CHAPTER 1
STATE, CIVIL SOCIETY AND SECURITY: THEORETICAL QUESTIONS

State and civil society are the critical realms of socio-political activity. The nature and engagements of (as well as the relations between) the State and civil society vary across time and space, and between regions and countries. Complexities abound with regard to the conceptualisation and interpretations of the State and civil society (Jessop 1990; Pierson 1996; Kaviraj and Khilnani 2002; Keane 1988; Hall 1995; Cohen and Arato 1992; Chandhoke 1995; Chandhoke 2003). Many of the contemporary studies on the State and civil society focus on how the State as an agency faces critical challenges under neoliberal conditions. There are also studies dealing with how and why the State retreats from the social security realms and how the residual space has been made available for free individual self-regulation and NGO activism in the civil society (Fukuyama 2001; World Bank 1999; Seethi 2009; Diaz 1993). Over years, the concept of civil society itself has undergone various interpretations and achieved different meanings. In the liberal understanding, civil society has been seen as a realm which protected the rights of the individual from the arbitrary power of the State. However, during the last three decades, civil society has been made out as a space detached from the State. There are also efforts to transpose the State in the Third World from its developmental practices (Blaney and Pasha 1993; Rudolph 2000; Wickramasinghe 2005). In the name of ‘good governance,’ ‘radical democracy,’ ‘grassroot development’ and ‘people’s participation,’ a large array of NGO network is being deployed as the civil society (World Bank 1997; World Bank 2000; Ayers 2006; Williams and Young 1994). It is with this new version of civil society that the neoliberal policies have been implemented across the world.

Paradoxically, the ‘shrinking’ State has also been too much militaristic in implementing laws and treaties of the market. Here, both the State and civil society tend to generate insecurity complexes. While the civil society is being appropriated by the neoliberal institutions for developmental purposes, say as an ‘alternative’ to the State, many undemocratic/revivalist/fundamentalist forces have been making inroads through this sphere. Many of them sought to gain political strength using tradition,
culture, religion etc by putting across sensitive issues for mobilisation (Tetreault and Denemark 2004). All these trends might affect the democratic process in countries where cultural diversity is critical and complex. The liberal spirit behind seeing civil society as “an essential pre-requisite for democratisation” is being threatened today with the very manipulation of civil society by the neoliberal institutions, on the one hand and the revivalist/fundamentalist forces, on the other. By arguing that civil society is an ‘alternative’ to the State, neoliberals try to undermine its role in the larger context of democratic practices. This chapter seeks to examine the historical evolution of the concepts of State and civil society by analysing the important theoretical narratives on the theme. It also tries to outline the discourses on security in relation to the State and civil society.

*State and Civil Society: Liberal Readings*

The historical evolution of the concepts of State and civil society in the liberal discourses is being associated with the development and expansion of capitalism in the West. It was accompanied by the Western Enlightenment paradigm, which celebrated ‘rational equality’ of human beings (Jacob 2000; Williams 1999). It was a shift from the theocentric worldview to a humanocentric view about man and society. The new inventions in science and technology had questioned the very rationality of the old order. The gradual shift from feudalism to capitalist mode production and the emergence of a new middle class reconfigured the power equations in Western societies. It was viewed as a shift from ‘the insecure’ social conditions to a ‘security community,’ in which the people were guided by modern rationality. The vernacular statist institutions had also evolved in this setting.

The West as a system of states and economies evolved hand in hand. The absolutist/authoritarian States can be considered as the precursors of the modern State. Absolutism arose in the sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe. It was an admixture of both the archaic as well as the modern elements. It had facilitated the rise of capitalism, on the one hand, and maintained the feudal structures, on the other (Anderson and Hall 1986: 21-40). Perry Anderson sees it as “a redeployed and recharged apparatus of feudal domination.” He notes: feudalism was “demarked by the unity of
economy and polity distributed in a chain of parcellized sovereignties.” With the coming of money rents, this unity became “weakened and it paved the way for ‘free labour’ and the ‘wage contract.’” The weakening of the feudal structures contributed to the upward mobility of the sovereignties towards a centralised militarised system—the absolutist state (Anderson 1979: 18-19; Gellner 1983; Gellner 1994a).

The introduction of Roman law had provided sufficient space for free capital growth in town and country. The basic feature of this law was its separation of the ‘private’ from the ‘public.’ The right to property was protected under the private law. In accordance with the public law, the administrative power was centralised (Anderson 1979: 25-28). The Absolutist states protected the feudal privileges as well as the interests of the “nascent mercantile and manufacturing classes” (Williams 1999; Anderson 1979: 40). As Christopher Pierson notes, “absolutism is perhaps best seen as a transitional form, albeit one that spanned several centuries (Pierson 1996:45). The transition from feudalism to capitalism was a gradual process. In the process, the State became more and more dependent on the civil society, for getting economic support for the smooth implementation of its policies (Mann 1986:512). At the same time, the powerful sections in the civil society hoped to shape State action to suit their own interests, because of its capacity to provide a coordinating framework for the new emerging capitalist economy (Held 1996: 83; Gellner 1994b). This mutually dependent alliance system shielded the protectionist self-development of native capitalism in the mercantile period.

The revolutions in Europe marked the end of the absolutist regimes in the West, which shifted the balance of power away from monarchy and aristocracy to the commercialised gentry and merchants. The newly emerged capitalist State enunciated the rights of the upper and middle ranks of the society to participate in power along with the rulers. This was formalised within the constitutional system (Anderson and Hall: 35-40). In fact, the transition from absolutism to a contractual state led to the releasing of the capital for self-development without any constraints from the State. The separation of the ‘civil’ from the ‘political’ became the hallmark of the time. Coincidently, the liberal discourses on State and civil
society took progress along with these developments (Gaus 1983; Kymlicka 1989). However, there is no pure doctrine of liberalism. The liberal notions are overlapping with other ideologies. But there are some core ideas which work differently in distinct contexts (Vincent 1995: 24-27). David Held sees liberalism as the attempt “to define a private sphere independent of the state itself, that is, the freeing of civil society from political interference and the simultaneous delimitation of the states’ authority” (Held 1998: 13). The separation of the private from the public and the freeing of the economy are the basic features of an advanced capitalist system. In its classical period, liberalism overemphasised individualism. The influence of Descartes was prominent during this period. Bertrand Russell puts it: “Descartes’ fundamental certainty, ‘I think, therefore I am’, made the basis of knowledge different for each person, since for each the starting point was his own existence, not that of other individuals or of community” (Russell 1979: 579). So each individual was regarded as an abstract entity.

Social Contract theorists like Hobbes and Locke offered the basic premises for the development of the concepts of State and civil society in their modern liberal version. In the Contractualist tradition, the separation of the ‘civil’ from ‘political’ seems to be ambiguous. The civil society was deliberately used to distinguish a particular form of social and political organisation from the state of nature (Chandhoke 1995: 80). The individuals created civil society in order to get out of the problem-ridden state of nature. The civil society is a rational order compared to the uncivil conditions of the state of nature. In order to overcome the insecure conditions of civil society, people created the sovereign—the State. The fundamental nature of the ‘state of nature’ in the analyses of Hobbes and Locke made differences in their political conclusions about the State. The life in the Hobbesian state of nature was: “Solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” (Hobbes 1991). But, to Locke, the state of nature was a ‘state of perfect freedom’ and the individuals were within the bounds of the ‘law of nature,’ and ‘reason’ taught them to obey the laws. They were the products of one omnipotent (Locke 1960: 269-71). So, in the Hobbesian state of nature, people needed an all-powerful overarching authority to maintain peace and security. But, to Locke, the State was limited, and was only an agency for preserving ‘civility’ in the civil society.
Hobbes’s position regarding the State and society was a mixture of both liberal as well as illiberal elements (Held 1998: 14-16). In his analysis individuals were mere abstract entities. Hobbes portrayed the State as a machine and not the end of the individual. On the contrary, the individual was the end of the State (Hobbes 1991; Wayper 1974: 63). In a market society, Hobbes’s autonomous men may become a threat. In order to control the self-seeking market men, he advanced the notion of sovereign. These self-seeking, self-moving market men were the rising bourgeoisie (McClelland 1996:270). He was also influenced by the rival fanaticisms of his time (Russell 1979: 539). That is why he supported an all-powerful State—the absolutist monarchy.

The Social Contract theorists agreed on the importance of ‘consent’ in the making of ‘civil/political’ society. Giving ‘consent’ is a rational decision because the individual gets security of his life and property only in a ‘civilised’ community. The civil society is characterised by the civilised behaviour of the individual. They develop mutual respect and obligation. For the preservation of civility in civil society, people created the political authority through consent. Civil society was co-terminus with political society, but the latter was possible only when civility in human relations was ensured through a contract. Conversely, civility could be maintained only when political authority enforced it. In the Social Contract tradition, the primacy of rights separated the civil domain from the political, and which restricted the power of the sovereign. The basic end of the political authority is the protection of the natural rights of the individual. These rights are natural, so no authority has the right to deny them. In this understanding State and civil society are dialectically linked (Chandhoke 1995: 80-85).

The Lockean idea of limited government and the autonomous development of the individual have been taken up by the utilitarians. According to them, the government should be accountable to the people. They imaged the State as an ‘umpire’ in economic matters. But whenever laissez-faire appeared to be inadequate to make the possible outcome or any threat arose from the individuals, groups or classes, strong State intervention was justified (Held 1998: 23-25). Thus the aim of the State
was to maintain peaceful conditions for easy economic transactions. John Stuart Mill puts it: “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will is to prevent harm to others” (Mill 1991: 14). According to Mill, political institutions are made by the people and the existence of them depends upon the human will. He put forward three conditions for the better functioning of political institutions. They are: (a) the consent—the people for whom the form of government is intended must be willing to accept it, or at least not so unwilling as to oppose an insurmountable obstacle to its establishment; (b) active participation—they must be willing and able to do what is necessary to keep it standing; and (c) rational behaviour of the people—they must be capable of fulfilling the conditions of action and the conditions of self-restraint” (Ibid.: 207-8). Mill considered the representative form of government as the best political authority for a civilised community.

