CHAPTER IV

ANUMĀNA OR INFERENCE

Inference is accepted as a means of mediate knowledge by the Schools of Indian philosophy except the materialist Čārvākas. The mediate knowledge of the physical universe is gained by means, such as anumāna (inference), Upamāna (comparison) and arthāpatti (Postulation) according to the schools of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā and Advaita-Vēdānta. Most of the western philosophers hold inference as the sole means of mediate knowledge the use of which is inevitable in everyday life, and ranks it next to perception. "It was the favourite subject of Nyāya school, which devoted to it centuries of exclusive attention and produced enormous literature as marvellous in precision and analysis as in the intention of an algebraic type of technical expressions." ¹

Inference or anumāna is a kind of knowledge (māna) which follows after (anu) some other knowledge or perception. Taking the etymological meaning into consideration, Gautama defines inference as a knowledge preceded by perception.² According to Vātsyāyana the word 'perception' in the definition
implies twofold perception. The perception of the invariable relation between the probans (liṅga) and the probandum (liṅgi) is a preconception of such a relation somewhere else. In addition to this, there is a perception of the probans as invariably related to probandum as it exists in the locus. Vātsyāyana defines inference as the knowledge of an object due to a previous knowledge of some sign or mark (Liṅga).³ The previous knowledge is the knowledge of the liṅga or mark. It has a universal relation with the major term (Sādhyya) and an inclusiveness in the minor them (Pakṣa).⁴ Hence inference has bee defined in the Nyāya system as the knowledge of object, not by means of the knowledge of a liṅga or sign and that of its universal (vyāpti) with the inferred object.⁵ Invariable concomitance or avinābhāvaniyama is the nerve of inference.

Inference is a process of arriving at truth not by direct observation but by means of the knowledge of invariable concomitance or a universal relation between two things.

According to the Vaiśeṣikas, inference is the knowledge derived from the perception of a liṅga or sign which is uniformly connected with something else, such as cause, effect, co-effects and correlative terms.⁶ The inference based upon these marks is drawn by means of the premises of an argument.⁷
The Buddhists take inference as involved in the perception of something which is known to be inseparably connected with another thing. Such inseparable connection between two things is due either to the law of causality or the principle of essential identity (tadutpatti and tādātmya). So also the Jainas hold that inference is the method of knowing an unperceived object through the perception of a sing and the recollection of its invariable concomitance with that object. The Cārvākas do not admit the validity of the inferential knowledge. According to them inference may provide knowledge but there remains an element of doubt with regard to the existence of inferred object until it is verified by direct experience. Moreover, there is no assurance that what has been true in the past will also be true future. The Sāṅkhya and the Yōga, the Mīmāṃsā and the Vēdānta systems also define inference.

As the knowledge of one term showing a relation, which is not perceived, through the knowledge of the other term which is perceived and is explicitly understood as invariably related to the first term. In inference what is perceived leads us on to the knowledge of what is inferred through the knowledge of a universal relation between the two.

The Naiyāyikas have Pioneered the systematic study of
inference. Their methods of reasoning and terminology have considerably influenced the logic of inference, there are sharp differences too as regards its particulars. They all agree that the key to inference is the knowledge of invariable concomitance. But they differ as to the exact meaning of Vyāpti, the way its knowledge is attained, and the method of reaching conclusion through this knowledge. The Buddhist way of determining invariable concomitance differs from the ways of the Naiyāyikas and the Advaitins.

A systematic account of inference according to the Advaita School is only to be found in the Vēdānta-Paribhāṣā and its commentaries. But they mainly deal with points on which the Advaitins differ from the Naiyāyikas, while tacitly signifying their agreement with the latter on other points.

The Advaita-Vēdāntic interpretation of Inference.

Vēdāntaparibhāṣā defines as "the distinctive cause of inferential cognition". The word anumāna refers to inferential cognition (anumiti) and the instrument of inferential cognition (anumiti - karaṇa).

