Though Perception is the fundamental basis of all kinds of knowledge yet Inference is by far the most important source of knowledge in our everyday life.
Knowledge is the revelation of objects. Just as the light of a lamp reveals the nature of an object, knowledge reveals the characteristic features of an object. This knowledge has been divided into two categories - the presentative knowledge (anubhava) and the recollection (smrti).(1) A presentative knowledge (anubhava) may be valid (Yathārtha) and invalid (ayathārtha). A valid presentative knowledge which is known as 'Pramā' is divided into Perception, Inference, Comparison and verbal testimony. The special causes (karaṇa) of these four kinds of knowledge are known as Perception (Pratyakṣa), Inference (anumāna), Comparison (upamāna) and verbal testimony (Sabda) and they

(1) Buddhismu dvividhā maṣā.
anubhūtiḥ smṛtisca syāḥ-anubhūtiḥcaturvidhāḥ."  
- Bhāṣāpariccheda. Verse No. 51.

"Sa dvividhā. Smṛtir-anubhavaśceta.
.............Yathārthānubhavaścaturvidhaḥ."  
- Tarkasamgraha, p. 32.33, G. S. Tārākāri
S'awmā E. Edition.
are known as the special sources of attaining the valid knowledge (Pramāṇas). (1)

Perception is the knowledge which is produced by the contact (sannikarṣa) of the sense-organs (indriya) with the object (artha). This knowledge will be indescribable (avyāpadeśya) i.e. indeterminate (nirvikalpa), non-deviated (avyabhicāri) and definite (vyāvasāyātma) i.e. determinate (sva-vikalpa). Or Perception is the knowledge of which the knowledge is not the special cause (karaṇa). (2) Without

(1) "Etāsām catasrṇāṁ karaṇāṁ-catvāri 'Pratyakṣānumāṇopānaṁ- mānasabhād pramanāni' iti Sūtrakṛtānī Vedāntāni." — Siddhāntamuktāvalī on verse-51.

(2) "Indriyārthasannikarṣotpannāṁ jñānaṁ avyāpadeśyamavya- bhicāri vyāvasāyātmaḥ pratyakṣam" ........."athavā jñāna-karaṇaḥ jñānaḥ pratyakṣam."
— Siddhāntamuktāvalī on verse-51.
taking any help of the previous knowledge, the perceptual knowledge of an object can be attained directly. In the case of the perception of a jar, it is known without taking any help of inferential knowledge or any other sources of valid knowledge.

Generally, what a man apprehends with the help of his sense-organs may be true. No man questions about the truth of the knowledge which is attained by the sense-organs unless anything contradictory to the object of perception is found. A man perceives the external objects with the help of the external sense-organs (vahirindriya). One can perceive the psychic states with the help of the internal sense-organ (antarindriya).

Perception is the basis of all kinds of knowledge. Without taking recourse to perception, other forms of valid
knowledge are not possible. Inference consists in making an assertion about an object on the strength of the knowledge of the probans which is invariably connected with it. The word 'anumāna' literally means a cognition which follows some other knowledge. Here the prefix 'anu' means 'after' and 'māna' means 'knowledge'. Without the perception of the probans, the inference is not possible. One can infer the existence of the fire in the mountain after perceiving the smoke which has an uninterrupted connection with the surface of the mountain. The knowledge of the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) is the main factor to get an inferential knowledge. This knowledge of the invariable concomitance is not possible without the help of perception. The invariable concomitance is nothing but the invariable co-existence between the probans and the probandum. The knowledge of the probandum.

(1) "Yāpya dhūmastatrāgnirīti sāhacaryaniyamo vyāptih."

- Tarkasamgraha (Inference Chapter), Page 49

(Same Edition)
The knowledge of the probandum as related to the subject of inference (Pakṣa) depends on the previous knowledge of the probans as related to the subject (Pakṣa) and at the same time as invariably related to the probandum. One can infer fire on the mountain because one perceives smoke on it and has seen that smoke is always accompanied by fire. In both the cases, there arises the necessity of perception.

Again, it can be explained in the following manner. Perception and Inference are equally valid sources of human knowledge. But Perception is independent in respect of the previous knowledge, while Inference is dependent on the previous knowledge. Inference has been defined in the Nyāyāsūtra by Gautam as the knowledge which is followed by Perception. That is to say, inference, as Gautama observes, is a knowledge in which perception must be present as an
antecedent. The direct cognition of an object is possible by perception, while the indirect cognition of an object is attained by inference etc. Perception can reveal those objects that are within the range of our sense-organs, i.e. it can give us the knowledge of the present objects, but not of the past and the future objects that are beyond the reach of our sense-organs in a normal way. But inference can give us the knowledge of those objects that are not connected with the sense-organs. So, it can be said that perception usually excludes inference, but not the vice-versa. The necessity of examining the knowledge of an object attained by through perception does not arise at all. Inference is not capable to cognise the nature of an object which is absolutely

(1) "Tatpūrvakaṁ trividham anumānaṁ pūrvacchāsatvat
sāmānyatodṛṣṭaṁ.
- Nyāya-sūtra - 1/1/5."
unknown and which is definitely known. Inference can be applied to know definitely the existence and the nature of an object which is doubtful. (1)

It may be said that the co-existence of some particular smoke with some particular fire can be perceived. The co-existence between all individual manifestations of smoke and fire can not normally be perceived, as they are beyond the reach of our sense-organs. To avoid this problem, the Logicians have adopted the supernormal connection through universal (sāmānyalakṣaṇapratyāsatti) which is regarded as the cause of an extra-ordinary or supernormal perception. So, it can safely be concluded that perception is the basis of inference.

