CHAPTER III

The definition of Vyāpti as offered by various systems of Philosophy.
The definition of Vyāpti as offered by the Mīmāṃsakas.

The definition or the nature of the invariable concomitance which is considered as the ground of attaining inferential knowledge is given by the Mīmāṃsakas in the Mānaṃyaodaya. Invariable concomitance is a natural relation (Svābhāvikah sambandhah vyāptiḥ). Naturalness (Svābhāvikatva) consists in that which is free from an extraneous adjunct (upādhirāhitya). In other words, naturalness consists in the absence of an accidental extraneous adjunct. In order to understand the naturalness (Svābhāvikatva) which exists in the absence of an extraneous adjunct, the nature of an extraneous adjunct (upādhi) is to be understood at first.

Another reason or probans (hetvantaram) which is the direct promoter (Sākṣātprayojakam) of the probandum is called an
extraneous adjunct (upādhi) when that separate reason or probans (i.e., the extraneous adjunct or upādhi) exists, the actual probans (Prastuto) that has acquired a relation with the probandum (Sādhyasambandham) which is related to that reason or probans (i.e., the extraneous adjunct or upādhi) can not be an instrument (asādhaka) of an inference. As for example, "The cruelty in the Agniṣomiya sacrifice is a vice, as it is a cruelty like other external cruelties." This form of inference is given by the Non-Vedists and Sāmkhya school of Philosophy. In this inference, the prohibitedness (nisiddhatva) will be taken as an extraneous adjunct. This prohibitedness (nisiddhatva) is a direct promoter (Sākṣatprayojaka) of the viciousness (adharmatva) which is the

probandum.\(^{(1)}\) Here other external cruelties are also prohibited. Due to their prohibition, it may be said that they have the viceness. As there is no prohibition regarding the cruelty in Agnisomiyā sacrifice (Kratuhiṃsāya niṣiddhavabhāve), the viceness can not be established by the cruelty alone (hiṃsāmātrea).\(^{(2)}\)

Not being the pervader of the probans (Sādhanāvyāpakatyā sati), if something has the equal or reciprocal pervasion (samavyāpti) with the probandum, it is called an

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\(^{(2)}\)"Uṣṭhahimsānāmapi ca niṣiddhatvakrtamevaadharmatvamiti kṛtuhimsāya niṣiddhavabhāve hiṃśātvamātreṇaadharmatvam na sidhyati iti." - Mānameyodaya, Page no.27 (Same Edition).
extraneous adjunct. As the prohibitedness can not be applied to the case of cruelty involved in the sacrifice (Kratuhimsā-yān niṣiddhatvābhāvāt), the prohibitedness does not exist in all the cases of cruelty which is the probans (Sādhanabhūta-himsatvadesa). (1) There is an equal or reciprocal pervasion (samavyāpti) between the viceness, the probandum and the prohibitedness (niṣiddhatva), the extraneous adjunct. Because, all that is prohibited is the vice and all that is vice is prohibited. (2)

The three-fold qualification (tadvisesānātritayam) in the above definition of upādhi (i.e., the pervaderness of

(1) "Sādhanāvyāpakatve sati sādhyasamavyāpta upādhihīti tasya laksanam. Niṣiddhatvam hi sādhanabhūta-himsatvadesa sarvatra na vartate kratuhimsāyām niṣiddhatvābhāvāt." - Ibid.

(2) "Sādhyabhūtana cādharmatvena niṣiddhatvasya samavyāptirasti nisiddhanām sarveṣāmapyadharmatvād adharmabhūtānāca sarveṣām niṣiddhatvāditī." - Mānameyodaya - Page no. 27 (Same Edition).
the probans - sādhana-vyāpakaṭva, the pervaderness of the probandum - sādhyavyāpakaṭva, and the pervadedness of the probandum - sādhyavyāpyaṭva) has been accepted so that something having the generic property existing in the collection of causes (Tatsāmagrikaṭvam), the kitchenness (mahānasatvam) or the mutual absence of a mountain (parvatanyatva) may not be considered as an extraneous adjunct in the inference of fire (agnyanuraitau). (1) If it is said that an extraneous adjunct is an equal or reciprocal pervasion with the probandum, the generic property existing in the collection of causes (sāmagrikaṭvam) of fire would become an extraneous adjunct in the locus of the probandum at the time of inference of the existence of fire from the existence of smoke. Because, it (agnisāmagrikaṭva) has a reciprocal

(1) "Tatsāmagrikaṭvam mahānasatvam parvatanyatvam cagnyanu­mitau upādhirnabhūditi tadvisesaṭrītayam." - Ibid.
pervasion with the fire. So, in order to remove this defect, it has been said (in the definition of upādhi) that it will not be the pervader of the probans (sadhanāvyāpaka). The causal aggregate of fire (agnisāmagri) is the pervader of the smoke which is the probans. Where there is smoke, there is the collection of causes of fire. If it is said (regarding the definition of upādhi) that it will not be the pervader of the probans (sadhanāvyāpaka ityevocyate), the kitchenness in that case would be taken as an extraneous adjunct. (1)

It is a fact that, where there is smoke, there is

not always the kitchenness. So, in the kitchenness, there lies
the non-pervaderness of the probans (sādhanāvyāpakatva). So,
the kitchenness will be treated as an extraneous adjunct. In
order to remove this defect, the adjunct 'Sādhyavyāpakatvaṃ'
(i.e., the pervaderness of the probandum) is also to be
inserted in the definition of upādhi. The kitchenness does
not pervade the fire. As in a monastery, there is the
existence of fire, but not the kitchenness. (1) As the kitchen-
ness has got no pervaderness of the probandum in it, it can
not be regarded as an extraneous adjunct.

It can not be said that something which is the
pervader of the probandum (sādhyavyāpaka) and the non-pervader

(1) "Na hi dhūme sati sarvatra mahānasatvamastiti sādhanāvyā-
pakatvasya bhavāt. Atastannivṛtyarthāṃ sādhyavyāpeka-
tvamāgrayāṇīyam. Na hi mahānasatva-syāgnivyāpaktevamastiti.
Māṭhādīśvagnisadbhāv'e'pi tadabhāvāt."
Mānasmeyodayah, Page-28 (Same Edition).
of the probans (sādhanāvyāpaka) is called an extraneous adjunct. Because, in that case, the mutual absence of the mountain (parvatānyatva) would become an extraneous adjunct (1).

In a mountain, there is not the mutual absence of a mountain (parvat-ānyatva). But the smoke may be seen there as the mutual absence of a mountain is not the pervader of the probans (sādhanāvyāpakatvāt). In the places (kitchen etc.) which are ascertained before the inference (Pūrvamavadhāritanā) as the loci of the fire (agnimattvānā), there is the mutual absence of the mountain. Where (i.e., in the previously ascertained places like kitchen etc.) there is fire, there is the mutual absence of a mountain. So, the mutual absence of a mountain is regarded as the pervader of the probandum.

(1) "Atha yadi sādhanāvyāpakatve sati sadhyāvyāpakā upādhīrtvyevocyate tathāpi parvatataramatvamupādhīh syāt." - Ibid.
So, it will be an extraneous adjunct. In order to remove this defect, the qualifying adjunct 'reciprocal or equal' (sama) has been inserted in the definition of an extraneous adjunct. As everything that has got the mutual absence of a mountain does not contain fire, it (the mutual absence of fire) has no reciprocal or equal pervasion with fire. So, it can not be an extraneous adjunct.\(^{(1)}\)

Freedom from the extraneous adjunct, the nature of which is of the above-mentioned type is called naturalness. And this natural relation is called Vyāpti.

In the Ślokavārtika, Kumarila Bhaṭṭa has given


\(^{(1)}\) "Mānayeṣodaya, Page no. 29. (Same Edition)."
the nature of inference and of the invariable concomitance in the following manner.

According to him, the man who knows the invariable relation (jñātāsambandha) between the probans and the probandum and has known one object (i.e., the probans) related to another makes an inference. (1)

That is to say, the man who knows the relation of smoke existing in the kitchen etc. in which the existence of the probandum is definitely known and who comes to know the smoke as having invariable relation with fire attains the knowledge of another object as fire on the mountain after knowing one object as smoke on it. (2)

(1) "Pramātā jñātāsambandha ekades'yatha vocyate." - Slokavārtika -Śloka no. 2 (Inference Chapter).

Now, what is this relation between the probans and the probandum? Is this relation a causal one (Kāryakāra-ṇabhāva), identity of nature (Tādātmya), contact (samyoga), inherence (samavāya), inherence in a common locus (ekārthasamavāya) or contradiction (virodha)? That relation is not in the form of any of these. For, the relation of the probans and the probandum between the appearance etc. of the star known as Kṛttikā and the star called Rohini can be established even when there is the absence of any of those relations. (1)

So, it has been said that the invariable concomitance is a relation of the probans with the probandum. (2)

(1) "Kah punarliṅgaliṅginoḥ sambandhah, kāryakāraṇatādātmya-samyoga-samavāyaikārthasamavāyavirodha iti cet, na, tada-bhāve' pi kṛttikārohinyudayādinaṁ liṅgaliṅgibhāvāt, ata āha- sambandha iti."


(2) "Sambandho vyāptiristātra liṅga-dharmasya liṅgīnā." Slokavārtika, Sloka no. 4. (Inference Chapter).
The invariable concomitance is Vyāpti. Any of the relations, through which the invariability is known, is to be understood as Vyāpti of the probans with the probandum. (1)

The definition of Vyāpti as offered by the Vedantists.

In the Vedānta-paribhāṣā, the definition of Vyāpti is given in the following manner. Vyāpti is the co-existence of the probandum with the probans in all the loci where the probans exists. (2) From the knowledge in the form - 'where there is smoke, there is fire,' the syllogistic argument can be advanced in the form - "The hill is fiery, as there is smoke." The object of the knowledge in the form - 'The smoke


(2) "Vyāptisāgasseasadhanāśrayasāritasādhyanasādhikaraṇyārūpāḥ." - Vedāntapariśāha, Inference Chapter.
is pervaded by fire' is Vyāpti. And this knowledge is derived from the knowledge in the form - "wherever there is smoke, there is fire."

The above-mentioned definition of Vyāpti has been clarified in the commentary known as Śikhamani on Vedānta-paribhāṣā in the following manner. Vyāpti is the co-existence of the probandum which is limited by the limitor of Sādhyata (the relational abstract property existing in the Sādhyā) which exists in all the loci of the probans. It may be argued that the definition is not correct, as the fireness etc. that are the limitors of Sādhyata do not exist in the kitchen etc. that are the loci of the probans. This view is not acceptable. For, the fireness which is the limitor of Sādhyata exists in the kitchen which is the locus of the probans through the
indirect relation known as Svās'rayāghaṭitaparampara.\(^1\) Here the term 'Svās'rayaghaṭitaparampara' means 'Svās'rayās'rayatva.' Here the fireness which is the first term of the relation should be taken by the term 'Sva'. The locus of the fireness is the fire. The existence of the locus of the object taken by the term - 'Sva' (i.e., the fire) is in the kitchen etc.\(^2\)

In order to remove the defect of the definition of Vyāpti of being 'Too wide' (ativyāpti) in cases of deviated

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(1) "Yavatsādhanās'rayās'ritam yatsādhyatāvacchodakam tadavacchinnasādhyasaṃānādihikaranyam vyāptirītyarthah. Na ca sādhyatāvacchodakasya vahñītvādeḥ sādhanās'rayamahānāsādyanās'ritatvādidamapi lakṣaṇam na yuktam iti vācyam, svās'rayāghaṭitaparamparāsambandhena tasya taduṛtītvāt." Sikhamani Commentary on Vedāntapurībhāsa, Page no. 174-175 (Khemraj S'rikṣṇadāsa Edition).

