CHAPTER 6
CONCLUDING REMARKS
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In the development of Indian philosophy, the controversy between the orthodox and the heterodox systems plays an important role. Of course, criticism of Brāhmanic schools can be found right from the Vedic period. As far as the present study is concerned, Jaimini does not refer to any type of controversy, but Śabara clearly indicates the refutation of the nirālambana (no-substratum theory) and śūnya (theory of emptiness) theories of Buddhism. Kumarila is intent upon the refutation of the opponents. He has a two-fold aim. He wants to protect the Mīmāṃsā school from the severe attacks of Buddhism and ii) He wishes that Mīmāṃsā should be brought back to the orthodox way from the Lokāyata system. Dīnāga refutes Mīmāṃsā theories, Bhavya refutes probably Śabara, and Jayarāśi, Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita, Prabhācandra, Ratnaprabhasūri, and so on criticise Kumārila on the major issues.

Here, in the present work, a humble attempt is made to study the refutation of the Mīmāṃsakas by the heterodox systems of Indian philosophy. The main Mīmāṃsā principles, like vedāpauruṣeyatva (non-human origin of the Veda), svataḥ-prāmāṇya (self-validity) śabdāntityatva (eternity of words) and lastly, six means of valid cognitions have been discussed in the light of their refutation by the scholars mentioned above.

In the first chapter of the thesis, the origin of controversy between the Mīmāṃsakas and the heterodox systems, is discussed. A brief survey of major works of the opponents has been made.
The second chapter deals with the refutation of the main Mīmāṃsā theory, 'vedāpaunuṣeyatva' (non-human origin of the Veda)

In the third chapter, the refutation of svatah-pramāṇya (self-validity) of all means of valid cognitions has been discussed according to the refutation made by Buddhism and Jainism.

The fourth chapter deals with the refutation of eternity of word, its denotation and the relation of both the word and its denotation.

The fifth chapter consists of the refutation of six means of valid cognitions, made by Cārvāka system, Buddhism and Jainism.

The refutation of self-validity of all valid means of cognition cannot be found in the Cārvāka system of Indian philosophy.

As far as the refutation of vedāpaunuṣeyatva (non-human origin of the Veda) is concerned, Jayarāśi clearly refers to the followers of Kumārila. In this connection, Eli Franco opines¹ that others who follow the opinion of the numbskull (Kumati, certainly mocks Kumārila say the validity of the Veda by its not being of human origin. As regard the verse quoted from TS of Śāntarakṣita, Eli Franco opines² that the verse seems to have come from some unknown commentary on the Brhaṭṭīkā of Kumārila. As he says, Jayarāśi, refers to Kumārila’s positions as they appear in the Brhaṭṭīkā and not in the Ślokavarttika. Next, he admits³ that some passages of this argument against the Veda have been assembled in NKC of Prabhācandra.

Jayarāśi attacks the Veda on the reason, 'unremembrance of the author' and secondly, on the assertion that 'the cognition derived from the Vedic injunction is faultless and does not have sublative. According to Jayarāśi, by employing artificial character, i.e. unremembrance of author, this would go to the contrary instance. He says that the followers of Kaṇḍada remember the author and people use to say in
their daily conversation very often that the Vedas are composed by Brahmā etc.

However, he does not go to take support from the means of cognitions to attack on the Veda as Jainas do, although he putsforth many alternatives in his argument. It can easily be said from the point of view of the Cārvāka system, that the author of the Veda is not perceived, since he is not the subject of perception. This system accepts sense-perception only as a means of valid cognition. If he is not the subject of perception, then the authorless treatise, i.e. the Veda becomes invalid, like Hare’s horn, which is not perceptible. According to him, there must be an author. To make his argument competent, he takes the usages of common people. Hence, the system is called Lokāyata. On the contrary, however, a doubt arises as to how can he accept the divine Brahmā. Since this system rejects God, soul etc. and secondly, how can he accept the usages (words) of people as valid as well as the words of the followers of Kāṇāda?

Next, Jayarāśi attacks on the validity of the cognition brought about by Vedic injunction. However, it seems that he does not differentiae the cognition which is derived from senses, from the cognition derived from Vedic injunctions. He uses allmost all ordinary examples to make his argument sound. However, Vedic injunctions convey the meaning (object) with regard to past, present, future and also what is subtle, hidden, remote and the like and this cannot be done by any organ of sense.

As Bhāvaviveka says in the so-called pūrvapakṣa it is true that the tradition of the Veda comes down to us by oral transmission and there is no any interruption in its study. Therefore, having seen this tradition, he admits Buddhism in this category and the teachings of Buddha are considered as Buddhism. However, in the case of the Veda, we cannot find any adviser. Veda itself is an adviser of
Dharma. Hence a question arises that how Buddhism can be accepted as āgama (authoritative sayings). Of course, there is never any interruption in the teachings of Buddha or in the tradition of Buddhism. If Buddhism is considered to be similar to the Veda, then the Buddha as the propounder of his doctrine should not have been remembered.

Bhāvaviveka gives an example of a goldsmith. People generally trust the goldsmith as regards the purity of gold although he is a human being. If goldsmith is a trustworthy person, then his words cannot be false. However, in the case of the Veda, there is no scope for such doubt. The assertion of the Veda i.e. 'Having desire for the heaven, one should perform sacrifices' is not an uncertain one.

Further, Bhāvaviveka goes on refuting the Veda on a number of points, like bhutahimsā (killing of living beings), surāpāna (consumption of liquor), mithyokti (speaking lie) etc. However it seems that these are the common factors which can be found in the refutation of Veda by opponents.

It seems that Dharmakīrti replies for the objection raised by Kumārila against Diinnāga. According to him, reason of truthfulness and merits of sentences pertain to human beings. This is to say that either truthfulness or merits depend upon the human beings. In the sense, Vedic sentences are dependent. Secondly, he says that the reason of making understand, the meaning depends upon the accurate convention of human beings.

Another reason he shows that a single sentence conveys many meanings, although there is a rule, i.e. one word conveys one meaning. As a matter of fact, in the case of Vedic sentence, this rule should be followed, otherwise, there is a split of sentence. However, we do not find the exact definition of the split of sentence (vākyabheda) in the Mīmāṃsā texts. On the basis of the JS II 2.47, we can explain
this concept as follows. 'When the parts of the sentences are equally independent of each other as well as one sentence does not expect words from other sentence to complete it, they should be treated as separate sentences.' Split of sentence is the most serious fault which disassociates the sentence and its meaning. Therefore it is to be avoided in sentences by means of various devices.

He raises another point that the beginninglessness would not lead to the status of being non-human origin of the Veda, because beginninglessness can be applied for the usages of Mlecchas as well as of the usages of heterodox systems.

According to Dharmakirti, an author of the Veda can be inferred, because, there is no single nature that can be found in the sequence of alphabets. This manifold nature of alphabets can be found only in products.

Next, he says that words themselves cannot assert the meaning as such and such people assume the meaning of words. It also leads to infer the author whose sentences should be non-contradictory and meaningful.

Regarding the Vedic injunction, 'One who desires heaven should perform Agnihotra'. Dharmakirti cite a parallel injunction: 'one who desire heaven, should eat flesh of dog'. This statement has no reference to Veda and has been made just for the sake of argument.

So far as the non-human origin of the Veda is concerned, Santarakṣita states that, this is the product of false pride of the twice-born people. He argues invalidity on the ground that it stands in need of explanations by persons. It is dependent like a blind man. Therefore validity and reality of the Veda cannot be right. It seems, that Santarakṣita's argument is similar to the arguments made by Dharmakirti. But regarding to the statement, i.e. 'Veda is dependent', it needs
further explanations, teachings of Buddha also need explanations. It is found that Buddhists too explain the teachings of Buddha in various ways. Hence, there is no need to say that the Veda is dependent.

According to him, the Veda is reduced to futility because there are the sentences, such as 'six cakes' etc 19. According to Šabara, these are useless sentences, since they are too ordinary and do not have expectancy 20. Next, Šāntarakṣita criticizing Veda, on the ground of tradition, without which the Veda would have not been proved to be valid. Any beginningless line of pupils and teachers even though assumed, cannot make it faultless. Since a single person cannot be held to be capable of perceiving super-sensuous things, the tradional line of pupils and teachers can only be a line of blind persons 21.

Regarding the unbroken tradition of pupils and teachers, Jayatilleke says that, it was not exclusively used in reference to the teachers of Vedic tradition. According to Jayatilleke, it seems that despite the presence of other traditions, the Vedic tradition was the most influential one and all attention is focused on questioning its authority. This line of teachers and pupils is called as 'paramparā'. The word 'paramparā' means a series of succession as well as an unbroken succession of teaching 22.

Next, Šāntarakṣita says that the Veda is a work of man; as it speaks about wrongful events, such as killing of animals and speaking lie etc 23. Bhāvaviveka also raises similar objections 24. However, prohibition of killing of animals of living beings can be found in the Šābara Bhāsyā. Šabara states that the immoral act like, Śyena etc. involves inflicting injury and the inflicting injury has been forbidden, because Śyena and other such sacrifices are nowhere prescribed as benevolent rites that one should perform. They are optional Vedic rites. If at all one desires to inflict injury
upon the enemy, one may perform the Śyena etc. They do not say that one should inflict injury 25.

The refutation of surāpāna (consumption of liquor) may be considered as the refutation of somapāna. Here, we can make a distinction between surā (liquor) and soma (soma-juice). Soma used to be offered to Gods and it was to be consumed by the priests alone. However, the surā was not usually offered to Gods (except the Sautrāmani sacrifice) and it was being consumed by common people.

A number of smṛtis, digests, commentaries prohibit drinking of liquor. Bhāvaviveka too presents his views, regarding the prohibition of liquor. However, he emphasises that consuming liquor with reciting mantras yields the same effect such as consuming liquor without reciting mantras 26.

As regards the mithyokti (speaking a lie), a number of passages can be found in the Vedas. According to the Mīmāṁsakas, they are to be considered as arthavādas (explanatory passages). Śabara quotes the mantra 'Catvāri śṛṅgāḥ' and says that the thing spoken of directly by the words here has no existence. However, words could be taken in an indirect sense and such expressions are accepted to be currect and justifiable. The mantra 'Oṣadhe trāyasva' etc. addressed to the sacrificial substances are insensate and meant to indicate the accomplishment of sacrifice. They are as efficient as intelligent beings. Similarly, the sentences like 'Śṛṇota grāvāṇaḥ' are meant to indicate that the recitation of Morning Hymns will follow. The statement is significant, because it implies that insensate stones will listen to it, how much more the learned Brāhmaṇas do? Therefore even if the stones are insensate, they are invoked 27.

It is interesting to note that Jainism differs from the Buddhism on one point. Prabhācandra states 28 that for want of all means of cognitions, the non-human
origin of the Veda cannot be proved. Perception is not capable to prove it, since sense organs contact only such things as are present. It cannot be proved by the means of inference, because the reason, 'unremembrance of the author' becomes useless, just like Hare's horn. As he says regarding the unbroken tradition, there are many sentences which have an unbroken tradition. Therefore, the reason given by Mīmāṃsakas becomes unsound.

As regards the authorship of the Veda, he quotes some Purānic sentences which are associated with the creatorship of Brahman. As he says, unremembrance of the author is accidental. Non-apprehension, presumption and inference are not the means to prove the 'unremembrance of the author'. āgama (scriptural sayings) cannot be a proof to achieve the status of non-human origin of the Veda, due to the fault of mutual dependence. As such, validity of the Veda can be achieved, only if there is the status of non-human origin, and that can be achieved only there is validity of āgama. It cannot be achieved in the form of prasājya pratiṣedha (negative particle नृ连接 with a verbal activity) or in the form of paryudāsa (negative particle is compounded with a noun). Ratnaprabhasūri follows the same line.

It is significant to note that in post-Buddhistic times, there was a controversy between the orthodox and the non-orthodox schools as to whether the Vedas derive their authority from a personal authorship, human or divine or form the absence of human authorship. Mīmāṃsakas assert the reliability of the Vedas on the grounds of their eternality. According to them, it had no human author or divine founder and therefore it was not affected by the defects of an instruments of knowledge. Since it dealt with matters which were unverifiable, it could not be contradicted.

As Jayatilleke says, the main criticism was that the authors of the Veda or their
successors do not have any special insight nor do they admit seeing directly the truth of their assertions and claim infallibility for them.

It can be found in Brāhmaṇic and Upaniṣadic tradition, that Vedic knowledge was deemed to be derived from divine origin i.e. Prajāpati or Brahmā. During that period, it seems that there was a strong belief that the original seers had a special intuitive knowledge of Vedic dharma. In this connection, we can quote the Yāska’s statement that ‘the seers had a direct personal knowledge of Dharma’. There are a number of earliest accounts of the divine origin of the Vedas, possibly due to the influence of the Puruṣa sūkta. Prajāpati is very often credited with the task of creating it. It is also significant that Prajāpati is identified with Brahmā in Brāhmaṇas. It should also be noted that in the Brāhmaṇas Brahmā is identically associated with the three Vedas.

If we come to the earliest phase of the Upaniṣads we find Prajāpati continuing in his role as creator of the Vedas. It seems that this notion might be the main target of the criticism of the opponents.

