CHAPTER FOUR
WAR WITH SHINDE IN THE NORTH. GENERAL LAKE'S CAMPAIGNING AND BATTLE ACCOUNTS
Strategy of General Lake

The grand strategy of Lord Wellesley envisaged a simultaneous advance against the combined forces of Shinde and Bhosle from the south and from the east. Earlier it has been discussed how General Wellesley defeated the Maratha forces in the battles of Asai and Gawilgarh. This chapter deals with the war waged by General Lake, the Commander-in-Chief in the north. General Lake was a man of experience and his influence with his soldiers was unbounded, his calmness in danger, self-reliance and power of command were his sterling qualities. He had but one way of dealing with the native armies. He moved straight forward and attacked them. His brain worked better when under fire but his decision taken under calm conditions were not always sound. Although a good field general, his planning was not always based on sound considerations. His bulldog tenacity which was displayed by him in the siege of Bharatpur cost him over 3000 casualties. A more intelligent general would have changed his tactics after the first failure. He rode hard and fought hard. "With a force at no time exceeding 8,000 men, he, between 29th August, and 1st November, 1803 destroyed the thirtyone battalions which the French had trained and disciplined for the service of India; a strong fortress, captured Agra, and entered as a conquerer the imperial city of Delhi, captured 426 pieces of cannons, and defeated the enemy in four pitched battles, the last of them, for the result it produced one of the most decisive battles ever fought."
"The campaign in Hindustan was contemporaneous with that of the Deccan and it must, of course, be remembered that, in concluding the Treaty of Surajj Anjangaon, Wellesley was harvesting the fruits not only of his own victories, but those of Lake in Northern India."²

In one sense the campaign in the north was directed less against Shinde than those great French adventurers who had raised a number of battalions and carved out principalities for themselves. De Boigne, Shinde's first military adviser had served Shinde with great loyalty and devotion and he guarded the Maratha interests by exercising his influence to maintain peace with the British, when he retired in 1796 he advised Shinde to disband the battalions rather than antagonise the British and risk a war with them. "He was," says Grant Duff, "a man of sense and prudence, a decided enemy to French revolutionary principles."³ He regarded the idea of conquest of India entertained by some Frenchmen as Chimerical. De Boigne was succeeded by Perron. "Though an able commander he was altogether a smaller man than his predecessor, and far less attractive in character."⁴ As Shinde was away in the Deccan for a long period, Perron strengthened his position and took over the administration and assumed the role of a reigning sovereign. He received tributes from the Rajput states of Jodhpur and Jaipur. He had the monopoly of salt and custom duties in Hindustan. He coined money and his annual income was estimated at 1,632,000. As a contemporary writer says,
"Mr. Perron exercised an efficient and scarcely disguised sovereignty over a tract of country, perhaps, the fairest in Hindustan, he possessed the important fortress of Agra, imperial Delhi, and the person of the great Moghal. He occupied the richest province of the Doab. He had established cantonments for twenty thousand men and constructed a very strong fortress at Aligud."

However Shinde himself was not likely to tolerate much longer his ascendancy to power, and Perron was looking for a French purchaser who would buy his Kingdom. Lord Wellesley foresaw at the beginning of the war that Perron was disinclined to cross swords with the British and was looking for an opportunity to escape to Europe with his accumulated wealth. Wellesley writes to Lake "I should not be surprised if he were to be found ready to enter into terms with your Excellency, provided he could attain sufficient security for his interests."

Lord Wellesley's appreciation of the political situation in January 1803 was that it was improbable that Shinde would create trouble. However in case he did, "our most effectual mode of controlling Scindiah must be irruption into his dominions in Hindostan, from the ceded provinces of Oude; and, in that case, the main and most critical effort must be made from the quarter where you are now present. The most important operations will be directed against Scindiah's possessions to the destruction of his powers in Hindostan."

With this clear objective, Wellesley informally discussed
his outline plan, defining the likely threats and the require-
ment of troops with General Lake who in turn gave his de-
tailed ideas about the way the military task assigned to him
could be carried out, not omitting the political moves which
should be made to facilitate his task. Lord Wellesley kept
the Secret Committee of Directors informed about the develop-
ments in the Deccan and in north India from time to time.

As Wellesley was aware that Shinde was trying to form a
coalition with Bhosle and Holkar, the plans kept this possi-
bility in mind. On 19th April 1803, Wellesley reported to the
Secret Committee, "Daulatrao Scindia (notwithstanding his
original application for the aid of the British Government in
restoring order to the Maratha empire) meditated an accommo-
dation with Deswant Rao Holkar, and a confederacy with that
chieftain, and with the Rajah of Berar, for the purpose of
frustrating the success of the arrangements concluded between
the British Government, and the Peshwa, without however in-
tending to desperate extremities of provoking a contest with
the British arms. 7 "This shows that Wellesley did not expect
a war even in April 1803. He was aware that Holkar possessed
40,000 cavalry, 30,000 infantry and 180 guns. A coalition
with Holkar would strengthen Scindia's position. He instructed
General Wellesley that "If Holkar should join the confederacy,
you will act towards him on the principles of the preceding
instructions. It is not desirable to erect Holkar's acciden-
tal power into an established state of India; his reduction
would certainly be the most advisable policy.” Later, Wellesley had to eat a humble pie and acknowledge Holkar as a chief.

He defined Lake’s task as follows:

“1st. To seize all his (Scindia’s) possessions between the Ganges and Jumna (Doab).

2nd. To take the person of the Moghul, Shah Alam under our protection.

3rd. To form alliances with the Rajpootts, and other inferior states beyond the Jumna, for the purpose of excluding Scindiah from the northern districts of Hindustan.

4th. To occupy Bundelkhand and thus strengthen the frontier of the Province of Benaras against Scindia or the Raja of Berar.

5th. The success of such a plan of operation would exclude the Marathas altogether from the northern parts of Hindustan, and would, establish a powerful barrier between our frontiers, and that of Scindiah by the intervention of the Rajpoott and other inferior states strengthened under our protection.”

Having thus clearly defined the objectives, the task was broken down in the following military aims:

1st. Immediate reduction of the forces under command of M. Perron.

