CHAPTER - IV

Criticism of some of the important definitions of Vyāpti.
According to the Prabhākara school of the Mīmāṃsakas, the non-deviated relation (avyabhicarita-sambandha) between the probans and the probandum is called Vyāpti.

Gangesa, the author of Tattvacintāmani, refutes the above view. According to him, the non-deviated relation between the probans and the probandum can not be Vyāpti. In other words, the relation specified by the absence of the deviatedness (avyabhicaritata) can not be Vyāpti. In the Vyāptipancaka, Gangesa explains the various meanings of the word 'absence of the deviatedness' and refutes the above definition given by the Mīmāṃsakas.

(1) "Ma Tāvadevyabhicaritatvan, taddhi na sādhyaḥbhāvavadavṛttitvaṁ, Sādhyaḥ-bhinnasādhyaḥbhāvavadavṛttitvaṁ, sādhyaḥ-bhāvavannisthābhāvavapratīyogītvam, sādhyaḥvadanyāvṛttitvaṁ." Five definitions of Vyāpti as described in Vyāptipancaka.
The first meaning of the word 'non-deviatedness' (avyabhicaritavata) is 'Sādhyābhāvavadaur̤ttāta'. In order to determine the meaning of it, the formation of 'Sādhyābhāvavadaur̤ttāta' is to be considered at the outset. The meaning of the term 'ur̤ttama' which is formed by adding the suffix 'kta' with the root 'ur̤t' is the superstratumness (ur̤ttata). The absence of the superstratumness is 'avur̤ttama' according to the rule of the 'Avyayabhāva' compound. Then, the meaning of it will be the absence of superstratum of an object having a locus where there is the absence of the probandum according to the rule of the 'Sāṣṭhitapuruṣa' compound. The term 'Sādhyābhāvavadaur̤tti' is to be formed by adding the suffix 'in' in the sense of possession (matvarthiṇīyam). Then, by the aphorism 'Tasya bhāvaḥ' the term 'sādhyābhāvavadaur̤ttītavā' is formed. In this way, the old logicians explained the first
definition. (1)

But according to the Neo-logicians, the above formation is not proper according to the dictum - "Na Karmadharayanmatvarthiyo vahubhihis'cettadarthapratipattikararh."

According to this dictum, a suffix conveying the sense of possession should not be applied to a word formed by a Karmadharaya compound to get a particular meaning if it is attained through Vahubhihi compound. As the meaning can be attained by a Vahubhihi compound in the case mentioned above, the application of the suffixes like 'matup' etc. after the compound Karmadharaya is against the above dictum. If it is said by the opponents that the suffix 'matup' has been added

(1) "Vṛttam vṛttih, bhāve niṣṭhāpratyayāt, vṛttasyābhāvo'vṛttam vṛttyabhāva iti yāvat, sādhyābhāvavato'vṛttam Sādhyābhāvavadavṛttam sādhyā-bhāvavadvṛttyabhāva iti yāvat, tad yatrāsti sa sādhyābhāvavadavṛttī matvarthīyenpratyayāt, tasya bhāvah sādhyābhāvavadavṛttitvam , Tathā ca sādhyābhāvavadvṛttyabhāvavattvamiti phalitamiti prāṇcaḥ."
to the compound 'Saśṭhäta-pruṣa' instead of Karmadha-raṇya, it
may be said that by the term 'Karmadha-raṇya' in the above
dictum they want to mean the compounds other than Vahubrihi.
Hence, as 'Saśṭhäta-pruṣa' etc. are the compounds other than
Vahubrihi, the suffixes like 'matup' etc. can not be added to
them. (1) what is the authenticity behind the meaning of
Karmadha-raṇya as stated above? In Didhitri the above meaning of
Karmadha-raṇya has been pointed out at the time of explaining
the similarity “agunavattvam”. (2) If the term “agunavattvam"
is formed by a suffix conveying the sense of possession
(matvarthiya) after the compound 'avyayibhava', 'agunavattvam'
will be the quality of a substance. Then there will be the

(1) "Tadasat, 'na karmadharayamatavarthiyo vahubrihih'cetta-
darthapratipattikarah, ' ityanusāsanavirodhāt. Tatra
karmadharayapadaśya vahubrihiśarasmāsaperatvāt."
Vyāptipāñcaka - Māthuri, Page no. 14 (Pt. Shibdatta
Mśtra Edition).
(2) "Taccagunavattvamiti sādharmavyākhyānāvasare guṇaprakāśa-
rahasye didhitirahasye ca sputam," - Vyāptipāñcaka,
defect of the interpretation of being 'Too wide' which can not be removed by taking the meaning of 'Karmadhāraya' as a compound other than 'Vahubrihi.'

According to some scholars, that which has the absence of superstratumness is a locus of the absence of the superstratumness (abhāvah asyāstīti abhāvavān). That is to say, the suffix 'matup' has been added to the term 'abhāva.' After that, there is the 'Tatpurūṣa' compound with the term Sadhya (Sadhya + abhāvavat > Tatpurūṣa). Such type of formation is not acceptable as the term 'abhāva' is a component part of 'abhāvavat.' The term 'sādhya' may be related to the whole, not to the part.

The term 'Sādhyābhāva' may be explained as follows. That of which the probandum is identical with its absence is Sādhyābhāva (Sādhyam abhāvo yasya sa Sādhyābhāvah). After that the suffix 'matup' can be added, as this is an instance of
Vahubrīhi compound. So, the meaning of the term 'Śādhyabhāva' will be the non-existence of the probandum as the non-existence of a jar is meant by the word 'ghatābhāva'. And the meaning of the word 'Śādhyābhāvavat' will be the locus of the absence of the probandum.

Where there is the absence of the superstratumness determined by the locus of the absence of the probandum is Śādhyābhāvavadavṛtti by accepting 'Tripadavyadhikaranavahubrīhi' compound and after that the suffix 'tva' has been added. (1) The meaning of the sixth case-ending existing in 'Śādhyābhāvavataḥ' which is understood is the state or condition of being determined (nirūpitatva) which will be connected with the term 'vṛtti' of 'Śādhyā-bhāvavadavṛttitva'

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(1) "Vastutastu Śādhyā-bhāvavato na vṛttīyatreti tripadavyadhikaranavahubrīhyuttaram tvapratyayah." Vyāptipāṇcaka, Māthuri, Page no. 20. (Shibdatta Mis'ra Edition).
The term 'vrtti' will be connected with the negation. So, the meaning of the non-deviatedness will be the locusness of the negation of the superstratumness which is determined by the substratum where the probandum does not exist. (1)

The particular relation through which the negation of probandum remains should be inserted. If the negation of probandum is taken through the relation through which the probandum does not exist, there will be the defect of definition of being 'Too narrow' (avyāpti). As for example, in the syllogistic argument in the form - "The mountain is fiery as it has smoke," the fire is the probandum and the smoke is the probans through the relation of contact (Sāmyoga).