As Jayatilleke says, there is another criticism of the infallibility of the Vedas. From the time of Brāhmaṇas, it was generally assumed that the seers were not the authors or the composers of the Veda, which they saw by supernatural insight. The seers are constantly described as the makers and the utterers of the hymns. With the emergence of the conception of the eternity of the Vedas, it could not have possibly held that the seers composed them. Mīmāṃsā argument emphasises that a word is the same even if it is uttered several times or by several persons.

As far as the validity of knowledge is concerned, a question arises as to what is validity and what is invalidity. The valid of knowledge is called as 'pramā' and validity is called 'pramātva' in the Nyāya system. Kumārila and his commentators
have used the terms 'pramāṇa' for valid means of cognition, 'prāmāṇya' for validity 'apramāṇa' for invalid and 'aprāmāṇya' for invalidity.

Pārthasārathi distinguishes the terms 'satyatva (truthfulness) and prāmāṇya (validity). There are two individuals, one asserting that there is Indra and the other asserting that 'there is no Indra'. These two statements are contradictory, one of them, however, must be true (satya). In this connection, Pārthasārathi says that as there is no certitude (nirṛityakatva) as which of them is true, there can be no validity 38. Thus it seems that the validity implies the truth does not imply the validity.

Kumārila defines valid knowledge as follows: "Valid knowledge is a firm or assured cognition of object which does not stand in need of confirmation by other cognitions" 39.

According to Pārthasārathi, the definition of valid knowledge as an apprehension of a previously unapprehended object, which is devoid of defects, in its source and is not contradicted by subsequent experience 40. Next, he mentions three distinctive features of valid knowledge 41 viz., 1) its object is not remembered as having been previously known.

2) it confirms the real nature of its object.

3) there is a feeling of conviction regarding its confirmity or agreement with the real object. Thus novelty, freedom from doubt and truth are the essential marks of valid knowledge and among these, if any one is absent, it cannot be valid.

The Buddhist view of valid knowledge is the same as that of Kumārila. Dharmakīrti states that a source of right knowledge is uncontradicted experience 42. Dharmottara defines valid knowledge as the knowledge of a previously unknown thing 43. Because the function of knowledge is to prompt activity in relation to a thing
that is presented by it and thus to help in securing it. Therefore memory is not valid
means of cognition. In the same manner, doubt and error are also excluded from
valid means of cognition. However, it should be noted that the view of non-contra-
diction is different from the view of Kumārila and his commentators. If knowledge
shows an object and leads to it, then it is non-contradicted. Knowledge is sought
for the sake of successful practical activity by people desirous of an effective deal-
ing with objects. Hence valid knowledge is that which alone presents objects capa-
ble of fulfilling our pragmatic needs 44. Thus it seems that Buddhistic conception of
truth is pragmatic while Mīmāṃsā conception is realistic.

The Buddhist conception of truth has been criticised, because it is too wide
as it applies to memory as well as practical efficiency. And again, it is too narrow,
because it does not apply to inferential cognitions of past and future objects which
lack practical efficiency 45. If truth is equated with practical efficiency, the knowl-
edge of such objects as perish after their birth (e.g. lighting) will always be flase,
because they cannot be attained 46. Again, a cognition showing water to a man who
is not thirsty, and inspiring no practical activity in him will be false and the cognition
of water in a dream leading to the satisfaction of the dreamer's thirst will be true
47.

Valid means of cognition is true and definite. If any knowledge, however, lacks
definiteness or certitude or does not convey any new information or does not rep-
resent things as they really are, it is invalid. According to Kumārila, there are three
kinds of invalid knowledge 48 viz. mithyājñāna (error or illusion), ājñāna (non-cogni-
tion or ignorance) and sañśaya (doubt). In this statement, there is no mention of
memory-which is definitely invalid according to him. It is strange that he does not
mention it as a form of invalid knowledge along with other forms.
Sucaritamiśra classifies knowledge into five categories viz., cognition, illusion, doubt, memory and consistent knowledge. In this list, he does not mention ignorance as a form of invalid knowledge. It is true that validity and invalidity are the properties of knowledge and not presence or absence of knowledge. It is also true that ignorance or absence of knowledge does not help in the practical activities of life. But the practical disadvantage which is caused by ignorance does not justify calling it invalid. It is always some knowledge that is judged to be valid or invalid.

Śāntarakṣita criticises the views of Kumārila regarding the validity of cognitions. He says that validity is not proved by valid cognition and in the same way invalidity also has not been proved. In the case of one thing being dependent on another thing of the same kind, there can be infinite regress. However, in the case of dependent of another kind, its root is firmly established, because it is due to another cause. According to him, a thing which produces desired effect, cannot be inherent, because it is non-eternal. If the capacity is inherent, then cognitions would have to be regarded eternal without cause either permanently exist or do not permanently exist.

Criticizing Kumārila, he argues that invalidity is to be regarded as inherent. Because it exists there, by itself and that self-validity is the only basis for invalidity. According him, there is a need for another sublating cognition where suspicion exists in the mind of the person by the previous cognition. A person through stupidity assumes the existence of sublating cognition. Wrong cognition arises due to suspicion, distinct place, time and certain circumstances. When persons having perceptive organs deranged by love, hate, intoxication, madness, hunger, thirst etc. come to cognise with difficulty and contrary conclusion is ascertained. If, then, validity of cognitions is inherent in them, then there is no infinite regress and validity and invalidity remain to be in reality.
As he says, validity of cognitions is to be proved by other means of cognitions and the latter is also the same, then there would be an infinite regress. Sense perception and the rest are recognised as valid means of cognitions and till they are so recognised, there would not be any business.

According to him, absence of defects in the words of trustworthy person is decreased from his excellences, then the infinite regress remains the same. In the assertion of the Māṁśakas 'the cognition produced by the Veda is valid' a negative form has not been used. Hence it does not mean the denial of invalidity. Further, he opines that if the validity of all cognitions is inherent in them by themselves, then there is no need of difference of opinion among disputants and the validity of cognitions itself is contrary to inference.

If self-validity of cognitions stands as the general rule, it is discarded when there is either an annulment of it or the cognition due to its defective sources. Knowledge becoming valid on account of the absence of annulment and absence of the cognition of the source being defective and thus certainty regarding validity is due to extraneous causes. Because absence is a negative cognition and the form others are positive. Invalidity of cognitions may be proved to be inherent in them for the same reason. Hence self-invalidity of cognitions should be asserted as the general rule.

In the same way, he refutes Māṁśakas in a long length and argues validity of the cognitions is due to extraneous and invalidity is due to intrinsic factors.

The Buddhists theory maintains that falsehood is inherene in all means of cognitions while truth is extraneous. An apperance of any cognition is not sufficient to prove its validity. The knowledge of silver arises when there is actually silver and sometimes when there is no silver, but some other object like silver such as a conch
shell. Hence it can be said that silver is actually present simply on the ground that its knowledge has been produced. Therefore the validity of knowledge cannot be ascertained by the knowledge itself. It can be ascertained only when it is seen that knowledge leads to the expected practical efficiency (arthakriyākārīta). For instance, when a jar is cognised, the cognition by itself does not give an assurance that the jar is actually present. Afterwards we approach the object and find that we can fetch water in it, then it is ascertained that the cognition was true. Again, it can be ascertained even when there is no knowledge of practical efficiency, by the subsequent knowledge that the cause of knowledge possesses excellence (guṇavatkaranajñāna) or by knowing that the knowledge agrees with another knowledge of the same object (jnānātaraśamvāda). Thus the validity of knowledge is ascertained by some other knowledge and not by the same knowledge, since knowledge by itself is doubtful on account of falsehood which is inherent in it. Falsehood is nothing, but the absence of truth. It is non-entity (avastu), like a hare's horn, and thus cannot be produced by any thing 59.

According to Mīmāṃsakas, that falsehood is generated by the defects of the cause of knowledge is wrong, because non-entity cannot have a cause for its origin. Hence falsehood is present in knowledge from the very beginning, while truth being a positive entity (vastu) like a pot, is produced in knowledge extraneously by a cause, i.e. the presence of merits in the source, just as a pot is produced by some causes such as the clay, the potter and so on. Defects or demerits of the sense-organ include those belonging to the cogniser, e.g. jaundice that causes defect in the eye-sight and as well as those belonging to the objects, e.g. minuteness of the object, distance from the cogniser etc. Excellence or merits include such elements as the healthiness of sense-organs, reliability of a person, nearness of the object and so on. Defects are not active parts in producing falsehood, but they only
remove merits. As a matter of fact, that falsehood is not produced by demerits can be found in the case of non-cognition (ājñāna). The Mīmāṃsakas cite positive and negative concomitance (anvayavyatireka) between demerits and falsehood, but that is wrong, because it fails in the case of non-cognition, even though it is true in the cases like illusion and doubt. Hence it can be concluded that falsehood is uncaused and natural while truth is caused and adventitious 80.

Pārthasārathi criticizes Buddhist view. He says that falsehood is not merely an absence of truth. It is not prior-absence of certitude (niścayaprāgabhāva), as the Buddhist seem to hold. In the case of illusion, e.g. that of silver in a shell, which is a form of false knowledge, the perceiver is as confidant of the presence of silver as in the case of real silver. False knowledge is positive in character. It represents something as a different thing due to certain vitiating factors and this can be known from positive and negative concomitance. The knowledge which is doubtful in its very origin is known to arise from certain defects. As regards the non-cognition, it is obviously due to the absence of causes which gives rise to cognition. However, what is true in the case of non-cognition, that may not be true in the case of illusion and doubt. Hence falsehood is uncaused and natural, it is caused by defects 81.

According to Buddhism, truth is caused by excellences and where there are no excellence there is no truth. If it is so, there could not be truth in the cognition of a white conch as yellow or in that of shell as silver which is produced by visual sense devoid of excellences. In the cognition of a yellow conch, the element of conchness is true, though yellowness is false. In the illusion of silver in a shell too, the cognition is true in respect of such general features as brightness etc. These elements are evidently caused by merely the conditions of knowledge but not by excellences, since there are no excellences. Again, (as regards), the purity of organs
etc. meant by the Buddhist, the Mīmāṃsaka's view is not contrary to it, because then excellences become equivalent to the absence of defects. And again, it does not interfere with the truth of the Veda. The Veda has no author and so the question of the presence of defects in its source does not arise. As a matter of fact, truth is not caused by the presence of merits, or by the presence of defects in the generating conditions of knowledge, but it is natural and intrinsic to knowledge. Wherever we found excellences in the cause of knowledge, they are not directly operative in producing truth. They serve just as removing defects. Thus merits are not directly the cause of truth.

The Buddhist's contention is that all knowledge is known to be false at the time of its origin, because falsehood depends upon the conditions which give rise to knowledge. If knowledge is inherently false, and immediately known to be false, illusion and disappointment cannot be explained. If a shell is perceived as silver and we immediately know that it is not silver, then the cognition 'it is not silver' becomes inexplicable. On the contrary, if a false knowledge is accepted to be true at the time of its origin, this fact shows that knowledge is known to be true intrinsically, while falsehood is a later discovery depending upon conditions extraneous to the condition of knowledge.

Pārthasarathi draws an attention in this regard to one possible misinterpretation of self-validity and invalidity due to others. Svātastva (intrinsicality) of truth does not imply that all knowledge is born true and parastva' (extrinsicality) of falsehood does not imply that knowledge born true is made false by such extraneous conditions as the subsequent appearance of a contradicting knowledge etc. Truth and falsehood are produced in true and false respectively as well as simultaneously with the production of knowledge. They are properties of knowledge and
are present from the very beginning. This is not correct to say that truth is born at the very beginning stage and falsehood is added later on, because falsehood is produced by same vitiating factors and they are present from the very beginning. The truth is intrinsic means that it is produced by the natural causes of knowledge and falsehood is extrinsic means that it is produced by some additional factor vitiating the natural causes 64.

Kumārila asks as to how are truth and falsehood can be known? He says that the validity of knowledge is known through the mere fact of its being of the nature of knowledge and it is aside by the knowledge of the object as being the recognition of discrepancies in the source 65.

The Mīmāṃsā view is that truth does not depend on any extraneous factor for its revelation and therefore it is self-evident. Pārthasārathi says that the theory of self-evidence does not mean that a cognition apprehends its truth in the form 'I am true'. On the contrary, it means that the knowledge of truth depends on the knowledge of cognition itself and the awareness of the object manifested by the cognition occurs. It is known that the object, as it is manifested, remains implicit until reflective consciousness appears. An explicit consciousness of the truth of a cognition appears subsequently and then it depends on the awareness of the cognition itself rather than on any extraneous factor 66.

It is true that the Mīmāṃsakas adopt the theory of self-validity to get a theoretical justification for the Veda and do not believe in the divine authorship. Veda is eternal and uncreated. The assertions like, 'one desirous of heaven should perform sacrifice', are not based on such extrinsic grounds as the divine authorship, ascribed to Brahman, or Prajāpati etc.

According to Prabhācandra, validity of valid means of cognitions is due to the
other factors in their origination. It is by itself as well as by other extraneous factors at the stage of consciousness 87. He says that when validity is due to self-causes, then it does not arise on account of general rule of place and time and therefore there is no activity of validity. If validity is due to its own causes, then there occurs the fallacy of establishing the established object. If validity is due to its own functions, then it cannot be produced by its own originating factors 88.

