The uniqueness of Buddhist philosophy lies in the Buddhist speculations and systems that stand in relation to other earlier, contemporary and subsequent Indian thoughts as well as among themselves. To search out the similarity and distinction between the dominant traditions of Indian thoughts movements - the upanisadic or the Vedantic and Buddhist scholars after the Swami Vivekananda started debate over the question of ‘Buddhism is a sect of Hinduism’ and took from the common stock of Hinduism - the theories of rebirth and Karma but deny only the existence of particular unchanging substance i.e. the Brahman - the Absolute and the Ātman - the Individual self as well as its transmigration. In this case, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan is more specific and claims that "................. Buddha is silent about the Ātman enunciated in the Upaniṣads. He neither affirms nor denies its existence. For so long as we swear by dry logic we cannot prove the reality of the souls as Ātman. The unknowable Ātman said to underic ourselves is an inscrutable mystery".  

1. Swami Vivekananda, The Complete Works, “Buddhism is one of our sects” (Vol-IV, 135); “Present day Hinduism and Buddhism were growth from the same branch”. (Vol-VI, 20); also Vol-I, 22; Vol-IV, 238, 496, Vol-V, 82, 309, Vol-VI, 225-227. 
2. Indian Philosophy, Vol-I, P-387.
On the other hand scholars like Prof. B. M. Barua strongly advocated that 'the Buddhist thinkers are naturally anxious to keep their conception distinct.'\(^3\)

He and also latter scholar cite so many examples from Pali and later Sanskrit Buddhist texts in support of their views.\(^4\) Thus from the study of Indian philosophy as an intellectual discipline, we notice that patient labour of a number of scholars for more than a century has been able to lay bare before us the essential documents of Indian philosophy from sixth century B.C. Their researches make it clear that there are two main streams of it - one having its origin in the \textit{Ātmavāda} of Upaniṣad and other in Anātmavāda of the Buddhists. Therefore the stereotyped observation of a group of scholars who hold the Indian philosophy evolving out of one single tradition - Upaniṣadic and the Buddhist Philosophy sprang from the Upaniṣads is not quite justified. We have to remember that Buddha's immediate disciples and their followers have greater claim to understand Buddhism than the moderners who remain separated from him by centuries of time as well as by distance of culture and outlook. Indeed, it is a very difficult task to trace the ultimate genesis of the soul theories among the Indians which reached its zenith in the Upanisadic texts. The oldest literature both Indian and the World i.e. the Veda and Brahmanas show us an advanced stage in the

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3. 'Prolegomena To A History of Buddhist Philosophy', P-42.
4. Ibid. also Conze, E, 'Buddhist Thought In India', pp. 34-39
ancient soul theory.5 "The Brāhmaṇa of the Hundred Paths" shows us first and foremost how from these confused masses of ideas the notion of the 'ego presses to the front of all others, and will domineer over them, in the language of the Indians; the 'Ātman' the subject, in which the forces and functions of human life find root and footing.6 And in them we also notice the germs of all the subsequent steps in philosophy and religion that have taken roots in the soils of India. Like the other soul-theorists of the World, the ancient Aryans (who were the authors of the Vedas) held with a simple faith as to the existence of 'soul' inside their bodies. And it never occurred to them to doubt for a moment that these souls continued to exist in a sort or mysterious way after death or to discuss the question of duration of cessation of the future life. This early simple soul-theory gradually became intricate with the advancement of civilization.7 The details of

5. In the Rgveda the creator of the Vedas is Puruṣa (Rgveda, X, 90) in the Brāhmaṇas the creator of the Vedas, is said to be Prajāpati (Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, VI, 1.18; Tattīṇḍya Brāhmaṇa, II, 3.10.1; III, 3.2.1, I, X-6, 3.1, Xi-7.2.23). These texts then identify Prajāpati with Brahmā - "Prajāpatay Vai Brahmā", I. Brāhmaṇa - III, 3.8.3; also in Gopatha Brāhmaṇa, Uttarābhīga, III. 18. The revealing fact is that, according to Tattīṇḍya. "Brahman became Brahmā of his own", III 12.9.3. 'Brahm-Brahmā āvāt-svyām.' Thus the absolutist concept of Brahman existed along with the personal conception of Brahmā and the two were finally identical. Accordingly 'Puruṣa' is often identified with Ātman.

6. For details vide, Dr. H. Oldenberg's Buddha, His life, His doctrine. His Order, Ch.-II, 25.

7. The Upaniṣads composed between 900 B.C. - 600 B.C., which dealt with soul and its destiny, constituted a very important branch of study called Ātmavidyā, (the Science of soul) or Adhyātmavidyā (the 'Spiritual science' or 'Brahmavidyā', the 'Divine Science') which is the foundation of all sciences. Ātmavidyā, at later stage called Ānvikṣikī (the 'science of enquiry'). Manu uses Ānvikṣikī as an equivalent term for Ātmavidyā. Vidyabhusan. S.C. "A History of Indian Logic", P-2, Rhys. Davids, T.W. 'The History & Literature of Buddhism' pp.6-12.
their gradual progress are indeed hidden in obscurity. But the general result was well ascertained. Before the rise of Buddhism the whole of the upper Gangetic Valley was familiar with different types of speculation of the Soul & Universe. What, in general, is suggested by 'Soul', 'Self', 'Ego is a permanent, everlasting and absolute entity, which is an unchanging substance behind the phenomenal world. Though there are ample references, it is not easy to point out and formulate the idea of Ātman in Brāhmanical tradition.

Here it would not be impertinent if we mention the theory of Ātman from the standpoint of commoners' notion before entering into the intricate discussion. Practically, all believe that 'Ātman' means a subtle substance which exists inside our body and governs us. It is beyond imagination as well as immutable and also beyond external perception. It continuously transmigrates from one existence to another and this transmigrating element i.e. Ātman is a part of Paramātman i.e. the 'Absolute soul'. The popular belief of Ātman emerged out of the teaching of 'Srīmadbhagavadgītā'. Because "the Gītā has been

8. The Brahmajālasutta, the first sutta of Pali Dīghanikāya contains the ample references about these speculations :- It holds that the self - Aṭṭā (Skt. Ātmā) and the Universe are to be treated from every point of view - positively, negatively and both. Some doctrines tell us that the self and universe are eternal (Sassatavāda), some others hold that the self and the universe are annihilation (uccheda-vāda). Some again set forth that the self and the universe have arisen without a cause (Adhiccasamuppanna vāda) etc. Thus sixty-two views are discussed in this Sutta in details. Dīghanikāya, P.T.S. vol-I, pp.1-46.

9. "The Bhagavadgītā is later than the great movement represented by the early Upanisads and earlier than the period of the development of the philosophic systems and their formulation in sūtras. From its archaic constructions and internal
recognised for centuries as an orthodox scripture of the Hindu - religion possessing equal authority with the Upanisads and Brahmasutra and the three together form the triple canon (Pruṣṭhāṇa - traya). The teachers of the Vedanta were obliged to justify their special doctrine by an appeal to these three authorities and so wrote commentaries on them expounding how the texts teach their special points of view. The Upanisads contain many different suggestions about the nature of the Absolute and its relation to the World. Brahmasutra is so terse and obscure that it has been used to yield a variety of interpretations. The Gita gives a more consistent view and the task of the commentators who wish to interpret the texts to their own ends becomes more difficult.\textsuperscript{10} Simultaneously Upanisadic soul-theory is reflected here in simple manner for the easy grasping of the common - folk. In the Gītā, the individual soul is depicted in the following way; it is never born, nor does it die at any time, nor having (once) come to be, will it again cease to be. It is unborn, eternal, and primeval. It is not slain, when the body is slain. Just as a person casts off worn-out garments and puts on others that are new, even so does the embodied soul casts off worn out bodies and takes on others that are new. Weapons do not cleave this self, fire does not burn it, waters do not make it wet; nor does the wind make it dry. It is uncleavable. It cannot be burnt. It can be neither wetted nor dried. It is

\textsuperscript{10} Radhakrishnan, S. The Bhagavadgītā, P. 15-16.
eternal all-pervading, unchanging and immovable. It is the same for ever.\textsuperscript{11}