And the distinctive cause of inferential cognition is the cognition of pervasion. The residual impression of their is an intermediate operation (vyāpāra) which generates inference.
The Naiyāyikas insist that, in every case of inference, subsumptive reflection (parāmarśa) is an indispensable antecedent and should, therefore, be treated as cause of anumiti.\(^{13}\) Parāmarśa is a complex cognition which arises from a combination of the knowledge of concomitance (vyāptijñāna) and that of the presence of the reason (hētu) in the subject (pakṣa) - technically known as Pakṣadharmaṭājñāna. This cognitive complex called parāmarśa is also known as liṅgaparāmarśa or trīyaliṅgaparāmarśa (the third cognition of the reason). The cognition of the presence of the reason in the subject may be said to be the first liṅgaparāmarśa; the cognition of the invariable relation between liṅga and sādhyā is the second liṅgaparāmarśa; and the complex cognition which arises from these two cognitions is the third liṅgaparāmarśa.\(^{14}\)

The Mīmāṃsakas and the Vēdāntins who follow them hold that the complex cognition called Parāmarśa is not indispensable for anumiti, though it may actually arise just before anumiti in many cases. In our experience, we are conscious of having anumiti directly after becoming aware of the presence of the reason in the subject and remembering invariable concomitance and without any intervening parāmarśa. Thus it would be necessary to treat anumiti as the effect of vyāptijñāna and pakṣadharmaṭājñāna and to exclude
Paramārśa from the causal complement of anumiti.

**Vyāpti (invariable concomitance)**

Vyāpti the universal relation of the middle term (hētu) with the major term (sādhyā) is the logical ground of inference. It is on the ground of vyāpti or universal relation that the middle term leads to the knowledge of the inferred object. (Vyāptibalēnārthagamakām liṅgam). Every inference is thus logically dependent on the knowledge of vyāpti.

The term vyāpti literally means the state of pervasion and lays stress on the universal character of the relation kept in view. It thus implies a correlation between two facts, of which one is pervaded (vyāpya) and the other pervades (vyāpaka). In this sense smoke is pervaded by fire, since all smoky objects are also fiery. But while all smoky objects are fiery, all fiery objects are not smoky; example the red hot iron ball. Similarly, all men are mortal, but all mortals are not men, like birds and beasts. A universal relation between terms of unequal extension, such as smoke and fire, men and mortals, is called asamavyāpti or viṣamavyāpti. It is a relation of non-equipollent concomitance between two terms, from one of which we may infer the other, but not vice-versa. Thus we may infer fire from smoke but not smoke from fire. As distinguished from this a universality between two terms of
equal extension is called samavyāpti or equipollent concomitance.

For any inference the minimum condition is some kind of universal concomitance between the middle and major terms. This satisfies the fundamental law of syllogistic inference that one of the premises must be universal. Now the universal concomitance between the middle and major terms means generally a relation of coexistence (śāhacārya) between the two. Example: wherever there is smoke there is fire.¹⁶

Hence universal concomitance as the logical condition of inference may be defined either positively or negatively. Positively speaking, universal concomitance is the uniform existence of the middle term in the same locus with the major term such that the major is not absent in any locus in which the middle term exists.

In the terminology of the Navya-Nyāya, universal concomitance is such a relation of coexistence between the middle and the major terms that the major is not a counter-entity to any negation abiding in the middle, that is, it is none of those things which are absent in the locus of the middle term.¹⁷ Universal concomitance has been negatively defined as the nonexistence of the middle term in all the place in which the major term does not exist.¹⁸ These two definitions of univer-
sal concomitance give us two universal propositions, one posi-

tive and the other negative, example; "all cases of smoke are
cases of fire" and 'no case of not-fire is a case of smoke'. This
means that the vyāpti or universal concomitance which is the
ground of inference may be either affirmative (anvaya) or nega-
tive (vyatīrēka).