But Mill was also a sceptic of modern State. He had in mind the dangers of the overpowering of modern democratic State, or the majority tyranny and the levelling spirit of democracy, which lead to an intolerance of social experimentation and personal eccentricity. This sentiment was shared by Tocqueville also. He put across three basic ideas for controlling and keeping the State power accountable to the people; the separation of powers, periodic elections and the social associations (Deakin 2001: 86-87). The associational life of the individual in civil society stretches in a wide canvas. It brings forth the active individual participation in public matters, the sustainability of democratic values and the considerable check on the governmental power. He believed that the free associations would link the private interest with the general. According to Tocqueville,

It is difficult to draw a man out of his own circle to interest him in the destiny of the State, because he does not clearly understand what influence the destiny of the State can have upon his own lot. But if it be proposed to make a road cross the end of his estate, he will see at a glance that there is a connection between this small public affair and his greatest private affairs; and he will discover, without its being shown to him, the close tie which unites private to general interest (Tocqueville 2000: Chapter 4).
From the seventeenth century onwards, a lot of voluntary associations had mushroomed in the West. ‘Self-help’ was the motive behind joining an association. Religions also formed associations in order to integrate the followers. Because of the large scale exclusions, women also formed their own associations. Later on, such movements extended themselves to the lower strata of the population (Frevert 2005:65-67). In his analysis on American democracy, Tocqueville said that democracy was closely associated with political liberty. This could be attained only through the ‘equalisation of social conditions.’ But such an egalitarian society could be safeguarded only through the institutional models that had developed in America. He warns: “if these free institutions are destroyed, this will lead to despotism” (Tocqueville 2000; Tocqueville 1997: 31; Aron 1997: 290-93). Tocqueville’s work was an antidote to the emerging individualism of his time. The tension between the demands of free democratic politics prompted him to develop the techniques of political citizenship as against the negative social effects of commercial society (Welch 2001:235). And also, the associational life in the civil domain would integrate the individuals out of their primary attachments (Warren 2001: 42). However, Tocqueville was not arguing that associational life was an alternative to the political. He said that it was an inception to the political life. This was obviously an antidote to the emerging individualism of the industrial capitalism.

According to Hegel, “civil society exists between family and the state.” In the civil society “universal and particular have fallen apart, yet both are still reciprocally bound together and conditioned. While each of them seems to do just the opposite to the other and supposes that it can exist only by keeping the other at arm’s length, none the less each still conditions the other” (Hegel 1897: 182-84; Hegel 1957). The particular ends of the individual cannot be attained without the help of the universal. “Individuals can attain their ends only in so far as they themselves determine their knowing, willing, and acting in a universal way and make themselves link in this chain of social connections” (Hegel 1897: 187).

Frederick Beiser viewed that “what is most striking about Hegel’s treatment of civil society is his balanced appraisal of it, his attempt both to
preserve and to negate it” (Beiser 2008: 244). According to Hegel, the domain of civil is also a sphere of self-centricism and exploitation. He had rejected the classical economist position of the self-regulation of the market and stressed the importance of State in this realm. To Hegel the realm of economy and civil society are the same. The exclusionary nature of the market prevents the vast sections of the people to enjoy the freedom of civil society. These excluded sections may pose a threat in the society. So, he argued for the regulation of the market in order to reduce the socio-economic and moral consequences emerging out of it (Chandhoke 2003: 122-23). Hegel stressed that there should be a balance between the individual interest and social interest. In his own words,

...the individual must certainly have a right to earn his living in this way or that, but on the other hand the public also has a right to earn his living in this way or that, but on the other hand the public also has a right to expect that necessary tasks will be performed in the proper manner. Both viewpoints must be satisfied, and the freedom of trade should not be such as to prejudice the general good (Hegel 1897; Hegel 1957).

Roughly, Hegel’s idea of free market and administration of justice resembled that of the classical liberals like Locke and Smith, but he varied from them in case of the importance of State in society. To Hegel, the State, an instrument to transcend the self-regulation is necessary to lessen the tension between the general interest and the private interest (Femia 2001: 13). Here, Hegel stands for an ethical society upon a commercial society (Jones 2004: 114). According to Hegel, “Civil society is a set of social practices which are constituted by the logic of the capitalist economy and which reflect the ethos of the market, but which have an existence distinct from the economy” (Chandhoke 2003: 117) Chandhoke notes: “Hegel gives us a picture of civil society that is shot through with shades of grey” (Ibid.: 124). But in Hegel’s analysis the working class remains in the dark side of the capitalist system (Ibid.: 136). However, in order to secure and maintain the system, he called for state regulation.

It is clear that there exists a historical nexus between the Western liberal State, civil society and capitalism. Liberalism has been characterised by its defense of the private realm from the arbitrary power of the State. The differences within the liberal discourses, over a period of time, were on
the question of the intensity of the State regulation on society, in accordance with the demands/interests as well as the strategies of the world capitalist system. In its classical period, liberalism sought to demand/support for more individual autonomy and very less State regulation. In its welfare capitalist phase, there was more State intervention in societal matters, quintessentially a State-guided society. When it comes to the neoliberal epoch, the State has been rolling back from social security/welfare realms. With the shrinking of the role of the State as a major provider, individual self-regulation and NGO activism became prominent. In the liberal lineages, the State is not a static entity because its root lies in the society. The liberals generally viewed the realm of civil society a ‘buffer zone’ which is protecting the individual from the arbitrary power of the State. This line of thought presupposes that modern State has a natural tendency of overpowering. The role of civil society is to check this tendency and protect the individual. Hence the State and civil society are dialectically linked which ensures a somewhat systemic balancing of both.

According to Max Weber “… state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber 1958). The modern States are said to be successful in maintaining legitimacy among their people. Weber continues: “Like the political institutions historically preceding it, the state is a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate (i.e. considered to be legitimate) violence” (Ibid.:33-34). Indeed, the State has been trying to make the whole society act in accordance with its ‘line of thought,’ whereby the use of force is a legitimate source of power. It could be understood only by analysing the relationship between State, society and the capitalist system.

Weber recognised the State as a superior power entity. While Marx viewed it as a bourgeois enterprise, a product of capitalism, Weber rejected this class-State linkage. To him, classes cannot be reduced to the realm of mere economic relations. It is only one factor in the distribution and struggle for power. But there are umpteen number of factors, broadly call the nationalist sentiments, playing a crucial role in the creation and
mobilisation of political power. To Weber, State is not a product of capitalism, but a promoter of capitalism. He notes:

> The modern state is a compulsory association which organizes domination. It has been successful in seeking to monopolize the legitimate use of physical force as a means of domination within a territory. To this end the state has combined the material means of organization in the hands of its leaders, and it has expropriated all autonomous functionaries of estates who formerly controlled these means in their own right. The state has taken their positions and now stands in the top place (Weber 1958: 37).

Accordingly, the State is an overarching authority, which has been legitimately dominating the society and for this motive (domination) it has taken over the privileges of the autonomous actors whom were dominating the society, and the State became ascendant to the supreme authority in the society. On a Weberian account, questions like what makes the modern State so distinct from other State forms may yield a somewhat concrete answer: “the centrality of societal power and the legitimate use of physical force.” Weber writes: “Bureaucracy...is fully developed in political and ecclesiastical communities only in the modern state, and in the private economy, only in the most advanced institutions of capitalism” (Weber 1958: 40). Here he tests the Marxian notion of the historical connection between the State and capitalism: “state is a product of capitalism.” According to Weber, capitalism fosters the expansion of more rational administration-bureaucracy (Held 1993: 63). Both the State and capitalism had evolved on a parallel line. At last, the State had become the overarching authority over the total means of political organisation. He also contends the view of abolishing private capitalism. This would lead to the merging of the bureaucracy with the capital and result in the bureaucratisation of the top management of the nationalised or socialised enterprises. The market is the key countervailing power to the State (Ibid).

The period between 1870 and 1914 witnessed profound social changes in the West. With the boom in industrialisation, a mass society came into existence. This displaced the dominant liberal paradigm resulting in the new forms of social and political organisation. The emerging pressures prompted the State to intervene in the social realm. Since then the State
shifted its role from an ‘umpire’ on individual matters to an activated agency—a shift from ‘leisseez-faire’ system to a ‘Welfare State capitalist’ system. During this period the Western liberal states took a ‘consensual path’ in order to deal with the varied interests, especially the interests of the dominant propertied class, on the one hand, and the proletariat, on the other. Along with these developments the fundamental liberal notions about the individual and State also changed. Andrew Vincent notes: from the late 1880s onwards liberalism has been changing its direction from the classical ‘atomism’ to ‘social individualism’ which gave equal weight to the individual and the community. Its resonance extended up to the 1970s (Vincent 1995: 30-50). During this period, the concept of civil society lost its glamour in the academic as well as political discussions. Sunil Khilnani notes: “… central to classical western political theory, the concept of civil society was largely moribund during the days when models of state-led modernisation dominated both liberal and Marxist conception of social change and development. It was recovered during the late 1970s and 1980s, as these models disintegrated” (Khilnani 2001:12).