In the case of comparison (upamāna) also,

(1) "Tatra nānupalabdhe na nirṇīte arthe nyāyaḥ pravartate, kim ārthī samāyite arthe." - Nyāyabāṣya on Sūtra 1.1.1.
perception is the basis. A dweller of the forest may tell a villager that which is similar to a cow is denoted by the term 'gayal' or bos-gavaeous (gavayapadavācya). After that, when the villager perceives some animal resembling a cow, this perceptual knowledge of the similarity will be considered as the special cause (karana) of comparison. Then he recollects the meaning of the sentence in the form:

"That which resembles a cow is denoted by the term 'gayal' or 'bos-gavaeous'. This is the intermediate cause (vyāpāra). After that, when he attains the knowledge in the form:

'Gayal or bos-gavaeous is that animal which is denoted by the term 'gayal' or 'bos-gavaeous', it is called comparison.\(^{(1)}\)

\(^{(1)}\) "Grāmīṇasya prathamataḥ pasyate gavayādikām
dāṛṣṭyadhirgavādīnām ya syāt sa karana matam."
- Bhāṣapariccheda, verse no. 79.

"Yatrāranyakena kenacit grāmīṇyoktaṁ gosadrṣo gavayapadavācya iti, paścīc ca grāmīṇaḥ kvācidarṇyadaṁ gavayo dṛṣṭaḥ, tatra gosāḍryadarśanām yajjātam, tadupamiti karanaṁ, tadānantaram gosadrṣo gavayapadavācya ityāतideśavākyārthāmāraṇaṁ yajjāyate tadeva vyāpāreṇa, tadānantaram gavayo gavayapadavācya iti jñānam yajjāyate tadupamitiḥ."
- Siddhāntamuktāvalī on verse-79.

"Saṁjñāsaṁjñāsambandhajāmānaṁ upamitih.
Tatkaranaṁ saḍāryajñānam. Taṁkhāṁ, kaścidgavayasyadārthamajñānam kutāṣāścidarṇyakapuruṣat gosadrṣo gavaya iti śrutā vanam gato gosadṛṣapindenām pasyan vākyartham sārati. Tadānantaram ayaṁ gavayapadavācyaḥ ityupamitirūtpadyate."
- Tarkasamgraha, page no. 43-44 (Śaṅkara Edition)
Dr. L. S. Stebbing has given a good example of comparison in his 'Modern introduction to Logic.' Some one who does not know what a 'saxophone' is may be told by a musician that a 'saxophone' is a musical instrument something like a U-shaped one. When the man perceives a musical instrument something like a U-shaped one, the perception of the similarity would be considered as the special cause (karana) of comparison. Then he recollects the meaning of the sentence - "That which is a musical instrument something like a U-shaped one is denoted by the term 'saxophone'." This recollection is the intermediate cause (vyāpāra). After that when he attains the knowledge in the form - "Saxophone is that which is denoted by the term 'saxophone'." This type of knowledge is called comparison. The grounds of the knowledge attained through comparison are the perception (caused by ear).
of the descriptive sentence (regarding an object) which is given by another person and the perception of the similarity. Without the perception of the similarity, such type of knowledge is not possible. So it can safely be concluded that perception is the basis of the knowledge attained through comparison.

In the knowledge attained through verbal testimony also, there is the existence of perception as its ground. When the knowledge of some object is attained from the words of a trustworthy person, it is called a knowledge based on verbal testimony. The statement of a person who knows the truth and speaks the truth for the guidance of others is taken to be a valid one. Here one hears the words uttered by some other person and understands the meaning of the word. This perceptual knowledge of the word is the special cause (karana) of the knowledge attained through verbal testimony.
and recollection of the meaning of a word is the intermediate cause (vyāpāra). Without the perception (caused by ear) of the word, the knowledge of the word uttered by another person can not be attained. So perception is necessary to get such type of knowledge also.

Some philosophers like the Mīmāṃsakas admit Presumption (arthāpatti) as a special source of valid knowledge. In the case of the knowledge attained through Presumption, Perception serves as a basis. Presumption can be explained with the help of an example. It is known from the Astrology that a particular individual named Debadatta

(1) "Padajñānam tu karaṇam dvāram tatra padārthadhiḥ." - Bhāṣāpariccheda, verse:61.
"Aptopadesah Sabdah." - Nyāyasūtra - 1/1/7.
has longivity for a period of hundred years and it is known through perception that living Debadatta is not present in his home. That the man who has longivity for a period of hundred years is absent in his home can not be explained unless it is admitted that he is existing outside his home. So the conclusion that Debadatta is outside his house is attained through Presumption (arthāpatti).\(^{(1)}\) In these cases also, Perception is the ground as the knowledge of Debadatta's longivity is attained through the perception caused by ear (śabdarpratyakṣa) and the knowledge of the absence of Debadatta in his home is attained through the visual perception. In the like manner, the knowledge in the

\(^{(1)}\) "Arthāpattīṁ premāṇāntaraṁ kecana manyante. Tathāhi - Yatra Debadattasya Śatavarsajīvītavam jyotiḥsāstra- davagatam jīvino gṛhāsattam ca pratyakṣādavagataṁ tatra Śatavarsajīvitvānathānupapattyā vahiḥsattvam kalpyate."