Likewise, the idea of the Absolute or Brahman, according to Gita, is as follows - 'It is the Supreme (Brahman), it is beginningless, and is said to be neither existent nor non-existent. With its hands and feet every where, with its eyes, heads and faces on all sides, with ears on all sides - It dwells in the World enveloping all.\textsuperscript{12} It appears to have the qualities of all the senses and yet is without (any of) the senses, unattached and yet supporting all, free from the gunas and yet enjoying them.\textsuperscript{13} It is without and within all beings. It is unmoving and also moving. It is too subtle to be known. It is far away and yet is near.\textsuperscript{14} It is undivided and yet seems to be divided among beings. It is to be known as supporting creatures, destroying them and creating them afresh. It is the light of lights\textsuperscript{15} and to be beyond darkness, knowledge, the object of knowledge and the goal of knowledge. It is seated in the hearts of all.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{11} 'Bhagavadgītā', (Sāṃkhya-yoga-dhyāya) Verses. 20-25
\textsuperscript{12} Cf. Mundaka - Upanisad, i. i, 6.
\textsuperscript{13} Cf. Svetāsvatara upanisad, Chapter - III, 19. / Apanipado javanagrahitapasyatya - Caksuh sa sinotyakarnah / sa vetti vedyam naça tasyavetvetā tamahurgyam purusam mahantam//
\textsuperscript{14} Cf. Isopanisad, verse-5.
\textsuperscript{15} Cf. Śvetāsvatara III, 8 and 16; Mundaka XIII, I, 7; Brhadāraṇyak upa, IV, 4, 6.
\textsuperscript{16} 'Bhagavadgītā, Ch. - XIII (Kṣetra-kṣetrajñāna-vibhāga-yoga) verses 12-17.
From the reflection of the Ātman and the Brahman in the Gītā, it is clear that the text does not give any argument in favour of its metaphysical position. The reality of the Individual (i.e. the Jīvātmā) and the Supreme (i.e. the Paramātmā or Brahman) is not a question to be solved by dialectic - which the vast majority of the human race will be unable to understand. Dialectic in itself and without reference to personal experience cannot give us conviction. In the Upaniṣads, these ideas find their earliest and most poetical expression and the latter system that is the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika etc. are attempt to synthesise this original intuition in their own way - but they all take the Ātman (Substance) as the basic reality. The movement of thought is equated by Dr. T.R.V. Murti, thus: Devatā = Ātman = Inner Essence = Sole - Reality, Absolute (Brahman).¹⁷ Dr. Rhys. Davids opines 'This very able and beautiful monistic philosphy was the dominant factor in Indian thought when Gautama the Buddha appeared. Many centuries afterwards it was elaborated and systematized, more especially by Sankara, into that Vedantist philosophy, now quite supreme in India.¹⁸

However, the former has its roots in the radical Upaniṣadic insight into the essential identity or consubstantiality of Brahman or the Absolute and the true self (Ātman) and its intricate relationship. There are more than 108 upanisads among them the oldest eleven the Brahadāraṇyak, the Chāndogya, the Aitareya, the Taittirīyā, the Kena, the Katha, the Mundaka, the Śvetāṣṭerā, the Praśna,

¹⁷. 'The Central Philosophy of Budhism' - P. 16 (f.n.-3).
¹⁸. 'The History and Literature of Buddhism', P-15.
the Kausitaki and the Isa are mainly taken into consideration. The other upanisads are of later date and are sectarian in character.

They represent the popular gods, Śiva, Viṣṇu, Sakti, as manifestations of the Supreme Reality. They are not parts of the original Veda, are of much later and are not therefore as authoritative as the classical Upanisads. The idea of the Ātman and the Brahman as well as their relationship is systematically worked out in successive movements of thought in these old philosophical texts. In the beginning a basis is laid down by the idea of the one and stable spirit (Ātman) inhabiting and governing a universe of movements and of the forms of movements. Then the multiple movements are identified as one Brahman, of whom, however, the unity and stability are the higher truth and who contains all as well as inhabits all. The breath - powers penetrate the human body and give it life; the Ātman is lord over all breath - powers; he is the central power, which works and creates in the basis of personal life, the "innominate breath-power", from which the other "nominate" breath - powers derive their being. "A decade of breaths truly" so says the Brāhmaṇa, "dwell in man; the Ātman is the eleventh, on him are dependent the breath-powers." "From the Ātman come all these members (of the human body) into being," , "of all that is, the Ātman is the first." Verily, as Sāndilya teaches in the Chāndogya Upanisad (Ch-III, 14, 1,

19. Radhakrishnan, S. 'The Principal Upanisads', P-6
20. 'Keith, A.B. 'The Religion & Philosophy of The Upanisads' PP 489-513.
4), the whole world is Brahman - containing all works, containing all desires, containing all odours, containing all tastes, encompassing this whole world, without speech, without concern, this is the self (Atman) within me within the heart; this is Brahman.\textsuperscript{22} In even more forceful terms, the sage Uddālaka instructs his son, Svetaketu, as follows - that which is the subtle essence, this whole world has for its self (Atman). This is the truth. This is the Atman. This is thou, that art,'Svetaketu.\textsuperscript{23} This Brahman (Supreme Being) is often called 'Atman', 'Deva' or 'Aksara'. The 'Deva' and the 'Atman' are sometimes used as interchangeable terms in these texts.\textsuperscript{24}

Here 'Brahman' is depicted as 'Being' or 'Real' (Sad), conscious (Cid), Infinite (Ananta) and 'Bliss' (Ānanda). Eternity (Sāsvata). Infinity (Ananta), Bliss (Ānanda), Knowledge (Jñāna), Consciousness (Cid), 'Laminosity' and Indescribability (Avyākta) of Brahman are repeatedly taught in Upaniṣads. Thus we are told that 'It is without any causal connections, without diversity, without speech, without concern, this is the self (Atman) within me within the heart; this is Brahman.'

\textsuperscript{22} Sarvam Khalidam brahmana, sarvakarmā sarvakāmā sarvagandhaḥ sarvarasāḥ sarvamidamabhyāḥ toavākhyanadara esa mā ātmāntahridaya etad brahmaitamiteḥ pratyabhisambhavitāmīḥ yasya sādaddhahāna vicīśāsṭīthā (smaḥ Sāndilyāḥ Sāndilyāḥ) Chāndogya-ūpaniṣad - III, 14, 1, 4.

\textsuperscript{23} Sa yatha-tatra nāḍāhyetādātmayamidam sarvam tat satyam ātmātattvamasi, Svetaketo ittaddhāsyā Vijñāvātī vijñāvatī // Ch. - XVI. 16, 3.

\textsuperscript{24} Brhadāranyaka, Chapter - III (Brāhmaṇa IV-IX). The existence of Ātmā in all organisation, the nature of Brahman, Aksara and its existence are minutely discussed with its additional topics. 'adhyātmayogādhi gamanena devam matvā dhirö harsasokhu jahati (Kāṭh. up. I, ii, 12); seyam devataikṣata (Ch. - VI,iii,2); devātmasākṣatim (Śvetāṣṭra I, 3); Caksusrotam ka vu devo unakti (Kena I,i); yadītam anupaśyatyātmānaṁ devam ānjaśā (Br. IV, iv, 15).
independent of becoming and not becoming, beyond good and evil, past and future; all attempts of defining 'It' are wrong; that is the meaning of 'neti neti'\textsuperscript{25}. In this famous book 'The Life Divine' Aurobindo explains - 'Because it is absolute and infinite, it is in its essence indeterminable. It is indefinable and inconceivable by finite and defining Mind; it is ineffable by a mind-created speech; it is indescribable neither by our negations, neti neti, - for we cannot limit it by saying it is not this, it is not that, - nor by our affirmations, for we cannot fix it by saying it is this, it is that, iti iti.\textsuperscript{26} According to Prof. T.R.V. Murti, Upaniṣadic way of defining Brahma as 'neti, neti, is as what cannot be grasped by speech, thought or senses. Brahma is nirdharmaka (asthūlam, anānu etc.), devoid of determination. Far from being unreal on this account, it is the sole reality, the soul of the universe.\textsuperscript{27} In majority of instances however, the Brahma is personified; the self is within us, inner guide, guardian, governor and lord of the World; It is inspirer of good as well as evil deeds. We have to conceive of the Brahma as one-self of all and then return upon the many as becomings of the one Being.\textsuperscript{28} "Brahma is one, not numerically, but in essence. Numerical oneness would either exclude multiplicity or would be a pluralistic and divisible oneness with the Many as its parts. That is not the unity of Brahma, which can

\textsuperscript{25} Brhadāranyaka, Chapter - III, IV, 2-4/IV 4. 22; Chāṇḍyogya, Ch. - VI, I, 3. Kathopaniṣad Ch. -II, 14.18.
\textsuperscript{26} Ch-II, p. - 292.
\textsuperscript{27} 'The Central Philosophy of Buddhism', p-48.
\textsuperscript{28} Isopaniṣad, Verse - 7.
neither be diminished nor increased nor divided." The idea is the acquisition in man of the Supreme consciousness by which the one self in him extends itself to embrace all creatures and realises the eternal act by which that one manifests itself in the multiple forms of the universal motion. On this conception also is founded the ancient idea of Individual self (Ātman or Jivātmā), Individual - self or technically 'Jīva' or 'Puruṣa'. Jīva literally means 'that which breathe' from 'Jīva' (-to breathe). It referred originally to the biological aspect of man's nature which goes throughout life in waking, dream and sleep. 'Puruṣa' or human individual is superior to animal, plant or mineral. 'Jīva' and 'Puruṣa' are used for the Ātman in Upaniṣads. 'Individual self', 'Jīva' or 'Puruṣa' - in this soul which reaps the fruits of deeds and survives after the death of physical body. It is the enjoyer (Bhoktr), and doer (Kātr). It is the 'Vijnānamayaātma'. The philosophers explained how the Individual soul is distinct from Universal soul, and the sense, if any, in which the two may be said to be identical. Samkara believes that the universal - self is identical with the individual self. The individual self is eternally one with and also different from the universal self, says Ramanuja.

