CHAPTER V

How to attain the knowledge of Vyāpti.
The philosophers who admit Inference as a source of valid knowledge have accepted the importance of Vyāpti in the field of inferential knowledge. So, they have offered various definitions of Vyāpti which have already been discussed in the Chapter no. 3. The word 'Vyāpti' means the coexistence of the probans with the probandum in a particular place where something is to be inferred. But how the coexistence between the probans and the probandum is to be known. What are the means of ascertaining Vyāpti?

According to the old school of Logicians, the knowledge of Vyāpti is attained through the repeated observation of the coexistence of the probans and the probandum. The single observation of the coexistence of the probans and the probandum in the same locus can not be the cause of ascertaining Vyāpti. Vyāpti can not be ascertained between an ass and a particular manifestation of fire on
seeing their coexistence in a particular locus once only.

So, the repeated observation should be considered as the cause of ascertaining Vyāpti. On seeing an ass even in a place where there is absence of fire, Vyāpti can not be ascertained between them due to the absence of the cause, the repeated observation of the coexistence between them. (1)

The above standpoint of the Old Logicians has been criticised by the Prabhākara school of the Mīmāṃsakas. (2)

(1) "Atha prācināṁ sakṛddarś'ānām na vyāptigrhāpāyāṁ, rāsabhavahnyoh sakṛtsahacārādaraṁ'ane'pi vyāptigrhābhāvāt, kim tu bhūyodarś'ānāmeva. Tathā ca vahnis!ūnyades'e'pi rāsabhadarś'anena bhūyodarś'anātmakākāraṇavirahāt na ta'yoryāptijāna-miti vadanti." Kiranāvalī commentary on Siddhāntamuktāvalī of verse no. 137 (Page no. 448 of Kṛṣṇaballav Acārya Edition).

(2) "Upāyābhāvaḥvyāptinis'cayāsambhevena-numanaprāmāṇyam na sambhavatī ca rāvaṁkapūrvaṁ pakṣe bhūyāhadsahyāsahdanaśaḥcārādaraṁ'ānām vyāptigrāhakamiti jārannaiyāyikasiddhāntah. Vyāptirna bhūyodarś'anagamyā, api tu sakṛddarś'anagamyeti tu prabhākaramatam tadeva matamādāvupanyāsyatam mūle....." Tattvacintāmanā - Gāḍādharī commentary Page no. 361 of Chowkhamba Edition.
Their question regarding the repeated observation is whether the individual perception of the coexistence or the collection of individual perceptions is the cause of ascertaining Vyāpti.

The first alternative of the question is not tenable, as the coexistence in a single instance may be regarded as an accidental one. On seeing of the coexistence between the probans and the probandum (an ass and fire as for instance) in a single instance, it can not be concluded that there is an invariable concomitance between the two. Moreover, the method of agreement which is in the form - 'where there is the cause, there is the effect' can not be applied here. If the individual perception of the coexistence and the ascertainment of Vyāpti are taken as a cause and an effect respectively, the individual perception of the coexistence between fire and an ass may be considered as the cause which can not lead to the
ascertainment of Vyāpti (i.e., the effect). So, there is the violation of the method of agreement.

The second alternative of the question is not also acceptable. The collection of the individual perceptions can not be the cause of ascertaining Vyāpti, as the knowledge, according to the Logicians, is momentary and successive. According to the Logicians, knowledge is produced at the first moment and it exists up to the second moment. On the third moment, it will be destroyed. So, it is technically called momentary or kṣanika. The counterpositiveness of the destruction that takes place on the third moment is called momentariness (kṣanikatva). (1) Moreover, as knowledge is

successive, it can not be attained simultaneously. As knowledge is momentary and successive, the collection of the individual perception of the coexistence of the prābans and the probandum is not possible. Moreover, the method of difference which is in the form - 'where there is no cause, there is no effect' can not also be applied here. The collection of the individual manifestations of the perception of the coexistence, which is considered as the cause of ascertaining Vyāpti, can not be assembled anywhere. But the ascertainment of Vyāpti which is considered as an effect is possible in many cases like - 'It has this colour, as it has this taste' (etadrūpavān etadrasāt) etc. So, there is the violation of the method of difference.

So, Vyāpti can not be ascertained through the repeated observation of the coexistence of the probans and the probandum. Because, the single individual perception of the
coexistence can not be the cause. The collection of the individual perception is not also possible as they are momentary and non-simultaneous. (1)

It is, of course, true that all the individual manifestations of perception are not capable of being assembled together. The impression (samskāra) which is produced by various perception exists in the soul (ātmā). According to the view of the opponents or prima facie objectors, this impression with the help of the sense-organs becomes the cause of ascertaining Vyāpti, as in the case of recognition (pratyabhijñā) the impression (samskāra) along with the help of sense-organs becomes its cause. (2) That is to say, impression is the cause

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(1) "Seyam Vyāptirn bhūyodars' anagamyā, dars'anānām pratyekam ahetutvat, aśuvināśinām kramikānām melakabhavāt."
Tattvacintāmanī - Vyāptigrahopāya Chapter.

(2) "Na ca tāvaddars' anajanyasamskārā indriyasahakrā vyāptidhi-hetavah, pratyabhijñāyāṃ indriyasya tathātvakalpanāditi vācyam."
Tattvacintāmanī, Vyāptigrahopāya Chapter.
of recognition (1) and the sense-organs play the part of the
promoters (prayojaka). (2) Without the assistance of the sense-
organs, impressions alone can not be able to produce
recognition. In the like manner, impressions alone can not be
the cause of ascertaining Vyapti for which the assistance of
the sense-organs is essential. The view of the opponents may,
again, be clarified in the following manner. Someone may have
seen a man before. After some days, he, after seeing that
person, recognises him and feels - 'This is that person.' This
type of knowledge is known as recognition or pratyabhijña in
which the sense-organs can not be the only cause. If the sense-
organs alone are considered to be the cause of such type of

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(1) "Smarane pratybhijnāyāmayāpānāheturud-rayate." Bhāṣāpariccheda
Verse no. 161.
"Ghatam Smaramiti smṛtim prati, so 'yam ghaṭa iti pratyabhijñānān
prati ca 'ghaṭa' iti somskāraḥ kāraṇam bhaveti." Kiranāvali
commentary (of Krṣṇaballabha Ṛcārya) on Siddhāntamuktāvalī of Verse

(2) "Indriya-sahakrasamākara-janya-jñānam pratyabhijñānān." Ibid.
knowledge then it will be treated as a perceptual one. Moreover
the identity between 'That person' and 'this person' can not be
established by the knowledge derived from the sense organs only.
That is why, the existence of an impression produced at the
time of the previous perception is to be admitted. So, the
identity between 'That person' and 'this person' can be
established by the knowledge derived from the impression and
sense organs. Though the assemblage of the various perceptions
is not possible, the impression is produced in each case of
individual perception. So, the repeated observation can be the
cause of ascertaining Vyāpti while the impression along with
the help of the sense organs works as an intermediate cause
(vyāpāra).

The above arguments of the opponents are not tenable.
Impression may be the cause of recollection or recognition when
the object remains the same. (1) At the time of the recollection of an ass which had been perceived before, the impression may be the cause as the object of perception is the same. In the like manner, in the case of the recognition in the form - "This is that Devadatta," the impression may be the cause as the object of both the perception and recognition is the same. But in the case of ascertaining Vyāpti, an impression is produced on seeing the coexistence of the smoke and the fire in the kitchen. Again, another impression is produced on seeing the same on the mountain. The knowledge of Vyāpti is attained on seeing the coexistence of a particular smoke with a particular fire in a particular place and time, as the previous perception

of the coexistence is the same. From different kinds of impression different kinds of knowledge will be produced. If it is said that different kinds of knowledge are produced by both the different kinds of impression and recollection produced by them, there would be absurdity. From the impression of a particular object, the question of recollection of that object will arise. If it is held that from the impression of a jar the recollection of smoke will be produced, it will lead to an absurd and unreal position. (1)

Moreover, 'mere concomitance' of the probans and the probandum can not be called Vyāpti, but it is the invariable concomitance. Vyāpti is the concomitance with the probandum which is not the counterpositive of the absolute negation.

(1) "Atha katham samskāreṇa vyāptijñaanam janyate? Anyathāti-prasangah."
    Tattvacintāmani, Vyāptigrahopāya Chapter.
existing in the locus of the probans. (1) From the impression of the coexistence of the probans and the probandum the coexistence of them can be ascertained, but nothing more than that. By the impression of the coexistence the invariability of the concomitance and the pervadedness of the probans by the probandum can not be ascertained. It is beyond the capacity of impression to become helpful in ascertaining Vyāpti.

According to the view of the opponents, the repeated observation of the coexistence between the probans and the probandum is the cause of ascertaining Vyāpti. Now the Prabhākara school of the Mīmāṃsakas ask the exact meaning of the term 'repeated observation' (bhūyodars'ana). The term 'repeated observation' (bhūyodars'ana) may be explained in three

(1) "Sādhanavannisthātyantābhāvapratiyogisādhyasamānādhikaran-nyam." 
Tattvacintāmanī (Vyāptigrahopāya Chapter).
ways. The first meaning of the repeated observation is the perception of the coexistence of the probandum and the probans in numerous loci. The second meaning is the perception of the coexistence of the numerous individual manifestations of the probandum and the probans, and the third is numerous observations of the coexistence of the probandum and the probans. (1)

The Prabhâkaras are of the view in this respect that first meaning of the term 'repeated observation' is not acceptable. On seeing the coexistence between taste and colour in only one locus, the knowledge of Vyâpti between them is

(1) "Kiñca sambandhabhûyodars'anam bhûyahsu sthâneṣu dars'anam, bhûyasam vâ dars'anam, bhûyamsi vâ dars'anāni ?" Tattvacintâmanî (Vyâptigrahapâya Chapter).

"Bhuyat̄su sthâneṣu sâdhyahetusaḥacâradars'anam, bhûyasam sâdhyânam hetunam ca sahaḥacâradars'anam, Sâdhyahetusaḥacârasya vahuvâradars'anam cetyarthah."

Kiranâvalî commentary (of Krṣṇaballabha Acârya) on Siddhântamuktâvalî of verse no. 137. Page no. 448 (Same Edition).
attained. In the syllogistic argument in the form - 'It has this colour, as it has this taste' (Etadrūpavān etadrasāt), the knowledge of Vyāpti between the coexistence of a particular type of colour and a particular type of taste is attained. On seeing the coexistence of this colour and this taste in a single instance, the knowledge of Vyāpti between them can be attained. So, the first meaning of the repeated observation is not tenable.