- Siddhāntamuktāvalī on verse:144.
form -"Debatta eats at night" is attained if it is known that the stout Debatta does not eat at the day-time. That Debatta who is stout does not eat at the daytime can not be explained unless it is admitted that he eats at night. (1) In this case also, perception is the basis, because the stoutness (Pinatva) of Debatta is perceived visually. The perceptual knowledge regarding the fact that Debatta does not eat at the day-time is also attained here.

Moreover, if it is known from a trustworthy person that the stout Debatta does not eat at the day-time, it is concluded that he eats at night. As the above fact is known from the statement of a trustworthy person, this knowledge is also to be taken as a perceptual one (i.e., the

(1) "Nanvarthāpattirapi pramanāntaranasti 'piṇo Debdatto divaṇa bhunkte' iti dṛṣṭe śrute vā pinatvānyathānupapttyā rātri-bhojanam-arthāpattyā kalpyate."

- Tarkasamgraha, Dipika - P.345 (Chowkhamba ed.)
perceptual knowledge caused by ear). So perception is also the basis here.

The Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedantists hold that non-cognition (anupalabdhi) is also a separate special source of valid knowledge. According to them, the non-cognition (anupalabdhi) of an object is known from the non-perception of it. Perception serves as a promoter (prayojaka) in attaining such types of knowledge. Without the help of perception, the non-existence of an object can not be known.

(1) "Ihaghe to nāstīti ghaṭam prati sadupalambhakaprameṇaṃpravṛttinastīti asaṃ pramāṇabhāvo ghaṭabhāvam paricchintati, tatra ca ghaṭaviṣayajñātrvyāpāṇamāruttpaye eva dṛṣṭādarsanā-vācyah pramāṇam, nāstīti buddhiḥ phalam. Athavā ghaṭabhāvavagrāhī grahitṛvyāparah sadupalambhakaprameṇābhāvajani to nāstīti prayayavabhbhāvaḥ pramāṇam, phalam tu hānadvijānām bhaviṣyatī." - Nyāyamanjari. P.46 (Chowkhambā edi.)

"Pratyakṣādyabhāvo yo nāstītyarthasya vodhakaḥ so'abhāvo nāma pramāṇam iti nyāyaratnākaraḥ." - Foot note, Ibid.
So it has been established that perception is the fundamental basis of all types of knowledge. Inference has also great importance in our society. Without the help of an inference, a man cannot live in a society. Inference as a special source of valid knowledge (Pramāṇa) is accepted by the philosophers of all schools of Indian Philosophy with the single exception of the materialistic school (the Čārvāka school). But it should be clearly borne in mind that the philosophers of the Čārvāka school also do not deny the existence of inference as such. They only hold that Inference can not be accepted as a special source of valid knowledge or Pramāṇa. There can at most be the knowledge of probability through Inference, but not definite valid knowledge. \(^{(1)}\) So the

\[(1) \text{"Dhūmadijnānāntaramagnyādijñāne pravṛttih pratyakṣamū-}
\text{latayā bhrāntyā va yujyate. Kvacic phalapratilembhastu}
\text{manimantaremādhadivat vādrcchikah."}\]

- Čārvāka Philosophy of Sarvadarsanasagraha.
dispute with the Carvakas in regard to inference is limited only to the question of its having the nature of the special source of a valid knowledge or otherwise. The Carvakas hold that inference has got no capacity at all to produce definite valid knowledge. It can at most produce the knowledge of probability, as stated earlier.

The philosophers of other schools of Indian Philosophy, theist or atheist, strongly oppose the standpoint of the Carvakas that inference has got no capacity to produce definite valid knowledge. The idea behind the strong opposition of the philosophers of other schools of philosophy is this that inference has got tremendous utility in our day to day life, and unless it can produce definite valid knowledge, it can not satisfactorily be an instrument to save us in meeting the diverse needs of our life. It is,
of course, to be concluded, they say, that the knowledge of probability also can serve us to a certain extent to meet the requirements of our life, particularly in respect of guiding us in the field of activity, yet it can never serve our purpose in every respect and in all cases. Definite valid knowledge of a particular object alone can guide us invariably to action, and this definite valid knowledge can certainly be produced by inference in most cases.

In a society the help of an inference is taken almost in every step, but generally we are unaware of the fact that we are inferring some object. In most of the cases, this inference is spontaneous. Illiterate persons are also guided by inference, not to speak of the literate persons. Cultivators are seen to infer some object after seeing some sign or mark (liṅga). Not only that, even a child also infers. (1) A child

(1) "Avalāvālagopālahālikapramukhā api. budhyante niyatādārtha dārthāntaramasāmśaya."
attains the inferential knowledge spontaneously as he does not know the process of inference. If a scholarly analysis is given of the process of inference of a child, it can be explained in the following manner.

A child comes to know the primary relation (Sāṅketa) of a term with its meaning at first from the verbal usages of the old persons (व्रद्धस्या सब्दधिनववाहारादेव). When a man who is aware of the meaning of a term (व्युत्पन्न) asks another man who also knows the meaning of the same term to bring a cow, then the person who has been asked to bring a cow by the senior person (उत्तमव्रद्ध) brings it after hearing the word uttered by the senior person (उत्तमव्रद्ध) and realising the meaning of it. On realising the performance of the man who has been asked to bring a cow, a child draws the inference in the form - 'This bringing of a cow is the
result of the inclination, the object of which is the bringing of a cow, as it has got effortlessness in it, as in the case of my inclination to suck the mother's breast.' (idām gavānayananā Svagocarapravṛtti janyam, cēṣṭātvat, madiya stanapanāṇadivat).