2nd. Capture of fortresses and passes northwards of the Jumna, which would prevent reinforcements marching from the Deccan to Hindostan.
The force under K. Perron consisted of about 9000 infantry and an equal number of cavalry located at Coel. As said earlier, Wellesley expected K. Perron to quit Shinde's service and seek asylum with the British. Perron's force consisted of a larger number of Indian soldiers who were discharged by the company earlier. It was expected that they would be willing to quit Shinde's service and rejoin the Company's army if an opportunity was offered to them. Similarly, Wellesley appreciated that a large number of European officers also would walk over to the British side if their career was guaranteed; rather than fight against the British army. Thus Perron was not expected to offer a stiff resistance.

Disposition of Lake's army prior to the commencement of the operations was planned as follows: 10

1st. Main body was to be located between Coel and Agra. After the destruction of Perron's forces, the force was to march on to Delhi and secure the person of Shah Alam. The next objective was to be Agra which would be secured by a separate detachment located at Shekohabad.

2nd. A detachment located at Stawan was to secure Gwalior.

3rd. A force located at Allahabad was to occupy Bundelkhand.

The composition of the main body was to be.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cavalry--British</th>
<th>Infantry--British</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 light Dragoons</td>
<td>7th Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 light Dragoons</td>
<td>Indian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 light Dragoons</td>
<td>1/2 Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2/2 Regiment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued/...
Indian:

1st Native Cavalry
2nd Native Cavalry
3rd Native Cavalry
4th Native Cavalry

1/4 Regiment
2/4 Regiment
1/2 Regiment
2/12 Regiment
1/14 Regiment
2/14 Regiment
2/15 Regiment
1/15 Regiment

Artillery

Two sallopers (guns) with each regiment of cavalry
Two six pounders with each battalion

In addition twelve pounders, six pounders and howitzers which were integral to the organisation.

Allahabad Brigade

The force at Allahabad was to consist of

2/11 Regiment (with two pounders with each regiment)
1/13 Regiment
1/14 Regiment
2/13 Regiment

Artillery

Two twelve pounders
Two howitzers
Four six pounders

Rohilkhand brigade located at Amroha

6 Regiment Native cavalry
2/8 Regiment
2/9 Regiment
1/12 Regiment

Two six pounders with each regiment and four additional six pounders. Task was to threaten Jahanpur and Kumpur.
Detachment to cover Benares ex Singapore

Three troops & cavalry Regiment (British)
1/1 Regiment
1/6 Regiment
2/6 Regiment

Kanpur Garrison

Five companies 2/16 Regiment
1/17 Regiment
2/17 Regiment

Etawah Garrison

1/11 Regiment

Fatehpur Garrison

2/14 Regiment

Midnapore garrison with task to seize Cuttack from Ganjam after the rains.

One battalion
One company artillery

Summary of tasks

Lord Wellesley sums up the task in their order of priorities as follows: The first task was to defeat Perron and occupation of the whole of the Doab. The next task was to secure the passes from the south into North India. A force was to be detailed to occupy Calcutta. In the Deccan the task was to defeat Shinde and the Rajan of Berar and to detach or defeat Holkar and Amrutrao during the rainy season. If these objects were attained before the month of October, the Maratha power would be extinct.
Political Strategy

Lord Wellesley had planned the political strategy as follows: The first objective was to detach M. Perron and the European Officers from Shinde's army. Perron's troops who were ex British employees were to be encouraged to desert and join the Company's force. An understanding was to be arrived at with the Rana of Gohad and the Jat Chiefs of Bharatpore and Kumbher. The Rajput Chiefs of Jodhpur and Jaipur were to be won over and lastly the Chiefs of Bundelkhand were to be won over.12

On 5th July 1803 Wellesley gave orders to General Lake to execute immediately the general outlines of the plan of war against Shinde. The decision was arrived at because Wellesley had received a despatch from Colonel Collins who was in Daulatrao's camp that negotiations had broken down and war was unavoidable.13 Lake was told to capture Agra before October. Possession of Gwalior was essential as it would prevent Shinde from entering North India with his large cavalry forces.

The Rana of Gohad was befriended and given financial assistance, so that he could use his influence with the Jats and raise a force to oppose Shinde. With the British in possession of Gwalior fort, this task could be accomplished with ease. Ranjit Singh, the Jat Raja was already in possession of Bharatpur, Kumbher and Deer forts. If he could be persuaded to join the British, Shinde's power would be weakened. He was to be given an assurance that he will be allowed to
retain his hereditary tenures and given a free hand in running his kingdom, so that he would be willing to join the British.

The next objective was to wean away the Rajput chiefs of Jaipur and Jodhpur and enter into a subsidiary alliance with them, so that they would get protection from the depredations of the Marathas. The plan was thus to erect an insurmountable barrier to Shinde’s resumption of influence in the North. These kings would be able to raise a sizeable cavalry which could be augmented by British infantry and artillery.

The British were already in possession of Bundel Khand and Bhogil Khand, which were held as fiefs from the Peshwa for the expenses of subsidiary forces stationed in those provinces to guarantee internal security. These countries would effectively oppose any attempt by the Rajah of Berar to disturb the tranquility of those areas. As Shinde had located some predatory horse at Kalpee, force from the Allahabad garrison had to be detailed to prevent Perron being reinforced. Another precaution which was to be taken was to assemble a force at Amroha, which will cover Rampur, and threaten Saharanpur so that Bapuji Shinde would not be able to come to the assistance of Perron. It would also keep a check on the Sikhs and Gujars.

The task of the force located at Benaras was to secure the passes on the road leading from Mirzapore to Nagpur, so that the Bundela chiefs and the Rajah of Berar would not be able to join hands.
A diversionary operation was to be planned which would be aimed at Cuttack from Ganjam. Since attacks on Mirzapore and Kalpee were planned to create an alarm in the mind of the Rajah of Berar, it was expected that he would leave Shinde's side and return to protect his own area. The only difficulty was that during the rainy season movement from Midnapore into Cuttack would be difficult.

To sum up the Grand strategy in the north, Wellesley planned to proceed in the following stages:

(a) Defeat of Perron in the north by General Lake.
(b) Prevention of Shinde's forces moving north to reinforce Perron by blocking the passes.
(c) Occupation of the Doab.
(d) Occupation of Cuttack to detach Rajah of Berar from Shinde.
(e) Military defeat of the combined forces of Shinde and Rajah of Berar in the Deccan by General Wellesley.

