CHAPTER V

Revolutionary Movement

August 7, 1942. The clarion call of the Congress to non-violent action was symbolised by Gandhi's slogan "Do or Die." Gandhi said to clarify in his peculiarly patient but passionate voice: "We shall either free India or die in the attempt. We shall not live to see the perpetration of our slavery. Every true Congressman or woman will join the struggle with an inflexible determination not to remain alive to see our country in bondage and slavery. Let that be your pledge: Keep jails out of your consideration. If the Government keep me free, I shall spare you the trouble of filling the jails. I will not put on the Government the strain of maintaining a large number of prisoners at a time, when it is in trouble. Let every man and woman live every moment of his or her life hereafter in the consciousness that he or she eats or lives for achieving freedom and will die, if need be, to attain that goal. Take a pledge, with God and your own conscience as witness, that you will no longer rest till freedom is achieved and will be prepared to lay down your lives in the attempt to achieve it. He who loses his life will gain it; he who will seek to save it shall lose it. Freedom is not for the coward or the faint-hearted." The voice spread all over the world and shook the foundations of the British Empire. It will, however, be an over simplification of facts to say that Gandhi electrified the nation just by making a sudden speech. The international and internal events were taking a grievous turn and people
were panicked by the Japanese invasion. The situation was further aggravated by continued opposition of the British to concede the substance of independence. So Gandhi had to take a fresh stock of the situation and come out with a programme of action.

Failure of the Cripps Mission resulted in a feeling of deep frustration and anger throughout the country. This was aggravated by the tale of woe of the Indian evacuees from Burma on their way to India, which involved racial discrimination of an outrageous character. Gandhi was also equally aggrieved. The series of set backs that the British suffered at the hands of the Japanese led them to adopt scorched earth policy. Apprehending Japanese invasion of India they seized or destroyed the boats, bullock carts and cycles of the people in Bengal, Assam and the eastern border of the country. Not only that, they even destroyed standing crops throwing the millions to starvation and death. To crown it all, secret circulars were sent to the high British officials in order to keep the British forces and officials ready for retreating to a defence line beyond Allahabad in the event of the Japanese invasion. Might be the British Government in India felt helpless and in these circumstances they did what was natural to do for an imperialist power. But this brought about a total change in Gandhi. Gandhi had so long favoured pursuing the policy of non-embarrassment to the British when they had been fighting against the black forces of Fascism. But the British attitude fully disappointed him. Gandhi had a number of British friends among whom the Names of C. F. Andrews and W. W. Pearson deserve
special mention. Because they were not mere friends but had been
influenced by some of Gandhian ideas and like true freedom-loving
Englishmen fought for the freedom of India. Moreover, Gandhi had
the experience of Mirabehn, the daughter of a British Admiral, Mr.
Slade, who dedicated herself to the cause of the Indian freedom
and had been a disciple of Gandhi. Though a shrewd politician,
Gandhi had an unwavering faith in man, and he still looked forward
to an honourable treatment from the democratic British. But this
time all his hopes were belied. He, on the contrary, became apprehensive that the people in India might invite the Japanese as liberators out of frustration. This apprehension was not unfounded.
Gandhi, therefore, felt that the orderly withdrawal of the British
was the only honourable solution under these circumstances. The
Working Committee was to meet on April 27 at Allahabad to review the situation and devise ways and means. Gandhi sent a draft resolution for the consideration of the Working Committee.

It was a lengthy resolution. The draft started condemning the British War Cabinet's imperialistic design ventilated through the Cripps offer. The plea of the British to justify their stay in India for the safety of the princes and for protecting the minority interests as also to defend India was taken as a disguised way of keeping India in bondage. "The princes need have no fear from unarmed India." As regards the minority question, Gandhi said that it "is a creation of the British Government and would disappear on their withdrawal." Pointing to the question of the Indian defence the resolution laid down that "Britain is incapable of defending India." As the Indian and the British interests differed,
so there was mutual mistrust. "The Indian army has been maintained until now mainly to hold India in subjugation." The people of India did not consider the army as their own and, therefore, could not rely upon it for the country's defence.

Making an observation on the position of Japan vis-a-vis India the resolution laid down: "Japan's quarrel is not with India." She had been fighting Britain and if Britain had withdrawn, India might negotiate with Japan. "India would be able to defend herself in the event of Japanese or any aggressor attacking India."

AICC, therefore, "appeals to Britain for the sake of her own safety, for the sake of India's safety and for the cause of world peace to let go her hold on India even if she does not give up all Asiatic and African possessions."

The draft made it abundantly clear that, "India bears no enmity either towards Japan or towards any other nation. India only desires freedom from an alien domination." In spite of that "if Japan attacks India and Britain makes no response to its appeal, the Committee (AICC) would expect all those who look to the Congress for guidance to offer complete non-violent non-co-operation to the Japanese forces and not render any assistance to them."

The principle of non-violent non-co-operation was explained as:

"1. We may not bend the knees to the aggressor nor obey any of his orders.

2. We may not look to him for any favour nor fall to his bribes. But we may not bear any malice or wish him ill."
3. If he wishes to take possession of our fields, we will refuse to give them up even if we have to die in the effort to resist him.

4. If he is attacked by disease or is dying of thirst and seeks our aid, we may not refuse it.

5. In such places where the British and the Japanese forces are fighting, our non-co-operation will be fruitless and unnecessary.

The resolution more or less represented the feeling of every common Indian and it might be expected that it would be adopted verbatim and unanimously. But the proceedings of the Working Committee record a different tale. As was their wont, ardent followers of Gandhi like Rajendra Prasad, Vallabhbhai Patel and J.B. Kripalani fully agreed with his interpretation of the situation, while it was not acceptable to Jawaharlal Nehru, C. Rajagopalachari and the Congress President, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad himself. Jawaharlal Nehru emphatically said, " ....... If Bapu's Gandhi was so addressed in the Congress circle approach is accepted we become passive partners of the Axis powers." Because the "whole background of the draft is one which will inevitably make the world think that we are passively living up with the Axis powers. The British are asked to withdraw. After the withdrawal we are to negotiate with Japan and possibly come to terms with her." He felt that, Bapu might "not be conscious", but his "feeling that Japan and Germany will win .... governs his decision." Jawaharlal Nehru, therefore, tabled an alternative draft.
Jawaharlal Nehru's draft started with a sense of sorrow for the British imperialistic attitude expressed in her denial of independence to India: "In view of the imminent peril of invasion that confronts India and the attitude of the British Government as shown again in the recent proposals sponsored by Sir Stafford Cripps, the All India Congress Committee has to declare afresh India's policy and to advise the people in regard to the action to be undertaken in the emergencies that may arise in the immediate future." He contended that war had been imposed upon the people of India "without the consent of their representatives", and the army has no connection with the Indian people. "While India has no quarrel with the people of any country she has repeatedly declared her antipathy to Nazism and Fascism as to Imperialism. If India were free, she would have determined her own policy and might have kept out of the war, though her sympathies would in any event have been with the victims of aggression. If, however, circumstances had led her to join the war, she would have done so as a free country for freedom, and her defence would have been organised on a popular basis with a national army under national control and leadership and with intimate contacts with the people. A free India would know how to defend herself in the event of any aggressor attacking her."

Repudiating the idea that "freedom can come to India through interference or invasion by any foreign nation", the draft noted that the "A.I.C.C. is convinced that India will attain her freedom through her own strength and will retain it likewise."
As against the impending aggression Jawaharlal Nehru's suggestion was: "we may not bend the knees to the aggressor nor obey any of his orders. We may not look to him for favours nor fall to his bribes. If he wishes to take possession of our homes and our fields, we will refuse to give them up even if we have to die in the effort to resist him." Non-violent non-co-operation was suggested to be the way of resisting the aggressor.