**Marxian and Neo-Marxian Readings**

It is also important to look at the critical responses to the debates on State and civil society in the context of the theories of capital accumulation. Marx viewed the State as a product of society in a particular stage of its transition. In the *Communist Manifesto* Marx and Engels described the modern State as “a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie” (Marx and Engels 1848). He argued that the State and its officials tend to exploit and oppress the civil society on behalf of certain particular sectional groups (Marx 1843: 44-45). Marx put the State at the super structural level and viewed it as the system of property relations and the ruling class struggle (Marx 1857). Engels argued that the State is an institution to regulate the struggle between the two opposing classes through oppression and concessions and it moderates the class struggle without altering the ruling class domination (Engels 1884: 154-63). The central idea is that the State is an instrument of the ruling class which protects the dominant class interests. The workers, women and children were excluded from this arena of power sharing.
Marx endorsed a vital role for civil society in the historical development of mankind, and contended that it cuts across both the State and the nation (Marx 1967: 469). However, Marx rejected the existence of civil society as an independent sphere, but saw its origin in the class relations and in the political economy (Marx and Engels 1962: 362). He saw civil society not primarily as an arena for voluntary meetings between groups and individuals, but for exploitation, and due to its inherent inequality, based on various roles within the capitalist system, it could, according to Marx, never develop into a sphere that strengthened the social fabric. While other thinkers saw civil society as a place of refuge from the exploitive relations of the family and the economy, Marx saw it largely as a mirror of these exploitations, and, unlike Hegel, he did not see the State as the remedy for the inequalities and possible unrest in the civil society. The State is, according to Marx, not universal, as it is influenced by the capitalist power structure and would, therefore, reinforce rather than resolve conflicts within civil society. While denying the positive role of civil society suggested by Tocqueville and others, Marx nevertheless saw civil society as a part of social and political changes. This change would, however, not come about through interaction within civil society, but through a revolutionary change within both the political and the economic sphere (Femia 2003: 138; Seethi 2009).

Marx viewed civil society as bourgeois society and the State is an extension of it controlled by the dominant class. He placed civil society in the substructure (Marx 1843: 44-45) and claimed that the realm is basically exclusionary and exploitative that caused the total alienation of the working class. This is in contrast to the liberal view which generally regarded civil society as a realm of high emancipatory potential. Marx observed that the capitalist system itself is self-contradictory, and that a major chunk of the population, the workers, women, and children were excluded from its developmental concerns. A Marxian sociologist notes: “Behind the factor of rule of law, voting rights and the slogan of liberty, equality and fraternity was the economic exploitation and alienation of the working classes that made a mockery of all these high sounding terms and phrases. The ideology of liberalism blurred the vision of the workers who could not see liberty as liberty to die of starvation” (Sheshadri 1979:...
The ideology of liberalism produces nothing other than ensuring the ‘legitimate’ sustainability of the modern capitalist system.

Habermas tried to synthesise both Weberian and Marxian notions regarding the modern State. His analysis is set in a frame - the question of ‘legitimation.’ He notes: “The functions accruing to the state apparatus in late capitalism and the expansion of social areas treated by administration increase the need for legitimation” (Habermas 1975; Connolly 1984: 145). The bourgeois revolutions caused the flourishing of a mass democracy in the West. The State becomes a coordinating force for the varied interests of various capitalist forces. He pinpointed three interest areas of the State to make consensus on the competing demands - they are individual capitalism, state capitalism and generalisable interests. And the increased State activity is the net result of a like in the need for legitimation, which seemed disproportionate as concerned with the ruler and the ruled (Connolly 1984: 146). Thomas McCarthy pointed out that the stability of the capitalist social formation would depend on the “continued effectiveness of legitimation that could not withstand discursive examination.” The problem, however, is how to distribute socially produced wealth inequitably and yet legitimately” (McCarthy 1984).

Antonio Gramsci, an Italian Marxist thinker, extended the Marxian notion that the State is a coercive instrument of dominant class (Gramsci 1998). He goes further and said that the very process of domination is not achieved through coercion alone, but also through the active ‘consent’ of the masses. Gramsci’s theory of the State came out of a proper understanding of the relationship between the State and civil society (Mukherjee 2000: 371). He had rejected the ‘economism’ of the conventional Marxism in all its forms (Merrington 1977: 140-75), and explained how both the State and civil society were playing a constitutive role in creating/maintaining the ruling class hegemony. Gramsci fixes the civil society and the political society/State at the superstructural level, and the ‘intellectuals’ in the society are the ‘mediators’ (Gramsci 1998: 12; Merrington 1977). The intellectuals ensure the ‘spontaneous’ consent of the people, while the State is being “legally enforcing the discipline on the masses, those who are hesitated to give consent” (Gramsci 1998: 12).
Here the State and civil society have been playing a rhythmic role in maintaining the ruling class domination. It is a mutual balancing system and if any systemic failure occurred the rule will be through coercion alone. The “moment of force is a sign of great weakness; normally the hegemonic equilibrium is characterized by a combination of force and consent, which balance each other reciprocally, without force predominating excessively over consent” (Ibid.: 154). Gramsci viewed that the “organic crisis” i.e. – “the conflict between the “represented and the representatives,” is a crisis of ruling class hegemony, quintessentially, the crisis of the State (Ibid.: 210).

Conceptually Gramsci’s definition of the State may appear to be ambiguous and wavering. In his notes on “Political struggle and Military war” Gramsci made a comparison between the Russian and the Western States. In the West, contrary to Russia, “The state was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earth works” (Gramsci 1998: 238). Gramsci writes:

...every state is ethical in as much as one of its most important functions is to raise the great mass of population to a particular cultural and moral level, a level (or type) which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces for development, and hence to the interests of the ruling classes... in reality, a multitude of other so-called private initiatives and activities tend to the same end-initiatives and activities which form the apparatus of the political and cultural hegemony of the ruling classes(Ibid.: 258).

In another instance, Gramsci stated: “hegemony over its historical development belongs to private forces, to civil society which is ‘state’ too, indeed is the state itself” (Ibid.: 261). In these statements one can see varying positions of Gramsci. Sometimes it is political society + civil society, and then a balance between the civil society and the political society, and in certain respects the State and civil society are one and the same. In short, on a Gramscian account, the State is “the entire complex of political and theoretical activity by which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its domination but also succeeds in obtaining the active consent of the governed” (Femia 1981:28). So, in this analysis, the State is symbiotically related to the civil society and each cannot be analysed in isolation.
In his analysis of the European State and civil society, Gramsci brings in the ruling class domination and views: “Civil society consisted of private institutions like schools, churches, clubs, journals and parties which were instrumental in crystallizing social and political consciousness” (Gramsci 1998). He had elaborated how these institutions in the civil society were creating ruling class hegemony. The institutions in the civil domain seem quasi political and, most often, political parties have been breaking these civil-political distinctions, and functioning as a mobiliser of social power into political power. The institutions in civil society re/produce the existing dominant values and have a great influence on public policy making. These influences are channelised through the political parties. They are playing a vital role in shaping social and political consciousness. Broadly speaking, the Marxian notion of civil society explains the exclusionary nature of that realm and Gramsci elaborates how this realm sustains the ruling class domination legitimately (Merrington 1977).

Nicos Poulantzas’s analysis on the State is a departure from the conventional Marxist position. He focuses on political and ideological struggles and rejects all forms of instrumentalism in analysing the modern State and viewed that State is a complex social relation. According to him, classes cannot be seen as simple economic forces existing outside the State and controlling it as a passive instrument for its own interests. The class struggle is not impounded to the civil society but it is reproduced within the State apparatus. He saw the State as a social cohesion and by way the capital accumulation can be pursued unrestricted (Poulantzas 1968: 44-50; 1974: 78-81). Accordingly the State plays a vital role in unifying the bourgeoisie and ensuring its domination. Quite distinct from the widespread Marxist view regarding the class unity that a class unity is related to the shared position of that class in the economic system, Poulantzas argued that the class unity depends upon the existence of the particular forms of organisation and representation (Poulantzas 1968: 188-9; Barrow 1993: 9-12).

The ideological hegemony of the ruling class is ensured by the leadership of the popular classes by the dominant classes or power bloc (Poulantzas 1968: 130-41; also see Gramsci 1998; Barrow 1993). For the domination of the dominant bloc it needs the support of the dominated classes like the
peasantry, urban petty bourgeoisie, various sections of the working class, the social forces like the ethnic minorities, religious sections etc. This has been done by slot in certain interests of such sections into the dominant ideology. The entire State apparatus as well as the practices like universal suffrage, competing parties, the separation of powers and parliamentary government are providing a somewhat flexibility to the power bloc to maintain social cohesion and thereby ensuring conditions for sustained capital accumulation (Poulantzas 1968: 277-307).