Next, he argues that at the stage of not repeated course of observation of an object in consciousness, validity of cognitions would not arise on account of unreality, suspicion etc. Both validity and invalidity is determined by self, when there is a repeated course of observation 89.

According to him, determination of validity cannot be cognised by the means of perception 70 nor by the inference 71 nor by āgama 72. It can be determined only through the consistent knowledge 73. Practical efficiency is the subject of so-called determination of validity, since it pertains directly to the non-contradiction and there is no infinite regression of the practical efficiency, compare to other cognition in suspicion of perceiving non-objects and there is no doubt from the point of view of unvisible, even that has no objects.

In a long length, as it is found in their treaties Śāntarakṣita and Prabhācandra refute mainly the views of Kumārila.

The Jaina philosopher, Ratnaprabhasūri criticises the definition of valid knowledge of the Mīmāṃsakas on the ground that it excludes recognition 74. But Kumārila denies it. Kumārila says: "that part of perception which has been perceived before cannot be said to be perceived but the present existence is not got at by any previous perception. In recognition, 'this is the same person whom I met yesterday', there are two elements, viz. 1) an element of memory 2) an element of perception.
It combines the memory element with the element of sense-perception. It is not a mere repetition of some past experience. It is valid because it reveals a new feature in the remembered object. Vādidevasūri defines valid knowledge as a determinate cognition which apprehends itself and an object. Ratnaprabhasūri explains the determinate cognition as that which determines an object in the form in which it really exists. Accordingly, absence of doubt and truth are recognised as the essential marks of valid means of cognition while newness is rejected and hence memory is accepted as a form of valid knowledge.

Regarding the validity of knowledge, it seems that he follows the line of Prabhācandra. He says that where the knowledge causing factors are good, then the knowledge is valid. On the other hand, where those factors are faulty, then the knowledge is invalid. Thus validity and invalidity of the cognition depending upon others. His argument on the Mīmāṃsā theory is that the knowledge of validity of a cognition arises from the consistent knowledge. It includes the knowledge of good qualities inherent in knowledge causing factors as well as excludes the contradictory knowledge. This consists in a knowledge of the form, the object of the present knowledge is apprehended to be similar to that of the previous knowledge. Such consistent knowledge gives the knowledge that the previous knowledge is valid.

It is established by the Mīmāṃsakas that the word as composed by letters, is eternal, so also what is denoted by the word and the relation between the word and its meaning is also eternal. Regarding this concept, almost all opponents severely criticise the Mīmāṃsakas.

According to Jayarāśi the relation between the word and its meaning cannot be cognised either by perception or by inference. If it be urged that it must be cognised by presumption, that the answer is that the presumption is based on
perception. If perception would not exist then there is an absence of presumption. Inference does not exist, because there is no rise of *vijñānagamaka* (to make an apprehension known). Being this situation, the stateness of the words and the relation of word and its meaning may not be known, then there is no validity for Vedic sentences 78.

According to S. Mukharji and H. Nagasaki, Dharmakīrti introduces a problem in Indian philosophy, whether the word is eternal or non-eternal. As they say, here the problem is concerned with the epistemological issue as to whether the audible word is possible if the latter (word) be neither permanent nor impermanent. Diṅnāga's assertion is that the word is non-eternal, because it is an object of audible perception. An assertion of Kumārila is that this argument is an instance of fallacy Dharmakīrti argues that, word is non-eternal, because it is audible as a case of doubtful issue. If audibility being understood as the causal efficiency for generating audible perception, it is natural that what is audible must be impermanent. However, audibility stands for particular causal efficiency for audible perception, then it amounts to a case of the uncommon probans. Nothing but word is possible, so the awareness of audibility in other non-eternal facts is not possible. Hence the occurrence of audibility in other non-eternal facts is not possible. Therefore it cannot be concluded that the word is non-eternal as the concomitance between audible and non-eternal is not ascertained. If it is contended that the concomitance is known in word by itself, then assertion is futile, since the word is known to be audible and non-eternal by the very act of knowledge of concomitance. Hence this is the reason for argument which is regarded as a case of doubt 79.

Regarding the eternality of word, Bhāvaviveka puts forth five more reasons in the pūrva-pakṣa 80 and they are rejected in his so-called siddhānta. It is interesting
to note that the V S of Kaṇāda claim the eternality of word and some of them are similar to the P M S of Jaimini. All they are rejected by Kaṇāda showing their doubtfulness. Rejection made by Kaṇāda seems to be similar with the rejection made by Bhāvaviveka.

Again, the refutation made by Bhāvaviveka seems to be similar to the views of opponent found in the S B. The word is often found to be destroyed, therefore when it is produced, its relation to its denotation is artificial. It is always found to follow after an effort. Šabara’s reply to this is that the word is found to appear after human effort, in the sense, that what is brought about by the effort is only the manifestation of the already existing word.

An example of a lamp given by Bhāvaviveka to disprove the eternality of the word cannot be found in the Śābara Bhāṣya. However, the refutation of the reasons, viz. recognition and repetition made by Bhāvaviveka indicates the direct refutation of Śābara Bhāṣya. Actually Mīmāṃsakas establish the eternality of the word on the grounds of these also. For these reasons, the word must be regarded as eternal. And the reason for this lies in the fact that the word heard today is actually recognised as the same that was heard yesterday. When there is utterance, it only serves to manifest the existing word, it does not create or produce it. Hence the word cannot be product or an effect. Not being an effect, it cannot be perishable and continuing to exist in its own form and not being perishable, it must be eternal.

Another objection raised by Bhāvaviveka is that if the word is perceived by ears, how is it regarded to be manifested by sound? Regarding the wordness, Bhāvaviveka says that wordness itself is not proved. However, according to the Mīmāṃsakas, wordness is the common nature found in all words. It may be noted as universal (class or generality). The term 'cow' is marked by certain characteristics
such as dewlop etc. This universal is an accomplished entity and is actually perceived as such. This universal is eternal and also the relation of the word and what is denoted by it, is also eternal.

According to Śāntarakṣita, there is no certainty regarding the eternality of word. He says that there is no some form which found in recognition. When certain words uttered by birds, such as parrot, Śārikās and so on, there is a notion of diversity. Hence recognition does not appear in all cases. As he says, there can be no manifest and manifested, because when the thing is one and indivisible then the notion precludes all notions of diversity and further there cannot be determination regarding the recognition that these are human and others are not human. As far as the oneness is concerned, his opinion is that there is no invariable concomitance as they are incompitable with the contrary.

Regarding the universal, he says: decluded people assert it as one and the same form among the several universals. However in reality the thing is momentary, the universal 'ga' is different from real 'ga'.

Next he says that under the variations of fast, middling and slow, the sound does not appear as different, when the cognition envisages something in a form that does not belong to it. Hence there is no real object of the exact form, the cognition is clearly objectless.

According to him, there is no connection between sound and its cognition. Actually there are two kinds of relationship, viz. the relationship of identity and the relationship of cause and effect. None of these is possible. It is not true that the words become expressive, when its relationship to its denotation has been apprehended, because in reality the word by itself is not expressive.

He states clearly that words do not bring about cognition of things directly,
because there is no invariable concomitance between words and external things. All words indicate the presence in the speaker of the 'desire to speak' of the things. They are definitely known through perception as the effect of the desire to speak. Therefore the relationship between them is clearly that of cause and effect and not be known except convention.

Regarding the order of sequence he says that people adopt the order of words, sentences and letters according to their own wish. There could be no certainty about uttering words exactly as they had been used previously by others. In this way the order of letters as their shortness etc. are all adjuncts of the articulation. Thus there is no property in words which is eternal. It becomes established conclusion that the word is non-eternal. Thus, Śāntarakṣita refutes the views of the Mīmāṃsakas, particularly that of Kumārila. It seems that Kumārila was the main opponent compared to other Mīmāṃsakas. Hence he quotes many verses from SV to establish the pūrvapakṣa on the part of Mīmāṃsā and afterwords he rejects all of them. It seems that the refutation made by Śāntarakṣita is similar to that made by Bhāvaviveka, however, in a broader extent.

As far as the Jaina epistemology is concerned, the Jainas do not accept the theory of eternality of word. Prabhācandra as well as Ratnaprabhasūri, reject the Mīmāṃsakas main thesis that the word is eternal, its denotation is eternal and the relation between the word and its denotation is also eternal.

Prabhācandra refutes the Mīmāṃsakas in the following way. It is not possible to ascertain the meaning of the word by the means of similarity because of its impermanence. The result of similarity of one reason can be found in another reason also, and that is appeared in the form of different and non-different. Generality (jāti) is completely a different object from this distinct and non-distinct forms, as it is
accepted as eternal. The generality should not be recognised by any reason or by
the word 63.

According to him, palatal sounds etc. are the functions of cognition but not the
functions of manifestation and there is no rule that wherever there is manifester
there is manifestation. Next, he disapproves the all-pervadingness of the word.
Regarding this, he uses an inference. The word is not all pervaded, because being
the feature of specific and general, it is perceived by external organ, like a pot.
Thus, there is no distinction between the pot and the word. He says, that the word
cannot be cognised by the means of perception nor by the means of inference
nor by the means of presumption 64.

Ratnaprabhasūri rejects the eternity of word on the following grounds viz.
recognition, inference and presumption.

According to him, recognition shows that sound is impermanent, atleast in
some respects that it is that something which was previously perceived. He says
that recognition is after all a fallocious form as it is supposed to both perception
and inference. Perception shows that a sound has its origin and its decompose. For
instance, when a pot becomes visible, if sunlight is being thrown over it, one cannot
feel that the pot is originated, nor can he say that the pot is non-existent, where it
remains invisible. Thus the fact that the perception of sound is originating and
destroying and that it is by no means eternal 65.

Next, he says that sound is not identical with the word and not as something
different from it and it is unreasonable to hold that a sound has its explicit and
that the characteristics of intensity, lowness etc. pertain to this explicit. Accord-
ing to him, inference is not capable to prove the eternity of word, because there
cannot be a rule that whatever can be heard must be necessarily eternal. An
argument based on a presumption is also unsound. A similar argument leads to the doctrine of eternality and oneness of the objects. For instance, the word 'Go' (cow) is applied to a particular cow, such as Bāhuleya, but it cannot be applied to Śābaleya cow. Hence there is an unavoidable difficulty by saying that, a word means not a particular thing, but the generality underlying the things of the same class. Hence he argues that the object is always the 'generality - as particularised - in - an - individual'. In this way, the Mīmāṃsā theory of the eternal self-existence of words based on presumption is criticized by Ratnaprabhasūri.

Perception is the primary source of valid knowledge and it gives a direct knowledge of reality, because in it we are face to face with reality, whereas the other means of cognition give only an indirect knowledge. Kumārila’s theory based on the sūtra of perception is that the cognition by a person, appears, when there is a contact of the sense-organs. It is not a means of apprehending duty (dharma) it apprehends only things existing at present. Jaimini proposes to examine the means of cognition from which duty can be known and in the very next sūtra (aphorism) he states that śabda or scriptural authority is such a means of cognition. He rejects perception since it apprehends only those objects which exist at present while Dharma (duty) as Śabara says, it yet to become (bhaviṣyat). In this connection, Jaimini has not examined the competence of other means of cognitions. Viz., inference, analogy etc. It seems that Jaimini recognised only two means of cognitions. Viz., Perception and verbal authority for the purposes of secular and religious matters respectively. It seems that Jaimini is not conscious of inference as a means of knowledge or he does not recognise its independence status. Or it may be the reason that means of cognitions are not the topic of discussion during the period of Jaimini.
According to Pārthasārathi 99, an earlier commentator Bhavadāsa takes the first part of the definition of perception viz., 'Perception is that cognition which arises on the contact of a person’s sense-organs with objects'. It seems that Diṇṇāga too accepts this first part of perception. Hattori opines 101 it is true that the works of early commentators are not available except that Śābara Bhāṣya and their views are not known in detail, so there is little justification for a decisive identification of the views as criticized by Diṇṇāga. Jinandrabuddhi comments 100 on each term of the sūtra 1) The compound ‘sat-samprayoga’ may be analysed into either ‘sato samprayogah’ or satā samprayogah 2) The word ‘samprayoga’ means samyak-prakṛṣṭa yoga (correct contact and of sufficient strength) Kumārila analyses ‘samprayoga’ means ‘samyak-prayogah’ (proper function). 3) The term ‘indriyāṇi’ refers to ‘manas’ and therefore the cognition which takes ātman for its object. 4) The compound ‘buddhi-janma’ refers as to ‘Karmadharaya’ or as a ‘ṣaṣṭheitatpuruṣa’ Kumārila develops detail discussion on the line of Śabara’s interpretation of the sūtra and rejects Bhavadāsa’s interpretation.

The second part of the sūtra as interpreted by Bhavadāsa. According to him, perception is not a means for the apprehension of Dharma. Kumārila rejects 102 this interpretation by asserting that a definition would not be correct, because one would not be able to establish a connection with the preceding nimitta sūtra (MS 1.1.3). The purpose of the sūtra is to investigate Dharma (duty) and there is no need to undertake a definition of perception. Since it does not contribute to the apprehension of Dharma (duty). Here, in this context, it may be said that if Jaimini wanted to define the means of valid cognition, he would have defined inference and the rest. If this would be considered as a definition, then it would be too wide, because it is not false cognition which arises when the senses are in contact with the object. If the word ‘samprayoga’ be reinterpreted as, ‘samyak’ ‘correct’ and ‘prayoga’ means
'functioning', then the definition would be 'perception is a cognition of a person when the senses are functioning correctly.