The two drafts apparently seemed alike, but if judged from the points of emphasis, it is evident that while Gandhi had taken a definite stand, Jawaharlal Nehru's approach was ambivalent. The socialist leader Achyut Patwardhan, who was an invitee to the meeting, correctly stated that, in spite of being in full agreement with Nehru's analysis of the background of the situation, it was difficult to adopt his attitude. Because the "British Government is behaving in a suicidal manner. If we do not take decisions, Jawaharlalji's attitude will lead to abject and unconditional co-operation with British machinery which must collapse." He emphasised that Indian "co-operation with Britain is an invitation to Japan." The socialists were no less internationalist, but this time they were pragmatically guided by national consideration. In complete agreement with Gandhi Achyut Patwardhan observed that the failure of the Cripps Mission put an end to the 'open door' policy, and it was better not to take sides. Narendra Deva's observation was more clear and emphatic. He also attended the meeting as an invitee. Distinguishing between the war aims of China-Russia and Britain-America, he pointed out that if their war aims had been identical, "we should join the
war and side with Britain. Our position has not been that we want power because without it we cannot kindle the national spirit. Our position has been that, if the war was a people's war and there was proof of it in action we are willing to throw in our weight on the side of the democracies." He also echoed Gandhi: "... we can tell the British to go leaving us to our fate. Whatever unreality there is in Indian politics is due to British rule. Let it go and unreality will disappear. I am not interested in defeating Hitlerite Germany. I am more interested in war aims and peace aims."

It was at this meeting that C. Rajagopalachari proposed his Madras Resolution which, almost in agreement with Cripps, sought to accept the Muslim-League demand for Pakistan and the restoration of a responsible government in Madras. This worsened the controversy. He was bitterly criticised, most vehemently by Vallabhbhai Patel and Narendra Deva. According to Vallabhbhai Patel C. Rajagopalachari's resolutions added insult to injury, while in the opinion of Narendra Deva he simply strengthened the hands of Cripps, and the mischievous move should be counteracted. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad this time took a clear stand as the President, though otherwise his chief concern like Jawaharlal Nehru was the British war setbacks. He virtually rebuked C. Rajagopalachari for taking such a stand as a member of the Working Committee. C. Rajagopalachari understood the mistake on technicality, but he refused to withdraw the resolutions for they represented his considered views. He, therefore, tendered resignation from the Working Committee in order to set
himself free to propagate his own views. C. Rajagopalachari, however, could not find any considerable support in the AICC or in the Congress circle taken as a whole, and this led him to resign even from the Congress. But he did not sit idle. Like a devoted student of Machiavelli, he tried to do whatever he could do. The enormity of the damage he did to the cause of India's freedom will be revealed in course of discussion. However, it may not be out of point to note that, unlike Machiavelli, C. Rajagopalachari was perhaps not even clear to himself as to how really 'considered' were his considered views. According to Maulana Abul Kalam Azad C. Rajagopalachari's views were that independence of India was held up by communal differences. It is then difficult to say how far it was his own views, for Cripps also made almost the same observation. C. Rajagopalachari is said to have confided to Gandhi that he did not believe in Pakistan, but as "Mussalmans ask for it, Mr. Jinnah asks for it, and it has become an obsession with them," it was better to "say 'yes' to them. ..... The same Mr. Jinnah will later on realize the disadvantages of Pakistan and will forgo the demand." Gandhi did not agree with him for obvious reasons, but this seems to be a very queer reasoning, particularly when it related to the future of the whole nation.

Although C. Rajagopalachari's resolution was lost, Gandhi draft was also not ultimately adopted, in spite of the fact that it was accepted by majority of the members of and invitees to the Working Committee. Gandhi's draft was passed in the morning sitting of May 1 by a majority vote, but the subject was reopened
in the evening sitting by the President himself and he "pleaded with those who supported Rajendra Babu's draft to accept Jawaharlalji's draft and make it a unanimous resolution." J.B. Kripalani, however, reports differently that Maulana Abul Kalam Azad threatened resignation unless the draft was materially altered. By material alteration of the draft he naturally meant the acceptance of Jawaharlal Nehru's draft because that was the only other draft lying before the Committee having basic differences with the Gandhi draft, and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad himself confessed that Jawaharlal Nehru often agreed with him in the interpretation of situations. It was, therefore, at the insistence of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and to avoid crisis that might be produced by his resignation that Gandhi draft was replaced by Nehru draft. It is learnt from J.B. Kripalani that after being reported of the episode Gandhi said, "you should have allowed the Maulana to resign." These details will indicate the different directions in which the minds of the Congress leaders had been moving.

But Gandhi had never been without resources. He had one very peculiar characteristic that when he blossomed, he did not care whether his nearer neighbours enjoyed the fragrance; he had the confidence that it would enchant the environment. It was for this reason Gandhi did not attach much importance to the AICC resolution. Long before the Working Committee met Gandhi started educating the nation with his ideas through the columns of 'Harijan' and watching the reactions. He made his position very clear regarding the demand for the withdrawal of the British. In reply
to a question whether he was inviting the Japanese while asking for the withdrawal of British rule, Gandhi reiterated that the British withdrawal from India might be followed by the Japanese reconsideration of their plan to attack India. But he reminded that British "withdrawal does not by itself bring independence. It may induce unity or it may lead to chaos. There is also the risk of another power filling in the vacuum if it is there", still he proposed that the British should leave. Under his proposal the withdrawal implied leaving "India in God's hands — but in modern parlance, to anarchy, and that anarchy may lead to internecine warfare for a time or to unrestrained decoities." But in Gandhi's opinion that state of life might not be worse, because the contemporary life was "in a state of ordered anarchy. It is misnomer to call such rule as is established in India, a rule which promotes the welfare of India". He, therefore, wanted "this ordered disciplined anarchy" to go and, if that produced complete lawlessness, Gandhi was ready to face it. He was confident "that 22 years of continuous effort at educating India along the lines of non-violence will not have gone in vain, and people will evolve real popular order out of chaos." Gandhi was asked if the remedy that he suggested was not worse than the disease. To this his reply was: "I waited and waited until the country should develop the non-violent strength necessary to throw off the foreign yoke. But my attitude has now undergone a change. I feel that I cannot afford to wait. If I continue to wait I might have to wait till doomesday. For the preparation that I have prayed for and worked for may never come, and in the meantime
I may be enveloped and overwhelmed by the flames that threaten all of us. That is why I have decided that even at certain risks which are obviously involved I must ask the people to resist the slavery."

Gandhi not only resolved that the British should go, but had already drawn an outline of the movement. "In the villages", Gandhi explained, "the peasants will stop paying taxes. They will make salt despite official prohibition." This might be a small matter, because the salt tax would not yield much to the British exchequer. "But refusal to pay it will give the peasants the courage to think that they are capable of independent action". The next step would be "to seize the land". In this case Gandhi did not rule out the possibility of violence, but he speculated that within fifteen days things would come under control. He, however, made it clear that lands would be confiscated without compensation, because it was "financially impossible for anybody to compensate the landlords". Previous movements suffered much in the absence of coordination between the village and the city. But this time Gandhi corrected the lapse and proposed a master coordination between the peasants and city working-class. "Workingmen in the cities would leave their factories. The railroads would stop running." He demanded that every section of the Indian populace would participate in the impending movement, for "everybody wants freedom." Gandhi had no doubt even about the Muslim participation in the struggle. In spite of the best efforts of their leaders as also of the government, "the Muslim millions do
not oppose independence and they could not, therefore, oppose our measures to bring about the independence. The Moslem masses sympathize with the one over-all goal of Congress: freedom for India."

