CHAPTER VII

Critical evaluation of the means of ascertaining Vyāpti by other systems of philosophy.
According to the Buddhists, the 'avinābhāva' (The nonexistence of an object without another) is the invariable concomitance. This 'avinābhāva' denotes invariable coexistence. According to some scholars, this type of general statement is not sufficient. So, the Logicians should enquire about the condition of the specific statement in the form - 'The nonexistence of a particular object without another particular object'. According to the Buddhists, these conditions are in the forms of the identity of nature and the causal relation. An object which is identical with something cannot remain separated from it. As sīmasāpatā is identical with the tree, the treeness can be inferred from it. So, the specific property existing in sīmasāpatā (i.e., sīmasāpatāvā), the probans of the inference in the form - 'This is a tree, as it has got the property sīmasāpatāvā', is called a natural probans (svabhāvahetu)
and this identity of nature existing in the probans is Vyāpti.\(^{(1)}\)

An effect is that which comes into being due to its cause. The cause of an effect can be inferred if the effect is known. The causal relation (taduptatti) existing in the effect in the form of probans is invariable concomitance.\(^{(2)}\)

According to the Buddhists, the interpretation of Vyāpti as mere invariable coexistence without mentioning the

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above-mentioned two kinds of Vyāpti which take place due to
the non-deviation of an object to be inferred is nothing but
an inadequate statement. (1)

In reply to the above statement, the Logicians are
of the view that this insufficient statement may be tolerable
if it is made by a less intelligent person. But the identity
of nature etc. should not be accepted as Vyāpti by persons
having keen intelligence like the Buddhists. If it is said
that the identity of nature which consists in the non-devitation
between probans and probandum becomes helpful in making inference
of the probandum, the relation between the probans and the
probandum is rather difficult to establish. (2) An unknown probans

(1) "Evam hi dvividham pratibandhamanumeyā-vyabhicāranivandhana-
manuktvā kevalasāhacaryaniyamamātravaranam yati prasākīrṇa
saiveti." Ibid.

(2) "Ueyate. Pādprasārikaiva sādhiyasī sthūladṛṣṭibhiravalam-
bhitā varam na sūkṣmadṛṣṭibhirutprekṣitāḥ tādātmādipratiband-
dhāḥ. Tādātmā ye tāvadgamakānge hetusādhyayoravyatireke gамya-
gamakabhāva eva durūpapādaḥ." Ibid.
cannot produce the knowledge of the probandum. Now, the question is whether the probandum will be cognised in the same knowledge of the probans (lingabuddhau) or not. If it is not cognised, it can not be identical with the probans. If it is cognised, it (the probandum) will be a perceptual knowledge like the knowledge of the probans. So, there will not arise any necessity of admitting inference. (1)

If it is said that inference is meant to remove the possibility of the imposition of the contrary objects in regard to the probandum, it is not tenable. There is no scope for the imposition of the contrary object as the nature of the probandum is definitely known. The trunkness can not be imposed

on an object if there is the observation of the specific features like head, hand etc. The imposition of an object other than a man (apurusārope) will not be possible when it is known that a man has a head etc. (1) As there is identity between the treeness and the specific property existing in Śīṃśapā (Śīṃśapātva), the question of the imposition of an object other than the tree will not arise if the property existing in Śīṃśapā (Śīṃśapātva) is known. If the generic property 'treeness' is known, sometimes the property other than 'Śīṃśapātva' can be imposed on the tree in the case of the unawareness of the specific property. But if that specific property (Śīṃśapātva) is known, the imposition of a property other than treeness on the Śīṃśapā is not justifiable. It is

rather very much unrealistic to state that, if a person has got
the perceptual knowledge of the 'Slims !apatva', he will have the
non-perceptual knowledge of the treeness. (1)

As there is no difference between the probans and
the probandum, the property 'Slims !apatva' can be inferred from
the treeness like the inference of the treeness from the
property - 'Slims !apatva', as there is no difference in nature.
Just as the non-eternity can be established on the strength of
its being invariably connected with the effort (prayatnanántarí-
yaka), it (i.e., the property of an object which is produced by
the effort) can be established from the non-eternity. (2)

(1) "Ihvrksatvaslims!apatvayorabhedátčhimslapătvagrahane sati
kă kathă vrkṣoterassaamanăropasya. Api ca vrksatva-grahane sati
samānyadharagrahānādvisēśānadhyavasāyāt kadācisdimśala-
paropah syād na tu sīmsapătvagrāhane sati avṛkṣatvamāropo
yuktāh.

Pranātuh slimśapātvam hi yasya
pratyaksagocarah.
Parokṣam tasya vrksatvamiti nātiva
laukikam." Ibid.