Then he comes to infer the state or condition of being produced by the knowledge of the feasibility (by one's effort), of which the bringing of a cow has become the qualificand (gavānayana dharmaikākāryatājñanajanyatvam) (1) in respect of the inclination with the help of the syllogistic argument in the form - 'That inclination to bring a cow is produced by the

(1) "Svaviṣayadharmaiketi, pravṛttivisayavisesyaketyarthah. Kāryatā, kritisādhyatā."

knowledge of the feasibility (by one's effort), of which
the inclination to the same has become the qualificand, as
it has got the generic property existing in inclination, as
in the case of my own (inclination). (Sāgavānayo napra vṛttiḥ
Svavisayadharmikakāryatājñānajanyā, pravṛttitvāt, nījapra vṛ
tivat). Then the child again forward the syllogistic
argument in the form - 'The knowledge of the feasibility (by
one's effort), of which the bringing of a cow has become the
qualificand, has a special cause, as it is an effect having
effectiveness in it, as in the case of a jar. (Gavānayagocar-
ratajñānām āṣṭāraṇaḥhetukām, kāryatvāt, ghaṭavat). After
making such inference, the child comes to know that the
knowledge of the verbal usages made by the old persons is the
special cause (āṣṭāraṇaḥkāraṇa) of the knowledge mentioned
A child attains the inferential knowledge being completely unaware of the above-mentioned inferential process.

(1) "Prathamam pada-su samketagraho vrddhasya vyutpannasya sabdadhineyavaharadeva valanam, tathahi, gamanayeti kena cinnipugena nityuktah kesaena vyutpannestadvakyato' artham pratitya gavanayanam karoti, taccopalabhamano vala idam gavanayana svagocarapravrtijanyam, cestatva- namadiyastanapanadivadityanumaya, sa gavanayanapravrttih Svavisayadharmikakaryastajnanaajanyena, pravrttitvamija- pravritivaditi pravrttergavanayanadharmikakaryastajnah- janyatvam prasadhy a gavanayanagocaratajnahnamasadharaṇaḥ hetuṁ, kerya va ghatavadyevamanuménavah........ Šrutam vrddhavākyameva todesadharaṇakāraṇatvenāvadharaṇaḥ.


In a society no man can believe in a word which is baseless. A word without any solid ground cannot impress a person who may be literate or illiterate. If we want to say something to our neighbours or to our relatives, we have to state the reason at the same time. If we advise my brothers or sons to do something or not to do something, we shall have to forward argument in favour of it. In every sphere of our life, we are going on saying something on the basis of some argument as the groundless speech will fall flat upon others. (1) This is nothing but a form of inference.

The valid inferential knowledge guides us in innumerable walks of our life beginning with the dealings with our fellow people in our everyday life. Our life becomes

(1) "Ashraskavacanopanyase sadhyasiddheh. ekakini pratijna
hi pratijnadam na sadhayet."

- Bouddha Philosophy of Sarvadarsanasamgraha.
thoroughly impracticable (1) unless we can satisfactorily and properly deal with our fellow people, and this can never be done unless we definitely and rightly understand the mind of the people around us. This clear understanding of others' mind can only be attained through inference in most of the cases. (2) If we can not understand the meaning of the speech of another person, we can not take part in discussions of any kind. We generally speak to our superiors in a manner which is suitable to their temperament. For this their temperament is to be read at first and after that we speak to them. our behaviour will of course, be different before a judge, before an interview

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(2) "Pramāṇāntarasāmānyathīte/panyadhiyogateḥ, Pramāṇāntarasāvedbhavēḥ......................" - Bouddha Philosophy of Sarvadarsanasangraha.
board, in the class-room, in a public place etc. We generally behave in a different way when we speak to a rickshaw-puller shop-keeper etc. But what is the reason behind the difference of our dealings to the different types of people? In reply to it, it may be said that we speak to different persons in different ways after reading this different types of sentiment. This reading of sentiment is nothing but a form of inference. Or it may be interpreted in another way. Our behaviour to different types of people is different, because we have learnt it from the usages of the old persons (Vṛddha-vyavahāra) of our society. We have learnt to respect the superiors etc. from the old persons. So, our activities or behaviours may find support in the behaviours of the old. This is also a form of inference of which the probans is the behaviour of the old.

Moreover, from the red colour of a mango, we infer
that it has ripened. On seeing cloud in the sky, we infer the immediate future rain. In the like manner, we infer the past rain from the swift muddy current of the river. In the same way, the pleasure, pain of another person can be inferred from their different types of expressions and gestures.

Sometimes, we infer the exact place or country where a man resides on seeing his particular type of dress and on hearing his particular type of language. Thus, we can get innumerable instances of the knowledge based on inference in our everyday life.