Gandhi had been taken to be the supreme leader in the Congress circle and outside, but he himself had personal assessment of his associates, particularly as to the question of their following his ideas and method of struggle. So, he said, "...... if it fails me, I have my own organization myself. I am a man possessed by an idea. If such a man cannot get an organization, he becomes an organization." His past experience made him sceptical about the Congress. The proceedings of the last Working Committee led him to comment that "Men who have held office in Congress may not rise to the occasion." The sling was particularly aimed at Jawaharlal Nehru. Gandhi was, however, unbendable in having his way.

It was not merely that he was planning, but had already started moving. And this movement was also manned not by his close associates, but by the socialists who would pretend not to see eye to eye with him. This time the socialists summoned an overflowing enthusiasm. Because the interpretation of situation and the outline of movement as given by Gandhi were almost in line with the socialists. "After the Cripps fiasco the party wanted the Congress to go in for an intensive preparation for a final assault." Trusting that the Socialists might make sincere soldiers in the final assault, Gandhi widened the scope of the movement. He summoned Ramnandan Misir, a promi-
prominent Congress Socialist, to visit Wardha after the latter's release from jail in May. "Thereafter, during July, he undertook a tour in Bihar and Madras — apparently as a secret emissary of Gandhi" to propagate Gandhi's views about the impending struggle.

The situation in the meantime worsened instead of improving while there was no change in the British attitude. A meeting of the Working Committee was convened at Wardha on July 7. The leaders assembled with varying mind. Although they all agreed that the internal conditions were deteriorating very fast and distress of the people knew no bound, yet a considerable number of Working Committee members including Jawaharlal Nehru, Govindaballav Pant and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad were reluctant to launch any movement of Gandhi's design. They apprehended misunderstanding on the part of Allied Nations and felt that the Congress might be misrepresented as a saboteur to war efforts. Observing that "we must refrain from any word or action which could offer encouragement to the Japanese", Maulana Abul Kalam Azad preferred "to wait upon the course of events and watch how the war situation developed." This attitude was contrary to the AICC resolution of May 2. AICC clearly denied to be a party to the war in which India had been forcibly involved without consulting the representatives of the Indian opinion. Jawaharlal Nehru had natural reasons to take this view. Because of his British upbringing he was favourably disposed towards Britain. His meeting with Edward J. Thomson, who came to India in the early years of the war as an
emissary of Churchill, made him favour the Allied war aims. However, with other leaders it mattered little if the Congress were to be regarded by the British as enemies of the Allied Powers. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad was trying to be shrewd when he commented later that Gandhi failed to give any clear idea about his programme of resistance. But it proved to be a very weak offensive against the propagation of Gandhi's ideas through the columns of the Harijan and other interviews with the press and persons. He gave full weight to the arguments of the members of Working Committee, but did not like their programme of inaction. His interpretation was clear and firm as before: Britain was the Japan's target, but India's only concern was her own freedom. He, therefore, opted to part company with the Congress and go alone with his programme of action. This had a tremendous effect on the Congress leadership. Despite the differences with Gandhi, the idea of parting company with him at such a critical and delicate stage of national life was beyond their contemplation. They had to reconsider their views and Gandhi somehow convinced Jawaharlal Nehru that what he proposed was the only way to meet British obstinacy and save the interest of India and the Allied Nations even at that hour of greatest peril. The funniest part of this episode was that the father of non-violence had to admit in unequivocal terms to the so-called non-violent leaders "that like other movements, this would also be on the basis of non-violence", and agree to soften the resolution as far as possible so that British sentiment was not wounded! However, after deliberations for long eight days the Working Committee
resolved on July 14 that the Congress would actively move for "the withdrawal of the British power from India." It was pointed out in the resolution that, the Congress "wishes to take no hasty step and would like to avoid so far as is possible any course of action that might embarrass the United Nations. The Congress would plead with the British power to accept the very reasonable and just proposal herein made not only in the interest of India but also that of Britain, and of the cause of freedom to which the United Nations proclaim their adherence. Should however this appeal fail the Congress cannot view without the greatest apprehension the continuation of the present state of affairs involving a progressive deterioration in the situation and the weakening of India's will and power to resist aggression, the Congress will then be reluctantly compelled to utilise all the non-violent strength it might have gathered since 1920 when it adopted non-violence as part of its policy for the vindication of the political rights and liberty. Such a widespread struggle would inevitably be under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi." As the issues raised were of far reaching importance, it was resolved to be sent for final decision to the AICC to meet on August 7, at Bombay.

This was definitely a low-toned resolution from the point of Gandhi's view. But one characteristic feature of this resolution was that for the first time the Indian people heard the Congress demanding something that would not depend upon what the imperial policy wanted to be. Gandhi thus had to surrender some of his ideas evidently. But his shrewdness was so fine and manoeuvrability so adroit that even his staunchest opponent could
not understand how he did manoeuvre. Notwithstanding their reservation Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and others "could not but yield to his Gandhiji's persuasion." The Working Committee meeting being over, Gandhi described the impending movement as an Open Rebellion in a press interview on July 14. As to the form of movement he said: "The conception is that of a mass movement on the widest possible scale. It will include what is possible to include in a mass movement or what people are capable of doing. This will be a mass movement of purely the non-violent character". Asked if he would court imprisonment this time, he replied, "it is too soft a thing. There is no such thing as courting imprisonment this time. My intention is to make it as short and swift as possible." In another interview he emphasised the non-violent character of his projected movement but also said that "the programme of the movement would depend on circumstances."

It is not very difficult to understand from what he said that actually he wanted to get the Congress committed to his leadership and his programme, at least broadly. Perhaps his idea was that the programme being adopted he might easily fill in the gaps to suit the needs of the time. For this reason he kept the programme of resistance wide open. But Gandhi's method was notably different from that of C. Rajagopalachari. The latter would have been played by persons whom he would try to play with. Gandhi had also been played, sometimes even, by his political kindreds, which has been discussed in proper place, but he never did underestimate anybody's conviction.
However, Gandhi was successful in bringing the Congress out of the do nothing mentality of some groups and injecting into a spirit of adventure and courage. The leaders felt it their duty to observe its reaction over the body politic and provide the nation with proper food so that the injection might work well. The interval between the Working Committee meeting and the AICC meeting was naturally a period of hectic activity for the Congress leaders. But it should be noted that though they were all trying to ensure maximum participation of the people into the struggle, their approaches were not identical. Vallabhbhai Patel described the impending movement as an "all-embracing one in which people of all classes and parties would join and there would be no restrictions as to discipline, and the choice of method of participation would be left to the discretion of the participant," and act of violence "even of the type of Chouri-Chaura will not stop the movement." Shankerrao D. Deo surmised that Gandhi might "even discard his principle of "Non-violence" in his struggle because he knows that his principle cannot be preached unless India is a free country." Jawaharlal Nehru anticipated the arrest of the Congress leaders and the Congress to be declared illegal as well as the news blackout with the beginning of the struggle. In such an eventuality his advice was that "people should not lose courage but should form their own working committees and carry on the struggle" in adherence to Gandhi's instructions. Gandhi's plan, as already stated, was more militant this time. "This plan was discussed by the Working Committee and the members almost unanimously approved the same."
Gandhi proposed to start his movement with a general strike for twenty-four hours. It has been explained: "It will be a day of fast and prayer. He does not want any public meeting to be held in cities and towns on the Hartal day, but he will direct that meetings to be held all over the villages in India to explain the Congress move. He will then enforce the 1920 programme of withdrawing students from schools and colleges, lawyers from the law courts, government servants from Government offices, policemen from the Police Service etc. The next stage would lead to breaking of the salt act by raiding salt factories and illicit manufacturing of salt on a large scale, picketing of foreign cloth, liquor shops, promoting industrial strikes, holding up the Railways, cutting telegraph lines, calling army to come out, non-payment of taxes and setting up a parallel Government. If Gandhiji is left free, he will direct the movement stage by stage. If he is arrested, it should be treated as a declaration of war by the Government against the Congress. He will also resort to fasting in the jail. If the people carry out his programme and refuse to tolerate the British power in India, he may break his fast." The Congress leaders were, thus, found decided to launch a movement as per Gandhi's plan, but they themselves had neither any definite idea about the nature of the coming struggle nor any plan of actions.