(2) "Kinca sādyasādhanayoravatyate kād yathā slimśapătvanā vrk-
ṣatvamanumāyate tathā vrksatvenāpi slimśapătvamanumāyate
tādātmyāvisēśāt. Tathā ca prayatnanántarījakatvenānityatvam
sādyate tadvadanityatvenāpi tatsādhyeta." Ibid.
The relation is one thing and Vyāpti is something else. That is to say, relation existence two objects but Vyāpti is a state or condition of being controlled by something else (parāyattatvalakaṇa). That which is controlled by other (i.e., cause) is Parāyatta. As effect is controlled by cause, the property existing in Parāyatta (i.e., Parāyattatva) exists in effect. The śīmsiapatva is pervaded by treeness but treeness is not pervaded by śīmsiapatva. Its being invariably connected with the effort (pratyatmanāntarīyakatva) is invariable connected, with non-eternity, but not the vice-versa. Similarly, the invariable concomitance of smoke exists in fire, but not the vice-versa. Such types of expression lead to the acceptance of the invariable relation (niyama), but not the identity of nature. In the case of identity of nature, śīmsiapā can not exist without śīmsiapā. In the like manner, treeness without
sīms!apātva should not be found. But actually the treeness without sīms!apātva is found to be existing in the Khadir-tree etc. The non-eternity is found in the lightning etc. in which there is the absence of its being invariably connected with effort. So, how can there be the existence of identity? Here, the object which has the property of the probandum exists without the property in the form of probans. It is not proper to say that the object which is seen without another can be identical with that.

(1) "Netu cānyaḥ sambandhah anyas'ica pratibandhah, Dvīṣṭhah sam-
bandhah pratibandhastu pariṣyatvalaśaṇa. Tatra sīms!apā-
tvam vrksatve pratibaddham na vrksavam sīms!apātve. Praya-
nanāntariyakatvamapanyatvam niyatam na tvanityatvam tat-
ti tothā dhūmasaṃghau pratibandho na tvayuḥdhūmas. Satyaṃ-
vam kim tvevamucyanīne niyama evāṅgikṛto bhaevet na tādāt-
myām. Tādāmyā hi yathā sīms!apā sīms!apām, vīna na draśy-
te tathā, vrksatvamapi sīms!apārahitam na draśyate. Draśy-
te ca khādirāda śīms!apārahitaṃ vrksatvam vidyādāna ca
prayatnanāntariyakatvarahitamanityatvamupalabhyaite iti
kathamabhṛdaḥ." Ibid.

(2) "Vīna sādhanadharmena sādhyadharmāyamasti hi. Drstastad-vyātirekena tadētāṃ ceti kaitavām." Ibid.
If it is said that the non-eternity existing in the jar etc. that are different from that existing in the lightning etc. will be identical with its being invariably connected with the effort, all types of inference will be impossible, as the knowledge of the method of agreement can not be attained due to the difference of the properties which (the difference) is caused by the difference of the locus of the attributes. (1) It can be explained in the following manner. After seeing a particular smoke qualified by smokeness in the kitchen, the relation of it with a particular fire limited by fireness can be established. If it is admitted that the properties will be different due to the difference of the object having the properties, the property in the form of smokeness existing in

(1) "Atha vidyadhyamityatvadanyadeva ghatadyaniyam avam Yatra- yatnayanantiyakatvabhinamucyate tarhi dharmibheda dharma- manos bheda anvayagrahanunupatteen sarvamanumanautsidaed." (Ibid.)
the smoke of a mountain will be different as the locus of this property (dharmi) in the form of the smoke existing on the mountain is different. Then there will be no certainty about the fact that the fire limited by the fireness existing in the fire of the mountain has a relation with the smoke limited by the smokeness existing in the smoke of the mountain. But if the property is different (due to the difference of its locus), there will not be any certainty regarding the ascertainment of the relation between the locus of property in the form of the fire which is limited by another property in the form of fireness existing in that particular locus and the smoke limited by smokeness existing in the smoke of the same locus. As the property becomes different due to the difference of its locus in every case, there is no guarantee of the fact that the relation between a particular locus of a property existing in a particular
place and another locus of another property existing in the same place will be invariable. As there is the absence of the knowledge of the method of agreement, the ascertainment of Vyāpti will not be possible.