It seems that Diṅnāga probably follows exactly the same method to criticize the Naiyāyikas who also maintain that perception is a cognition produced by the contact of sense and object.

Vṛttikāra (probably Upavarṣa) interpretes the sūtra by changing the terms 'tat' and 'sat'. He reads, 'true perception is that which arises from the contact of a person’s sense-organs with that object alone of which it is the perception'. Eli Franco says that it is quite obvious that the Vṛttikāra construed the sūtra in a very ingenious way which neither Hottori nor Frawallner seems to have realised. In order to accommodate his theory, as Eli Franco says, he has probably construed 'satsamprayoge' not only with 'indriyāṇāṁ' but also with 'puruṣasya'. Here the word 'person' is interpreted as 'soul' and not as a person. Then the interpretation of the definition would be as Eli Franco observes, "perception is (the means of valid cognition whose result is) the arising of cognition when there is a contact of the senses (and) the soul (together with its properties) with an existing (object)".

It should be noted that although Jayarāśi deals with the enumeration of causes and definition as independent alternatives, he certainly has in mind Kumārila’s interpretation of the sūtra. Perception in which something other than Dharma appears refers to normal perceptions whereas the second, perception in which Dharma appears refers to the perception of Yogi, while the third, namely perception which does not arise looks strange but becomes understandable. According to the Mīmāṁsakas however, there is no such yogi pratyakṣa (mystic perception).

Kumārila says that mystic perception is impossible. It is held that 'yogin' by virtue of his power of meditation can have a direct knowledge, not only a present
things, but also of those that are past, future and distant. Perception is ordinarily seen to be of those objects alone that exist no more or in future. The mystic-perception cannot go beyond the limits of ordinary perception 106.

Kumārila concludes that the sutra is meant to state the reason why perception which is well known to be a means of valid knowledge and it cannot give a knowledge of Dharma (duty) Sense-perception (of mystics) is not the means of knowing dharma, because it apprehends accomplished entities. It apprehends accomplished entities, because it is brought about by a present sense-contact. It is brought about by a present sense-contact, because it is perception like the perception of ordinary objects 107.

Of all valid means of cognitions, Čārvākas accept only the sense-perception. However, we cannot find any explanation either in SDS or in TPS for the question as to, why perception has to be accepted? Here, it can be said that the perception is necessary for practice life and the perception of every person has to be accepted as true for them.

Perception is the primary source of valid knowledge, even it is criticised by various ways of thought. The Jainas and the Buddhists define perception as the direct cognition of an object. Māṇikyanandi defines 108 perception as distinct (viśāda) cognition, which is explained as the knowledge not mediated by another knowledge and as apprehending its object in all its details. The Buddhist philosopher Dharmakirti is known for his celebrated definition of perception 109. According to him, 'it is devoid of determination and non-erronious. Determinations are the characteristics and their relations. Non-erronious is a general condition of all forms of valid knowledge. This definition of perception is severely criticised by the rival schools. It is the same as the definition of indeterminate perception (nirvikalpaka pratyakā) given by Kumārila
Two forms of perception have generally been recognised in Indian philosophy. They are, *nirvikalpaka* (indeterminate) and *savikalpaka* (determinate). The former proceeds the latter and the latter is more advanced than the former. Perception which arises immediately after the contact of a sense-organ with an object and without any *vikalpa* (determination) is nirvikalpaka or indeterminate perception. But the next moment while the sense-object contact still continues, the object is determined as belonging to a class or possessing some qualities etc. then the perception becomes savikalpaka or determinate perception. Indeterminate perception is also called as ālocanājñāna (simple apprehension).

Buddhists use the word 'kalpanā' instead of 'vikalpa' but is similar in form (derived form the root 'kalp') and identical in meaning with the word 'vikalpa'. it seems, it was first used in philosophical literature by Diinnāga in his 'Pramānasamuccaya' where he defines perception as knowledge free from imagination and unconnected with name, genus etc. Again even the word 'ālocana' occur in the PPB, detailed description is attempted for the first time by Kumārila. In contradistinction to his opponents, asserts that the denial of indeterminate perception is the denial of a well-established fact. As the experience, which proves that on the contact of a sense organ with an object, the cognition that arises in the first moment is indeterminate. It is a cognition in the shape of mere observation which is not qualified and it is similar to the cognition of the infant or the dumb arising purely out of the object by itself. At that time neither any specialisation nor any generalisation is recognised, what is cognised is only the object, substratum of these specialisation and generalisation. In the absence of indeterminate perception, the determinate is too impossible. In the determinate stage, the object is conceived
as belonging to a class and possessing a certain name, the class concept and the name given by memory. But memory cannot arise all of a sudden without some cause. As a matter of fact, what is perceived in the indeterminate stage arouses latent impressions and then alone can the object be determined as possessing class character and a name.

The Buddhist doctrine of perception is based upon the view that every object is the object itself and not another and has, therefore its own character (svalakṣaṇa). That the object is itself and not anything else (svetarabhīnna) is known perception. Buddhists do not accept the reality either of the category of particular (viśeṣa) or of the universal (jāti, sāmāṇya). The idea of the particular is only that which is not anything else and so of that which is different from everything other than itself (anyāpoḍha). According to this system, the universal is only either a name (word) or a mental concept (vikalpa) and the established conclusion is that all perception is indeterminate (nirvikalpaka). This is correct so far as the attribution to an object of something not possessed by it. But this does not exclude determinate cognition from perception because this latter does not make any false attribution. Universal is as real as particular. Hence determinate cognition is perceptual in character.

Bhāvaciveka does not enter into the discussion on the valid means of cognitions. Hence the question does not arise in this regard. He refutes the views probably of Śabara, who did not concentrate either on indeterminate perception or on determinate perception. It seems, that there are three rival theories infront of Kumārila viz. the Buddhists, the Advaitins and the Grammarians. Śāntarakṣita rejects Kumārila's theory. He putsforth Kumārila's view on indeterminate and determinate perception as putvapaksa then rejects . He emphasises that the cognition appertains to the
particular individuality of the thing, then even the apprehension of the universal and other properties should remain free from verbal expression, since particular individuality of things cannot be denoted by words. Again, he says that and the same cognition cannot apprehend both the specific and the universal. If that is conceptual cognition, then there would be no comprehension of the former, on the other hand, there could be no apprehension of the latter too. If the universal and other properties have become already cognised by the initial cognition, then the latter cognition would be apprehending only what has been cognised. Thus it would be like memory.

According to the Jainas, sense-perception which is one of the forms of direct cognition is defined as clear cognition and they accept the distinction between indeterminate and determinate perception in their own way. According to his system, completed perception is the perception of the object as determined by the universal. Such perception is determinate perception. But before the stage of determinate perception, the perceptual process goes through three stages and hence completed perception has four stages. They are - 1) *avagraha* (simple contact of sense and object) 2) *vyāñjanāvagraha* (contact with an indication) 3) *arthāvagraha* (contact with the object itself) 4) *īhā* (expectation, questioning to know what the object is). According to the Jainas, first three stages among these pertain to the indeterminate whereas the fourth to the determinate. However, as far as the present study is concerned, refutation of the Mīmāṃsakas has not been found either in the aparokṣa (direct cognition) or in the parokṣa (indirect cognition) in the wisdom of Jainism.

Śabara's definition of inference is the basis for the later development of thought of inference. Śabara does not use the word 'samprayoga', although Jaimini uses it
instead of 'sannikarṣa' in the definition of perception. Its use is rarely found in later philosophical literature and that of the word 'sannikarṣa' is very common. Thus the word 'sannikṛṣṭa' means an object in contact with the senses and the word 'asannikṛṣṭa' means an object not in contact with senses. Accordingly, Śabara's definition 116 of inference be formulated like, "when the perception of one term of well-known relationship leads to the cognition of other term of that relationship, which latter is not in contact with the person's sense organs, this second cognition is called inference. Kumārila gives explanation of the compound form 'jñātasambandhasya' as we have already seen.

According to Čārvāka system 117, inference cannot be accepted as a valid means of cognition, because its truth depends upon major premise. If inference is accepted as a valid means of cognition it must enable us to know only what is already known in the major premise through perception, then there is no need of inference. If it gives a new truth, then the major premise cannot be true. However, the conclusion can be true, only if the major premise is true. If it is said that the major premise can be based on casualty, then the answer is that every causation assumes the truth of the principle of casualty which is a universal proposition. Everything simple happens as it does. Every event is a chance. It is nature. All our inferences are gusses and their truth is accedental. God, heaven, atman are not acceptable because they are not perceivable at all.

As Eli Franco observes 118, there is a certain discrepancy between the theory of inference in the SV and the one which is reflected in TPS. However a relation between the two texts can be found. Jayarāśi quotes a verse from SV and the problem of apprehension of an unapprehended object is one of the main topics of the theory of inference. According to Eli Franco 119, Jayarāśi does not refer to SV but
he quotes elsewhere from the Brhaṭṭikā. The half-verse quoted here, appears in SV does validate this assumption. Brhaṭṭikā is a later and more extensive treatise which incorporates material from the SV. As Eli Franco says \(^{120}\), Frauwallner has already pointed out that Kumārila in the Brhaṭṭikā had changed his theory of vyāpti (invariable concomitance) under Dharmakīrti’s influence. The discussion in the TPS indicates that he has changed his theory of anumeyya (object of inference) as well.

Jayarāśi’s criticism of Kumārila is quite simple. Whatever the object of inference may be, either it was previously perceived as related to the inferential indicative and thus its apprehension is that of an apprehended object or it was not previously perceived and hence it cannot be inferred from the inferential indicative.

The criticism made by Jayarāśi is closely connected with a well-known Lokāyata verse \(^{121}\), often used by orthodox systems to refute their opponents with slight variations. That Jayarāśi putsforth the vikalpa (alternative) seems to be strange. Because universals are supposed to be eternal. Hence it would be useless to infer their existence at a certain time. Pārthasārathi holds that an object is produced or destroyed in the universal part, the one which it has in common with other individuals of the same class, is produced or destroyed with it, though it continues to exist, as part of other individuals of the same class. If it is urged that the universal is eternal and not subject to production and destruction whereas the individual has the opposite nature, how could there be unity of these two? This is not a fault, because this thing has many forms. It is a certain form to be eternal etc., and a certain being non-eternal etc., is not contradictory at all. Not only is the universal in the form of individual, not eternal but also the individual with the nature of the universal.

Dharmakīrti defines \(^{122}\) inference, such as, “inference is the cognition of the
inferable from the sign having three-fold character*. The three-fold characteristic of a sign are 1) its presence in the pakṣa (minor term) 2) presence in sapakṣa (similar instance) 3) absence from the vipakṣa (contradictory instance). However, this definition of Dharmakīrti is severely criticised, because it enumerates the conditions of validity rather than the state the essential nature of inference. The inclusion of the word 'inferable' in the definition makes it open to the charge of circularity. There is no mention of invariable concomitance. Another defect has been found that instead of stating that inference is a cognition resulting from the cognition of a sign, it merely states that inference is a cognition from sign. From a mere sign, i.e. smoke, nothing can be cognised unless it is known to be the sign of something i.e. fire. Sucaritamiśra rightly points out 123 that nothing can be cognised from the mere existence of something. Dharmakīrti is quite aware, as he makes the necessary amendment in the next sūtra, but in the actual definition, he misses it.

There occurred frequent refutation of the Mīmāṃsakas with regard to their definition of the perception, but that is not the case with the inference. Śāntarakṣita the only Buddhist philosopher criticises 125 the views of Śabara and Kumārila and establishes the theory of 'perceptual flux'. According to him, it proves that perpetual flux is all embracing, there can be no inference by itself. What has been urged in the case of two particular things, i.e. having seen the relation of fire and smoke, the observer recognises in other places the presence of the same fire through the indication of the same smoke, on this, he attacks as no such sameness can have any real existence and what is merely assumed cannot be an entity and an assumed object, it would clearly be devoid of an object. If universal persisted that would also be covered by perpetual flux 124.

The answer given by Pārthasārathi 125 is that there is the permanent relation-
ship between the probundum (fire) and probans (smoke) and it holds to view that inferential cognition like every valid cognition apprehends something that is not already known. He argues that even it is true that smoke is seen and also that said perception of smoke carries with the general idea of the fire as a permanent concomitant of the smoke, the final object apprehended by the resultant inferential cognition and this is not already apprehended by other valid means of cognitions. Because it is said that the perception of smoke implying the notion of fire as its relative, does not imply the notion of present fire in the mountain. This qualified fire forms the object of Inferential cognition. Thus inferential cognition has to be regarded as apprehending something not already known by other means of cognitions. Hence there is no chance to the objection made by Śāntarakṣita that there is an assumed object etc.

As far as the verbal cognition is concerned, Jayarāśi refutes the only Vedic authority, i.e. Vedic injunction but not the words of any reliable person. He criticises all valid means of cognitions accepted by Mīmāṃsakas and comes to the conclusion that there are no valid means of cognitions except perception. Even in this Cārvāka system, it can be found that the sense perception alone is the valid means of cognition. This system does not accept as valid means of cognition. Thus Cārvāka refutes testimony in general and scriptural testimony in particular, because Vedic knowledge in his opinion, is 'all fraud, a device of the cunning priests to ear their living by cheating the ignorant masses'.