The socialists, on the contrary, tried to avail of this new opportunity and proposed to drive the British out of India "by all possible means" conforming, however, to "Ahimsa according to Gandhi's advice." Although Gandhi described the
movement as an open rebellion, the socialists proposed to channelise the movement towards a full-fledged revolution. They were aware that "revolution is a gamble. If they win it, they are worshipped as heroes, if they lose it, they are ridiculed by friends and foes alike." The socialists were also conscious about the irrational forces that were out to help the enemy, and that the movement had been launched with little preparation. In spite of that the revolutionaries could not but depend upon the chance factor. The anti-British attitude of the people and the acceptance of their leadership by "a shrewd general [Gandhi] who knew the very pulse of the people and how to use it", had been correctly taken by the socialists to be a great opportunity.

The socialists tried to educate the revolutionaries in three basic things of revolution, namely, knowing the people with whom they were going to work, knowing the environment in which they were going to work, and building the organization which was going to work, in order to bring about the revolution. In explaining these three things Yusuf Meherally said: "In order to know the people, he [the revolutionary] must know their psychology, what things were appealing to them and what were not. Secondly, he must judge the environments from two points of view, viz. what people were in favour of the revolution, who may be turned into revolutionaries and what people were capable of plunging into a revolution being impelled with sentiments. What people were going to remain neutral? Which people were likely to create trouble being irrational? Then secondly, he must know the lay of the land. He must have maps and plans and must have made
tour of the province or district or place in which he has to work. He must have well studied the forces of the enemy and should have contact with them, but here it is better to have some of our spies working in the fold of the enemy. Again, he must know what people in the fold carry a soft corner in their heart and are likely to become our fifth column. The workers must have such people in Civic Guards, in the Police, in the army, in the various factories and stores of the army, in the Railway, in the Ports, in the Post and other offices.

The short-course training in revolution by the socialists was very timely. They correctly felt that the conservative leaders' propaganda enthused the people, but could not drive them to a definite direction. Moreover, it was necessary to expose C. Rajagopalachari and the communists, who not only had a soft corner for the British but were trying also to stab the movement in the back. Hence the training scheme was geared to educate people in the norms and conditions of revolution. The revolutionaries were directed not to take the old Congressmen into confidence and even warned against consulting Gandhi in every detail, lest he might disapprove of specific moves.

The socialists rightly understood that the British rule is based on the military organised on the best scheme of Defence and on the swift means of communications, and hence the British rule could be weakened only by striking at its military root. It was for this reason that the disruption of military communications was given top priority in their plan of action. The British
military was divided into four divisions with Quetta as the
headquarters of the Western Division, Nainital for the Eastern
Division, Rawalpindi for the Northern Division and Poona for the
Southern Division. Each division had sub-divisional stations at
a distance of every hundred miles. Socialists planned to cut
off communications between the divisional headquarters and their
sub-divisional stations. Successful operation in this field
would completely frustrate the scheme of defence. But that
operation needed a widespread movement and organisation among
the workers. They were to be taught in the elementary principles
of communications so that when they struck they might switch off
the whole system. It was not necessary to call the Indians to
leave their services as proposed by Gandhi, because if the
socialist plan could be properly put into operation, they would
be induced to join hands with the revolutionaries. The
socialists were preparing for a revolution, it should be
clarified that this was not a class revolution, but national
revolution. In national revolution " ...... a people overthrows
a government it regards as alien. This kind of revolution is the
culmination of a movement for independence."

But despite the endeavours of Gandhi and preparations
of the socialists, things did not sail smoothly. The Communist
Party of India and C. Rajagopalachari left no stone unturned to
thwart the move. So, no narration of the '42 Movement can be
complete without a reference to the role played by the CPI and
C. Rajagopalachari respectively.
Being terrorised by Hitler's aggressive foreign policy, Soviet Russia concluded the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact in August, 1939. The Pact was concluded for ten years, provided that, if either Germany or Russia became the object of belligerent action by a third power, the other High-Contracting party shall in no manner lend its support to this third power. There was a secret clause providing for the partition of Poland between the two. But the initial victory of Germany against Britain and France enamoured Hitler so much that he ignored the non-aggression pact with Soviet Russia and attacked her in June, 1941. Soviet Russia then had no other alternative but to join the Allied Powers for her own safety.

When Soviet Russia joined the Allies in the Second World War the Indian communists performed a volte-face. The war which was so long an imperialist war was over-night turned into a peoples' war. But till the Japanese invasion became imminent, there was a lull in their propaganda activities. They considered it damaging to their party to issue the heavy spate of literature prepared in justification of their pro-war policy. The menace of Japanese invasion re-invigorated the Central Committee of the Communist Party and a steady revival of activities in the communist circle was marked. They had prepared a plan of action, which was, however, guided by the principle; "We co-operate where we can, we resist where it is demanded by the peoples' interest." The government was denounced as incapable of rousing popular enthusiasm for war and sufficiently increasing industrial output to meet the needs of defence. Party
members were strongly encouraged to join the Congress Volunteer organisation so that they might strengthen the demand for the arming of the people for local defence. The ultimate motive was to administer a coup de grace to the government at the end of the war. As regards army recruitment the communist plan was: "We will send our members, sympathisers and supporters into the different branches of the fighting forces and specially train them so that they may inspire even the mercenaries recruited by the imperialist government with the peoples' war spirit. We will champion the cause of the soldiers, we will expose their grievances, racial discrimination, high-handed treatment by officers, lack of elementary cultural rights, and win public support for soldiers' demands and thus endeavour to create the atmosphere for real National Army." Fraternal meetings between the soldiers and people particularly of the villages were sought to be organised so that the people might feel the army as their own and greet the soldiers as "soldiers of freedom". In this effort the communists wanted to get the Congress socialists with them, but received a very cold response from the latter. They, however, succeeded in consolidating their own ranks and fellow-travellers by exploiting the feeling of frustration reigning all over the country. The section of the Party members, who doubted the soundness of the pro-war policy, was "..... now persuaded that it [the changed policy] is best calculated to serve the present interests of the Party and that after the war British Imperialism is certain
to be swept away in the tide of world-wide revolution led by the Soviet Union, in which the Communist Party of India will play a worthy part." But "the general public, and even those sections of the people to whom the communists directly appeal, namely the workers and peasants, remain largely unaffected by the call for support for the war, and the Communist Party of India has so far failed to make an impression on those who, for political or other reasons, are reluctant to help the war effort."