If the negation of fire is taken through the relation of

(1) "Sādhya bhāvatā ityatra nirūpitaṃ saṣṭhyarthah. Anvayaścāśya vṛttau. Tathā ca Sādhya-bhāvādhikaraṇanairūpavitayābhāvavattvamavyabhīcāritatvatvatvi phalitam."
Vyāptipāṇcaka, māthuri, Page no. 20 (Shibadatta Mis'ra Edition).
inherence, the locus of the negation will be the kitchen where there is the existence of smoke. So, there will occur the defect called avyāpti. In order to avoid this defect, the negation of the probandum is to be taken through a relation which is the limitor of Śādhyatā (i.e., the relational abstract property existing in a Śādhyā). By the insertion of the relation mentioned above, the locus of the negation of fire which is taken through the relation of contact will be the lake etc., not the kitchen etc. The negation of the superstratumness which is determined by the lakes etc. that are the loci of the negation of probandum exists in the smoke. So, there does not arise any question of the defect called 'avyāpti' as pointed out above.

If it is said that the meaning of the term 'Śādhyā-bhāva' (the absence of the probandum) existing in 'Śādhyā-
bhāvavat' (the locus of the absence of the probandum) of the definition is taken as mere absence which is the determinant of the counterpositiveness existing in a Sādhyā (Sādhyanistha-pratīyogitānīrūpaka), then in the syllogistic argument in the form - "The mountain has fire as it has smoke," the negation of a particular individual fire (i.e., the negation of the fire existing in a kitchen in the form - "Māhānasiyavahnirnāsati") or the negation of both the fire and a jar ("Vahnighato-bhayam nāsti") may be regarded as negations of fire. The loci of those negations are the kitchen etc., in which the smoke which is the probans exists. So, there is again, the defect of 'Avyāpti'. In order to avoid this defect, the generic negation of Sādhyā (Sādhyasāmānyābhāva) is to be taken by the word "Sādhya-bhāva" (the absence of sādhyā). Accordingly, the specific negation or the negation of both the entities can
not be accepted as they can not be considered as the generic absence, the counterpositiveness of which is limited by the generic property only existing in a counterpositive. So, in the above syllogistic argument, the locus of the generic negation of the probandum will be lake etc. So, the generic negation of the superstratumness determined by lake etc. is present in the smoke. So, there will be no defect.

The negation in the form - "There is no fire" (vahnirnāsti) is regarded as a generic negation of fire. In order to include the said generic negation, Mathurānātha says that the absence of Śādhyā is to be understood as the negation, the counterpositiveness of which is limited by the limitor of Śādhyā and limited by the limiting relation of Śādhyāa.(1)

In the case of the syllogistic argument - "It has fire as it

(1) "Śādhyā-bhāva! ca sādhyatāvacchedakasambandhāvacchinna - sādhyatāvacchedakāvacchinna-pratiyogitāko grāhyah."

Vyāptipāncaka, māthūrī, Page no. 29 (Same Edition).
has smoke," the negation of fire is to be understood as the
generic negation of fire, the counterpositiveness of which
should be understood to have been limited by the relation of
contact (Samyoga) and by the fireness only. (Vahnitvamātrā-
vacchinnasamyoga-sambandhāvacchinnavahni-nistha-pratiyogita).

Now, the locus of the negation of Śādhyā is to be
understood through the absential particular relation (abhiyati-
vais'esanatā-vais'esena vodhyam) i.e. a particular nature -
relation (Svarūpasambandha). (1) Otherwise, there will arise
the defect of Avyapti in the case of the syllogistic argument
in the form - "It is the locus of the generic property
existing in quality, as it has got the knowledgeness" (Guhatva-
vān īśānatvāt). Here the probandum is the generic property
existing in quality (gūyatva) through the relation of inherence,

(1) "Vislesana-vis'esyabhāvī vislesanavis'esyā-svarūpameva,
nātirikta sambandha." - Tarkasamgraha - Dipika, Page
no. 44. Venkateswar Press Edition.
because it remains in its locus through this relation. And
the probans of the above inference is knowledgeness (jñānatva)
through the relation of inherence, as it remains in its locus
through the said relation. So, the limiting relation of both
the reasonness (hetutā) and Sādhya (the relational abstract
property existing in a Sādhya) is inherence. The locus of the
negation of Sādhya (i.e., the negation of gunatva) through the
relation of content-possessorness (visayitva) becomes in ānā
t knowledge itself in which the probans (i.e., knowledgeness)
exists. So, there will be the defect of the definition of being
'Too narrow'.

Though it has been said that the locus of the
negation of Sādhya should be taken in the nature-relation

(1) "Nanu tathāpi gunatvavān jñānatvād Sattāvān jāterityādau
visayitvāvyāpyatvādīśambhandhena tādṛśaśādhyā-bhāvavati
jñānādau jñānatvajātyādervarvamānatvādavyāptih."
Vyāptipancaka, Māthuri, Page no. 39 (Same Edition).
(svarūpa-sambandha) to avoid the defect mentioned above, there are some valid inferences where the locus of the negation of Sādhya is not possible through that (i.e., nature) relation.

In the cases of the syllogistic arguments like -

"It is the locus of the absolute negation of jarness as it has clothness" (ghaṭatvātyanta-bhāvān paṭatvāt) and "It is the mutual locus of the natural absence of a jar as it has clothness" (ghaṭānyonyābhāvān paṭatvāt), the probandum is the absolute negation of jarness and the mutual negation of a jar respectively. The negation of the probandum will be the negation of the absolute negation of jarness and the negation of the mutual absence of a jar respectively i.e., the jarness. The locus of the absence of the probandum (i.e., jarness) through nature relation (svarūpa-sambandha) is not possible, as the universal jarness remains in its locus through the relation of inherence.
So, the defect of the definition of being 'Too narrow' will take place. (1)

In reply to the above standpoint, those who hold the nature relation as a determinant of the locus of the negation of the probandum recognise the negation of the negation as a separate object in order to justify those types of inference mentioned above. So, it is proved that the negation of the absolute negation of jariness or the negation of the mutual negation of a jar is not the jariness, but a separate object. (2) As the locus of the negation of Sadhaya is possible through the nature-relation, there is no 'avyapti.'