The Buddhists do not accept verbal cognition as distinct means of valid cognition. According to them, hearing the word as a sound is perception and knowing its meaning is inference. Thus, the verbal cognition is a combination of perception and inference. If we accept the authoritativeness of a book, because that is composed by a reliable person, then there is only a reliable person who is the
Buddha. His teachings should be accepted as he is a reliable person. A reliable person is one who has knowledge of the ultimate truth, who knows, what is to be sought for and what is to be avoided and who is infinitely compassionate. He has gone in the right way (sugata) and who knows and teaches the Four Noble Truths. Such a person is the Buddha and his teachings alone are reliable. Further his teachings can be verified by experience and inference 127.

Regarding the verbal cognition, Bhāvaviveka claims in his so-called pūrvapakṣa that it is an independent source of knowledge like other cognitions. As he says, it cognises super-sensuous objects like, 'svarga', 'apūrva' etc. However, we cannot find this type of assertion either in the Jaimini sūtra or in the Śābara Bhāṣya. Śābara simply defines 128 that the śāstra (scripture) is the means of cognising the object not in the contact with the senses. It seems that Śābara does not bother about providing an assertion of verbal cognition, on the contrary, later commentators like, Kumārila, Prabhākara and others have asserted that the verbal cognition is an independent means of knowledge. Bhāvaviveka presents his views in a different way regarding the inclusion of verbal cognition in the inference. He states 129 that one can cognise unseen matters (like svarga etc.) by parārthānumāna (an inference for the sake of others) and it is the course of cognition of an unperceived object, because it depends upon the memory cognition about the relation.

Śāntarakṣita 130 putsforth the views of Mīmāṃsakas as follows: other people have declared verbal cognition is the knowledge of imperceptible things which is derived from the words or that which is derived from the eternal sentence or that from that sentence which is uttered by a trustworthy person. Next, he criticises 131 these that the possibility and expressiveness are improbable and a sentence may be capable or incapable. Hence there is no certainty about the cognition. In such
cases where certain meaning is actually comprehended from words, there is a need of explanation for such comprehensions and it is found that the expounder is free to explain things according to his own wish. Next, regarding the trustworthy persons, he says that imperceptible things and their assertions are found to be true in most cases, then he says that mere fact of one's assertion being not true in some individual case, cannot prove that his assertions are true.

Next he includes verbal cognition under inference. He says that from all verbal statements there follows the inference of the 'desire to speak'. This is definitely known to be the cause of words through direct perception and non-apprehension. The Buddhist do not accept the status of an independent means of cognition to verbal testimony. He says that the intention of the speaker finds expression in his statement. The intention is the cause and the statement is its effect. When a speaker utters the word, the hearer infers the presence of fire from its effect viz., smokey. In this inferential process the speaker is the minor term, his intension is the major term, and the word is the middle term.

In this connection, Kumārila asserts that first learnt the meaning of a word, then hear that word, and then cognition of its meaning arises in our mind through memory and not through inference. Thus the understanding of the word has the nature of recollection. However, it (recollection) is not a means of cognition at all. The Buddhist attempt to reduce our cognition of meaning on hearing a word to inference is futile, because it constitutes a means of cognition called verbal testimony which is not a word but a sentence. If the meaning of a word be cognised through inference, the knowledge of a fact of hearing a sentence is not inferential and hence arguments made by the Buddhists are irrelevant.

Kumārila gives a long explanation of the points of difference between the
inference and verbal cognition and concludes that the verbal cognition does not fulfil the three conditions that are essential in all inference and hence it is distinct from inference like sense-perception. However, he appears to be slightly halting on this point and he seems to concede that the knowledge derived from individual words could be included under inference. and goes on to point out that the cognition provided by sentence can never come under inference.

Kumārila’s statement that the knowledge derived from individual words could be included under inference may be true, but it is true only in the case of ordinary people, because the cognition produced by them is purely inferential. The speech of men is an effect of his knowledge and therefore we can infer its cause from the effect. Thus all ordinary verbal cognition is inferential whereas that provided by the Veda alone is purely verbal.

Jainas do not accept the verbal cognition as a distinct means of cognition, but admit it in the last category of indirect cognition. They call it as āgama (scriptural sayings). It is infact verbal knowledge obtained from words. This verbal cognition is included in direct knowledge also. Jainas are not very clear on how verbal cognition can be classified under both headings. It seems that the verbal cognition comes under direct cognition whereas scriptural cognition is indirect cognition. A scripture is composed by a person, who is omniscient, dispassionate and beyond ignorance. The words of such person are true and valid. The scriptures of Jainism alone are true and not those of others.

It is interesting to point out that the Jainas, started as a sect of the bookless did not accept the authority of the extant Vedic scriptures but ended up with acknowledging their own scriptures means for the scriptural knowledge which was most reliable of all forms of indirect cognition. The Jainas say that the scripture must
have been composed not by a God, but by the person who was the leader of their own religion. Their doctrine of verbal cognition is interesting. They treat a part of it as coming under direct cognition and author part under the indirect one, again the latter a part as fallible cognition and the scripture as infallible one. However, the refutation of the Mīmāṃsakas is absent throughout the whole discussion.

As far as the Analogy is concerned, Jayarāśi says that the analogy is based upon perception. If the perception is not apprehended, then there cannot be analogy. He sets forth many alternatives in this context. According to him, the similarity of association of organs in Gayal would not go beyond remembrance and an apprehension like 'my cow is similar to this' may be a subject of horse also, or there may be an upsetting apprehension. Having seen even a buffalo or horse, the apprehension would be 'my cow is similar to this'. Next, he says that if generality or universal of both cow and Gayal is said for similarity, then this apprehension would not arise. He gives stress upon remembrance, like, if the apprehension belong to the other object and that belong to senses then existant cognition is to be cognised and it would not leave the remembrance.

Śāntarakṣita does not accept as a separate means of cognition. According to him, there is no object that could be cognised by this means of cognition and being the nature of remembrance, it cannot be a valid form of cognition. He argues that there are some parts in the Gayal’s body which bring about cognitions similar to those brought about by the parts of cow’s body, and then there follows the remembrance of the parts of cow’s body that have been seen repeatedly. He emphasises that if there is a slight element of valid cognition found in analogical cognition, it is to be regarded as an independent form of cognition, then there could be no limit to the number of such independent forms of cognition.
The Jaina philosopher Prabhācandra admits this analogical cognition under pratyabhijñā (recognition). Another Jaina philosopher, Ratnaprabhasūri includes it under indirect cognition. According to him, the Mīmāṃsā theory of analogy, confines to an apprehension of similarity only. Hence another cognition should be found out for such cognition as that cow is dissimilar to that which consists in a cognition of dissimilarity. As he holds, according to Mīmāṃsā that dissimilarity is non-existence. Hence, cognition of dissimilarity come under indirect cognition. Next, from the another point of view, he includes the analogy under recognition where there are two elements viz., element of perception as well as recollection. The recognition is a second form of indirect cognition as accepted by the Jainas. Recognition is indeed, a combination of perception and memory. In this case, 'he is the same person I saw yesterday' both perception and memory are involved. Thus, extending the meaning of recognition, the Jainas reject the view of the Mīmāṃsakas regarding analogy is a distinct means of valid cognition.

According to Kumārila, in the analogical process, the observer already knows the object, i.e. a cow, then on going to the forest, he sees another animal which he perceives, and which is similar to an animal already known to him. Thereupon he recalled to his mind the formerly perceived cow which he cognises now as similar to the animal in front of his eyes. Hence there is the objective form of analogical cognition in which the remembered cow is qualified by similarity to the seen animal. There is truth in the opponents objection, that the similarity is perceived while the cow is remembered, yet the two together i.e. cow along with similarity to the seen animal are not cognised either by perception or by remembrance. Therefore Mīmāṃsakas urged a need for the cognition of two together, a distinct means of valid cognition. For this reason, it cannot be included either in perception
or in remembrance or in any other means of cognition. It cannot be regarded as the same as inference because the factors essential for inference are not present in the case of analogical cognition.

One of the criticisms made by Śāntarakṣita is similar to that regarding the analogy made by Ratnaprabhasūri. It seems that Kumārila and his commentators have not anticipated it. Nārāyaṇa, the author of the Mānameyodaya, comparatively a recent author anticipates the objection that if the cognition of similarity requires an independent source of knowledge then the cognition of dissimilarity should require another means of cognition and the answer he gives is that dissimilarity, being the non-existence of similarity is cognised by non-apprehension, the sixth means of cognition. It seems that this has been anticipated and criticised by Śāntarakṣita and Ratnaprabhasūri who preceded nārāyaṇa by several centuries. If dissimilarity is equated to the non-existence of similarity, then similarity can also be equated to the non-existence of identity. Thus, if dissimilarity is cognised by non-apprehension for the reason that it involves non-existence, then similarity too should be cognised by non-apprehension for the same reason. Then analogy becomes superfluous.

The fact that Nārāyaṇa repeats a reasoning which was refuted several centuries ago. G.P. Bhāṭṭa rightly says "to return opponents criticism, if we in the case of immediate inference in analogy it would not conflict with Kumārila's position, because we compare a physically absent but ideally present thing to another thing which is physically present."

As far as the presumption is concerned, Jayarāśi quotes six kinds of presumption asserted by Kumārila, but refutes only one among them. i.e. the perceived (seen) presumption. According to him, presumption based on perception is not
proper, because the knowledge of positive and negative concomitance of organ
eye, the cognition of reason would not arise by presumption. It seems, that, he uses
reasoning to examine presumption. He argues that all presumption should be seen
in the same way. According to him, if there is no perception then there is no
presumption.

Śāntarakṣita cites Kumārila's views at first as pūrvapakṣa and refutes them
later. According to him, apart from the potent object, there is no such thing as
potency which could be cognised by means of presumption. If the object does bring
about the effect, then the potency would not be anything different and it does not
have a dual character. In the case of mobility of one Sun, he says that the cognition
is born again in a different place as it is found in the case of fire-flame. A thing that
remains permanent is of a totally different kind. A regard potency, that is nothing
apart from the thing 145.

Next, he includes presumption under inference 146. In the case of 'fat Devadatta
not eating during the day' the cognised thing is the man spoken of as related to
'eating at night' on the ground of his being fat while going without food during the
day', like other person, this is meant that the example is a corroborative instance
and is a proban in the form of effect. Next, he shows the relation of cause and effect
between fatness and eating through positive and negative concomitance.

Regarding the presumption based on analogy, he says that since the validity
of analogical cognition is refuted, the validity of presumption arising out of it is also
thereby refuted 147.

Next, he includes the presumption based on non-apprehension under infer-
ence 148. In the case of absence of Caitra having been cognised through the non-
existence etc. etc., he says that it cannot be right to deduce the fact of Caitra being
outside the house from the fact of his absence in the house, because the elements of certainty would be lacking. The absence in the house is cognised from the fact of his not being seen through the eyes, it shows that it is cognised through an Inferential indicative. One who is not in the house is always outside of it. For instance, the man standing in the courtyard is seen by men at the gate. The man inside the house provides the term where probandum is known to be absent. From all this, he concludes that this presumption does not differ from inference.

Prabhācandra, the Jaina philosopher also includes presumption under inference 149. He setsforth many alternatives and checks every one through reasoning. He emphasises that being its 'otherwise inexplicability' presuming an unseen object would not occur or it may occur, then the reason makes the cognition arise which is to be inferred of indefinite concomitance and afterwords it may be differed from presumption. Further, he states that presumption means the whole structure of inference only. In the case of Devadatta, there we can use the syllogisms as follows:

1) Living Devadatta’s absence in the house is based on his existence outside the house.

2) Because there is living Devadatta absence in the house.

3) Like the absence in the house of a living person who stands just outside the house.

or, Devadatta is outside, because he is not depending upon the house for his life, like self-soul. Ratnaprabhasūri, another Jaina thinker follows the line of Prabhācandra. He also includes presumption under inference 150.

In Śabara's statement 151, the words 'drṣṭāḥ śruto vā' do not appear to refer to two different kinds of presumption, viz, presumption from seen and presumption
from heard. Śabara has given only one example of presumption, but in case he intended two forms of presumption, he should have given two instead of one. Kumārila, however, interprets Śabara's statement as referring to the two main forms of presumption. He again classifies them into five. Thus there are six kinds of presumption in all.

According to the Mīmāṃsakas, presumption is entirely different from inference. The given fact in the example is Caitra's absence in the house. That can be known from the fact which can be stated in the following forms, viz., 'Caitra is present in the outside space', and 'outside space is one in which Caitra is present'. Accordingly the minor term is either Caitra or the outside space. Now the question arises: What is the middle term? The middle term is always the property of the minor term. In the present case, the absence cannot be the middle term, since it is not a property either of Caitra or of the outside space. Absence is apprehended in the house. Therefore, it can reasonably the property of the house, but not the property of Caitra or of the outside space. Next, imperceptibility is related to Caitra, because when a person goes to Caitra's house he does not perceive him there. This imperceptibility is not the middle term, because imperceptibility is not directly related to the major term, viz., the presence outside. From the imperceptibility it is directly ascertained that Caitra is absent in the house. It cannot have the double function of leading simultaneously to two inferences, viz., that Caitra is absent in the house and that he is outside. Here, the former is related to the minor term, Caitra, but is not related to the major term the presence outside the house, and the latter may be related to the major term but is not related to the minor term. There is another difficulty also. In inference the minor term is apprehended prior to the major term. In the present case, the minor term, has not been apprehended before which is the object of the inferential cognition. Neither outside nor Caitra has been per-
ceived before. Hence it cannot be regarded as inference or cannot be included in inference. It is a distinct means of valid cognition.