The individual self is eternally different from the universal self according to

Madhava. The plurality of individual souls is admitted by Upanisads. The individual ego is separatist ego. Because it believes itself to be separate and different from all others. This selfish desire prevents it to enter into harmony and unity with the Universe. In Buddhism, this separatist ego is technically called 'Avijjā' the first factor of the twelve fold dependent origination or 'Paticcasamuppāda'. This is one of the root cause of human existence as well as suffering. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan explains it from the Brāhmanical point of view, thus - "so long as we are subject to ignorance, we stand away from God and are immersed in our limited egos, then we rise to self-knowledge, we are taken up into the Divine being and become aware of the infinite, Universal consciousness in which we live." It is the individual self who is subject to ignorance and who rises to self-knowledge. It does not dissolve in the Universal Absolute until it attains self-knowledge. To reach that desirable position individual self has to give up all desires (Kama or Trṣṇā). The sages of the Upaniṣads expressed that when the desires in his heart cease, then at once the mortal becomes immortal and obtains here (i.e. in this world) Brahman. In order to root out desire it has to realise that there is only the 'self', 'soul' or 'Atman' without a second - 'I am below, I am above, I am behind, before, right and left -  

32. 'The Principal upanisads', p. 93.  
33. 'The Principal Upanisads' P. 95.  
34. 'Yada sarve pramucyante kāmā yeasya hridisritah / atha martyoamrtō bhavyatra brahma samsūne // cycle-II, ch-II, verse-14
I am all this.\textsuperscript{35} If a man understands himself to be the Atman, what could be wish or desire for the sake of which he should pursue the Body.\textsuperscript{36} For he who sees, perceives and understands this, loes the self, delights in self, rejoices in self, becomes self - respondent (Svarād).\textsuperscript{37} In that case there is nothing (other than self) that could be an object of desire. Thus by realisation of the self, one becomes completely free not only from desire but also from anxiety, trouble and sorrow. So it is said, 'when a man understands that all beings have become only the self, what delusion, what sorrow, can there be to him who beholds that unity.\textsuperscript{38} So the sages of the Upaniṣads urged 'the self is to be perceived, to be heard of, to be thought of, and to be meditated upon.\textsuperscript{39} Thus the evolution of Upaniṣadic soul theory as stated in the following way would not be impertinent, i.e.\textsuperscript{40}

Brahman alone is all this. All this is Ātman.\textsuperscript{41} All this is Brahman,\textsuperscript{42} and finally there is no diversity here. He who perceives diversity here goes from death to death.\textsuperscript{43} The Ātman of the Upaniṣads is not the transmigrating self.\textsuperscript{44} Finally, 'Jīva' is completely identical with 'Brahman' the difference is in appearance.

\textsuperscript{35} Chāndogya upanisad, Ch. -VII, Sec. - XXV, Verse-I.
\textsuperscript{36} Br. Upa. Ch. -IV, Sec. - IV, Verse - 12.
\textsuperscript{37} Chāndogya, Ch. - VII, Sec. - XV, Verse -2.
\textsuperscript{38} Isōpaniṣad, verse - 7.
\textsuperscript{39} Br. Upa. Ch. - II, Sec. - IV, Verse-5.
\textsuperscript{40} This idea is reflected in the Mundaka - Upaniṣad, Ch. - II, Sec. - II, Verse -2.
\textsuperscript{41} The same verses from Chāndogya-upaniṣad are quoted in this connection, previously, Ch. -VII, Sec. - XXV, Verses - 1,2.
\textsuperscript{42} Chāndogy ży upa. Ch. - III, Sec. - XIV, Verse -1.
\textsuperscript{43} Br. upa. Ch. - IV, Sec. - IV, Verse-19.
\textsuperscript{44} Radhakrishnan.S, Indian Philosophy, Vol-I, PP. 204 ff.
This is the first stage - the original inspiration which initiates a new path and therefore is the basis of a philosophy. Later the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Mīmāṁsakas etc. developed their own system, following the tradition of Upaniṣads as well as conceiving the reality on the pattern of an innercore - soul or Ātman. S. Radhakrishnan suggested. 'In the case of every darsana, we have just of all a period of philosophic fermentation, which at a particular stage is reduced to sutra or aphorisms. This is succeeded by the writing of commentaries on the aphorisms, which are followed by glosses, expositions and explanatory compendia, in which the original doctrines undergo modifications, corrections and amplifications ... The commentator by means of dialogue is enabled to show the relation of the view is expounding to the diverse trains of thought suggested by the rival interlocutors. The ideas are restated and their superiority to other conceptions established.45 Before the rise of Buddhism i.e. the pre-systematic period of philosophy set forth some general reflections regarding the nature of Soul. The force of thought which springs straight from life and experience as we have it in the Upaniṣads, gives place to more strict philosophising after the revolt of Buddhism and Jainism. Appearance of Buddha forms a new era in the history of Indian thought. It finally exploded the method of dogmatism and helped to bring about a critical point of view.46 Then philosophy

of Soul-theorists needed help of Logic (Anviksiki)\(^47\) to consolidate its position against the onslaught of Great Buddhist philosophers viz. Anātmavadins. Thus the age of Buddha represents the great springtide of philosophic spirit in India. The question of the validity and means of knowledge forms an important part of each system. Each philosophical scheme has its own theory of knowledge, which is an integral part of its metaphysics and all those Brāhmanical systems protest against the Buddhists and erect a standard of objective reality and truth as opposed to an eternal universal flux.\(^48\) The different systems following this Upaniṣadic tradition developed in different centres of philosophical activity. Of them six schools became more famous, viz - (1) Gautama's Nyāya, (2) Kaṇāda's Vaiśeṣika, (3) Kapila's Sāṃkhya, (4) Jaimini's Pūrva-Mimāṃsā, (5) Badarāyaṇa's Uttara - Māṁsa or the Vedānta. Among them the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Sāṃkhya and the Māṁsaka philosophers came into direct conflict with the Buddhist scholars and this academic tussle continued covering a period of not less than one thousand years. The climax was reached when Nāgārjuna and his followers propounded a new theory of Sūnyatā i.e. in the third to fourth century A.D. and continued about the time of Kamalaśīla i.e. in the eighth or

\(^{47}\) Logic was called Ānvikṣiki or the 'Science of Debate'. S.C. Vidyabhusan in 'A History of Indian Logic' gave detail explanation of this particular term and referred how the meaning of the term is changed in different ages. He mentioned the distinction between Ātmavidyā and Ānvikṣiki lay in this, that while the former embodied certain dogmatic assertions about the nature of the Soul, the latter continued reasons supporting those assertions, p-5.

\(^{48}\) Mookerjee, S. 'The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, P. xi-xivili; 'Indian Philosophy', Vol. - II, PP 24 ff; The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, pp. 25ff.
ninth century A.D. The most upsetting were the dialectics of Diṇāgā and Dharmakīrti and their redoubtable successors.\(^49\) Primarily, in Buddhist records we find the old and new soul-theories clearly distinguished. The doctrine which maintains the reality of the self corresponding to the psychophysical (Nāma & Rūpa) individual is called Ātmavāda, whereas the view approaching the doctrine of permanent soul is called Pudgalavāda. There are two schools - the Vatsiputiṇīyas and Sammittiyas which are nevertheless, adherents of the Pudgalavāda. For all the other Buddhist schools Pudgala was but another name for Ātman, and they refuted both the theories by the same arguments.\(^50\) To search out the evolution of Buddhist philosophy Dr. B. M. Barua suggested four well-defined stages of its growth from historical perspective, i.e.

1. **PART - I First Period** (Bimbisara to Kālaśākya)

2. **PART - II Schismatic Period** (Kālaśākya to Kaṇiska)

3. **PART-III Classical Period** (Kaṇiska to Harsavardhana)

4. **PART-IV Logical Period** (Gupta to Pāla). \(^51\)

It is to be admitted by all, Buddhist philosophy has a history of continuous development. The movement of thought presents various phases or stages, each foreshadowing that which followed, and containing that which preceded


51. Prolegomena to a History of Buddhist Philosophy, pp-42-43.
it. From this stand point, we may point out that first phase was an attempt to collect the scattered discourses of the Master by his direct disciples in a systematic form. In the second stage, the earliest Buddhist scriptures i.e. the ('Buddhavacana' or 'Tipitaka' (Skt - Tripiṣṭaka), 'Anattā' (Skt-Anātmā) and 'Dukkha' (Skt-Duṣṭha). The classification of things (Dhamma or Skt. Dharma) into 'Khandha' (Skt-Skandha), 'Āyatana' and 'Dhātu', is also well-established. The Theravāda and the Sarvāstivāda schools, inspite of important differences were the first to have an Abhidharma, much earlier then the other schools. The Abhidharma treatises of those two schools synthesised the teaching of Buddha.