(1) "Na ca Sadhyabhāvābhikaranatvamabhāvāvīvis'esanatā-vis'esasa-
sambandhena vivaksitanitī vācyam. Tathā sati ghatavātyan-
tā-bhāvavān ghatānyonyā-bhāvavān vā patavādityādau sadh-
yābhāvasya ghatavāder-vis'esanaata-vis'esesa-sambandhenādhi-

(2) "Atyanta-bhāvānyonyā-bhāvavoryatyantā-bhā-vasya saptama-
If the view of the old school of the Logicians regarding the double negation is accepted, it may be said that the relation that determines the locus of the negation of a Sadhya will be different in different inferences. In the case of the syllogistic argument in the form - "The mountain has fire, as it has smoke on it," the determining relation of the locusness of the negation of Sadhya is the nature relation (Svarūpa sambandha). But in the case of the syllogistic argument in the form - "It has the absolute negation of jarhood as it has clothness" or "It has the mutual negation of a jar as it has clothness," the determining relation of the locusness of the negation of Sadhya is inherence and so on.

If the negation of a negation becomes the counter-positive etc., the locusness of the negation of a Sadhya, according to Mathurānātha, should be taken through the limiting
relation either of the counterpositiveness which is determined by all the Sadhyas and which exists in the generic negation of the Sadhya, the counterpositiveness of which is limited by the limiting relation of Sadhyata and by the limitor of Sadhyata or of the limitorness determined by the said counterpositiveness. (1)

In the case of the syllogistic argument in the form - "It has fire, as it has smoke," the counterpositiveness determined by all the Sadhyas remains in the absence of fire, as the negation of the absence of fire becomes fire-in-general. The limiting relation of the counterpositiveness is nature (Svarūpa) or absential particular relation (vis'esanatā-visēsa).

In the case of the syllogistic argument in the form - "It has the absolute negation of jarness, as it has clothness," the negation of the probandum is jarness. As the negation of Sādhyābhāva (the negation of jarness) becomes the probandum itself, the counterpositiveness determined by the probandum (i.e., the negation of jarness) exists in the jarness which is taken as a generic negation of Sādhyā. So, in this case, the limiting relation of the counterpositiveness determined by all the Sādhyas is inherence (Samavāya). (1) Again, in the case of the syllogistic argument in the form - "It has the mutual negation of a jar, as it has clothness," the negation of the probandum is the negation of the mutual negation of a jar, i.e., jarness. Though in jarness there is not the

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(1) "Tār̥ṣ'asambandhas'ca vahniṃān dhūmādityādibhāvāsādhyaka-sthale vis'esaṇatā-vis'esa eva ghaṇṭatvātyantā-bhāvāvan paṭatvādityādyabhāvasādhyakasthale tu Samavāyādireva." Vyāptipaṅcaka, Māthuri, Page no. 41 (Same Edition).
counterpositiveness of the probandum (i.e., the mutual negation of a jar), there is the limitorness determined by a counter-
positiveness of the probandum.\(^{1}\) So, the limiting relation of the limitorness of the counterpositiveness determined by all
the Sādhyas will be the relation of inherence (Samavāya) again.

'Vṛttitva' (superstratumness) existing in the term
'avṛttitva' (i.e., the absence of the superstratumness) of the
definition must be limited by the limiting relation of the
reasonness (hetutāvacchedakasambandhāvacchina). Otherwise,
there would be the defect of the definition of being 'Too
narrow' in the valid inferences like - 'It has fire as it has
smoke.' For, the loci of the generic negation of fire are the
part of smoke (dhumāvaya), lake etc. As smoke exists in its

\(^{1}\) "Evaṁca ghaṭānyonyābhāvavān paṭatvādityādau sādhyābhāvasya
ghatatvādeḥ Sādhyāpratīyāgītavirahē'pi na ksatīh, tādṛś-
ānyetaresya Sādhyāpratīyōgītāvacchedakatvasyaiva tatra
sattvēt." - Vyāptipāñcaka Māthuri, Page 53. (Same
Edition).
parts through the relation of inherence and in lakes etc. through the temporal relation (Kalika-sambandha), the aforesaid negation of the superstratumness is not possible in smoke. By the insertion of the superstratumness (vṛttitva) which is limited by the limiting relation of reasonness (hetuṭa), the superstratumness determined by the limiting relation of reasonness i.e., contact, but not the superstratumness determined by the limiting temporal relation or by the limiting relation of inherence as the case may be, should be taken in the above case of inference. As the negation of the superstratumness which is limited by the relation of contact and which is determined by the locus of the negation of fire (i.e., the part of smoke-dhamavyaya or the lake etc.) exists in the smoke, the probans, there is no avyāpti.

By the negation of that type of superstratumness,
the generic negation of that type of superstratumness, not
an absence having its counterpositive existing in that type
of superstratumness (tādṛśaṇvrtitvanisthapratiyogitākābhāva),
is to be understood. Otherwise, there would occur the defect
of the definition of being 'Too wide' in the case of the
invalid inferences like - "The mountain has smoke as it has
fire." The specific negation of superstratumness in the form
- "There is the absence of the superstratumness determined
by the lake which is the locus of the negation of smoke."
(dhūmābhāvavadhradvṛttitvāṃ nāstī) may be taken in the fire,
the probans of the inference. So, the defect called 'atīvāyāpti'
will take place there. In order to avoid this, the generic
negation of that type of superstratumness is to be taken into
account. So, in the above inference, the locus of the negation
of smoke is red-hot iron ball. As the superstratumness
determined by the red-hot iron ball, the locus of the negation of Sadhya (i.e., the smoke) exists in fire, there is the absence of the generic negation of the superstratumness determined by the locus of the negation of smoke. So, the defect called 'ativyāpti' will not occur there.

The first definition of Vyāpti has been clarified in the above manner. This definition involves the defect of being 'Too narrow' in the case of the syllogistic argument in the form - "This is the locus of the contact of a monkey, as it has got this treeness (Kapisamyogī etadvṛksatvāt). Here the negation of the probandum is the negation of the contact of a monkey, the locus of which is this tree (i.e., as in the base of this tree there is the absence of the contact of a monkey) as the contact is of incomplete occurrence (avyāpya-vṛtti). That is to say, though the absence of the contact of a
monkey can not exist at the top of the tree, the absence of it may remain at the base of the same. So, this tree, the locus of the contact of a monkey, is also the locus of the generic absence of the same (i.e., the contact of a monkey) So, in the probans (this tree), there is the superstratumness (vṛttitva) determined by the locus of the generic absence of the contact of a monkey, but not the absence of the superstratumness determined by the locus of the generic negation of the contact of a monkey (Kapisamyogāśāmyābhāvavadvṛtti- tvābhava). So, there is the defect of the definition of being 'Too narrow'.