In order to achieve these objectives Begum Sumroo was to be won over. She had eight battalions in all, out of which four were with Shinde in the Deccan. Although she was eager to side with the English, as her forces were with Shinde, she found it difficult to declare herself openly her sentiments. To Wellesley's suggestion that Gwalior should be captured, General Lake suggested an alternative. As Gwalior Fort is very formidable its capture is not easy and Lake could not spare an adequate force for this task. The fort was in possession
of Ambaji Ingle and his brother Khondaji. Ambaji was dissatisfied with Vaijav Rao, the Prime Minister of Shinde, as Ambaji felt that he should have been appointed to that post. If his fort was attacked, Ambaji would forget his disappointment and join Shinde, but if the fort was not attacked, Ambaji and Khondaji were likely to remain neutral and if Shinde was defeated they might form an alliance with the English. A clear move indeed!

The discussions and a gradual formulation of the plan for the campaign in the north was so far being carried out by Wellesley through private correspondence with Lake. But on the 27th of July 1803, Wellesley wrote an official letter giving detailed operational instructions to his Commander-in-Chief, General Lake. After a few introductory paragraphs, Wellesley discusses the position and importance of M. Perron and his army in the North, which was most efficient army of regular native infantry and the most powerful artillery existing in India. Wellesley felt that even if Shinde agreed to the Treaty of Bassein, M. Perron may not accept the terms and act independently seeking the aid of France, "The safety of the British dominions requires the reduction of M. Perron's military resources and power independently of any question which might exist between Shinde and the British Government. This operation necessarily includes the capture or destruction of all his artillery and military stores and especially of all arms of European manufacture."
Having thus defined the most important task Wellesley goes on to say that Delhi and Agra must be captured, and a chain of posts should be established on the Western and Southern banks of the Yamuna, from the mountains of Kumaon to Bundelkhand sufficient to secure British power the free navigation of the Yamuna and the possession of both banks of the river. Thus the river was to be the limit of exploitation. When Delhi was captured the person of the Mughal who had been treated by the Marathas and by M. Perron with the most barbarous indignity and violence would be secured. Once the power of M. Perron was defeated, all the other minor Rajput and Jat powers would be willing to enter into an alliance with the British thus forming a barrier between the Marathas and the Company's territory denying access to the former to northern India. The last objective was the annexation of Bundelkhand which was a rich province and its possession would not only give additional security to Benaras but also check the Raja of Berar.

Within this framework the General had been given certain freedom of action. "early and effectual demolition of the French state created by M. Perron on the banks of the Jumna" was a task which had to be completed previously to the conclusion of the rains. General Lake was to assess the situation after this task was achieved and decide whether he should take Delhi first or secure Agra first and then proceed to Delhi. As General Wellesley was also commencing his operations in
the Deccan, although he would certainly defeat both Shinde and the Rajah of Berar in battle, it was essential to block the passes between Hindustan and the Deccan so that the Marathas do not get a chance to retreat towards the north and join M. Perron.

Steps had already been taken by Wellesley to seize the post of Broach in Gujerat and expeditions had been planned from Calcutta and Ganjam to occupy Cutack in the month of August forcing the Rajah of Berar out from Orissa.

The strategy was not to be limited to fighting alone. Lake was to spare no efforts in enticing M. Perron and other European officers to leave the service of Shinde. He was given full powers to conclude any agreements for the security of M. Perron's personal interest and property, provided he agreed to deliver of the whole of his military resources and power, together with the person of the Kophul and his heir apparent. If a siege was laid to Agra, it was likely to surrender. The officer in charge of the garrison at Agra was one Mr.Hessing. He was to be bribed so that he would surrender the fort without a fight.

**GENERAL LAKE'S CAMPAIGNS--BATTLE ACCOUNTS**

**Capture of Coel and Aligarh**

M. Perron had established a cantonment at Coel which was a few miles away from the fort of Aligarh. The fort itself was strongly held by a garrison. General Lake was ordered to
commence his advance from Kanpur on August 5, 1803 and he confronted Coel on the 29th. He had 5000 infantry, 2500 cavalry and the usual proportion of artillery. The British frontier was about four miles to the south of Coel. The town of Coel was separated from the Fort of Aligarh by a plain.

The Maratha troops at Coel consisted of 2000 infantry and 8000 cavalry. With the usual proportion of guns. M. Perron was commanding this force. The right flank of M. Perron's defences rested on the fort of Aligarh. A marsh stretched in front of their defences which made a frontal attack by the enemy impossible. On his left flank which was exposed, there was a village which was held by a detachment of Perron.

General Lake carried out a reconnaissance and came to the conclusion that should attack the enemy's left flank. He lined up his cavalry in two lines, supported by the line of infantry and guns. In this process his left flank was exposed. Had M. Perron decided to attack this flank General Lake would have been discomfitted but M. Perron had no intention of giving battle. He left the field and headed for Mathura. The men were thus demoralised and when the British galloper guns opened fire Shinde's men dispersed; some half-hearted attempts were made by the Cavalry to make a stand but when the British cavalry finally advanced to meet them, they withdrew. Coel thus fell very easily. In this skirmish General Lake's casualties were very light. No officer was either killed or wounded. Lake detailed a battalion to occupy Coel and pro-
ceeded with his force to Aligarh fort and camped in an area south of the fort.