This was the second stage of development of the Anātma tradition. The Third stage in the development of Naiṣṭhikya (Anattā in Pali) tradition was reached by all categories and doctrines (Atman as well as Anātman) of all species of dogmatic philosophy — Pramāṇa is the negation of all views i.e. the Sūnyatā.

According to Mādhyamika this Sūnyata is the pivotal concept of Buddhism. The entire Buddhist philosophy turned on this concept during this phase. Prof. T.R.V. Murti, Th. Stcherbatsky and several other scholars showed in different ways

52. This phase comprises the period from the life time of Buddha to the first century A.D. Dr. Barua divides this period into two parts, viz. Part-I. First Period (Bimbisāra to Kāḷāśōka). Buddha and his disciples; Part-II. Schismatic Period (Kāḷāśōka to Kaniska). Ibid. p-42.

53. Conze, E. 'Buddhist Thought in India' Ch. -IV, P-178.

54. Dr. B. M. Barua stated in his book entitled "Prolegomena to a History of Buddhist Philosophy" P-43, It is a classical period (Kaniska to Harsavardhana). According to him, "The main subject of investigation comprises the four systems - Mādhyamika, Yogācārā, Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika, which spring into existence by a further reduction of the earlier schools."
that not only the Buddhist philosophy, each system of Indian philosophical thought more or less began remodelling, reforming and re-adjusting its tenets in the light of this theory of Sūnyata of Mādhymika - ācārya Nāgārjuna.55

The Fourth phase was the culmination of this thought movement i.e. the "Logical Phase"56. "Under Buddhist Logic we understand a system of Logic and epistemology created in India in the VI-VIIth Century A.D. by two great lustres of Buddhist science, the Master Diśnāga and Dharmakīrtī. The very insufficiently known Buddhist logical literature which was their creation and the enormous literature of commentaries which followed it in all northern Buddhist countries have to be referred to the same class of writings.57 The appearance of a band of logicians among the Buddhists like Diśnāga (the father of Indian Logic) consolidated the position of Buddhist philosophy which reached its apogee during the seventh and eighth centuries A.D. E. Conze stated 'Infact Buddhism is the one great religion of the world that is founded on a coherent systematic logical analysis of the problem of life'.58 Therefore, the historical development of Buddhism is not irrational. No Indian Philosophical system is merely speculative. Each is an insight (a darsan) into the real which is at once a path of perfection.

56. Vide 'Prolegomena to a History of Buddhist Philosophy, p-43 (part-IV. Logical Period': Guptas to Pālas) by Prof. B.M. Barua who was also indebted to Dr. Vidyabhushan's thesis on 'Indian Logic, Medieval School', P. - 43. Ibid. also Vidyabhusana's 'A History of Indian Logic', Ch.-II, pp-251ff.
58. Conze. E. Buddhist Thought in India, P. - 262.
and cessation of pain. On the same subject, however, Buddha held that the root cause of suffering, from which one seeks escape is Avidya or ignorance.

To escape from recurrent birth and death (Samsāra), he denied the existence of any permanent entity i.e. Soul. Denial of the Soul or Atman (technically Satkāyadṛṣṭi) is the very pivot of Buddhist doctrine of salvation. It is one of the three cardinal points of the Buddhist doctrine. In the dialogue of Buddha we breathe a different atmosphere. There is a distinct spirit of opposition, if not one of hostility as well, to the Ātmavāda of the Upanisads. Buddha always claimed that he initiated a new path, never trod before. In the Brahmajāla - Sutta and the Samaññaphala-Sutta and elsewhere, current philosophical speculations were reviewed and all of them were rejected as dogmatic (Ditthi-vāda) and inconsistent with spiritual life. As in the case of Buddha, so in the case of his

Sāntarakṣita explicitly states that Nairātmanā is that which distinguished the teaching of Buddha from all others, - Tatnasamuccaya - 3340.
etasca sugatasasamādānā naññāma - kīrtanāt / sarvāṁ thikaram āsasmat sthitā mūrdhāni tathāgataḥ //


62. In the Cūla-Maññika-Sutta of Majjhimanikāya (No. 63), it is pointed out that various speculations about the nature of the world and the Soul are considered as 'Avyā-Kafāñi' (not expounded). As well as in the Vacchagotta - Sutta (No. 72), these are also called Thapanīya - Paññhas or questions to be left aside i.e. not to be pressed.
followers, the denial of views means the denial of such views as are based on extremes especially the extremes of eternalism and negativism both of which are traced back to the false sense of soul. But then a question arises as to what notions of atman were envisaged by the Buddhists when they so emphatically denied it. From the study of 'Anaṭṭalakkhana - Sutta of Saṃyuttanikāya' it seems that the ideas of atta were of two kind that is:

1. the idea implied in the use of 'I' and 'Mine' by ordinary people and (2) the philosophical opinion held by the Vedāntik schools, specially Sāṃkhya and Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika that a continuing substratum acts as an agent which outlasts the different actions of a person, concedes to one or more existence and acts as a 'support' to the activities of the individuals. The word 'Atta' or 'Attā' is variously used in Pali cannon - (1) It means 'One-self' i.e. 'attahitāya patipanno na parahitāya (acting in one's own interest, not in the interests of others) or 'attana vā kataṃ sādhu' (what is done by one's own self is good); (2) It means 'one's own' person, the personality both body and mind i.e. in attabhāva (life) attapaṭi - lābha (birth in some form of life); (3) 'Self', 'Soul' i.e. 'atthi me attā' (do I have a soul ?). The word 'Attā' simply means "Self". It may be individual self or 'individual soul'. The self is the 'I' but the mind and body complex is not the real 'I' or 'self'. When one says 'He is healthy' one identifies the self with one's body.

63. Traditionally, this Sutta was preached by Buddha five days after his first sermon ('Dhammacakka-pavattana Sutta) to his five followers in the same Deer Park at Isipatana near modern Benares. Preaching of this sermon took place on the full moon day of Asādha. It belongs to Samyutta Nikāya, P.T.S. Vol-IV, PP. 22-24.
When one says 'He is worried', one identifies the self with one's mind. This identification is universal. Atta forgetting its real nature believes itself to be the ego. As H. Oldenberg observed "The word which we have translated 'Person' (Satta) is not the precise technical term which the Brahmanical speculation, at an earlier stage, had coined as the most exact and specia expression for the eternal in man; Atman, 'the self', 'the ego'. The Buddhist texts deal with the Atman (in Pali : Atta) also. If the demands of dialectic alone be regarded, it cannot be understood how the question regarding the 'ego' was to be answered otherwise than the question as to the 'person' - it names for the same idea and that he who denies the existence seems clear enough that both words are only different of the 'person', cannot maintain the existence of the 'ego' or even admit it possible. It is however, doubtful and a matter of much dispute among experts, whether the Upanisadic doctrine of the atman had any influence on early Buddhism. What in general is suggested by Soul, Self, Ego, or to use the Sanskrit expression Atman, is that in man there is a permanent, everlasting and absolute entity, which is the unchanging substance behind the changing phenomenal world - Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky opined "The possibility is not precluded that the foundation stone of the anatma-dharma theory was laid before Buddha. Just as Mahāvīra was not the first to proclaim Jainism, but only adopted

65. "Buddha" P. 271.
and gave lusture to a doctrine which existed before him. In the same way Buddha may have adopted and spread a doctrine which he found somewhere in that philosophical laboratory which was the India of his time. He, indeed, is reported to have emphatically disowned the authorship of a new teaching, but claimed to be the follower of a doctrine established long ago by former Euddhas. This is usually interpreted as a kind of propaganda device, but it is not quite improbable that a real historical fact underlies these assertions. Among that oldest set of Upaniṣads which for many reasons are generally admitted to be pre-Buddhistic, but display some knowledge of the Sāṅkhya system, we find along with Sāṅkhya conceptions, a statement that might be an indication of the existence of such a pre-Buddhistic form of the anātma-dharma theory." He further mentioned that "All Buddhists rejected the Ātma-vāda, since Buddhism (Buddhānuṇḍasani), philosophically means nothing else than the dharmata, the theory of dharmas, which is but another name for anatman, nairatmya."67 Prof. B.M. Barua discussed the same matter from opposite point of view and pointed out with so many examples that 'there were among the Buddhists, Puggala-vādins, even Saṅkāntikas, but there were none who committed themselves to the Absolutist position. The Tīrthakara theory of soul has never been accepted by Buddhist thinkers. It may be, as we are told in the Laṅkāvatāra, that they adopted the