A man wants to perform those works that he thinks as essential for him. End-in-view (prayojan) is an object for which or to avoid which a man acts. In order to attain

(1) "Prayojanamanuddiśya na mando' api pravartate."
"Yamarthamadhiktaya pravartate tatprayojanam." - Nyāyasūtra - 1.1.24.
"Yena prayuktah pravartate tatprayojanam. Yamarthamabhipaññihāsanāh karmarabhate tenānena sarve prāṇinānāi sarvāni karmāni sarvāsca vyāptāḥ."
- Nyāyabhāṣya, Page-4. (Anandasramagrathāvalī).
something or to get rid of something, a man engages himself in any activity.\(^{(1)}\) Man's desire is related to the result and to the means of the result. The pleasure and the absence of pain is the result. The knowledge of the result is the cause of the desire of the result. That which is known and which is wanted for himself is the goal of human life (purusārtha). That is to say, it is the object of one's own desire which is not dependent on others' (desire).\(^{(2)}\) So the desire of the result is due to the existence of the knowledge

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\(^{(1)}\) "Yamarthenāptavam hātavyam vādhavasāya tadāptihānopāyanamutisthai tat prayojanam. Tadveditavyam pravrtilhetavāt." - Nyāyabhāṣya on Sūtra - 1.1.24.

\(^{(2)}\) "icchā hi phalaviśayini upayaviśayini ca. phalam tu sukham duḥkhabhāvasa. Tatra phalecchām prati phalajñānam kāraṇam. Ateva purusārthā eva sambhavati yajjñānam sat svavṛtti-tayasyate sa purusārtha iti tallakṣaṇāt. Itarecchānadhinecchāviśayatvam phali-to'arthaḥ." - Siddhāntamuktāvalī on verse - 146.

"Nirdūḥkhatve sukhe cecchā tajjñānādeva jñayate." - Bhāṣāpariccheda, Verse no. - 146.
of the result. This is also a form of inference. The cause of the desire for the means is the knowledge of its conduciveness to that which is desirable (istasādhanatājñāna). This knowledge of its conduciveness to that which is desirable is considered as the probans or reason to the desire for the means. (1) Again the knowledge of the feasibility through one's effort (krtisādhyātājñānam) and the knowledge of its conduciveness to that which is desirable (istasādhanatājñāna) are considered as the causes or reasons behind the desire to do something does not arise at all in respect of rain etc., as there is the absence of the knowledge of the feasibility through one's effort, the cause of the desire to do (2) so, this can also be

(1) "Icchā tu tadupāye svādiṣṭopāyāyatvadhīryadi."
   - Bhāṣāpariccheda, verse no. 146.
   "Upanaycham pratiṣaṣadhanatājñānam kāraṇām."
   - Siddhāntamuktāvali on Verse-146.

(2) "Cikīrsā krtisādhyāvatapraKarācca tu yā bhavet.
   Taddhetuḥ kṛtisādhiṣṭasādhanatvamanatirbhavet."
   - Bhāṣāpariccheda, verse-147.
   "Cikīrsām prati kṛtisādhyātājñānam iṣṭaṣaṣadhanatājñānam ca kāraṇām. Atēva vr̥ṣṭyādau kṛtisādhyātājñānam bhāvānna cikīrsā."
   - Siddhāntamuktāvali on verse-147.
taken as an instance of inference in our everyday life.

In the same way, it can be said that the knowledge of its being productive of what is extremely unpleasant (dvītaśādhanatājñāna) is the cause of the aversion (dvēsa) the object of which causes pain. (1)

When we do not perceive any object in a place, we come to the conclusion that the object is absent there. As for example, when we do not perceive a jar on the ground, we conclude that the jar has non-existence on the ground. Such types of knowledge are inferential in which the nonperception (of the jar etc.) is considered as the probans or reasons.

Moreover, if we want to establish the existence of the objects that are imperceptible, we have to take the

(1) "Dvītaśādhanatābuddhībhavet dvēssasya kāraṇam" - Bhāṣāpariccheda, Verse no. 148.
"Dhūkhopāyaviṣayakam dvēsam prati dvītaśādhanatājñānam kāraṇamityarthah." - Siddhāntamuktāvali on Verse-148.
help of inference. Inference is the only means to prove the existence of Atman, God etc. So the Logicians establish Atman (i.e., Jivatma) as a locus of the qualities like desire, aversion, effort etc. Soulness (atmatva) is inferred as the limitor (avacchedaka) of the inherent causeness of pleasure, pain etc. (1) Again, that which imparts consciousness in the sense organs and also indirectly in the body is Atman. Though the contentness (visayatva) of the perceptions like 'I am unhappy' etc. remain in Atman, it would not be possible at first to make an individual having doubt about it.

(1) "Icchādveśaprayatnasukhduḥkhajñānānyātmāno liṅgamiti."
   - Nyāyasūtra - 1.1.10.
   "Atmatvajātistu sukhanduḥkhādisamavayikāraṇatavacchedaksiyātātayā sidhyati." - Siddhāntamuktāvalī on verse-47.
   "Jñānādhi karaṇatātātma." - Tarkasamgraha - Page no. 19.
   (Choukhamba Edition).
understood that atman which is the object of the above-mentioned perceptions is different from body. Hence, another argument is to be given. As no result is produced at all from the cutting instrument like an axe etc. without being guided by an agent, the eyes etc. that are the special sources of knowledge can not produce any result without being guided by an agent. That is why, an agent is to be inferred. This agent is nothing other than atman. (1) The syllogistic argument regarding the existence of atman existing in others’ body will be as follows. The body of Devadatta