As there is difference between the effect and cause in the forms - 'smoke and fire', it is proper to say that smoke has the invariable concomittance with fire but not the vice-versa. But, in the case under discussion it can not be said that 'its being invariably connected with the effort' (prayatnaṁantarīya- katva) has the invariable concomittance with the non-eternity, but not the vice-versa, as there is no difference between the probans and the probandum. (1)

(1) "Dhūmāngyostu kārya-kāraṇa-yorbhedād yuktāṃ vaktuṃ dhūmasyāgnau pratibandho na tvagnerdhūme. Iha tu sādhyasādhanāyoravatyati-rekāna tathā sākyate; vaktuṃ tathā 'bhidhāne vā nāvyatirekah'.
Ibid. Page no. 114."
The state or condition of being produced (kṛtakatva) is the natural probans (svabhāvahetu) of the inference in the form - "The sound is non-eternal, as it has the state or condition of being produced" (Śabdo'nityah kṛtakatvāt). How can this probans be said a natural one? What are the meanings of the terms 'non-eternity' and 'the state or condition of being produced'? The non-eternity has got the connection with the destruction, but the state or condition of being produced' has got the connection with the production. That which is produced must be destroyed, but it is not the fact that the production is identical with the destruction. So how can there be the identity between the probans and the probandum? (1)

(1) "Yasyacāyamanityaḥ śabdoḥ kṛtakatvādīti svabhāvaheturudāhṛtaḥ Sa katham svabhāvahetah, tāmas hi cintyate anityatvam nāma kimucyate kim ca kṛtakatvamīti. Tatrāṇityatvam vināś'ayogaḥ utpattiyogas'ca kṛtakatvam. Utpannasya ca bhāvasya vinās'a na tūtpāda eva vināśa iti katham sādhyasādhanayoravyatirekah." Ibid, Page no. 115.
If nothing has got its connection with destruction, the knowledge will arise in the form - 'The sound is subject to destruction' (Slaabdo vināslō) instead of the form - 'The sound is noneternal'. This knowledge is invalid, as the knowledge of the sound qualified by destruction can not be attained by it like the knowledge of the mountain qualified by fire. If the knowledge of an object having the property in the form of absence is not attained at the time of the knowledge of the absence, the knowledge of an object qualified by the property in the form of absence can not be attained with the help of that absence.\(^{(1)}\)

The suffix 'tva' can be added to an object bearing

\(^{(1)}\) "Atra codayanti Viśesajyaghe hyanityatve vināslō slabda iti buddhih syānnānitya iti. Eṣā ca mithyābuddhiḥ sīlkhakīṇa eva kṛṣānuvisesātāya vināśāvatāḥ slabdasya grahītyāmas'-akyatvāt.

Abhāvena hi dharmena tadvatō dharmināḥ katham.
Abhāvagrahaṇabelāyāṃ dharmināḥ nupalamabhānēt." Ibid.
the positive sense. How can it be added to the term 'anitya' (non-eternal) conveying a negative sense? Let it be said that the non-eternity is the existence of an object limited in both the ends (ubhayāntaparicchinnā). (1) That is to say, the non-eternity of an object will be limited by the prior absence and the posterior absence or destruction of that object which is considered to be non-eternal. The state or condition of being produced is stated as existence, the substratum of which is an object which is produced by its cause. As the existence is the probes and the probandum, the natural reasonness of it has been established. (2)

(1) "Anityatvamiti ca bhāvapratyayāḥ kathamabhāve bhaved viruddhatvāt. Taśnādubhayāntaparicchinnā vastusattā'ṇityatvamucyatām." Ibid.

It can not be accepted, as the probans and the probandum can not be cognised in that manner. If it is said in the manner mentioned above, the knowledge in the form - 'The sound is the locus of the existence, as it has got the loculessness of it (the existence).' will be attained. But 'The sound is non-eternal, as it has a state or condition of being produced' - this type of knowledge is attained instead of the previously mentioned one. The statement that the probandum is in the form of existence which is limited by both the ends and the probans is that existence which has been produced by a cause and which inheres in its locus (asraya-samavayinī) is not proper here, as there is the absence of the limitorness due to the non-existence of the end in the form of destruction. (1)

The sound is subject to destruction' - in this form of knowledge, the relation between the qualificand and the qualifier can be established. What is the utility of assuming the probandum as the existence? The above-mentioned statement that the suffixes -"tva," tāl," etc. can not be added to an object bearing the sense of negation can be said by an in-experienced person. For, the connotation of a term (Śabdpravṛttinimitta) has been mentioned by 'Bhāvapratyaya' (i.e., a suffix conveying the sense of Bhāva, or connotation). A particular term can be used in order to make us understand a substance having some particular property. In the same way, the term 'abhāva' can be used in order to make us understand an object qualified by the property existing in an absence. So, the relation with the destruction which exists in the knowledge as
an object of it is called non-eternity. In the same way, the state or condition of being produced has got the connection with its production but not the existence.

The two properties - the production and destruction can not be the adjuncts of the relation. The property which does not exist in the sound exists in a jar. Similarly, a property which exists in the sound does not exist in a jar.