A. Perron had detailed Colonel Fedron in charge of Aligarh fort. The fort was garrisoned by 2000 trained infantry. When General Lake summoned Colonel Fedron to surrender, he flatly refused. Lake tried to tribute the garrison but in this also he did not succeed. Now Lake was on the horns of a dilemma. If he decided to lay a siege to Aligarh, he could be wasting valuable time, in which Bhinde's army might move from the Deccan and reinforce Delhi, which was Lake's next objective. However, he could not bypass Aligarh as it was on his lines of communication and would interfere with his logistics. The fort of Aligarh was very strong and well defended, but Lake discovered a weak point in defences. There was a narrow passage leading across the ditch into the fort, which was shown by Lucan, a deserter from the garrison. It was guarded by a strong gateway, covering three other gateways behind it. Difficult though it was, this was Lake's only chance. He now planned a coup de main attack on this gateway. The attack was launched in the early hours of 4th September. The resistance was very stiff. Although General Lake lost 200, in killed and wounded, the fort was captured. Colonel Monson who figured in history later, was wounded in this attack. He received a wound in the arm with a pike and was evacuated. The effect of this defeat on the morale of Bhinde's army was disastrous. To use the words of an officer then in the service
of Shinde: "It was a mortal blow to the Maratha war; it struck panic into the minds of the natives and astounded all the princes of Hindustan; it gave them dreadful ideas of European soldiers and European courage." The effect of this defeat was that the Jats and the Sikhs left the Marathas. Six European officers of the Second Brigade also deserted Shinde's service. A large number of cavalry men left the service and went home. General Lake is full of praise for the Marathas who "were determined to hold out, which they did most obstinately and (I may say) most gallantly." Lake had to win it 'inch by inch' it being so determinedly defended. He praised his own soldiers and their British valour which "never shone more conspicuous. He justified the large number of casualties had by arguing that he laid a siege and effected a breach, eventually the casualties would have mounted to the same number or even higher. Moreover, a siege lasting over a month would have boosted up the morale of the Marathas and their allies would have come to their aid but this sudden shock of a defeat would make them leave the side of the Marathas and instill fear in their mind of the British army. The fort stood out for more than an hour and Lake admits: "A more anxious time I never experienced; the fire was tremendous and nothing, from the strong way in which the natives were posted, with all their advantages, but British soldiers would have effected the business."  

The possession of the fort of Aligarh was essential becau
without it, Woab could not be secured, with Aligarh in enemy hands, the British could have been driven out of Woab any time. Thus possession of Aligarh was of tactical importance.

The Governor General in Council published General Orders on September 9, congratulating General Lake and his army upon the successful attack on Coel. 21

Details of the attack on the Aligarh fort were as follows: Lake had detailed Lieutenant Colonel Monson to lead the attack. He was given four companies of His Majesty's 76th Regiment, and the 1st battalion of the 4th Regiment, native infantry under Lieutenant Colonel Browne with a detachment of 17th Native Regiment, under Captain Bagshaw.

Colonel Harsford, of the artillery covered their advance by a heavy fire from the batteries in locations which had been previously prepared.

Lieutenant Colonel Monson gallantly lead the charge under the most galling fire of musketry and grape shot, against the fort hitherto deemed impregnable and strongly defended on all sides. Mr. Lucan lead Monson to the gate through the narrow passage. In this attack of both Colonels Monson and Browne were seriously wounded, Major McLeod of the 7th took over and lead the charge. Both he and his gunner officer Captain Shipton were wounded but stayed on at their post. The losses suffered by the 76th Regiment in officers and men were rather heavy and General Lake who was always very careful of the lives of the British soldiers lamented this loss.
Losses suffered by the British during the attack on
Aiznurh were as follows: 22

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Total killed and wounded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27 Dragoons Artillery</td>
<td>Lt. Cols: 2; Major: 1; Captain: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76 Regiment</td>
<td>Lieutenants: 8; Ensigns: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/4 Battalion Native Regiment</td>
<td>Subedar: 1; Jemadars: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/4 - do -</td>
<td>NCOs: 10; Drummers: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four Companies 17th Regiment</td>
<td>Rank and File: 223 Followers: 5; Horses: 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Battle of Delhi

General Lake had thus accomplished the first and the most important task of defeating the army of N. Perron. His next task was either to capture the Fort of Agra and then move on to Delhi and get the possession of the Mughal Emperor, or leave Agra alone for the time being and proceed to Delhi first and then reduce Agra. Wellesley had given him the latitude. General Lake knew that Agra was strongly held and if he decided to attack Agra first, he would be spending a lot of valuable time when the enemy from the Deccan might move north and reinforce Delhi. General Lake, therefore, decided to advance on to Delhi.

On September 11, General Lake's army which consisted of 200 European artillery men, three regiments of the King's Dragoons, five native cavalry regiments, His Majesty's 76th Foot and eleven battalions of sepoyas, 23 marched eighteen miles and reached the banks of the Hindun river. He was only six
miles away from Delhi.

As Perron had resigned his command, L. Joins Berquin took over the command of the Maratha force. He had deployed seventeen battalions in the area. He had 17,000 men in two brigades. When he learnt that General Lake was advancing with an army, Joins decided to give battle and moved out of Delhi and deployed his force on the banks of Hindon. Unfortunately the Dragoons who were deployed ahead of the marching column did not do their job of reconnaissance well and Lake was thus unaware of the close proximity of the enemy. General Lake went forward for a reconnaissance closely followed by the British Dragoons and the Rajput troopers. When he pushed forward through the crops and tall waving grass he was surprised to find himself in contact with the Maratha scouts who were deployed to establish contact with the enemy. He suddenly found Joins Berquin's force with 100 guns drawn up and entrenched astride the road to Delhi, hardly a mile away. Both the flanks of the Maratha army rested on marshy grounds. In his own words: "Here was a pretty kettle of fish, by God, thanks to these rascally Dragoons, and their careless scouting; a pretty pass, for an army to be surprised at dinner time after years of active service."

The Marathas opened fire which was very effective. Lake started losing men all round him. His own horse was killed under him. The enemy had chosen a good position for the battle. It could not be out flanked as there were marshes on either
side. As the guns were blazing away, there was no question of charging them with bayonets. "The more we look the less we shall like it," said Lake as he realised that only a ruse will work. When he was a young lad, in the battle of Ticonderoga a trick had been used to deceive the enemy. Lake now decided to try the same plan.

Lake's cavalry was some 600 yards from the enemy guns, which were secure as their flank rested on the Jumna river, his infantry was half a mile in the rear. He formed his cavalry in line of squadrons and ordered them to advance. They were clearly told that, as soon as the enemy opened fire there were to turn about and retire as if in confusion. Lake hoped that the enemy would throw caution to the wind and charge the retreating Dragoons. If that happened, the cavalry was to withdraw through the infantry which had formed up for the attack and the infantry was to charge forward with their bayonets. The ruse worked and the Pathans believing that the British were withdrawing poured out in pursuit, when they reached the tall Pampas Sarkanda grass, they were suddenly confronted with column of Scarlet clad infantry ready for the attack. It was too late for N. Jains to call back his force and protect the guns. General Lake lead the charge himself riding another horse. The disciplined infantry halted, raised their Brown Bess rifles and fired a volley and advanced at a steady double. The enemy who had been denuded of their cavalry now could not stand the bayonet charge and fled for the fords.
and bridges of the Jumna, or to the wide Joab.