The communists, however, got an ally in a person who was so long a bitter critic of the communists. It was C. Rajagopalachari. It has been already mentioned that he could not push through his considered views in the Congress circle. He, therefore, joined the open market to sell his views and developed a cartel with the communists. Communists, however, do not generally make dealings in the open market, but this time, their position being very delicate, they had to open a joint account with C. Rajagopalachari. C. Rajagopalachari's dissociation from the Congress helped him to earn good will of the government. Because of their pro-war policy the CPI was legalised on July 23, 1942, though the Intelligence Department had doubts about the honest application of their policy, but some of the communist leaders were still either in jail or underground. C. Rajagopalachari came forward to negotiate with the government for their release. Some of them were members of the AICC; so if they were set free, they would surely oppose the "Quit India" resolution at the AICC meeting to be held on August 7 in accordance with
their party's changed policy. C. Rajagopalachari wrote to R.M. Maxwell, Home Member of Council, on August 1: "..... may I request that, Chitale, who is in Nasik Jail, and who is a member of the All India Congress Committee, may be released in time? He would be a source of strength to his Party [Communist Party] at the discussion on 7th August." He also got warrants against E.M.S. Nambudiripad, P. Sundarayya and others cancelled by pleading that: "Their being underground prevents a lot of good work which may otherwise be done." He tried his best to get S.V. Ghate and other trade unionist detainees released for he felt that "..... their association with labour will be added strength to the movement for national defence." The government was unwilling to release Ghate for he had been "regarded as one of the more dangerous communists", but R.M. Maxwell was ready to reconsider his case if C. Rajagopalachari was "..... satisfied that the release of Ghate at an early date would serve a really useful purpose." C. Rajagopalachari in reply enclosed to R.M. Maxwell a letter written by S.V. Ghate to him which assured that "..... my activities in future, as in the past, will be guided by the line and policy laid down by my Party." But R.M. Maxwell received the letter "on 6.8. --- not in time to consider before AICC meeting." However, a secret express note was issued by the Home Department of the Government of India to all provincial governments: "If any Communist members of All India Congress Committee are still in custody and would be likely to oppose Congress Working Committee Resolution, if enabled to attend the meeting, it is suggested
that Provincial Governments should consider desirability of 
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everly release."

But all these efforts were futile. The "Quit India" 
resolution was overwhelmingly adopted on August 8. Gandhi, 
however, did not want to start the movement, immediately, for he 
desired to wait upon the Viceroy and plead with him for the 
acceptance of the Congress demand. Although the British was 
asked to quit India, the "resolution is not a threat". 
Jawaharlal Nehru, while winding up the debate on the resolution, 
clarified: "It is an invitation. It is an explanation; it is 
an offer of co-operation. It is all that." Jawaharlal Nehru, 
of course, cautioned: " ...... still, behind it, there is a 
clear indication that certain consequences will follow if 
certain events do not happen. It is an offer of co-operation of 
a free India. On any other terms there will be no co-operation. 
On any other terms, our resolution promises only conflict and 
struggle."

August 9 dawned with a different doom. All the members 
of the Working Committee and leaders of different ranks were put 
under arrest to befoul Gandhi-in-Congress. Gandhi might have 
unlimited faith in man, but that part of humanity which was 
ruling India did not have the corresponding faith in Gandhi. The 
government machinery did not sit idle when the Congress leaders 
were campaigning for the impending struggle after the Working 
Committee meeting of July 14. The intervening period between
July 14 and August 8 was utilised by the government for the preparation of mass round up and in this regard their planning was full proof. While Yusuf Meherally was searching for persons to work as spies in the enemy fold, the Intelligence Department made full collection of his secret speeches and watched his activities: "He/7Meherally_7 had a great sanction of authority behind him as a Mayor of Bombay and was thinking of exerting that right by arresting all the white officers under him on the ground that they had arranged to run away from India." The official finding undoubtedly suffered from exaggeration, but this could be naturally expected of an imperialist power which was out to damage the prestige of the national organisation fighting for national liberation. Apparently the government's concern was the defence of India and the protection of "..... the loyal and responsible elements who form the vast majority of the people of India ..... engaged in the present struggle _the war_ for human freedom." But actually the government's actions were designed to safeguard British rule in India. The British attitude was made amply clear by Leopold Amery in course of his reply to a full-dress debate on India in the House of Commons on October 8: "We are not quitting India under any one's orders. It is we who wish India to go forward with our good will to build her future under her own leadership." Even that leadership was to be determined by the British Government. Because the government offered that after the war was over all parties _and not only a single party _meaning thereby the
Congress would meet to consider freely the form of government that might suit India. To this Gandhi gave a very pungent reply: "Has this offer any reality about it? All Parties have not agreed now. Will it be any more possible after the war? Moreover, Parties grow up like mushrooms, for without proving their representative character, the Government will welcome them as they have done and if they, the parties, oppose the Congress and its activities, though they may do lip homage to independence, frustration is inherent in the Government offer. Hence the logical cry of withdrawal first."

However, the indiscriminate arrest followed by ruthless oppression could not suppress people's zeal. Because the treatment of the British had brought the situation into such an impasse that people, though surprised by unprovoked arrest, did not fail to move in right earnest. "The characteristic thing about the 1942 struggle was that it was no "reaction" to a British move. It was positive in that it refused to be moderated or accentuated according to the announcement of policy by the British. .... It was only in 1942 that the Indian people realized the difference between demanding limited freedom within an enclave of dependence and acting so that Sovereignty could be wrested and established. In the former kind of agitation, patriotic policy would always depend upon what imperial policy wanted to be, for the former was either provoked or appeased by the latter. In the second pattern of anti-imperialism the patriotic Indian has to think and act as part of a Sovereign People whose decision are their own."
But the government in its eagerness to crush the movement with its military power failed to feel the pulse of the nation. They let loose an unparalleled reign of terror over the country, and yet they could not silence the people. Events that followed British action was perhaps beyond the imagination of the British rulers. The leadership was also put to an acid test. A new leadership emerged not only to save, but also to enhance the prestige of the Indian National Congress. The mass arrest made it a duty for the congressmen, particularly the socialists who could escape arrest, to continue the movement. But it was not possible to pursue the rebellious activities openly in terms of Gandhi's prescription. Socialists, therefore, felt it wise to work underground in order to keep the fire burning. It should be noted that they did not go underground out of despair. They pointed out, as the '42 upheaval was not merely a pressure movement like the former ones, but a positive movement to bring an end to foreign domination, the fighters were not to bother unnecessarily about the method of struggle but about the ultimate object. Relentless non-co-operation was the object. It might express itself in various ways: "from slowdown of production to open withdrawal of co-operation" with the object of compelling the occupying power to "...... feel at every turn, and in every breath, the scalding hostility of the people. The underground", therefore, "becomes the symbol of people's unyielding defiance." Its prime task was "to cease to be the underground, to emerge as the de jure sovereign authority." In this connection, it may be pointed out that the socialist's
underground offensive was designed purely for the final struggle. It did not form a part of their regular activities as it was with the communists and Royists.

The movement gained its own momentum. Within a couple of days the whole country was paralysed. Reports of strike, dislocation of communications, cutting of telegraph and telephone wires reached New Delhi from different places. This time the labourers played a magnificent role. The Bombay mills remained closed for about a week. Production was worst hit in Ahmedabad mills where workers did not work for more than three months. Strikes in Gujarat and Bihar spread like fire. Throughout the country schools were empty and colleges abandoned. The students played a very active part. Factories and mills in different parts of India including Madras, Baroda, Jamshedpur and Delhi, remained closed for varying periods. Women also did not lag behind. Matangini Hazra of Midnapur in Bengal, aged 73, firmly held the national flag high even when she fell victim to a British bullet in a marching procession. In Tamluk of Bengal, Bhagalpur in Bihar, Ballia in U.P., Satara in Maharashtra, people established "Swaraj Government", paralysing the entire administration by keeping the officers captive. Police, below the rank of sub-Inspector, by and large took part in the movement. Their participation was largest in Bihar.