Now, the Prabhakara school of the Mīmāṃsakas is to consider whether the second interpretation of the term 'repeated observation' is justifiable or not. The inferences like - 'It is a substance, as it has got jarness in it.' (dravyam ghatatvāt) can not be justified on the basis of the second meaning of the term 'repeated observation'. For, the invariable relation between the substanceness and the jarness
is ascertained on seeing their coexistence once only. As the substanceness and jariness are considered as universals (Sāmānyā), they must be one in number. As substanceness and jariness can not be numerous, the numerosness of the probandum and the probans in this case is not possible. So, the second meaning (i.e., observation of the coexistence of the numerous individual manifestations of the probandum and the probans) can not be applied in all cases. (1)

The third meaning of the repeated observation is not also acceptable. If the repeated observation means the numerous observations of the coexistence of the probans and the probandum, it will not be possible to ascertain Vyāpti being produced from the stream of repeatedly continuing

(1) "Na tathā. Ekatra rūparasayordravyatvaghatatvayos'ca vyāptigrāhāt." Tattvacintāmani (Vyāptigrāhāpāya Chapter).
cognitions (धारावहिकज्ञान) of the coexistence of the probans and the probandum in a single locus. Man generally perceives the coexistence between the probans and the probandum at the first moment. As the cause of perception may remain for the second or third moment, the same coexistence may be perceived. This stream of continuous knowledge may be regarded as repeated observation of the coexistence between the probandum and the probans; but there does not arise any question of Vyāpti between them. Though the cause (i.e., repeated observation according to the third interpretation) exists here, there is no effect (i.e., no ascertainment of Vyāpti). So, there is the violation of the rule of the method of agreement in presence (Anyaya-vyabhcāra). (1)

(1) "Na tathā..............Ekatraiva dhārāvahi ke taddhiprasam-
gāt."
   Tattvacintāmaṇi (Vyāptigrahopāya Chapter).
In the third meaning of the 'repeated observation' (bhūyodars'ana), the numerous observations of the coexistence of the probans and the probandum have been indicated by that term. This 'numerous observations' means not a consecutive one, but the observation qualified by the plurality (bhūyastva-vis'istadars'ana). In the stream of continuous perception, more than two cognitions are to be taken as observations qualified by the plurality. The 'plurality' or 'bhūyastva' of the coexistence denotes the number beginning from three to the number known as 'parārthva'. There is no common cannotation (anugama) by which a particular plural number is to be understood by the term 'bhūyastva' or plurality. Now, what is to be understood by the term 'anugama' or common cannotation?

"The word 'anugama' means accepting all required objects in a common form (anugatarūpāna Sarvasamgrahaḥ). On the strength
of an interpretation of Gadādhar Bhāttācārya, Bhāmācārya, the author of Nyāyakos'ā, has defined 'anugama' as a common cannotation (Pravṛttinimittam). For example, all the jars have got a common cannotation in the form of the generic character like janness (Anugamam anugatapraśāvṛttinimittam, yathā sarvesām ghatānāmanugamo ghatatvam - Nyāyakos'ā - P. 17). (1) So, it is to be accepted by the opponents that particular groups of perception are the cause of particular ascertainment of Vyāpti as there is no common cannotation in the case of the repeated observation. If this theory is accepted, it will go against the accepted logical method of technical lightness in respect of imagination (Kalpanālāghava). (2)

It may be argued by the opponents that the term

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(1) Taken from 'Navya Nyāya System of Logic' by Dr. D. C. Guha. Page no. 281 (Old Edition).
(2) "Bhuyastvasya tricaturāditvenānanugamacca." Tattvacintāmaṇi (Vyāptigrahopāya Chapter).
'bhūyastva' (plurality) denotes the number comprising at least three units. That is to say, by the term 'perception qualified by the plurality (bhūyastva-vis'istadarśan), it is to be understood that the perception consists of at least three individuals.

In reply to the above argument, it is said that the invariable relation between two objects can not be established though their coexistence may be found hundred times. The earthly substances (i.e., the earthen pot, stone, etc.) are scratchable by iron. Though it is seen that the earthly substances may be scratched by iron, Vyāpti cannot be established between the property called earthly substanteness (parthivatva) and the property called scratchability by an iron (lohalekhya-tva), as there is an exception in the case of a diamond which, though an earthly substance, can never be scratched by an iron.'

(1) "Apica, parthivatvalohalekhystvadau sataśo darsane'pi Vyāptigrāhāt." Tattvacintāmaṇi (Vyāptigrāhopyāya Chapter).
The opponents may argue that the repeated observation alone cannot be the cause of ascertaining Vyāpti, but it becomes the cause of the same with the help of \textit{'Reductio-ad-absurdum'} (Tarka).

This standpoint cannot be accepted. For, the \textit{'Reductio-ad-absurdum'} (Tarka) along with the perception of the coexistence of the probans and the probandum and non-perception of the deviation (vyabhicāra) of the same would become the cause of ascertaining Vyāpti. As \textit{'Reductio-ad-absurdum'} is essential and adequate for attaining the knowledge of Vyāpti, there is no necessity of admitting repeated observation as the cause of the same.\footnote{\textit{Tarkasahakṛtam tatheti cet ? Tarhi sahaśāradarś'ana-vyabhi- cāradarś'ana-sahakṛtah sa eva vyāptigrāhako'stu, āvas'ya- kātvāt. kim bhūyodarś'anena ?" Ibid.}}

It cannot be argued that the \textit{Reductio-ad-absurdum}
(Tarka) is not possible without repeated observation. For, a wise person can use 'Reductio-ad-absurdum' by the perception of the coexistence and by the nonperception of the deviation (Vyabhicāra) of the same in only one instance. (1)

The opponents are of the view that let the 'Reductio-ad-absurdum' along with the perception of the co-existence of the probans and the probandum and nonperception of the deviation (vyabhicāra) of the same in a single instance be the cause of ascertaining Vyāpti.

If the above-mentioned view is accepted, there would occur the defect known as 'Regressus-in-infinitum' (anavasthā), as 'Reductio-ad-absurdum' is not possible without the knowledge of Vyāpti. (2) It can be explained in the following manner.

(1) "Na ca tena vinā tarka eva nāvatvatī prathamādars'ane vyuttannayā tarkasambhavat." Tattvacintāmani (Vyāptigrahopāya Chapter).
(2) "Na caivamevāstu, tarkasya vyāptigrahāmūlakatvenānavasthānāt." Ibid.
The definition of Tarka is given in the Nilakanthī commentary on Dipika of Tarkasamgraha as follows:

"Ahāryavyāpyavatta-bhrama-janyah ahāryavyapakavattābhramaetarkah."

That is, Tarka is an imposed (ahārya) invalid knowledge of the existence of the pervaded (vyāpaka), which is produced by another imposed invalid knowledge of the existence of the pervader (vyāpya). The knowledge which is produced out of one's desire at the time when there is the contradictory knowledge (virodhijñāna) is known as an imposed knowledge (ahāryajñāna). (2)

If the knowledge in the form—"There is fire in the lake" (hrado vahnimān) is produced out of one's desire at the time when there is the existence of the contradictory knowledge in the form—'There is the absence of fire in the lake' (hrado

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(1) Page no. 376 (Chowkhamba Edition).

(2) "Virodhijñānānakalīne ca vyāpasrayojajñānatvam ahāryajñānatvam."
The 'tarka' is of two types - the 'tarka' that determines the definite valid knowledge (visayaparisa'odhatarka) and the 'tarka' that removes the doubt of deviation (vyabhicāras'amkānivartakatarka). The term of Visayaparisa'odhatarka - 'if it has no fire, it has no smoke' (Yadyam vahmīmānam na syāt tātā dhūmavān na syāt) determines the certainty of the existence of fire in a particular locus (i.e., in the mountain). Here by the absence of the Apādya or the consequence (i.e., by the absence of the negation of smoke) the certainty of the existence of the absence of the Apādaka (i.e., the absence of the negation of fire) is ascertained. That is to say, by the knowledge of the existence of smoke the existence of fire is ascertained. In such a way, doubt regarding the existence of fire on the mountain in this particular case may be removed by applying.
this kind of Tarka. The perception of the co-existence with the help of the methods of agreement and difference is to be understood as the cause of ascertaining the cause and effect relation (kāryakāranabhāva) between smoke and fire. As this type of Tarka is not the cause of ascertaining Vyāpti, the Vyabhicārastamkānivartakatarka is to be resorted to. In the form of the second type of Tarka - "If the smoke be deviated from fire, it will not be caused by fire" (Dhumo yadi vahni- vyabhicāri syāt terhi vahnjanyo na syāt), the first part is known as Āpādaka or the ground and the second part is Āpādāya or the consequence. In the Āpādaka, there is the invariable concomitance determined by the Āpādya. (1) The form of the

invariable concomitance is where there is deviation of fire, there is the negation of being a product of fire (Yatra Yatra vahniyakharitvam tatra tatra vahniyatvabhavaḥ). In this form of invariable concomitance, the first part is the Vyāpya or pervaded and the second one is the Vyāpaka or pervader. In the same way, it can be said that the part of Tarka as Āpādaka is the pervaded and the Āpādya is the pervader. So, the invariable concomitance is included in the Tarka. In order to know this Vyāpti, the necessity of another Tarka will arise if there is any doubt about the existence of the Vyāpti determined by the Āpādya and existing in the Āpādaka in the form 'whether the Āpādaka is pervaded by the Āpādya or not' (Āpādaka āpādyavāpyo na/vā). In this way, 'Tarka' will have to be taken resort to with a view to averting the possible doubt in regard to the Vyāpti existing in the Āpādaka and
determined by the Āpādya. In that Tarka, there is another Vyāpti. In order to remove the doubt of the above-mentioned form existing in the Vyāpti, another Tarka will have to be resorted to. In this way, there would arise the defect known as 'Regressus-in-infinitum' (anavasthā).

The opponents are of the opinion that, as inference is possible without any 'Reductio-ad-absurdum' in some cases, the question of the defect of argument technically known as "Regressus-in-infinitum" (anavasthā) does not arise at all.