When General Lake—"Lucky Lake" as he was called after the capture of Agra, saw that the Marathas were fleeing in all directions, he halted his infantry and launched his cavalry in pursuit of the retreating enemy thus causing a complete rout. Many of the Marathas were drowned in the Jumna. M. Joins Burmien had held two battalions in reserve at Delhi Chat. They too were dispersed by the cavalry and a large number of guns were captured. "Camels, palanquins, shaminas, bullock carts, tumbrils of powder, huge brass cannons on lumbering, solid wheels cast in Shinde's arsenal at Gwalior, dragon mouthed pieces contributed by Baroda and light field pieces from Scotch Sangster's Agra foundry, sixty eight pieces of cannon and two tumbrils of treasure were captured."^23

English records have estimated the casualties suffered by the Marathas to be approximately 3000, which is probably exaggerated. The British suffered a total of 485, of which the 76th Regiment had a large share.

On the 14th, M. Joins Burmien and four other French officers surrendered to Lake.

Tactics adopted by Lake in the Battle of Delhi were briefly as follows. He had detailed Major General St. John to command the left flank and Major General Ware commanded the right flank. (Later Major General Ware received a very serious confusion while advancing with the right wing). The cavalry was commanded by Colonel St. Leger. He advanced with
British and Indian cavalry steadily in the face of heavy artillery fire. The 76th Regiment of Haji's forces was commanded by Captain Boyce who continued advance in a steady manner in face of fire and when he was within a hundred yards away, the Regiment halted, brought their muskets to the shoulder, fired a volley and charged at a steady double, all in barrack square precision. "They rushed on with the bayonet with a determination nothing could resist, had forced the enemy to abandon their formidable artillery." This is the time when General Lake halted the infantry and ordered the cavalry to charge. "Colonel St. Leger, with the cavalry under his command moved rapidly forward, when a general slaughter ensued; by a well timed manoeuvre of the Colonel's in intercepting their retreat to the Jumna, much execution was done; the enemy confusion was such that many were drowned in attempting to cross the river. "General Lake suffered a few casualties due to sunstroke and heatstroke among the British soldiers. It must be remembered that the attack was launched immediately after a strenuous march of 18 miles.

Reactions of the Governor General in Council were published in his General Orders dated 1st October, 1803. In this order he refers to the work done by General Lake during the period 29th August to 18th September 1803 which had been already included in a previous General Order. This order deals with the battle of Delhi. He praises the gallantry of Major Generals Ware and St. John and Colonel St. Leger.
Captain Bovce and the 76th Regiment are mentioned in the order in these words: "The conduct of Captain Bovce and of His Majesty's 76th Regiment, is noticed with the warmest applause by the Governor General in Council; the high reputation established by that respectable corps in various services of difficulty and danger in India, appeared in the battle of Delhi, with a degree of lustre which has never been exceeded over by British troops." He goes on to praise the native infantry and cavalry units and the artillery commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Horsford.

The Governor General in Council awarded honorary colours (flags to commemorate battle honours), with a device properly suited to commemorate the reduction of the fortress of Aligad on the 4th and the victory obtained at Delhi on the 11th of September to all the regiments, British and Indian who participated in those actions. The British Regiments were to carry the colours as long as they were in India unless they were confirmed on them by the King. A war memorial was to be erected in Fort William at Calcutta in memory of those who gave their lives in the campaign. As a result of this campaign and the Battle of Laswarée later, General Lake was raised to a peerage and became known as Lord Lake.

Lieutenant General Lake wrote to his Royal Highness the Duke of York who was the Commander-in-Chief in Britain at that time giving a summary of the operations upto 20th October, 1803. Describing the battle of Coel and the Capture of Aligad.
Lake described the battle of Delhi. In describing his meeting with the Mughal Emperor Shah Alam, Lake states that on the 12th September, the Emperor sent a word that town of Delhi and the two forts which defended it had been evacuated by the party of the Marathas left in their defence. General Lake entered Delhi in all pomp and glory and had an audience with Shah Alum who bestowed a title, "the second in the empire in rank and importance."

Thus General Lake completed his second task, which was to capture and secure the person of Shah Alum.

On 24th September, 1803, General Lake commenced his march towards Agra. When General Lake captured Aligarh he had despatched a force of a brigade consisting of His Majesty's 29th Regiment of Light Dragoons and two regiments of native cavalry under Colonel Vandaleur, back to the British territory to combat an irruption made by the Maratha cavalry. This force now joined General Lake's army which had reached Mathura on 2nd October 1803. From Mathura, the force proceeded towards Agra and arrived on 4th October, 1803.

Return of the killed and wounded and missing, in the action before Delhi, of the 11th September, 1803 included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total European Officers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Soldiers</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indians</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>728</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 951
Seizure of Agra

The town of Agra situated on the banks of Jumna was large and populous even in the beginning of the 19th century. It was defended by a strong wall, remnants of which still exist. On its south west side the fort of Agra is situated. It is a properly constructed strong fort, with a ditch and high walls. There are inner walls and a series of gates. It was a formidable fort with extraordinary strength. It was garrisoned by 4,500 men under the command of George Hessian, a Dutchman.

The Marathas had planned to intercept General Lake's army in order to prevent him from making contact with Agra fort. Thirteen of Shinde's battalions under Budrency, a French commander were on their way from the south. However, Lake reached Agra without any interference. Colonel Monson who had been wounded in the battle of Aligad now rejoined duty at Agra. The army encamped on the western face of the place. The Maratha garrison opened artillery fire but the shots either flew over or fell short. This ranging helped the British to choose a camp site out of range of Maratha artillery. The Marathas sent out several parties to harass the British force and Sinclair who was commanding the garrison holding the advance post suffered a few casualties.