To avoid the defect mentioned above, there arises the necessity of introducing the second definition of Vyāpti which runs as follows. Vyāpti is the absence of the superstratumness (in the probans) determined by the locus of the
negation of the Sādhyā. That locus of the negation of Sādhyā is different from the locus of the Sādhyā. (1) In the syllogistic argument in the form - "It has fire as it has smoke," the loci of the Sādhyā (i.e., fire) are the kitchen etc. The loci that are different from those of Sādhyā are lake etc. Again, the lake etc. are the loci of the absence of Sādhyā (fire). So, the absence of the superstratumness of the probans (smoke) exists in the lake etc. In this way, the above definition can be applied to the above inference.

The Neo-logicists explain the above definition in the following manner - Vyāpti is the absence of the superstratumness (existing in the probans) determined by the locus of the absence of Sādhyā which (the absence) exists in places

that are different from the loci of the Śādhyā.(1)

In the case of the syllogistic argument in the form - "It is the locus of the contact of a monkey, as it has this treeness" (Kapisamyogī etadvṛksatavat), the defect called 'avyāpti' which took place in the case of the first definition can be avoided by the first interpretation of the second definition. Though the absence of the contact of a monkey exists in this tree, the locus of the probans (i.e., this treeness), the tree is not different from the locus of the probandum (Śādhyāvadbhinna). The mutual absence of the locus of the contact (Samyogavat) in the form - "This is not the locus of the contact" (Samyogī na) is of complete occurrence (Vyāpyaūrtti). So, this tree is not different from the locus

of the contact of a monkey (Kapisamyogavat) as it (the contact of monkey) exists in this tree. The locus of the mutual absence of the locus of the contact of a monkey (Kapisamyogavadbhinna) is another object other than that (i.e. the locus of the contact of a monkey) i.e. quality etc. As the absolute negation of the contact of a monkey remains in quality etc., they will be the loci of the absolute negation of the contact of a monkey. The absence of the superstratumness (avṛttitva) determined by quality etc. remains in this treeness (etadvṛksatva), the probans of the inference. So, the defect called 'avyāpti' does not take place. In order to avoid the defect of avyāpti involved in these types of inference, the term 'different from the locus of the probandum' (Sadhyavad-bhinna) has been inserted in the definition as a qualifier (vis'esana) of the locus of the probandum.
In this way, the defect called 'avyāpti' can be removed according to the second interpretation of the definition also in a different manner.

But, again, there will arise the defect of the definition of being 'Too narrow' (avyāpti) in the case of the syllogistic argument in the form — "This is the locus of the contact, as it has got the substanteness" (Sanyogīdravyatvāt).

The quality etc. which are different from the locus of the contact (i.e., the locus of the probandum) becomes the locus of the absence of the contact existing in a substance. The absence of the contact which exists in a substance may also remain in quality etc. So, the substance becomes the locus

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(1) "Kapisamyojī etadvirksatvādityādyāvyāpyavrttisādhyakāvyā-
ptivāraṇāya - Sādhyavaddhinneti Sādhyābhāvavato vis'esa-
na'kam pa'ncaḥ." Vyāptipancakā Mathurī, Page no. 85.

"Kapisamyyāvābhāvādhikaranamāvacechhinneyvaṁ
nymāntāmādāyāvyūptivāraṇāyetyarthāḥ. Tathā ca hevadhika-
ranibhūtavṛksasya sādhyavaddhinnatvābhāvanna dasah."
Commentary on Mathurī, Page no. 85 (Shib datta Mis'ra Edition).
of the absence of a contact which exists in quality etc. that are different from the locus of the contact (Samyogavadbhinna).

As the superstratumness determined by the substance exists in the substantiveness, the probans, there will be the defect of the definition of being 'Too narrow' (avyāpti).

In order to avoid the above mentioned defect, the third definition of Vyāpti has been introduced. According to the third definition, the absence of the superstratumness (vṛttitvābhāva) determined by the locus of the co-existence of a mutual absence (anyonyābhāva), the counterpositive of which is the locus of the Sadhya (Sādhyavatpratiyogikānyonyā- bhāvāsāmanādhikaranyam) is the meaning of the term 'non-deviatedness' (avyabhicaratvatva). (1) As for example, in the

(1) "Hetau Sādhyavatpratiyogikānyonyābhāvādikaraṇanirūpita-vṛttitvā-bhāva ityarthah." Vyāptipancaka Mathuri, Page no. 93 (Same Edition).
case of the syllogistic argument, in the form - "It has fire as it has smoke," the mutual absence, the counterpositive of which is the locus of the probandum is the absence in the form - "It is not the locus of fire" (vahnīman na). This mutual absence remains in the lake etc. in which there is the superstratumness existing in fish, moss etc. The absence of the superstratumness (vṛttītvabhāva) determined by the lake etc. which are the loci of the said mutual absence remains in smoke. In this way, the definition can be applied to those valid inferences. According to this definition, the defect called 'avyāpti' which involved, according to the previous definition, in the case of the syllogistic argument in the form - "It is the locus of the contact, as it has got the substanteness" (Samyogī dravyatvāt) can be avoided. Because, the mutual absence in the form - 'It is not the locus of the
contact' (Sāmyogīa), the counterpositive of which is the locus of the contact (Sāmyogavatpratiyogika) cannot remain in the substance. Because, the substance is the locus of the contact (Sāmyogī). As the mutual absence is of complete occurrence (vyapya-vṛtti), the mutual absence of the locus of the contact remains in the objects other than the substance i.e., in quality etc. The superstratumness determined by quality etc. (gunādinarupitavṛtti) remains in the generic property existing in quality etc. (gunatvādi). The absence of it (i.e., the superstratumness determined by quality etc.) exists in the substanteness, the probans of the inference. In this way, the definition can be applied here.