(2) "Svās'rayāghaṭitaparamparāsambandhena = Svās'rayās'rayatvasambandhena. Svam vahñītvādikam tadās'rayayo vahnyūdista- dās'rayatvam mahānāsādvītī sambandhavākyārtathah." Super Commentary 'Maniprabhā' on the commentary Sikhamani on Vedāntapurībhāsa, Page no. 175 (Khemraj S'rikṣṇadāsa Edition).
probans (vyabhicārīṇa) like the fire etc., the term 'As'eṣa' has been inserted in the definition. The property 'As'eṣatvam' which is understood from the term 'as'eṣa' means plurality (kārtaṇa). Now, the question as to whether it is to be construed with the probans (hetvanvaya) or with the locus of the probans (hetumati) or with the probandum (Sādhyā)\(^{(1)}\)

The first alternative is not possible, because there will be the defect of the definition of Vyāpti of being 'Too narrow' (avyāpti) in the probans which is only a single individual (ekavyaktikahetau). It is to be understood from the syllogistic argument in the form - "The jar is a substance, as it has earthness" (ghaṭo dravyam prthivitvāt). Here the plurality (kārtaṇa) which is understood by the term 'As'eṣatva'

can not be applied as the generic property like earthness (prthivitva) is only one in number.\(^{(1)}\)

The second alternative is not also acceptable, because there will be the defect of the definition of Vyapti of being 'Too narrow' (avyapti) in the probans, the locus of which is only one in number. It is understood from the syllogistic argument like - "It has this colour, as it has this taste." (Etadrupavan etadrasat). As the locus of the probans is only one in number here, the plurality meaning variousness (nānātvarūpākāṛtana) can not be applicable here.\(^{(2)}\)


\(^{(2)}\) "Na dvitiyah, ayaṁ ghāta etadrūpavānetadrasādityādāveka-vyakti-mātravṛttihetāvavāyaptetatra hetumata skatvena nānātvarūpākāṛtanaṁbhāvāt." - Ibid.
The third alternative is not also justifiable, because, in the probans i.e., smoke which is understood from the syllogistic argument in the form - "The mountain has fire, as it has smoke" there lies the technical defect called 'asambhava' (absurdity) due to the absence of the co-existence determined by the fire existing in a red hot iron ball. As in the smoke (i.e. the probans) there is the absence of the co-existence determined by the fire existing in a red hot iron ball, there is the absence of the co-existence determined by all kinds of fire. So, the above-mentioned Vyāpti is not possible. (1)

(1) "Na trtiyah, parvato vahnimān dhūmadityādau prasiddhadhū-mādiḥstāvasambhāvad dhūma ayahpīndiyavahninirūpītasāmānā-dhikaranyābhavena sakalavahnisāmanādhikaranyābhāvāttathā ca moktā vyāptih sambhavatiti cenna."

The above-mentioned objections are not tenable.
If the meaning of the term 'As'esatva' is taken as the pervaderness (vyāpakatva), there will be no defects even in all the three alternatives. (1)

If it is admitted that the 'As'esatva', the meaning of which is the pervaderness (vyāpakatva), is construed with the probans, the definition of Vyāpti will be as follows. The co-existence of the probandum is called Vyāpti. This co-existence exists in the locus of the probans wherein lies the pervaderness of the limitor of reasonness (hetutāvacchedakavyāpakatva) through the 'Avacchedakatā' (the relational abstract property existing in a limitor) relation or through the indirect relation called 'Svās'royasr'ayatva'. This pervaderness of the limitor of reasonness exists in the

(1) "Vyāpakatvarūpāś'esatvā-bhyupagamana paśatraye'pi dosābhāvāt." - Ibid.
locusness of the probandum. (1)

It can be clarified in the following manner. The superstratumness (vruttitya) which exists in the probans (sādhana) which, in its turn, exists in the locus of the probandum is called the co-existence with the probandum in the same locus (sāmānādhikaranya) wherein lies the pervaderness (vyāpakatva) of the limitor of reasonness (hetutāvacchedaka). In this form of knowledge - "where there is the limitor of reasonness, there is the superstratumness determined by the locus of the probandum (yatra yatra hetutāvacchedakam tatra tatra sādhyasāmānādhikaranyam), the first-mentioned part

(1) "Vyāpakatvarūpas'esatvasya-hetāvanveya bhuyapagamapaksa sādhyasāmānādhikaranyanistham yad hetutāvacchedakavyā- pakatvamavacchedakatakāsambandhena svāsīrayasārayatvasambandhena va tad vad.yatsādhanam tadasrayasāritasaśādhyasa- sāmānādhikaranyam vyāptiriti paramamūlokaśājananiṣkara- rṣaḥ."

Super Commentary known as Maniprabhā on S'īkhamani commentary on Vedānta paribhāṣā. Page no. 173. (Khemrāj S'rīkṛṣṇaḍāśa Edition).
indicates the pervaded (vyāpya) and the second one the pervader (vyāpaka). The pervaderness (vyāpakatva) remains in the superstratumness (vṛttitva) determined by the locus of the probandum (sādhyādhikareṇanairupita). This superstratumness (vṛttitva or adheya) remains in the probans through the nature relation called 'anuyogita' or subjunctness (anuyogitā-khyasvarupasambandha). So the pervaderness (vyāpakatā) which exists in the superstratumness (vṛttitva) is related to the probans through the relation of limitorness (avacchedakatā sambandha). The subjunctness (anuyogita) of that superstratumness in which the pervaderness (vyāpakatva) exists remains in the probans (Sādhana). So, through the superstratumness the probans may be the limitor of the pervaderness (vyāpakatāvacechedaka) through the indirect relation (paramperāsambandha). So, in the limitor of the pervaderness (vyāpakatāvacechedaka),
there exists the limitorness of the parvaderness. It may be said that the probans will be the limitor of the pervaderness through the indirect relation which comprises the substratumness (ādheyatāghatitaparamārasambandha). If this limitorness of the pervaderness is accepted as a relation, the pervaderness may be related to the probans through this relation (i.e., through this indirect relation or paramārasambandha). As the limitorness through the indirect relation may not be accepted by all, the alternative indirect relation known as 'Svāsiraya-sirayatva' has been mentioned. Through this relation the pervaderness (vyāpakatva) may be construed with the probans in the following manner. Here the pervaderness stands for 'Sva' which remains in the superstratumness (vruttitva or samānādhikaranya) which again exists in the probans (hetu) through nature relation called anuyogita or subjunctness.
On the strength of the above argument, the pervaderness (vyāpakatva) may be construed with the other two alternatives (i.e., the locus of the probans and the probandum - hetumati va sādhyoce va). The indirect relation which may be accepted for the construction of the pervaderness with the other two alternatives will, of course, be somewhat different from the above-mentioned indirect relation. It is not considered necessary here to discuss those two relations elaborately, as the principle involved in them is same as mentioned in the case of the previously stated relation.

So, the co-existence of the probandum which is limited by the limitor of sādhyatā (the relational abstract property existing in a sādhyā) which exists in the locus of the probans (sādhanā) through the indirect relation called
'Svās'rayāś'rayatva' and which, again, is the pervader of the locusness of the probans (śa[bdhanādhikaranatvavyāpakaṁ) is called Vyāpti. (1) In the form of the knowledge - "where there is the locusness of the probans (hetvadhikaranatva), there is the limitor of Sadhyata" (yatra yatra hetvadhikaranatvam tatra tatra Śādhyatāvacchedakaṁ), the limiting relation of the pervadedness (vyāpyatāvacchedakasambandha) is the nature relation (svārūpa), as the locusness of the probans (hetvadhikaranatva) remains in the locus of the same (hetvadhikarana) through the nature relation (Svārupasambandha). Here the limiting relation of the pervadedness (vyāpakatāvacchedakasambandha) is through the indirect relation called

(1) "Śādhanādhikaranatvavyāpakaṁ svās'rayāś'rayatvasambandha śa[bdhanāś'rayāś'ritam ca yat śādhyatāvacchedakaṁ tadavacchinnasādhyasāmānaḥdhi[aranyaṁ vyāptih."
Super commentary known as Maniprabhā on Vedāntaparibhāṣā page no. 175 (Same Edition).
'Svāś'rayāś'rayatva'. Here the limitor of Sadhyātā is the pervader of the locusness of the probans. The co-existence of the probandum which is limited by the above-mentioned limitor of Sadhyātā is called Vyāpti. As in the quality and action which are the loci of the probans (i.e., Sattva or existence) there is the absence of the generic property existing in the probans (i.e., Sattva or existence), there can not be the defect of the definition of Vyāpti of being 'Too wide' (ativyāpti) in the syllogistic argument in the form - "The jar is a substance, as it has existence." (Ghato dravyam sattvāt). If it is to be understood that locusness of the probans should be determined by the limiting relation of reasonness (hetutāvacchedakasambandha), the component parts of the smoke (dhūmāvayava) may be taken as the loci of the probans through the relation of inherence (Samavāya)
which is the limiting relation of reasonness. So, it should not be understood that the definition involves the defect of being 'Too narrow' (avyāpti) in the probans which is to be understood from the syllogistic argument in the form - "The mountain has fire, as it has smoke." Here, the limitor of Sādhya (the relational abstract property existing in a Sādhyā) exists in the locus of the probans (i.e., in the kitchen etc.) through the indirect relation (paramparā sambandha) known as Svās'rayās'rayatva. But, as the locus of the probans is taken through the limiting relation of reasonness, the fireness i.e., the limitor of Sādhya (i.e., the limitor of Sadhyatā) can not exist in the component parts of the smoke (dhymāvayava). Hence, there would not arise any question of the defect known
as Avyāpti or Too narrow. (1)

According to the dictum - "A qualified object is not different from a purely unqualified one" (viś'īstam śuddhānātiricyats), there is no difference between the generic property called pure satṭā (S'uddha satṭā) and the generic property called satṭā other than that existing in quality and action (guṇakarmānyatvavis'īstasattā). So, the quality and action can be taken as the loci of the probans. In quality and action which are the loci of the probans, there is the non-existence of the limitor of Sādhyatā (i.e., the

(1) "Tathā ca sattvarūpasādhanēsrayagunādau svāsrayēsrayasraya-
tvasambandhena dravyatvābhāvāt ghatō drayyam sattvādi-
tyādau nātivyāptih. Hetutāvecchedakesambandhena hetva-
 dhikarapatvasya vivaktei tatvād dhūmāvayavanādāya parvato
vehnimān dhūmādityādāu dhūmādāvavyāpterudghāṭanamapi na
kāryamiti."
Super commentary Maniprabhā on the commentary Śikhāmani
on Vedāntaparibhāṣā, Page no. 175 (Same Edition).
property existing in the substanteness - dravyatvatvarūpa-
sādhyatāvaccheda) through the indirect relation known as
Svās'rayas'rayatva. As there is the absence of the pervader-
ness of the locusness of the probans (Sadhānadhikaraṇaṭvavāya-
pakatvāsattvena) in the limitor of Sādhyāta (i.e., in the
property existing in the substanteness - Sādhyatāvacchedaka-
dravyatvatvā), there would not be the defect of the definition
of Vyāpī of being 'too narrow' (avyāpti) in the generic
property known as sattā other than that existing in quality
and action existing in the syllogistic argument in the form -
"The jar is a substance, as it has got the generic property
known as sattā other than that existing in quality and action."
(Ghato dravyam guṇakarmāṇyavatvavisīśastattvāt)(1)

(1) "Netr caivaṃpi visīśatam aiudhāṇānāśecyate iti nyāyena
guṇakarmāṇyavatva visīśatasattāyāh sudhāsatattāyāsa bheda-
bhāvena guṇakarmāṇaḥ sādhanādhikaraṇaṭvānī svāsīrayaśiśra-
yatvasambandhena dravyatvatvarūpasaḍhyatavacchedākabhāvena
sādhyatāvacchedakaḍravyatvatve sādhanādhikaraṇaṭvavāyapaka-
tvāsattvena ghato dravyam guṇakarmāṇyavatvavisīśasta sattva-
dityādayau guṇakarmāṇyavatvavisīśastattāyātpyāptiṃ
vācyam." - Super commentary Maniprabhā on the commentary
Śīkhāmaṇi on Vedāntaparibhāṣā, Page No. 175 (Same Edition).
The pervaderness of the locusness of the prbbans which is determined by the superstratumness or ādheyatā existing in the prbbans and which is limited by the limitor of a reasonness is to be understood here (sađhanatāvacchedakāvacchinna-sađhanāđhi-karaṇatvavyāpakatvasya vivakṣitavat).