If it is said that one property only has got the relation with the objects, all positive objects will be produced

(1) "Tadevaṃ vināśalī s'abda iti visēṣanavisēṣyabhāvasiddheh kim satāsādhyā-kalpaneyā. Vatpunarabhiḥitaḥ abhaeva bhāva-stvatēdina syāditi tadātyantānabhijñasya codyaṃ. S'abda-pravṛttinimittasya tatra bhāvapratyayenā-bhichānāt. Yasya gunasya hi bhāvād dravya s'abdeniveśa iti abhaeva'pi abha-vatvamiti daryaṇāt. Tasmād buddhistha vināśa'yoga evānityayātvaṃ." Ibid.

(2) "Kṛtakatvamapayutpattiyoṣa eva na satā." Ibid.

(3) "Nānūtpādavināśākhyāṃ na dhārmaṃvayamanveṇya Yaēghate nāsti tacchabde yecca s'abde na tad ghate." Ibid. Page-116.
on the production of a single one. Then, all objects will be
destroyed on the destruction of a single object. (1)

It can not be said that the meaning of the condition
of being produced as existence is more reasonable. For, the
properties of similar types will be cognised though the objects
having those properties may differ. Even if the properties are
different, there will arise the contradiction in respect of the
effect like the knowledge of the method of agreement etc., as
the properties are cognised as of similar types. (2) As the verbal
usage of the method of agreement etc. is possible to ascertain
the properties of similar type without the help of the universal,

(1) "Athaikā eva dharmāḥ sarvabhāvasambandhi āgyata tarhi —
Ekabhāvasamutpāde sarvotpāda prasajyate.
Ekapralayakāle ca sakalapralayo bhavet." Ibid.

(2) "Tasmāt sattāpakṣa eva varāṇ. Naistadevaḥ. Dharmibhede'pi
dharmāṇāṃ tulyarūpānāmavabhyāsāt. . . . . . . . . . . . . Bhinnatva'pi ca
dharmāṇāṃ samānārūpātvaṃavabhyāsāmanātvaṃvādanvayagrhaṇadhikā-
ryavirodhaḥ." Ibid.
the framer of the aphorism had applied the term 'similarity' (sādharmya) instead of the term 'universal' (sāmānya) in the sutras - 'That which can produce the inferential knowledge of the probandum on the strength of the similarities of the instances is called the probans' (udāharaṇasādharmyāt sādhyasa-
dhanam hetuḥ) etc. The two properties called production and destruction are regarded as the probans and the probandum respectively. As they are different from one another, the state or condition of being produced, the probans of the aforesaid inference, can not be a natural one (svabhāvahetu). It can not also be the probans in the form of effect (kāryahetu). Now, the question is whether the Buddhists admit the existence of a causal relation between two objects or the existence of the same (Samādāna), in a succession of objects existing in them.\(^{(1)}\) It can not be

\(^{(1)}\) "Sajātīyā kramotpannāḥ pratyāsannāḥ parasparam. Vyaktayastāsu santānāḥ sa caika iti giyate." Arhatadarsāna of Sarvadarsānanāṃgraha.
said that the causal relation exists between two objects. If it exists between two objects, the causal relation is rather difficult to enunciate due to its minuteness.\(^{(1)}\)

The causal relation in a succession of smoke and fire is not possible due to its unreality. Reality (vastutva) is the property of that by which some purpose is served and some activities are accomplished (arthakriyakāritva). If fire can be inferred with the help of smoke by virtue of its being an effect, it can also be inferred by its other properties like blackness, which is not possible, its nature of going up in the sky etc. It can not be said that

smoke shall be effect of a particular object somehow and sometimes it would not be so. For, smoke will be an effect as a whole as it is produced as a whole from an object (i.e., fire) which is connected with smoke through the methods of agreement and difference. (1)

So, it should be taken into consideration that smokeness will coexist with fire (through the indirect relation). So, mere coexistence is the invariable concomitance. The causal relation is of no use at all. (2)

According to the philosophers of the Carvaka system, inference can not be a source of valid knowledge, as invariable concomitance can never be ascertained.


(2) "Dhumatvamātraṃevāgniśahācāriti manyase. Sahācāritvamevāstu tadupattikatha vṛtha." Ibid. Page-117.
In criticising their view, it may be asked whether they advance some argument in support of their standpoint or not. If they do not forward any argument in support of their standpoint, they cannot justify their non-acceptance of inference as a source of valid knowledge by mere asserting - "inference is not a source of valid knowledge." The object which they want to establish cannot be taken into account if there is no argument in its favour. It is said that the mere proposition in which there is no reason cannot justify an object as being established. If it is said that the argument will be forwarded in support of the statement, they (the Carvakas) will be charged for making self-contradictory statement (svavyāghāta). They do not admit inference and verbal testimony as special sources of valid knowledge. But, on assuming that their statement will be accepted by others as valid, they are making some
statement in support of their viewpoint. For this reason, they may be charged for making self-contradictory statement.