The baby moves on to suck mother's breast without turning to other objects. The reason behind the inclination to suck mother's breast of a new born baby is the knowledge of its conduciveness to the desired object (īṣṭasādhanatājñāna). The reason behind his absence of inclination to other objects is the knowledge of their conduciveness in gaining objects that
are not desired (aniṣṭasādhanatājñāna). In the previous birth, he had acquired the knowledge of the invariable concomitance in the form - "where there is the means for the maintenance of my life, there is the means of attaining my desired object (yatra yatra majjīvanaraksopāyatvam tatra tatra madiṣṭasādhana-
tvam). The impression of the knowledge of the invariable concomitance which was experienced in the previous birth remains in the soul of a new born baby. After the awakening of the impression (sāṃskāra), the baby attains the knowledge of the invariable concomitance which produces the inference. In this inference, there is no scope for applying the "Reductio-ad-
absurdum" (Tarka), as he bears no doubt about the efficacy

(1) "Evam S'arīrasa ca itanye vālakasya stanyapāne pravr-
sucking mother's breast. So, there can not be the defect of argument known as "Regressus-in-infinitum" (anavasthā). (1)

In reply to the above argument, the Prabhakaras are of the view that, as the child has the knowledge of Vyāpti without the help of any Tarka, the Tarka can not be the cause of the ascertainment of Vyāpti. As the knowledge of Vyāpti is possible without taking recourse to the 'Reductio-ad-absurdum', there is the violation of the rule - 'the method of agreement in absence.' Here, the effect (i.e., the ascertainment of Vyāpti) is present while the cause (i.e., Tarka) is absent. So, Reductio-ad-absurdum or Tarka can not be the cause of ascertaining Vyāpti. (2)

(1) "Jātamātrasya pravṛttinivṛttiḥetvanumiti jānakavyāptijñānam tarkam vināivāto nānaavastheti ceto?" 
Tattvacintāmanī (Vyāptigrahopāya Chapter).
(2) "Tathā vyābhicārāt so'pi na vyāptigrahāḥ hetuh." Ibid.
It may be said that the ascertainment of Vyāpti promoted by the 'Reductio-ad-absurdum' will be regarded as characterised by an intermediate generic property (avāntarajāti). The limiting property of the state or condition of being caused by Tarka (Tarkajanyatvavacchedakadharma) would be the intermediate generic property. The ascertainment of Vyāpti characterised by the intermediate generic property are considered to be the products of Tarka. As there is no such intermediate generic property in the case of the ascertainment of Vyāpti of a newly born baby, it cannot be considered as an effect of Tarka. So, there does not arise any question of the violation of the rule of the method of agreement in absence (vyatireka-vyabhicāra).

(1) "Na ca tadbuddhau avāntarajāṭirasti.
Tattvacintāmani (Vyāptigrahopāya Chapter)."
The above view can not be accepted. There is no question of accepting the existence of an intermediate generic property unless it is proved that the 'Reductio-ad-absurdum' is the cause of the ascertainment of 
Vyāpti. So, without the establishment of Tarka as a cause of ascertaining Vyāpti, it is not possible to admit the existence of an intermediate generic property (avāntarajāti). So, there would occur the fallacy of mutual dependence (anyonyāśrayadosāh). The Reductio-ad-absurdum' may be taken as a cause of ascertaining Vyāpti if there is the existence of the intermediate generic property. Again, the existence of the intermediate generic property is to be admitted if it is proved that the 'Reductio-ad-absurdum' is the cause of ascertaining Vyāpti.

According to the opponents or the prima facie objectors, the knowledge of Vyāpti is to be attained by the
cognition of all the individual manifestations of the probans
and the probandum by the super-normal connection through a
universal (सामान्यलाखणप्रत्यासत्ती). The inference of fire
from smoke is possible when the knowledge of व्याप्ति between the
smoke-in-general (धूमसामान्य) and fire-in-general (वाहिनिसामान्य)
is attained. Such type of knowledge is not possible by
ordinary process of perception, as a man can know the co­
existence of a particular smoke with a particular fire. That is
why, the super-normal connection through a universal (सामान्यलाखणप्रत्यासत्ती) is to be adopted. The coexistence (सामान्य
द्विकारण्य) of the probandum which is the pervader (व्यापक) of
the probans is called व्याप्ति. This coexistence may be different.
In a particular smoke, there is the coexistence of a particular
fire. In the same way, there is the coexistence of another
particular fire in another particular smoke. In such a way,
the knowledge of numerous individuals of the coexistence is 
to be attained by 'super-normal connection through the 
universal'. In the coexistence, there is the generic property 
eexisting in the coexistence (Sāmānādhirānyatva). Again, the 
knowledge of the numerous individuals of the coexistence wherein 
lies the generic property "Sāmānādhirānyatva" is to be 
attained. The knowledge of numerous individuals of the co- 
existence is not possible without the repeated observation. 
So, the repeated observation should be considered as the cause 
of ascertaining Vyāpti. (1)

(1) "Sāmānyapratyāsattyaḥ sarvoposahārad avinābhāvagrāhah. Sāmānā- 
nyarūpetā ca na sakṛddarśanaganyeti bhūyodars'atānāpekseti 
cenna." Tattvacintāmaṇi (Vyāptigrāhapāya Chapter).
"Sāmānyatvena jñātaṃ sāmānyam pratīṣṭityabhimānena 
sāmānādhirānyasya Vyāptivamate'numityaupayika. Yāvad-
dhūmadharmikavyāptigrāhe asannikṛṣṭyā vyāptobhānanamakṣa-
sāmānādhirānyavṛttitvena sāmānādhirānyatvajñānādeva 
bhaviṣyatītyanekasāmānādhirānyajñānanaapekṣitaṃ tadeva 
sambandhabhūyodars'anamityās'atam kate mūlakrt."
Anumānāgādādharī, Page no. 647, Chowkhamba Edition.
In answering the above standpoint, the Prabhākara school of Mīmāṃsakas argues that the universal or sāmānyya as it exists is to be considered as the super-normal connection and not the universal as being an object of knowledge. For, if we consider the simple universal object as it is as the super-normal connection in one hand and the universal as being an object of knowledge on the other, the super-normal relation (i.e., the first standpoint) has got the law of parsimony (lāghava) in its favour. In the second standpoint, the knowledge of universal is included to make the universal a super-normal relation, whereas in the former, it is not so. (1) In the co-existence, there is the generic property in “Sāmāṇādhikaranyatva” by the supernormal connection through a universal which is the

(1) “Sāmānyasya hi pratyāsattitvam lāghavat, na tu sāmānyatayā jñātasya.” Tattvacintāmaṇi (Vyāptigrahopāya Chapter).
generic property existing in the coexistence, the knowledge of all individuals of coexistence may be known. Seeing the coexistence in a single instance, the knowledge of all individuals of coexistence may be attained by the above-mentioned process. So there is no necessity of the repeated observation.

According to the opponents, there is the necessity of perceiving the coexistence for the second time or more for the removal of doubt. The coexistence of smoke and fire may be accidental in one or two cases. At that time doubt may arise whether the smoke is pervaded by fire or not. If the coexistence of smoke and fire is seen in many cases, the doubt in the above-mentioned form will be removed. So, repeated observation is required for the removal of doubt.

The above standpoint is not tenable. For, doubt about
The coexistence may exist though it is seen in hundred cases. The coexistence between the probans and the probandum though seen in hundred cases can not ascertain Vyāpti if there is the deviation in a single case.\(^1\)

The knowledge of the absence of any extraneous adjunct (anauṇḍhitavajñānaṃ) is considered to be the cause of ascertaining Vyāpti. In a particular place or time, there may exist the jar etc. which may be doubted as an extraneous adjunct. This doubt may be removed sometimes by the knowledge of the pervaderness of the probans (Sādhanavyāpakatva-jñānena) or sometimes by the knowledge of the nonpervaderness of the

\(^1\) "Na ca kākātyāvatvādī amśāvyūdāsaṛthaṃ dvitiyādidaśīlāna-pekṣeti vācyan. Dvitiyādidaśīlānaśi slamkatādaavasthyāt." Tattvacintāmaṇi (Vyāptigrahopāya Chapter).

"Vāvaccavijñānāt saśāntaṃ saśāntaṃ Sāmkyate. Vipakṣena kutaśvaddhetergamanikāvalaṃ." Nyāyakusumānjali
probandum (Śādhyāvyāpakajñānena).

That which is the persuader of the probandum and non-persuader of the probans is called an extraneous adjunct. Vyāpti cannot be ascertained in a particular object where there is the doubt of existing an extraneous adjunct being associated with the probans. For, the probans associated with an extraneous adjunct will not coexist with the probandum. In order to attain the knowledge of Vyāpti between the probans and the probandum, the doubt of an extraneous adjunct is to be removed.

It can again be explained in the following manner.

If there is any doubt of the association of an extraneous

(1) "Nanvanupādhikatvajñānanaṁ vyāptijñāne hetūḥ. Taddes!akāla-tatrāvasthitaghatādānāṁ upādhitvāsamkānirāsah kasyacit Śādhanavāyāpakatvajñānena kasyacit Śādhyāvyāpakatvajñānena syāt." Tattvacintāmanī, (Vyāptigrahaopaya Chapter).

(2) "Śādhyāsyā vyāpako yastu hetoryāyāpakastathā. Sa upādhir-bhavet..........." Bhasāpariccheda - Verse no. 138.

"Śādhyāvyāpakatve sati śādhanāvyāpakatvamupādhiḥ." - Tarkasamgraha. Page no. 61 (Chowkamba Publication).
Satkāri Saṁśa Edition.
adjunct (upādhi) in a particular hetu, the above-mentioned definition of an extraneous adjunct is to be applied there for ascertaining whether the supposed extraneous adjunct is really so (i.e., upādhi) or not. If the supposed extraneous adjunct happens to be a pervader of the Sādhyā and non-pervader of the Hetu, the object will be considered as an extraneous adjunct. That is to say, if the supposed upādhi is found to be the non-pervader of the Sādhyā or the pervader of the Hetu, it will not be treated as an extraneous adjunct. So, the doubt will be removed. The 'Not being a pervader of the Sādhyā' (Sādhyāvyāpakatva) signifies 'being the counterpositive of the absolute negation existing in the same locus of the Sādhyā' (Sādhyasamānādhikaranātyantābhāvapratiyogitvam).

the counterpositive of the absolute negation existing in the same locus of the Hetu. (Hetucāṇādhikaraṇātyantābhāväpratiyogita-vap). In order to ascertain that the supposed extraneous adjunct is really not an 'upādhi', it is to be enquired whether the object (i.e., the supposed extraneous adjunct) is the pervader of the Hetu or not. Or, it is to be found out whether the object is the non-pervader of the Sādhya or not. Or, sometimes it may be necessary to attain the knowledge of both the alternatives. To ascertain the pervaderness of the probans, it will be necessary to observe the co-existence in many loci. The non-pervaderness of the Sādhya may, of course, be ascertained from a single instance. But sometimes there may arise the necessity of repeated observation if the situation so demands. So, repeated observation is required for the ascertainment of the absence of Upādhi in the probans and by the
repeated observation Vyāpti can be ascertained. (1)

According to the Prābhākaraś, the above argument of the opponents is not tenable. For, all the extraneous adjuncts are not capable of being perceived (i.e., perceptible). So, the absence of the imperceptible extraneous adjuncts cannot be known by perception. In order to ascertain the absence of the extraneous adjunct, inference is to be resorted to. That is to say, the knowledge of the absence of the extraneous adjunct in the probans (anaupādikatva) is to be attained by inference. In order to ascertain Vyāpti in that inference, the knowledge of the absence of the extraneous adjunct (anaupādikatva) is necessary. For attaining the knowledge of it

another new inference is to be resorted to and so on.