On 8th October, General Lake ordered MacDonald's Brigade to carry out recce in force and secure a place known as Tange which was surrounded by gardens. This place was held by three battalions of the Marathas. The Dragoons were also moved out
to support MacDonald. Their task was to move behind the force to cut off their route of withdrawal. The Marathas, however, did not give a fight but withdraw. MacDonald left a force of five companies and two guns to hold Tanze.

All was not well inside the fort. The Marathas had already received reports that French officers like Perron, Bourouin and others had started deserting them and seeking asylum with the British. The garrison, therefore, placed George Hessing and six other European officers under open arrest. In the meantime the Marathas had been reinforced. Three battalions as mentioned earlier had been deployed at Tange and five more battalions from Perron’s Fifth brigade had arrived from the South. They had 26 guns. This force was commanded by Major Brownrigg. The Agra garrison would not admit those men inside the fort as they felt that the strangers would claim a share in the treasure of twenty-five lakhs of Rupees held in the fort.

In addition, there were twelve battalions of trained sipahis under General Dudrenec, who had marched from Burhanpur via Ujjain, “the flower of Scindia’s army,” who occupied a position on the right rear of the British force. Dudrenec’s plan was to ensure that Lake was committed to the siege of Agra and then move to Delhi and recapture it while Lake was engaged at Agra.

General Lake divided his operation in three phases. In the first phase he dealt with the enemy outside the fortress. They consisted of troops who had withdrawn from the force com-
manded by Herron and later by Bourruin. He attacked this force on the 16th October and defeated them in battle. The Marathas suffered 650 casualties and lost all their guns. This dispirited the remainder so much that two days later 2,500 of them surrendered and accepted British service. This was anticipated by Wellesley as some of these soldiers were earlier in the service of the Company and were retrenched when the strength of the force was reduced for financial reasons.

Describing this phase General Lake says in his letter to Wellesley dated 17th October 1803, states: "Finding it impossible to make approach against this place as long as the seven battalions of the enemy who remained here, were in possession of the town of Ara, of an incasement with a large number of guns on the glacis, I decided to take possession of the ravines this morning, which will answer as trenches and afford complete cover for carrying on our works." 30

With this in view, he ordered Brigadier General Clarke who was encamped with his brigade in the rear of the town, to take possession of it, at the same three battalions were to advance and occupy the ravines. Brigadier General Clarke’s brigade consisted of 2/9 Native Infantry, 1/12 Native infantry and five companies of 16th Native infantry commanded by Lieutenant Colonel White. 31 No British troops were employed in this phase. "The business was severe, and I understand from Colonel Clarke that he was obliged to return to the camp with the two battalions, but Lieutenant Colonel White maintained his ground
and kept possession of the town "when Brigadier Clarke found that his attack failed, he decided to withdraw but reinforce Lieutenant Colonel White with one of his battalions. Once a foothold was secured, the position was consolidated and at night work on construction of batteries for the guns started. As the ravines provided cover, work could go on in the day time as well.

The Marathas fought very bravely with their back to the wall. They had been deployed on ground which was ideally suited for defence.

General Lake hoped to be ready to fire at the fort within forty eight hours and he estimated that a breach could be effected in another ten hours. Although he had tried to get the garrison to surrender the fort, he had very little hopes of the enemy obliging him and he was preparing for a long siege, all the time worried that the seventeen battalions under Dudrench might either either attack him or head towards Delhi. Time was thus very precious.

Lake praises the work of the Native Infantry. However, he is convinced that "it is impossible to do great things in a gallant and quick style without Europeans." He felt that the proportion of European troops to Indian troops should be one to three. By the end of 1803, it had been diluted to one to six as the mother country was not prepared to send more Europeans out to India as their casualties caused discomfort to the Directors in England. Lake felt that if the French army
lands in India, the Native army will not hold out against them and England will lose her possessions in India. His argument was based on the fact that when one considers the large number of officer casualties suffered in the Native Regiments, one is convinced that the Native troops have to be personally led by European officers. "In short everything has been done by the examples and exertions of officers, and without which we would not have been where we are." General Lake was to find in April 1805 that the British troops would not charge the fort of Bharatpore whereas Indian troops did.

The next phase was the capture of the fort itself, but being impracticable Lake decided to negotiate with George Hessing and Sutherland who were in charge of the fort. They had already written to Lake seeking for a safe passage, on October 13, proposing that they were prepared to deliver the fort, guns, stores, etc. provided Lake guaranteed protection to them and their private property. They were to be allowed to either stay in the city or go where they pleased to join their families. All the Sircar's arms, treasure or any other public property was not to be taken out. General Lake gave this undertaking in a letter addressed to Hessing and Sutherland dated October 13, 1803. On October 17, 1803 the Fort of Agra termed as the key of Hindustan, capitulated and between five and six thousand men marched out of the fort with their private property on October 18, and Lake unfurled the Union Jack and the Maratha flag was lowered. Once for all, what made Hessing to hasten up
matters was the fact that on October 17, Lake had completed the construction of his batteries and guns opened up within a range of 350 yards on the rampart walls. A practicable breach would have been created within a matter of another eight or nine hours. So for the loss of three British gunners and three Indian golaiz, Lake got the surrender of the fort. Had the fort held out, there would have been heavy casualties on both sides. The morale of the Marathas was lowered by the surrender of the fort. Thus, General Lake saved time by this subterfuge and was now free to deal with Durenec and his twelve battalions which was the third phase of his plan. Wellesley, in his letter dated October 24 congratulated General Lake in these words: 'This is the fruit of your glory in the field—securing Agra the most important single object of the war, without effusion of blood and by the mere lustre and terror of your name— you have now actually accomplished every point of my instructions in the few weeks which have intervened between the 25th of August and the 17th of October—with all sanguine temper of my mind, I declare that I could not have hoped for a completion of my plans at once so rapid and so secure."

Leaving Brigadier General MacDonald in charge of the fort with a garrison in the fort of Agra, Lake now set out after Durenec on 27th October, 1803.

