The target audience or beneficiaries of developmental schemes had to be the poorest of the poor and the most backward regions of concerned states. Interestingly, from a purely theoretical perspective, there have been efforts of scholars to include the protection of the environment as an essential element in the fulfilment of human wants. Notions of environment have differed over time: liberal theory attributed great importance to property in enabling an individual attain his full potential. For Marx, industrialisation was a progressive force which harnessed technology to natural resources and permitted a reduced dependence on agriculture. In the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Volume of the Capital he wrote: One of the major results of the capitalist mode of production is that... it transforms agriculture from a mere empirical and mechanical self-perpetuating

\textsuperscript{15} A point that has been contested by several scholars. Although the term Sustainable Development implies flexibility of environmental standards depending upon the capacity of the society concerned, the argument that environmental hazards are often supra-national in nature has been levelled by some nations to impose uniform standards of sustainability that work in tandem with the developmental objectives of the Developing world. The term has also been seen as a 'first world' concept, one that has emerged from discussions of the Brundtland Commission and the offices of the IIED. The poor are largely concerned with their immediate livelihoods, it is argued. The enlightened rich give priority to sustainability. Needless to say, environmental preservation has thus been brought within the realm of political contestation and debate.
process employed by the least developed part of society, into the conscious scientific application of agronomy (Marx, 1974: 617). Elaborating the above statement, Lenin in his discussion on man and nature held that man was not only a product of nature but also a part of it. Other Marxists such as Rosa Luxemburg elaborated on the relationship between man and nature specifically in the context of colonialism. They were of the view that capital could only fully appropriate surplus value through the conversion of nature to its own purposes (Redclift, 1984: 8). Engels, commenting on the relationship between man and nature maintained that man alone had succeeded in impressing his stamp upon nature, by better understanding the laws of nature, was capable of reacting to what he had done (Engels, 1970: 74-5). Redclift notes that Engels feared that man’s mastery over nature might pose a threat to material advance itself. Engels suggested that man’s ability to react to the changes he makes in his environment implies new responsibilities towards nature. Redclift further notes echoes with contemporary conservation in the following passage written by Engels:

Let us not however, flatter ourselves overmuch on account of our human victories over nature. For each such victory nature takes its revenge on us... we are reminded that we by no means rule over nature like someone standing outside nature, but that we... belong to nature, and exist in its midst, and that all over mastery of it consists in the fact that we have the advantage over all other creatures of being able to learn its laws and apply them correctly.

Needless to add, the term Sustainable Development has no consistent definition: it has been described as development that is likely to achieve lasting satisfaction of human needs and improvement of the quality of human life (Allen, 1980) and the sustainable society as one that lives within the self-perpetuating limits of its environment. That society... is not a “no growth society”... it is rather, a society that recognises the limits of growth... and looks for alternative ways of growing (Coonner, 1979). ‘The term “Sustainable Development” suggests that the lessons of ecology can, and should, be applied to economic processes’ (Redclift,
The World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) was the first to use the term Sustainable Development and defined the same as 'development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs' (1987). Associated with the term therefore, is the concept of 'carrying capacity' of a resource which has been defined as the 'maximum level of human or animal population that can be supported in the long run' (Kadekodi, 2001: 167-8). Assessing this carrying capacity is an integral part of Sustainable Development since it determines the continuance of economic activity on a sustained basis while at the same time preventing environmental damage and protecting resources. It must be added here, that although carrying capacity is seen to be an environmental yardstick determining the extent to which development is feasible or permissible, environmentalists are yet unsure about how the balance between demand and carrying capacity is to be ensured (Krishna, 1996: 240). Mustafa Tolba (1987) notes some general characteristics that the concept of Sustainable Development encompasses:

1. Help for the very poor because they are left with no other option than to destroy their environment.
2. The idea of self-reliant development, within natural resource constraints;
3. The idea of cost-effective development using differing economic criteria to the traditional approach; that is to say development should not degrade environmental quality, nor should it reduce poverty in the long run;
4. The great issues of health control, appropriate technologies, food self-reliance, clean water and shelter for all;
5. The notion that people-centred initiatives are needed; human beings, in other words are the resources in the concept.
Sustainable Development thus not only provides an effective critique of the process of development that has been followed in the First World and blindly replicated in the Third, but also sees it as a way in which the domination of one over the other is perpetuated\(^\text{16}\).