Another reason, why presumption cannot be included in inference is that it does not stand in need of the knowledge of invariable concomitance, whereas the latter cannot proceed without it. Invariable concomitance is a generalisation based on a frequent and uncontradicted experience of two things together and in inference invariable concomitance which constitutes the major premise is known prior to the conclusion. It is true that there is invariable concomitance between non-existence inside the house and existence outside the house, but it is not known prior to the presumption of Caitra's existence outside the house. Hence it cannot be the cause of the cognition that Caitra is outside. Even a person who never experienced the concomitance of non-existence and existence presumes that a person who is not inside present outside.

Moreover, the proof of the said concomitance is no other than presumption. From the inexplicability of the fact that Caitra exists but does not exist in the house, it is presumed that he exists outside and then we become aware of the relation between the non-existence inside and the existence outside. The conclusion of reasoning is the result of applying a general rule to a particular case. This also establishes the distinctness of presumption from inference.

As far as the non-apprehension is concerned, Jayarāśi refutes the views of Kumārila. According to him, if the cognition of non-apprehension is to be understood by the dispurse of means of cognition, then there may be a fault like mutual dependence. It may be the condition what is to be known, becomes to make the thing known, but it is not the situation that the dispurse of the means of cognitions is desired to make the thing known. Cognition should be understood by the appre-
hension of existence and not by the non-existence 154.

Regarding the non-apprehension, Dharmakirti says that in the case of the two co-perceptible facts, i.e. the ground and the jar, the ground is perceived and the jar is not perceived. If the jar is present on the ground it must be perceived, just like the ground is perceived. If the perception of another object (i.e. ground) is construed as non-perception (of the jar the object of negation), then it must be admitted that the negation of the jar is known by perception. What is known by perception does not require to be proved by other means of cognition 155.

Śāntarakṣita rejects the non-apprehension after quoting the views of Kumārila. Such as, if it is meant by 'non-modification' is only the absence of modification, then, as the entity concerned is eternal, this should be understood to be there at all times as it never ceases. Or there may be non-modification of the soul, then the definition is wrong, because in the case of sleep, unconsciousness and the like, the object of cognition is there even though there is non-modification of soul. The non-modification of the soul be held in reference to the jar and other things on the ground, then there other cognitions; the ground concerned is seen to be devoid of those things 156.

Next, he argues that if non-apprehension of cognition is an object, then the non-apprehension of the cognised object also should be the same. Hence it should be included under perception. Again, he emphasises that the existent and non-existent cannot exist together in one and the same substratum. Since they are contradictory. The dual character can never subsist in any single object 157. The object that is featureless being devoid of the form of cognition cannot be a form of cognition, since this is always of the nature of cognition and entirely featureless object cannot serve as the cause of anything 158.
The Jaina philosopher Prabhācandra strongly refutes the non-apprehension as an independent means of cognition. He says that the non-objectivity of the non-apprehension does not produce any cognition and that where there is the non-existence of five means of cognitions, there would not arise the cognition of non-apprehension. And again, in the case of a person who has an apprehension of non-apprehension, but not the apprehension of the object which is to be negated, that apprehension of non-apprehension may arise only because of perception and not by any other means of cognition 159.

Next, he rejects all four kinds of non-apprehension in a long argument and lastly he declares that there are only two kinds of cognitions, viz, direct cognition and the indirect cognition 160. Another Jaina thinker Ratnaprabhasūri also rejects the non-apprehension as an independent means of valid cognition. He includes this non-apprehension in the perception. Apart from the arguments of others, he uses another device for attacks. He says that memory which sometimes gives the cognition by non-existence of the form, 'that spot of land had no pot in it' and again 'this is that spot of land which had no pot in it'. And next, in a similar way he says that the cognition of non-apprehension can be cognised by recognition, inference and by verbal cognition. Hence the non-apprehension cannot be regarded as independent means of cognition 161.

According to Kumārila, the non-apprehension is a distinct means of cognition. The source of negative judgements is neither perception nor inference. Perception, inference etc. are the means of knowing the positive aspect of things. Hence, he clearly states that 'in the case of an object where the perception and the rest do not function towards the apprehension of the existence of that object, then there is a non-apprehension as the sole means of cognition. The ascertainment of the
non-existence of non-object depends upon the validity of this (non-apprehension) as a means of cognition. Next, he says that by the word 'pramāṇābhāva' is meant the non-functioning of perception and the rest. This is either a particular modification of soul or the cognition of another object. Sense-perception and the rest apply to such cases where there is an apprehension of a positive form of an object. However, where the object of apprehension is in a negative form, the action of sense-organs is non-appearance. The notion, 'this is not' is never brought about by means of sense-organs, because they are capable of having contact with a positive form only. On the other hand, the notion, 'this is not' is due to the absence of such contact. Hence absence of knowledge is thus the means of the knowledge of absence. In the example 'the absence of a jar on the ground', the knowledge of the absence of the jar cannot be perceptual. However, here in the case, the function of sense-organ pertains to the ground which is a positive entity. There can be no pure non-apprehension. Non-apprehension is always some positive entity in some positive locus. Hence it can be said that 'so far as the positive form is concerned the cognition is perceptual and so far as the negative form is concerned, the object (i.e. jar) is remembered. Hence the notion is that 'this (the jar) is not', which is purely mental. Therefore, it is an independent source of knowledge.

Regarding the means of cognitions it seems that almost all the systems of Indian philosophy except Cārvāka, accept all means of cognitions. They do not refute them but try to re-arrange the number of means of cognitions and include them under various heads. For instance, the Buddhists include verbal cognition in perception and inference, analogy also in the same, presumption in inference, non-apprehension in perception whereas the Jainas include verbal cognition in scripture, a kind of indirect cognition, i.e. inference, analogy in recognition, an kind of indirect
cognition, i.e. inference, presumption also in indirect cognition and non-apprehension in perception. The Cārvāka is the only the system which refutes all the means of cognitions except perception.

Scope for further research - With in the scope of present study, it is not possible to pay attention to all arguments made by heterodox systems for the refutation of the Mīmāṃsakas. Main principles of the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā philosophy have been discussed. The views of the Prābhākara school is not included for discussion due to its limitation. If a study is undertaken on remaining principles of the Bhāṭṭa school as well as the Prābhākara school from the point of view of the refutation made by heterodox systems, it would be a good contribution to the study of the development of Indian philosophy.

There are not many serious studies on the controversy between orthodox and heterodox systems. It is possible to undertake a study of a few more topics in this regard, namely, the refutation of Vedāntins as well as Naiyāyikas by heterodox systems separately. Even with in the orthodox systems there are a number of controversial notions and different attitudes. If a study at these notions is undertaken will through more light on the argument and disagreement between different systems on a number of issues for philosophical debate.
Foot Notes :-

1) Eli Franco, Perception...... p. 345.


3) Ibid, p. 106.

4) चोदना हि पृथः भवः भविष्यत्ता सृष्ट्यं व्यवहति विप्रकृष्ट्यंत्येवं
नान्यकत्यत्यं नान्यकत्यत्यं नान्यकत्यत्यं नान्यकत्यत्यं नान्यकत्यत्यं

जातिकर्मार्य शक्तोयमनमाधितुः नान्यकत्यत्यं नान्यकत्यत्यं नान्यकत्यत्यं

SB on JS 1.1.2, p. 15.

5) करुंस्रराणाश्चेष्टो वेदोऽरुक्तकुंकः

सम्प्रदायानुस्थेयां गम्यगम्यास्ती तदर्थभेलम्


6) नृवाकः वेद दश्पुरुषाश्चप्रमाणमितीयते

सीविकासाेववाक्येन हेतुस्याद्य व्यभिचारिणाः


7) भूतांसाराणार्यमित्योक्त्याशास्त्रात्

MTN, 31 od, Ibid p. 106.

8) गिरो मिथ्यात्वेनुस्तूतन दोषाणां पुरुषाश्रयत्

3.225 od

गिरो सत्यात्वेनुस्तूतन गुणानां पुरुषाश्रयत्

अपौरुष्यं मिथ्यार्थं किं ने तथये प्रचवते

3.226

PV of Dhammakirti, Ed. R. C. Pandeya, pp. 287-88.

9) अर्थापणंहेतुहि संकेतः पुरुषाश्रयः

गिरामपीपेययेवेवयति मिथ्यात्वसम्भवः


10) गिरामकार्यानिनियमं न स्वायत्तान्तरे गति

अपेक्षामिनियमं विरुद्ध्वक्तिसंयमं


11) समेदु व्याप्तेतः स्वातः J.S. II. 2.47.

12) Kane P.V. Hist....... of Dharma ......, Part II, p. 1299.
13) हेतुः प्रविद्यायन्ते सर्वं ते व्यभिचारिणः।

सर्व्यथा नानंदिता सिद्धवेदं नापुर्याधयः। || 3.245 ||

तस्मादपैठाले स्वयंयोग्यनरङ्गः।

म्येचछादि व्यवहाराणां नालित्रवचसांपि। || 3.246 ||

PV of Dharmakirti, Ed. R. C. Pandeya, pp. 300-302.

14) कर्तृसंस्कृतो भिन्नं सहितं कार्यमेकृतः।

सा चानुपूर्वी वर्णानं प्रवृत्ता रचनाकृतः। || 3.307 || Ibid, p. 342.

15) अर्थां नानामयं न इतिशब्द चतूच्च न। || 3.315 ||

कल्याणयस्यः पुरुषैस्तेच्छ रागादिनियुतः।

तत्रैकधत्त्वविनाय इति भेदना किं कृता: || 3.314 ||

तत्तदुः पुनर्वेच क्रययिपि ज्ञानी कदित् कथं न च।


16) तेनानिन्होंमें जुड़ृपलु स्वर्गकाम इति श्रुती। || 3.319

खाद्यत्वांसिद्धिनि नार्यं इत्य इत्यं का प्रमा। || 3.320 || Ibid, pp. 348-49

17) सर्वेनेत्व द्विगतिनां मिथ्यानिज्ञानिश्वभतम्। || T.S. 2351 ||


18) वेदो नरं निराशंसो झूठेद्वयं न संदा स्वतः।

अन्यात्स्तुतितुल्यं तु पूर्यां समन्वयं। || TS 2375 ||


19) आन्यकुक्षमां प्राप्तं चड़पूपदिवाक्यवत्। || TS 2355 ||

TS of Śāntarakṣita Ed, Dvarikadas Shastri, p. 787. Ibid,

20) दशादारामां झड़पूर्ण इत्येवमादीन च। SB on JS 1.1.5.

M D Anandashrama ed. p. 56 ff. 5-6
21) इत्यादि मानेनस्यते वेदे शिष्याचार्यपरम्परा।
   अनादि: कल्याणापि नादोपत्याय युक्ते। TS 2377।
   यसादेकोपि तन्मध्ये नैवातीन्द्रियार्थः।
   अनादि: कल्पितायस्य तत्त्वादन्त्यपरम्परा। TS 2378। Jha Eng. trans.


23) कामिंगमियाक्रियाप्रणालिहिंसांसत्यामिभि तथा। TS 2786।

24) भूतहिंसासाधुरासाप्रनिधयों्यंग्नायतवत्त। MTN 31।

25) हिंसा हि सा। हिंसा च प्रतिष्ठिते। .......... नैव श्रेयन्द्रयः कर्त्तव्या विज्ञायते।
   यो हिंसितुनिच्छेत् तत्त्वादामुमुष इति तेषामुपदेशः।
   श्रेयन्द्रयदृश्येन यजेत इति हिंसामाननिन्य नाभिचरित्वंदिति।

26) न मद्यपानं निदौं यहो मन्त्रपरिच्छाति।
   मद्यक्षुद् तत्यात्म्येऽहट्टो मन्त्रपरिच्छाति। MTN 42।
   Bhat Refutation ...... p. 108

27) चत्वारिशेष्रा इत्यसदिभागे गौणः शब्दः।
   गौणी कल्पना प्रामाण्यत्वात्। उदारार्थाद्वाद्वग्रहाणपूर्वः।
   ........ यशस्मृत्ये साधनानां चेतनसास्त्रमुपयोगाद्वितुकाम्। आमन्त्रणाश्वेतन्न लक्ष्यति,
   ओषधे ज्ञात्वैनमिति, शून्योत्प्रावरण इति।
   अत: प्रातःपुनावक्षणं भविष्यति; यत्राचेतना: सन्तो ग्रावणोष्पि शृणु।
   किं पुनर्विद्यासोप् प्राभाण इति। इत्यं चाचेतना अपि ग्रावणं आमन्त्रणे।
   SB on JS 1.2.37, MD Anandashrama ed. Vol. II, pp. 64-65.

29) RKT of Ratnaprabhasūri, Ed. Dalsukh Malvania pp. 89-103.


31) साशालकृत्तथर्मण: ऋष्यो ब्रह्मः | Nirukta I. 20.

32) RV 10.90.