The casualties suffered in the battle of Agra were as given on next page.
Battle of Laswari

Having secured Agra Fort, there now remained for General Lake to deal with only the twelve battalions about 9,000 strong, flower of Shinde's army, led for the most part, from Ujjain by General Dudrenec. Unfortunately the conditions offered by the British Government to the European Officers were so generous, that Dudrenec and all the European Officers in this force left service and entered British territory. The force was now commanded by Ambaji Ingle, an able and experienced commander when he heard of the fall of Agra he decided to withdraw in easy stages from Jaipur territory and take shelter in the hilly country of Mewar. He planned to hold a defensive position at the pass which was easily defensible. He had adequate artillery. Lake there-
fore was anxious to prevent this force from reaching the pass. His progress was hampered by rains but he managed to reach a camp near Fatehpur. He now decided to leave behind his heavy artillery with adequate infantry protection and move rapidly with his army carrying out forced marches, in hot pursuit of the Marathas. On the 31st he reached a camp which had been quitted by the Marathas the same morning. As speed was vital, Lake let the infantry catch up at their own speed and decided to move out with his cavalry alone after having given them some rest. He moved out at midnight hoping to catch up with the enemy and keep them engaged until his infantry would reach the area of engagement.

The cavalry covered 40 miles in twenty-four hours but by first light he established contact with the Maratha army. He had with him three cavalry brigades and mounted artillery.

The Maratha army was deployed for battle near a village Laswari. Their left flank rested on the village itself (see map whilst their right was covered by a rivulet, the banks of which were difficult and steep. As the ground was covered by tall grass the infantry was covered from view. Ambaji Ingle had deployed his guns in front of the infantry. Partly due to the good use of cover made by him and partly due to the dust raised by Lake's cavalry, General Lake came suddenly on the enemy and did not realise the extreme strength of the enemy's position and as they were only eight miles away from the pass in Mewat Hills, General Lake decided to engage the enemy. Finding the enemy too advantageously posted Lake, however, did not hope for
complete success. He was not keen in taking undue risk. On 1st November 1803, he deployed the cavalry for attack, out of range of the enemy guns and waited for his infantry. When the infantry arrived Lake charged the guns with his cavalry. The Marathas opened heavy fire causing a large number of casualties. The cavalry attack was thus not successful but they did capture some guns. However as there was no infantry at that time on the field, the guns could not be brought back. By eight o'clock the enemy guns stopped firing and not ready to face the second phase of the attack which would be launched by the infantry. General Lake who had lead the cavalry charge early in the morning took up his position at the head of the infantry to lead his infantry attack which was staged later in the day.

The aim of the first attack was to prevent the Marathas from breaking off the engagement and getting to the pass and secure the guns. General Lake succeeded in the first and failed in securing the second object. The attack was launched by the advanced guard commanded by Major Griffith and the first brigade commanded by Colonel Vandeleur. In this attack Colonel Vandeleur was killed. The Brigade was withdrawn and another cavalry attack was launched by the Third brigade of cavalry, consisting of His Majesty's 29th Regiment and the 4th Regiment of Native cavalry, under the command of Colonel Macan. This too met with partial success.

The infantry had started the march at 3 a.m. on 1st November and reached the battlefield at 11 a.m. having covered 25 miles.
They needed rest. General Lake states in his letter despatch dated 2nd November 1803 that at this stage Ambaji Ingle sent an envoy stating that the Marathas were willing to surrender the guns if certain terms were agreed to. Lake being anxious to prevent further bloodshed acquiesced to the request and allowed them an hour to decide. In the meantime the infantry was being formed up for the attack in several columns. The attack was to come from a western direction. The river bank was ideally suited as assembly area the eastern bank of which provided a good forming up place. Major General Ware took up the left position and Major General St. John took up the right.

After having repelled the cavalry attack Ambaji Ingle adjusted his position so that now the right flank of his army turned through forty five degrees leaving Laswari. He formed the army in two columns one behind the other facing south with the village Koholpur in between the two columns. The guns too were redeployed accordingly. General Lake, however, had no intention of launching a frontal attack and he planned to turn the right flank of the Marathas.

When Ambaji understood the enemy's manoeuvre he further swung his right flank and made it parallel to the river bank. The task given to Major General Ware was to attack the enemy's right flank. He was also to detail a force to capture Laswari village, thus securing the right flank Major General St. John, who commanded the left wing was to support the first column. The third brigade of cavalry under Colonel Kocan was to support
the infantry, the second brigade under Lieutenant Colonel Vandeleur was detached to the right to cut off enemy's retreat. A brigade under Colonel Gorion was held as reserve and was formed between second and third brigade. As the heavy guns had been left behind, General Lake had to rely solely on galloper guns which were organized into four batteries. The advance of the infantry started under the cover of these guns. The enemy also opened up with all his guns. The attack was lead by the 76th Regiment. As they were suffering very heavy casualties due to enemy artillery fire, General Lake decided to charge with whatever troops were available instead of waiting for other regiments to form up for the attack. The Marathas launched a cavalry charge to break up the attack but the 76th repulsed the attack. General Lake now launched 29th cavalry regiment to drive away the enemy cavalry. This regiment was now commanded by Captain Sale since Major Griffith died in the earlier attack in the morning. In the meantime Lake's infantry arrived and lined up. Unfortunately at this time, Major General Ware fell dead, his head being carried by a cannon shot and Colonel Mac Donal took over although he too was already wounded.

The Marathas offered a very stiff resistance. It was only when they lost all their guns that their infantry fell back. Even then their left wing resting on Lasswary held out and later withdrew in good order. They were now attacked and dispersed by the 27th Dragoons and the 6th regiment of Native
cavalry under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Vandeleur. Over 2,000 Marathas were taken prisoners and all the baggage was lost. General Lake detained only forty eight officers and remainder were allowed to go away without their weapons. But the cavalry cut down many retreatig soldiers.

General Lake later assessed that the Maratha strength amounted to thirteen regular battalions which were sent up from the Deccan earlier in the year under Durrance. Two battalions which escaped from Delhi had also joined this force. "These battalions were most uncommonly well appointed and had a most numerous artillery, as well served as they can possibly be, the runners standing to their guns until killed by the bayonet, all the sepoys of the enemy behaved exceedingly well and if they had been commanded by French officers, the event would have been, I fear, extremely doubtful. I never was in so severe a business in my life or anything like it, and pray to God I never may be in such a situation again; their army is better appointed than ours, no expense is spared whatever, they have three times the number of men to a gun we have, their bullocks, of which they have many more than we have, are of a very superior sort, all their men's knapsacks and baggage are carried upon camels, by which means they can march double the distance."