Commenting on the narrow vision of classical models of development, Escobar (1992) holds that it (development) "... has to be seen as an invention and strategy produced by the 'First World' about the underdevelopment of the 'Third World', and not only as an instrument of economic control over the physical reality of much of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Development has been the primary mechanism through which these parts of the world have been produced and produced themselves, thus marginalizing or precluding other ways of seeing or doing". Thus, the need for society to produce agricultural crops for economic/commercial benefit has led to large-scale destruction of forests that have been cleared for the extension of farmlands. This leads to increased pressure on nature to adapt itself to changing environments. Further, to maintain an 'artificially high rate of productivity', fertilisers, fuels for machinery, irrigation technology, genetic selection of species of pest control are employed. The use of such artificial means on young ecosystems (that have recently been incorporated into a different land use pattern) is a significant ecological threat that undermines its capacity for natural regeneration. In addition to having an environmental and economic dimension, the concept also envisages the need for a 'political will' to ensure that development is sustainable.

Caldwell cites the moral dimension of unsustainable development in the following statement, "if we take the view that transcending both underdevelopment and overdevelopment requires

\(^{16}\) Within the Third World as well, there are distinct pockets of affluence and poverty. The classical model of development, it is argued has increased social cleavages and economic disparities among people. Infact, "backward" regions are looked upon as a resource base to fulfil the needs of the developed centre. The critique of large-scale multipurpose hydel projects such as those in the Narmada valley has stressed that in addition to being environmentally unsustainable, their construction (and operationalisation) results in the displacement and dispossession of the marginalized in favour of a few beneficiaries.
that we fully appreciate the objective natural limits to our manipulation of our environment, then we must begin to question the utility of a perspective on development which places so little emphasis on resources and the environment (Caldwell, 1977; c.f. Redclift, *ibid*: 18). Drawing from the Indian experience, Gopal Kadekodi (2001) highlights some essential features of Sustainable Development as distinguished from the classical models of economic development. Reiterating the ecosystem approach mentioned earlier, he maintains that an essential part of resource management is the emphasis on waste management, investments on regeneration of natural capital and understanding the exhaustibility of the same. The ecosystem approach also adds the dimension of direct utility of natural resources in the form of aesthetic beauty, social security and inter-generational equity. He goes on to add that in addition to the principle of efficiency, this approach has dimensions of proper valuation of all resources, equity, understanding of renewable and non-renewable resources as natural capital stocks and resilience of the ecosystem.

An important facet of the concept of Sustainable Development is the emphasis on the reduction of poverty among the marginalized. As a departure from the previous method of gauging development by comparing National Income and GNP levels of different countries, this method looks at social and ecological variables. In that sense, Sustainable Development possesses a moral facet: one that seeks to abolish inequalities stemming from limited access to

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17 Michael Redclift (1987) addresses the issue of unsuitability of judging development merely by looking at GNP. Holding that this method is not only crude and simplistic, it is also narrow in that it overlooks other productive labour performed by women and children. Concentrating only on the formal sector, it also gives scant importance to demographic profiles and to social cleavages that are extremely important in understanding levels of development in the Third World. Perhaps the most important environmental critique of the use of GNP as an indicator of development is that it records the productive utilisation of resources irrespective of whether these are renewable or not.
resources by the world's poor and the vicious circle of poverty\textsuperscript{18}. As mentioned above, poverty compels people to exploit their environment mercilessly. This accounts for the existence of the world's poorest people in the most environmentally fragile areas; a phenomenon that has been called the retreat of poverty into certain geographical areas into remote and economically vulnerable rural areas or on the edges of growing towns (Elliot, 1996: 21). The need to decentralise development to include the world-view of the marginalized therefore falls within the scope of sustainable development. It must be added further, that the onus of wasteful developmental policies leading to the environmental crisis faced by the world today cannot be squarely attributed to either the capitalist or the socialist mode of production. Although the existence of a free market in the capitalist system encouraged the unhindered exploitation of natural wealth, the centralisation of environmental policies under the socialist system undermined any protectionist safeguards that might have existed. Also, many developing countries were rightly sceptical about the First World call for Sustainable Development since they feared that having enjoyed the fruits of development themselves, they were attempting to hinder similar development in their countries by putting limits on the exploitation of resources (Elliot 1996, Redclift 1987).