'Regressus-in-infinitum' (anavasthā). So, the knowledge of the
absence of an extraneous adjunct can not be the cause of
ascertaining Vyāpti.\(^{(1)}\)

To avoid the defect known as 'Regressus-in-infinitum'
the opponents may advance the previous arguments in a modified
form. If there is a doubt of the existence of an extraneous
adjunct in the form of other attributes coexisting with the
probans and the probandum, the ascertainment of Vyāpti will not
be possible. The knowledge of the absence of an extraneous
adjunct in the attribute coexisting with the probans and the
probandum is possible if the knowledge that they are not the
cervader of the probandum is attained. That is to say, the

\(^{(1)}\) Ayogyopādhi-vyatirekasyānumādhīnaṁajñānatvenānavasthāpītāt.\(^{1}\)
Tattvacintāmanī, same Chapter.
knowledge that they are the pervader of the probans (but not the pervader of the probandum) is the cause of the knowledge of the absence of an extraneous adjunct in the attributes coexisting with the probans and the probandum. This knowledge of the nonpervaderness of the probandum is possible only by repeated observation. So repeated observation is badly required. (1) There is no hard and fast rule regarding the number of repeated observation of the coexistence of the probans and the probandum. The repeated observation is required until the removal of doubt of being an extraneous adjunct in the form of attributes. The repeated observation has got no common cannotation (ananugamah) by which it can be taken together. (2)

(1) "Atha Sādhyasādhanasahacaritadharmāntarāṇāṁ upādhitvasam- śaye na Vyāptigrahah. Atasteṣāṁ anupādhitvajñānam bhūyo- dars'ānādhiṇāsādhyāvyāpaka- tva- jñāne satītye-tadartham bhūyodars'anāpeksā." Tattvacintāmaṇi (Same Chapter).
(2) "Ata eva yāvata dars'ānana tannis'cayastāvad bhūyodars'anam heturiti na vārasamkhyaśniyamah, na vānanugamah." Tattvacintāmaṇi, Same Chapter.
Though it is not easy to find out the common cannotation (anugama) by which a particular plural number is to be understood by the term 'repeated observation,' the repeated observation is to be considered as having a common cannotation in as much as it becomes the cause of the ascertainment of the absence of an extraneous adjunct. Thus, the common cannotation of the repeated observation would be 'being an observation which is the cause of ascertaining the absence of an extraneous adjunct (anupādhitvaniscāyakadars'anatvam bhūyo-dars'anatvam). Though the doubt of the pervaderness of the probandum and the non-pervaderness of the probans existing in a particular object can not be an obstacle to attain the knowledge of Vyāpti determined by different Sādhya, the doubt of deviation (vyabhicārasams'aya) which is produced by the doubt of the pervaderness of the probandum and the non-pervaderness
of the probans may be an obstacle to the attainment of the knowledge of Vyāpti determined by the same hetu and Sādhya. So, it will be necessary to remove the doubt of deviation with the help of repeated observation.\(^1\)

The above view is not tenable. Though the doubt of the pervaderness of the 'Sādhya and the nonpervaderness of the 'Hetu' can be removed by repeated observation, the doubt of deviation which is produced by the possible connection of an imperceptible extraneous adjunct with the probans can not be removed either by repeated observation or by an inference.\(^2\)

It may be argued that the impression caused by the repeated observation of the coexistence of the probans and the

\(^1\) "Vadyapi cānyasya sādhyavyāpatekvasādhanāvyāpakatvasam-

\(^2\) "Ayogyopadhisams'ayādhīnaavyabhicārasamsayasya tathāpyanu-

\(^1\) Tattvacintāmanī (Same Chapter).

\(^2\) Tattvacintāmanī (Vyāptigrahopaya Chapter).
probandum may be the cause of ascertaining Vyāpti. This standpoint can not be accepted. For, the impressions produced by the repeated observation can not be the assistant of the external sense-organs. A man who has the knowledge of the coexistence only can ascertain Vyāpti without the help of impressions. (1) The impressions produced by the repeated observation can not also be an accessory to the internal sense-organ. Then the impressions produced by the repeated observations or the recollection produced by the impressions will be considered as a separate source of valid knowledge (Pramāṇa). If an object along with its accessory gives us a valid knowledge, it is called a Pramāṇa. In the like manner, if the impressions along with the sense-organ as an

(1) "Api ca bhūyodaraśāñāhitasaṃskāro na bahirindriyasahākāri, tadvyāpāram vināpi ca sahaścārađijñānavato vyāptigrahāt." Tattvacintāmanī (Vyāptigrahopāya Chapter).
accessory gives us a valid knowledge (i.e., the ascertainment of Vyāpti), they should be treated as a separate source of valid knowledge (Pramāṇa) which is against the classification of Pramanās. Moreover, the recollection produced by the impressions would be the special cause of the ascertainment of Vyāpti. So, the recollection also will have to be considered as a separate source of valid knowledge. So, the impression produced by the repeated observation can not be an accessory to the internal sense-organ. So, the repeated observation, according to this view, can not be the cause of ascertaining Vyāpti.\(^\text{(1)}\)

As there is no other alternative, it is to be admitted that the single observation is the cause of ascertaining

\(^{(1)}\) "Nāpi manasāḥ, indriyādi vid bhūyodarsanajanyasamaskārasya tajjanyasmaranasya va pramanāntaratvāpatteḥ." Tattvacintāmaṇi (Vyāptigrahopāya Chapter).
Vyāpti by the application of the method of residue. The
negation of an extraneous adjunct existing in the locus of the
probans is called Vyāpti.\(^{(1)}\) The above definition of Vyāpti is
defective, as it can be applied to the invalid inference wherein
lies the fallacy known as 'Viruddha' (i.e., contradictoriness).
When a probans has an invariable connection with the absence of
Sādhya, it is called a Viruddha reason.\(^{(2)}\) In the inference -
"The sound is eternal, as it is created (S'abdo nityah kṛtakat-
vat)," the reason 'being created' (kṛtakatva) exists in the
noneternity of sound which is not the probandum. Here, the form
of the invariable concomitance is: "That which is created is
eternal" (Yad yat kṛtakam tat tad anityam). Though there is the

\(^{(1)}\) "Tasmāt pariś'esāt sakṛddarśanagamyaśā. Tathā hyupādhya-
bhāvo vyāptih." Tattvacintāmaṇi (Vyāptigrahopāya Chapter).

\(^{(2)}\) "Sādhyaḥbhāvavyāpto heturviruddhah." Tarkasamgraha - Page
no. 59 (Sātkari Sarma Edition).
absence of an extraneous adjunct (upādhyabhāva) in the locus of the probans of the above-mentioned inference, this inference is an invalid one. So, the above definition of Vyāpti is to be taken in a modified form. The coexistence of a 'Sādhyā' with a 'Hetu' which is the locus of the absence of Upādhi is called Vyāpti (upādhyabhāvevattus sati Sādhyasāmanādhikaraṇam).

Though there is the contradictory 'Hetu' in the above inference, there is the absence of Upādhi. The contradictory 'Hetu' which is free from an extraneous adjunct cannot coexist with the 'Sādhyā'. So, the above definition of Vyāpti cannot be applied to the invalid inference mentioned above.

The Prābhākaras do not accept negation (abhāva) as a separate category. According to them, negation is either a more locus or the connection with the particular time or self-luminous knowledge of that locus. The knowledge of the negation
of an extraneous adjunct can be attained in the first case of perception. (1)

It may be said that the knowledge of the counter-positive is the cause of the knowledge of the negation which is nothing but the mere locum etc.

The above view is not tenable. For, without the knowledge of an extraneous adjunct the knowledge of the negation of it is not possible. If some one has the knowledge of an extraneous adjunct, one can attain the knowledge of the absence of it as in the case of the knowledge of the length etc. (2) It can be explained with the help of the following form of knowledge-

(1) "Abhāvas'ca kevalādhikaraṇam tatkālasambandho vā svaprakāśa-rūpam tajjñānam vā. Tacca prathamadars'ānena vaśe gatam eva caksurādinā." Tattvacintāmaṇi (Vyāptigrahopāya Chapter).

(2) "Na ca pratiyogijñānam adhikaranādi jñānajanakam Yenopādhi-jñānam vina tanna syat........ Upādhyabhāvavayavahārastu tadhiyam apeksate, dirghatvādivyavahāra ivāvadhijñānap." Tattvacintāmaṇi (Vyāptigrahopāya Chapter).
"Debdatta's stick is longer than the Yajñadatta's." One can attain the knowledge of the length of Debdatta's stick without the knowledge of the Yajñadatta's. For, the length is a quality which can be cognised through the collocation of causes (Sāmagri) of the substance without depending on the knowledge of the limit (avadhi) i.e., the knowledge of the length of Yajñadatta's stick. In the case of the verbal usage of the length in the form - 'This is longer than that', the knowledge of the limit (avadhi, i.e., the knowledge of the length of the Yajñadatta's stick) is badly required. (1)

The opponents of the Prabhākaras may argue that there may arise the possibility of inference from the knowledge of the

(1) "Yathā dirghatvaparimānasya dravyāsāksātkārasāmagri-grāhyatayo dirghatvajñāne navadhijñānāpeksaḥ, kimtu ayamasmād dirgha iti Vyavahāra evavadhijñānāpeksati bhāvaḥ." Māthuri Commentary on Tattvacintāmani, Page no. 195 (Calcutta Edition).
relation between fire and smoke and this relation may be compared to the relation between a particular fire and an ass. (1) That is to say, the mere knowledge of the relation between the probans and the probandum can not be the cause of inference unless the invariable relation between the two is known. Without the knowledge of their invariability, the relation between the two will be considered as an accidental one like that between a particular fire and an ass. One may have the knowledge about the coexistence of the fire and the smoke in a kitchen. Mere knowledge of the relation which is devoid of the knowledge of the invariability of their coexistence can not be the proper ground of inference.