33) i) प्रजापतिः सोमं राजानमसूजत | तैं ऋषो बेदा अन्वसुङ्यत | Tai. Br. 2-3.10.1

   ii) प्रजापतिः बेद: | Tai. Br. 3.32.1.

34) i) प्रजापतिः ब्रह्मा | Tai. Br. 3.38.3

   ii) प्रजापतिः बै ब्रह्मा | Gopatha, uttarabha 3.18.

35) i) अथ केन ब्रह्मां (क्रियते) इति चर्या विद्ययति श्रुयात् | Ait. Br. 5.33.

   ii) अथ केन ब्रह्मां (क्रियते) इत्यत्या चर्या विद्ययति ह श्रुयात् | Sat. Br. 11.5.8.7.

36) Ch. Up. 4.17, I-2.

37) Jayatilleke K.N., Early Buddhist......... p. 193

38) केनचित्तीनिधैत्यविषयमेव वाक्यमिन्द्राःस्तीति

   प्रपुक्तम्, अपरेण नास्तितिः, तयोरन्नतरदवस्यमि सत्यमिति |

   ऐति चतुर्मान्तारभिमाणेऽत्तम, न तु प्रामाण्यभिमाणेण |

   द्योरपि तन्मूलाभावेनानार्यक्तवाद्यामाणेयं साधये नास्तेैकान्तकत्रम् |

   NR on SV, 2.178.

39) तस्मात् द्वित यथुपत्तम नापि संवादमुझ्वति |

   ज्ञानान्तरेण विज्ञान तत्प्रामाण्य प्रतीतितम | | SV, 2.80

40) कारणदोषवाचाक्षां नरहितमभौतिग्रहिष्णां प्रमाणम् |

   SD of Pārthasārathi, Dharmadatta Jha ed. p. 45.

42) द्वारकादिष्ठयां ज्ञानमयीकृताय स्मरणम्। | 1.3ab
PV of Dharmakirti, Ed. R. C. Pandeya p.2

43) अनन्दोद्गतिविषयं प्रामाण्यम्। Vide. Bhatta G. P. Epistemology...... p. 79.

44) Ibid. p. 80


47) TT of Umbeka, Ramanath Shastri ed. p.65.

48) अप्रामाण्यं विधा भिन्नं मिथ्यायनसंस्य:। SV, 2.54ab.

49) प्रामाण्य प्रम: संशयं संवाद इति पश्चात्य ज्ञानं विभजन्मेहे।
KSV 2.20 Vide, Bhatta G.P. Epistemology...... p. 89.

50) अनन्दोत्तत्वेवेकं प्रामाण्यस्य निबन्धनम्।
तदेव हि विनाशयेत सापेक्षाये समाधिते। | TS 2813.

51) सा चालित्यही शक्तिः स्थेतुतत्त्वभाविति।
स्वाभाविकूप प्रमाणां युग्माभि: कथयित्वेत। | TS 2818

स्वाभाविक्यम् हि शक्ति स्वाभिनतयत द्वेतुतत्य वा।
प्रमाणांच तदात्म्यानन्त्रताहेतुतत्वत्र धुरम्य। | TS 2819

सदाभावोब्धवात: वाग्भवोंहेतुतेऽत्यतत्त्वफलसह।
अत: कार्यं तदायतं कार्यविकं न युग्यते। | TS 2820.

हृदयं च प्रमाणां त्वर्हमं कार्ये मियं च।
कार्यविकतमत: शक्तितुत्तम स्वाभाविक: न। | TS 2821, Ibid.
52) किश्चाप्रामाण्यवें वृत्त एव प्रसन्न्यते ।

न हि व्यवस्तततस्य कुतस्थिदिपिः संभवः । । TS 2842, Ibid.

53) आत्ममधे हि भावानां कारणपुष्पित्यते । TS 2847ab । ।

उद्वेष्यत हि यो मोहार्जालमपि बाधकृत ।
स सर्वयवहरेषु संशवभा क्षयं विने । । TS 2871.

dेशकारणार्थादेशे: संशवहारतः

सिद्ध एव हि ये परिसंतेषु पेय्या बाधकार्थिनः । । TS 2875.

रागदीघभदोभादशुरुणादिकाकायतनिद्रे: ।

dुःहिते ज्ञानमाने से तद्भवाद् विभयः । । TS 2880.

तेन स्वतः प्रमाणाचे नानवस्थोम्भरेषी ।

प्रमाणत्वाप्रमाणाचे यथायोगमत: स्थिते । । TS 2884, Ibid.

54) प्रमाणानां प्रमाणत्वं येन चान्येन साध्यते ।

तस्यायमेव साध्यत्वार्थावश्च प्रसन्न्यते । । TS 2906, Ibid.

55) दोषाभावो गुणेष्वक्षेत्रायेषु काले ।

अनवस्या भौतिसवेव गुणववचानुपादित: । । TS 2890, Ibid.

56) चोदना-जनिता-बुद्धि: प्रमाणमिति; नेह च ।

प्रयोगोत्तिस्त नाश्चेतन नाप्रामाण्यविकर्त्तनम् । । TS. 2942, Ibid.

57) किन्तु सर्वप्रमाणानां प्रमाणं निन्दितं यदि ।

वृत्त एव तदा कस्मात् मिल्लेद: प्रवादिनाम् । । TS. 2943, Ibid.

58) यदि स्वतं: प्रमाणत्वं सर्वोत्तमार्थिं स्थितम् ।

बाधकारणवरुट्टव्यायामायं तदपोष्यते । । TS 2996 ।।

बाधकारणवरुट्टव्यायामायं प्रमाणात ।

60) तस्मात् व्यामाविकं तेषाप्रामाण्यनिम्पीयताम्।

प्रामाण्यं च परापेक्षम् अतः न्यायोऽन्वीयते। | SV, 2.38.

अप्रामाण्यसत्त्ववान् व्याव कारणदोष:।

वस्तूवत्वं गुणैमेवः प्रामाण्यपुपलयते। | SV, 2.39.

प्रामाण्यं हि योत्सर्गोऽसः तद्भावोऽय कृत्रिमः।

तदा स्वाजाद्वियोऽपि प्रामाण्यं केन वायते। | SV, 2.40.

मतस्ते कारणाभावात् प्रामाण्यं नोपजाते।

हेतुसत्त्वप्रस्फूतो न क्षविष्यत्त्वस्तुनाः। | SV, 2.41.

इन्द्रियादिः गुणधारश्च कारणं तदसदृश्चिद्याः।

हृष्टविदिविद्रीवादीनामवावोऽन्वतसत्वश्च वा। | SV, 2.42.

अतः एव च तो प्राविन्देश्चिर्मध्यात्मीरिति।

तद्वारस्तः गुणाभावसत्त्वृतो हाप्रमाणताः। | SV, 2.43

तस्मात् कारणशुद्धविवं ज्ञानप्रामाण्यकारणम्।

स्वाभाववतोऽप्रामाण्यं तद्भावनेन उच्यते। | SV 2.44.

अन्त्ययथिर्यायाप्रामाण्यं न दोष:।

नाज्ञाने हृष्यते होतत् कारणाभावरहेतुके। | SV. 2.45, Jha Eng. trans.


63) Ibid.

64) NRM of Parthasarathi, Ed, Subrahmanya Shastri, p. 43.

65) तम्मात् बौधात्मकपूर्व प्राप्तादुः: प्रमाणता ।
 अर्थान्वयात्केतौत्त्यत्त:धानान्वयपूर्वते । | SV, 2.53. Jha Eng. trans.


68) Ibid, p. 150.


70) Ibid, p. 159.


72) Ibid, p. 166.


74) RKT of Ratnaprabhasūri, Vide, Bhāṭṭa G.P, Epistemology ........ p. 84.

75) सर्वर्ज्ञाविषयमिदं तावत् परीक्ष्यताम् ।
 प्रमाणत्वाप्रमाणत्वस्य स्वतः किं प्रत्येकवा । | SV, 2.33.
 स्वतोसततमसाध्यत्वात् केविदाहुत्वं स्वतः ।
 अपरे कारणोत्तन्त्यन्योपणवधारणात् । | SV 2.34. Jha Eng. trans.

76) स्खर्वन्यावसासिण्यं प्रमाणम् । PNT p. 19.

77) RKT of Ratnaprabhasūri, Vide, Bhatta G.P., Estemology ........ p. 84.

79) PV of Dharmakirti, Eng. trans. by S. Mikhaji and H. Nagasaki, p. 73.

80) Bhat S., Refutation ........ p. 50.

81) सर्वत्र योगपदात् | JS 1.1.10, द्वयस्तुप्रद्वयरेष्यभावाः | VS 2.2.38.

संख्याभावाः JS 1.1.20, संख्याभावाः | VS 2.2.39. संप्रतिपत्तिभावाः | VS 2.2.41.

82) SB on JS 1.1.6., MD Anandasharma p. 87.


84) अद्वियृत्तेऽर्त्यं दीपेश्वप्रवृत्तिः व्यभिचारितया हेतुः: शब्दनियत्यमयससः | MTN 44.

85) शब्दनियत्यत्वासिद्ध: शब्दवृत्ते न निदर्शनम्.

अभिव्यक्तिषिष्ठीत ध्यनिविवर्णो न चायपवर्णौ | MTN 47.

श्रवणो वदि शब्दस्ते ध्यनिविवर्णो: कथं मतं: | MTN 48.

प्रतिपत्तिसतु संकेतादास्य शब्द: प्रस्थवते | MTN 49.

86) प्रत्यक्षप्रत्यभिः तु प्राणेय विनिवारिता.

प्राणे: सकलंनत्वाद्य नातो नित्यनिद्रय: | TS 2447.

87) ततो न व्याजलं किंचिद् व्याम्यं वा भवतां भवेत्.

एकसिद्धविभक्तं हि व्याहता भेदकल्पना | TS 2450.

श्रुरुपया इन्हे शब्दा एते बानरकृत्तुका: |
88) एकरुपत्याऽभारतेनबध्वसायत:।।TS 2472\text{nd}।
भाषात्: क्षणिकत्वात् तु तात्त्वकालिकविन्यासः।
नैवायिन्नति कि तस्य स्थिति: पद्धारपीयते।।TS 2473, Ibid.
89) दुतमध्या भेदादिनान्यः शब्दोदवभासते।
अतिरेये च तात्त्वव्याख्यां नाविषयं कथय।।TS 2488, Ibid.
90) को या ज्ञानस्य सम्बन्धः शब्देन यत् इत्यते।
तत्तत्वबोधरुपं न तात्त्वतः विभेदतः।।TS 2506।
न च तस्य तदुपपति: शब्दस्या ज्ञात्त्वमतः।
तदुपपती तु नियमतत सा सदाभाविनी भवेत्।।TS 2507, Ibid.
91) साक्षात् शब्दाः न बाझार्थप्रत्ययायतेऽवेकः।
गम्यार्थतीतिः प्राप्ते विचारामुच्ककालिकविम्।।TS 2618, Ibid।
तस्या: कार्यवत्या ते हि प्रत्ययानुपपन्नमतः।
निष्ठिता इति तेनान्त्र कार्यरतणाता सुवट।।TS. 2619।
92) न च सर्वेऽ: क्रमः: पुम्भः: पुरविलङ्कः: प्रगुणहते।
स्वातन्त्र्यंप्राप्ते कुर्विन्नति पदवाक्यास्तरक्रमम्।।TS 2675।
वर्द्धवाः वर्तेन परेकुर्विन्नतेऽवेकः।
इत्याविन्नति सम्भन्वधनार्थेन।।TS 2677।
तस्मात् पदवांविन्नति नियमस्ते कविःक्षीयदः।
तेनान्त्रं पदं सिद्धं वर्णनिमात्त्वादिनाम्।।TS 2696, Ibid।
93) PKM of Prabhācandra, Ed. Mahendrakumar Shastri. pp 404-405।
94) Ibid, pp 414-416।
95) RKT of Ratnaprabhasūri, Ed. Dalsukh Malvnia, pp. 104-105.

96) Ibid, pp. 107-121.

97) सतसामोहें पुरुषोपनिविण्यां बुद्धिज्ञम् तदप्त्यक्षमंकिलितं विख्यामामोपमंज्ञतात् | JS 1.1.4.

98) आप्तविकल्पं शब्दस्याध्येन सम्बन्धस्य

प्रज्ञानुपदेशोऽविरोधायार्थोऽनुपल्लो तदग्रन्थणं ....... J.S. 1.1.5.


100) Hattori, Diṅnāga ......., p.161.

101) Hattori, Diṅnāga ......., p. 162.

102) वण्यंते सूत्रभेदेन देव स्त्रयश्चग्नम् \\

लेन सूत्रवर्य नम्बरों वाच्यः पूर्वप्रतिज्ञवा | | SV, 4.1.

क्षणप्रयोगनाम् तु केनांशोपगुणवते ।

किमथि चानुमानविद्व्यक्षणं नात्र कथ्यते । | | SV, 4.2.

न तावदग्रन्थणत्वं तेवां नायक्षुद्धिषय ।

शक्यते| नागिन्तर्भस्कुः न च क्षणानुत्क्षया | | SV, 4.3.

न च अपि सिद्धिरेण स्यादर्थोत्त्वस्त्रयश्चग्नात् ।

न हि तत्परं च सर्व प्रमाणमिति निश्चितम् । | | SV, 4.4.