It has also been argued that the concept of Sustainable Development contains within it an idea of 'no growth'. Pitting the neo-classical model of economics against what he calls the 'steady-state' model, Herman Daly holds that the former is an isolated system in which exchange value circulates between industries and households with neither matter nor energy leaving the system. In the steady-state model on the other hand, the economy is one of the components of the larger ecosystem in which both material and energy undergo transformation. Economy

\textsuperscript{18} Sustainable Development is said to comprise 3E's: Economy, Ecology and Ethics.
thus has to conform to the limits set by the ecosystem. Daly goes on to argue that an economy that is steady in scale might still ‘develop a greater capacity to satisfy human wants by increasing the efficiency of its resource use, by improving social institutions and by clarifying its ethical priorities’ – but not by increasing the amount of resources put through the industrial process. Thus, Daly is opposed to the idea of globalisation of national economies because he thinks that deregulated trade would stimulate the growth of resource utilisation. He opines that with the flow of capital abroad, the opportunity for new domestic employment diminishes, reducing thereby the price of domestic labour (c.f. Krishna, op. cit.: 237). Even if free trade were to increase the price of labour in low wage countries, this would be at the expense of the wages earned in the high-wage countries. Holding Daly’s steady-state model as untenable especially in the context of low-income developing countries, Krishna admits that it does have resonances with popular environmentalism. It does not however, solve the problem of existing inequalities among nations, nor does it address the ‘historically skewed patterns of resource utilisation’. Indeed, most developing nations see resource use as the key to furthering development and feel that the environmental damage generated from the same is miniscule compared to that contributed by the developed nations. Development policy has been biased towards humanly-created capital, i.e., marketed products that yield economic gains. Natural capital is on the other hand, underpriced since its real value in providing ecological services is not understood (c.f. Krishna, ibid: 238). In order to ensure equity through sustainable development, Ramakrishna (2002) holds that an integrated approach should be undertaken that satisfies basic human needs in an equitable manner, maintains and promotes social, cultural and biological diversity, as well as the ecological integrity of the system. It has also been argued that equity and sustainability are two different concepts and that instead of
insisting that sustainability incorporates the notion of equity, it is less confusing to view
development as equitable sustainable development. Critics have also viewed the term
Sustainable Development as an oxymoron, involving contrasting ideas that cannot be
reconciled (Wall, 2002: 89-91). Sustainability requires a long-term perspective and something
that is sustained should be enduring and ideally, exists in perpetuity. Development, on the
other hand, implies change - a progression from an existing situation to an ideally superior,
state. Wall adds further that there is also considerable latitude over the meaning of the term
and consequently, over “what is to be sustained” and “what is development” leading to
tensions between the economy and the environment. The failure of the term to have a
conceptual precision\textsuperscript{19} to be readily measured or for it to act as a clear guide for academic
research has posed the danger of relegating Sustainable Development the status of political
rhetoric or analytical construct. On the other hand, this ‘fuzziness’ can be used advantageously
in bringing people with different perspectives together, thereby promoting dialogue between
seemingly disparate groups, including academics, policy makers, conservationists, developers
and the communities that they serve (Wall, ibid.).

In India, conflicts between the marginalized and the state over the redistribution of resources,
decentralisation and the adoption of area-specific developmental models, implemented
through popularly elected local democratic institutions have characterised the move towards
sustainability. In certain areas, this has also involved the rejection of institutions that have
been imposed by the state in favour of age-old systems of governance that have greater

\textsuperscript{19} Wall cites the work of C Hunter (1997) wherein he defined Sustainable Development from various
perspectives as being ‘very strong’ to ‘very weak’, encompassing diverse viewpoints.
acceptance (and hence, legitimacy) and take into consideration the ecological needs of the concerned society. The paradigm of Sustainable Development in political science parlance has thus redefined notions of power and authority and has demolished the hierarchical character of the state. It has also challenged the authority of the state to control and allocate resources and in so doing, has given democracy in the state a broader meaning: the people can now question and determine what they consider to be the best interests of the society. However, Sustainable Development is not entirely emancipatory. Given the diverse cleavages within Indian society, politics (and thus political power) is subject to influences from various quarters. If Sustainable Development involves the diffusion of boundaries in that it regards the global environment as being important, it also consequently endangers public and private domains of knowledge rendering indigenous communities more susceptible to the threat of ‘globalisation’, undermining the traditional rights of people in remote areas, reinforcing the need for the state to follow a welfarist, protectionist policy rather than retreat from the same. Herein lies the greatest critique of Sustainable Development that challenges any move to