Indians system of philosophy take inference as a process
of reasoning which is not formally valid but materially true.
According to the Advaita Vēdānta, vyāpti or a universal
proposition is the result of an induction by simple enumeration.
It rests on the uncontradicted experience of agreement in
presence between two things. The knowledge of this is the
direct means to inference. As defined by Vēdānta-paribhāṣā,
"Invariable concomitance is the coexistence of the thing to be
inferred with the mark in all substrate in which the mark may
exist". The notion of concomitance being altogether
subjective, the Vēdāntins do not emphasize the necessity of
perceiving the concomitance with any distinction as to a
repeated experience or a first experience. Since the deciding
factor is simply the observation of it Advaita-Vēdānta is not
anxious to establish any material validity for the inference,
but only subjective and formal validity.
Classification of Inference

All inferences are meant either for the acquisition of new knowledge oneself or for the demonstration of a known truth to others.

The Naiyāyikas classify inference into three based on either the use it serves or the universal relation between the middle and major terms of it or depending on the nature of induction of knowledge. In the first case which is a psychological one, inference is of two kinds svārtha and parārtha. In the second there are three kinds pūrvavat, śēsavat and sāmānya tōḍṛṣṭa. The third classification distinguishes inference into kēvalānvayi, kēvalavyatirēki and anvayavyatirēki. It is more logical where we get the knowledge of vyāpti or the universal proposition involved in inference.

Kēvalānvayi inference is based on a middle term related only positively to the major term. It is through the agreement in presence (anvaya) that the knowledge of vyāpti between the middle and major terms is arrived at.22

Kēvalavyatirēki inference is based on the relation of the middle term negatively to the major term. The knowledge of vyāpti is arrived at only through the method of agreement in absence(vyatirēka)23 because there is no positive instance of
agreement in presence. Anvayavyatirekī inference is based on
the middle term both positively and negatively related to the
major term. Here knowledge of the vyāpti is arrived at through
the combined method of agreement in presence (anvaya) and
absence (vyatireka).

Inference for one self and for other: syllogism

The Advaitin accepts the classification of inference into
(1) inference for oneself (svārthānumāna) and (2) inference
for others (parārthānumāna). The first kind of inference is
a psychological process which does not require the formal
statement of its different members inference for oneself causes
one's own inferential experience. For instance: A person
knows the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire by
repeated observation. He perceives smoke in a hill and doubts
the presence of fire there. The invariable concomitance of
smoke with fire" "whatever is smoky is fiery" soon leads him
to the inference that 'the hill is fiery'. This is the psychological
analysis of inference for oneself.

Parārthānumāna is a logical process to convince others
the truth by a syllogism stating all the members of it in a
formal manner. The Nyāya syllogism accepts five members
namely pratiṣṭhā, hētu, udāharaṇa, upanaya, and nigamana.
Pratiṣṭhā or proposition is the logical statement which is to be
proved, example; the hill is fiery.²⁷

Hētu or reason, the second member of the syllogism, states the reason for the establishment of the proposition, example; 'because the hill has smoke'.

The third member of the syllogism is udāharana, which is a universal proposition showing the invariable concomitance between hētu and sādhyā. 'Whatever has smoke has fire, example: a kitchen'.

The fourth member upanaya is the application of the universal concomitance to the present case example; 'So like the kitchen, the hill is smoky'.

Lastly, nigamana is the conclusion drawn from the preceding propositions; 'therefore, the hill is fiery'.

Advaita Vēdānta recognises only three members instead of five in the syllogism. They are: proposition (pratijñā) reason (hētu), and example (udāharana) or otherwise example, application (upanaya) and conclusion (nigamana). They find it possible to exhibit the invariable concomitance and the presence of the reason in the subject (pākṣa) by three component parts while the two additional component parts accepted by the Nyāya syllogism remain redundant. The conclusion only states what the pratijñā declares, and upanaya repeats only what the hētu affirms. The five membered
syllogism is used by Nyāya only in inference for others. While, according to the Advaitins, inference for others, is a demonstration of the conclusion by a syllogism.  