(1) "Indriyāṇāṁ saṁjñayā ca paramparayā caitanyasampādakāḥ. Yadya yo yatman aham sukhi aham duṣkhītyādipratyakṣavāsaviśayasya āhamsrastya eva, tathā api vipraṭipannāṁ prati prathama eva sarirādibhinnastatpratiti-gocara iti pratipādayitum na sakte; ityātaḥ pramanāntaram darsayati - karanamiti. Vāyādāniṁ chidādikaraṇānāṁ kartāramantareṇa phalānupa- dhānāṁ dṛṣṭām, evam ca kṣaṇādikaraṇāṁ jñānakaranānāmapi phalo-podhānāṁ kartāramantareṇa nopaṇadyata ityātiriktaḥ kartā kalpyate." - Siddhāntamuktāvalī on verse 47.
is qualified by ātman as it has got the state or condition
of being qualified by the inclination like a chariot.
(Devadattaśarīram ātmavat pravṛttimattvāt rathavat).

If we, again, want to establish the existence of
God, we have to establish Him with the help of an inference.
By going through the inferential process, we make others
understand that God exists. For this purpose, we have to
forward argument in the following manner. As the effects like
jar etc. are caused by an agent, so the earth (Kṣiti), dyads
(āṅkura)(1) etc. must have some agent. The agentness of it
can not exist in the persons like us, as our knowledge and
power is limited. So, God is to be inferred as an agent of

(1) "Āṅkureti = Yathā vijādutpannasya upkṣaprayojakasya
prāthamika-darsāna-viṣayasyāṅkuretvam tathā paramāṇu-
bhyāṃmutpannasya saṣṣārateruprayojakasya dvāṇukasyaāṅku-
rasāmyāt āṅkurasabhādena dvāṇukaṃ lakṣyate."
- Kīranaśravāi commentary on Siddhāntamuktāvalī of
the earth etc. It may be argued that, as it is not produced with the help of a body, it can not be produced by an agent. So, there would occur the fallacy of Satpratipakṣa or counter-balanced argument. The proposition - 'The earth has an agent as it is produced' may be rebutted by the counter-argument in the form - 'The earth has no agent as it is not produced by one who has got a body.' This view is not acceptable owing to the absence of the favourable argument (aprayojakatvāt, i.e., anukūlatārkābhāvāt). (1) As the state or condition

(1) "Tathāhi - yathā ghaṭadikāryaṁ karṇaṁ tathā kṣityam- kurādikamāpī ti. na ca tatkarṣātvasmādādīnām sambha-tātya-tastatkarṣātvamesv asarṣādīnām na ca sarṣāvajanyatvena karṇyajanyatvasadēhakena Satpratipakṣa iti vācyam. apraya-jakatvāt." - Siddhāntamuktāvalī on Verse-I.

of not being produced by one who has body (Sarīrājanyatva) and the state or condition of not being produced by an agent (Kartryajanyatva) are considered as absolute rogations, there is the absence of the favourable argument in the form of the causal relation which is the basis of ascertaining the invariable concomitance between two eternal objects. (1) The causal relation between an agent and the effect is the favourable argument. That is to say, every effect which is produced is invariably connected with an agent. In the like manner, it can be safely concluded that this universe, the effect, has also a creator or an agent who is God. (2)

(1) "Anukūlatarketi = Sarīrājanyatvākārtyajanyatvayoryatantābhāvarūpatvena nityavyo-vyaptigrāhakākāryakāraṇabhāva- rūpānukūlatarkabhāvādityarthah." Super commentary Ramarudrī on commentary Dinakari on Siddhāntamuktāvalī of Verse - I. P.-24 (Chowkhamā Edi.).

(2) "......Kartrtvena kāryatvena kāryakāraṇabhāva evānukula-starkah." Siddhāntamuktāvalī on Verse-I.
In this way, the existence of God can be established with the help of argument or inference. Though the existence of God can be proved with the help of verbal testimony in the form of Śruti or āgama, the idea of the existence of God can be attained by an illiterate person more easily through the inferential process. Moreover, the imperceptible facts that are supported by argument are intelligible to others more clearly through the light of argument.

A good number of people of our society believes in God in every sphere of life even in this modern age. But very few of them have realised God. It has already been stated that there is the inferential knowledge behind their belief in the existence of God. They are drawing series of inference in every step of their life. Their syllogistic arguments are of the

(1) "Dyāvabhūmi janayan deva eko viśvasya kartā bhuvanaasya goptā," etc.
following forms. (a) The activity in which the dyad has become a promoter (prayojaka) and which occurs at the first time of creation is produced by effort (prayatnajanyam), as it is an activity. (1) That is to say, this world is originated from the combination of atoms. Two atoms make a dyad (duyāṅku), three dyads make a triad (trasaṃreṇu), and in this way the whole universe is formed by the combination of atoms. But, as these atoms are inanimate objects, they can not be combined with each other without being guided by a conscious being. This Conscious Being is nothing other than

(1) (a) "Sargādyakālinadvyaṇukaprayojakaṁ karma prayatnajanyam, karmatvāt."
Dinakari Commentary on Siddhāntamuktāvalī of verse-1, Page-29 (Chowkhamba Edition).
God. (1) (b) The absence of the dropping down of weighty substances (gurutvavatām) is caused by an effort which is obstacle to the dropping down of a substance, as it has got steadiness, as in the case of the absence of the falling of a bird (Pakṣipatanābhāvavat). (2) (c) The destruction of the universe is caused by an effort, as it is a destruction, as in the case of the destruction of a jar. (d) The initial verbal usage of a jar etc. is caused by an independent person, as it is a verbal usage, as in the case of the usage of the script introduced in the modern age.