"These fellows fought like devils, or rather heroes and had we not a disposition for attack in a style that we should have done against the most formidable army we could have been opposed to, I verily believe, from the position they had taken
we might have failed. The fall of these brigades will bring (Ambajee) to terms immediately—" This is how General Lake has described the Maratha army and their performance in the Battle of Laswaree.

The Governor General in Council in his despatches to the Honourable Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated 28th December, 1803 states: "... the enemy were completely defeated, with the loss of all their baggage, camp equipment and baggage, a considerable number of elephants, camels, and bullocks, seventy two pieces of cannons, five thousand stand of arms thrown down on the field of battle, forty four stands of colours, sixty four tumbrils, completely laden with ammunition together with three tumbrils of money, fifty seven carts laden with matchlocks, muskets, and stores. Two thousand prisoners were taken and numbers slain." The work of General Lake has been highly praised in this despatch. He lead a cavalry charge in the morning and lead an infantry attack in the afternoon. He too had covered 65 miles in the previous 48 hours with his army." "The resistance opposed by the enemy, wrote Wellesley, "on this memorable occasion was more determined than any which the army under General Lake had experienced since the commencement of the campaign."

In the second attack, as the men were forming up, General Lake's horse was shot under him. The next moment, his son who dismounted to offer him his own, was shot by his side and severely wounded. This would have perturbed any man but
General Lake kept aside his personal feelings and anxiety and lead the charge.

Major Thorn in "War in India" records that from the commencement of the conflict early in the morning to the close of the general action in the evening the enemy discovered a firmness of resolution and a contempt of death which could not fail to command the admiration of their opponents."

The British lost 838 in killed and wounded, 13 officers were killed, 40 were wounded. According to Colonel Malleson though Lasawari was fought twenty days before Argaum, it was not Argaum but Lasawari which decided Shinde to accept the terms offered by Marquese Wellesley. Argaum was a rout, the Maratha troops engaged in which had been beaten before they had fought. Lasawari had taken the fighting stuff out of every man in the Maratha dominion. Its result, coming immediately after Argaum was the treaty of Surji Anjangaon.

An Analysis of the Battle of Lasawari

The Battle of Lasawari fought on 1st November, 1803 between the English army commanded by General Lake and the Shinde's army commanded by Ambajee Ingle is considered to be one of the decisive battles of the Second Anglo Maratha war. The strategy and tactics of this battle are of interest to a student of Military History.

Defence Layout: Ambajee Ingle who had a good eye for ground had occupied a hasty defence position in area of Lasawari. His
The right flank was secure since there was a rivulet whose river banks were steep and the escarpments made direct assault by cavalry impossible. He had a total of 15 battalions and seventy guns. He had some cavalry with him. The infantry was deployed in two lines. The first line occupied a position between the villages Moholpur in the north and Lasawerli in the south. There was plenty of tall grass and cover and the guns had been well camouflaged. The second line of infantry, probably the battalions who had retreated from Delhi were deployed in between highground and village Moholpur. This provided depth to the first position. The cavalry was held in reserve. This shows the tactical skill of Ambaji Ingle.

General Lake who sacrificed security for speed left his heavy guns behind and when he came to Ambaji's last camp, asked the infantry to take some rest and march at their own speed and catch up with him later. Thus when he bumped into the enemy he only had a brigade of cavalry who had covered forty miles in the last 24 hours. Rather than waiting for his infantry, General Lake decided to charge hoping to capture the guns. The attack failed and General Lake withdrew his cavalry out of the range of the guns and waited for the infantry which had started from the last camp at 3 a.m. and would take 10 hours to cover twenty-five miles. As they would be tired they would be ready to launch an attack only in the latter part of the day.

As the frontal attack had failed, General Lake wisely planned a flank attack. It was better to attack from the west
as the ground was broken and provided cover for infantry.
The village of Laswari which was in the way had to be cleared first. This was entrusted to Major General Ware who was to lead the attack. After securing the village he was to move along the river bank and form up on the enemy’s right flank. Major General St John was to follow with his brigade and be ready to support the attack.

Abaji Ingle now proved a match to Lake. He too adjusted his position and deployed the guns facing west. He now employed his cavalry to charge Major General Ware’s brigade. The artillery opened up and a chance shot killed General Ware.

General Lake did not have enough time to wait until General St John formed up, as the Maratha cavalry was forming up again for a second charge, the first having been repelled by the 70th Regiment. At this junction, Lake’s horse was shot under his and his son, who dismounted to give his father his horse was wounded. This alone would have shaken up any person. But General Lake who performed better when under fire forgot about his personal problems and lead the infantry charge. The men who had seen all this naturally followed Lucky Lake and vehemently attacked and captured the guns. Lake had also ordered the 29th Hussars to disperse Maratha cavalry. Thus by better manoeuvres and superior tactics and above all with brave leadership Lake won the battle of Laswari. But the victory was not easily won. The Marathas fought very hard. In fact, they suffered less casualties in the battle itself.
but were mowed down when they started retreating in a dis-
orderly manner. The first withdrawal to adjust the position
was planned and very orderly.

Wellesley has remarked: "The victory must principally be
attributed to the admirable skill, judgement, heroic courage,
and matchless activity of the Commander-in-chief, whose
magnanimous example, together with the recollection of his
achievements at Coel, Aligarh, Delhi and Agra, inspired general
confidence and emulations."....

"The Commander-in-Chief displayed not only the most reso-
lute fortitude and ardent valour, but the utmost degree of
professional ability and knowledge, availing himself with
admirable promptitude of every advantage presented by the enemy,
and frustrating every effort of the enemy's obstinacy and
boldness."
NOTES


(5) Ibid., p. 297.

(6) Ibid., p. 297.

(7) Ibid., Appendix, p. 666.


(9) Ibid., p. 36.

(10) Ibid., p. 39.


(14) Ibid., p. 667.


(18) Ibid., p. 396.

(19) Ibid., p. 403.

(20) Ibid., p. 419.
(21) Ibid., p. 441.
(22) Ibid., p. 443.
(23) Ibid., p. 445.
(24) Ibid., p. 552.
(25) Ibid., p. 554.