20 A study conducted recently in the Gori river valley in Kumaun Himalayas by Emmanuel Theophilus of Foundation for Ecological Security (FES) India revealed that in areas where local traditions and institutions were firmly entrenched, the introduction of co-operatives or any state-induced initiative did not yield positive results. Infact, people looked upon these initiatives with suspicion, preferring to work within the well-established traditional framework (ISMF Conference, Mussoorie, November 2002).

21 The impact of globalisation has affected almost every facet of human life, especially that of the marginalized peasants who the state ironically promises to protect. In a recent survey in the Palakkad district of Kerala, it was discovered that traditional rice growers were forced to penury and ill health with the establishment of the Coca-Cola factory in their village. Not only had the company tapped into the ground water resources and drained the aquifer, but had also not given them the jobs it promised. The depletion of water resources had destroyed the cropping pattern of the region and also contaminated drinking water, leading to digestive problems among the community. That land had been given for the production of a non-essential commodity such as an aerated drink is not the only irregularity on the part of the state. What seems doubly suspicious is the manner in which a law prohibiting the conversion of agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes has been transgressed for the establishment of the factory (George 2002: 52).
ensure equity, both at the national and the global sphere\textsuperscript{22}. Also, as Sukhamoy Chakravarty (c.f. Krishna, \textit{ibid:} 252-3) has pointed out, although the market does have an important role, so does the central planner at intermediate levels of decision-making. However, he did not seem too optimistic about co-operative ventures since he could not establish the reasons that induced people to seek such ventures in the first place. Finally, Sustainable Development requires ‘political conscientisation’ and without a certain ideology and value orientation that is widely accepted by the masses without which intermediate level of decision making would not succeed on a large scale. To this Krishna adds that administrators and social scientists use the terminology if Sustainable Development without giving due concern to the social structures necessary to realise sustainability. Government and NGOs hope that the contradictions will simply resolve themselves. Rigorous analysis of the environmental impact of the policies is lacking.

For Sustainable Development to be truly emancipatory especially in the context of the Third World, it becomes essential for the livelihoods of the people to be secure. This however, is impossible without state intervention. The concept of Sustainable Development does not imply that the state should forgo its primary duties of safeguarding the rights of its citizens

\textsuperscript{22} Although not exclusively the scope of this study, it is worth pointing out that the conflict over what constitutes a public and private domain of knowledge has been heightened by the introduction of biotechnology and patents into the global market that has challenged indigenous modes of agriculture and seed replication. The use of biotechnology and gene pools is seen to provide cheap and viable alternatives to food and medicines in the future. Further, the World Trade Agreement makes patenting or alternative systems of protecting plant varieties mandatory. In the Indian context, patents entail that Indian farmers will be required to pay high royalties and will not be able to save harvested seeds for use in successive seasons. Also, researchers will be denied the opportunity of developing the technology independently and could only avail of the same by paying royalties to the patent holding company, curbing thereby the scope of scientific research. Needless to add, the search for equity in sustainability remains elusive if such inherent contradictions are not ironed out. For a detailed discussion, see Shiva (2000) and Krishna (1996).
(and indeed, a commitment of ensuring welfare and redistribution). In fact, it reinforces them. It increases the spaces within which negotiations within the state and society take place and redefines notion of public and private by bringing more issues into the former for contestation and debate. Perhaps the need for ensuring sustainable livelihoods increases the scope of activity for transnational organisations and NGOs that work to empower Developing societies by tapping into local knowledge and resource base.

In present times, much debate has been generated over disinvestments in the public sector which as the radical critique would hold marks the complete withdrawal of the state from its developmental objectives. Although this falls beyond the scope of the study, it is a manifestation of the state bowing to the pressures exerted on it by the bourgeois elite. It marks the end of an era of state paternalism and protection that has serious implications on those who have been displaced and dispossessed.