67. "The Central conception of Buddhism", p-68. He also cited examples from Kathopanisad in favour of his view that monistic immortal soul (ātman and paramātman) became weaker during those days and the germ of Anātma-dharma theory is found in the Kathopanisad, pp-70f, 80ff.
language of the soul-theorists, but they did so with the object of rendering their theory of non-soul attractive and acceptable to the heretics (Tīrthakarānāṁ ākārśanārthaṁ). The Vajjiputtakas or Vātsiputriyas, as we said, were Soul-theorists among the Buddhists, but their conception of soul or personality was quite distinct from the Sāmkhya or the Vedānta conception.68 "The Buddhists were the only school of thought to advocate the transference of Karmic effects from one existence to another without admitting the existence of Soul (Pudgala)69. Dr. T.R.V. Murti says - "The Buddhists are not only ones in taking their philosophy as nairātmyavāda. Jaina and Brāhmanical systems invariably characterise Buddhism as denial of ātman, substance or soul. Mādhavācārya considers the Buddhist only slightly less objectionable than the materialist (Cārvak); in the gradation of systems he makes in his Sarvadarśanasamgraha, Baudha - darśana immediately follows Cārvak. For an anātma-vādīn nothing could be more pernicious than the denial of self. Udayanācārya very significantly calls his Refutation of Buddhistic Doctrines (Bauddhadhikāra) Ātmatattvaviveka (Distinction of the Reality of self). The acceptance of the Ātman is what divides orthodox from the Buddhist systems. The Jainas agree with this characterisation, and sharply distinguish their view from the purely modal view of the Buddhist.70 Buddha curved a new path to reach the goal of desireless

68. 'Prolegomena to a History of Buddhist Philosophy', pp 40-41.
69. Dr. N. Dutta in Foreword of the 'Milind-Paṇha and Nāgasena - Bhiksu Sutra' p-xi, Published by the Vietnam Buddhist Institute.
70. 'Central Philosophy of Buddhism', p-27.
position. His personal experiences and spiritual practices led him to conclusion apparently opposed to what were in vogue in those days. Therefore the concept of person is depicted in different ways. According to Buddhists, the so called person is in fact just a bundle of five psychophysical logical factors. These five aggregates technically called Pañca-Upādāna-Khandhā constitute an individual-being (Pudgala). And so the soul should be identical with any one of these five aggregates. But these five are impermanent and if there is soul in it, it should be impermanent. The second sermon of Buddha upholds the theory of "Anattā" by thorough analysis of 'Skandhas' or five psychophysical factors. All these phenomena are of impermanent nature and have no nature of their own that is why they cannot constitute a permanent entity (or soul) within the flux of world. The Bhārasutta of Saṃyuttanikāya tells us that these five

71. The Pañca-upādānakhandha is the combination of Nāma & Rūpa. Nāma means the mind. It is composed of vedanā (Feeling) Saṭṭhā (Perception), Samprākāra (Mental faculties) and Vijñāna (Consciousness). Rūpa means physical body. Thus Pañca-upādānakhandhā denotes the physical combination of a being. In the Culla-Saccka - Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya (Sutta -35), we get a discussion on it. It is also to be noted that these terms are not used with any strict connotation. They constitute the complex grouping of a self.

72. Cf. Ātmā skandhā yadi bhaved udayavyaya - bhāg bhavet/ Skandhebhayo' nyo yadi bhaved bhavet askandhā - lakṣṣāṇyā/,

MMK, Ch-XVIII, ka-l.

73. "Tasmāt āha, bhikkhave, yam kiñci rūpaṁ atīṭhāgata-paccuppannam ajjhātantā vā bahiddhā vā, dharmaṁ vā sukhumā vā, hināma vā pañītam vā, yam dūre santike vā, sabbaṁ rūpaṁ n'etaṁ mama, n'eso'hamasmi, na m'eso attāti".

"Ya keci - vedanā ... p.e..... ye keci saṁfahī .... pe ... ye keci saṁkhāra .... pe .... yam kiñci viññānasam adittanagata - paccuppannam.... n'etaṁ mama, n'eso'ham... asmi, na m'eso attāti, evam etam yathābhūtām sammāpaccittāya daṭṭhbabbaṁ' - Saṃyutta Nikāya P.T.S., Vol-IV, pp. 24-25.
aggregates are therefore burden. Again, in Paṭisambhidāmagga (a text of Khuddakanikāya) clearly it is stated that the matter is not self because it has no permanent core. Feeling, perception, mental faculties and consciousness are impermanent cause of suffering and are also soulless. The Mīlāndapāṇīha deserves special attention in this context. Here, it is pointed out that when a person is indicated by giving him a name, it does not denote a soul (Atta) but is merely an appellation for the five aggregates (Pañcūpādānānakhandhā) which constitute the empirical individual. Nāgasena even admits that his designation 'Nāgasena' indicates nothing permanent. Things are names, concepts etc. Chariot (Ratha) is a name as much as Nāgasena. The proper understanding of the truth is that the individual who is the object of reference is somehow an organic body, in which all cognizable or conceivable parts and functions are possibilities. The so called parts (of any body) must somehow be harmoniously combined and unified and must be capable of functioning together as a unit.


75. The Paṭisambhidāmagga of khuddaka Nikāya in Sutta - Pitaka tells us ... Vedānā, saññā, samkhārā, viññānaṃ, cakkhum...pe., jāra - maranaṃ aniccaṃ khayatthena, dukkham" khayatthena anattā asārakatthenāti". -- 'Paṭisambhidāmagga, P.T.S. p-37.

76. 'Nāgaseno' ti va 'Suraseno' - ti va 'Viraseno' - ti va 'Śīhaseno' - ti va, api ca kho, mahārāja, samkhā samāmāṇā paññatti vohāro nāmamattam, yad-idam, 'Nāgaseno ti; na h" ettha puggalo upalabbhati" ti. or 'Nāgaseno' - ti samkhā samāmāṇā paññatti vohāro nāmamattaṃ pavattati, paramāthatho pan' ettha puggalo n' upalabbhathī. Bhāsitaṃ - p'etāṃ, mahārāja, Vajrāyā bhikkhunīyā Bhagavato sammukha; 'yathā hi anagambhārā hoti' Saddo 'ratho' iti, evaṃ khandhesu santesu 'hoti' satto' - ti sammuti" - ti. Mīlāndapāṇīha, P.T.S. pp-25f.
whereby the whole of the individual can be comprehended. There is no 'ego' or 'soul' in the core of the body. It is really a crucial element in Buddhist thought that they believe in a couple of related ideas (karma and rebirth) and deny the soul. Karma controls the birth at a definite level. If a person does good work he is born in heaven and if he does bad work is born in hell.\textsuperscript{77} But if there is no continuing agent which Brahmanism or other religion called ātman or soul, then what is reborn in different planes or 'who is linked'?\textsuperscript{78} Otherwise, the continuity of a being or person is always maintained through-out this life and in many other lives that follow. Our present life is only a link in the chain of existences. This continuity is solved by the Buddhist in the following way. In the Milindapañha Nāgasena put the example of burning lamp. The continuity of life is like the flame of lamp. The life is identified with the lamp, here. The light appears same from the lamp but oil, wick, lamp holder and the air etc. are

\textsuperscript{77} We get elaborate ideas about Vimāna and Peta lokas in the texts called 'Vimānavatthu' and 'Petavatthu' of the Khuddakanikāya in Sutta Pitaka. A person can attain Vimānaloka for his deed but for his bad deed he reaches into the Petalokas and suffers. "Kammanā vattati loko kammana vattati pajā/kamma nibandhanā sattā rathāssānīva yayato //" Sutta - Nipata, P.T.S. verse-658.

In the Milindapañha, it is stated - 'Kammassakā maṇava, satta kammadāyāda kammayanā. kammabandhu Kammapaṭisaraṇā. Kammaṃ satte vibhajjati, yад idam hiṇaṇaṭītavātu. Milindapañha, P.T.S. p-5. The action of karma has been well illustrated by different stories in the Buddhist texts, besides Vimāna - vatthu and Petavatthu, the Jātakas, the Mahāvastu and the Avadāna texts deserve attention in this respect.