Like Gramsci and Poulantzas, Lukacs (1993) also contributed to rethinking classical Marxist position on State and civil society. The Critical Theorists of the Frankfurt School had drawn heavily from the perspectives of Lukacs (particularly his writings on Hegel) and Gramsci on the relevance of civil society and culture (Seethi 2009). Max Horkheimer, Friedrich Pollock, Theodor Adorno, Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, Jurgan Habermas et al. offered critiques of State under both capitalism and Soviet socialism. They tried to analyse the ever-expanding role of the State, the growing interlocking of the base and superstructure, the spread of culture industry, the development of authoritarianism, human rights violations, social movements etc (Horkheimer 1972; Held 1980). A major theoretical contribution from the Critical Theory tradition was the concept of ‘public sphere’ developed by Jürgen Habermas (Habermas 1989; Seethi 2009). For him the coffee clubs, salons and small discussion groups were instances of inclusive literary public spaces wherein equality, critique, accessibility and reflexivity prevailed. The public sphere, to be located in civil society, is a realm where people could discuss matters of mutual concern, and learn about facts, events, and the opinions, interests, and perspectives of others in an environment free of coercion or inequalities. To Habermas, the civil society comprises of “those more or less spontaneously emergent associations, organisations, and movements that, attuned to how societal problems resonate in the private life sphere, distill and transmit such reactions in amplified form to the public sphere.” Its core “comprises of a network of associations that institutionalizes problem-solving discourses on questions of general interest inside the framework of organized public spheres” (Habermas 1997: 367). Thus, neo-Marxists, in particular Critical Theorists, offered powerful insights that “transcended the conventional paradigm of state and civil society” (Seethi 2009).
Broadly speaking, the perspectives on the State vary from the ‘state centrist’s’ to the ‘society centrist’s.’ The statist perspectives are too much obsessed with equilibrium, order and the formal functions of the State and dismantled the change and transformation from below (Chandhoke 1995: 57). Nordlinger asserts: “The state is conceptualized as a closed off entity; bounded, shielded from society, its reference point is its own officials—there is neither need for, nor a disposition towards “private tutoring” (Nordlinger 1989: 56). Durkheim conceptualises State as a special organ whose responsibility is to work out certain representations which hold good for the collectivity. These representations are distinguished from the other collective representations by their higher degree of consciousness and reflection” (Giddens 1986: 40). All these definitions are state-centric. Chandhoke viewed that “the state is simply a social relations, in as much as it is the codified power of the social formation” (Chandhoke 1995: 49). Here she stressed the dialectical relationship between the State and society and its considerable separation.

The State and society can also be distinguished. As a source of power the society pioneered the State, and has an influence on the State. Unlike society, the State is the sole authority to enact and enforce laws for the collective interest and which monopolises the means of coercion within its territory. And also, through its political practices, the State fixes unstable powers in the society (Ibid.: 66-70). In this understanding, the State is a supreme power entity, which is under the twists and turns of the societal power. However, the State is not a static entity. Joel S. Migdal notes that the State is not a fixed ideological entity. Rather it embodies an ongoing dynamic, a changing set of goals, as it engages other social groups (Migdal 1994: 2001). The State also implies the conflicting societal interests and their mutations between the identities in a frame of both national and global capitalism. In short, the State is an ensemble of societal power relations in a given territory, in which the institutional practices broadly distinguish the public from the private and its interplay results in the mobility of the whole system; and the whole system has been revolving around the centripetal force of the international capitalist system. It is within this State-society frame that the role and dynamics of civil society needs to be studied.
In the liberal discourses, the domain of civil society is open to all those who are ready to obey the terms and conditions of it. As far as the civil domain remains as a realm of unequal power-sharing or a sphere of exploitation and oppression, there would be responses from the victims of exploitation. Most often these responses are absorbed or appropriated by the political/religious/cultural mechanisms in the society and thereby perpetuating the existing order. The responses sometimes turn violent. The role of the State generally is to deal with those ‘uncivil elements’ either through ‘coercion’ or through ‘consensus’ (Rhodes 1990: 256-305). The strategy of consensus is a somewhat diluted form or ‘civilised’ form of coercion. This is wrapped by the dominant values and their interpretations, and may be justified in the name of ‘development,’ or ‘security’ or their umpteen forms.

The rejuvenation of the concept of civil society in the last quarter of the twentieth century was associated with the ‘activist’ assertions in many parts of the world (Elliot 2003: 1). Charles Taylor says that the notion of civil society “expressed a programme of building independent forms of social life from below, free from state tutelage” (Taylor 1997). He defined civil society as “webs of autonomous associations, independent of the state, and these have an effect on public policy” (Elliot 2003: 44; Taylor 1997). Michael Walzer notes that only a “democratic state can create a democratic civil society; only a democratic civil society can sustain a democratic state. The civility that makes democratic politics possible can only be learned in the associational networkers; the roughly equal and widely dispersed capabilities that sustain the net workers have to be fostered by the democratic state” (Walzer 2003: 79). To him, civil society means “the space of un-coerced human association and also the set of rational networkers formed for the sake of family, faith, interest and ideology” (Ibid.:64). According to John Keane, “Civil society is an ideal typical category..... that both describes and envisages a complex and dynamic ensemble of legally protected non-governmental institutions that tend to be non-violent, self-organizing, self-reflexive and permanently in tension with each other and with the state institutions that frame, construct and enable their activities” (Keane 1998). The libertarian Cato Institute in Washington, DC defined the concept of civil society as
fundamentally reducing the role of politics in society by expanding free markets and individual liberty (Edwards 2004).

According to Neera Chandhoke, “civil society is a sphere which is flanked by the domain of particularistic loyalties and the state. It is a complex structure consisting of rights bearing individuals, associational life, and the construction of a critical rational discourse on the modes of social and political organization. It is important because it offers the possibility of democratization” (Chandhoke 1995:51). The process of democratisation seems a mission of civilising. Chandhoke observes that “there is nothing intrinsically democratic about civil society. Civil society has to be rendered democratic in and through sustained engagement with undemocratic groups” (Chandhoke 2007). The process of democratisation also may bring forth conflicting values and violent responses. The Western-oriented individualistic approach on society and polity may cause chaos in undemocratic countries. This individualistic conception of modern politics is the net result of modern capitalism. Capitalism reduced the individual to the level of a commodity. The abstraction of the individual from his social surroundings is one of the objectives of modern capitalism. The liberals generally advocated associational life in the civil domain in order to curb the ill-effects of this system.

Neoliberalism, State and Civil Society

Much before neoliberalism emerged as a new version of liberal ideology, many libertarians had argued for a ‘minimal state.’ They held that many of the powers of the modern Welfare State “are morally illegitimate.” Institutions of the State violate the rights of citizens when they punish, or threaten to punish individuals. The State also violates the rights of citizens when they force, or threaten to force, individuals “to transfer their legitimately held wealth to the state in order to provide for pensions, to help the needy, or to pay for public goods” etc. (Machan 1982). Robert Nozick asserted that nothing more than the maintenance of peace and the security of individuals and property by the State can be justified (Nozick 1974: 149). Friedrich August von Hayek had already reflected on this theme of ‘minimum’ dispensation (Hayek 1960). This line of thinking gained a lot of attention since the 1980s.
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc created necessary conditions for the minimalist school to assert its position. This also became inevitable for legitimising the process of globalisation. The situation was gently used by the Right-Wing forces in many countries. They created a general feeling that there was no alternative to the liberal ideology and institutions. This was the time when the neoliberal global institutions were trying to incorporate the Third World economies into the world capitalist system. Richard Falk notes:

The historical unfolding of economic globalization in recent decades has been accompanied by the ascendancy of a group of ideas associated with the world picture of neoliberalism. This ideological outlook as “the Washington Consensus,” which accurately highlights the “made in the USA” package of the neoliberal scheme of things. This neoliberal scheme points to the general direction of autonomous markets and facilitative states (Falk 1999: 1).

Globalisation has changed the conventional understanding of the nation-state category. The international politics during the cold war was dominated by the realist worldview by which the nation-states were the major actors in an ‘anarchical’ international system (Morgenthau 1985). With the emergence of a US-led ‘new world order’ accompanied by neoliberal global regimes, the scholars and statesmen declared the ‘retreat’ of the nation-state and its inability to tackle the emerging problems. As Ernst-Otto Czempiel writes: “we have to give up the notion and the concept of the state as well as the terminology that is traditionally connected to it … There are no ‘states’ acting in the transitional world; there is no use preserving in terminology what can no longer be found in reality” (Sorensen 2004:2). The advances in science and technology, no doubt, reduced ‘time and space.’ People-to-people interactions increased and large-scale migrations across the national borders have been creating hybrid cultural formations and new spaces of interactions. In this globalised scenario, the conventional State has been facing threats from different quarters. The State has also been reducing its role in society, giving way to the informal networks and market in accordance with the provisions of the ‘Washington Consensus.’ This changing scenario makes the conventional sovereign State inadequate to tackle the complex problems that are becoming more and more global and transnational. This
situation has been portrayed by many as ‘the retreat of the state’ (Strange 1996).

Contrary to the liberal view of the role of the State, the realists still portray the State as a sovereign entity, which has been determining the boundaries of the non-state actors. George Sorensen sums up the realist arguments regarding the State action:

States are unitary and coherent actors. Strong states (i.e., great powers) have a robust portfolio of power resources. Most important in this respect is a high level of military power relative to other states. Governments are constrained by the international system, but such constraints may not be strong enough to affect the great powers. Governments are autonomous in relation to their own societies; that is, they are able to act freely on their behalf (Sorensen 2004: 16).