(1) "Na caiva rāsabha-sambandhatulya-vahnidhūmasambandhajñānād evānumitiḥ syādītī vācyam." Tattvacintāmaṇi (Vyāptigraho-pāya Chapter).
This standpoint cannot be accepted by the Prābhākaras. The cause of inference and the ground for the verbal usage of the absence of the Upādhi is the knowledge of a mere locus along with the absence of the Upādhi. This absence of perception is possible by the recollection of the Upādhi and by all the causes that are essential for the perception of the Upādhi. The Upādhi itself and the objects pervaded by it, i.e., the contact of the sense-organs with the Upādhi will be excluded from the same total of conditions of the perception of Upādhi.\(^{(1)}\)

According to the above-mentioned view of the Prabhakaras, if it has been held that inference is possible from the mere locus wherein lies the absence of Upādhi, the

\(^{(1)}\) "Upādhisamarche satyupādhitadvayāpyetarasesakalautadupalambhaka-
samavadhēne cōpādhyanupalambhasahitasya Kevalādikaraṣajña-
nasyānumitihetvāt tadvyavahārehetutvācca."

Tattvacintāmāni (Vyāptigrahopāya Chapter).
inference from the knowledge of the relation between fire and smoke will be a valid one, as there is the knowledge of the mere locus only. Though there is no knowledge of the invariability between the probandum and the probans, the ascertainment of Vyāpti is possible. To avoid this difficulty it has been said by the Prābhākaras that the knowledge of a mere locus is not the cause of inference, but it must be accompanied by the absence of knowledge of the association of Upādhi. (1) As in the above case pointed out by the opponents there is the knowledge of a mere locus and not of other (i.e., the absence of the knowledge of the association of Upādhi), it can not be a case of valid inference.

It may, again, be said that the knowledge of the

(1) "Upādhyanupalambhasahitasyeti upādhimattajānābhava-sahitasāstyaarthathā." Māthūrī Commentary on Tattvacintāmaṇi, Page no. 196 (Calcutta Edition).
probans alone (Kevalahetu) may be the cause of a valid inference if there is the absence of the knowledge of the deviation (Vyabhicārajñānābhava). A valid probans accompanied by the wrong knowledge of the deviation (vyabhicārabhrama) cannot be the cause of a valid inference. A valid inference may be drawn even when the wrong knowledge of deviation exists in the probans, as there are two conditions - the knowledge of the probans alone (kevalahetu) and the absence of the knowledge of the association of Upādhi as stated by the Prabhākaras.(1)

The Prabhākaras may object that the invalid knowledge of the deviation in the probans is produced due to the invalid knowledge of the presence of Upādhi. Because, it

(1) "Namnevam dhūme vyabhicārabhrama'pi tato'numitih syāt uktarūpasākalahastusattvāt.........."

Māthūrī on Tattvacintamāṇi, Page no. 196 (Calcutta Edition).
is the Upādhi that can help one to infer the deviation (vyabhicārāṇayaka) in the probans. (1) Due to the violation of the second condition, such type of inference can not be a valid one.

In reply to the above standpoint, the opponents may say that, though the knowledge of Upādhi points out the knowledge of deviation in the probans, the knowledge of deviation in the probans, the knowledge of deviation can not always be followed by the knowledge of Upādhi. Because, one may have the knowledge of deviation from a single instance where the probandum does not coexist with the probans though at that time one may not have the knowledge of Upādhi. (2)

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(1) "Vyabhicārāṇayānumānumānumāpādheṣṭupāyojanam." Bhāṣāpariccheda Verse no. 140.
"UpādhiVyabhicārenāhetau sādhyavyabhicārāṇumānumaupādheṣṭ prayojanamityartho." Siddhāntamuktāvalī on Verse 140.

(2) "Vyabhicārajñāne upādhiyānānānniyamācca." - Māthuri commentary on Tattvacintāmani, Page no. 196 (Calcutta Edition).
Moreover, there are some instances of inference where there is no such connection of the probans with the sense organs that may lead to the perception of the probans at the time of inference. In the form of syllogistic argument - "Time is eternal, as it has contact with all the corporeal substances. That which is not of this type would not be of this type as in the case of a jar" (Kālo nityaḥ sarvamūrtasaṃyogitvāt. Yannaivam tannaivam yathā ghatāḥ), the probans which is the locus of the absence of Upādhi has no connection with the sense organs that may lead to the perception of it (the probans) and the causes of the absence of knowledge about the presence of Upādhi are not present here. As there is no ascertainment of Vyāpti, such types of inference will be impossible.

In order to avoid this difficulty, the Prābhākaras
argue that the cause of inference is the knowledge of the probans (i.e., the locus of the absence of Upādhi as accepted by them). Here, the probans will be considered as the qualificand (Viśeṣya) and the generic property existing in the absence of Upādhi (upādhyabhāvatva) as the qualifier (prakāra), as it normally exists in the absence of Upādhi. But, as the absence of Upādhi is identical with its locus which is nothing other than the probans here, it can logically be said that the property existing in the absence of Upādhi (Upādhyabhāvatva) is the qualifier. Such type of knowledge may not always be perceptual, but it may be derived from inference or verbal testimony. If some one has got such type of knowledge, one can draw inference though there is no such connection with the sense-organs that may lead to the perception of the probans at the time of inference. In the case of the perceptual knowledge
of the absence of Upādhi in the probans, the recollection of
Upādhi is necessary. In other forms of knowledge (i.e., the
knowledge derived from inference or verbal testimony), the
recollection of Upādhi has no function at all. (1)

It may be said (by the opponents) that, if the
ascertainment of Vyāpti is possible at the perception of the
coexistence of the probans and the probandum in a single case,
there is the necessity of the perception which is of the
specific character. When the perceptual knowledge of the
specific character is attained, the doubt of the invariable
relation between the two objects will be removed. On seeing the
coexistence of a particular fire and an ass, as for instance,
in a single case, the invariable relation between them can not

(1) "Upādhissamaraṇe ityādikamtu laukikapratyakṣeśātmakopādhyabhā-
vatvaprasaskārakajñānasya kāraṇemātrapradars'īnam iti."
Māthuri commentary (known as Rahasya) on Tattvacintāmāni,
Page no. 196 (Calcutta Edition).
be ascertained. The doubt of the invariable relation between them will be removed by the perception of the specific character of their coexistence.\(^1\)

In reply to the above standpoint, the Prābhākaras are of the view that after the attainment of the knowledge of Vyāpti doubt may arise in one’s mind in the form - 'There may be any extraneous adjunct which has not been known by me as such.' From this doubt there will arise another doubt in the knowledge of Vyāpti attained earlier. The possibility of an extraneous adjunct will be removed by the repeated observation. After that, the doubt regarding the absence of Vyāpti will be

\(^1\) “Naṃ veśāṃ prathamadars’anesvāvyāptiniscayād
vis’eṣādars’ane sati rāsabhādisams’ayavat
tatsams’ayo na syāditī cet?”
Tattvacintāmaṇi (Vyāptigrahopāya Chapter).
There may arise doubt regarding Vyāpti from the doubt of the validity of the knowledge of the Vyāpti which has been attained earlier. The knowledge of a jar is possible if there is the collection of the causes (Sāmagri) for the knowledge of the same. From the doubt of the validity of the knowledge of a jar the doubt of the same may arise. It should not be assumed that the knowledge of the jar is not produced at all. For, there will arise the doubt of the jar in future.

(1) "Vyāptijnānānāntaram kim vidyamāna evopādhirmayopādhitvena na jñāte iti s'amkāya grhītavyāptāvapi samsārayah. Atastatra bhūyodarsanenaopādhirinrāsadvāra vyāptabhāvas'āmākāpanīyate." Tattvacintāmanī (Same Chapter).

"Vyāptijnānānāntaramiti vyāptinis'cayanantaramyadyarthah. Kim vidyamānajīti kimatra upādhireva vidyamānāh vartamānah mayā upādhitvena na jñāte ityarthah, ........... iti s'amkāya iti s'amkāsattaya grhītavyāptāvapi nis'citōyām vyāptāvapi samsā'aya ityarthah." - Māthūrī Tattvacintāmanī, Page no. 199 (Same Edition).
The negation of an extraneous adjunct is called Vyāpti. The absence of an extraneous adjunct is taken as identical with the locus where the absence of Upādhi exists. As there is no other alternative that can produce the knowledge of Vyāpti, single observation of the coexistence of the probans with the probandum should be considered as the cause of ascertaining Vyāpti. But from the doubt of the validity of the ascertainment of Vyāpti, the doubt about Vyāpti may arise. (1)

It can not be said that the invariable concomitance is ascertained on seeing the coexistence of a particular fire

(1) "Yadvā jñānaprāmāṇyasya samāyād vyāptiśaṁsyāyāḥ, Yathā ghata-jñānasāmānyam satyām ghatajñāne sati tatrāpi maṁyasyaṁsyāya-hitaṁ śaṁsyāyāḥ, na tvagṛśaṁsyāyānurūdhena tatra ghatajñānam ēva na vṛttam ēti kalpyate, tathāhāpyupadhyābhāvasya vyāptītvāt tasāya ca kevalādi-karaṇarūpasya prathamadarsānaṁ pi nis'citatvad vyāptigrāhakāntarasyabhāvavāc cca paris'esaṁ sakṛddarsānaṁyāva vyāptigrāhakātvaṁ tannis'c-aye prāmāṇyasyaṁsyāyādeva tatsaṁsyāyāḥ." Tattvacintāmani (same Chapter).
and an ass in a single instance due to the absence of real
Vyāpti between them. Moreover, the object (artha) which is
perceived may be regarded as one of the causes of perceptual
cognition. (1) The presence of Vyāpti is the cause of the
perception of it. As the Vyāpti determined by fire does not
exist in the above case (between a particular fire and an ass),
there is the absence of the same. So, there will be no
perception of Vyāpti. The verbal usage of the invalid knowledge
of the invariable concomitance between a particular fire and an
ass is possible due to the non-cognition of the absence of
relation (asamsargāgraḥāt) which is produced by some defects (2)

(1) "Indriyārthasannikarṣajanyam jñānam pratyakṣam."
Tarkasamgraha - Page no. 4 (Sātkāri Sārmā Edition).