\textsuperscript{78} 'Ko paṭisandhati'? "Nāmarupam, who maḥāraja, paṭi-sandhati' -- t ....... maḥāraja, kīcchāpi aṁśaṃ māraṇantikam nāma-rūpaṃ, aṁśaṃ paṭisandhistiṃ nāmarūpaṃ, api ca tato yeva tam dibbattām, tasā na parimutto pāpakehi kammehi' ti. Mil. pāṇīha P.T.S. pp. 46-48.
changing every moment. We think that the light is the same, yet it is always changing. A new born baby when dies in old age is not the same person - physically and mentally - yet both are denoted by the same name. Even a man is never the same for two consecutive moments, and yet continuous in an endless number of existences without being completely different himself. We cannot see internal changes. We point it out by external change. The fire will burn till there is fuel to feed it. Similarly human life also continues so long as desire (Trsna) lasts like that burning lamp. About that connecting link, Buddhism answers - the five aggregates constituting the individual at the dying moment cause another, subtler five fold replica, which causes yet another - and so on until the new physical form of a foetus is produced, to which all cravings trace and the illusory identity of the dying bundle have been bequeathed. There is continuity, but no identity. The consciousness of two successive moments have no substantial identity. What is felt in the previous moment is already dead and gone, and even as we think our experiences flit away. Each state is an isolated individual, appearing for a moment and immediately vanishing, giving place to another, which has a similar fate. In successive states of consciousness we are

different beings, and even continuity of existence between them is hard, hard to comprehend. In its core the mark of not-self is a simple corollary of the impermanence of everything. There can be no lasting individuality because the skandhas have neither permanence nor unity (Pinda). It should be noted that in the above basic formula the absence of a self is confined to the fine skandhas, and that nothing is said either way about its existence or non-existence quite apart from them. The Buddha never taught that the self "is not", but only that "it can not be apprehended." Dr. S. Radhakrishnan also suggested that "Buddha clearly tells us what the self is not, though he does not give any clear account of what it is. It is however wrong to think that there is no self at all according to Buddha." Further he claimed that "Buddha knows that there is something else. He is never willing to admit that the soul is only a combination of elements, but he refused to speculate on what else it may be." As well as, in another occasion, he opined that "Man is bound to the world he tries to escape from. If freedom from servitude to the not self means the extinction of self, then death is our goal. Buddha meant by freedom triumph over self, but not its destruction." But, a thorough study of Pali Nikaya texts specially Samyutta-Nikaya, clearly proves that Buddha denied the existence of any permanent entity or soul on the ground

80. 'Buddhist Thought in India, Ch. - III, PP-39ff.
81. Indian Philosophy, Vol -I, p-386.
82. Ibid, p-388.
83. Ibid, p-590. In the very beginning, we have quoted from this same work of S. Radhakrishnan that 'Buddha is silent about the Atman enunciated in the Upanisads. He neither affirms,nor denies its existence.' p-387.
that when a man sees that there is Atman, he identifies his body and mind with it, and there arises his lasting love for it and the 'ego' arises when the self may be identified with the Skandhas (Pali-Khandhā). Thus, once a devotee is said to have extolled the Buddha 'If there is the notion of 'I' (ahāmkāra) in the mind, the continuity of birth does not cease, nor does go away the notion of 'I' from the mind, if there is the notion of 'I' from the mind, if there is the notion of Atman. And there is no other teacher than you in the world advocating the absence of Atman. Mrs. Rhys Davids expressed that 'The anti-atta argument of Buddhism is mainly and consistently directed against the notion of soul, which was not only a persistent unchanging blissful transmigrating super-phenomenal being, but was also a being where in the supreme Atman or World-Soul' was immanent, one with it, in essence and as a bodily or mental factor using its fiat. Notices can next be taken about Soul as discussed in the Mūlamadhyamaka - kārika and similar other philosopical texts containing the fundamental principle of Śūnyata. We have now to notice the early Buddhist analysis of the Soul. The psycho-physical empirical categories have been denied as the character of Soul in early Buddhism. "Whether Buddha appears in the world or whether Buddhas do not appear in the world, it remains a fact, an unalterable condition of existence and eternal law, that all that exists (Sabbe dhammā) is non-absolute

(anatta i.e., without an unchangeable or absolute ego entity). This fact a Buddha discovers and masters, and after having discovered and mastered it, he announces, proclaims, preaches, reveals, teaches and explains thoroughly, that all that exists is non-absolute (without a permanent ego). In early Buddhism, existence of a being or thing is analysed by the following way, it transmigrates at first as anatta and then it has changed into nothingness or Sūnyata. Sūnyavadins or Mādhyamikas examined this primitive Buddhist philosophical thought from different points of view. Before this discussion, it is necessary to mention that there is another misconception that Mahāyāna schools reversed the soul - theory and re-affirmed its reality. Prof. T.R.V. Murti and several latter Buddhist scholars prove that it was a great mistake. Mahāyanists are more thorough in carrying out the nairātmya - doctrine. They deny not only the substance - Pudgalanairātmya, but extend the denial to the elements - Dharma nairātmya too, which the Hīnayāna schools had uncritically accepted as real. Therefore we notice that Vasubandhu devotes one whole chapter of his famous 'Abhidharmakośa' to the discussion and refutation of the Ātma-doctrine viz. Pudgalaviniścayā. It also refutes the Sāṃkhya and Vaiṣeṣika conceptions of

87. It is principally a condemnation of the Pudgalanairātman - heresy in Buddhism, the special tenet of the Vatsāputriya school which admitted a sort of quasi-permanent self, neither identical with nor different from the mental states. The 'ixth' Kośasthāna of the Advaitkaravījñāna, which is named as 'Ātmavada - Parīkṣā' by Vasubandhu himself, is a special appendix devoted to the much controverted question about Buddhist denial of soul. Famous book on this particular chapter is 'The Soul theory of the Buddhists' by Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky. Prof. Sukomal Chaudhuri also discusses the same problem in brief in his 'Analytical Study of the Abhidharmakosā.' pp-27-29.
the Ātman, Vasubandhu declares that of all teacher Buddha is unique in denying the self.88 The final decision of Vasubandhu is "Here there is neither a self nor a sentient being. A self in the real sense of the term does not exist. By wrong beliefs the element of consciousness is fancied to represent a self. There are only the dharmas produced by causes. Life revolves in twelve successive stages which contain nothing else except the elements differently classified as the five aggregates (Skandhas), the twelve bases of cognition (āyatanas) and the eighteen component parts of existence (dhatus). If we carefully examine them we do not find any individual among them. See that "both interior and exterior elements are void, and the ascetic who is plunged in deep meditation about this two fold voidness is also not found among the elements or real existence."89 Madhyamikas explained the problem from separate point of view. In the Mūlamadhyamaka - kārikā, chapters VI-VIII, and X have a strong thematic connection, attacking the thesis peculiar to the Vatsīputṛyas of the existence of a personal substance (a soul), which is its own creative principles, and for which the physical and psychical components of the personality are merely instruments in Samara. In the following analysis of those chapters, concentration

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88. Cf. Yasomitra refers -
Sāhāmākāre manasi na samam yāti janmaprabandho,
naḥānākāraścalati hridayād ātmadrīstäu ca satyām;
anyah Śaṣṭā jagati ca yato nāsti naṁātmāmyavāda
nānyastasmād upaśāma - vidhes tvan-matād asti mārgah.
Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, p.697.

will be laid on pointing out the flow and structure of Nāgārjuna’s argument against the theories of soul & Non-soul. \(^{90}\) Primarily the Mādhyamika synthesis of the texts and doctrines is on the distinction of existence into Paramattha (Absolute) and Saṁyrtti (Empirical) and text into Nīlartha (Primary) and Neyārtha (Secondary). \(^{91}\) Nāgārjuna is justified in declaring that the Buddha has nowhere taught the doctrine of elements as the ultimate tenets. \(^{92}\) Buddha tells us that there are two principal viewpoints - the existence (Bhavadiṭṭhi) and the non-existence (vibhābadadiṭṭhi). No one can, holding either of these be free of this

90. Besides, those three or four chapters, important clues in regard to the subject can be found throughout the book, specially the chapter - xviii is devoted to the 'Examination of Soul' called Ātma - Parṇāsa. Otherwise, about Ātmā, we get informations from Chs XX.5; XXVIII, 3, 21-22; XXVII-4-8, 12; and Anātma - XX., 23, XXII, 3; XXIII.22.

91. ‘Dvāsatye saṁpadaḥ buddhānāṁ dharmadesanā, loka - saṁyrtti satyaṁ ca satyaṁ ca paramārthaḥ//

Or
Ye 'nayor na vijānanti vibhāgaṁ satyaṇaṁadvayoḥ,
te tattvaṁ na vijānanti gambhiram buddha-sāsane //

Ibid. ka-9.

Vyāvahāraṁ anāśritaṁ paramārthaṁ na deṣyate,
paramārthaṁ anāgamyam nirvāṇam nādhiṣaṁyate//

Ibid, ka - 10.