In the preceding discussion, the thread that emerged was the following: states do not subscribe to a uniform definition; instead they are distinguishable by the functions they perform as being integral to and indeed in many cases necessary for the society (and hence the people) they govern. This includes rule making, rule adjudication, punishment and the exercise of force. It also includes ensuring to the people a good life, or at the very best, the conditions necessary for a good life. The nature of the functions of the state is additionally governed by its interactions with the society. Thus society (or social forces, as Migdal prefers to call the melange of organisations and associations within society) determines the limits to state power and often policy and issues of governance.
Having established the role of the state vis-à-vis social forces, the Third World state in the present era is pitted against not merely the society at the national level (in multicultural societies such as India, these interactions assume multi-tiered proportions) but also in the globalised era with other states, MNCs and economic and political interests. This scenario is not new: states in the days of Imperialist expansion were indeed subject to global influences even in the remotest of regions as will be discussed in the subsequent chapter. Pressures on third world states that have been historically connected with colonialism are fairly substantial when they are committed to fulfilling a democratic promise within their domain. For along with democracy follow attendant ideals: liberty (freedom of thought and expression), secularism (freedom of belief and worship), equality and justice. Drawing from the Indian experience, it is indeed difficult to envisage adequate fulfilment of all these commitments while also chasing a developmental goal. Social justice clubbed with balanced regional development sound like mere platitudes when seen in the Indian context where primordial identities are still pre-eminent. In India, abolishing poverty has been a chief concern of the state and has been the winning slogan of several political parties. The call Garibi Hatao won Mrs Gandhi an election and subsequently, political leaders have been shrewd to capitalise on the same. However, the interpretation of prosperity is seen in the gainful employment of the teeming millions and the economic growth of the backward sections. It is also measured by increased access to power by the socially backward people (SCs/STs & OBCs). It is this notion of development in contemporary Indian politics even today that has overlooked environmental concerns (both regional and global) and the interests of the marginalized. This narrow minded vision has also partly been responsible for the growth of movements for statehood by ethnic and linguistic groups that feel deprived (or at best, inadequately compensated) despite the apparently wide ranging welfare policies of the state. What is perhaps the greatest tragedy of the Indian political system is that populism and personalities
tend to overshadow and even erode the importance of formal institutions. As Kothari has correctly pointed out, the failure of developmental policies to incorporate within them mechanisms to ensure that the fruits of development (redistribution, employment, removal of income disparity) would automatically trickle down to the very bottom has resulted in the presence crisis and the erosion of institutions. Further, the growth of populism has resulted in parties relying too heavily on personalities, thereby resulting in demands from the bottom that could not always be fulfilled. Added to this is the crucial problem of the absence of any strong values that the state can aspire to achieve. In the same line as the Rudolphs, Kothari argues that both Gandhi and Nehru had clear values towards which they aspired however; the absence of the same in subsequent governments has resulted in a political space that has been appropriated by religious forces. Indeed, this tendency is palpable all across the world and the move on part of the state to capitalise on religious identities has gained ground even in India as the modernising-bureaucratic elite has failed to provide the people with a meaningful identity. The crisis in the Indian state is therefore one that plagues all plural societies. To its credit, the state has managed to provide the democratic tradition (if not the institution) with some legitimacy and by responding to movements, has reinforced the faith of those who believe that these traditions might wither away. To cite Kothari (c.f. Jayal (ed.): 110) yet again, the crisis of the moderate state stems from its attempt to reconcile development and welfare. He further warns that one must not take a rigidly negative view of the

'state as an embodiment of human will. That nations are historical and cultural entities with long traditions of their own, that they transcend great internal diversity (as in India) as well as state boundaries imposed by the colonial regime (as in Africa, the Arab world, and Latin America), the state power is crucial to the realisation of social goals, and that the political process geared to the acquisition of state power acquires a dynamics of its own which is autonomous of social and economic factors – all this needs to be affirmed. The post-1945 era of nation-building in diverse historical contexts, based on a common struggle for political autonomy and human dignity encompassing vast regions of the world, represents a major
turning point in human history. What is threatening such a creative orientation of the state is the progressivist creed and its attempt to make the state into an economic instrument, as an agency for exploitation, control and subjugation – nationally and internationally'.