(1) "Īśvaresya cikīrṣāvasāt paramāṇuṣu kriyā jāyate. Tataḥ paramāṇudvayasyasanyoge dvānuṣkapatamupadaya. Triyutro dvānuṣkaistrenukamupadaya. Evar caturānukādiyakramena mahatī prthivī ......... upadaya.


as it is a verbal usage, as in the case of the usage of the
scripts introduced in the modern age (adunikakalpatilpya-
divyavaharavat). (e) The valid knowledge produced by the
Vedas is produced by the valid knowledge of the exact meaning
of the sentence uttered by the speaker (of the Vedas), as it
is a valid knowledge derived from verbal testimony, as in the
case of a valid knowledge produced by the words of an
individual named Caitra. (f) The Vedas are introduced by a
being who is other than an individual who entangles in the
wordly affairs, as it has the specific properly existing in
the Vedas. That which is not of this type would not be of this
type, as in the case of a piece of literature.

(1) (e) "Vedajanyapramā Vakṣyathārthavākṣyarthajñānajanya,
Sūḍabdepramātvat, Caitravākṣyajanyapramāvat,
(f) Vedah asamsāripuruṣapratītah, vedatvāt, Yannai-
van tannaivan yathā Kavyamiti vyāsātātātātah.

Dinakari Commentary on Siddhāntamuktavali of Verse.I
Page no. 29. (Chowkhamba Edition).
the Vedas. That which is not of this type would not be of this type, as in the case of a piece of literature. This is an instance of the method of agreement in absence. (g) The Vedas are made by an individual, as they have got the generic property of a sentence, as in the cases of the Mahābhārata etc. (h) The number produced by the dimension of a dyad is produced by the knowledge of addition (apekṣābuddhi), as it is the number other than one. All these syllogistic arguments prove the existence of God directly or indirectly. (1)

(1)(g) "Vedah pauruseyah vākyatvāt, bhāratādīvat, (h) Dvyanuka-parimāṇajenikā sāmkhyā apekṣābuddhi-janyā, skatvanya-sāmkhyātvādityanumānāntaraṃśyāpi sākṣat paramparaye vā isvārasādhakāni Vodhyanīti. Taduktam - 'Kāryāyajanadhrtīyadeḥ padat pratyayataḥ Śruteḥ. Vākyāt sāmkhyāvisēṣacca sadhya Viśvavidavyayaḥ.' Āyojanam-karma, padyate gamyate anenatī padam vyavahāra iti sāmkṣepai" Dinakari Commentary on Siddhāntamuktāvali, Verse no. I Page-29 (Chowkhambā Edition).
Again, the existence of an atom (Paramāṇu) which has turned into a great power in the modern world and on which researches are going on now-a-days, can be established with the help of an inference. Though the modern scientists assert the perceptibility of an atom through a microscope, it can be said from the standpoint of the Logicians that the perception of an atom through a microscope is not a normal one, as it (an atom) can not be perceived as such (paramāṇu-tvena rūpaṇa) according to the conception of atom of the Logicians. So the inference is the only means by which the existence of an atom can be established.

If the whole of an object has an endless series of parts, there would arise the contingency of equality in respect of size between the mountain and a mustard seed. That is to say, if the whole has some parts, then the parts
also have some other parts in which there are other parts and so on, there would arise the defect of Regressus-in-infinitum (anavasthā). As there is no final unit of a definite size, we can not add these up to make different sizes. Hence, there would arise the contingency of equality in dimension between very big and small objects, as in mathematics, anything multiplied by zero is zero. (1) So this process of stopped anywhere. If the limit is taken as non-eternal, division must be non-eternal; it would be taken into account that a positive effect may be produced even when there is the absence of the inherent cause. That is to say, if the limit is considered as non-eternal, it must be taken as an effect which remains in its parts through the relation of inherence (Samavāya). But, as there are no parts in it, it can be said

(1) Foot note, Bhāṣāpariccheda, Page no. 44.
Śaṃśī Madhavānanda Edition.
that it is a positive effect having no parts. As a positive effect having no parts is not possible, it would be taken as an eternal object. (1) As the gradation of the medium dimension (Mahatparimāṇatāratamasya) has limit in the ether etc. (ākāśādau), the gradation of the dimension of an atom (añuparimāṇatāratamasya) has a limit somewhere. Where there is limit is an atom. It can not be said that the limit of the atomic dimension would be a triad (trasareṇu). That a triad has got its parts (avayava) can be established with the help of the syllogistic argument in the form - "A triad has got its parts, as it is a substance subject to visual perception like a jar". (Trasareṇuḥ sāvayavaḥ Cakṣusadravyatvat, Siddhāntamuktavali, Verse No* 37*).

(1) "Tasām cāvayavadhārāya anantatve merusārṣapayorapi sāmyaprasāṅgah, ataḥ kvacid viśvāmo vaćyaḥ, yatra tu viśvāmaḥ tasyānityatevāsamavetabhava kāryotpattiprasyangāt tasya nityatvam."