People proved that it "was not the rebellion of an active minority as in France and Russia, but the spontaneous upsurge of a whole people." It was a Herculean task to coordinate the movements throughout the country. Pamphlet and
leaflets were widely circulated by the underground workers, yet their circulation was limited. The necessity of a transmitter was earnestly felt. Some groups were trying hard to start broadcasting with little success; it was chiefly due to Rammanohar Lohia's able coordination that the Congress Radio started functioning at last. Babubhai Khakhar, Vithalbhai K. Jheveri and Usha Mehta worked together to transmit news and broadcast speeches from the "Congress Radio calling on 42.34 Metres from somewhere in India." The speeches were used to clarify and explain the Congress stand from national as well as international points of view. The speeches were chiefly delivered by Rammanohar Lohia and occasionally by Achyut Patwardhan. "The Congress Radio was not only in name. It had its own transmitter, transmitting station, recording station, its own call sign and, last but not the least, a distinct wavelength."

The movement was "decentralised, individualistic, anarchical. Yet because it is a movement and not an involuntary explosion of pent up energy, it has a direction, and anarchy is deliberate and purposeful", observed Rammanohar Lohia while making frantic efforts to coordinate the movement and "set the direction, inform and animate the participants with the purpose". It was made quite clear that the object of setting up a machinery was strictly limited to the continuance of the struggle. It was called the "Freedom Struggle Front where every group, every party, every glass and section and every individual
can find a place to fill without losing their separate identities." Different sections of the population had been participating in the struggle. The constituents of the Front were to work amongst these sections like the peasants, spinners, labourers etc. and make them conscious about their economic grievances firstly through informal discussion and then through meetings, "all the while attempting to relate the immediate problems to wider and bigger issues in simple, understandable terms." Works were destined to be intensive amongst the peasants, since peasantry would form the bulk of the Indian population. Confrontation with the authority was sought to be avoided at the initial stage. As soon as the discontent would crystallise to some extent, "orderly but confident procession should be organised, for its collective representation before the local authorities. On their failure to redress, which is inevitable, the more extreme and militant spokesmen of the peasants should be helped to take the lead and prepare the man for direct action; by organised and orderly seizure of stocks of essential goods; by refraining from payment of rents and debts; by refusing to part with crops; by ignoring court processes for distraint and refusing to attend or bid at sales; by taking possession of the machinery of local administration, such as Union Boards, Chowkies, Thanas and running it themselves." If the developments could be fairly synchronised in different parts of the country from the centre, "the forces of the state will be helpless to check this progress, the disturbances will be too widespread and scattered." The police and military forces might rush to certain places of disturbances, but by
constantly cutting off their communications and frustrating their food supplies, they would be rendered immobile. Suffering of the villagers might be very great but success in one place would be followed by the onset of the same process in other places and thus bringing a total collapse of the British administration. Success in paralysing the British rule in villages would make the task of the industrial labourers easier. They, being more organised, would easily be able to launch an economic battle against the British by resorting to ceaseless strikes and similar other techniques of struggle. The other sections of people would work for running the propaganda and raising funds, which would virtually stem the movement.

Rammanohar Lohia was a master planner, but the underground workers lacked that organisation which might effectively rope in the whole movement and implement the plan of actions. But it cannot be said that the attempts had gone in vain. Although the government tried to describe the '42 rebellion as a movement of the educated middle class Hindus, their reports on trouble had shown that every section of the populace took part in the movement and the peasantry had a notable share. And in almost every report, whether from Central Province, Bombay, Bihar, U.P. or Orissa, the Congress socialists had been described as the trouble makers. W.H. Lewis, the Governor of Orissa wrote to Lord Linlithgow:

"..... We have been confronted with lawlessness in Balasore of a rather different type on the
borders of the Nilgiri State. ..... This has some aspects of a peasants revolt. Local leaders are frequently of the village type, but as always in such cases instigation comes from outside and these outbreaks here are in some instances rather more closely connected with Kisan movements and the leadership given from behind the scenes may probably be the Congress Socialist group. I have seen a recent report from the Central Intelligence Officer that outbreaks in the States and Orissa are in his belief due primarily to the Congress Socialists and not directly to the Congress High Command or Mr. Gandhi. ..... It may well be that in localities where they are organized the Congress Socialists may have set the pace. ....."

Report from Central Province reads:

"Behind all these widespread movement there was a group of active revolutionaries belonging to the extreme "left" wing of the Congress, i.e., Congress Socialist Party and Forward Bloc, and such organisations as the Hindusthan Red Army. These revolutionaries, working singly or in groups, were very active in inciting the populace and in giving publicity to the Congress programme of destruction of government buildings, sabotage and other methods of paralysing Government."
More or less the same thing had been reported by different provincial governments. The freedom fighters continued their work against heavy odds. They included ruthless police and military atrocities in particular. They ran after the underground workers like hungry wolves and on November 12, 1942 they could unearth the underground broadcasting centre. But Rammanohar Lohia, Aruna Asaf Ali, Achyut Ratwardhan could not be arrested; Jayaprakash Narayan, who scaled the walls of Hazaribagh jail in September, 1942, could also not be trapped.

However, during the end of 1942 the wave of the movement started receding. It was not that the people yielded to police and military repressions or were bewildered by constant communist propaganda like "..... the fascist agents have entered the Indian freedom movement and the foremost task is to hound them out of it." People had to repose in inaction, because the leaders failed to continue to ignite their imagination. People had pinned their faith on Gandhi's call, fought tooth and nail and suffered at the hands of their foreign masters for four months; but left uncoordinated, they could not be expected to fight long. The leaders, who had gone underground, had their natural limitations. Consequently, people became inactive. "Three factors were responsible for the initial retreat of the revolution: (i) lack of an organization to lead the resurgent masses; (ii) absence of a full programme of the revolution; and (iii) failure of all parts of the country to rise together."
Under these circumstances, Jayaprakash Narayan felt that the first phase of non-violent mass action being over, it was not possible to repeat that course once again, at least in the near future. He, therefore, declared: "..... I have no hesitation in admitting that non-violence of the brave, if practised on a sufficiently large scale, would make violence unnecessary, but where such non-violence is absent, I should not allow cowardice, clothed in Shastric subtleties to block the development of the revolution and lead to its failure." Moreover, violence was in no way contrary to the Congress policy because the Bombay resolution itself announced to fight out aggression by arms if the country became independent. "Well, we have declared ourselves independent, and also named Britain as an aggressive power," said Jayaprakash Narayan, "I feel that I should be completely justified as an honest Congressman, without in any manner intruding my socialism upon the question, in repelling the British aggression with arms."