Śikhāmaṇi does not agree with the stand taken in Vēdāntaparibhāṣā on similar grounds. In difference of opinion to be settled whether the hill is fiery or not, the most natural starting point for one would be to give the pratijñā first and then reason. This will naturally satisfy the curiosity or ākāṅkṣā of the hearer. If one could start with the example as the Advaitin believes, there is no reason why one should not start with upanaya, since abruptness without preparation is common to all such starting-points in the discussion. So Ramakrṣna concludes that only the first three members need be accepted and not the last three beginning with udāharaṇa. And, if only the udāharaṇa and the upanaya are admitted as the Bauddhas do, all these defects emerge.

There is a difficulty with reference to the stand taken by the Advaitin and the Naiyāyikas. Pratijñā and the nigamana and the hētu and the upanaya are more or less verbal restatements and therefore, they can be done away with; the Naiyāyika affirms that each of the five members in a syllogism fulfills a distinct need. Each member answers to a separate pramāṇa, verbal, inferential, perceptual and analogical
respectively; and the conclusion is not a purposeless restatement of the thesis, pratijña. Its purpose is to indicate that the probans is not vitiated by the presence of a counterprobans proving the contrary (asatpratipakṣatva) nor stultified by stronger proof (abādhitatva). And the complex cognition or subsumptive reflection (or upanaya) is there to show that the probans which is made out to be invariably concomitant with the probandum (sādhyavyāpaka) should be specifically known to be present in the minor term. Without this, the syllogism will not be complete. Prof. Kuppuswami Sastri writes refuting the thesis "either hētu or upanaya and either pratijña or nigamana are superfluous and this superfluity is inherited from the time when the Nyāya was a method of debate and not yet a syllogism and in the case of the Nyāya School, the convention of five members may have been fixed by a desire, to equate the four 'premises' with the four pramāṇas."

All these points show that a completely satisfying syllogism must have some procedure, however formal it is; convincing demonstration will necessitate the mention of the thesis to be proved which becomes the conclusion after proving. This does not mean that they are the same. That is how the syllogism of the Advaitins could be expanded into
the formal reasoning of the Naiyāyikas, and the syllogism of
the Naiyāyikas could as well be expressed in the syllogisms
of the Advaitin. One is inclined to say, therefore, that the other
syllogisms are only the repetitions of the Nyāya Syllogism.\footnote{33}

\textbf{Inference proves the unreality of the world}

Advaita asserts Brahman alone as real, and the world as
unreal (mithyā). The realisation of the ultimate reality reveals
that the world is sublatable and hence unreal (mithyā). Madhusūdana Sarasvati says that the only way to prove the
doctrine of advaita, the non-dual reality, is by proving the
unreality of the world- "advaitasiddhērdvaitamithyātva
siddhipūrvakatvāt." \footnote{34} But the Dvaitins hold that the three
entities that is God, Jīva and world are real. Śaṅkara and his
disciples, on the other hand, deny the existence of the plurality
of selves and the separate entity of the world and God. The
śrutis say that "ekamēvādvitiyaṃ Brahma" (Brahman is one
only without a second) "nēha nānāsti kiñcana" (Here in
Brahman, there is no plurality).

Inference also can be employed to prove the unreality
of the world. The Advaitins offer several syllogistic arguments
to prove the unreality of the world-like nacre-silver, rope-snake
etc. The chief of which is the famous syllogism having for its
probans cognisability (drṣyatva). "The world is unreal since it

148
is perceptible, non-conscious (jaḍa), and limited by place (dēśa), time (kāla) and things (vastu). Whatever is perceptible in the world is unreal like the shell-silver. When the shell, the substratum of the silver, is known the knowledge of the silver will be sublated similarly the knowledge of the empirical reality of the world will be sublated by the ultimate reality, which is greater than empirical reality.