Though there is no difference between the pure existence or the generic property known as pure sattā and the sattā other than that existing in quality and action (guṇakarmānyatvavislistāsattā) according to the aforesaid dictum (i.e., vislistām suddhanāñatiricyate), there is difference between the locusness of a pure existence or the generic property known as pure sattā (s’uddhasattādhi-karaṇatva) and the locusness of the existence or sattā other than that existing in quality and action (guṇakarmānyatvavis’īṣṭasattādhi-karaṇatva). In the syllogistic argument in the form - "The jar
is a substance, as it has got the existence of satta other than that existing in quality and action in it, the limitor of reasonness (Sādhanatāvacchedakaṁ) is the generic property existing in the satta other than that existing in quality and action, but not the generic property existing in a pure satta or existence (Suddhasattatva). The locusness of the probans which is determined by the superstratumness or ādheyatā existing in the probans and which is limited by the generic property existing in the satta or existence other than that existing in quality and action exists in the substance only which is the limitor of reasonness, not in quality and action (gunakarmavṛttitvabhāvena). As the pervader- ness of the substratumness or adhikaranatā determined by the superstratymness or ādheyatā (existing in the Satta or existence, the locus of the probans) which is limited by the generic property existing in the qualified Sattā (Visistāsattatva)
exists in the limitor of Sādhyatā i.e. in the property existing in the substanceness (dravyatvatve), there would not be the defect of the definition ofVyāpti of being 'Too narrow' (avyāpti) in the probans (i.e., in the satta) other than that existing in quality and action (gunakarmānyatvavisliṣṭasādhanē). In this way, all other defects can be removed. (1)

(1) "Sādhanatāvacchedakāvacchinnasādhanādhihikaraṇatvavivapakatva-sya vividkṣitatvaḥ. Tathā ca visliṣṭam Suddhāṁnātiricyate iti nyāyena guṇakarmānyatvavisliṣṭasattayāḥ Suddhāṁtā-yaśāc ca bhedābhāve'pi guṇakarmānyatvavisliṣṭasattādhihikaraṇatvasya Suddhāṁtādhihikaraṇatvasya ca bhedena ghato dravyam guṇakarmānyatvavisliṣṭasattvā-dityādau Sādhanatāvacchedakam guṇakarmānyatvamēva na tu Suddhāṁtātvam tadevačchinnaśādhanādhihikaraṇatvasya dravyaṁtravṛttitvena guṇakarmavṛttitvabhāvena guṇakarmānyatva-visliṣṭasattātvāvacchinnasattarūpasaśādhanādhihikaraṇatvavivapakatabhāvena sādhyatāvacchedaka-dravyatvatva sattvena guṇakarmānyavvisliṣṭasattarūpasaśādhane nāvyāptīrīti. Evam dusānanteśvaraḥpi kartavya ityālamativistareṇeṇī."
Super Commentary Manirabha on the commentary S'īkhāmani on Vedāntaparibhāṣā (inference Chapter) (Same Edition).
The definition of Vyāpti as offered by the Sāṅkhya Philosophers.

The invariable co-existence of the pervader is to be understood as Vyāpti which may be determined by both the probandum and the probans or either of them. ("Niyatadharmaśāhityamubhayorekatarasyavā" - Sāṅkhya Śūtra-5/29). Here the term 'niyatadharmaśāhityam' means the invariable concomitance which may exist somewhere. The term 'ubhayoh' denotes the probandum and the probans and the term 'ekatarasya' denotes of the probans (sādhanā) only. When the knowledge of Vyāpti is attained between the knowability and the nameability, the Vyāpti in this case is an instance of equal or reciprocal Vyāpti (Samavyāpti). In this type of Vyāpti, the probans invariably co-exists with the probandum and the vice-versa. In this type of inference, the invariable co-existence of both the probans and the probandum is possible. In order to
include this type of inference, the term 'ubhayoh' (of both the probans and the probandum) has been inserted in the above definition of Vyāpti. Sometimes, the knowledge of Vyāpti is derived between fire and smoke. The invariable concomitance in this case is an instance of non-equal pervasion (Viśama Vyāpti). Here the probans (i.e., smoke) invariably co-exists with the probandum (i.e., fire), but not the vice-versa. Because, the smoke is absent in the red hot iron ball where the fire exists. In order to make us understand such types of inference, the term 'ekatarasya' (of one entity i.e., of the probans only) has been inserted in the above definition of Vyāpti.(1)

According to the opponents of the philosophers of the Sāṃkhya school, Vyāpti is a separate entity. This view has been discarded by the philosophers of the Sāṃkhya system. Vyāpti can not be a separate entity other than the twentyfive accepted categories of the Sāṃkhya philosophy, as there will arise the question of admitting it a separate object other than those (accepted twentyfive categories). It may be said that there is no harm in admitting it as a separate entity. Non-deviation (avyabhicāra) must be accepted as the Vyāpti even if it (i.e., Vyāpti) is admitted as a separate entity. If non-deviation is admitted as Vyāpti, there would be no necessity of accepting Vyāpti as a separate entity. So, the invariable concomitance is not a separate entity (Tattvāntaram)\(^1\). The invariable co-existence of the two objects is the

(1) "Na tattvāntaram vastukalpanāprasakteh." - Śāmkhya-Sūtra - 5/30.
invariable concomitance, not more than that. If the specific property existing in invariable concomitance (Vyāptitva) is considered as an object other than the invariable co-existence of the two objects, the existence of an object which is the locus of that property existing in invariable co-existence (Vyāptivāśrayasya vastunāḥ) is to be admitted. As the specific property existing in invariable concomitance has been accepted (klpta) as being already established beforehand, there is no necessity of admitting another object accepted anew as Vyāpti.(1)

Other scholars are of the view that the invariable concomitance is a separate entity in the form of a peculiar

(1) "Vyāptirvakṣyamanasaśāktyādirūpam padārthāntaram na bhevati-
tyāha. Niyatadharmanāhityātiriktā vyāptirna bhevati vyāp-
tivāśrayasya vastunāpi kalpanāprasangāt. Asmābhista
siddhavastuna eva vyāptitvamātram klptamityarthāh.
Sāṃkhya Pravacan Bhāṣya, Page no. 355 (Mahesa Candra
Pāl Edition)."
power which is produced by the own power of the pervaded (nijasāktyudbhavan). (1)

This own power of the pervaded (vyāpya) can not be the invariable concomitance as the own power of a substance remains so long as the substance remains. At the destruction of a substance, the power of it will also be destroyed. So, it can not be said that the invariable concomitance remains so long as the substance remains. So, the power of the pervaded produced by itself can not be the invariable concomitance, but another power produced out of its own power is called the invariable concomitance. (2)

If it is said that the own power is the invariable

(2) "Paramatamāha. Apare tvācāryā vyāpyasya svasāktyijanyam Saktiviseṣarūpaṁ tattvāntarameva vyāptirityāhuh. Nija-
concomitance, there may exist the invariable concomitance of fire in smoke existing in another place. If the smoke is taken away by wind in another place, it will lose its own power in the form of invariable concomitance with fire. If Vyāpti is taken as a power of smoke, it (i.e., vyāpti) may be considered to be existing in the smoke staying in a different place. But, there is the absence of the invariable concomitance of the fire in the smoke which is taken away in another place by wind. So, the defect of the definition known as ativyāpti which involves in the smoke existing in another place can be avoided. According to the philosophers of the Sāmkhya school, the invariable concomitance of fire exists in smoke limited by the time when it is produced. (Utpattikālāvacchinnatvena). (1)

According to the view of Pāncas'īkha-cārya (an authoritative philosopher of the Sāṃkhya school), the invariable concomitance is the relation of the power existing in the superstratum (adhēyas'aktiyoga). (1) As in the Buddhi etc. there is the verbal usage of the pervadedness (Vyāpyatva) determined by the entities like Prakṛti etc., the power in the form of the substratumness (ādharastās'akti) has been mentioned as the pervaderness (vyāpakatva) and having the relation of the power of the superstratumness (ādheyastās'aktimattvānca) has been mentioned as the pervadedness (vyāpyatva). (2)

It has already been said that the relation of the power of the superstratum (adhēyas'akti) is the invariable

(1) "Adheyas'aktiyoga iti Pāncas'īkahah." - Sāṃkhya Sūtra-5/32.
(2) "Buddhyādisu prakṛtyādīvyāpyatavyavahāradadhāratas'aktir-vyāpakatādheyastās'aktimattvānca vyāpyatvamiti Pāncas'īkahah ityarthah."
Sāṃkhya Pravacāṇa Bhāṣya - Page 356 (Same Edition).
concomitance. Now, what is the utility of assuming the power of the superstratum? If it is said that the power constituting the essential nature (svarūpa) of a thing to be pervaded (vyāpya) is called an invariable concomitance, the defect of tautology will crop up here. (1) It is practically meaningless to say - 'The jar is a pitcher', as there is no difference in meaning between the two objects. If it is said that Buddhi is an entity to be pervaded, there would also occur the same defect due to the identity of meaning. If it is said that the invariable concomitance is the nature of an object (but not the power constituting the essential nature of an object), the knowledge of the pervadedness (vyāpyadharma) can not be attained in

(1) "Nanvādheyasaktīṁ kimartham kalpyate vyāpyasya vastunāḥ svarūpasaktireva vyāptirastu - tatrāha." - Sāṃkhya Pravacan Bhāṣya, Page 357 (Same Edition).
respect of an object which is pervaded (vyāpte). In order to establish the fact that the invariable concomitance is nothing but an attribute of the thing to be pervaded, the term 'power' (śakti) has been used after the term 'essential form or nature' (Svarūpa). (1)

Another defect will also involve therein. In the twigs, there is the pervadedness of the tree. If it is said that the power of the essential nature is Vyāpti, the vyāpti of the tree cannot be ascertained in the twigs also. (2) So the power of the essential nature cannot be the invariable concomitance, as there is the absence of the power of the

(1) "Svarūpasāktistu niyamo vyāptirna bhavati paunṛuktyapasamgāt. Ghaṭah kalasā itivadbuddhirvyāpyetyatāpyarthabhedenetyarthah. Svarūpamiti vaktavya śaktipadopādānam vyāpte vyāpyadharmatopāpādanāya." 
Sāmkhya Pravacan Bhāṣya, Page-357 (Same Edition).

(2) "Pallavadīsvanupapaṭṭes'ca." - Sāmkhya Sūtra-5/35.
essential nature in the lopped off twigs of the tree also.

Again it cannot be said that the relation of the power of the superstratum (ādheyaśakti) is Vyāpti, as it cannot be ascertained at the time of its being cut off on account of the destruction of the power of the superstratum at that time. (1)

But, why the Pāṇeśaśīkhācārya does not say that a separate entity in the form of a peculiar power produced by the own power of the pervaded is Vyāpti. If it is said that the Vyāpti is a separate entity in the form of a peculiar power which is produced by the own power of the pervaded, there will be the possibility of the non-pervadedness of the fire in

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the smoke due to the absence of the superstratumness of the fire (vahyādheyaṁ vābhāvaṁ). If it is established that the power of the superstratum is Vyāptī, a separate entity in the form of a peculiar power which is produced by the own power of the pervaded (nijaśaktyudbhaṁ) will also be established as an invariable concomitance on the strength of the same argument. That is to say, a separate entity in the form of a peculiar power which is produced by the own power of the pervaded can be described as an invariable concomitance through the light of those arguments by which the power of the superstratum is established as Vyāptī. (1)

(1) "Ādheyaśaktyisiddau nijāśaktyiyogāḥ samānānāyat." Śāmkhya Śūtra-5/36.