In order to make us understand the fact that like the invariable concomitance established by the method of agreement (avyayavyāpti) the invariable concomitance, the
ground of which is the method of difference (Vyatirekavyāpti) also comes under the purview of the meaning of the word 'non-deviatedness' (avyabhicaritata). The fourth definition has been introduced. According to this definition, the counterpositiveness of the negation existing in all the loci of the absence of the probandum (Sakalasadhyābhāvavannisthābhāvapratiyogitva) is the meaning of the term 'non-deviatedness' (avyabhicaritata). Here, the term 'all' (Sakala) should be taken as a qualifier (vis'esana) of the locus of the absence of the probandum, not of the absence of the probandum. (1)

As the syllogistic argument in the form - "It has fire as it has smoke" is an instance of both the Anvayavyāpti and vyatirekavyāpti, this definition can be applied here also.

(1) "Sakalyam sādhyabhāvavato vis'esanam, Tathā ca - yavanti sādhyabhāvādhihkaranaṁ tannisthābhāvapratiyogitva hetorvyāptiriti." - Vyāptipacāka Mādhuri, Page no. 95 (Same Edition).
The counterpositiveness of the absence of smoke exists in the smoke itself. This absence of smoke remains in all the loci of the absence of fire i.e., in lake, sea etc. The definition of Vyatirekavyāpti is the counterpositiveness of the absence which is pervaded by the absence of the probandum (Sadhyabhāvavyāpakībhūtabhāvapratiyogitva). That is to say, the counterpositiveness determined by the above-mentioned negation existing in all the places where there is the absence of the probandum is known as Vyatirekavyāpti. This definition can be applied to the form of syllogistic argument - "The earth is different from others than that (i.e., the earth), as it has smell." (Prthivi itarabhina gandhavattvat). The mutual absence from others (itarabheda) is the probandum, the absence of which is the negation of the mutual absence from others (itarabhedabhāva) i.e., the property existing in others
(itaratva), as the negation of the mutual absence becomes the limitor of the counterpositiveness. The property existing in others (itaratva) i.e., the property existing in other object than the earth (prthivitataratva) exists in water, air, ether etc. where there is the absence of smell. As the counterpositiveness determined by the absence of smell exists in the smell, there will not occur any defect of the definition.

The fourth definition of Vyāpti has got no common connotation (ananugata), as it is constituted by the terms 'yat' and 'Tat'. That is to say, as it is said that the negation exists in the places that are the loci of the absence of the probandum etc., the definition has got no common connotation on account of which the fifth definition has been introduced.

The fifth definition runs as follows. The absence
of the superstratumness (vṛttitvābhāva) determined by other places than the locus of the probandum. That is to say, the absence of the superstratumness existing in a place which is other than the locus of the probandum (Sādhyavadanyāvṛttitvam) is Vyāpti. (1) As for example, in the case of the syllogistic argument in the form - "It has fire, as it has smoke;" the loci of the probandum (fire) are kitchen etc. The loci other than those of the probandum are lake etc. The superstratumness determined by lake etc. remains in fish, moss etc., and the absence of it remains in smoke, the probans of the inference. There will arise no defect of the definition of being 'Too wide' (ativyāpti) also in the invalid inferences like - "It has smoke as it has fire." The loci of the probandum (smoke)

(1) "Atrāpi prathamalakṣanarītyā hetau sādhyavadanyāvṛttitvābhāva ityarthah." - Vyāptipancaka, Mathurī, Page no.100. (Same Edition).
are kitchen etc. The locus other than the loci of the probandum is the red-hot iron ball in which there is the superstratumness determined by fire. That is to say, the absence of the superstratum determined by fire does not exist there. So, the definition of Vyāpti can not be applied here.

The aforesaid five definitions of Vyāpti can not be the proper, as they are not applicable to a Kevalānwayi inference (i.e., an inference where there is the absence of the instances of the method of agreement in absence).

'Kevalānwayi' means 'not being the counterpositive of an absolute negation which exists somewhere (vṛttimadatyantābhā-vāpratīyogitvām). In the syllogistic argument - "It is nameable as it is knowable", the 'nameability' is Kevalānwayi, as the absence of it is not found anywhere.

(1) "Sarvānyova lākṣaṇāni kevalānwayavyāptya duṣeyati kevalān-
vayinyabhāvāditi. Pañcānaṁeva lākṣaṇānāmidam vācyam jñeyā-
tvādityādyāvyāpyavṛttikevalānwayisādhyake........cābhā-
The first definition can not be applied to the above inference. According to the first definition, the invariable concomitance is the absence of the superstratumness determined by the locus in which the probandum is absent. As 'nameability', the probandum is not absent anywhere, the locus of the absence of the probandum can nowhere be found.

According to the second definition, Vṛṣṭi is the absence of the superstratumness (in the probans) determined by the locus of the negation of Sādhyā. That locus is different from that of Sādhyā. In the above inference, the locus different from that of Sādhyā is not possible, as the Sādhyā is present everywhere.

The third definition can not be applied to the above inference, as the mutual negation of the locus of the Sādhyā is not possible due to its presence everywhere. For the
same reason the fourth and the fifth definitions also cannot be applied to the above inference.

According to the Vedantists, Vyāpti is the invariable concomitance of the co-existence of the probandum with the probans in all the loci where the probans exists. (1)

After discussing various probans, the Vedantists arrived at the conclusion that the 'As'esa' (i.e., entirety) signified by the term 'As'esa' mentioned in the definition of Vyāpti means pervaderness (vyāpakatva). According to them, if the meaning of the term 'As'esa' is taken as pervaderness (vyāpakatva), there will not occur any defect of the definition of Vyāpti even in the three alternatives which had already been discussed in Chapter no. III. (2)

(1) "Vyāpti'cās'esaśadhanās'rayās'ritesādhyasāmanādhiyakāpya-rūpā." - Vedāntaparibhāṣā (anumāna Section).
(2) "Vyāpakatvarūpās'esaśvābhāsyupagamena paksatrayē'pi doṣābhāvāt." - Super Commentary Maniprabhā on Vedāntaparibhāṣā. Page no. 173 (Same Edition).
The pervaderness (Vyāpakatva) is the state or condition of being limited by the property in which there is the absence of the limitorness determined by the counterpositiveness of the absolute negation existing in the same locus of that object. (1) The pervaderness of smoke (dhūma - Vyāpakatva) is the state or condition of being limited by the property in which there is the absence of the limitorness determined by the counterpositiveness of the absolute negation existing in the same locus with the smoke. (2) That is to say, the loci of the smoke are kitchen etc. in which there are the absolute negations of the substances like jar etc. The limitors of the counterpositiveness are the properties like

(1) "Tatsamānādhikaranātyantābhāvapratiyogitānavacchedakadharma-vattvam tadvyāpakatvam."