Siddhāntamuktāvalī, Verse No. 37.
That the parts (i.e. dyads) of a triad, in their turn, have got their own parts can also be established by another syllogistic argument in the form - "The parts (dyads-dvyanuka) of a triad have got their own parts, as they produce objects of medium dimension, as in the case of the two final parts of a jar. (Trasareṇoravayavah sāvavyavah mahadārambhakatvāt Kapālavat). A part of a dyad, one of the parts of a triad is called an atom. (1)

(1) "Mahat-parimāṇa-tāratamasya gagara iva Visrāntatvamiva-pu-parimāṇa-tāratamasyāpi kvacid visrāntatvamastitī tasya paramāṇutvaśidhiḥ. na ca traseraṇeva visrāntatvamastitī vacyan. Traserenuḥ sāvavyavah caksusadravyatvaḥ ghatavadi-tyanumānena tadavavasiddhau, trasarenoravayavah sāvavya-vah mahadārambhakatvāt, Kapālavadyanumānena tadavaya-vasiddheḥ."

Siddhāntamuktāvalī on Verse-37.

"Tryaṇukāvayavoḥ sāvavyavah mahadārambhakatvāt Kapālavat.
Yo dvyaṇukāvavah sa paramāṇuh."

Tarkasamgrahadipikā, Page no. 190.
Chowkhamba Edition.
The existence of ether (ākāsa) on which the scientists have laid great importance in modern age can also be established as an object of which sound is a quality.\(^{(1)}\)

That is to say, ether is inferred with the help of the probans in the form of the sound existing in it. That the sound is the quality of ether has been established with the help of the series of syllogistic arguments which have not been discussed here out of fear from entering into the detailed discussion.

In the same way, the existence of Time (Kāla) is inferred from its general causeness to the objects that are produced (janya), from its being the locus of this universe,\(^{(2)}\)

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   "Ākāsasya tu vijñeyah sa abdo vaisvēsiko gunāḥ." - Bhāṣāpariccheda, Verse no. 44.
(2) "Janyānām janakaḥ kālaḥ jagatānām rayo mataḥ." - Bhāṣāpariccheda, Verse no. 45.
and from its being a special cause (Karana) of the knowledge of priority (paratva) and posteriority (aparatva). In the same way, Mind is inferred as the special cause of the knowledge of pleasure etc. The form of the syllogistic argument will be as follows. "The knowledge of happiness has got a special cause in it as it is a kind of perceptual knowledge which is produced, as in the case of the knowledge of visual perception." 

The philosophers of the theist school specially take recourse to inference as a means to go above the sphere of 

(1) "Paratvaparatvabuddherasādhāraṇaṃ nīmīttaṃ kāla eva."
Siddhāntamuktāvalī on Verse-45.
(2) "Sākṣātākāre sukhādīnāṃ karanaṃ mana ucyate." - Bhāṣāpariccheda, Verse no. 85.
"Tathāhi - Sukhasāksātkaraḥ Sakaraṇakaḥ janyasaṃkṣātkāra-vāccākṣusāsākṣātkārawadityanumānaṇena manasah karanaṃvāsi-
ddhīḥ." Siddhāntamuktāvalī on Verse no. 85.
"Sukhādyupalabdhisādhanaṃindriyaṃ manaḥ"-Tarkasamgraha-
dīpikā, Page no.20. (Chowkambā Edition).
of grief and sorrow and attain fulfilment in the form of attaining salvation or Moksa.

The Upanisadic injunction that the realisation of the soul should be attained through hearing, thinking and constantly meditating upon the nature of the soul is accepted by the philosophers of the theist school as a supreme gospel, by obeying which a man can rise above the sphere of sorrow and grief and attain salvation. 'Thinking' in the injunction is nothing other than inference of the soul as distinct from other worldly objects (Mananam ca tmanah itarabhinnatvena anumanam). This inference of the true nature of the soul should be attained through frequent practice of inference. Hence, it can easily be understood what great importance has been attached to Inference by the theist philosophers of our country having regard to the utility of
Inference in the matter of attaining the supreme goal of life.

Each and every object of this world can be inferred as distinct from other worldly objects. As for example, a jar can be inferred as distinct from the objects other than the jar, i.e., pot etc. In this way, a pot can be inferred as distinct from the objects other than that the pot etc., i.e., jar etc. The probans of the inference of some object as distinct from others is the definition of that object. As for example, a cow is distinct from the animals other than cow, as it is the locus of the dewlap \((\text{Ga}u\text{h gavatarabhinn\text{ā sāsnādimattvāt}})\).

From the above discussions, it can be concluded that inference has great utility in each and every sphere of our life. Because perception or other forms of knowledge caused by particular kinds of conditions, both positive and
negative, can not guide or control our activities in the majority of cases of our life, for the simple reason that the capacity of those conditions to produce definite valid knowledge is limited compared to that of the procedure of inference.

Though it can be argued that procedure of inference is extremely complicated and it can only be successfully applied by the highly educated persons, trained in the art of drawing right inference, it can also be equally emphasized that the drawing of inference from some given data is not a so difficult proposition. It has already been said that even the illiterate persons also are to be found to be spontaneously drawing inference from some circumstances and controlling their activities accordingly. It is, of course, very difficult to give a scholarly analysis of the procedure of inference,
but to draw inference from some given data is not at all difficult, rather it is, to a great extent, spontaneous.

Keeping, therefore, in view of this practical aspect of inference, it can safely be admitted that inference has got great utility in our everyday life.