According to the philosophers of the Sāmkhya school also, the various kinds of co-existence should be understood as the invariable concomitance. If the invariable concomitance is regarded as of various kinds, it will not have any common connotation (ananugama) in respect of the cause of the inferential cognition. That is to say, if it is of various kinds, the question would arise as to what type of the invariable concomitance is the cause of an inference. This standpoint is not acceptable. For, the peculiarities existing in the effects of the various kinds of the invariable concomitance are different from each other as the peculiarities existing in the effect in the form of fire generated by grass (trāṇa), sacrificial wood (arani) and jewel (Māni) etc. are different from each other. So, there is no defect if the invariable concomitance has no
common connotation as such. (1) That is to say, fire may be generated by grass, sacrificial wood and jewel etc. In that case there would arise the question of deviation according to the method of agreement in absence (vyatirekavyabhicāra) in as much as the particular fire caused by grass is not produced by sacrificial wood. In this way, the particular fire produced by jewel can not be considered to have been generated either by grass or by sacrificial wood. To remove this defect, it has been suggested that each and every particular effect in the form of fire in this case has got a peculiarity of its own. That is to say, the particular fire generated by grass has got a

peculiarity of its own in the form of being generated immediately after the operation of grass. (Trāṇavyabhūtottaraprajāyamāṇavahṅitvāvacchinnam prati trṇatvena karanatā). Similarly, in other cases of fire also, the same logic will have to be applied with a view to avoiding the defect called vyatirekavyabhicara i.e., the method of agreement in absence.

The definitions of Vyapti as offered by the Jainas.

According to the philosophers of the Jaina school, the invariable concomitance is an important factor for attaining the inferential knowledge. This invariable concomitance is conditioned by the observation (upalambha) and non-observation (anupalambha), as it has been mentioned in the Pramāṇamīmāṃsā that the Inductive reasoning is the knowledge of the invariable concomitance conditioned by the observation
and non-observation. \(^{(1)}\)

But, what is to be understood by the term - 'ūha'?

According to the philosophers of the Jaina school, the knowledge in the form - 'This occurs if it invariably exists there' which is related to the relation between the probans and the probandum of the present, past and future is called the reasoning or ūha. This relation (between the probans and the probandum) which is the object of the knowledge must be originated from the observation and non-observation of them. \(^{(2)}\)

Now, what is the definition of Vyāpti? Hemacandra defines it in the following manner in his Pramanamīmāṃsā.

\(^{(1)}\) "Upalambhānapalambhanimittam vyāptijñānamūhah."

Pramāṇamīmāṃsā - 1/2/5.

\(^{(2)}\) "Upalambhānapalambhāsambhavam trikalikitaśādhyā-sādhanasambandhādyālāmvanam - 'idamāsmin satyeva bhavati' ityādyā-kāram samvedanaṃ ūhāparanāmā tarkah."

Pramāṇanayatattvāloka, Chapter No. 7, Sūtra No. 7.
The invariable concomitance consists in the occurrence necessarily of the pervader, i.e., the probandum (vyāpaka) on the occurrence of the pervaded i.e., the probans (vyāpya), or the invariable occurrence of the pervader (the probandum) in the locus where the pervaded (the probans) occurs. (1)

The relation between the object that pervades and the object that is pervaded is called Vyāpti. When the invariable concomitance will be desired to be known as a property of the pervader (Vyāpakadharma-vyāpa), the existence of the pervader in all places where there is the pervaded is called Vyāpti. (2)

(1) "Vyāptirvyāpakasya vyāpye sati bhāva eva vyāpyasya va tatraiva bhāvah." - Pramāṇamīmāṃsa-1/2/6.
If the invariable concomitance is desired to be known as a property of the pervaded (vyāpyadharmatā), the existence of the pervaded in a place where the pervader also invariably exists is called Vyāpti. In the case of the non-existence of the pervaded in a place where there is the pervader, there can not be Vyāpti. (1)

The statement of the existence of the pervaded (Vyāpya) and the pervader (vyāpaka) of Vyāpti is justified here so that one may not think that the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) in both the cases is the same due to the existence of their resembling properties (tylya-dharmatā). In the previous case mentioned above (i.e., in the case of

(1) "Yadā vyāpyadharmatā vyāptirvivakṣayate tadā 'vyāpyasya' va gamakasya 'tatraiva' vyāpaka gamye sati yetra dhermini vyāpako'asti tatraiva 'bhāvah' na tadabhave'pi vyāptirīti." Commentary on Pramāṇamārga, On Sūtra No. 1/2/6, Page no. 38. Singdhi Jaina Series No. 9 (Pt. Suklalji Sanghavi Edition).
the pervaded and the invariable concomitance - *Vyāpya* and *vyāpti*), the inseparable connection (ayogyavaccheda) between them to definitely known (avadhāraṇaṃ). In the latter case (i.e., in the case of the pervader and the invariable concomitance - *vyāpaka* and *vyāpti*), the absence of the connection of it with another object (anyayogyavaccheda) is definitely known. So, there is no uniformity (ekākaraṇa) of the invariable concomitance in both the cases.(1)

The invariable existence of the probandum (liṅga) in the locus of the probans (liṅga) is the uniform characteristic between both the probandum and the probans.

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(1) "*Vyāpyavyākvadharmaśaktiṇaṃ tu vyāptērubhayatāra tulyadharmaśayikākāra pratitiṁabhūditi pradaraśanārtham. Tathā hi - pūrvatīyogyavacchedenaścavadhāraṇaṃ uttaratīnyayogyavacchedeneti kuta ubhayatraikākārataḥ vyāptēḥ." Commentary on Sūtra 1/2/5 of Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, Page no.38 (Same Edition)
If such characteristic is not found or if the reverse cases are found (niyamasya viparyāse), the relation between the probandum and the probans will not be treated as universal. (1)

Invariable concomitance (avirābhava), again, is the invariability between the respective existence of the synchronous (Sahabhāva) and the successive (Sahakrama) events. (2)

Now, what is to be understood by the synchronous events? The synchronous events (Sahabhāva) are those which are co-effects of a same set of cause, as for example, the colour and taste of a fruit, the generic property existing in Slimalapa (Slimalapātva) which is the

(1) "Linge lingī bhavatyeva
linginyeyetarat punah.
Niyamasya viparyāse' sambandho
lingalinginoh." - Ibid.

(2) "Sahakramabhāvinoh sahakramabhāvanīyamo'vinābhāvah."
Pramanamīmamsā - 1/2/10.
pervaded (vyāpya) and that existing in the tree (vrksatva) which is the pervader (vyāpaka). Successive events occur in succession, as for example, the appearance of the star named Kṛttikā and another star named S'akatā, the fire and the smoke, which are regarded as the cause and the effect. So, it has already been mentioned that the invariable concomitance is the invariability between the respective existence of the synchronous and the successive events.(1)

The definition of Vyāpti as offered by the Naiyāyikas.

The knowledge of the invariable concomitance (vyāpti-jñāna) is the ground of inferential knowledge. The nature of an

(1) "Sahabhāvinoh ekasmagryadhīneyoh phalādīgateyoh rūpara-sayoh vyāpyavyāpakayoṣca Śiṣṇaśpātvavrksatvayoṣ, 'kram-abhāvinoh' Kṛttikodayas!aketodayaṣa, karyakāraṇayoḥ dhūma-dhumadvajayoryathāsāṃkhyeyam yah 'sahakramabhāvaniyamah' sahabhāvinoh sahabhāvaniyamah kramabhāvinoh kramabhāvani- yamah, sādhyaśādhanayorīti prakaraṇāllaḥbhyaṃ sah evinā-bhāvah." - Commentary on Śutra 1/2/10 of Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, Page no. 41 (Same Edition).
inference can not be known without the knowledge of the nature of Vyäpti or invariable concomitance. So, an enquiry has been made in the Vyätipañcaka regarding the nature of Vyäpti which is the content of the knowledge of the invariable concomitance which, in its turn, is the cause of inference.\(^{(1)}\)

In reply to it, Gangesia, the author of the Tattvacintāmani, has given five prima facie definitions of the invariable concomitance (vyāptipurvaṇa).\(^{(2)}\) As those five definitions given in the Vyātipañcaka involves the defect of Too narrowness, they cannot satisfy the curiosity of an enquirer. 

So Ganges'ā, the author of the Tattvacintāmani, has given the

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\(^{(1)}\) "Nanvanumitihetu-Vyāptijñāne kā vyāptih." - Vyātipañcaka.

\(^{(2)}\) "(a)Sadhyābhāvavada-vruttitvam.
(b) Sadhyavaddhinnasadhyābhāvavada-vruttitvam. (c) Sādhyavatpratipyogikānyonyābhāvāsāmāṇādhikaranyam. (d) Sakalasadhyābhāvavannīṣṭhābhāvapratiyogitvam. (e) Sādhyavada- nyāvruttitvam." - Vyātipañcaka.
The conclusive definition of Vyāpti which has been given in the Siddhāntalakṣaṇa is as follows. Invariable concomitance is the co-existence of the probans with the probandum which is not limited by the limitor of the counterpositiveness of the absolute negation which exists in the same locus of the probans, but whose (of the absolute negation) counter-positive does not co-exist with it. (1)

In the above definition, the adjunct 'the absence of co-existence of the counter-positive' (pratiyogyasamānādhi-karana) would be taken as the qualifier (vis'esaṇa) of the negation. (2)

(1) "Pratiyogyasamānādhi-karaṇayate samānādhi-karaṇātyantābhāva- pratiyogitāvacchedāvacchinnam yanna bhavati tena saman tasya sāmanādhi-karaṇyam vyāptih." - Siddhāntalakṣaṇa of Vyāpti.

(2) "Idaṃca atyanā-bhāva vis'esaṇam." - Commentary known as Lakṣmī on the Siddhāntalakṣaṇa, Page no. I, Śrīmā Diṃyānanda Edition,
The term 'yat' which is mentioned first denotes the probans (hetu) and the second term 'yat' stands for the probandum (sādhyā). The term 'Tat' in the word 'tena' denotes the probandum (Sādhyā) and that in the term 'tasya' stands for the probans (hetu).\(^1\) So, the invariable concomitance is the co-existence (saṃāṇādhikaranya) of the probans with the probandum in which there is the mutual absence (bhinnā) of that which is limited by the limitor of the counter-positiveness (pratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinna) of the absolute negation which exists in the locus of the probans and which does not exist in the locus of the counter-positive.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) "Yatsamāṇādhikaranyaī - yatpadam hetuparam. Hotusamāṇādhikaraṇetryartheḥ.........Yanna bhavati ityatra yatpadam sādhyaparam......... Tena Sādhyena tasya hetoḥ." 
Commentary known as Lakṣmi on Siddhāntalakṣāṇa, Page no.2. (Swāmi Divyānanda Edition).