Sorensen notes the liberal arguments against the backdrop of the realist views on the State: “the state was never a strong, unitary, coherent and autonomous actor for liberals; it was always a guardian of individuals and groups in civil society and therefore strongly influenced by these ‘non-state actors.’ In recent decades, transnational and transgovernmental relations have increased significantly and this has accentuated the erosion and dispersion of state power” (Ibid.: 17). So both the ‘state centrists’ as well as the ‘retreat’ scholars draw two parallel lines which never intersect. One is obsessed with the inevitability and capability of the State to control power resources, while the other viewed the State as a guiding authority on individual matters and the guardian of the civil society generally. Georg Sorensen explains the ‘transformation’ of the modern State to a postmodern statehood. In his own words: “The transformation from modern to postmodern statehood implies a more prominent role for non-state actors than was the case under the conditions of modern statehood” (Ibid.: 179). The peculiar feature of the postmodern statehood is the multi-level governance system. In this system, apart from the conventional nation-states, the influence of IGOs, the expanded role of UN institutions, the expansion of transgovernmentalism, mushrooming of NGOs and its widening influence across the national borders created a complex governing system (Ibid.: 60-61). So, naturally, the space of the State activity got reduced.
Sorensen shares an in-between space of the realist and the liberal positions. The state centrists and the ‘retreat scholars’ exhibit two different dimensions of the same picture. But, both are not sufficient enough to understand the exact picture of the ‘state transformation.’ Actually, the State has got strengthened in some areas, while being weakened or shrunk in other areas. Sorensen viewed that the widened economic activities across the national borders and the extended activities of the non-state actors put the State under pressure. State’s management of the national economies considerably decreased. At the same time the States attempted to compensate for their decreased national capacities for regulation by increasing their international capacities for regulation through cooperation with other States (Ibid.: 37). The States also started playing a crucial role in order to provide favourable conditions for market operations (Ibid.: 37-38). Thus, the State has been ‘introvert’ in matters of social security and ‘extrovert’ in cases of making and implementing stringent laws for the smooth functioning of the market. So a shift from the Keynesian Welfare State to the neoliberal State has changed its role, and the State also became too much militaristic. A.K. Ramakrishnan writes:

There is ambivalence in neoliberalism as far as the role of the state and the provision of security is concerned. It wants the state to be weak for the operation of the market but wants to be strong for ensuring laws and conditions for free markets. The privileging of the non-state realm of markets as against other major national and international actors in neoliberalism boils down to an imagination of free competition and freedom from the state. But in the process, a weak public authority that cannot ensure freedom and security fully result in the ensuing legitimation crisis, the state in security terms becomes more militaristic and at the same time, less powerful as far as its provider role is concerned (Ramakrishnan 2004: 64).

The new-found role of the State as a facilitator of global finance has implications for the common people. The changed equation between the State and civil society in a globalised environment has inevitably generated new forms of security threat. Indeed, globalisation is equated with Westernisation. As such resistances are underway in the non-Western societies against the unilateral imposition of Western values. Meanwhile there are attempts towards cultural hybridisation and the resulting assertions of New Right forces (like the Hindu Right in India) tend
to undermine the process of democratisation. These forces have been appropriating the civil society by penetrating into it. The changing notion of civil society under neoliberalism is thus providing a fertile ground for the assertion of such forces.

Neoliberals considered the civil society to be a non-violent response against the authoritarian regimes. The net effect of the civil society mobilisation was the collapse of many authoritarian States (Chandhoke 2007: 607). However, the very notion of civil society became trampled over years. Chandhoke identified three reasons for the ‘flattening’ of the concept. First, the close relation between the civil society and the collapse of the authoritarian States was used by the multilateral and donor agencies to superficially view it as a technique for democracy. Secondly, civil society was interpreted as an alternative to the derailed party system. Thirdly, in accordance with the post-‘Washington Consensus’ the State has shrunk and the remaining space has been allotted for NGOs in the name of civil society (Ibid.: 608). However, the very notion of civil society is being viewed as an essential pre-condition for deepening and widening of democracy though the question remains whether the entire activities in the name civil society necessarily lead to consolidation of democracy.

The World Bank-sponsored structural adjustment programmes demanded the active involvement of civil society in the implementation of the economic packages. The 1997 World Development Report by the World Bank was specifically devoted to ‘State and Civil society.’ It emphasised the importance of strengthening the statist institutional mechanisms in terms of providing adequate support to the smooth functioning of the market. The then president of the World Bank introduced the Report titled “The State in a Changing World”: “development requires an effective state, one that plays a catalytic, facilitating role, encouraging and complementing the activities of private business and individuals” (World Bank 1997). The report promoted the contracting out of the delivery of social services to NGOs. It specifically mentioned the importance of NGOs in the emerging developmental scenario. According to the report:

The emergence of private and NGO alternatives to public provision can help meet gaps in the supply of public goods, as well as provide those goods and services that individuals are willing to pay for out of their own pocket. NGOs can be both partners and competitors in the delivery of
public services. And when backed by citizen voice, they can exert useful pressure on Government to improve the delivery and quality of public services (World Bank 1997: 116).

The neoliberal appropriation of civil society has been aimed at the weaving of an apolitical realm, which ultimately promulgates a 'consensual pattern' of capitalist development and ensuring the better integration of the world capitalist economy. There is also a concerted attempt to transpose the State. The role of the State has been reduced to be a mere facilitator for world financial capital (Below 1955).

According to the neoliberal perspective, “civil society consists of associational life – a non-profit, voluntary ‘third sector’ – that not only restrains state power but also actually provides a substitute for many of the functions performed by the state” (Kaldor 2004:9). The transfer of power and functions of the State to the civil society organisations is the dictum of the ‘Washington Consensus.’ The term Washington Consensus was initially coined in 1989 by John Williamson to describe a set of specific economic policy prescriptions for the Third World countries promoted by Washington-based institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and the US treasury Department. It became associated with neoliberal policies in general and was drawn into the broader debate over the expanding role of the free market constrain upon the State. Chandhoke pinpointed the political meaning of Washington Consensus: (a) the State, particularly in the Third World countries should withdraw from the social sector; (b) the market should be freed from all constraints and people in the civil society should organise their own social and economic reproduction instead of depending on the State (Chandhoke 2002: 43). The Washington Consensus thus underlined the pre-eminence of the market over the State. The post-Washington Consensus packages, however, sought to replace the State by the civil society organisations. The consensus opined that only through a strong civil society under the guidance of NGOs that we can foster Democracy (Ibid.: 43-45).

The shift from Keynesian welfare economism to the Washington Consensus-based structural adjustment was considered as the essential pre-requisite for ‘strengthening’ and ‘deepening’ democracy in the Third World. The rollback of the State from social sectors and market in the
name of furthering democracy yielded to the intrusion of non-state actors in the remaining space. This was conceptualised by donor agencies as civil society, which primarily introduced non-governmental agencies or the voluntary sector (Chandhoke 2002). This large array of NGO networks across the national borders smoothened the process of globalisation. Thus, the neo-Tocquevillean notion of civil society offers a picture where State has a very limited role (World Bank 1997; World Bank 2000; Ayers 2006; Williams and Young 1994).

The neoliberal version of civil society is different from the conventional-liberal understanding of civil society which viewed it as a realm to protect the individual rights by restricting the overpowering of the State. However, the neoliberal view tries to transpose the State in their discussions on civil society. By considering the position of John Locke and Hegel, Gurpreet Mahajan notes that a civil society “exists for the sake of securing the rights of men, and within it the actions of the sovereign are supposed to create conditions by which individuals can enjoy their rights and liberty fully.” As a result, “a political society in which the basic rights of citizens are not recognised or given priority by the sovereign does not constitute a civil society.” Mahajan continues: “Civil society is also a kind of political society in which the principle of ‘primacy of rights’ distinguishes the civil society from other forms of political society” (Mahajan 1999:170). In response to Mahajan’s position, Andre Beteille writes: “Politics alone cannot change a society fully. A certain kind of state is inevitable but it is not sufficient. For analytical purpose, there is no need to assign pre-eminence to state or any other institutions of society. The differentiation and integration are complementary” (Beteille 1999: 2589). It is true that civil society cannot sustain itself without the rule of law. The State is the guarantor of rule of law in a society. The basic presuppositions of the civil society are the separation of functions between the State and itself. At the same time, the State also needed sufficient support from the civil society for its projects. If it lacks, no State can perform in the long-run. So, the civil society and State are symbiotically related.

Under neoliberalism, the conventional liberal notion of national civil society has also been transcended to its new form—global civil society. Martin Shaw notes:
In the second half of the twentieth century, much of the nation-state frameworks of civil society have been transformed. During the cold war, both the state and civil society underwent changes in the West. National forms were maintained, but they lost much real significance. There was a huge internationalisation of western military, economic, cultural and ideological power. Western states increasingly shared frameworks for organising their monopoly of violence and their management of economic life. They created the conditions for massive process of economic and cultural globalisation. In this context the old national civil society declined (Shaw 1999:271-72).

With the advancement of globalisation many of the local/national problems have assumed global ramifications. In this scenario, the national and inter-governmental bodies seem to be inadequate to tackle the issues. It is here that a global civil society is supposed to have transnational capabilities (Etzioni 2004: 341). However, the leading advocates of global civil society described it as a ‘fuzzy’ and ‘contested’ concept (Giddens 2001). There is still confusion hanging over the concept about what it is? John Keane defines it as “a vast interconnected and multi-layered social space that comprises many hundreds of thousands of self directing or non-governmental institutions and ways of life” (Keane 2001:23). It was reported that a fifth of today’s international non-governmental organisations were formed after 1990s (James 2004). This is inextricably linked with the ascendancy of the neoliberal global regime. From a neoliberal point of view, a global civil society is capable of providing adequate ‘governance’ to the people, an area where the conventional States are said to have failed. Thus, it has the power to transpose the conventional understanding of State system, in which the nation-states were the major actors. The shift of emphasis from the State to the NGOs in the name of civil society has been portrayed as the best way to foster democracy in the Third world. This view is based on the assumption that a democratic culture can be developed and sustained through informal networks and associational life even without support from the State (Fukuyama 2001; World Bank 1999).

The neoliberal attempts to globalise the neo-Tocquevillean notion of civil society tend to dismantle the complex relations between the State, religion and the voluntary sector. According to Tocqueville, in America the
religion and the political system are complementary, not contradictory. The religion also “facilitates the use of free associations (Tocqueville 1997:36-37). In America, the government is the major source of funding to the domestic communitarian bodies, without which it cannot function properly (Etzioni 2004:349). So this dependency must be kept in mind when we extend these types of models to the international realm.