92. "This interpretation of the two truths is totally absent either in the early discourses or in the canonical Abhidharma. In the so-called Theravāda tradition, it appears for the first time in the non-canonical texts (Miṅ.160), contributing, as it did in the case of the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika schools, to insoluble problems such as the duality of mind and matter. Vasubandhu's statement of the two truths Saṁyrtti and paramārtha - in the above context, where he was recording the interpretation of the Sautrāntika view, remains in sharp contrast to the spirit of the Buddha's teaching on 'non-substantialism'. This should certainly provide an interesting background to the analysis of Nāgārjuna's own version of the two truths. Kalupahana, D.J. Mūlamadhyama - kārikā of Nāgārjuna, p-333.
world. Only those who analyse and understand the origin, nature and contradictions of these two views can be freed from the recurrent existence of the cycle - Samsāra. In this connection Nāgārjuna also mentions the kaccāyana - Sutta. Kaccāyana desires to know the nature of Right - view (Sammādīthī or Skt - Samyakdṛṣṭi) and in reply, Buddha says that 'the world is accustomed to rely on a duality, on the 'It is' (atthitam) and the 'It is not' (nātthitam); but one who perceives in accordance with truth and wisdom, how the things of the world arise and perish, for him there is no 'is not' or 'is'. "That everything exists" - is, kaccāyana, one extreme; that does not exist'- is another. Not accepting the two extremes, Tathāgata proclaims the truth (dhammam) from the middle-position93. Nāgārjuna pointed out this passage in his Kārikā both the 'is' and 'not is' views - all views.94 He emphatically declares that the Buddhas have made known the conception of self and taught the self and taught the doctrine of non-self. At the same time, they have not spoken of something as the self or as the no self.95 He also says that who assert the substantial existence (Sattattvam); whether that be of monistic self (ātman) or of distinct entities (prthak

94. 'Katyāyaṇavāvāde caśtināstīti cobbhayaṁ; pratisiddhām bhagavatā bhāvabhāvavibhāvīnaṁ' MMK, Ch.-XV, ka-7.
95. 'Atmetya pi prajñāpitaṁ anātmetayapi desitaṁ, buddhir nātma na cānātma kaścid ityāpi desitaṁ//' MMK. Ch. - xviii, ka-6.
prthak bhāvānāṁ) are conversant with the teaching of Buddhā. Prof. Murti explains - "According to Nāgārjuna, Buddha has affirmed the existence of the atman against the materialist, for there is the continuity of karma and its result, act and its responsibility; he has denied it as against the eternist who takes it as an immutable identical essence; he has also said that there is neither the self nor the no-self. Buddha, like a skilful physician, always graduated his teaching according to the need and the capacity of the taught.

We know, for the Buddhists, continuity can be explained in more empirical way by following the principles of empirical dependence of impermanent factors of existence. In this context, Nāgārjuna put the question, if a transmigrating person (Pudgala) is sought for in the aggregates, and elements (which are all impermanent in nature) one does not find out him (Sau nāsti, literally 'does not exist'). Then who will transmigrate? The aggregates do not continuously provide a foundation for grasping (Saṃskāra). They arise and cease. With such arising and ceasing condition, grasping (upādāna) itself would be interrupted. This means that 'upadana' has to be non-existent (Vibhava), would also be non-

96. Ātmanāśca satattvam ye bhāvānāṁ ca prthak prthak,
nirdiṣanti na tārūmanye śāsanasyārtha kovidān/
MMK, Ch. - x, ka-16.
vide MKV, pp. 354ff for the considered stand point of the Mādhyamika on the subject of the Ātman.

96(a). The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. p-24.

97. Pudgalah saṃsaranti cet skandhāyatana dhātuṣu,
Paṁcaḥ mṛgyāmāno' sau nāsti kah saṃsāriṣyati?
MMK, Ch. - XVI, ka-2.
grasping (Anupādāna)\textsuperscript{98}. If it were to be different from the aggregates, it would have the characteristics of the ncn-aggregates.\textsuperscript{99} The Buddha who denied an eternal soul or self (Ātman) was often confronted by skeptics who raised the question as to how karmas performed by a non- 'self' can effect a person. This is not, however, the problem of moral responsibility (karma-phala), which Nagarjuna takes up in Chapter eight\textsuperscript{100} and seventeen\textsuperscript{101}. According to early Buddhism, neither the person nor the aggregates have any substantial reality. Because, the Pudgala or Person is the another name of Pancūpādānakhandha or five - aggregates, each receiving its form conditioned by the Saṃkhaśā. These samkhara themselves are impermanent\textsuperscript{103} and all phenomena, including all persons or aggregates are non-substantial i.e. anattā\textsuperscript{104} The canonical

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{98} Upādānād upādānaṁ saṁsaran vibhavobhavet, vibhavaścānupādanaḥ kāḥ sa kiṁ saṁsāriṣyati?
    MMK, Ch.- XVI, ka-3.
  \item \textsuperscript{99} Atmano' stitva - nastitve na katham ca sidhyateḥ,
    MMK, Ch.-xxiii, ka-3.
  \item \textsuperscript{100} i.e. 'Skandhebhyo' nyo yadi bhaved bhaved askandhalaksanah''
    MMK, Ch. - xvii, ka-l.
  \item \textsuperscript{101} i.e. 'Karma-Kāraka Parīkṣa'.
  \item \textsuperscript{102} i.e. 'Karma - Phala parīkṣa'.
  \item \textsuperscript{103} 'Vaya-dhammā saṃkharā āppamādādena sampādetha' ti.
  \item \textsuperscript{104} The Pañcūpādāna Khandhā, viz. Rūpa, Vedanā, Saṅgītā, Saṃskāra and Vīññāna,
    'Vedanā anattā', ibid. p. 37; 'Saṅgītā anattā'. ibid. "Saṃkharā anattā" - The
    22,24."Sabbe dhammā anattā .......
    The Dhammapada, verse-279. Nāgārjuna in MMK, mentions -
    'Rūpa-sabda-rasa-sparśa gandha dharmācā kevalā/ gandharvanagarākārā marīci - svapna - samnibhāh //
    Ch. - XXIII, ka-8.
Abhidharma texts thus rejected a real self or soul (Atta) and listed the various physical and psychological factors that go to constitute the human personality. It resolves all phenomena into their ultimate contents (paramārtha sarūpa) analytically and then aims at synthesis by finding the relations (paccaya) between the various concomitant factors. The language of Abhidhamma is purely scientific, i.e. objective and impersonal, and contains no such words as 'I', 'We', 'He', 'She', 'Man', 'Tree', 'Cow', 'Mountain', 'God', etc. which are just conventional names given to an object. Here everything is expressed in terms of Khandha - five groups or aggregates or existence, Āyatana - five sensory organs and mind and their respective objects, Dhātu - elements, Indriya - faculties, Sacca - the fundamental truths, and so on. All relative concepts such as man, tree, etc. are reduced to their ultimate content, such as khandha, Āyatana etc., and viewed as an impersonal psycho-physical process which is Anicca (impermanent, changeful), Dukkha (unsatisfactory, ill) and Anattā (without a permanent entity e.g., ego or atma, i.e. unsubstantial). The purpose of this analytical approach is to get rid of the egocentricity of selfhood which hinders evolution and which is the root cause of bondage in Saṁsāra.\textsuperscript{105} The interpreters of these physical and psychological factors admitted the real existence of these various factors. Thus came the theory of substantiality of elements propounded by the Sarvastivadins, Nāgārjuna, perhaps realised the concepts of substantial existence (asat,  

\textsuperscript{105} Buddharakkhita, Acarya, Introduction to Pali Language & Literature, pub. by Buddha vacana trust, Bangalore -9.
anastitva) where two extremes to be avoided in any discussion of action and agent (Kāraka). The concept of admitting a really existing entity (Sadbhūta) a soul or self (Ātman, Pudgala) or even substance (Sadbhūta) a soul or self (Ātman, Pudgala) or even substance (Dharma, Svabhāva) as envisaged in the Upanisads in substantialist traditions, partakes of the characteristics, namely, permanence, eternity, non-duality and non-multiplicity. This means that any activity, any change in quality and quantity, in character, or in form would be merely superficial. The real or the essential is the eternal. Nāgārjuna insists on this point that perversion (Viparyāsa) raises to grasping the impermanent as the permanent or eternal.\footnote{106} The fact that anātman and anitya are conceptually related to ātman and nitya does not mean that the latter are cognitively based. They are relative only at the conceptual level. He declares that the existence or the non-existence of the self is not established in any way.\footnote{107} He utilizes the same terms used by the Buddha and the Abhidharma interpreters when he has examined the perversions.\footnote{108} It is a clear indication that Nāgārjuna was conversant with the early discourses as much as he was familiar with the Abhidharma commentarial literature. On the similar ground, Dr. D. J. Kalupahana observes that “the Sarvāstivādins were bold enough to admit an underlying

\footnote{106} Anitye nityam ityevam yadi graho viparyayah\footnote{107} Ātmanāt stiva-nāsitve na katham ca sidhyate\footnote{108} Specially, kā - 21 and 22 in the ch. - xxiii of MMK. For details vide, Kalupahana's Mūlamadhyamaka - Kārika of Nāgārjuna, Introduction, pp-16-20, and pp322ff.
substance that remains unchanged, even though they did not realize that such a doctrine was incompatible with the Buddha's notion of non-substantiality (anātman). The Sautrāntikas, on the contrary, denying such a substance and claiming themselves to be the faithful interpreters of the discourses, still maintained the momentary destruction (Kṣaṇabhāṅga) of Phenomena. They did not realize that their conception of the momentary destruction of phenomena was forcing them to recognize a subtle transmigrating entity. Hence they came to be characterized by their opponents as 'transmigrationists' (Saṃkrāntivādin). It seems that they did not admit soul or pudgala but did not deny the existence and reality of dharma (or elements) either. The first attempt to synthesise the teachings of Buddha was the Abhidharmik system. We may comprise under this the Theravāda as well as the Sarvāstivāda. Internal evidence of the Mahāyāna systems themselves and historical evidence unmistakably point to the Sarvāstivāda as the matrix from which the Buddhist systems developed as departures and deviations. Brāhmaṇical influence on the rise of Mahāyāna has been surmised by some scholars. Probably, the influence exerted was with regard to the conception of Godhead and Bhakti