(2) "Dhūmasamānādhikaranātyantābhāvapratiyogitānavacchedaka-dharma-vottvam dhūmavyāpakatvam."
jarness etc. The non-limiting property of the counterpositive-
ness of the absolute negations is fireness. The state or
condition of being limited by the fireness existing in fire
is the pervaderness.

This pervaderness (vyāpakatva) may be interpreted
as invariability (niyatatva). Invariable concomitance is
included in the pervaderness. When it is said that wherever
there is smoke there is fire, the pervaderness existing in
the fire is known. Then, the pervaderness is attained in the
fire. The invariable co-existence is Vyāpti. (1) The existence
of an invariable concomitance is to be admitted in the
pervaderness, as there is also the invariable co-existence.

The pervaderness is taken as the component part of
the definition of Vyāpti as offered by the Vedantists. As the

(1) "Yatra dhūmastatrāgniriti Sāhacaryaniyamo Vyāptih."
knowledge of invariable concomitance depends on another
Vyāpti which is inside the pervaderness, there is the defect
of self-dependence in knowledge (ātmas'raya).

According to the Buddhists, Vyāpti is possible
when the probans is different from the objects existing in
the locus of the absence of the probandum (avinābhāva). If
the probans does not exist in the locus of the absence of the
probandum, there is Vyāpti.

This definition of Vyāpti can not be applied to a
Kevalānvayī inference (i.e., an inference in which the absence
of the probandum is not found anywhere). This definition can
not be applied to the inference - "It is nameable, as it is
knowable", as the absence of nameability, the probandum can
no where be found. (1)

(1) "Nāpyavinā-bhāve, kevalānvayinyabhāvāt." Tattvacintāmani
(Pūrvapaksa grantha).
Moreover, if the relation of the identity of nature (Tādātmyasambandha) is taken as the relation known as 'avinābhāva', the syllogistic arguments like - "The mountain is fiery, as it has smoke" in which the probans and the probandum (i.e., the smoke and the fire) exist in the relation of contact (Samyogasambandha) will not be possible. Because, the identity of fire does not exist in the probans in the form of smoke. If the causal relation is taken by the term 'avinābhāva', the inferences like - "This is the locus of the specific property known as 'sattā', as it is a universal" (Sattāvān jāteh) in which the probans and the probandum are the eternal objects and the inferences like - "This is a tree, as it has got the specific property existing in S'ims'apā (ayam vṛksah S'ims'apātvāt) in which the probans and the probandum exist as identical will not be possible due to the
absence of causal relation between the probans and the probandum.

If the Buddhists want to say with a view to avoiding this difficulty that the state or condition of being the locus of the invariable existence or sattā pervaded by the sattā in the form of probandum (Sādhyā-sattāniyatasattāvattva) is to be taken as the relation known as 'avinābhāva', the question will arise as to the meaning of the term 'niyata' (invariable or pervaded). That is to say, what do the Buddhists mean by the term 'niyata' (invariable)? If the meaning of it is accepted as pervaderness (vyāpakatva), the definition can be applied to the probans of equal pervasion or reciprocal pervasion (samavyāptahetu). But the above definition can not be applied to the probans of the unequal pervasion (viṣamavyāptahetu). Moreover, this definition can be applied to the invalid inferences like - "It has smoke as it has fire." (dhūmavān
vahneh). So, the meaning of the term 'niyata' (invariable) as pervaderness (vyāpakatva) can not be acceptable, as there will be the defects of the definition of being 'Too narrow' (avyāpti) and 'Too wide' (ativyāpti) in the inference where the probans is of unequal pervasion and the invalid inference mentioned above respectively.

If the meaning of the term 'niyata' is accepted as 'pervaded' (vyāpyatva) by the Buddhists, the definition of the invariable concomitance as offered by them will involve the defect known as 'mutual dependence' (anyonyās'raya). That is to say, the invariable concomitance exists in the pervadedness (Vyāpyatva). So, without the knowledge of the invariable concomitance the knowledge of the pervadedness is not possible. In the same way, it can be said that without the knowledge of the pervadedness the knowledge of the invariable concomitance
can not be attained, as the definition of it comprises the pervadedness. So, the above definition of the invariable concomitance involves the defect known as 'mutual dependence' (itaretaras'raya).

The definition of Vyāpti as advanced by the philosophers of the Sāmkhya system is as follows. The invariable co-existence is to be understood as Vyāpti which may be determined by both the probans and the probandum or by a particular individual object of them. (1)

The above-mentioned definition of Vyāpti is not proper, as it involves the defect of self-dependence (ātmā-s'raya). Here the invariable concomitance is included inside the invariable co-existence of the pervader (niyatadharmasāhi-tyām). As the invariable co-existence is Vyāpti, the existence

(1) "Niyatadharmasāhityamubhayorekatarasya vā Vyāptih."  
Sāmkhyasūtra 5/29.
of the invariable concomitance is to be admitted inside the invariable co-existence. Here the invariable co-existence is the component part of the definition of Vyāpti. In this component part, there exists the definition of Vyāpti. As the knowledge of the invariable concomitance depends on Vyāpti itself which exists in the component part of the original definition (i.e., which exists in the invariable co-existence), there is the defect of Self-dependence (ātmās'raya) in knowledge of Vyāpti.

According to some scholars, Vyāpti is to be defined as being connected with the locus of the probandum which is not the counterpositive of the mutual absence existing in the locus of the probans (Sañhanavanniṣṭhānyonyabhaṅgāpratiyogī-śādhyavatkatvam). According to them, the smoke is the probans in the case of the syllogistic argument in the form - "It has
fire, as it has smoke." The loci of the probans are kitchen etc. in which there is the mutual absence in the form - "This is not the locus of a jar (ghaṭavān na). The counterpositive of this mutual absence is the locus of a jar and the non-counterpositive of it is the locus of the fire, as the mutual absence in the form - "This is not the locus of fire" (vahnimān na) is never found there. The locus of fire which is identical with the locus of the probandum in this particular inference is connected with the probans. So, this definition can be applied there.