\(^2\) "Tathā ca - pratiyogyasamāṇādhikaranyaḥetusamāṇādhikaranyā-tyantābhāvapratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinnaḥbhinnasādhyasamāṇādhikaranyam vyāptirīti lakṣāṇam." - Ibid.
That is to say, if the probandum, the content of an inference does not become the counter-positive (apratiyogī) of the absolute negation existing in the locus of the probans, the co-existence of the probans with that probandum will be an invariable concomitance. The definition of the invariable concomitance can be applied to the Vyāpti existing in the probans of a valid inference (Saddhetu). In the form of syllogistic argument - 'It has fire as it has smoke' (vahnimān dhūmat), fire is the probandum and the smoke is the probans. In the kitchen etc., the absence of the probandum can not be found as the fire which is the probandum actually exists there. In the locus of the probans of the above-mentioned inference, the negation of an indifferent object like a jar etc. will be found. The jar will be limited by the limitor of the counter-positiveness of the aforesaid negation. As the mutual absence
of that (i.e., pratiyogitāvacchedākāvacchinna) exists in the fire (i.e., the probandum), the aforesaid co-existence with the probandum (Sadhyasamanādhikaranya) is, of course, known in the kitchen etc. So, the definition of the invariable concomitance is applicable to the Vyapti which is the content of the above inference. (1)

If in the case of a valid inference the absence of the probandum can somehow be taken (which, of course, can never be taken in the case of a valid inference) as the negation existing in the locus of the probans (hetusamanādhi-karanābhava), there will be the defect of Avyapti. But, in the case of an invalid inference, the negation of the probandum

(1) "Vahnimān dhūmadityādau pratiyogiyasamanādhikaragopūramānādhi-karanānasīca yo'ntyantabhāvah ghetā nāstityabhāvavastasya pratiyogitāvacchedākāvacchinno ghaṭastadbhināsādhyo vahnistat samānādhi-karanya dhumē iti laksana-samanvayah." Lakṣmi Commentary on Siddhāntalakṣaṇa, Page no. 2. (Same Edition).
can be found in the locus of the probans. Otherwise, there will arise the defect of ativyāpti. In the form of the inference - "It has smoke as it has fire" (dhūmavān vahneḥ), the absence of the probandum (i.e., the absence of the smoke) can be taken as an absolute negation existing in the locus of the probans (hetusamanādhirikaraṇātyantarābhāva), as the absence of the probandum (i.e., the absence of smoke) exists in the red-hot iron ball which is the locus of the probans (i.e., the locus of the fire). As the smoke (the probandum) is limited by the limitor of the counter-positiveness of that negation, there will not arise any question of the defect ativyāpti of the definition in this case. (1)

(1) "Dhūmavān vahneṛityatra vahnyadhikaraṇāyogolakṣṛtyatyan-
tā-bhāvapratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinna eva dhūma iti nātivyāptiḥ." Lakṣmi Commentary on Siddhānta-vasana, Page no. 2 (Same Edition).
The second term 'yat' denoting the probandum has been mentioned in the definition of Vyāpti. It may be said that, as the negative term 'naṇ' has been mentioned after the term 'yat', it (i.e., the naṇ) should be construed with the probandum. Then the meaning of the definition will be as follows. The co-existence of the probans with the locus of the mutual absence of the probandum (sādhyabhinnam) which is limited by the limitor of the counter-positiveness of the said negation (Tādrṣāpratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinnam i.e., the pratiyogi or the counter-positive) is called Vyāpti.\(^{(1)}\)

If the above interpretation of the definition is accepted, the mutual absence of the Sādhyā (Sādhyabheda) is to be admitted as existing in an object which is limited by the

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\(^{(1)}\) "Tādṛṣāaniyamānurodhe sati tādṛṣāpratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinnam yadbhinnam bhavati tatsāmānādhikaranyamityeva laksanāsāriṇām syat." - Ibid. Page no. 5.
limitor of the counter-positiveness of the absolute negation existing in the probans (i.e., in a counter-positive or pratiyogī). But, the above meaning of the definition cannot be accepted. For, if the above meaning of the definition is accepted (i.e., if the relation of 'naṁ' with the Sādhya is accepted), the defect of the definition of being 'Too narrow' (avyāpti) will take place in the syllogistic argument in the form - "It is the locus of a knowable object, as it possesses the property of being expressed (Prameyavān vācytvāt), as the mutual absence of the probandum i.e., knowable (Sādhyabheda) is unreal here. As the mutual absence of a knowable object does not exist anywhere, the mutual absence of the probandum can never be taken into account. (1) So the opposite

(1) "Evānca prameyavān vācyatvādityatra prameyatyavacchinna-pratiyogitākabhedaśrasiddhyā avyāptiriti." Lakṣmī commentary on Siddhāntalaksana, Page no. 6 (Same Edition).
construction (vīparītānvaya) of the term 'naḥ' is to be admitted. So, as it is accepted that the mutual absence of the counter-positive exists in the probandum, it will not involve the defect known as ayyāpti.

In the original definition of Vyāpti, it has been said that the mutual absence of an object limited by the limitor of the counter-positiveness exists in the probandum. But actually the counter-positive is the object which is limited by the limitor of the counter-positiveness (pratiyogita-vacchedakāvacchinnna). It will come under the purview of the law of parsimony (īāghava) if the term 'pratiyogibhinnatva' (the property existing in an object that has the mutual absence of the counter-positive) is inserted in the definition instead of 'pratiyogita-vacchedakāvacchinnabhinna' what is the utility of accepting it (i.e., pratiyogita-vacchedakāvacchinnabhinna)
which leads to the technical heaviness (gaurav). In reply to it, it has been said that, if the term 'pratiyogibhinnatva' (the specific property existing in an object that has the mutual absence of the counter-positive) is taken as a qualifier (vis'asana) of the probandum, there would be the defect of the definition of being 'Too wide' (ativyāpti) in connection with the invalid syllogistic argument like - "It is the locus of the knowable object through the relation of inherence, as it has got the positiveness (samavyayena prameyavān bhāvatvāt). According to the rule - "The counter-positiveness exists in an object which exists through that relation by which it is limited",(1) the counter-positiveness of the negation of the probandum (i.e., the negation of a knowable object) through the relation called inherence exists

(1) Tatsambandhāvaccchinnapratīyogītāstena sambandhena vṛttimadvacchinnatvaḥ.
in the inherent knowable object (samavetaprameya). So, the mutual absence of that (i.e., the locus of the counter-positiveness of the negation of 'prameya') may exist in the non-inherent knowable object (asadaveta-prameya). So, there would be the defect of the definition of Vyāpti of being 'too wide' (ativyāpti). This defect can be avoided if the adjunct 'pratiyogitavacchedakavacchinnabhinnatva' is inserted in the definition of Vyāpti instead of the adjunct 'pratiyogibhinnatva'. Here the limitor of the counter-positiveness will be the knowability (prameyatva). All knowable objects will be limited by the limitor of that counter-positiveness. The mutual absence of that (prameya) can not exist in the probandum. So, there would not occur the defect called Ativyāpti.

If the meaning of the original definition is taken into account there would arise the contingency of the defect of
the definition of being 'Too narrow' (avyāptī) in the valid syllogistic argument like - "It has fire as it has smoke."

In the kitchen which is the locus of the probans (i.e., the smoke), there is the absence of the fire existing in the mountain (parvatiyavahni). Again, in the mountain, there is the absence of the fire existing in the kitchen (mahānasīyavahni). In this way, all individual manifestations of fire will be the counter-positive of the absence of the particular individual fire according to the principle involved in the operation of a sieve (cālanīyanyāya). As the fire, the probandum of the inference, is the counter-positive of the absolute negation existing in the locus of the probans, there is Avyāptī.¹

¹ "Tathā ca vahnimān dhūmādityatra dhūmādhiyakaraṇe parvate mahānasīyavyahnavaktilrṇāsti mahānase ca parvatiyavahnaviyyaktkirnāgīti rityā cālanīyanyāyena tattadvyaktyabhāvamādāya sarvesāmeva vahnināṃ pratiyogitāvacchedakibhūtataatad - vyaktivāvacchinnetvena tattadvyaktyavacchinabhinnatvāv - bhāvādavyāptitirityarthah" - Lakṣmī Commentary on Siddhānta-lakṣaṇa, Page-7 (Same Edition).

In order to remove the above-mentioned defect, Raghunātha, the author of the Didhiti commentary on the Tattvacintāmani, clarified the original definition and inserted the mutual absence of the limitor of the counter-positiveness in the limitor of Sādhyatā (the relational abstract property existing in a Sādhyā or the object of inference). According to Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, the clarified definition of Vyāpti would be as follows. Vyāpti is the co-existence of Sādhyā or probandum which is limited by the property which is not the limitor of the counter-positiveness of the absolute negation co-existing with the probans limited by its particular generic property and whose (i.e., of the absolute negation) counter-positive does not co-exist with the said absence. (1) In the original

(1) "Pratityogyasamānādhikaranyadṛṣṭiḥśaṃsānādhikaranātyantābhāvakariyogitānavacchedadaka yo dharmastaddharma-vacchinnena yena kenāpi saman śāmanādhikaranam...........

Didhiti on Siddhāntalakṣaṇa."
definition, the mutual absence of that counterpositive: (Tadra' apratiyogi) has been taken in the Sādhya, but in the clarified definition of Vyāpti the mutual absence of that sort of limitor of the counter-positiveness (Tadra' apratiyogita-vacchedaka) has been taken in the limitor of Sadhyatā. So, the co-existence of the probans with the probandum which is limited by the limitor of Sadhyatā (Sadhyatāvacchedaka) in which there is the mutual absence of that sort of limitor of the counter-positiveness. Now, there can not be the defect called avyāpti which took place in the aforesaid inference. The limitor of the counter-positiveness of that absence of an individual fire will be the property existing in a particular individual fire (Tattadvyaktitva), but not the fireness. But the limitor of Sadhyatā is fireness. As the mutual absence of the limitor of the counter-positive (i.e., the specific property existing in a
particular individual fire) remains in the limitor of Sādhyatā (i.e., in the fireness), there would not occur the defect of avyāpti. (1)

The above clarification of the definition can not be accepted as it can not be applied to the valid inference like - "It is the locus of the holder of the staff, as it has got contact with the holder of the staff (Dandīmaṇa dāndisamyo-
gat). Here the contact with the holder of the staff (dandi-
samyoga) is the probans through the relation called anuyogita or subjunctness and the holder of the staff (dandi) is the probandum through the relation of contact (samyoga). The locus of the probans (i.e., the locus of the contact with the holder of the staff) is the ground where there is the absence of a

(1) "Vahnīmaṇ dhūmādityādau dhūmāsamānādhibhāro yāḥ tadvyak-
tirnāstityabhāvastatpratiyogitāvaccchedakāṁ tadvyaktivam
tadbhīrmanā sādhyatāvaccchedakāṁ vahnītvaṁ tadavacchīna-
sādhyo vahnistat sāmānādhibhāroṇasya dhūme sattvālakṣaṇa-
śamanuṇayaḥ." - Lakṣāṇī commentary on Siddhāntalaksana, Page no. 8 (Same Edition).
particular individual of the holder of the staff. The particular individuals of the holder of the red, blue, yellow staffs will be different. Though on the ground there is the existence of the holder of the red stick, there may be the absence of the holder of the blue staff. As the absence of a particular individual of the holder of the staff exists in the locus of the probans, all the staffs will be the limitors of the counter-positiveness according to the principle involved in the operation of a sieve (cālaniyanyāya). As the state or condition of being the locus of the mutual absence of the limitor of the counter-positiveness (Pratiyogitāvacchedakabhinnatva) does not exist in the staff i.e., the limitor of Sādhyātā, there is Avyāpti. (1)

(1) "Nanu dandimān dandisamyogādityastrāvyaptih cālaniyanyayena dandamātrayaiva hetusamāñadhikaranābhāvopradityogitāvacchedakatvat." - Siddhāntalakṣaṇa, Jāgadīśa, Page no.36. (Swāmi Divyānanda Edițion).
In order to avoid the above-mentioned defect, it is to be admitted that the staffness will be the limitor of Sadhyatā through the indirect relation (paramparāsambandha) known as 'Svāsrayāsrayatva'. Here, staffness (dandatva) stands for 'Sva' which exists in the staff (danda), the locueness of which remains in the holder of the staff (dandi) which is the probandum. The property 'staff' (danda) exists in the holder of the staff (dandi) which is the probandum. But, in order to avoid that avyāpti, the staffness (dandatva) is taken as a limitor of Sadhyatā in the indirect relation (parampara sambandha).(1)

(1) "Dandyādau sādhyē paramparāsambaddhām dandatvādikamevāvacchedakamato nāvyāptih." - Didhiti, Siddhāntalakṣaṇa, Page no. 48. (Same Edition).

"Hatumati dandaśamāṇyābhāvasattvāddandatvampi tādṛśāvaacchedakamevāvata uktam paramparāsambaddhamitī. Tatha ca svāsrayāsrayatvalakṣanaperamparāsambandhena dandatavatodandināḥ sādhanavatī abhāvavirahāṇānvāyāptih." - Jagadīśī, Siddhāntalakṣaṇa, Page no. 48 (Same Edition).
It may be said that the syllogistic argument - "It is the locus of the holder of the staff, as it has got the contact with the holder of the staff" (dandimān dandisamyoget) is characterised by the qualified limitor of Sādhyatā (vis'īg-tasādhyatāvacchedaka). In order to justify the above syllogistic argument, the adjunct 'the state or condition of not being limited by both the properties - the limitor of the limitorness of Sādhyatā and other than that (Sādhyatāvacchedakatāvacchedakataditarobhayadharmanavacchinnatva) has been inserted in the limitorness of the counter-positiveness (pratiyogitāvacchedakatā) existing in the definition of Vyāpti. The limitorness of the counter-positiveness of the negation of the particular individual of the holder of the staff (Tattaddandī) exists in the particular individual staff(tattaddanda). That limitorness of the counter-positiveness has been limited by both the
properties – the staffness (dandatva) and the specific property existing in a particular individual (Tattva). As the adjunct 'the state or condition of not being limited by both the properties (ubhayadharmanā navacchinnatva) does not exist in the limitorness of the counter-positiveness, the negation of that particular individual of the holder of the staff (Tattaddandi) can not be taken as the negation which is the component part of the definition. (1) So, there is no avyāpti.