Jayaprakash Narayan planned to hit the enemy by small bands of trained fighters called Azad Dasta. They should work in every district as "A BAND OF SHOCK TROOPERS, A SORT OF ADVANCED GUARD, WHO SHOULD POSSESS THE PROPER TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL TRAINING, AND WHO SHOULD, IN THE MANNER OF GUERILLAS, WAGE CEASELESS WAR AGAINST THE ENEMY". Although Jayaprakash Narayan referred only to the part played by the guerillas in European warfare and liberating some parts of Europe, India also did not lag behind to record the glorious role of guerillas led
by Shivaji. However, in modern times it was Jayaprakash Narayan who for the first time initiated guerilla warfare in India. The chief advantage of Azad Dasta was its decentralised functioning, and this democratically organised but martially loyal... unit functioned almost without fire-arms. Since the freedom fighters were not engaged in conspiratorial activities, and since killing and terrorism did not form any part of the programme of guerilla warfare possession of arms was inessential except as means of self-defence for the Azads. The guerilla bands were financed by their operation on the "enemy" treasures and "in the matter of goods and clothing, guerillas have always been known to obtain their requirements from the people aiming whom they operated. The very basis of the operation of guerilla bands is that such support should be generally available to our Dastas." The Azad Dastas had to carry on three-fold activities: (1) Dislocation of the chief means of communication such as telephone and telegraph lines and installations; railways; roads and highways; postal services; broadcasting and wireless telegraphy. (2) Depriving government treasuries etc. of monies by looting of mailbags; looting of post offices and railway stations; looting of railway trains carrying government money; looting of revenue collections before they reach headquarters; looting of government grainshops and other government stores. (3) Raid on centres of enemy authority like police stations for disarming and destruction of records; raid on chowkies, patwari's office, registration office, chungi office and other small and not-too-well guarded offices and destruction of the records contained therein and other properties, where possible.
Although Jayaprakash Narayan found little time to implement the scheme in full, yet within the short period of its working Azad Dasta achieved a notable success. "Looting of mailbags has been found very successful in Karnataka and parts of Gujarat. In Karnataka a number of railway stations have also been burnt down by dislocation bands. In Gujarat in the Broach District two police stations were raided by trained bands, and disarmed and records were burnt. In the second raid only 27 guerillas, whom we shall call Azads, took part." The activities had been significant in Bihar-Nepal border. The Government of Nepal gave refuge to some peasants from the district of Darbhanga in Bihar, who had been inflicted much pain by the British for their participation in the first round of struggle. The Nepal Government gave them not only shelter, but also cultivable lands free of rent for three years and initial capital for cultivation. The Nepal Government had to risk the British intimidation for this, but the Nepalese who are renowned for their bravery and are armed too, did so unhesitatingly. This political condition as also the topography of the area greatly helped the guerilla activities. Two persons namely Shyamnandan Sinha and Suryanarayan Sinha conducted the guerilla activities in the Bihar-Nepal border. The family of Shyamnandan Sinha settled in Nepal. This greatly helped the Bihar leaders to undertake operations in Bihar and escape in Nepal. Azad Dasta was organised also in Nepal. This group snatched Jayaprakash Narayan and Rammonohar Lohia away from the British when they were arrested by the British police on the Bihar-Nepal border. But as the guerilla warfare was one of
the many means of paralysing the British Government even at that stage, so it was rather difficult to ascertain which troubles were caused by guerilla activities and which were due to other sporadic activities.

Jayaprakash Narayan was not merely engaged in internal struggle. He recognised the importance of the Shonan Government /Singapore/ established by Subhas Chandra Bose, and his National Army. But he maintained that even "if the Japanese defeat the British in India, they would not quietly hand over India to us — whatever might be the understanding between Tojo and Subhas." What was needed was to be internally ready to seize power in the event of an Axis-Allied clash in India and only then "can outside help, such as Subhas' National Army be of value to us and Tojo be prevented from annexing India." Jayaprakash Narayan, therefore, made bold attempts to link up the freedom struggle inside India with the Azad Hind campaign of Subhas Chandra Bose, "Jayapralashji even made desperate attempts to contact Netaji by sending three messengers across the Assam borders."

The revolutionaries were not only engaged in striking activities, they had also to counter, and that also from the underground, the sinister moves taken by the communists, Muslim League and the so-called peace-makers who were keen to end the "deadlock".

As already stated, the communists entered into wedlock with the British in pursuance of their international policy. They
tried to take full advantage of this relation particularly when
the Congress was declared illegal and the Congressmen had gone
underground. In the columns of the 

Peoples' War they vehemently
attacked Gandhi's "suicidal" policy of disrupting the nation
and also warned the people against the socialists who had been
fighting the Tojo and Subhas' war in India. At the same time,
they did not fail to launch a "unity campaign" and demand the
formation of a National Government. But that these demands
were mere pretentions for bringing the people to their fold in
order to utilise them for war efforts by exploiting their senti­
ment is revealed from the report of: an interview between R.M.
Maxwell and P.C. Joshi, the Secretary of the Communist Party of
India: "Joshi is concentrating on the appeal to patriotism.
He wishes people to believe that they are fighting for freedom.
Having inculcated this idea he asks, will sabotage or strikes
help you gain freedom? He points out that only India can
suffer from such things and finds this line of appeal effective
in conversation with youngmen whom he gets to listen to him. The
demand for National Government voiced by the "Peoples' War" is
intended to appeal to this sentiment. So also the 'unity
campaign' is based on it." But "Joshi was evidently confident
that if National Government become a fact the Communists would
dominate it with the aid of non-Gandhi elements, among which he
includes Nehru, and in fact he expected Gandhi to take a back
seat." They boasted of the support of non-Gandhi groups,
but here also they failed to bag the support of at least two
very important non-Gandhi groups, the Congress Socialist Party
and the Forward Bloc. Jayaprakash Narayan, however, made the socialist position clear on the communist demand for National Government. He also vindicated the Congress position. Jayaprakash Narayan said: "A national government by all means. But the most amusing thing is that while Congress fights for such a government and suffers, others merely talk. If a national government is not the same thing as coalition ministries under the Act of 1935 or a glorified Viceroy's Council, it cannot be won by holding conferences. The Congress left the futile path years ago and if communists expect to establish such a government by petitioning to their imperial master, they are welcome to their toading. But they will achieve nothing but the ridicule of the people and the contempt of their pay-masters."

Besides the communist demand for National Government another move was on foot. Leaders like Tej Bahadur Sapru, M.A. Jayakar, C. Rajagopalachari and others were out to end the "deadlock". Life of the people in their political and economic walks were shattered by the ruthless oppression and the famine created by the alien government. These leaders met in a conference in April, 1943 and decided to impress upon the Viceroy through a deputation from the Conference that the Viceroy should come forward to an early settlement of the Indian problem. Lord Linlithgow was, however, in no mood to consider their appeal: "so long as Mr. Gandhi and the Congress did not dissociate themselves from the resolution of last August, and also repudiate the violence for which the Congress was held responsible by the Government." But the leaders were undaunted. They issued an
apologetic statement for the Congress Resolution of August 8, 1942 and condemned the acts of violence and sabotage that followed the arrest of Gandhi and other Congress leaders. Socialists sensed sinister motive in this move for compromise. Achyut Patwardhan addressed a letter to the editors of the national press seeking their co-operation for creating opinion against this move: "... I have to request you to safeguard the interest of Indian freedom, as guardians of public opinion and spokesman of Rebel India, in jails and underground. .... I have to request you to demand that any settlement must be judged mainly in terms of the Congress. Let no one start deciding in advance what Congress should do about the terms of the settlement. All this may appear premature and actually no such peace offer may be mooted. It is another matter, and personally I see no reason to regret it. Britain will have to bend, or else she will break." As a matter of fact, nothing new did happen so that the Congress might extend its hands for compromise with the British. Jayaprakash Narayan ruled out the possibility of compromise and said: "A compromise implies give and take on either side. Now, the least gains on the side of the Congress can be the release of all those imprisoned in connection with the national struggle and restoration of the status of "legality" to the Congress and its ancilliary bodies. The least that Britain can gain is removal of the terrible strain that British administration has to bear due to the continuance of the struggle. It is my conviction that in this sort of a compromise British stands to gain everything and the Congress to lose much."
To Jinnah the socialist reply was that, in spite of his repeated tirades, Gandhi could not give him Pakistan, simply because he did not have it in his pocket. It was the British Government which could give him Pakistan, but he was to fight for that. Jinnah could not obtain it merely by issuing statements, sitting in an ivory tower.