Now it is imperative to define unreality. All empirical or illusory appearances are objective, but not describable as sat, asat or sadasat. Objectivity cannot mean independent existence, for object and knowledge are, according to the Advaitins, only two names denoting the appearance of one and the same consciousness expressing itself through different media. This necessitates a probing into the exact significance of mithyā attributable to appearances. Only after defining unreality one can proceed to establish the unreality of the world. Dharmarāja defines unreality this: "The counter-correlate of absolute nonexistence, located in whatever is considered to be (abhimata) the locus of the presentation itself".

In the above definition the term 'abhimata' avoids the chance of the definition turning futile due to the lack of any true substratum of the unreal. The term 'whatever' (yāvat)
saves the definition from an unexpected conclusion (arthāntara). This view is endorsed in the following statement:

sarvēśāmapi bhāvanāṁ svāśrayatvēna sammatē
pratiyogitvamantābhāvaṁ prati mṛṣātmātā 37

The early advaitins define 'mithyā' in five different ways to show that the world is illusory. Everything except Brahman, in spite of their being cognisable as entities, are sublated by the true knowledge of Brahman. Thus the existence of things that are empirically real, can be denied at all points of time with reference to the substratum or the Brahman. The character of the phenomena and the knowledge of the empirical reality are sublated by the knowledge of the ultimate reality or the relative greater merit of the substratum to the superimposed.

Mithyā is analysed in five different ways by Madhusūdana Saraswathi the disciple of Śaṅkara to show its unreality and duality. The first three are enunciated by the Vivaraṇa school, the first of which is ascribable to Padmapādācārya, the author of Pañcapādikā.

**First definition of unreality**

Padmapāda says that unreality is indefinable. The indefinability of the world as the substratum of either being or nonbeing, the confusion of sat, asat or sadasat is that which makes it unreal.
Vyāsatīrtha in his Nyāyamṛta contents that this definition of mithyātva or falsity is ambiguous and fails to denote negation of existence qualified by nonexistence, total negations of existence and nonexistence and the total negation of nonexistence qualified by total negation of existence. The first of these is not tenable because absence of existence qualified by nonexistence is already present in the world which is only real and hence would involve the fallacy of establishing what is already established. The problem with the second sense is that it would involve all the three fallacies of vyāghāta, arthāntara and sādhyavaikalya. The third sense also is not tenable because of the presence of the same three fallacies. Unreality cannot be regarded as involving absolute negation of being and the absolute negation of nonbeing; because between being and non-being the presence of one necessarily implies the absence of the other, and a combination of the two is self-contradiction.

Madhusūdana the author of Advaitasiddhi, points out that self-contradiction would arise if one had the character of the negation of the other between being and non-being or if the absence of one were accompanied by the absence of the other. The first of these conditions of self-contradiction is not tenable to the Advaitins who do not accept any mutually negative or
exclusive relation between reality and unreality. In the second condition also, self-contradiction does not arise because there is no concomitance between the absence of non-being and the presence of being. The awareness of the unreality of the duality facilitates comprehension of the non-dual reality which is the substratum of the whole phenomena. The third allegation of vyāghāta can be proved baseless because being the pervaded in the mutual absence is not conducive to vyāghāta. For instance, the mutual absences of cow and horse though they are pervaded, coexist, in the camel. It is proper to mention here that the definition of falsity does not include the fallacy of sādhyavaikalya and the fallacy of arthāntara. To conclude, the definition of falsity in Pañcapādikā that it is neither the locus of reality or unreality is faultless.

Second definition of falsity

According to Prakāśatman the world being the creation of nescience, the duality of all phenomena is mithyā, which is defined as: "falsity is being the counter-correlate of negation for all the three points of time in the very same locus where it appears to be".

Vyāsatīrtha discards this definition, with solid argument whether being the counter-correlate of negation in the locus where it appears to be is absolute or practical or apparent. If it
is absolute negation whether it is real or unreal. If real, there should be two real things—Brahman and negation, thereby undermining the view that the non-dual Brahman alone is real. On the other hand, if it is taken as apparently real, it will remain as real leading to the fallacy of establishing what is already established. Thus if the world is a counter entity of a merely apparent real negation, mithyā will be a real entity. If it is practical then it will be negated later and therefore it will not contradict the absolute Brahman and for the same reason the reality of the world is not questioned in any way. This in its turn will present the fallacy of arthāntara and nullify the validity of such śrutis as 'there is in it no diversity'⁴⁰ thereby finally establishing the absolute reality of the world.