Most often the global civil society visionaries discard the political economy aspect from their discussions. It undermines the realities of power and hegemonial relations at the international level. The global political economy is not governed in a democratic fashion. The current global governance reflects the interests of a narrow section of humanity, in which the majority are excluded. Inevitably, associational life only fosters the structures of the existing hegemonial relations (Pasha and Blaney 1998: 432-33). The gap between the haves and have-nots has been widening at the national as well as international levels. “In spite of the tremendous rise in production, rapid technological change, and greater increase of life expectancy, the ‘development gap’ appears as large as it was 100 years ago. The lack of change is certainly remarkable” (MacEwan 1999:1). So without reducing the inequalities, without providing a somewhat equal accessibility of participation to whole members of this planet, the discussions on global civil society seem quite beside the point.

Alternative Readings

The concepts of State and civil society also came in for critical evaluation in the post-positivist traditions of social theory, as represented in the postmodern/poststructural literature since the 1970s (Seethi 2009; Seethi 2001). The writings of Michel Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Baudrillard, Fredric Jameson et al. have thrown open critical questions concerning the very foundation of modernity, liberalism and socialism (Jameson 1992: Harvey 1989; Lyotard 1984). According to postmodernists, the claims and promises of both liberalism and socialism, with respect to ‘emancipation,’ ‘liberation,’ ‘development,’ human rights etc. are no longer sustainable. The significance of postmodernism in understanding the dynamics of State and civil society is to be seen in its critique of ‘modernity’ and all ‘grand narratives’ (Foucault 1988: 16-46) of the past. Foucault questioned the state-centric notions of power and

stressed the ‘capillary flow of power’ in the societal body (Foucault 1979). He insisted that the studies of power should begin from the ‘micro-physics of power,’ which are the specific forms of exercise in different institutional sites. He viewed that the disciplinary techniques of the modern State are originated from these local centres and they were later taken up and integrated into the global strategy of bourgeois domination (Foucault 1979). Unlike the statists, the Foucauldians put forward a bottom-up approach. In fact, these perspectives ignore the complex, contradictory and constitutive relationship between the State and society.

Akbar S. Ahmed argues that postmodernism is reinvigorating many ethno-religious forces all over the world. However, he writes: “While noting the fragmentation of social and political ideas and shifts in thought, postmodernists fail to link this process with the revival of ethnicity and religious fundamentalism.” The identity assertions are augmented with the media revolution. These types of revivalist assertions challenge the modernist conceptions of large state structures (Ahmed 1993:13-14). Similarly a discussion on postmodernism and the assertion of the ethno-religious forces is not complete without considering its linkage with neoliberal/New Right thinking. “The post-industrial capitalism generates new forms of diversity, plurality and creativity. They are increasingly susceptible to commodification and commercialisation” (Seethi 2001:310). At the same time, postmodernism provides an epistemic support to the assertion of many marginalised sections and the assertions of such sections threaten the existing power equations. This is in striking contrast with the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in many countries in West Asia and South Asia, and Hindutva in India. Such forces have gained considerable leeway in the civil society of these countries which amounted to silencing the critical social engagements.

Apart from the neoliberal version of civil society, the new communication networks bring forth a notion of global public sphere where non-instrumental communication can take place. The ‘migratory quality of experience’ unites the people at various international forums in their fight against the ‘globalised evils.’ The social movement approach sees global civil society as mainly progressive, because it does not “seek to replace one form of power with another;” instead its objective is to ‘whittling
down’ the capacity of concentrated centres of power (Stammers 1999: 1006). Like the neoliberal version of global civil society, this approach is also trying to bypass the State. The States are regarded as the central barriers to the emancipatory political practice (Chandler 2004: 314). Social movements are different from the conventional political parties: “they are networks of interaction between different actors” (Della Porta and Diani 2000:16). It appears to be an attempt to depoliticise the movements and also to depoliticise the realm of civil society.

The social movement perspective viewed the realm of civil society as ‘apolitical.’ For Mary Kaldor “anti-politics is the ethos of civil society” (Kaldor 2004: 57). Rajni Kothari considers it as a “whole new space” which is “essentially a non-party space.” The role of this space “is to deepen the democratic process in response to the state that has not only detached the poor and the oppressed but has turned oppressive and violent.” It is to “make them part of the political process” (Ibid). The struggles of the marginalised sections to get a space in the civil domain are historical, and the ‘new social movements’ (NSMs) exhibit new dimensions to these struggles. Their slogan is that it is possible to change the existing power equations without capturing the political power. State is the codified form of power in a given territory. So without changing this political power equation it is difficult to change the state-society relations. The vertical social mobility has its strength as well as weakness. Under the banner of NSMs many historically undermined problems came to the central stage. However, it amounts to undermining the possibility of a class movement by the workers. To a great extent, these movements scatter the working class and create a structured apolitical realm, which is easily vulnerable to neoliberal appropriation.

There has been perceptible intellectual bias in the liberal discourses, especially in the Social Contract traditions, regarding the birth of civil society and the State. In their discussions, the notion of security is enmeshed in the idea of civil society. A shift from the state of nature to the civil society implies a shift from insecurity to security, danger to safety, disorder-order, and anarchism-to-statism, and ultimately a transfiguration of ‘uncivil’ conditions to a ‘civilised society.’ The civil society is a rational order, where the individuals share certain common values which are
mutually beneficial. The basic assumption of liberal thinking is that the spread of this value system all over the world will eventually lead to peace and stability. Today, the liberals generally accept the Kantian notion of ‘transnational peace’ as the end of history. Unlike Rousseau, Kant believed that the war between the sovereign States at the international state of nature would lead to ‘perpetual peace.’ The violence and conflicts are inherent in the spread of Western Enlightenment across the world. Kant resembles the State at the international realm with the human beings in the state of nature. The people envisaged civil society in order to get out of the problem-ridden state of nature; likewise, the challenge of the sovereign States is to create an ‘international civil society’ (Buchan 2002: 407-427).

After a long period of retreat, the end of the cold war gave a space for the liberals to reclaim their legacies. Fukuyama claimed the end of cold war as the triumph of ‘ideal state’ and the ‘liberal capitalism’ (Fukuyama 1992). He revived the liberal internationalist view regarding international peace that the spread of ‘legitimate political order’ will eventually bring an end to international conflicts. This neo-Kantian position sees the liberal state as a model for the rest of the world. The liberals claimed that the illiberal states are responsible for war. The militaristic and undemocratic states create war in order to increase their control over the citizens (Burchill 1996). The basic assumption of this view is that the liberal States are peace loving, and have a ‘normative superiority’ over the illiberal states (Buchan 2002: 409-10). He notes the main variants of this normative explanation: “… shared norms between liberal representative states” (Ibid.: 414). The liberal State contains an ‘independent’ civil society/civilised condition, which restricts the State to get into war. But in an ‘illiberal’ State, the lack of civility in social relations generates war.

Francis Fukuyama who shares the non-statist view sees civil society as “a complex welter of intermediate institutions, including businesses, voluntary associations, educational institutions, clubs, unions, media, charities, and churches.” A thriving civil society depends upon a people's habits, customs, and ethics – attributes that can be shaped only indirectly through conscious political action and must otherwise be nourished through an increased awareness and respect for culture (Fukuyama 1995: 414).
For Fukuyama, civil society is the whole private sector (including business) outside government. He contends that the capitalist economy has been evolving toward a moral (civil) order. The early Scottish philosophers of the Enlightenment "all hoped that the destructive energies of a warrior culture (lords, barons, monarchs) would be channeled into the safer pursuits of a commercial society, with a corresponding softening of manners." Fukuyama is hopeful for the continued evolution of society. He argues that human beings do not act like rational ‘utility maximizers’ in any narrow sense, and they are investing in economic activity with "the moral values of their broader social life." In effect, a civil society and a private economy belong together; the capitalist system advances civil society. In other words, the free market economy stabilises and develops civil society. Fukuyama says that the left-wing version of civil society is about mobilising a grass roots movement to stop Wal-Mart or lobby Congress. The right-wing version is about how civic groups are antidotes to big government (Fukuyama 1999).

The ‘normative superiority’ of the liberal States over the illiberal ones is based on the understanding that the liberal States contain a vibrant civil society which restricts the States’ war-making capacity. Those States share common norms and values, which prevent them to fight each other. A common value system includes the sharing of certain economic values and interests. According to the liberals, especially in its classical and neoliberal persuasions, the State should be minimal in the market. The role of the State is to make adequate conditions for free market operations. As a scholar observes: “.... the state must act as a ‘housekeeper’: it must provide only necessary background conditions for capitalism to develop. These essentially comprise the creation of private property rights, a conducive system of law and company law, a police force and an army/navy to ensure order and security. These institutions effectively create ‘confidence’ without which the smooth running of the economy will be impossible” (Hobson 2000:71). Thus, the liberals, especially in its neoliberal version, suggest a militaristic State in matters of law and security in the market. Contrary to the liberal notion of ‘free trade’ and ‘minimal state,’ the so-called ‘illiberal’ States are said to be following ‘protectionism’ in economic matters. Liberals claimed that “... interventionist (authoritarian or despotic) States had a natural propensity
towards tariff protectionism which, in undermining exacerbated tensions and jealousies between States, led to tariff wars and eventually military conflict”(Ibid.: 169). Thus, the idea is that the liberal notion of free trade strengthens co-operation and friendship between the peoples of various liberal States and this intermeshing of civilized people/civil societies across the national borders brings forth an ‘international civil society’ which ultimately creates a ‘liberal peace zone.’ Kant had viewed it as a ‘confederation of republican states’ (Ibid.:70), and the role of the liberal State is to take initiatives to create an ‘international civil society’ (Buchan 2002; Richard Falk 1991; Luke 1991).