According to the opponents, the previous argument of Raghunātha Siromani (i.e., in the probandum i.e., in the holder of the staff, the staffness is the limiter of Sādhyatā through the indirect relation) will be of no use. In order to avoid this difficulty, Raghunātha Siromani, the author of

(1) “Na ca pratiyogitāvāmukthobhayānavacchinnatvasya nivesena nayamabhā-vo laksanaghataka iti vācyam.”
Lakṣāṇī Commentary on Siddhāntalaksana, Page no. 55 (Same Edition).
Dīdhiti commentary, has given the term ‘Adi’ in ‘dandyadau’. On the strength of the term ‘ādi’, the syllogistic arguments like - "It is a locus of the substratum of the generic property existing in comparatively less places than colourlessness, as it has colour" (Rūpatvanyūnavṛttijātimadvān rūpāt) can be taken. (1) The universals like whiteness (S'uklatva), blueness (niśatva) are taken as the generic properties existing in comparatively less places than colourlessness (rūpatvanyūnavṛtti-jāti). The negation of a white jar and a blue jar is available in the locus of a yellow jar. The limitorness of the counterpositiveness of the above negations remains in the universals like whiteness (S'uklatva), blueness (niśatva) etc. As that

(1) "Tathā Sati daṇḍasya sādhyatavacchedakatve'pi avyāptivāra- nādatādralaśūrāraṇasya Vaivarthāpātāditi cenna. Rūpatvanyūnavṛttijātimadvān rūpādityastrāvyāptivāraṇāya tādṛśaśūrāraṇāt." - Laksāmi Commentary on Siddhāntalaksana, Page no. 55-56 (Same Edition),
limitlessness is an unqualified one (niravacchinna), there is the absence of the limitedness or the absence of the state or condition of being limited by both the properties - the limitor of the limitorness of Sadhyatā and other than that. As the universals like blueness etc, which are the limitors of Sadhyatā are identical (abhinna) with the limitor of the counter-positivenses, the non-limitorness of that sort of counter-positiveness (tōḍīś'apratiyogitānavacchedaka) does not exist in the limitor of Sadhyatā. So, there would be the defect of the definition of being 'Too narrow' (avyāpti). To avoid this defect, Raghunātha S'iromāni, introducing the indirect relation (parampara-sambandha), indicated that the colourness of this particular instance will be the limitor of Sadhyatā. In the statement - "The stickness etc, are the limitors of Sadhyatā" (dandatvādikam sadhyatāvacchedakam), the term 'ādi' indicates
the colourness etc. In an inference in which the locus of the universal pervaded by the colourness (rupatvavyapayajatimat) is the probandum and the colour is the probans, the colourness will be the limitor of Sādhyatā through the indirect relation known as Svanyūnavṛttiḥātyāsrayatva. Here the colourness (rupatva) stands for 'Sva'. The substratum of the generic property existing in comparatively less places than colourness is the universals like blueness etc. The loci of these universals like blueness etc. are the colours like blue etc. As a result of this, though the limitor of the counter-positiveness is the universals like blueness etc., the specific property existing in an object which has the mutual absence of that (i.e., the limitor of the counter-positiveness - Tadbhinnatva) remains in the limitor of Sādhyatā i.e.,
the co-lourness. So there is no avyāpti. (1)

'The co-existence of the probans' (hetuśāmanādhi-
kāranya) has been inserted as a qualifier of the absolute
negation, the component part of the original definition.
Raghunātha explains it as the co-existence of an object
limited by its own property (Vadrūpaviśīṣṭasāmānādhi-
kāranya).
The property which is the limitor of the reasonness (hottā-
vacchedekadharmā) is to be understood by the term 'Vadrūpā'
(itse own property). The meaning of the word 'that which is
limited by its property' (Vadrūpaviśīṣṭa) is the probans

(1) "Sarvāsāmeva nilatvapitvatvādirūpatvanyunavṛttijātītinām
śādhanavaniṣṭhābhāvapratiyogitāyāh niravacchinnāvaccheda-
katvāt rūpaveti nīlo nāsti pīto nāstityādipratiyādityā-
slayena daṇḍyādaśāvityastrādipadamupāttam. Tatha ca - tatraπi
Svanyunavṛttijātyāśrayatvasambandhena rūpatvameva
śadhyatavacchedakamiti nāvyaptiriti bhāvah."
- Jagadīśa, Siddhāntalakṣaṇam, Page no. 53. (Same Edition).
limited by the limitor of reasonness (hetutāvacchedakāvacchinna). Otherwise, there would be the defect of the definition of Vyāpti of being 'Too narrow' (avyāpti) in the syllogistic argument in the form - "It is a substance, as it has got the generic property called Sattā other than that existing in quality and action" (dravyam gunakarmānyatva vis'ītasottvēt). As there is no difference between a qualified sattā and a pure sattā according to the dictum - 'A qualified object is not different from the unqualified one' (vis'ītam suddhānātiricayate), the absence of the substanteness (dravyatvēbhāva) i.e., the absence of the probandum (sādhyēbhāva) remains in quality and action also that are the loci of the probans i.e., the loci

(1) "Yadrupavis'ītasya yeti = hetutāvacchedakāvacchinnyasyeyasya-
tyarthāh. Yadrupapadaḥ hetutāvacchedakāpapaḥ."

Lakṣmi commentary on Siddhāntalakṣānām, Page no. 59 (Same Edition).

"Hetvadhikaranyaḥ hetutāvacchedakavis'ītādhikaranyam vācyam." Siddhāntamuktāvalī on Verse no. 69.
of the qualified sattā. As the limitor of the counter-positiveness of that negation is identical with the limitor of Sādhyatā, there is avyāpti. In order to avoid this defect, Raghunātha has given the explanation of the term 'co-existence of the probans' (Yatsamānādikaraṇa) as the co-existence of the probans limited by the limitor of the reasonness (hetu-tāvacchedakāvacchāna). Though the qualified sattā is identical with the pure sattā (Suddhasattā), the substratumness (adhipraṇaṭa) which is determined by the superstratumness (ādheyaṭa) limited by the property existing in a qualified sattā (vis'īśāsattātvāvacchāna) is different from that (i.e., adhipraṇaṭa) which is determined by the superstratumness limited by the property existing in a pure sattā (Suddhasattātvāvacchāna). The substratumness (adhipraṇaṭa) which is determined by the superstratumness
(ādheyatānirūpāta) limited by both the properties - the state or condition of having the property existing in an object which is qualified by the mutual absence of the quality and action (gunakarmānyatvavais'īṣṭya) and the generic property existing in a sattā (sattatva) remains in the substance alone. The substratumness which is determined by the superstratumness limited by the property existing in a sattā remains in a substance, quality and action. Hence, the substratumness which is determined by the superstratumness limited by the generic property existing in a qualified sattā and that (i.e., the generic property) existing in a pure sattā (Suddhasattatva), that are the limitors of the reasonless (hetutāvacchedaka), exists in a substance only in which the negation of the probandum can not be taken. So, there is no avyāpti.

'The absence of co-existence with the counterpositive'
(pratiyogyasāmanādhikaranya) has been inserted in the definition of Vyāpti as a qualifier of the absolute negation existing in the locus of the probans (hetusamānādhikaraṇātyantābhāva) in order to avoid the defect of 'avyāpti' in the syllogistic arguments like - "It has got the contact of a monkey, as it has got this particular treeness." (Ayam Kapisamyogi etadvṛksatvāt.)

That is to say, the contact of a monkey and its absence remain at the same time in the locus of the probans (i.e., in the locus of this particular treeness i.e., in this particular tree) though the contact of a monkey exists on the top of the tree, the absence of it remains in its base, as the contact

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(1) "Ayam kapisamyogi etadvṛksatvādityādīsāṃgrahāyāsāmanādhi-
karaṇāntaṁ."

Didhiti on Siddhāntalakṣaṇam, Page no. 90 (Same Edition).

"Pratiyogyasāmanādhikaranyasya prayojanasya pravajananam dars'ayati.
Didhitau ayemiti. Samgrahāyaḥ - avyāptinirāśya. Asamā-
ṇādhikaraṇāntamiti. Pratiyogyasāmanādhikaraṇadalamītyor-
thaḥ." Laksāmi Commentary on Didhiti of Siddhāntalakṣaṇam, Page no. 89-90 (Same Edition).
and its absence are of incomplete occurrence (avyāpyavṛtti).

The counterpositive of that negation is the contact of a monkey and the limitor of the counter-positiveness is the contactness of a monkey which is the limitor (but not the non-limitor) of Sadhyatā. So, there is 'avyūpti'. By the insertion of the term 'pratiyogyasamānādikarakaraṇa' (that which does not co-exist with the counter-positive), it is meant that the absence should not co-exist with its counter-positive in the same locus. (1) The absence of the contact of a monkey can not be taken as an absolute negation existing in the locus of the probans, as it exists with its counter-positive. The absence of an indifferent object like a jar, should be taken as the negation which does not co-exist with the counterpositive

(1) "Abhāvasa!ca pratiyogivyadhikarakaraṇa vodhyeyā." Siddhāntamuktāvalī on Verse no. 69.
in the same locus. The limitor of the counterpositiveness of that negation would be the jarness and the non-limiter of it would be the contactness of a monkey, the limitor of Sadhyatā. The co-existence of the Sadhya which is limited by the limitor of Sadhyatā (i.e., the relational abstract property existing in a Sadhya) exists in this particular treeness(etadvṛksatva), the probans of the above inference. So, there is no avyāpti.(1)

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(1) "Tathā ca pratiyogasāmānādhiṁkaranyānupādāṇaḥ kapisamyogī etadvṛkṣaśatvādityatra hetuadvṛkṣānābhitaitadvṛkṣaś mūtagavacchādeṇā kapisamyogābhāvasya vidyānātataḥ tatpratiyogita-vacchādeṇaḥ sādhyatāvacchādeṇaḥ sattvādavyāptiratā hetuśaṃśānādhiṁkaranaḥbāve pratiyogasāmānādhiṁkaranyām visleśanīyaḥ. Tūdopādāṇe ca kapisamyogābhāvasya hetuśaṃśānādhiṁkaranaṁtvena pratiyogisāmānādhiṁkaranaṁ pratiyogyasāmānādhiṁkaranaṁ ghatābhāva evo hetuśaṃśānādhiṁkaranaṁsca, tatpratiyogita-vacchādeṇaḥ sādhyatāvacchādeṇaḥ kapisamyogatve sattvānāvyāptirīti bhāvah.

Lakṣmī Commentary on Dīdhitī of Siddhāntalakṣaṇam, Page no. 90 (Sāmā Edition).