प्रत्यक्षश्चाकंदृश्न नायक्षुद्धिष्यक्षणात् ।

विद्वान न िसिद्धितीयेवमथर्यक्षोष्न न चुभ्यते । | | SV, 4.5.

तद्वच्चत्वपूर्वकल्यायनं च तदक्षणादि भवेत् ।

तदुक्तत्वानुमानादि किं न स्यात् तदपूर्वकम् । | | SV, 4.6.

न च क्षणभेदस्य स्वरुपे यत् तयारपि ।

प्रत्यक्षश्चादेवं कायक्षिदवधारणा | | SV, 4.7.
भात्ता G. P. Epistemology ...... p. 150.


Ibid.

अतीतेत्वातेर्वयथा सूक्ष्मे व्यवहितेषोऽच।

प्रत्यक्षं योगिनामिष्टं कैलिङ्गुकालनामपि। । SV, 4.26.

विद्यमानोपलम्बतपातिं तत्र तान् प्रति।

भविष्यत्त्वयो वा हेतुसतं दायाध्विभियारिता। । SV, 4.27.

मा भूतात्मिति तेनाह लोकसिद्ध संदित्ययम।

न लोक्यातिरिक्त हि प्रत्यक्षं योगिनामपि। । SV, 4.28, Ibid.

NR of Pârthasârathi, on SV 4.20-21.

विशश्चं प्रत्यक्षम्। । 2.3-4, PMS of Mâñikyanandî.

कल्पनायोगमान्यम्। NB of Dharmakîrti, 1.4.

अःति बालोवमः ज्ञानं प्रथमं निर्विकल्पकम्।

बालमूकदिविज्ञानसत्गं शून्यवस्तुनम्। । SV, 4.112.

न विशेषो न सामायं तदानुमथूर्वते।

तथोराधारमुता तु व्यक्तिरेवसीयते। । SV, 4.113, Jha Eng. trans.

तत्: परं च पुनर्वस्तुध्वर्ममात्यादिभिर्योगम्।

बुध्यावस्यं सापि प्रत्यक्षदेव सम्मता।। SV, 4.120, Ibid.
112) प्रत्येक कल्याणपोषः नामनात्यदिशसंभंतः | PS of Diṁnāga.

113) PPB.


115) Raju P.T., Structural ........., pp 107-108,

116) अनुमान ज्ञातसम्बन्धस्यकेदेशदर्शनानात्यकेदशान्तरेःसन्निकृतेऽथ बुधः | MD. Anandraśharma ed. p. 43.


119) Ibid.

120) Ibid, p. 396.

121) विशेषे नुसमादयः सामायः सिद्धसाध्यता |

अनुमानसम्बन्धकेदसिन्धम् निम्नमानाविद्यतिनः |

SD of Pārthasārathi, Dharmadatta Jha ed. p. 63.

122) त्रिरुधासिद्धान्तं यदनुमयेष ज्ञानं तदनुमानम् | NB-2.3


124) तदन्त्र क्षणमूलय य्यपिनः प्रतिपादनल्लोः |

प्राकृतस्येत्तेनैव नामांसदस्य संरेणः | | TS, 1446, Jha Eng.trans.

125) व्यक्तिरूपस्य नामोऽष्टिः लिङ्गेयवाकृतिस्यवः:

वदि न क्षणमूल्यायेभ्यं तस्य अधिष्कृतम् | | TS, 1449, Ibid.

126) Vide, Bhatta G. P. Epistemology ........, pp 244-45.

127) Raju P.T., Structural..... p. 168.

128) शास्त्रं शब्दविज्ञानासन्निकृतेऽथ विज्ञानम् MD Anandashrama ed. p. 44.
129) अहंकारमिस्थिते परायायनुमानत: ।
प्रतिपत्तिभुषयतो बोधे तस्मादधर्मयज्ञस: । । MTN, 53.
नानुमानात्मकमपि: परोक्षमितेऽहुत: ।
समवधामस्यपरेक्ष्यादनुमानं यथा खत: । । MTN, 54.

130) शब्दहरातु परोक्षमित्वां शब्दं परे जगु: ।
तदायकरक्ततो वाक्याद्व यदुवा प्रत्ययितोदितत: । । TS, 1488, Jha Eng. trans.

131) तत्त्वाकरक्तावक्यस्य सम्भवार्यवस्थापी: ।
तस्मादसम्भवित प्रीतां प्रयमं शाब्दकम्य ... । । TS, 1499.
वचेः पिनिक्षेप्योऽधि विवेकायानुभवेऽऽधि ।
प्रत्यक्षानुपल्लभायां तत्त्वेतः सा विनिधित: । । TS, 1514.
विद्वधा: प्रक्षालधिः अभिन्नतिः गरामल्लसः । । TS, 1516 ओँ.
वेलक्षणेन हेतुं विवेशं तामु ये न तु ।
अवगच्छन्ति दोषोऽत्तरं तेषा हिंद्गाय नानित: तु । । TS, 1517, Ibid.

132) एवं स्थितेःनुमानकं शब्दे धूमादिवदु: भवेऽतः।
वेतरूपसहितायेन ताहिनिषयसत्वत: । । TS 1524, Ibid.

133) Bhatta G. P. Epistemology ......., p. 284.

134) प्रभावानुमानं वा यथरपि स्थात: पदान्तिः ।
वाक्यायस्यावमार्गतव्यं दोषो नागमवादिनामः । । S V, Šabda 108.
Vide, Jha G. N, Pūrvamīmāṃsā ......., p. 145.


137) प्रमेयतत्त्वभावेन नाभिप्रेतास्य मानता । TS 1542ab.
तत्त्वाय गये हुए स्मृतः समुपज्ञायते ।
अस्कुद्ध हर्षपुरुषक गोरुपाववर्णविविधयम् । I TS 1547, Ibid.

138) एतावता च बैलोन प्रमाणत्वविद्यति ।
नेत्रता स्वातः प्रमाणानामन्यथापि प्रमाणतः । I TS, 1555, Ibid.


141) तस्मादत् स्मरिते तत्स्थात् सादृश्येन विशेषितम् ।
प्रमेयपुपुणामाय सादृश्यं वा तदन्त्वितम् । I SV, upamāna 37.
प्रत्यक्षणावंदेशष्ठिति सादृश्ये गति च स्मृतः ।
विशेषत्वान्वयतो सिद्धंप्राप्तमानन्यथार्थता । I SV, upamāna 38.
प्रत्यक्षेषपि यथा देशे स्थर्यमाने व पारवे ।
विशेषत्वावृत्त्वम्यन नानुमानप्राप्तमान । I SV, upamāna 39.

यत्र त्वसाहाशदेव कल्याणाविमाणायते ।
सादृश्यप्रत्ययक्त्र तदाभास्त्वकलात्मा । I SV, upamāna 40.

समीपस्थेषपि ज्ञातति सादृश्यं नैति तब हि ।
न बाध्यते समीपस्थो यत् तु सादृश्येव तत् । I SV, upamāna 42.

न नैत्यानुमानात् पक्षधार्मिकशिवायत ।
प्राक्क प्रमेयस्य सादृश्यं न धर्मत्वेन गुःते । I SV, upamāna 43, Jha Eng trans.

142) एतत्साधयावाक्याय्यधुपमानं समीपितम् ।
एवेनेत हि वैधानिकप्रामाण्य संबंधेतु ।


145) असंभावनाकरण शक्ति: कान्या भयेत् ततः। TS 1607।

्व्यतिरिक्ते तु कार्ययु तस्या एवोपयोगतः।

भावोस्तकरण एवस्थापयोगे न भेदिनी। TS 1608।

उपादनासामाने च देशे जातिनिर्ततर्मू।

रवेदेशाद्वात्म्याज्ञानादेव गम्यते। TS 1617।

स्थिरतमनो विशेषत्वानान्यायेयं प्रस्वयते।

तथा देशान्तर प्राप्ति: कृतिस्तव्या निराकृता। TS 1618, Jha Eng. trans.

146) क्षयाभोजनसम्बन्धी पुमानिष्टः प्रतीतमते।

विद्याभोजनवैकल्यपीनचेन तदन्यवत्। TS 1622।

भोजने सति पीनत्वम्यविरितकः।

निविक्तं तेन संबहादु वस्तुः वस्तुतो गति। TS 1623, Ibid.

147) उपमायः प्रमाणस्वे विस्तरण निराकृते।

अर्थारस्तलुट्याया वारितेव प्रमाणता। TS 1631, Ibid.

148) विष्ठोपि भवत्त्व वधानानांगतो परः।

अर्थारस्तिरियं तस्माददुनानानं भिक्षरः। TS 1646, Ibid.


150) RKT, Ed. Dalsukh Malvania Part I, p. 127-28,

151) अर्थारस्तिरियं दृष्टः: शृष्टोशरस्तुप्रक्या नोपप्पहत इत्यत्थक्लप्पा।

यथा जीवति देवदलेकुशामादर्शनेन बहिर्भावस्यादेवस्य कल्पना।

MD, Anandashrama ed. p. 46.

152) अभाबावताङ्गवा बहिर्भावस्य सूचनम्।
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पक्षधार्मिकृत्वा भिन्नेनायायुनमानस: । | SV, Arthā, 10.

बहिष्कर्षिन्तिकेः देषे वा तदिनेषे ।

प्रमेये यो गृहान्व: पक्षधार्मिकृत्वा कथम् । | SV, Arthā, 11.

तद्भविन्नित्वः तु गृहं धर्मः न कर्यचित् ।

गृहान्विन्नित्वक्त तदादि न प्रतीतते । | SV, Arthā, 12.

गम्यते तु गृहं तब्र न च चैत्र: प्रतीयते ।

न चारादर्शने हेतुचन्त्रामावेदिनित्वः भवायते । | SV, Arthā, 13.

तेन देशश्चयावादिति हेतुन भल्यते ।

अद्वर्षनद्वारे च प्रमेयायावाचिते । | SV, Arthā, 14.

बहिर्मात्रतिनासि तेनादर्शनहृत्वका ।

चैत्रान्वाय भल्यते गृहेभवक्ष जंग्लितः । | SV, Arthā, 15.

पूर्व न च गृहीतस्य धर्मण: स्यात् प्रमेयता ।

न चात्र बालदेशे या चैत्रे या गृहते पुरा । | SV, Arthā, 16, Jha Eng. trans.

153) तेनार्थ्यविन्यासस्य पूर्वस्य यथे च कारणे ।

कार्यादर्शनार्क: शक्येविद्वेष्टि च समप्रतियमेति । | SV, Arthā 47.

कार्यार्थ्य नु विह्स्ति न समप्रतियमेति ।

हुष्ठ्या सम्भवितस्ति चैषा शक्यविन्यात नान्यथा । | SV, Arthā 48.

तहिन्ने तदादि च प्रक्षादेशस्मवान ।

अर्थापने: प्रमाणाय चैव शक्यमूलः पिन्न भवेत् । | SV, Arthā 49, ibid.


156) तत्क्रियाक्रमानात्मा स चैत्रे विन्यितः ।
सर्वदा वस्तुनिष्ठत्वं सम्प्रदायस्त्रां विवर्तनात् || TS, 1660.

अस्तु वापरिणामोऽस्य तथापि व्यभिचारिता ।

स्वाप्नार्थसंदेहालु तद्भवेऽयस्मिनंसम्भवत् || TS, 1661.

प्रत्ययन्तसद्द्वाये तद्विविनिकान्यदशनान् ।

घटानादिरुपेण तस्यासाधिते यदि || TS, 1662.

यदि वस्तु प्रमाणायो मेयाभावस्यब्रह्मच न ।

प्रत्ययेन्निर्यातः भावस्था सति कथं न ते । || TS, 1669, Jha Eng. trans.

157) अर्थक्रियासमयच सददन्युद्धते ।

समावेशो न चैक्रत्र तयोऽयुक्तो विरोधतः || TS 1674, Ibid.

158) नीरुपयः हि विज्ञानरुपहानी प्रमाणता ।

न युन्ये प्रमेयस्य सा हि संवित्तलक्षणा || TS 1678.

तद्दुत्तत्त्वात् प्रमाणाः वेदस्युर्विविद्युद्धते ।

न नीरुपयः हेतुतस्मयोऽद्धिति कथाचन । || TS 1679, Ibid.

159) PKM, Mahendrakumar Shastri ed. pp. 189-208.


162) प्रमाणपक्षं प्रत्र वस्तुरुपे न जापाते ।

वस्तुनिष्ठत्वोऽहै तत्राभावप्रमाणता । || SV, Abhāva 1.

163) प्रत्यथादेरुत्पति: प्रमाणाभाव उप्यते ।

सात्मन: परिणामो वा विज्ञानं वाचावलुि । || SV, Abhāva 11.

164) प्रत्यथाधावतारस्तु भावांशो गृह्यते यदा ।

व्यापारसद्दन्युपस्येभावांश निदृशते । || SV, Abhāva 17.
न तावदिनिदिर्पयेरिषा नासीत्युत्पत्ते मति: ।
भावांशेनैः संयोगो योगत्वार्दिनिदिर्ग्यं हि । | SV Abhāva 18.

165) गुहीत्वा वस्तुस्मर्द्वां स्मृत्वा च प्रतियोगिनम् ।

मानसं नासिताद्वां जायते श्रापेक्षणात् । | SV, Abhāva 27. Jha Eng. trans.