(2) "Na caiva rasabhe'pi prathamam vyāptiparicchedah syāditi
vācyam Tatra vyāptarabhavāt pratyakṣajñāne vīsaṃya hetu-vāt,
vacidasamsargāgraḥāt tathā vyavahāro dosāmahātmyāt."
Tattvacintāmaṇi (Same Chapter).
as the non-cognition of the absence of relation between 'the
generic property existing in silver (Rajatata) and a shell
(S'uktii), between yellow-colour and conch. Let there be such
non-cognition produced from the defect and verbal usage in
the above vyapti (i.e., between a particular fire and an ass).
But it is not possible as the false imputation (ārope) also
needs some grounds. The knowledge that the conch is yellow
can not be a valid one due to the presence of defects (e.g.,
an excess of ādite). In the same way, behind the perception of
the moon as a small object there is the defect in the form of
distance. (1) In the same way, the non-apprehension of the
absence of the relation is possible there if it is supported by

(1) "Pita samkhā iti jñānesthale'pi pittarūpadosasattvāccham-
-khavapramānutpattipasaṃgat........kvacit pitaḥ dibhrame
pittaṃ doṣa kvacīc candrādeḥ svalparimānahrame duṛatvam
doṣaḥ........iti evaṃrupa doṣa ananugata eva bhṛntejanaka
ityarthāḥ." Siddhantamuktāvalī on Verse 131.
some grounds for this. The possibility of false imputation on the basis of some imaginary ground is not justifiable. (1)

When the probans coexists with the probandum (in the same locus) which is not the counterpositive of the absolute negation existing in the locus of the probans, the coexistence, according to some scholars, is called Vyāpti. Or, Vyāpti is to be defined as being connected with the locus of the probandum which is not the counterpositive of the mutual absence existing in the locus of the probans. (2) Both of these definitions are subject to the perceptual cognition. When the relation between fire and smoke is cognised at the first

(1) "Na cātrāpi tathā, ārope satīnimittanusaranam, na tu nimittam astityārope ityābhhyupagamāt."
Tattvacintāmanī (Same Chapter).
"Nimittasya doṣasya anusaranam kalpanamityarthah, phalavāditibhāvaḥ" - Mādhurī, Tattvacintāmanī, Page no. 200 (Same Edition).

(2) "Kecit tu sādhanaavannisthātyantābhāva-pratiyogisādyasāmānādhiharyam, Sādhanaavannisthānyaonābhāva-pratiyogisādyavat-katvam vā vyāptih." Tattvacintāmanī (Same Chapter).
observation, Vyāpti between them is ascertained. When the absolute negation of an in indifferent object like a jar or the mutual absence of the locus of the object qualified by the jar is found in the kitchen, the fire or the locus characterised by fire can not be the counterpositive of the negation. (1)

The above view is not tenable. From the perception of the coexistence of a particular smoke and a particular fire in the kitchen Vyāpti between them is ascertained. But the particular fire existing in the kitchen is not the counterpositive of the negation existing in the locus of the probans (i.e., in kitchen), as the fire existing on the mountain etc.

(1) "Tadubhayamapi yogyan, pratyakṣena vahnidhūmasambendhānu bvahena prathamam avagatam eva Mahānase Va'ntyantābhāvo nyonyābhāvo vāvagatassya pratiyogī na vahnih na vā vahnīmān ityanubhavat." Tattvacintāmānī (Same Chapter).
are the counterpositives of such negations. So, Vyāpti can be ascertained between the fire existing in kitchen and smoke existing in the same (kitchen), not between all individual manifestations of fire and smoke in general. Such type of Vyāpti can not help us in inferring the probandum as qualified by the generic property. (1)

The opponents may say that the above difficulty may be overcome if the definition is taken in a modified form. According to them, Vyāpti is the coexistence of the probans with the probandum. But the Sādhyatā (the relational abstract property existing in the Sādhyā) must not be limited by the limitor of the counterpositiveness of the absolute negation

(1) "Tan na. Evar hi tadvahnitaddhūmayoreva vyāptiḥ syāt, na tu dhūmatvavahnitvavacchedena." Tattvacintāmaṇi (Same Chapter).
existing in the locus of the probans. In the kitchen which is the locus of the probans, there is the absolute negation of a jar, the counterpositive of which is the jar itself. The limitor of the counterpositiveness is the jarness and the non-limiter of it is the fireness, which is the limitor of Sadhyata. In this way, the knowledge of Vyapti between all individual manifestations of fire and smoke is possible.\(^{(1)}\)

The probandum, according to the Prabhakaras, is that which is limited by the non-limiter of the counterpositiveness of the absolute negation existing in the locus of the probans in general, not in the locus of an individual probans. Fire may exist in some loci of smoke, but not in all, as all

\(^{(1)}\)"Manu dhumatvavacchinna-samanadhi karatntatyantabhavapratiyogi-\ta\nayavacchedakavahnitvavacchinnasamanadhi karanyam......
dhumasamananyahetukavahnyanumanopayogi......" Mathuri, Tattvacintamani, Page no. 202 (Same Edition).
the loci of smoke are beyond our knowledge. So, the above procedure of ascertaining Vyäpti is not acceptable. That is to say, the ascertainment of Vyäpti is not possible by a single observation of the coexistence of the Sādhya with the Hetu. In the first instance of observation, it can not be definitely known that the fireness or the property of being the locus of fire (vahnimattva) is not the limitor of the counterpositive of the negation existing in the locus of the Hetu. So, the repeated observation is essential.(1)

In criticising the view of the Prabhakaras, Gaṅgasā means of it is now giving his own opinion regarding the ascertainment of Vyäpti. At first he refutes the above arguments. According to him, Upādi is either that which is the pervader of the

(1) "Vahnitvam vahnimattvam vā na pratiyogitāvacchedakam iti prathamato jñātum as'akyam eveti."
Tattvacintāmanī (Same Chapter).
probandum which becomes an object of inference in a particular context (Prakṛtasādhyā) and the non-pervader of the probans or the condition which is the qualifier (vis'esana) in the form of the limitor of the relatedness (Sambandhitā) of the Sādhyā which becomes an object of inference in a particular context (Prakṛtasādhyā) alongwith that which is considered as a Sādhana limited by Sādhanatva (the generic property existing in a probans). (1) In the wrong inference - "It has smoke, as it has fire," fire is regarded as a Sādhana. Fire coexists with smoke which is considered as a Sādhyā here. So, the limitor of the relatedness of the Sādhyā (Sādhyasambandhitāvacchedaka) is the

(1) "Prakṛtasādhyavyāpakasādhanāvyāpakovā, sādhanatvābhimatena samam prakṛtasādhyasambandhitāvacchedakam vis'esanam vopādhiḥ."
Tattvacintāmani (Vyāptigrahopāya Chapter).
connection with wet fuel (adrendhanasamyoga) which is the
Upādhi here. Even according to both the alternatives of the
definitions of Upādhi (ubhayathāpi), the absence of Upādhi
can not be considered as Vyāpti. If Vyāpti is the knowledge of
the absence of the Upādhi existing in the 'Hetu', the question
will arise in the form: 'whether the existence of an extraneous
adjunct in the Hetu is proved or not'. If there is the existence
of an extraneous adjunct in the probans, there is no senseorgans
that can assert the existence of Upādhi in all cases (excluding
the perceptible Upādhi) or that can assert the negation of the
same. If there is the absence of an extraneous adjunct or if
the absence of it is not proved, the negation of it can not be
apprehended due to the absence of the counterpositive. (1) "Only

(1) "Ubbhayathāpi tadabhāvo na vyāptih. Siddhyasiddhibhyām tanni-
śedhānupapatteḥ," Tattvacintāmaṇi (Same Chapter).
"Siddhyasiddhibhyāmīti pratiyogiprasiddhyaprasiddhibhyāmi-
tyarthāh, Tanniśedhānupapatteri tadabhāvaya Saddhetā-
vanupapatterityarthāh." Māthuri on Tattvacintāmaṇi,
Page no. 205 (Calcutta Edition).
it is to be taken into consideration that the counterpositive of an absence is not a fictitious thing, because the counterpositiveness (pratiyogita) is said to exist in a real object as has been clearly expressed by Udayanacarya in the Nyāyakusumāṇjali.\(^1\) The counterpositive of an absence should be the absence of an absence as has been stated in the verse of Nyāyakusumāṇjali just now referred to.\(^2\)

But the absence of Upādhi (anupādhikatva) is the coexistence with the Sadhya that is deviated from those that are deviated from Hetu (Yāvatsava-vyabhicārīvyabhicāri-Sādhya-samānādhikaranyam). In the inference - 'It has fire as it has smoke,' smoke is the probans which stands for 'Sva' in this

\(^{(1)}\) "Vyāvartyābhāvavattaiva bhāvikī hi vis'esyātā. Abhāvavirahatmatvam vastunāḥ pratiyogitā."  
- Nyāyakusumāṇjali 3/2.

\(^{(2)}\) Taken from 'Navya Nyāya system of Logic, Dr. D.C.Guha. Page no. 126 (Old edition).
context. It is deviated from jar etc. The jar etc. are deviated from fire (Sādhyā). The coexistence of fire or the existence in the locus of fire (vahnyadhikaraṇavṛttitva) is called the absence of an extraneous adjunct (anupādhitva). The knowledge of the absence of Upādhi can not be attained at the first instance of observation. Moreover, the mere knowledge of Vyāpti as it is can not be the cause of inference. The knowledge of Vyāpti characterised by the generic property existing in Vyāpti (vyāptitva) is the cause of inference. That generic property of Vyāpti is the generic property existing in the absence of Upādhi (upādhyabhāvatva). Without the knowledge of Upādhi the knowledge of the absence of Upādhi as qualified

by the generic property existing in the absence of Upādhi is not possible. Because, the knowledge having an object which is a qualified one is caused by a qualifier (vis'esaṇa). In every case of ascertaining Vyāpti, there is no certainty regarding the existence of the prior knowledge of Upādhi. (1)

The Prabhakaras have said that the knowledge of the counterpositive is the cause of the verbal usage regarding the absence, but it is not the cause of the knowledge of absence. If it is so, there would be the inference from the knowledge of the absence of the Upadhi without any verbal usage of the same. Such type of inference may be drawn as its ground is the knowledge of the absence of Upādhi though there is not the

(1) "Kiṁca na vāstugatyā vyāpti-jñānam hatuh, kimu vyāptitvena, taccopādhyabhāvatvam. Na copādherajñāne tadabhaśvatvena jñānam sambhavati, vis'esaṇajñānasadhyatvād vis'istajñāna-sya. Na ca niyamataḥ prathamaṁ upādhidhiṁasti." Tattvacintāmāni (Same Chapter)."
knowledge of the same (i.e., Upādhi). As without the knowledge of Upādhi the absence of it can not be known, inference is absurd in such cases.\(^{(1)}\)

In fact, Vyāpti can not be ascertained in the first case of observation of the coexistence between the Sadhyā and the Hetu, as there may be doubt about the extraneous adjunct existing in the Hetu.\(^{(2)}\) Again Vyāpti can not be ascertained between the two objects at the first instance of the observation of the coexistence of them on seeing mere the common attributes like coexistence etc. alone from which the doubt of the

\(^{(1)}\) "Yaccoktaṃ pratiyogijñānaṃ vyavahāraheturanābhāvajñāna iti, astu tavād evaṃ. Tathāpi tadabhāvo mā vyavahāri. Upādhya-bhāvajñānādhiñānumitiśayad evopādhijñānām vināpi. Na caivān." — Tattvacintāmaṇi (Same Chapter).