'My mother is barren' - this type of word is regarded as a self-contradictory word. (1) If there is motherhood, there can not be the barrenness, and the vice-versa. If the Cārvākas accept such type of self-contradictory word as evidence, they can not say that perception is only a source of valid knowledge. They can not also forward any reason as an evidence which is mentioned in their own books or in others.

The validity of the special source of a valid knowledge and its appearance can be determined due to their being the locus of the specific property existing in Pramāṇa and its appearance (Pramāṇabhasa) respectively. The validity of a Pramāṇa can be inferred from the syllogistic argument in the form - "It is a special source of valid knowledge, as it possesses the special property existing in a Pramāṇa" (Idam pramāṇam pramanasajātiyatyāt). In the same way, its appearance (Pramāṇabhasa) can be determined. By this statement, the Carvākas are admitting the existence of an inference.\(^{(1)}\)

How do the Carvākas forward their contrary arguments after hearing the arguments of the opponents? What the opponents of the Carvākas want to establish by reasons can not be known by perception. The contradictory knowledge of the opponents can

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\(^{(1)}\) "Kiṁca pramāṇatadābhāseavyavasthāpanam tatsamānājātiyatyāditāt vadatā bhavataive svākṛtaḥ svabhāvānumānam." Ibid.
known by the Cārvākas on hearing their words. This method of knowing others contradictory judgement is nothing but a form of inference.\(^1\) The statement is the effect of the knowledge of the object sought to be expressed by it and as such the statement becomes the effect of the said knowledge. For, the statement of an object depends on the knowledge of that object. Hence, it becomes the object of that knowledge.\(^2\)

The Cārvākas, after knowing the non-cognition of an object, come to the conclusion in the form - 'This object is not present.' This method of knowing the non-existence of an object is nothing but an inference in which the probans is the non-cognition. As for example, 'There is no jar, as it is not cognised here' (Nasti ghaṭa'ṇupalabdheh). Here, the absence

\(^1\) "Paragatā vipratipattisty vacanliṅgeneti Vruvata Kāryaliṅga- kānumāneḥ." Ibid.

\(^2\) "Vyavahāram prati vyavahartavyaprakārakajñānasya kāraṇatvāt."
of a jar has been inferred by the probans in the form of non-cognition of it. (1)

In order to cognise the distinction between a valid and an invalid knowledge, in order to know others' desire etc. and to know the absence of an object, inference is to be admitted. (2) Moreover, the denial of an object which is beyond the capacity of our sense organs to cognise can not be established without the help of an inference. (3)

If the Carvākas do not accept inference as a source of valid knowledge, how can they justify the knowledge of the fire which is attained on seeing the smoke? They can not deny

(1) "Anupalabhīyā kānciderthēm pratīṣṭhēya tānupalabhīhīlingakā-
numānām." Bouddhadas'ān of Sarvadas'ānāsaṅgraha. Page no.5

(2) "Vyavsthānāyadhīnisdhānām siddheḥ pratyakṣaśca pramāṇasidd-
hiḥ." - Pramāṇamīṃśā - 1/1/11.

(3) "Pramāṇapramāṇavibhāgaśya parabuddhēḥ atīndriyārthasiddha-
sya ca siddhirnānumānādipramāṇam vinā." Commentary on
1/1/11. of Pramāṇaśāstra.
the existence of such types of knowledge. One shall not engage oneself to do a particular work without the specific knowledge of it. A man who wants fire shall not engage himself to kindle fire without the specific knowledge of it. It is admitted on all hands that the particular knowledge of an object is the cause of the inclination to a particular object. (1)

In reply to the above, the Cārvākas argue that, when the knowledge of fire is attained from the smoke, it is not an inferential knowledge but the knowledge of probability. This knowledge of probability is nothing but a specific form of doubt. In a doubt, there are two sides - the positive (bhāvākotī) and the negative (abhāvākotī). If there is the prominence of any side of the two in a doubt, that kind of doubt is called the

(1) "Pratyākṣādṛśetemapi padārthajātaṃ tajjñātavāyānīgavyāpā- reṇa sukhasādhanam itgrakāraṇamiti vā nisācitya tadupāde- data āhāti vā laukikāh............" Nyāyamañjarī, Page no. 110 (Chowkhamba Edition).
knowledge of probability or Sambhāvanā in a technical way. At the perception of the smoke in the mountain, a specific form of doubt will be produced. As there is the prominence of the positive side (bhāvekoti) i.e., of fire in the specific form of doubt, it is called the knowledge of the probability of fire. So, the inclination or absence of inclination to a probable object is possible by the specific knowledge in the form of probability.\(^{(1)}\) So, it is not essential to admit the existence of a source of valid knowledge other than perception in order to justify the above-mentioned case. According to them, the ascertainment of Vyāpti which is the ground of inference can never be possible due to various reasons which have been discussed in the previous chapter.