But this definition can not be applied in the case of the syllogistic argument in the form - "It is the locus of the contact of a monkey, as it has got this treeness" (Kapi-sanyogī etavākṣatvāt). Here the locus of this treeness, the probans of the inference is this tree in which there exists
the mutual absence in the form - "This is not a locus of the contact of a monkey" (kapisanyogi na) determined by the base of this tree. The counter-positive of it is the locus of the contact of a monkey i.e., this tree. As the counter-positive (but not the non-counterpositive) of this mutual absence is this tree which is the locus of the probandum, there is the defect of the definition of being 'Too narrow' (avyāpti).

The above-mentioned definition of Vyāpti has been criticised in the manner mentioned above. According to Mathurānātha Tarkavagis'ā, the mutual absence is of incomplete occurrence if the limitor of the counterpositiveness of it is an object which is of incomplete occurrence (avyāpyavṛtti). That is to say, the mutual absence, the counterpositive of which is something which is qualified by the incomplete occurrence (avyāpyavṛttimatpratiyogika) will be of incomplete
occurrence. For, the mutual absence is contradicted to the
limitor of the counterpositiveness. The limitor of the
counter-positiveness of the mutual absence in the form - 'It
is not the locus of the contact of a monkey' (Kapisamyogi na)
is the contact of a monkey. The mutual absence is contradicted
to the contact of a monkey. Where there is the limitor of the
counterpositiveness (i.e., jarness) of the mutual absence in
the form - "This is not a jar" (ghato na), the mutual absence
of a jar can not exist there. In the same way, where there is
the limitor of the counterpositiveness i.e., the contact of
a monkey, the mutual absence of the contact of a monkey can
not exist there. It may, however, remain in the places where
there is not the limitor of the counterpositiveness.

Some Scholars have advanced the following opinion
in respect of the above-mentioned theory. According to them,
the mutual absence may remain in some places, but the limitor of the locusness determined by the superstratumness existing in a mutual absence (anyonyabhavanisthadheyatannirupitadhiranatavacchedaka) may be different. Though the mutual absence in the form - 'This is not the locus of the contact of a monkey' exists in this tree limited by the base of it, the locusness (adhikaranatva) of the mutual absence is of complete occurrence (vyapavrtti). Though the mutual absence in the form - 'This is not the locus of the contact of a monkey' remains in this tree limited by the base of it, the locusness of the mutual absence exists in the whole tree. So, the absence of the locusness will not be found in this tree.

If this view is accepted, the above-mentioned criticism will attain the less importance due to the dispute in respect of this theory. But the above view may not be accepted by all. Some may think that the locusness of the
mutual absence remains in a particular place or a particular part where it (the mutual absence) exists. Keeping in view the possibility of the diversity of opinion in respect of the criticism of the existence of the locusness of the mutual absence, the above-mentioned criticism of the said definition of Vyapti has been advanced. That is to say, though it is the accepted theory of the logicians that the locusness of the mutual absence, the counterpositive of which is qualified by an object of incomplete occurrence (avyāpyavṛtti) is accepted as of complete occurrence, a question may still be raised as to the justifiability of the argument on the basis of which the locusness is accepted as of complete occurrence (vyāpyavṛtti). Because, it is not easy to understand that, which the said mutual absence is of incomplete occurrence, the locusness determined by the superstratumness (ādheyatānirūpitādhikarana)
existing in the said mutual absence is of complete occurrence. Why should we not consider the locusness also as of incomplete occurrence when the said mutual absence existing in the locus is accepted as of incomplete occurrence?

If the said mutual absence existing in this tree is considered to be of incomplete occurrence as being limited by the limitor in the form of the base of this tree, the mutual absence is considered here as of incomplete occurrence. Why should we not then, by applying the same logic, accept the locusness determined by the superstratumness existing in the said mutual absence also as of incomplete occurrence considering the same base of the tree as a limitor?

We are, therefore, inclined to leave this problem for solution to the scholars of Navya Nyāya Logic.

The definition of Vyāpti as given by the Jainas
philosophers is as follows. The invariable concomitance (avinābhāva) is the invariability between the respective existence of the synchronous and the successive events.\(^{(1)}\)

It has been explained in the commentary as follows. Synchronous events are those that are co-effects of a same set of cause as for example, the colour and taste of a fruit.\(^{(2)}\)

Here, colour and taste are considered as the co-effects of a same set of cause. It may be said that the colour and taste can not be produced from a same set of cause. The collection of causes of colour is different from that of taste. The peculiarity of an object depends on the peculiarity of the collection of causes (Samagri). The peculiarity of an

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\(^{(1)}\) "Sahakramabhāvinoh Sahakramabhāvaniyamo'vinābhāvah." Pramanānīmaṃsā - 1.2.10.

\(^{(2)}\) "Sahabhāvinoh okasāmagrādhīnayoh phalādīgatayoh rūparasā-yoh etc." - Commentary on Sūtra 1.2.10 of Pramanānīmaṃsā. Page no. 41 (Singdhī Jaina Series no. 9 Pt. Sukhlalji Sanghavi Edition).
effect depends on the peculiarity of a cause. As peculiarity involves in colour, it must be originated from a peculiar cause. The peculiar taste is also originated from a different peculiar set of causes or conditions. If the colour and taste are produced from a same set of cause, they become identical. So, the above explanation given by the Jaina philosophers is not acceptable.

According to the Mīmāṃsakas, the invariable concomitance is a natural relation (svābhāvikah Sambandah Vyāptih). Naturalness consists in that which is free from an extraneous adjunct (upādhirāhityam). That is to say, naturalness remains in the locus of the absence of an accidental extraneous adjunct. In order to understand this naturalness, the nature of an extraneous adjunct is to be understood. According to them, not being the pervader of the probans if something has an
equal or reciprocal pervasion with the probandum, it is called an extraneous adjunct (Sadhanavyapakatve Sati Sadhyasamavyapta upadhish).

The above-mentioned definition of Vyapti is not proper, as it involves the defect of Self-dependence in knowledge (atmas'raya). Here, the invariable concomitance is included inside the meaning of the term - 'The equal or reciprocal pervasion with the probandum' (Sadhyasamavyapta) which is the component part of the definition of upadhi which is necessary to understand the naturalness of the relation which is Vyapti. So, the existence of the invariable concomitance is to be admitted inside the reciprocal or equal pervasion with the probandum. Without the knowledge of invariable concomitance the equal or reciprocal pervasion with the probandum can not be understood. As the knowledge of the invariable concomitance
depends on the knowledge of Vyāpti itself which exists in the component part of the definition of an extraneous adjunct, there is the defect of Self-dependence in knowledge (ātmaśraya).

As the definition of upādhi is faulty, the definition of naturalness is also faulty. So, such type of natural relation can not be Vyāpti.