"Abhāvasāca pratiyogiyadhikaranapadhyāḥ. Tenā kapisamyogatvevaśetadvṛkṣātavādityādau mūtagavacchādeṇaḥtadvṛkṣaśavṛttikapi-samyogābhāvapratiyogitveva kapisamyogaysia na vyāptīḥ." Siddhāntamuktāvalī on verse no. 69.
After mentioning the opinion of some opponents, Raghunātha S'īromani says that the term 'pratiyogyasamānānadhikaraṇa' (that which does not co-exist with the counter-positive) has been inserted in the definition to avoid the defect known as avyāpti in the syllogistic argument in the form - "It is the locus of a contact, as it has got the substanteness in it." (Idam samyogi dravyatvāt). Though the contact exists in the substance, the locus of substanteness i.e., the locus of the probans, the generic absence of it (samyogasaṃānābhāva) remains in the whole substance. That is to say, the contact exists in the parts of a substance, but not in the whole of it. The limitor of the counterpositiveness of that generic absence of the contact is contactness (saṃyogatva) which is, again, the limitor of Sadhyatā. So, there is the defect of avyāpti. In order to avoid this defect
the absence existing in the locus of the probans should be
taken as not co-existing with the counter-positive. (1)

In order to refute the view of the opponents,
Raghunātha says that there is no ground in favour of accepting
that the generic absence of contact (Samyogasāmānyābhāva)
exists in a substance though there may exist the specific
negation of contact (Sasyogavisēśābhāva). (2)

(1) "Yattu idam samyogī dravyatvādityaḥ avyāptivāraṇāya tat. 
Samyogasya śākhādyavacchedena vṛttervṛkṣatvā-vacchedena 
tatāmānāyabhāvavṛttavāpi avirodhāt." Didhiti on Siddhānta-
alaksanam, Page no. 92 (Same Edition).
"Dravye sāmyogasāmānyābhāvavāśiṣṭakatāḥ navānām matām duṣay-
śītyamumanyasyati. Vattviti. A vyāptivāraṇāyetī. Hetvadhi-
karaṇe dravye vartamānasya sāmyogasāmānyābhāvasya prati-
yogitāyāḥ sāmyogatve sattvāt prasaktāyāḥ avyāptervāraṇāy-
yetarthāḥ. Aṣamāṇādhikaraṇāntamiti. Pratiyogyasāmānādhī-
karanāmyarthāḥ. Tudosādāne ca sāmyogābhāvasya pratiyo-
gisāmāṇādhikaraṇāyāḥ bhāvāntaramādāya navvāptītyasya-
yah." Lakṣma Commentary on Didhiti, Page no. 92 (Same 
Edition).

(2) "Tanna dravye Sāmyogasāmānyābhāvē mānābhāvāt." 
Didhiti commentary on Siddhāntalaksanam, Page no. 97 
(Same Edition).
In reply to the above-mentioned argument, the opponents argue that the object which is the locus of all the specific negations of a particular object (yāvadvis'esabhāvāvān) also becomes the locus of the generic negation of it (Sāmānyābhāvavān). If the ground becomes the locus of all the specific negations like the absence of a red jar, the absence of a blue jar etc., it must be the locus of the generic absence of the jar. By applying the same logic, it can be said that, as a substance is the locus of all the specific negations of contact like the absence of the contact of a monkey (Kapi-samyogābhāva), the absence of the contact of a jar (ghata-samyogābhāva) etc., it must be the locus of the generic absence of the contact (samyogasāmānyābhāva).(1)

(1) "Na ca yo yadiyayāvadvis'esabhāvavān sa tatsāmānyābhāvavāniti vyāpteḥ Samyogayāvadvis'esabhāvā eva mānag." 
Ibid, Page no. 98.
In reply to the above standpoint, Raghunātha says that, as the meaning of the terms 'yat' and 'tat' have no common connotation (ananugata), the general definition of Vyāpti would not be possible through a common connotation. Moreover, the locusness of all the specific negations (Yāvadvis'ēśabhā-vavattva) limited by the particular individual limitor becomes an extraneous adjunct (upādhi) in the above-mentioned case of Vyāpti, as its superstratumness is not determined by any property. (1) So, Vyāpti which is the relation free from an extraneous adjunct (anupādhika sambandha) can not exist there.

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(1) "Yattadarthayorananugamāt ekāvacchedena samyogayāvadvis'ēśabhā-vavattvasyopādhitvācca."

Didhiti commentary on Siddhāntalakṣaṇam, Page no. 115 (Same Edition).

"Ekāvacchedenetyasya nirvacchinnavṛttikatvavisiṣṭasya vivakṣitavāt."

Jāgadiśī, Siddhāntalakṣaṇam, Page no. 120 (Same Edition).
The adjunct 'the absence of the co-existence of the counterpositive' (pratiyogyasāmānādhikaranya) means the absence of the co-existence of a particular object which is limited by the limitor of the counterpositiveness (pratiyogītavacchedakāvacchinna). The negation which does not exist in the locus of a particular object which is limited by the limitor of the counterpositiveness is to be accepted in the above definition. (1) Otherwise, there would be the defect of 'ativyāpti' in the invalid syllogistic arguments like - "It is the locus of the generic property known as satta other than that existing in

(1) "Pratiyogyanadhiranatvamca pratiyogitavacchedakāvacchinnānadhiranatvam vācyam." - Siddhāntamuktāvalī on Verse no. 69.

"Pratiyogyasāmānādhikaranya ca pratiyogītavacchedakāvacchinnāsāmānādhikaranya," - Didhiti commentary on Siddhāntalaksanam, Page no. 146 (Same Edition).

"Tatha ca svapratiyogītavacchedakāvacchinnādhikaranāvṛttiryo'bhāva iti phalitam." - Lakṣmi Commentary on Didhiti of Siddhānta laksanam, Page no. 146. Ibid.
quality and action, as it is a universal." (Gunakārmānyatvavisēṣāstāvatāṃ jāteḥ). Here the sattā or existence other than that existing in quality and action remains in the substance only. Here, if the mere negation which does not exist in the locus of the counterpositive is taken, the negation of the existence or sattā other than that existing in quality and action which is the probandum cannot be taken as an absence that does not exist in the locus of the counterpositive. Because, the counterpositive of the negation of the existence or sattā other than that existing in quality and action will be the very same sattā. As the qualified existence or sattā is not different from the pure one, the qualified sattā as well as the pure sattā will be the counterpositive of that negation.

(1) "Vis'istam S'uddhānātiricyate."
This pure sattā exists in the quality and action also where there is the negation of the sattā other than that existing in quality and action. As the absence of the probandum co-exists with its counterpositive, another negation which does not co-exist in the locus of the counterpositive is to be taken into account. Then, there will arise the defect of 'ativyāpti.' In order to avoid this defect, the adjunct 'pratiyogyasāmanādhi-karana' (that which does not co-exist with the counterpositive) is to be explained as the absence of the co-existence of that which is limited by the limitor of the counterpositiveness. (pratiyogitāvacchadakāvacchinnāsāmanādhi-karana). According to this interpretation, the negation of the existence or sattā other than that existing in quality and action will be found in quality and action, the loci of the universal. The counterpositiveness (of that negation) which is not limited by both
the properties - the condition of having the property existing in an object which is qualified by the mutual absence of the quality and action (gunakarnānyatvavais'īṣṭya) and the generic property existing in a sattā (Sattāva) exists in a substance only, but not in quality and action. The negation of the existence or sattā other than that existing in quality and action exists in the quality and action and it does not co-exist with the counterpositive. As the absence of the probandum does not co-exist with the said counterpositive existing in the locus of probans, the definition is not applicable here. So there is no ativyapti.(1)

(1) "Tena vis'iṣṭasattāvān jāterityadāu jātyadhikaranaṇaṇa-gunādau vis'iṣṭasattābhāvapratiyogisattādhikaranatvavesattvapi na kṣatih." - Siddhāntamuktavālī on verse no. 69.
"Tena dyam guṇakarnānyatvavais'iṣṭasattāvān jāteh....itāyadāu nātivyaptih." - Dīdhi commentary on Siddhāntalākaṇā, Page no. 146 (Same Edition).
"Tathā ca jātyadhikaranaṇaṇa-dinānābhāvapratiyogītavācche-dakam yadvvis'iṣṭasattātvam tameva cčinnānadhikaranatvavasya guṇe sattvena sādhyābhāvoc'pi pratiyogiyadhikaranā iti nātivyaptih." - Lakṣmī Commentary on Ibid.
By the term 'absolute' (atyanta) of the absolute negation, the component part of the definition of Vyāpti, the determinant of the generic property existing in the absolute negation (atyantābhāvatvanirūpaka) is to be understood. Otherwise, a negation which does not co-exist with its counterpositive may be taken into account. That is to say, all the negations existing in the locus of the probans are different from another negation existing in the same locus. Hence, a negation which does not co-exist with the counterpositive can not be available. (1) As for example, in the syllogistic argument in the form - "It has fire, as it has smoke," the negation of a

jar is taken in the locus of the probans. The mutual absence of a pot while existing in the negation of a jar becomes identical with the locus of the negation i.e., the negation of the jar itself according to the theory - "Abhāvādhikaranābhāvasyā adhikaranasvarūpatvam" (i.e., the negation, the locus of which is also a negation becomes identical with the substratum or with the locus of the negation itself). So, the Counterpositive of the absence of a jar is the jar itself as well as the absence of a pot. As the absence of a pot, the Counterpositive of the absence of a jar exists in the locus of the smoke, the absence of a jar becomes co-existent with the Counterpositive. In this way, all the negations will be co-existent with the Counterpositive. The absence that does not co-exist with the Counterpositive will never be available. That is why, the absence of the co-existence with the Counterpositive which is the determinant (nirūpaka) of the absolute negationness
(atyantābhāvatva) is taken here by the qualifier 'atyanta' of the negation. According to this explanation, the counterpositive of the absence of a jar will be the jar itself, but not the absence of a pot. Because, the absence of a pot is the counterpositive which is the determinant of the generic property existing in the mutual absence (anyakābhāvatva), but not of the generic property existing in the absolute negation (atyantābhāvatva). The counterpositive which is the determinant of the absolute negation is the jar only. The locusness of the absence of a jar remains in the locus of the smoke. So, the absence of a jar is not co-existent (asamānādikaraṇa) with its counterpositive. Hence, the absence that does not co-exist with its counterpositive is that which exists in the locus of the probans (hetvadikaraṇa) which is not the locus of the counterpositive.

As for example, in the form of syllogistic argument - "It is the
locus of the contact of a monkey as it has this particular treeness." (Kapisāmyogī etadvrksatvāt), if the absence of the contact of a monkey is taken, the counterpositive of it will be the contact of a monkey. Quality and action (not the substance) are not the loci of the counterpositive (pratiyogyanadhikarana). The locus of this particular treeness (etadvrksatva), the probans of the inference, is this particular tree itself. Though there is the absence of the contact of a monkey in this particular tree, the absence of it (i.e., of the contact of a monkey) exists in the locus of its counterpositive, the contact of a monkey. So, the absence of the contact of a monkey existing in this particular tree cannot be taken as a negation that does not co-exist with its counterpositive (pratiyogyasamānadhikaranabhāva). The absence of an indifferent object like the absence of a jar etc. should be taken there.
The counterpositive of the absence of a jar is the jar itself which does not exist in this particular tree, the locus of the probans. The absence of a jar existing in this particular tree which is the locus of the probans is not co-existent with its counterpositive. The limitor of the counterpositiveness of the negation is the jarness and the non-limiter of it is the contactness of a monkey (Kapisamyogatva), the limitor of Sadhyatā. The definition of Vyāpti can be applied there, as the co-existence (Samānādhikaranya) of the probandum limited by the limitor of Sadhyatā (i.e., Kapisamyogatva) which, in its turn, is not the limitor of the counterpositiveness of the said negation (pratiyogitānavacchedaka) exists in this particular tree-ness, the probans of the inference.

Now, what is to be understood by the locus other than that (anadhikarana) of the counterpositive which is limited
by the limitor of its counterpositiveness (pratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinna)? Whether it (i.e., anadhikarana) means the locus other than that of a particular counterpositive or of all the counterpositives or of a counterpositive limited by any of the limitors of the counterpositiveness. (1)

The first alternative is not acceptable. If it is accepted, there will be the defect called avyapti in the case of the syllogistic argument in the form - "It is the locus of the contact of a monkey, as it has this particular treeness (Kapisamyogītadurksatvat). The negation of the contact of a monkey remains in this particular tree, the locus of the probans.

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(1) "Nanu pratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchiṁnaśyā (?) Yasya kasyacit, tatasāṁmyasya, pratiyogitāvacchedakayat-kiṃcidavacchinnaśyā vā." Didhi Commentary on Siddhāntalakṣanam, Page no. 192 (Same Edition).