110. This standpoint is present in the Pali Canons, and is well developed in the Abhidharma literature specially the Kathāvatthu and the Milinda Panha, Central Philosophy of Buddhism, pp-20ff.
111. Ibid. p-56.
112. Kern sees distinct parallel between Bhagavadgītā and Saddharma Pundarīka; A. B. Keith hints at Greek and Christian influence (Buddhist philosophy, pp. 216-7); Stcherbatskay says: 'That the Mahāyāna is indebted to some Aupanisadic influence is probable' (Buddhist Nirvana, p.-51, also p. -61).
and the absolute as the transcendent ground of Phenomena, an idea which is well-defined in the upanisadic conception of Brahman. The question is difficult to decide as there is little direct evidence. If there was any borrowing, it was indirect and circumstantial. The part played by some phisolophical schools, notably the Vatsiputriya and Saurstantika, in proving as a sort of transitional link, must be mentioned. The second state in the development of Nairatmya was reached in the Madhyamika. There is the denial of all categories and doctrines - Atma as well as Anatma, of all species of dogmatic - philosophy; all dogmatic systems are Drsti, and Prajna is the negation, of all views - Sunyatā. Sūnyata is the pivotal concept of Buddhism. Yogacara idealism based on the acceptace of Sūnyata. The critical and absolutist trend in Atma tradition is also traceable to this. After a thorough observation Prof. T. R. V. Murti arrived at this definite conclusion that this development, which was a turning point in the history of Indian philosophy, was engendered by two sets of influences: one, the drive towards self-consistency which was at work in the older Vedanta too, and second, the adoption of the technique (dialectical method) already perfected by the Madhyamika and also used by the Vijñana-vāda. We have definite evidence of this influence in Gaupapada, though in Saṅkara the traces are almost obliterated. There was, however, adoption of the technique of the Madhyamika dialectic and not the borrowing of its tenets. Influence is not necessarily acceptance or borrowing of doctrines. That too is influence which stimulates the systems to modify, revise or even re-affirm their doctrines. Influence may be expressed
as much through opposition as by acceptance. In this sense alone the Brāhmaṇical systems, Vedānta and Nyāya, have been influenced by Buddhism.113

A close parallel, as pointed out by many scholars, is the Upaniṣads, which with one voice speak of the knowledge of the self as the knowledge of all and this is the sole means of freedom. Bondage is the ignorance of the self. For Buddha, however, the self is primarily a wrong notion. Buddha denies the existence of 'Brahman' and 'Ātman' and advanced a new theory of 'Anātman' i.e. 'Non-Soul' or 'No-self', for the declares all thing are changing and it is unreasonable to look for an absolute unchanging principle or eternal self.114 Buddhism retains the self as a combination of matter and mind in continuous change. This self is perfected by cultivation. This is what is meant by self-culture or self-creation. This can only mean that for him knowledge is the self-conscious awareness of the world process i.e. Praṇītyasamutpāda. The act is that the absolute identity involves permanence and absolute difference implies annihilation. 'Dependent origination' is the middle way adopted by the Buddha in elucidating change and causation. Nāgārjuna also emphasises on this very point, and firmly declares that

Praṇītya yad yad bhavati na hi tāvat tad eva tat,
na canyad api tasmān nocchinnam, nāpi sāsvāmaṃ //114

113. Central Philosophy, p. - 56.
114. MMK. Ch. XVIII, Ka-10
- It is not an annihilation nor is it eternal. Such, it is reminisced, is the immortal message of the Buddhas, the patrons of the world. The Buddha concerns himself with an analysis of the various theories of reality and rejects them all. Buddha ascends from the conflict of Reason to the inexpressibility of the absolute. The Upaniṣadic seers do not concern themselves with the different philosophical standpoints and views of the real. Being pioneers in the field, they had not before them many, right or wrong views to criticise and condemn. They appear to start with an intuitive or extra-philosophical knowledge of Brahman and then lead the disciples to that knowledge through agruments and analyses.

Indeed, from the historical standpoint, it is very interesting, but is not possible to investigate the fuller implications of the Non-soul doctrine. Because, origin of Buddhism is not very clear. Most popular theory about its origin is that it is the 'reaction against the slaughter of animals in sacrifices.' But non-violence (Ahimsā) too was nothing new as a doctrine since the Upaniṣads had already

115. Anekārtham anānārtham anucchedam asāsvatam, etat tat 'lokanāṁthānam buddhānāṁ' sāsanāṁ dram//

MMK, Ch. - xviii, ka -I|  

116. "The absolute is not a matter of empirical observation. The world of experience does not reveal the absolute anywhere within its limits" - Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, I.P. Vol. - I, p. 683. "In the Buddha declined to define the nature of the Absolute or if he contended himself with negative definitions, it is only to indicate that absolute being is above all determinations." - Radhakrishnan in 'Gautama, the Buddha', p-59.

provided for it. Jainism also is claimed to have had talked of it earlier than Buddhism. As a matter of fact, any system, worth its name must have its roots in the society and as a matter of course, serve the cause of society. The Vedic society had its emphasis on the house-hold order of life and was patriarchal. Patriarchy involves hierarchy in every sphere of life. The father or the patriarch became the person of highest worldly authority and on that very pattern a supreme authority was conceived of. Mother and maternity came to be looked down upon. Not only the values were created in favour of such a social order; creation myth came to be concocted, narrated and ultimately was established in immutable essence wherefrom the world of creation was held to be emanated. The family involves hierarchy and individuality that breeds 'self,' 'Essence,' or 'Egoism'. Thus the myth of the soul was put forward. From the practical point of view men, in general, seem to be giving all their energy to preserve their own identity and existence and their possessions. But in truth, it is impossible to preserve for ever; even for one moment, nothing can stay unchanged. It is thus insecure in relation to space and time. There is no solid reason behind it, still now, that they can discover the core of their own existence. It is only an innovation. Dr. D. J. Kalupahana observes it in the following way: Man's search for a permanent entity, while he is equipped with limited epistemological resources, leaves him with unresolved question. He continues to doubt. He is

118. Ahuja, Ram 'Indian Social System', p.1-89.
119. Ibid.
constantly perplexed and troubled. Looking for permanence, he misses the empirically given. The search for the unseen "beauty queen (Janapada-Kalyāṇī, D 1, 193; M.2. 40) makes him forget the immediately relevant questions (M.2. 40). As such he has no peace of mind. However, if he were to direct his attention to what is immediately given, and understand the human predicament in its context without being inquisitive about metaphysical entities (dukkham eva uppajja-mānam uppajjatidukkham nirujjhamānam nirujjhatiti na kaṅkhati na vicikicchatī, ibid), his mind would be peaceful (Sāntam)¹²⁰ However, the patriarchy stands in direct confrontation with the notion of equality and the idea of free humanity. Buddhism was a challenge to such a society. The Buddhist Sangha system was the direct challenge to the Aryan household system based on the concept of immutable soul. Buddhism, therefore, thought if wise to proclaim the doctrine of impermanence (Anicca, Skt. Anitya) and non-soul (anattā, Skt. Atman). The soul, if it ever exists, in his opinion, must exist only as related to the World, it does not have the prospect of being left alone. As against the immutable Brahman and 'Ātman', it therefore, postulated the concept of 'Anātman' and eternal flux.

Thus the psychological background of the society had to be moulded so that the society could accommodate change in its nomenclature. Because, the common man may not be conscious of having a philosophy of his own. For he

has neither the occasion nor the capacity to formulate a system, nevertheless his conduct implies a world view. The choice then it not been having a metaphysics or not having it but between a good one or bad one. Besides the Buddhists the protagonist of the other philosophical schools, except Materislist realised the demand of the time but they could not ignore their age-old tradition. Therefore they followed their predecessors. Prof. S. K. Mukherjee suggested - "The difference between the two philosophies is therefore based upon a fundamental ground and neither of them can be expected to capitulate to the other, as this world imply the entire change of outlook and philosophic orientation. But a dispassionate critic, when confronted with a metaphysical tangle of this type, and to pronounce an unbiased verdict either in favour of one or against the other. it is very seldom that the critic can come with offers of compromise, as compromise proves very often to be suicidal to philosophy. Compromise is a virtue in social life, because it ensures the harmonious cooperation of the members of the community, which disagreement and difference would render impossible. But difference of opinion does not spell any such danger, if it does not involve a fundamental antagonism in ethics and social life. So the practical work-a-day man of the world has no reason to sound the toesion of alarm if philosophers differ between themselves, as decent philosophy does never stoop below wordy warfare.\textsuperscript{121}

\textsuperscript{121} Mookerjee, S.K., 'The Philosophy of Universal Flux' - p-196.