In order to refute the above-mentioned standpoint, it can be said that the specific knowledge which is produced

\(^{(1)}\) "Loka dhūmādidarśanānāntaram vahnyādiyavahārasāca sambhāvanamātratā." Tattvacintāmanī (anumitinirūpanam Chapter).
from the perception of the smoke etc. and in which there is the knowledge of Vyāpti as an instrument can not be a probable one. For, the knowledge of an object is produced from the appreception (anuvyavasāya). After the visual perception of a jar on the ground the appreception will arise in the form - 'I am seeing a jar' (ghatak pasiyāmi). In the like manner, the specific knowledge about the existence of the probans qualified by Vyāpti on the subject (vyāptivisistapaksadharmā) will arise. Out of that specific knowledge, the appreception (anuvyavasāya) will arise in the form - 'I am inferring the fire on the mountain.' (parvate vahnimanunāmi). Such type of appreception is not possible depending on the doubt in the form of the knowledge of probability. This appreception is the evidence of the existence of an inferential cognition. So, the existence of the inferential knowledge is to be admitted like
the existence of the perceptual one.\(^{(1)}\)

In criticising the view of the Cārvākas, Hemacandra, an authoritative philosopher of the Jaina system, says in his Pramāṇāmīmāṁsa that, though the Cārvākas do not accept inference as a source of valid knowledge they have to depend on other sources of valid knowledge like inference etc. for establishing the validity of perception. For, the direct cognition of the object of the past and future is not possible with the help of perception as it has got the capacity of cognising only those things that are very near, not those existing in a remote time and place. So, the Cārvākas will not be able to prove the

validity and invalidity of their cognition to others.\(^{(1)}\)

The validity of perception can be established on the strength of its unfailing correspondence to the fact. This method is nothing but an inference. If the validity of perception can be established on the strength of its unfailing correspondence to the fact, inference can also be established by applying the same logic.\(^{(2)}\) In the case of the establishment of the validity of perception, they will have to take recourse to the inference in the form - "The presentative cognition of perception is valid, as it has got the causeness of the

\(^{(1)}\) *Na ca sannihitārthavālano npadyāmānam purvāparaparamārṣasūryaṃ pratyaκṣaṃ purvāparakālabhāvinīnaṃ jñānavyaktīnāṃ prāmāṇyāprāmāṇavyayavasthāpakaṃ nimittemupalakṣayitum kṣamata Na ca yam svapratitigocarānāma pi jñānavyāktināṃ parām prati prāmāṇyāmeprāmāṇyam vā vyavasthāpayitum prabhubati.* - commentary on Sūtra 1/1/11 of Pramanamāmāsa, Page no. 7 (Pt. Sukhlalji Sanghvi Edition).

\(^{(2)}\) "Pratyakṣasyāpyarthāvyabhicārādeva prāmāṇyāṃ taccārthāpratibaddhalīṅgasābaddadvārā samunmajjataḥ parokṣasyāpyarthāvyabhicārādeva kim nesyaṭe?" - Ibid.
successful inclination" (Pratyaksanubhutiḥ pramaṇa saphalapravṛttijanakatvat). So, the Carvakas have no other alternatives than to admit the validity of inference. If the validity of the perceptual cognition can not be established by inference, the validity of it (i.e., the perceptual cognition) shall never be established.

It may be said by the Carvakas that the validity of the perceptual cognition can not be established by inference, but the validity of it can be established by itself (svataḥ). That is to say, the knowledge is produced by the collection of causes for attaining the knowledge which is the locus of the validity (pramāṇa).\(^{(1)}\) In the like manner, the validity of the perceptual knowledge can be ascertained by its being produced by the collection of causes that are capable of attaining the

\(^{(1)}\) "Svatogrāhyamiti = jnanagrāhākasāmagrijanyagrahaviśaya ityarthah." Super commentary Nilakanthi on Dipikā of Tarkasamgraha, Page no. 358 (Chowkamba Edition).
knowledge which is the locus of validity (pramātva).