**Ascendency of the New Right**

The term ‘New Right’ is used as a descriptive term for various forms of conservative, right-wing, or self-proclaimed dissident oppositional movements and groups that emerged in the second half of the twentieth century. They were ideologically committed to neoliberalism as well as being socially conservative. Key policies included deregulation of business, a dismantling of the Welfare State, privatisation of nationalised industries and restructuring of the national workforce in order to increase industrial and economic flexibility in an increasingly global market (Green 1987; Gunn 1989; Levitas 1986). The nature and operations of the New Right groups and organisations differ from country to country. So are the strategies employed and realms of articulation and mobilisation. Religion, race, ethnicity etc are the most widely used categories for mobilisation and articulation, and civil society is the terrain of activities through which the right-wing forces attempt to gain legitimacy (Tetreault and Denemark 2004).

Since the 1970s, the British-American governments were forced to reconstitute their (developmental and security) strategies in both national and international spheres of action. It may be noted that since the 1940s, the US had been experiencing undisrupted growth rate in its economy. The collapse of currency stability in 1971 and the oil crisis of 1973 caused recession in the US economy which threatened the stability of the Western economy in general. Both the British and American governments had adopted two strategies: to rebuild a new alliance at the international level in defense of the West, to change the balance between the State and
society and reinvigorate their national culture (Gamble 1998: 1-3). In fact, the crisis in the Fordism led to the post–Fordist restructuring of the world capitalist economy. Fordism refers to the simultaneous growth of productivity and consumption. The Amsterdam School viewed post–Fordism as the decline of Fordism. The ‘Reaganomics’ in the US and ‘Thatcherism’ in Britain were the reaction to the crisis of Fordism. In this scenario, the financial interest overshadowed those of productive capital, decline in the State intervention, freeing the market and return to the conservative values. This change was generally viewed as the triumph of neoliberalism (Ruigrok 1998 12-19). H. Overbeek notes that neoliberalism “is at once directed towards disarticulating the old formation which is in crisis, that is, towards deconstructing corporatism and the Keynesian welfare state, and towards, the formation of a new configuration, the construction of a post-Fordist accumulation regime” (Overbeek 1990:19).

Gamble viewed that the decline of Fordist accumulation regime, the decline of American leadership in international affairs and the crisis of social democracy led to the ascendancy of the New Right (Gamble 1998: 1-3). Lisa McGirr sees the New Right as emerging in reaction to the left-oriented social movements of the 1960s (McGirr 2001).

Milton Friedman and Peter Bauer influenced the policies of Thatcher and Reagan administrations. Friedman emphasised the replacing of the Keynesian Welfare State with an activated financial market. According to them, the chief aims of the monetary policy were to promote price stability and to preserve the gold standard; the chief criteria of monetary policy were the state of the ‘money market,’ the extent of ‘speculation’ and the movement of gold” (Friedman 1968: 5: 1963). This was an inception to the New Right thinking. According to this, the government interference in the market would distort the very balance of demand and supply. It emphasised the laissez faire in the market. According to Friedman, the government should only focus on matters of defense, law and order, necessary public works etc (Friedman 962; Friedman 1980).

Gamble says that “a wide range of groups and ideas make up the New Right and there are many antennial divisions and conflicts” (Gamble 1998:27). He continues: “as a political programme the New Right is identified with opposition to state involvement in the economy. They are
fierce critics of Keynesian policies of economic management, and high public expenditure on welfare. But the New Right politicians are also renowned as advocates of “national discipline and strong defense.” The peculiar feature of the New Right is the convergence of the traditional liberal defense of the free economy with the traditional conservative defense of state authority (Ibid.:28-29). As a doctrine, “conservatism has always been characterized by its emphasis upon the conditions that are required for the establishment and maintenance of social order. These conditions include the need for authority, hierarchy and balance.” In fact, the conservatives are highly critical of the liberal doctrines of individualism. But in order to counter the advanced form of liberalism and the social democracy in Europe, the conservatives joined with the neoliberals. They have identified social democracy as their common enemy. The conservative New Right strongly believed that the dismantling of many aspects of social democracy is inevitable to curb the expansion of communism. The motif behind the creation of a grand military alliance, NATO, in the post-war years was to curb the expansion of the Soviet communism (Ibid.: 54-57). At the domestic level, for example in US, a ‘threat’ from the left means the threat from the blacks. Roger Eatwell points out that many of “the left hold that overt, or more usually covert, racism has further helped right wing parties” (Eatwell 1989: 5). “The most urgent task which the conservative New Right identified in the 1970s was to reverse the drift towards chaos and authoritarianism by restoring authority at all levels in society” (Gamble 1998: 58). These strands—the conservative New Right thinking and the neoliberal one—led to the emergence of Thatcherism in Britain and Reaganomics in the US (Green 1987; Gunn 1989; Levitas 1986).

As in the US and Britain, the conservative movements got intensified in many parts of the world. Edelman argued that the conservative reactions are the outcome of growing social tensions, rapid cultural change, the advance of democratisation and such related progressive movements (Edelman 2001: 293-94). Diamond viewed that “to be right-wing means to support the State in its capacity as enforcer of order and to oppose the State as distributor of wealth and power downward and more equitably in society” (Diamond 1995:9). The conservative right movement varied from country to country. It could be seen in both the East and the West. In
France, Italy, Germany, Greece, UK, USA, Australia, Thailand, New Zealand, Romania, Netherlands, South Korea, Ukraine and India the New Right movements can be seen in different forms.

In Thailand, during the 1970s, the State intervened in the civil society and created a right-wing movement. The village Scouts (Wild Tiger Cubs) is considered as the largest right-wing movement in Thai history. It was founded in 1971 under the support of the Ministry of the Interiors’ powerful Border Patrol Police. The ultimate end of this State-sponsored social movement was to contain communism (Bowie 2005: 47). During the 1970s and 1980s, the Labour Party in Australia initiated new right policy reforms based on the social conservativism, on the one hand, and liberal economy, on the other. The politicians favouring new right reforms were labelled as ‘dries’ and those who were opposing (means those who were supporting the Keynesian economism) were called the ‘wets’ (Moore 1995; Saleam 2010).

The Italian New Right has a more critical and constructive perspective regarding the Western modernity. It focused essentially on culture, rather than direct political action. It often indicated a willingness to search for a new synthesis and tried to reconcile contradictory positions, such as anti-egalitarianism and libertarianism. Italian New Right culture was heavily influenced by the late fascist experience. For an entire generation of veterans, the loss of the war resulted in a feeling of isolation and alienation from political life. In this context the ex-fascists founded a party, the MSI. The MSI and its cultural organs (such as the Centro Studi Ordine Nuovo) seemed unable to find new life in post-World War Italy. In this context the ideas of the far right, especially the ideas of Julius Evola (1898-1974) had considerable impact. He was influenced by Eastern traditions and his philosophy was based on the rejection of linearity in history and on the assumption of its cyclical character. His cyclical vision of history postulated the deterioration of a spiritually superior stage to one of decadence, where only a small elite stood out within a world in ruins. This vision had a powerful and reassuring impact on a generation that had lost a war and felt estranged in a modern mass society characterised by the reduction of qualitative aspects of life to vulgar economic values (Sacchi 2006).
The French New Right was born in 1968. It was less concerned with the tradition and stressed on the libertarian values. The French New Right today strongly support clear and strong identities favouring cultural difference. It is against racism and also stressed that struggle against racism was not negating the concept of race, nor by the desire to blend all races into an undifferentiated whole. Rather it is meant for the refusal of both exclusion and assimilation: neither apartheid nor the melting pot; that means the acceptance of the other as ‘Other’ through a dialogic perspective of mutual enrichment. The New Right is against immigration because according to them it would spare individuals from being cut off from their cultural roots. It upholds differentialist feminism, the feminine rights like the right to virginity, to maternity, to abortion etc. It gives prominence to participatory democracy and celebrates local community life rather than homogenising civil society. It also stands for a federal Europe (Piccone 2006). Paradoxically, the position of the French New Right has identifiable features with the postmodernist perspectives.

**New Discourses of Security**

In the 1990s, the notion of security has assumed a new dimension with the advent of globalisation. The concept of human security gained considerable attention during this period (UNDP 1994; Acharya 2001). This underlined a shift from the state-centric notion of security to a global, individualistic version of security. The human security approach implied that the individual is at the core of any security perspective. Satisfaction of individual needs at different realms of life is central in such approach (Ramakrishnan 2004: 68). An individual has been facing so many threats from different quarters and the conventional State is said to be incapable of providing security to all (Chen et al. 2005). The attempts to transpose the state-centrism in security thinking generated new meanings and spheres of action. Human security “is a term with which global civil society activists can confront the current preoccupation of governments and public opinion with terrorism, entering the security debate with strategies that go beyond repression. This could be more realistic and productive than just lamenting the current security paradigm” (Glasius 2006: 31). An examination of the challenges emerging from the increased globalisation
is, perhaps, relevant (Cha 2000: 391-403; Guehenno 1998-99: 5-19; Scholte 2000; Clark 1999).