But the underground leaders found little time to carry on activities as they planned. Jayaprakash Narayan was re-arrested in September, 1943 at Amritsar while travelling in the Frontier Mail. With the re-arresting of Jayaprakash Narayan the underground work came to be confined into sporadic dislocations of railway service. The government, however, could not arrest Rammonohar Lohia before May, 1944. He was the last leader to be arrested. But Aruna Asaf Ali and Achyut Patwardhan eluded the British till the end. While underground Achyut Patwardhan had recanted much of his former beliefs against his will on Gandhi's request; but he remained unconvinced that going underground was a sin. But Gandhi could not inspire him to surrender to the police. Aruna Asaf Ali, however, could not be convinced to recant inspite of her serious illness. She came out only when the warrant against her was cancelled in 1946.

The revolutionary phase of the socialist movement thus came to an end. Jayaprakash Narayan, however, did not give up the idea of guerilla warfare even after coming out of jail in 1946. He felt that one more struggle might be necessary to win independence and for that workers needed a thorough training. So he
organised a guerilla training centre at Khagaul at the south of Danapore station with the name Gandhi Ashram. This was a secret organisation strictly separated from the Party. Besides Jayaprakash Narayan Gangasaran Sinha was the only other member of the CSP to be associated with the Gandhi Ashram. This organisation was liquidated with the transfer of power.

The '42 revolution could not be successful for its inherent limitations which have already been mentioned. But it does not mean that the upheaval was fruitless. The revolutionary upsurge was crushed; still it weakened the power of the alien government. Their lies the significance of this apparently unsuccessful national revolution.
NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Gandhi's speech in Hindusthani on August 7, 1942 at the AICC meeting - quoted in Mahatma, Vol. VI, by D. G. Tandulkar, pp. 199-200 / Vithalbhai K. Jhaveri & D.G. Tandulkar, 64, Walkeshwar Road, Bombay-6, 1953/7.

2. Gandhi: His Life And Thought by J.B. Kripalani, p. 197.

3. A summary of the draft literally translated into English from Hindusthani in Gandhi: His Life And Thought by J.B. Kripalani, pp. 198-200 - Appendix III for the full draft.

4. Documents relating to the proceedings of the Working Committee meeting between 27.4.42 and 1.5.42, were seized by the Police from the Congress headquarters in Allahabad and were given to the press by the Home Department - Hindusthan Standard, Calcutta, August 5, 1942.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Summary of the text. This draft was ultimately adopted and was taken to the AICC Meeting. It was passed there on 2.5.42. It has been quoted in Modern Review, June 1942, p. 499. See Appendix III for the full text.


10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.
14. C. Rajagopalachari addressed and presided over a small meeting of his old supporters in the Madras Legislature on April 23, 1942 and carried two resolutions for the submission to the AICC. The first one recommended the acceptance of Pakistan in principle as a basis of settlement between the Congress and the Muslim League, and the second one proposed the restoration of a responsible government in Madras. The basic reason behind the move had also been explained in the resolution itself which asserted that "to sacrifice the chances of the formation of a national government for a doubtful advantage of maintaining a controversy over the unity of India is the most unwise policy and that it has become necessary to choose the lesser evil." The members supporting the resolution were obsessed by the idea of Japanese invasion - ref. Mahatma, Vol.VI by D.G. Tendulkar, p. 96.

15. Proceedings of the Working Committee meeting between 27.4.42 and 1.5.42 - Hindusthan Standard, August 5, 1942.


22. Gandhi: His Life and Thought by J.B.Kripalani, p.201, f.n.


27. Ibid.


30. Ibid., pp. 72-73.

31. Ibid., p. 73.

32. Ibid., p. 73.

33. Ibid., p. 73.

34. Ibid., p. 74.

35. Ibid., p. 74.

36. Ibid., p. 83.

37. Ibid., p. 63.
38. Ibid., p.63.
42. Gandhi : His Life And Thought by J.B. Kripalani, p. 201.
44. Ref. Appendix III \textit{The Nehru draft which was ultimately accepted by the AICC}.7
45. Feroz Chand made this observation in a private interview with the author in 1973.
47. Ref. Appendix III \textit{Gandhi draft}.
50. Resolution published in \textit{Advance}, July 15, 1942 – for the full text see Appendix V.
51. Ibid.
53. \textit{Advance}, July 15, 1942.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid., July 16, 1942.
56. Vide Chapter VI, p.260.


60. Jawaharlal Nehru spoke at a propaganda meeting held under the auspices of Bombay Provincial Congress Committee, at Nare Park, Parel, on August 5, 1942 - Intelligence Summary of the Commissioner of Police for the week ending August 8, 1942 - ref. Government of India, Home Dept. File - F.N. 3/31/42 - Poll (I), 1942.


62. Ibid.

63. Achyut Patwardhan spoke at a public meeting held under the auspices of Bombay Provincial Congress Committee on the maidan opposite Phoenix Mill, Ferguson Road, Bombay on August 6, 1942 - Intelligence Summary of the Commissioner...


66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.


71. Ibid.


74. Ibid.


77. Ibid.


79. Ibid.


81. Ibid.


83. C. Rajagopalachari - R.M. Maxwell Correspondence - ref. Government of India, Home Dept. File - F.N. 7/15/42-Poll. (I), 1942 - the text of the correspondence as have been available in the Government file is given in Appendix IV.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.


96. Hindusthan Standard, August 9, 1942.
91. Quoted in Modern Review, September, 1942, p. 204.
92. Ibid., p. 204.
93. Ibid., p. 204.
96. Reuter's summary of the broadcast to America by Leopold Amery, Secretary of State for India on August 10, 1942 - quoted in Modern Review, September, 1942, p. 199.
101. The Socialist method of fighting in the '42 Movement was justified later in the article "The Underground" by Asoka Mehta in Janata, February 10, 1946, p. 3.


103. It is needless to make a lengthy narration of events which were evidently numerous. The details may be had in the Government of India, Home Dept. Files - F.N. 3/31/42-Poll. (I), 1942, 3/34/42-Poll.(I), 1942, 3/49/42-Poll.(I), 1942 and 3/79/42-Poll (I), 1942.


106. "The Freedom Struggle Front", a plan of actions which had been described by the Intelligence Bureau, Home Dept. as "a typical Congress-Socialist production and may 'well be the work of Ram Monohar Lohia," — ref. Government of India, Home Dept. File - F.N. 3/83/42, Poll.(I), 1942 — for the full text see Appendix VI.

107. Ibid.


112. Ref. Peoples' War, October 11, 1942, quoted in Nation Betrayed. — A case against Communists. Their own evidence by Dr. A.G. Tendulkar, p.13. Dr. Tendulkar writes in the Preface -- "Every word of the text is from them Peoples' War. Some headlines have been written afresh for the sole purpose of giving a succinct picture but every word and phrase and even in the headlines is from the original Peoples' war text." Padma Publications Ltd., Bombay, 1945.


114. The first letter written from somewhere in India, December, 1942 in To All Fighters for Freedom by Jayaprakash Narayan, p.10 Sind Congress Socialist Group.

115. Ref. Quit India Resolution in Appendix V.


117. A.B.C. of Dislocation in Appendix VII.
118. Ref. The first letter written from somewhere in India, December, 1942 in To All Fighters for Freedom by Jayaprakash Narayan, p. 10.

119. A.B.C. of Dislocation in Appendix VII.

120. Ibid.

121. Ibid.

122. Ibid.


125. Ref. The second letter from somewhere in India, September 1, 1943 in To All Fighters for Freedom by Jayaprakash Narayan, pp. 35-36.


127. Quotations from the files of Peoples' War in Nation Betrayed. - A Case against Communists. Their own evidence by Dr. A.G. Tendulkar, pp. 1-21.


129. Ibid.
130. Ref. The second letter from somewhere in India, September 1, 1943 in "To All Fighters For Freedom" by Jayaprakash Narayan, pp. 29-30.


132. Ibid., June, 1943, p. 413.


135. Ibid., p. 33.