As the knowledge of the absence of something depends on the knowledge of its counterpositive, the absence of an extraneous adjunct can not be ascertained without the knowledge of it (i.e., an extraneous adjunct). It has already been said that the invariable concomitance exists inside the nature of upādhi mentioned above. So, without the knowledge of the invariable concomitance the knowledge of an extraneous adjunct is not possible. In the same way, it can be said that without the knowledge of an extraneous adjunct the knowledge of
invariable concomitance can not be attained, as the definition of it (Vyāpti) comprises the extraneous adjunct. In this way, the above definition of Vyāpti involves the defect of mutual dependence (itaretarās'raya or anyonyās'raya or parasparās'raya). (1) It has been justly criticised by the philosophers of the Čārvāka school.

According to Kumārila, the invariable concomitance is the relation of the probans with the probandum. (2) This definition has been offered by Vātsyāyana also. (3)

In criticising the definition of Vyāpti of Vātsyāyana, the argument which is advanced by Ganges'a in the

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(1) "Tatra vidhyadhāyasāya-pūrvakatvānvisodhdyavasāyasāya

upādhijñāne jāte tadabhāvavis'ītasambandharūpavvyāptijñā-

naṁ, Vyāptijñānādhihām copādhijñānamitii parasparās'raya-
vajraprahāradoso vajrālapayate." Čārvāka-dās'ana (Śarva-
dās'anasamgraha).

(2) "Sambandho Vyāptiristātra līṅgadharmasya līṅgīnā." Ślokavārtika - Ślokē no. 2 (Inference Chapter).

(2) "Sambandhamatram Vyāptih........." - Tattvacintamāni (Pūrvapakṣasāṃgrahā).
Tattvacintāmani is applicable to the criticism of the definition of Kumarila also.

The relation of the probans with the probandum in any form can not be called Vyāpti. That is to say, the relation of them in any form can not be the connotation of the term 'Vyāpti' (Vyāptipadapravṛttinimitta), as the knowledge of relation in general can not lead one to get an inferential knowledge. \(^{(1)}\) As for instance, fire exists on the hill where the smoke also exists. On seeing this relation (in the form of co-existence) of the two objects on the hill, it can not be said that the fire is pervaded by the smoke. That is to say, it can not be said that there is the invariable concomitance of fire with smoke, as deviation is found in the red-hot iron ball.

\(^{(1)}\) "Nāpi Vyāptipadapravṛttinimittamidam. Sambandhajñāne'pi Vyāptipadāprayogat." Tattvacintāmani (Pūraṇapaksāgranthāh).
So, the definitions given by Kumārila and Vātsyāyana can not be accepted as valid.

The definition of the invariable concomitance as offered by Vallabhaśaṅkara, the author of the Nyāyālīlāvatī (1) is the universal relation between the probans and probandum. (2)

This definition of the invariable concomitance is not acceptable. If the above definition is interpreted as the relation of all the individual manifestations of the probandum with the probans (Kṛtanena-Sādhyena hetoh sambandha), the definition can be applied to the probans of the reciprocal pervasion. But this can not be applied to the probans of unequal pervasion (visāmavyāptahetu). So, there will be the defect of the definition of being 'Too narrow' (avyāpti). (3)

(3) "...........Na kārṣṇyena sādhyena sambandho vyāptih visāmavyāpte tadbhāvacceta." Tattvacintāmaṇi - Vyāptipūrvapakṣa Chapter.
If this definition is interpreted as the relation of all the individual manifestations of probans with the probandum (kṛtsnasya hetoh sādhyena sambandhahaḥ), there will be the defect of the definition of being 'Too narrow' (avyāpti) in the inferences like: "It has fire as it has smoke" in which the probandum has got various individual manifestations. As the probandum of the inference mentioned above has got many individuals, the relation of all the individual manifestations of the probans with any of the individual manifestations of the probandum is not possible. If the definition is interpreted as the relation of Sādhyā existing in all the individual manifestations of the probans (kṛtsnesu sādhanesu Sādhyasaṁmānādikaranyam), there will involve the defect of the definition of being 'avyāpti' in an inference in which the probans is a
If the definition is interpreted as the relation of all the individual manifestations of the probans with all the individual manifestations of the probandum (krtsnena sādhyena krtsnasya sādhanasya sambandhah), it will not also be acceptable. Because, the relation of a particular individual manifestation of the probans with the particular individual manifestation of the probandum can easily be ascertained, but not the relation between all the individual manifestations of fire and smoke. So, there will be the defect of the definition of being 'Too narrow' (avyāpti) in the valid inferences in which the probandum

(1) "Kṛtsnena sādhanasya sādhyasya vā. Ādyapi kṛtsnasādhanasā- 
mānādhikaranyam sādhye kṛtsneṣu sādhaneṣu sādhyasāmānādhik- 
karanyam vā. Tatra na vikalpadvayam, ekavyaktihetuke tada- 
bhāväḥ, nānāvyaktihetuke'pi sakaladhūmasambandhasya kasmi- 
nnapi vahnāvabhāväḥ." - Introduction of the 'Siddhāntalakṣa- 
ṇam' (Swami Divyananda Edition).

"Kṛtsnena sādhanena sādhyasya sāmānādhihikaranyamityarthah, 
taccaikavyaktihetukasthale nāsti.....aṇekās'etvarūpasya 
kṛtsnyasya-bhāvāditi Bhāvāḥ." - Tattvacintāmanī, 
Māthuri, Page no. 86 (Calcutta Edition).
consists of various individual manifestations (nāṇāvyaktisādh-
yaka). (1) In the valid inferences in which the probandum is a single individual (ekavyaktisādhya), there will be the defect known as 'avyāpti', as the existence of all the individual manifestations of the probans or the probandum is not possible. Moreover, this definition of Vyāpti will involve the defect known as 'avyāpti' in the inferences in which the probans is of unequal pervasion (visamavyāptahatu), as the relation between all the individual manifestations of the probans and the probandum is not possible. So, the above definition of the invariable concomitance can not be accepted. (2)

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(2) "Nāpi kārtṣṇyena sambandho Vyāptih ekavyaktike tadabhāvāt nāṇāvyaktike'pi sakaladhūmasambandhaṣya pratyaka-vahnyāva-
bhāvāt. Ataeva na kārtṣṇyena sādhyaṇa sambandho vyāptih visamavyāpte tadabhāvācca." - Tattvacintāmani (Vyāpti-
pūrvapaksa Chapter).