Challenging the Dvaitin's conception of duality as sat the Advaitins state that the negation in all the three times is non-different from Brahman which is the substratum of negation. Moreover, the fact of the world being the object of an absolutely real negation does not essentially corroborate the phenomenal world as absolutely real. So negation has no absolute reality but only an empirical reality like bhāva and abhāva which have the same status in point of reality. The common character of perceptibility makes the world and its negation liable to contradiction. The śrutis also assert that the
mithyātva of the world, establish the non-duality of Brahman.

If the world in its own form were capable of negation in all the times it engenders the objection of it having no origination, continuance and dissolution as explained by Vēdāntins.

Another objection raised by the Dvaitins to this view is that if the phenomenal world is mithyā it has no existence at all. Being the object of an absolute negation in relation to the substratum occupied by it means the capability of absolute negation at all times and in all places. According to the Advaitins, however, the object of negation at all times belongs to the phenomenon of indefinable existence (anirvacanīya). That which lacks the character of being as such, and has no existence at all can never be cognised in any substratum as real. Thus Prakāśātman explains that the reality does not belong either to the shell-silver or to the phenomenal world, but only to Brahman. Therefore, neither the shell-silver nor the phenomenal world can be absolute non-entities. The silver and the world are distinctly cognised as existence or reality. But sat indicates Brahman which is not contradicted in past, present or future. The Vivaraṇa definition of falsity that it is the counter-correlate of negation for all the three points of time in the very same locus-where it appears to be,
is faultless.

Third definition of falsity

On the basis of Vivaraṇa, Madhusūdana explains mithyātva as an entity terminable by cognition.⁴³

Vyāsatīrtha criticises this saying that this cannot be a true definition of falsity. Cognition of past events and things even though false, ceases by itself without waiting to be discarded by right cognition. It is also not felt that silver is discarded by cognition of sea-shell. Moreover, every cognition would be discarded by a subsequent cognition, so much so that cognitions have to be considered false.

Madhusūdana contends this by saying that what is meant by the state of being discarded by cognition is that it has its existence denied by a general negation proceeding from the true knowledge of the substratum. This existence may be in its own form as effect or cause. The effect has an existence in the cause. For example, when a pot is broken with a blow, it ceases to exist in its own form as the pot, but its existence in the form of its material cause is continuous with the latent form as earthen particles. This sort of dual existence of anything in the world could be negated only by the true knowledge of the non-dual reality that is Brahman. Therefore, falsity is the state of being negated by knowledge in its function.
as knowledge. All cognitions need not be considered false because one cognition does not negate the proceeding cognition by its function as cognition, but it does so on account of its posteriority and hence the charge of invalidity against this argument will not stand. The definition of unreality is not applicable to non entities like the hares born because the absolute denial of their existence is not by virtue of any knowledge. In the case of shell-silver, there is an apparent reality of the silver until it is denied by subsequent cognition "This is not silver". The knowledge of the real substratum (shell) removes the ignorance of misconception of the silver (nivartya) along with other factors of the present and the past. Thus in general, the empirical reality of the whole phenomenon will be contradicted by the true knowledge of Brahman.

**Fourth definition**

Citsukha defines mithyā as the counterpart of the absolute negation located in its own substratum.44 The absolute negation is with reference to the invariably present positive counterpart that enables the cognition of the unreal object.

Vyāsatīrtha alleges the very same defects as he did in the case of the second definition. Madhusūdana agrees with him, in spite of his notion that it is not similar to the second definition. Here it is to be taken to mean appearance in the
very same locus where there is actually its own eternal absence.