\(^{(2)}\) "Vyabhicārasaṃs’ayāditi upādhisaṃs’ayādityarthāḥ." — Maṭhūri Commentary on Tattvacintāmaṇi, Page no. 207 (Calcutta Edition).
extraneous adjunct in the Hetu may arise due to the noncognition of the specific character of an object. If some one perceived an object in an insufficient light (mandāndhakāre), one can not know the specific characteristic feature of the object at the first instance. Moreover, there are some characteristic features that are similar to another object. Under this circumstances, doubt may arise about the nature of the object (e.g., it is a man or a trunk of the tree). In the like manner, doubt may arise about the deviation of Vyāpti in the Hetu at the first observation, as the specific characteristic feature of Vyāpti is not known. The 'Hetu' which has the nonexistence in all the loci of the absence of Sādhyā (Yavatsādhyā-bhāvādhi-karanavruttitvam) is an invariable one. The 'Hetu' which has the existence in some loci of the absence of Sādhyā (kiñcitsādhyā-bhāvādhi-karanavruttitvam) is a deviated one. The coexistence
with the Sadhya (Sadhyasahecarya) is the common characteristic feature of both the invariable and the deviated Hetu. Though at the first observation one may have the knowledge of the coexistence of the Hetu and Sadhya, doubt may arise in the form - "whether the Hetu is deviated from the Sadhya or not." (Hetuh Sadhyasya vyabhicari na va). (1)

It may be argued that the doubt of deviation of the Hetu can not be an obstacle to the definite knowledge of the invariability of the Hetu, as the doubt regarding an object to be cognised (grahyasamsiya) can not be an obstacle to the ascertainment of the invariable relation with the Hetu. That is to say, as the ascertainment of Vyapti is possible by inference

(1) "Vastutatu vis'agasadasiane Sahacaradisadhuranadharmaedar-s'anad vyabhicarasesa layat prathamadarasiane na vyapti- nis'cayah."
Tattvacintamani (Same Chapter).
etc. even when there exists the doubt of deviation, its obstacleness can not be justified.\(^1\) If the doubt of an object to be cognised becomes an obstacle to the attainment of the definite knowledge of the invariable relation with the Hetu, the ascertainment of Vyāpti would be altogether impossible after the time when the doubt arises.\(^2\)

In reply to this, Gaṅgaśa argued that it has not been said that the doubt about the deviation would be an obstacle. It is said that the doubt will arise when the specific characteristic feature of aHetu is not known and the

\(^1\) "Nam satyāmapi vyabhicārasīmkāya manumāṇādina āvyaptinīsīcayotpādāt tasyāḥ pratibandhakaṭvāsasamgatam........."
Jagadīśī on the commentary known as Didhi of Tattvacintāmaṇi, Page no. 377, Chowkhamba Edition.

\(^2\) "Ātha vyabhicārasasīayo nāvyabhicāraniścayapratibandhakaḥ, grāhyasāmśayasya nisīcayapratibandhakaṭvat. Anyathā samśayottaram kuśpi nisīcayo na syāditi cet ?"
Tattvacintāmaṇi (Vyāptigrahopāya Chapter).
common characteristic features like coexistence etc. are known. From the collocation of the condition (sāmagri) producing doubt there will be no ascertainment of the invariable relation. Where the collection of conditions for attaining the knowledge of some object becomes an obstacle to the another knowledge, the knowledge also becomes an obstacle to that place if the specific characteristic feature is not known. For this reason, the doubt of deviation of the Hetu becomes an obstacle to the ascertainment of the invariable connection of the Hetu. (1)

The opponents are of the view that even the repeated observation becomes the cause of doubt which can not be removed

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(1) "Na vyabhicārasyaṃśayāḥ pratibhandhaka iti brūmaḥ. Kiṃ tu visēṣādars'ane sati sahaśārūdhāraṇaḥdharmanāṃ śaṃśayāḥ syāt. Na tu śaṃśayāsamagrīto niścayāḥ. Kiṃca yaḍdhiśāmagraṁ yatra pratibandhikā visēṣādars'ane tatra taddhirāpīti vyabhicārasyaṃśayopī pratibandhakaḥ." Tattvacintāmanī (Vyāptigrahopāya Chapter).

even by the 'Reductio-ad-absurdum' in which there is the defect known as 'Regressus-in-infinitum', which has been discussed earlier (i.e., from Page no. 300 to 305). (1)

In response to the above standpoint, Gangesa says that the knowledge of the coexistence of the probans and the probandum along with the absence of the knowledge of deviation of the probans is the cause of the ascertainment of Vyāpti. (2)

This view has been supported by Viswanatha also. According to him, the knowledge of the absence of deviation as well as the knowledge of the coexistence of the probans and the probandum in a particular locus are the causes of ascertaining Vyāpti. (3)

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(1) "Evam bhūyodarsānanam api sameśāyakah, tarkastvanavasthāgra-\stā eveti kathāṃ vyāptigrahah ?" Tattvacintāmaṇi (Same Chapter).

(2) "Vyabhicārājñānavirahasabakrtam Sahacāradarsānanam vyāptigrahakam." Tattvacintāmaṇi (Same Chapter).

(3) "Vyabhicārasyaśāgraḥo sahacāragrahastatha heturvyāptigrahe \ ........ " Bhāṣāpariccheda Verse no. 137.

"Vyabhicārāgrahah sahacāragrahastāca vyāptigrahe kāraṇam." Siddhāntamuktāvalī on Verse 137.
Now what is to be understood by the absence of the knowledge of deviation? It is the absence, the counterpositiveness of which is limited by the knowledgeness existing either in the definite knowledge of deviation or in the knowledge of deviation in the form of doubt. (1)

The knowledge in which the probans is known as the qualificand (vislesya) and the coexistence of the probans with the probandum in the same locus as the qualifier (Prakāra) is to be understood by the term 'Sahacāragraha' or 'Sahacāradarśanam' (i.e., the knowledge of coexistence). (2) It can be explained with the help of an example. In the knowledge in the

(1) "Samslayaṁcauṣādharaṇavyabhicāryajñānātvacchinnapra-tiyogitakābhava ityarthah.
Kiranavalī commentary of Kṛṣṇaballav Ācārya on Siddhāntamuktāvalī of verse no. 137. Page no. 448 of Chowkhamba Edition.

(2) "Sahacāragrahasīca hetuvislesyakasamāṇadhiharanyaprakāra-kan jñānam catyarthah." Kiranavalī commentary of Kṛṣṇaballav Ācārya on Siddhāntamuktāvalī under verse 137. Page no. 448 (Chowkhamba Edition).
form - "The smoke is the coexistent with the fire in the same locus" (dhamah vahnisanadhihikaranah), the smoke is the qualificand (visΝesya) of the knowledge and the coexistence of the smoke with the fire in the same locus is the qualifier (Prakara).

Both the knowledge of the coexistence of the probans and the probandum in a particular locus and the absence of the knowledge of deviation are the causes of ascertaining Vyapti. (1)

What is the argument behind considering the absence of the knowledge of deviation as a cause of ascertaining Vyapti? In reply, it can be said that, as the knowledge of deviation stands as an obstacle to the knowledge of Vyapti, the absence of it should be considered as the cause of ascertaining Vyapti. (2)

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(1) "Tudubhayamapi Vyaptinisicaye karanam." - Kiranavalı commentary on the same.

(2) "Vyabhicaragrahasya vyaptigrahe pratibandhakatvadadabhaevah karanamityarthah." Siddhantamuktavalı under Verse no. 137.
The knowledge of deviation becomes an obstacle to the knowledge of Vyāpti, as there remains the counterpositiveness of the negation which is the cause of a particular effect. (1) The knowledge in the form of the limitor of Sadhyatā (inferredness) is the limitor of the counterpositiveness of the negation existing in the locus of the probans (Sadhyatāvacchidakam hetusamānādhi karaṇābhāvapratyayogyāvacchedakam). The knowledge of deviation is the knowledge in which the limitor of Sadhyatā (inferredness) is known as the qualificand and the limitorness existing in the limitor of the counterpositiveness of the negation existing in the same locus of the probans as the qualifier. (2) The commonly known knowledge of vyabhicāra is in

(1) "Kāraṇaṁbhūtābhāvapratyayogyāvacchedakam pratībhakatvām." (2) "Vyabhicāragrahasyati = Sadhyatāvacchidakāḥ hetusamānādhi- karaṇābhāvapratyayogyāvacchedakatvātmakevyabhicāraprakāra- kajñānasyetarthah." Kirāvalī commentary on Śiddhāntamuktāvalī, Page 448 (Same Edition).
the form 'vahniḥ dhūma vyābhiṣcāri' which, if analysed in a 
Navya Nyāya style, can be expressed in the following manner.

In the wrong inference - "It has smoke, as it has fire' 
(dhūma vahniḥ), the limitor of Sādhyatā (i.e., smokeness) 
is a qualificand. The limitorness existing in the limitor of 
the counterpositiveness of the negation of smoke existing in 
the red-hot iron ball which is the locus of the probans is a 
qualifier. So, the knowledge of the limitorness existing in 
the limitor of the counterpositiveness of the negation (i.e., 
smokeness) in the limitor of Sādhyatā is the knowledge of 
deviation.

What is to be understood by the knowledge of Vyāpti 
(Vyāptigraha)? The knowledge of Vyāpti means to determine the 
nonlimitorness of the counterpositiveness of the negation 
(existing in the same locus of the probans) in the limitor of
Sādhyāga, the component part of the Vyāpti.\(^{(1)}\) To make the
sense more clear, this may again be explained in the following
manner. In the limitor of Sādhyātā which is a component part
of Vyāpti, there is the existence of the negation of the
limitorness existing in the limitor determined by the counter-
positiveness of the negation existing in the same locus of the
probans. The word 'Vyāptigraha' denotes the definite knowledge
of the absence of the limitorness determined by the counter-
positiveness of the negation existing in the same locus of the
probans.