What then is the role of the state? That the state is the necessary condition of a good life cannot be contested. The crisis of the liberal state arises from this totalistic vision of state power which is undermining its role as a civilisational process and as an instrument of human values. The state remains the chief allocator of resources. However, it also becomes an arena for negotiations and bargaining. Here, formalism that is associated with the state structure or with procedure becomes redundant and new alignments (often informal associations) emerge that negotiate with the state for their apportioned share of national wealth. Does that consequently imply that the state become impervious to the demands of the marginalised? The emergence of the other backward classes, new social movements (including peasants movements, environmental movements and even women's movements) can be considered a mode of protest against the apathy of the state (or the preponderance of the patron-client relationship discussed earlier). These movements are indeed a reflection of a demand to rethink the developmental ideal in sustainable terms. It brings to the fore issues that are immediate but have been ignored in the past: issues relating to redistribution of land, agricultural subsidies, exploitation of timber and forest produce by marginalised communities and their access to these resources. It also envelops movements against displacement by large projects and the need to preserve lifestyles of communities who till today live on the fringes. The study examines shifts in the state-society discourse. To this end, it bases its analysis on the Gangotri region which although mainstream (in that it is dominated by a priestly community endemic to the hills) falls in the state of Uttaranchal which has witnessed a prolonged movement demanding autonomy from the parent state of Uttar Pradesh on grounds of underdevelopment and neglect. It has also been the focal point of several movements (both in
colonial and post-colonial times); more recently, environmental movements have dominated the political discourse of the region. In addition, women's movements primarily because of their active participation as part of the labour force of the region have been predominant. The status of the region as a pilgrim centre (and demands that the glacier from where the river issues forth are designated as national shrine) somehow implies that state involvement is restricted to policy and basic implementation since it is concerned with maintaining its secular position. In such a scenario, development is restricted to improving amenities within the township and upgrading them from time-to-time. However, environmental exigencies require that the state respond in an appropriate manner: restrict access to the region, standardise environmental norms and so on. In so far as state policies towards improving amenities and ensuring income generation for the population are concerned, it can be surmised that the state considers these commercial goals as being detached from that of environmental pollution. Can the state maintain its distance from the issue? In so far as the state formulates policy and initiates reform, the state reflects an image of itself (Migdal, 2001). However, in the fact that it is unable to act where it fears a clash with social forces, define its limits and hence restrict our perception of the state. The state then, does not stand above society as the Nehruvian monolith, but instead is brought down to its heels as one of the many forces within society.

To summarise with Migdal:

'... as the 21st Century unfolds, the state will remain centre stage, but increasingly it will be the state's difficulties in achieving conformity and obedience that should attract the interests of comparative political scientists. If they are to understand the yawning gap between state rhetoric and performance, their old ideal-type images of states as able to successfully impose uniformity, as capable of building an iron cage, need to be replaced by theories that start with the limitations of actual states' (Migdal, 2001:235).

The state thus becomes limited and in its engagement with society, generates a series of coalitions and alliances that in turn incorporate a new material basis as well as new ideal and
values into its constitution. The compulsions of the modern state to compete with different contestants in a limited arena have altered its nature. The emergence of the new international order has further undermined the state since its arena has now been delimited to providing security and resource allocation (in some instances). In addition, the global call for sustainability coupled with people's struggles for preservation of their livelihoods and homestead have compelled the state to respond to issues of environmental preservation and conservation. The engagement of the state with society in the Garhwal Himalayas is discussed in the context of the need to develop a region that has thus far been exploited for its wealth, as well as to preserve its environment. At the same time, it reflects the need to develop the human resources of the region (thus provide employment) and fulfil the developmental promise. The interest of the state in sustainable development could also be reflective of a need to ensure its own perpetuity through the maximisation of profits and the utilisation of resources in a manner such that it can be of use for many generations. As the following chapters will reveal, in their engagement with each other, the state and society not only transform and influence each other, but also evolve patterns and institutions of control and governance. Indeed, these interactions reflect on the democratic nature of the Indian state (as can be seen in the success of social movements demanding access and control over natural resources and subsequently the fulfilment of that goal through the birth of the state of Uttaranchal) and its autonomy (something that has been challenged since it is argued that its policies always have a class bias). Further, these interactions produce dialogues between policy and practice, between development and environment; participation and exclusion. These relations between state and society fall within a continuum of co-operation and conflict (with negotiation and interaction falling in the midst of this continuum). These will be discussed in the subsequent chapters in greater detail.