The argument against this is that when a pot is produced it discards its eternal absence. Madhusūdana refutes this stating that the pot and its absolute negation may coexist at some time and at the same place. The pot exists in the kapāla, while its negation remains on the floor. But before the production of the pot, it may come into contact with a certain point in space. There is an absolute negation of it at that point of contact and after the breaking of it but not cognisable empirically. The pot has no existence before it is produced and its prior nonexistence does not exist after its production. Similarly, there could be compatibility of the nature of their cause with the absolute negation of the product. Thus it creates the prior negation of an object but not possibly on the same substratum where its absolute negation exists. As in time, in place also the prior negation and the eternal absence of the same object can coexist. For admitting the coexistence of prior negation and eternal absence in the same place also we have valid ground. Inference and śrutī prove their coexistence.

Dvaitins admit of the coexistence of the prior and the absolute negation on the point of time only. But the Advaitins disagree and cites the example of shell-silver to prove the coexistence of prior and absolute negation. Illusory shell-silver
is empirically real, prompting to take the shell as silver but there is the absence of silver in the same place where silver is cognised. Thus the whole phenomenon is absolutely absent yet it is not as at because the latter never appears as real in any substratum. Śruti also asserts that in the beginning there was only sat no idea as to the existence of asat. Moreover, inferential cognition also establishes the unreality of the word; for Brahman as sat never appears to exist on any substratum. The world is not non-dual Brahman; it is only mithyā as it has no entity at any time, place etc; apart from nāmarūpa.

Citsukha shows us the falsity of the world to prove that the non-dual sat is the only reality starting the argument with a formal definition of the most fundamental concept of the Vēdānta, namely the concept of self-revelation or self-illumination (svaprakāśa).

**Fifth definition of falsity**

Ānandabōdha defines mithyā as "sadviviktatva", an object which exists in its being something distinct from sat recognisable by the means of valid knowledge and hence appears to be real. The validity of the means exists in its being unaccompanied by deficiencies or discrepancies. Thus, falsity is like the dream experience known by means of knowledge under the influence of the deficiencies imposed by sleep. But
Viśiṣṭādvaitins and, the Dvaitins accept the knowledge in the dream also as real. In the Advaitic concept this knowledge in the dream also as real. In the Advaitic Concept this knowledge in the dream is unreal, for it is sublated by the knowledge of the waking state. Remaining uncontradicted in the empirical level it is contradicted only after the realization of Brahman. There is no sublation in the state of Saṁsāra, \( ^{47} \) "for where there is duality as it were, there one sees the other, one smells the other, one tastes the other, one speaks to the other, one hears the other, one thinks of the other, one touches the other, one knows the other". Śruti also supports the view of the non-contradiction (abādhya) of the world in the state of bondage of the jīva. Just as the dream cognition is real at the time of the cognition of dream objects, this would also be abādhita not being sublated till the realisation of the pāramārthika sattā or Brahman. Avidyā (nescience) is not to be taken as dōṣa in the case of the knowledge of Brahman (Brahmajñāna). Ātman is incomprehensible and hence described as 'not this' 'not this' knowledge of Brahman is not contradicted but the knowledge of the pot, shell-silver etc. will be contradicted for they are mithyā and the knowledge of the empirical and the apparent is accompanied by defect (dōṣa). Sadbhinna or the things other than the non-dual sat are unreal for, they differ from Brahman
of the ultimate reality which is realised without defect by an instrument of knowledge.

This definition will, however, apply to absolute nonentities as well as to Brahman which is devoid of any character. Hence, it become necessary to supplement the definition further. Falsity of an object consists in its being distinct from existence and yet being cognised or Brahman because both are never known as existing. Thus the object is unreal when it is distinct from real, yet when it is cognised as existing, it does not include asat, for it will not be the object of cognition qualified by existence.

Non-duality is the ultimate truth and the very truth of non-duality entails the illusoriness of a world of multifarious differences. To determine the nature of reality on the basis of experience is to reduce it to the status of appearance. But the only reality behind the appearance is Brahman.