Now what is to be understood by the word "obstacle-
ness" or 'contradictoriness' (pratibandhakatva) of the knowledge
of deviation? The invariable non-existence in the same locus

\(^{(1)}\) "Vyāptigraha = Vyāptighaṭakasādhyātāvacchedake hetusamānā-
dhikṣaraṇābhāvapratiyogitānacchedakatvanirnaye."
Kiranavali commentary on Siddhāntamuktāvalī, Page no.448
(Same Edition).
is the contradiction. (1) Contradiction lies in jarness (ghatatva) and clothness (patatva), as they do not exist in the same locus in any time. But in the case of knowledge, the term 'virodha' can not be explained in the above way. For, the knowledge of the absence of a jar may be in one's soul in a particular time from the standpoint of the Logicians. But this knowledge is not a permanent one. In another time, there may be the knowledge about the presence of a jar in the same soul. So, the locus of the two contradictory forms of knowledge being the same, the above definition of contradiction can not be applied here. Here the term 'pratibandhakatva' should be considered as due to the cognizance of the negation of a particular object which may be known in different time. That which is cognised by any

(1) "Niyatam aśāmānādhikaranyam Virodhaḥ."
source of knowledge is called 'grāhya'. The definite knowledge of the negation of the object cognised in different time is known as the contradictory knowledge. (1)

The absence of the knowledge of deviation is the cause of ascertaining Vyāpti as stated earlier. What is to be understood by the term 'cause' here? As the negation of the knowledge of deviation is the cause of ascertaining the knowledge of non-deviation (avyabhicāra), the component part of Vyāpti, it has got its utility in attaining the knowledge of Vyāpti which is the knowledge of coexistence in the same locus of the Sādhya which is limited by the limitor of Sādyata. (2)

(1) "Pratibandhakatvat = grāhyabhāvāvagāhitvena Virodhitvāt." Kiranāvalī Commentary on Siddhāntamuktāvalī under verse no. 137. Page 448 (Same Edition).
(2) "Kāraṇam = Vyāptighaṭakāvyabhicārasyaṁśiścayakāraṇatvat tādēśayasyādhyātāvacchedakāvagāhitassaśādhyaśāmānādhiṣkara- nyātmakāvyāptijñānopayogitvamītibhāvaḥ." Ibid.
This can, again, be clarified in the following manner. Non-deviation is the vital part of Vyāpti and it can be ascertained with the help of the absence of the knowledge of deviation. The Śādhya is limited by the limitor of Śādhyatā wherein lies the absence of the knowledge of deviation, the component part of Vyāpti. The knowledge of coexistence in the same locus of the Śādhya having the previously mentioned characteristics is Vyāpti. So, the absence of the knowledge of deviation has got its utility in attaining the knowledge of Vyāpti.

The causeness existing in the cause of the knowledge of the coexistence between Hetu and Śādhya in the same locus is to be understood by applying the methods of agreement and difference in the form: 'If there is the knowledge of the coexistence between Hetu and Śādhya, there is the knowledge of Vyāpti. If there is the absence of the knowledge of the same,
there is the absence of the knowledge of Vyapti.\(^{(1)}\)

Repeated observation can not be regarded as a cause of Vyāpti. For, Vyāpti may sometimes be ascertained by a single observation of the coexistence of the Hetu and the Sādhya in a particular locus if the knowledge of deviation does not arise.\(^{(2)}\)

In the form of inference - "It has this colour, as it has this taste." (etadrūpavān etadrasāt), the knowledge of Vyāpti is in the form - 'This taste is pervaded by this colour' (etadrasaḥ etadrūpavyāpyah) of which this taste is a qualificand and the pervasion determined by this colour is a qualifier. From the single observation of the coexistence of the Hetu and the Sādhya in the above inference the definite knowledge of Vyāpti is attained. So, single observation of the coexistence may be

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\(^{(1)}\) "Sādhyahetvāḥ sahacārajanānaṁ sattva vyāptijānānasattvam, tayāḥ sahacārajanānābhaeva tu vyāptijānānābhava iti pratyakṣato'nvayo-vavyatirekābhyaṁ sahacārajanāśca-yasyāpi hetuṁ vodhyet yaṁ thathaḥ." Kīranaṁvalī Commentary on Siddhāntamuktāvalī under verse no. 137. Page 448 (Same Edition).

\(^{(2)}\) "Bhūyodaras'ānāṁ tu na kāraṇaṁ vyabhicārāśphurtam sajṛddharmāṁ śāstraṁ pi kvacidvyāptigrahaṁ." Siddhāntamuktāvalī on verse 137.
regarded as the cause of ascertaining Vyāpti. As Vyāpti is ascertained from a single observation of the coexistence of the two when there is the absence of the knowledge of deviation repeated observation can not be the cause of ascertaining Vyāpti due to the violation of the rule - 'the method of agreement in absence' (Vyatirekavyabhicāra).(1)

Repeated observation, of course, sometimes acts as a promoter (prayojaka) in the case of ascertaining vyāpti by removing the doubt of deviation.(2)

(1) "Etadrusavisāsyakaitadrupanirūpitavyāptiprakārakānakācaya-
jananāt........vyabhicārajñānābhāvasahāskāśādhyahetuahaca-
ravishayakasakārānasā vyāptinācAYotpatteh vyatireka
vyabhicārāt bhūyodarsanām na vyāptigrahopāya iti bhāvah."
Kiranāvalī commentary on Siddhāntamuktāvalī, Page 448
(Same Edition).

(2) "Kvacid vyabhicārāsaṃkāvidhūnānadvārā bhūyodarsanaṃupayu-
jayate." Siddhāntamuktāvalī under verse 137.
"Bhūyodarsanaśāyāhetutve'pi kvacit prayojakataya tadādaraḥ."
Dinakarī commentary on Siddhāntamuktāvalī under verse 137.
Page no. 490 (Chowkhamba Edition).

"Tathā ca bhūyodarsanaśya vyāptigrahakatāpāvādah kvacit
vyāptigrahopayogītāpara iti tasya vyāptigrahakāraṇapatvavirā-
he'pi na naipīyikanām Svamataparityāga iti bhāvah."
Gādhādhāri, Tattvacintāmāni, Page 645 (Chowkhamba Edition).
the doubt of deviation means by bringing out the absence of the assemblage of the causes (sāmagrī) of the doubt of the existence of the limitorness determined by the counterpositive-ness of the negation existing in the same locus of the probans in the limitor of Sadhyata. And this doubt is caused by the erroneous knowledge of the negation of the Sadhya existing in the locus of the Hetu. (1) So, repeated observation may be promoter sometimes in ascertaining Vyāpti. That is to say, in repeated observation there is an attribute of being a promoter (prayojakatva). (2) For, that which is an invariable antecedent of an effect and where there is the absence of four categories


(2) "Uparujuyate = pūrvavṛttitātmaḥ(prayojakarūpa)vad-bhava-tītyarthah." Ibid.
of superfluity except the first one is known as an attribute of being a promoter (prayojakatva). (1)

There are two kinds of knowledge—the definite knowledge and the knowledge in the form of doubt. The doubt of deviation may arise in some cases from the doubt of an extraneous adjunct and sometimes from the knowledge of the common attributes (of the Hetu and the Sādhyā) like the coexistence etc. along with the absence of the knowledge of the specific characteristic feature. Such doubt can be removed by the 'Reductio-ad-absurdum' which becomes an obstacle to the opposite standpoint (Vipakṣaśādhakatarka). Sometimes the removal of doubt is caused by the absence of the collection

(1) "Prathamānyathā-siddhibhinnānyathāsiddhicatuṣṭayasaṅgatva sati kāryaniyatapūrvavṛttitvaṃ prayojakatvam."
of causes of doubt (Svataḥsiddha). (1) According to Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa, the removal of doubt is caused by another cause except Reductio-ad-absurdum. (2) If there is the nonexistence of other causes except Tarka, the absence of causes or the absence of the collection of causes is the cause of the removal of doubt. (3)

Tarka is the limit (avadhi) of a doubt, as a doubt can be removed by the application of it. It may be argued that

(1) "Jñānam niścayah sāmakā ca. Sā ca kvacidupādhisandehāt kvacid Vīsesādārsanasesāhitāsādhāránadārāmānāt. Tad-virahastē ca kvacid vipakasādākhakātērēkā, kvacit svataḥsiddha eva." Tattvacintāmaṇī (Vyāptigrahyopadeśa Chapter).


(3) "Svataḥsiddhā evaṁ = itarakāranevirahasthale tādṛśaṅkāra-নavirahaprayukta evetyarthāḥ." Super commentary Nilakantha-prakāśikā on Dīpikā of Tarkasamgraha, Page-263 (Chowkhamba Publication), Satkārī Sārma Edition.
if Tarka is the basis of the knowledge of Vyāpti, there would involve the defect of 'Regressus-in-infinitum' (anavasthā) in the process mentioned earlier (from page no. 300 to 305). (1)

But Tarka cannot be applied in all cases of inference. It is necessary for those cases where doubt arises. If there is no doubt due to the existence of contradiction (vyāghāta), inference can be drawn without taking recourse to Tarka. (2)

(1) "Na tarko'pyavāhināvemāpekṣya pravartate, tato'nnavasthaya bhavitavyan." Nyāyakusumāṅjali, Page 345 (Chowkhamba Edition).

"Śaṃkāyā avadhīstarkah, tanni'vartakatvāt. Nanu tarka'pi vyāptimulakatvā bharkāntarāpekṣāyamānavasthā......" Commentary 'Prakāsa' on Nyāyakusumāṅjali, Page 342 (Same Edition).

"Tarkasya vyāptigrahāmulakatvenānavastheti cet." Tattvācintāmaṇi (Same Chapter).

(2) "Na Yāvadāśāṃkam tarkānusaraṇāt. Yatra ca vyāghātena Śaṃkāvīva nāvatarati tatra tarkām vinaiva vyāptigrahāh." Ibid.

"Vyāghātāvadhīrāśaṃkā tarkah śaṃkāvadhīrmatah." Nyāyakusumāṅjali 3/7.

Where the doubt of deviation does not arise in the Vyāpti existing inside the Tarka due to the existence of contradiction in respect of one's own activity (Svakriyāvyāghāta), the necessity of another Tarka does not arise there. (1)

One can doubt so long as there does not arise any contradiction in respect of one's own practical activity. A man does not bear the doubt about the Vyāpti between smoke and fire, because he seeks fire in his practical life to get smoke without any hesitation. If he has a slight doubt regarding the Vyāpti between smoke and fire, he would not seek fire for having smoke. If there is any doubt, it will contradict his own activity.

(1) "Tarkamulavyāptau svakriyāvyāghātena, vyabhicāras'amkaiva nodetīti na tatra tarkāpekṣetyarthah."
Commentary known as 'Prakāśa' on Nyāyakusumānjali, Page 342 (Chowkhambs Edition).
In this way, it can be said that a man takes food for satisfaction and takes recourse to words to make others understand something. So, one's own activities indicate the absence of doubt in them. For, the activities are regarded as the obstacles to a doubt. (1)

(1) "Yadi hanyavayatirekavadhattakaranabhavan karaṇam vinā kāryotpatti S'āmkysta, tada niyama dhūmartham vahnāṣṭrapyartham annasya parapraptipattyartham S'ābdayopādānam na kuryāt, tairvināpi teṣām sambhavāt. Tasmāt tadupādanameva tādṛṣṭasāmkāparātibandhakaṃ." Ibid.