The above standpoint of the Cārvākas is not tenable. If the validity of knowledge is ascertained by the collection of causes for attaining the perceptual cognition, the doubt of the validity of knowledge in the form - 'This knowledge is valid or not (idam jñānam pramā na vā) will not be possible. Gāngesha also says that the doubt of the validity of knowledge is not possible if the validity of it is attained by the collection of causes for attaining it (this knowledge). (1) The doubt of validity does not arise in the knowledge which is produced in an initial stage (anabhāṣadāsā). If the inclination caused by this knowledge is successful, the validity of the knowledge can be ascertained on account of its causeness

(1) "Svatasāca prāmāṇyagrahaḥ tatsaṃśayānupapattah." Tattvacintamani (anumātinirūpaṇam Chapter).
to the successful inclination. In this way, the validity of the knowledge based on some reasons other than the collection of causes of ascertaining knowledge has been accepted by the Logicians. As the validity of the perceptual cognition has been inferred from the probans in the form of the causeness to the successful inclination (Iyamanumitiḥ saphalapraṇvṛtijanakatvāt), the validity of an inferential cognition can be inferred from the same probans or from the probans in the form of the state or condition of its being produced by the knowledge of the probans which is qualified by the Vyāpti and its existence on the subject (Iyamanumitiḥ pramā vyāptipakṣadharmatāvisīṣṭahsvajñānajanyatvāt, yannaivam tannaivam yathā apramaā). (1) In the

(1) "Pramātvam na svato grāhyam samśayānupepatitah." Bhāṣopariccheda, verse no. 136.
like manner, the validity of inference can be inferred from the probans in the form of the state or condition of being the locus of the limiting property of being the special cause of the valid cognition (Anumānam pramāṇam pramitikaranatāvacchedaka-dharma-vattvāt, caksurvat).

So, it is proved that inference is a source of valid knowledge. It is not necessary to mention that the Vyapti can be ascertained.

According to the philosophers of the Jaina system, the knowledge of the invariable concomitance is attained by the ūha or reasoning. (1) The knowledge of the invariable concomitance which is conditioned by observation (upalambha) and non-observation (anupalambha) is ūha or reasoning. (2) The knowledge


(2) "Upalambhānupalambhanimittaṃ Vyāptijñānamūkhaḥ." Pramāṇamīmāṃsā on 1/2/5.
in the form - 'There is smoke if there is the existence of fire, and there is no smoke if there is the non-existence of the existence of fire' is an instance of reasoning. (1)

In criticising the above view, it can be said that the existence of such type of knowledge has been accepted by the Logicians also. What they (the Jaina Philosophers) have mentioned as observation and non-observation can be explained as the methods of agreement and difference. The causal relation between two objects can be established by the method of agreement and difference (anvaya-vyatiraka). The method of agreement can be expressed by the following statement: A particular object exists if another particular object exists (Tatsattve tatsattā). The

method of difference can be expressed by the following statement. A particular object can not exist if another one does not exist. (Tadasattve tadasatta). In the above example given by the Jaina philosophers, the method of agreement and difference can be applied. 'There is the smoke as an effect if there is the existence of fire as a cause along with other causes of smoke' - this type of expression which is described as 'upalambha' by the Jaina philosophers can be explained with the help of the method of agreement. Similarly, 'there is no smoke if there is the non-existence of fire' - this type of expression which is called as 'anupalambha' by the Jaina Philosophers can be explained as an instance of the application of the method of difference.

The philosophers of the Jaina school said that the invariable concomitance between objects can be established by the reasoning which is produced by the observation and
non-observation. On the other hand, the Logicians said that the invariable concomitance between the two objects can be established by applying the methods of agreement and difference. So, what the Jaina philosophers said is not a new theory to the Logicians.

So, it may be concluded that the difference in respect of ascertaining Vyāpti between the Jaina philosophers and the Logicians lies in terminology, not in respect of object.

The clarification of the means of ascertaining Vyāpti according to the Vedanta system of Indian philosophy resembles closely to that offered by the Logicians. In many cases, there is similarity of approach to the problem and it appears that the Vedantists, up to a certain limit, were offering their clarification keeping in view that of the Neo-logicians. But their criticism in some cases appears to be a bit far-fetched when they state that the knowledge of coexistence (Sahacārajñāna) cannot be the cause of ascertaining Vyāpti in the
capacity of the knowledge of a qualifier by citing some
examples where the coexistence is not a qualifier, rather it
is known as a qualificand. In that case, the knowledge of
coeistence cannot be the cause of ascertaining Vyāpti in the
capacity of the knowledge of a qualifier (viśesāna).