In fact, herein the case of this fifth definition of falsity also, all the reasonings put forward in the case of the first definition are relevant. Falsity is distinct from both existence and nonexistence. Thus the fifth definition of falsity also is flawless.

**Conclusion**

Placed next to perception, anumāna is a mediate means
of knowledge. It is the instrument of inferential knowledge derived from invariable concomitance. However, the Naiyāyikas state that invariable concomitance is not enough for inferential knowledge which is derived from parāmarśajñāna.

Anumāna falls under the categories of svārtha, meant for oneself and parārtha meant for others. The former derives knowledge out of arguments with oneself. The latter demonstrates the truth of the conclusion to others by means of a syllogism. The reasoning process involved in a syllogism consists of three members to the Advaitins while to the Naiyāyikas, it has five members. Dharmarāja affirms that anumāna is of a single kind called anvayi unlike the kēvalānvayi, kēvalavyatirēki and anvayavyatirēki of Naiyāyikas. Thus anumāna places the whole world except Brahman as mithyā which is illustrated in five different forms by later Advaitins to prove the illusoriness of the word.

Notes and references
1. D.M. Datta, Six ways of knowing, p.203
2. Tatpūrvvakamanumānam, N.S.I.I.5
3. mitēna liṅgēna liṅginōrthasya pāscāt mānamanumānam V.B;I.1.3.
4. Vyāptiviśīṣṭapakṣadharmaṭājñānajanyam, etc; T.C.II.P.2.
5. N.M., P.109
6. Asyēdam kāryam, kāraṇam, saṃyōgi, virōdhi, samavāyi cēt laiṅgikam, V.S.; IX, 2.1
7. Vai.s., IX.ii.2
8. Nyāyabindu, Chapter. I I
10. Mādhvācārya, Sarvadarśanasanāngraha, P.5-9
11. Tattvakaumudi, 5; V.B; I.7, VP; P.54.
12. "Anumitikaraṇam Anumānam", V.P.; P. 52
13. Parāmarśajanyam jñānamanumitiḥ, T.S.P.18
14. A Primer of Indian Logic; P. 194
15. Ibid.; P. 200
16. Yatra dhūmastatrāgniriti sāhacaryaniyamō vyāptih, TS.p.45
17. Athavā hētumanniṣṭhavirahapratiyōgina sādhyeṇa hētōraikādhikaranynam vyāptirucyatē, B.P.; 69. Vide also T.C.; II, P. 100.
18. Vyāptiḥ sādhyavadanyasminnasāṃbandhah, B.P.; 68.
19. V.P., Ch. II.
21. Bhūyōdarśanam sakPADdarśanam vēti viśēśo nādaraṇīyah,
23. Ibid.
25. V.P.; P. 57
26. Ts; P. 50.
27. N.B., 1.1.39
28. V.P., p.57
29. Ibid., p. 170
30. S.Kuppuswami Sastri, A primer of Indian logic, p.222
31. S.C.Chatterjee, Nyaya theory of knowledge, p.305
32. H.N.Ranade, Indian logic in early schools; p.167
33. Advaita Epistemology; p.70
34. Advaitasiddhi, Nirmayasagar Press edition, 1937, p.8
35. Ibid., p.31
36. Svāśrayatvēnābhimatayāvanniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyōgitvam, VP., p.58
37. Tattvapradīpikā; p.39
38. N.S.; 1. 2-8
40. Nēhanānāsti kiñcana, B.U.IV.iv.19
41. A.Sl.P.140 "ōtadēva sadarthakēṇa upādhīpadēṇa sūcitam"
42. Ibid. See Viṭṭhalēśōpādhyaẏi, the commentary on Laghucandrika, p.140.- "Satpadam hi abādhyatvēnaiva brahmna bōdhakam"

43. A.Si.,p.160, vide, P.P.V., p.179
44. A.Si., p.182
46. A.Si., p.195 "Sadviviktatvam vā mithyātvam"
47. V.P., pp.5-6
48. A.Si., p.202