"Nanu pratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinnaśyā yasya kasyacit pratiyogino'naṃdhikaranatvam, tatasāmyasya vā, yatkiṃcitpratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinnaṇadhikaranatvam vā vivaksitam?" Siddhāntalaksana, on verse 69.
The limitor of the counterpositiveness of the negation is the contactness of a monkey. The contact of a monkey which does not exist in this particular tree can be taken as one of the counterpositives limited by the limitor of the counterpositiveness. The locusness other than that of the contact of a monkey (Kapisamyogānadhikaranatva) existing in another tree may be considered to be existing in this particular tree, the locus of the probans. As the absence of the contact of a monkey existing in another tree does not co-exist with its counterpositive and the absence of the probandum (i.e., kapisamyoga) exists in the locus of the probans, there would arise the defect of avyāpti. (1)

(1) "Adye - avyāpyavṛttīśāchya tāvyāptih, eka-pratīyogyadhikarāṇayāpi tadvākyantaranadhikaranatvāt." Didhiti commentary on Siddhāntalakṣaṇa, Page no. 193 (Same Edition). "Adye = pratīyogītāvacchedakāvacchinnayatkitpratīyogī- 
vyaktyanadhikaranatvevivaksane. Avyāpyavṛttīśāchyāvyāp-
tiritikapisamyogī etadvāksatvādityatrāvyāptirītityarthāh. 
(note continued in next page).
The second alternative also cannot be accepted.
For, there would arise the defect called 'ativyāpti' in the case of the syllogistic argument in the form - "It is the locus of the absence of substanceness, as it has got the generic property known sattā." (Dravyatvābhāvavān sattvēt).
In a substance which is the locus of the existence or sattā, there is the absence of the negation of substanceness (dravyatvābhāvabhāva) which is identical with the absence of the

(note continued from prepage).

Ekapratīyo gya dhikaraṇasyāā. Ekasya kapi sa myogātmakapratīyo
giṇḍhikaraṇasyāā etadvṛkṣasya. Tadyaktyantarāṇadhikaraṇa-
tvāt. Kapi sa myogāntarasya vrksa vṛttikapisamyogasya anadhik-
karanatvādityarthā ṣa. Tathā ca kapi sa myogābhāvo'pi pratiyogi-
vya dhikaraṇa iti pratiyogiva iyadhikaraṇyopādāne'pi kapi sa myo-
gi etadvṛksatvādityatrāvṛtyāptārāt vārānāt tadvaiyarthameveti 

bhāvah." - Laksamī Commentary on Dīdhiti of Siddhāntalakṣa-
ṇam, Page no. 193-94 (Same Edition).

"Adye kapi sa myogī etadvṛksatvādityatva tathaiva vṛtyāptih, kapi-
samyogābhāvapratīyo gita vaccheda vṛcchinchno vrksa vṛttikapisam-
yoge'pi bhavati, tadanadhikaraṇam vrksa iti." - Siddhānta-
muktāvalī on verse no. 69.
prpbandum. The limitor of the counterpositiveness of that absence of the probandum is the property existing in the absence of substanceness (dravyatvābhāvatva). By all the counterpositives limited by that property existing in the absence of the probandum, the absence of the substanceness qualified by the eternity etc. (nityatvādivis'istadravyatvābhāva) can be taken. The counterpositive of it (i.e. nityatvādivis'istadravyatvābhāva) remains in the locus of the existence or sattā existing in the non-eternal substances. As the substanceness qualified by the eternity does not exist in the non-eternal substances like a jar etc. that are the loci of the existence or sattā, the absence of the locusness of it (i.e., nityatvāvis'istasattā) exists there. So, the absence that does not co-exist with its counterpositive (pratiyogyesamānādhikaranābhāva) is not possible here. (1)

(1) "Dvitiya saṃyogasaṃsanyābhāvavyāvāvāvān dravyatvābhāvavyāvāva saṃyadātyāvatiyāptiḥ. Sādhyaḥbhāvavyāvāvāvāvāyaḥ pratiyogāyāḥ āhyātāṃ pratiyogāyaḥ saṃyāntiḥ pratiyogāyaḥ śāntīḥ pratiyogāyaḥ saṃyāntiḥ. " - Didhiti commentary on Siddhāntalakṣāna, Page no. 193 (Same Edition).
The third alternative is also not acceptable, as there would arise the defect of avyāpti in the case of the syllogistic argument in the form - "It is the locus of the absence of the contact of a monkey, as it has got soulness" (Kapisamyogābhāvavān ātmavat). The absence of the negation of the contact of a monkey (Kapisamyogābhāvābhāva) i.e., the contact of a monkey (Kapisamyoga) exists in the soul, the locus of the probans (ātmavā). It becomes identical with the absence of the probandum (i.e., the contact of a monkey). If the locus other than that (anadhikaranā) of a counterpositive which is limited by any of the limitors of the counterpositiveness is taken into account, the property existing in the generic absence of quality (guṇesāmānyābhāvatva) becomes the limitor of the counterpositiveness of that absence. As the contact of a monkey which is identical with the absence of the
probandum is a quality, the counterpositive of it may be the generic absence of quality (gunasāmānyābhāva), the limiter of the counterpositiveness of which is the property existing in the same (gunasāmānyābhāvatva). The generic absence of quality which is limited by the property existing in it does not exist in the soul (ātmā), the locus of the probans i.e., the locus of ātmatva. For, the soul can never be the substratum of the generic absence of quality. As the absence of the probandum exists in the locus of the probans, there is avyāpti.


(1) "Trtiye tu kapisamyogābhāvayān ātmatvādiyādāvavyāptih, sādhyaḥbhāvanām kapisamyogānāṃ gunānāmādhikaranasāyātmanasatpṛitiyogitāvacchedaka-gunasāmānyābhāvatvāvacchinnānadhikaranatvāt." - Didhiti commentary on Siddhāntalaksanam, Page no. 202 (Same Edition). "Trtiye tu kapisamyogābhāvavānātmatvādīyādāvavyāptih, tatrātmavrttikapisamyogābhāvabhāvah kapisamyogah, tasya ca gunātvāt tatpṛitiyogitāvacchedakam gunasāmānyābhāvatvamapi, tadvacchinnānadhikaranatvam hetvādhikaranasya ātmana iti." Siddhāntamuktāvalī on verse no. 69
In reply to these prima facie objections, Raghunātha says that the definition should be clarified in the following manner whatever the absence there may be. The locus of the probans becomes other than the locus (anadhikaraṇa) of that which is limited by the limitor of that type of counterpositive-ness (Yadṛṣṭapratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinn), the non-limitor of which is the limitor of Sādhya. The co-existence of that which is limited by that sort of limitor of Sādhya is Vyāpti.¹

¹ "Yadṛṣṭapratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinnādhikaraṇatvam hetumastadṛṣṭapratiyogitānavacchedakatvasyoktavāt." - Didhiti commentary on Siddhāntalakṣaṇa.
"Yadṛṣṭapratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinnādhikaraṇatvam hetumastadṛṣṭapratiyogitānavacchedakatvasya vivaksitavāt." - Siddhāntamuktāvalī on verse no. 69.
According to this interpretation, there would be no avyapati in the case of the syllogistic argument in the form - "It is the locus of the contact of a monkey, as it has got this particular treeness (Kapisamyogi etadvrasatvat). Though the non-locusness (anadhikaranatva) of the contact of a monkey existing in another object (other than this particular tree) can be taken in this particular tree, the locus of the probans, the limitor of the counterpositiveness will be the contactness existing in a contact which, again, remains in an object other than this particular tree (etadvrasavrttikapisamyogatva) on the strength of the term 'yadro apratiyogitā' (i.e., the counterpositiveness of a particular nature) which has been inserted in the above clarification of the definition. (The counterpositiveness existing in the contact of a monkey which exists in a place other than this particular tree is taken by
the term 'Yādṛśapratīyogitā'). The non-limitor of that
counterpositiveness will be the pure contactness (S'uddha-
samyogatva) which is the limitor of Sādhyaṭā. So, there is
no avyāpti. (1)

In the second instance of the inference cited in
order to show the defect of accepting the second alternative
of the interpretation, there is no ativyāpti. Because, the
absence of the negation of substanceness (dravyatvābhāvābhāva)
existing in the substance which is the locus of the probans
i.e., sattā, the limitor of the counterpositiveness of that
absence is the property existing in the absence of the
substanceness (dravyatvābhāvatva). The absence of the locus

(1) "Kapisamyojī etadvṛkṣatvādityatārapī Kapisamyogetvacchī-
nādhihkaratātāy ētadvṛkṣa Sattvād yādṛśapratīyogitāpa-
dena Kapisamyojaganiṣṭhepratīyogitāyā dhartumass'khyatayā
ghaṭatvāvacchinnapratīyogitānavecchadhakatvāsaya Kapisam-
yogatve sattvāt prathamakalpoktā-uyāptirapi nāstīti

" Lakṣmī commentary on Didhiti of Siddhāntalak-
sanam, Page no. 205. (Same Edition)."
of that which is limited by the limitor of the counterpositiveness of the abovementioned negation remains in the substance.

The property existing in the absence of the substanteness (dravyatvābhāvatva), the limitor of Śādhyata does not become the non-limiter of that counterpositiveness. So, there is no atīvyāpti. (1)

There would be no defect in the case of the third instance cited in order to show the defect of accepting the third alternative of the interpretation. The generic negation of quality has been taken as a counter-positive of the absence of the generic negation of quality, the limitor of the counterpositiveness of which is the property existing in the generic absence of quality. Though Ātmā or soul is the locus of the

(1) "Dravyatvābhāvatvaḥ. Sattvādityādau tu dravyatvābhāvatvā vacchinnānadhikaranam yaddhetumānīsthaḥbhāvasya tādṛṣṭa-pratīyogitāvacchedakameva dravyatvābhāvatvamato nātīvyāptirīti bhāvah." - Siddhāntalaksana - Jagadīśa, Page no. 205 (Same Edition).
probans which is not the locus of that which is limited by the 
limitor of the counterpositiveness, the limitor of that type 
of counterpositiveness becomes the property existing in the 
generic absence of the quality which is the limitor of 
Sādhyatā. So, there would not arise any defect. (1)

(1) "Tathā ca gunasāmāṇyābhāvanisthapratīyogītāyā Yadavacchedadakam gunasāmāṇyābhāvatvam hetumastadavacchinnānadhikaraṇatvāpi Kapismogābhāvatvasya tādṛṣṭapratīyogītānavacchcedakatvāt tādṛṣṭypena sadhyatāyāmātmātvahetau nāvyāptēh." - Jagadīśī commentary on Siddhāntalaksana, Page no. 204 (Same Edition).


"Kapisamyoģabāvāvāvanātmātvādityādeu gunasāmāṇyābhāvatvāvacchinnāpratīyogītāyā eva yādṛṣṭapratīyogītāpadeṇopādātum S'akṣyayā tadanavacchcedakatvāsyā Kapismyoģabāvatvē satvānāvyāptīritī bhāvah." - Dīnakārī commentary on Siddhāntasamutsāvalī of Verse no. 69, Page no. 225 (Chow-khambā Edition).
The definition of Vyāpti as offered by the Buddhists.

According to the Buddhists, the relation known as 'avirābhāva' is called Vyāpti. Here 'viṇa' means the locus of the absolute negation of the probandum (Sādhyātyantābhāvāvān). The meaning of the negative particle 'naṁ' (naṅarthā) is construed with the absence (abhāva). Then the meaning would be the absence of the superstratumness (vṛttiyabhāva) in the locus of the absence of the probandum. So, the meaning of the term 'avirābhāva' is the locution of the absence of the superstratumness determined by the locus of the absence of the probandum (Sādhyābhāvāvad-vṛttiyabhāvavattvam). Or, it means the absence of the superstratumness determined by all the loci of the absence of the probandum (Sādhyābhāvavattvāvacchedena

vṛttyabhāva). The invariable concomitance existing in the probans is the counterpositiveness of the absolute negation of the superstratumpness - the absence which is the pervader of the absence of the probandum. 'Avinabhāva', 'avyabhicara' and 'Vyāpti' - these are the synonymous terms.(1)