The Cold War scenario was dominated by the realists who stood for a strong ‘state,’ the basic unit of an ‘anarchical’ international system. Here the Hobbesian notion has apparently been deployed in the realm of international system, where all States are in a state of war. The actions of such States are justified on the ground of national interest (Buzan 1998). For several decades, the cold war ideology “served to eclipse the distinction between the state, popular interests and the multiplicity of values, claims and identifies of a state’s citizenry.” When it came to considering security, State and society were considered as one. “Issues like internal conflicts, interstate migratory flows and environmental problems were more or less subsumed under the security policies and interests of nation-states”(Poku 2005:9). This State-centric notion of security has been challenged by the widened process of globalisation. The increased interdependence brought in a somewhat sensitive relation between the ‘local’ and the ‘global.’ Anything happens at the ‘local’ has serious repercussions on the ‘global’ and vice versa. On issues like migration, environment etc. the realists call for a beyond-State approach. Ethical and moral standards are important in order to deal with such issues. Consequently, the realist proposition of national security has been challenged on a human security angle today. The conventional notion of national security does not touch every sphere of individual action, while at the same time a major chunk of the population are marginalised due to increasing stresses. The security of one State is tantamount to the insecurity of the people of other States (Ibid.: 10-21). Thus, the human security frame “acknowledges that the security of citizens is not always bound up with the security of the state.” At times, the State itself may threaten its citizens. It also acknowledges that in the twenty-first century the State may not always be able to keep its citizens secure, and other actors, at the local, regional and global levels, should share responsibility for human security (Glasius 2006 108). Here the notion of human security is enmeshed in the neoliberal paradigm. The individual-centred idea of human security seems to be hybridised with the proposed non-state developmental pattern of neoliberalism. But, in reality, neoliberalism tends to undermine human security.
Thus, the notion of human security is basically individual-centric. The neoliberal ideas seem to be the core of the process of globalisation. The globalisation brings forth an individualistic culture, where the individual has been compartmentalised from his social surroundings. The advancement of information technology provides wide networks of interactions among the individuals. But such interactions may be formal and egoistic. This makes a somewhat insecurity complex among the individuals and that may lead to many societal problems. In so far as neoliberalism contributes to uneven socio-economic development, a major chunk of population has been marginalised from the mainstream socio-economic path. This generates social tensions and thereby new security problems. The process of globalisation thus not only brings forth hybrid cultural forms but it also results in aggressive responses.

The whole matrix of relations in a society is structured on a legitimate ground, the security. Mc Sweeney notes: “The verb to ‘secure’ was first predicated of people. It became attached to states” (Mc Sweeney 1999: 17). According to Michael Dillon, security became the predicate upon which the “architectonic political discourses of modernity were constructed; upon which the vernacular architecture of modern political power exemplified in the modern state, was based; and from which the institutions and practices of modern (inter) national politics, including modern democratic politics ultimately seek to derive their ground and functional legitimacy” (Dillon 1996: 13). The notion of security perpetuates its alter-ego, the danger. People are used to both tangible and intangible measures to secure from ‘threats.’ Mc Sweeney says that “we imagine security an ‘inner experience but which makes an undefined ‘other’ (Mc Sweeney 1999: 13). This ‘self/other’ dichotomy perpetuates conflicts and chaos. The capitalist system and its rational institutional mechanisms made the binaries, civilised/uncivilised. The coercive instruments of the State have been deployed to deal with those ‘uncivil’ elements.

The global interconnectedness has changed the importance of security from its state-centric approach towards a humanocentric one. The Brandt Report of 1980s stated, “an important task of constructive international policy will have to consist in providing a new, more comprehensive
understanding of security, which would be less restricted to purely military aspects" (Mac Sweeny 1999: 52). Mc Sweeney notes: “...Security relates to a quality of a relationship, grounded in human needs, which encourages confidence in the participants that their legitimate values are protected in a manner compatible with the capacity of others to do likewise” (Ibid.: 100). Here he identifies security with a negotiable realm. He stressed the role of identities in this spectrum. “Identity is not a fact of society, it is a process of negotiation among people and interest groups” (Ibid.: 73). In his opinion, the identities are not the cause of the security problem, but the effect of it. The historical representations attached to the identities make unequal footing in their negotiations. To a greater extent, their assertions are treated as ‘security threat’ and dealt with severely. The process of globalisation brings forth a world of insecurity complexes, struggles and uncertainties.

**Identity and Security**

Though security is a core concept in the theory and praxis of national, regional and international politics, it is also viewed in the context of local, inter-local and trans-local relations. In the positivist paradigm, security is assumed to possess an ontological and epistemological certainty where the sources of insecurity as well as the referent of security are givens. Conventional International Relations (IR) therefore focused on a state-centric, power-oriented, and militaristic discourse of security. With its focus on power, politics, and anarchy as fixed—mainstream IR reads narrowly into the role of ideology as manifested in the concepts of State, national interest, and nationalism. Neither does it pay attention to the ways in which anarchy/insecurity may be constructed or how the roles of ideology, culture, history, or state practices themselves may produce anarchy in IR (Das 2002: 76-89).

The critical constructivists address the above concern. Problematising the conventional assumption that IR is in a state of perpetual anarchy, the critical constructivists instead view security as what David Campbell calls “representations of danger” (Campbell 1998: 1-13). For the critical constructivists, objects of insecurity and insecurities are not ontologically separate things. Rather, they are mutually constituted in a variety of ways that may privilege a certain conception of identity over others. Operating
within a framework of meanings, assumptions, and distinctive social identities, the representation of the ‘Other,’ their identities and what constitutes insecurity ‘imaginaries’ are left open to the dynamics of interpretation, whereby relations of identity may also be produced, enforced, and reified in a conflictual manner (Muppidi 1999: 124). Further, construction of identities influencing security dynamics may not simply be confined to rigid interstate dynamics, but may also be mediated by "complex network of social relations, cultural traditions, and political structures..." involving state security elites themselves (Niva 1999: 152). Thus, critical constructivists assume that all social (in) securities are culturally produced (Weldes 1999: 1). Central to the concept of postcolonial insecurity is what Sankaran Krishna calls postcolonial "anxiety," defined as an ideological drive of postcolonial state leaders to achieve successfully the "modern enterprise of nation-building" (Krishna 1999: xvii-xix). Central to the metaphor of creating a nation as something "ever in the making but never quite reached," is the idea of nationalism (Das 2002).

Thus, in the new literature of international relations (Campbell 1998; Krause and Williams 1997; Lipschutz 1995; Weldes et al. 1999), security is conceptualised as a productive discourse that brings forth insecurities to be operated upon. It also defines the identity of the object to be secured. This contests the dominant conceptual paradigm of security that sees insecurities as essential variables, while focusing attention on the acquisition of security by given entities. It underlines the processes through which something or someone (the ‘Other’) is discursively formed as a source of insecurity against which the ‘Self’ needs to be secured (Anand 2005: 203-215). Thus, discourses of insecurity are about ‘representations of danger’ (Campbell 1998; Dillon 1996). Insecurities are inevitably ‘social constructions’ rather than givens—threats do not just exist out there, but have to be produced. All insecurities are thus culturally shaped in the sense that they are produced in and out of “the context within which people give meanings to their actions and experiences and make sense of their lives” (Weldes 1999:1). Insecurities and the objects that suffer from insecurities are mutually constituted. That is, in contrast to the received view, which treats objects of security and insecurity themselves as pre-given and natural and as separate things, we treat them as mutually constituted cultural and social constructions and thus
products of processes of identity construction of Self –Other. The argument that security is about representations of danger and social construction of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ does not imply that there are no ‘real’ effects. What it means is that there is nothing inherent in any act or being or object that makes it a source of insecurity and danger (Anand 2005: 203-215).

Dibyesh Anand argues that security is linked closely with identity politics. How we define ourselves depends on how we represent others. This representation is thus integrally linked with how we ‘secure’ ourselves against the ‘Other.’ Representations of the ‘Other’ as a source of danger to the security of the ‘Self’ in conventional understandings of security are accompanied by an abstraction, dehumanization, depersonalization and stereotyping of the ‘Other.’ The ‘Other’ gets reduced to being a danger and hence an object that is fit for surveillance, control, policing and possibly extermination. This logic of the discourse of security dictates that the security of the Self facilitates and even demands the use of policing and violence against the ‘Other.’ This is demonstrated through the case of the Hindu Right’s politics of representation, which legitimises anti-Muslim violence in the name of securing the Hindu ‘Self’ at various levels. ‘The Muslim’ as such is a threat not only to the Hindutva but also to the international security. These representations of ‘danger’ to the security of the Hindu body politic facilitated the ‘politics of hate’ in India. This is done through the realm of civil society in an aggressive manner using wide network of organisations as well as the media.

According to Anand, ‘Muslim’ as an object of insecurity in the discourse of the Hindu Right organisations inhabits the levels of the personal, local, national and international. Here the ‘Muslim’ is discursively constructed as a site of fear, fantasy, distrust, anger, envy and hatred, thus generating desires of emulation, abjection and/or extermination. His argument is that these desires are not confined to the subscribers to Hindutva but are prevalent in the wider society among those describing themselves as Hindu. The Hindu Right assertion is not an inevitable result of these prejudicial desires but scavenges upon them and, in turn, fuels and fossilises them. The desire of emulation, abjection, and extermination is inextricably linked to certain threatening representations of ‘the Muslim’.
(Anand 2005: 203-215). Anand points out that Hindutva’s ‘politics of representation’ is one replete with myths and stereotypes. For instance, Anand shows how Hindutva discourses “construct a myth of the Hindu self as virtuous, civilized, peaceful, accommodating, enlightened, clean and tolerant, as opposed to ‘the Muslim’ Other, which is morally corrupt, barbaric, violent, rigid, backward, dirty and fanatic. The myth borrows from various stereotypes and motifs that are prevalent in India and elsewhere, including the West” (Ibid; Das 2002). Thus, the articulation, representation and mobilisation of ‘threat’ and ‘security’ are carried out through the realm of civil society and, in most cases, the State reinforces such perceptions of ‘threat’ and ‘security’ through the media and other agencies in the civil society.