Here a solution can easily be offered by inserting
the term 'avyavahitottaratva' (i.e., the property existing in
an object produced immediately after something) as a qualifier
of the limitor of the effectness (kāryatāvacchedaka). Here the
knowledge of Vyāpti is considered as an effect and the limitor
of the effectness would be the state or condition of being the
knowledge of Vyāpti (vyāptijñānatva). The causeness of the
knowledge of the coexistence as a qualifier can be established
to an effect limited by the knowledgeness of the Vyāpti existing
in the knowledge of Vyāpti which (knowledge) is produced
immediately after the knowledge of coexistence known as a qualifier (Vislesaśabdhaḥ saha-cārajaṁ-nāvavahitottarajāyamāna-vyāpti-grahatva-vacchinnam prati tādṛṣṭa-asaha-cārajaṁ-nāvatvena hetutā). In this way, the causeness of the knowledge of coexistence as a qualificand can be established to an effect limited by the knowledgeness of the invariable concomittance existing in the knowledge of the same produced immediately after the knowledge of coexistence as a qualificand (Vislesaśabdhaḥ saha-cārajaṁ-nāvavahitottarajāyamāna-vyāpti-grahatva-vacchinnam prati tādṛṣṭa-asaha-cārajaṁ-nāvatvena hetutā).

If the term 'avyavahitottarata' (i.e., the property existing in an object produced immediately after something) is inserted as an adjunct of the limitor of the effectness (karṛyatāvacchedaka), the deviation of the causal relation between the knowledge of coexistence and the knowledge of Vyāpti
can easily be avoided. It may, of course, be contended that in this type of solution no common cansion (anugatadharma) of the cause in the form of both the types (i.e., विस्तोत्सनाविध्याज्ञातां सहाकारज्ञानां and विस्तेष्याविध्याज्ञातां सहाकारज्ञानां) of the knowledge ofVyāpti can be available. But in that case, the common cansion can be made by inserting the term 'anyataratva' (i.e., the specific property existing in either of the two forms of knowledge) as the limitor of the causeness (कारणतावच्चेदका) existing in the knowledge of coexistence.

It can be explained in the following manner. If the knowledge of the coexistence of the coexistence which is the cause of ascertaining Vyāpti is taken as a knowledge of which the coexistence has become a qualifier (Sahacāravis'ेषापाज्ञाना) or as a knowledge of which the coexistence is taken as a qualificand (Sahacāravis'ेषयकाज्ञाना), we can easily take all
individual manifestations of knowledge of coexistence in a common statement by saying any one of this knowledge of coexistence.

This sort of common cannotation (anugama) as 'anyataratva' or 'anyatatmata' as the case may be has been resorted to by the Neo-logicians in many cases just as in the case of ascertaining the causal relation between the consideration (parāmāraśa) and the inferential cognition (anumiti). There the probans may sometimes be known as a qualifier in the knowledge technically known as 'parāmāraśa' or sometimes the probans may be known as the qualificand (visleśya) also in the consideration. That is to say, the smoke is known as a qualifier of the consideration in the form - 'The mountain is the locus of the smoke pervaded by fire' (vahniyāpyadhūmavān parvataḥ). In the form of consideration - 'The smoke pervaded by fire
exists on the mountain (vahnivyāpyadhumāḥ parvate), the smoke is known as a qualificand. If the inferential knowledge is attained from the second type of consideration where the smoke is the qualificand, there will be the deviation in the method of agreement in absence (vyatirekāvyabhicāra) due to the absence of the first type of consideration where the smoke is taken as a qualifier.

In that case, the deviation regarding the causal relation between the consideration and the inferential cognition has been averted by inserting the term 'avyavahitottarātvā' as a qualifier of the limitor of the effectness (kāryatāvecchedaka i.e., anumitītva). There also the common cannotation can be made by inserting the term 'anyatarātvā' or 'anyatamatva' (if the situation so demands) as a common cannotation existing in the cause of inferential cognition (i.e., consideration) of various types.
The procedure of ascertaining Vyāpti as mentioned (Page no. 123, Chapter no. VI) by the Mīmāṃsakas involves the defects technically called 'heaviness' (Gaurāb) and anavasthā (Regressus-in-infinitum). For, if any one goes on thinking a number of properties like kitchenness (mahanāsatva) etc. as so many extraneous adjuncts and goes on eliminating them, it will involve in an unnecessary long process of elimination and as such not technical heaviness but the defect called 'anavasthā' will crop up as an obstacle to the ascertainment of Vyāpti.

The absence of Upādhi should certainly be considered but there is no necessity of going on imagining an unlimited number of Upādhis to make inference in a particular case. It is quite sufficient to see whether actually some extraneous adjuncts exist in the probans of a particular case of inference or not. But it is not necessary to assume the existence of the
imaginary adjuncts. For, in that case no body would be able to make an inference in any case. The idea behind this point of criticism is that the process of inference should not unnecessarily be lengthened by taking recourse to unwarranted and unnatural imagination.