CHAPTER 5

REFUTATION OF ALL MEANS OF COGNITION
CHAPTER V
REFUTATION OF PRAMĀNAS
(MEANS OF COGNITIONS)

j) Position of Mīmāṃsā - Valid cognition has been classified by the Mīmāṃsakas into six - viz.,

i) Sense-perception (pratyakṣa)
ii) Inference (anumāna).
iii) Verbal cognition (śabda).
iv) Analogy (upamāna).
v) Presumption (arthāpatti).
vi) Non-apprehension (abhāva).

As regards the sense-perception, Jamini defines sense-perception as follows:

"Sense-perception (is) that cognition (which takes place) when there is a contact of the sense-organs (with their respective objects) ¹.

After having defines sense-perception Jamini, in the latter part of the same sūtra points of its limitations as far as the knowledge of Dharma is concerned. He says : " (It is) not a means (of knowing Dharma) it apprehends only whatever, is present" ².

On this, Śabara says : "That cognition by a person which appears when there is a contact of the sense-organs is sense-perception".
"Sense-perception is not the means (of knowing Dharma), because it is that cognition which arises when his sense organs are in contact with the object cognised. Dharma, however, is something that is yet to come and it does not exist at the time of cognition. The perception is the apprehending of an object that actually present and not one what is not present at the time of cognition. Therefore sense-perception is not a means of (knowing Dharma)."

SV of Kumārila provides the following explanation regarding the sense-perception: The use of 'Satsamprayoge' (contact) in the sūtra would lie in excluding 'dream cognition'. Hence it cannot be said to be either directly mentioned or supplementarily implied. Since the definition is not mentioned by name in the sūtra. The form of the direct declaration of the definition would be - 'That which is sense-perception has this character' and the form of the definition, as a 'supplementary explanation would be - 'That which has such a character is sense-perception' and so long as definition has not been mentioned by name, it cannot be either the one or the other.

Further, Kumārila asserts that the fact of being a perception is the reason for proving the rest of the arguments and this, is too well-known, in case of sense-perception. It is explained only with a view to the 'perception of Yogi'. However, the sense-perception of the Yogis too cannot be any other than ordinarily known, because the very fact of its being sense-perception would prove it to have two characteristics, viz., (1) the premissing the fact of sense-perception consisting of the comprehension of objects existing in the present time becomes in-applicable in reference to such yogis.

2) The reasoning based upon the future character of duty would be contradicted by the fact of future objects being perceptible to Yogis. In order to avoid
these two contingencies the sütrakāra has used the word 'sat' in the sense of 'what is well-known' 6.

Again he says that if there is a sensuous cognition for ever, produced by contact with objects not existing at present time, then alone could it apply to Duty which is yet to come. For this reason, Jaimini added the term 'sat' in the sütra. And also, Duty is not perceptible prior to its performance and even when it has been performed, it is not perceptible. Like our sense-perception, the sense-perception of the Yogis as consisting of the comprehension of objects existing at the present time and as having the character of sense-perception cannot be accepted as applying to Duty. The signification of 'sat' could be got at through the locative (samprayoge), yet the assumptions of others have to be rejected hence Jaimini added 'sat' in the sütra 7.

Next, he explains the significance of 'sam' used in the sütra as in the sense of 'proper' and it serves to preclude all faulty 'prayoga' (functions). In the case of perception of silver in the conch-shell, the functioning of the sense-organ is faulty. Therefore such perceptions become precluded 8. Again, he explains the words 'person' and 'sense-organs' which have been construed by means of trans sposition in the bhāṣya. The 'person' here meant to be either the ordinary person or the person whose existence is to be proved. By the word 'buddhi-janma' (cognition-production) is meant that cognition becomes authoritative as soon as it is produced. In the case of all cases, their operation is something apart from their birth. In order to exclude such character from the means of right cognition, the word 'production' (birth) has been added in the sutra. Hence the only operation of cognition with regard to the objects, consists in its being produced, that alone is 'right notion' (pramā) and the cognition itself as accompanied by this right notion is the 'means
of right notion' (pramāṇa). The word 'being produced' has been explained by Śabara, as identical with the cognition itself and it has also been made the qualification of cognition sensuous, in order to differentiate it from all past and future cognitions 9.

Next, according to SV provides the sense-perception is of two kinds. viz., 1) nirvikālpaka (non-determinate or non-conceptual) 2) savikalpaka (determinate, conceptual). He explains the 'non-determinate cognition, as follows, - first of all, there is a cognition in the shape of mere observation in the abstract, which is undefined, similar to the cognition of the infant or the dumb, arising purely out of the object by itself and at that time neither any specialisation nor a generalisation is recognised; what is cognised is only the object, the substratum. The determinate cognition is such, if non-determinate cognition is followed by fuller perception of the thing as having certain qualifications, such as; belonging to a certain community or universal bearing a certain name and so forth 10.

Jamini does not define the means of cognitions except sense-perception and probably verbal testimony because, the other means are based upon sense-perception in the first instance; secondly they cannot be the means of knowing Dharma.

As far as the inference is concerned,Śabara says "When the perception of one factor of a well-recognised relationship leads to the cognition of other factor of that relationship, the latter is not in contact with the person's sense-organs; this second cognition is what is called 'anumāna' (Inferential cognition). This is of two kinds, viz., (1) that based upon a directly perceived relationship and (2) that based upon a generalised relationship.

Among these, an example of the former is that the cognition of fire follows from the cognition of smoke, - this is based upon the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire, directly perceived in kitchen. Next, an example of the latter kind of infer-
ential cognition is that when the Sun changes its position, we infer on the ground of our experience, that 'the Sun is moving' in the case of Devadatta, it is only after the moves that he changes his position. This experience has led us to the generalised premiss that 'whenever an object changes its position, it moves' and it is on this generalised premiss that the inference of the Sun's movement is based

As regards the 'verbal cognition', Šabara defines as Śāstra 'scriptural injunction' is that means cognising the object not in contact with the senses, which follows from the verbal cognition.

Kumārila says that the bhāṣya does not think to supply a definition of word or verbal cognition in general, it defines only the particular form of word or injunction which bears upon the subject matter of Mīmāṃsā i.e. Dharma and Adharma. Therefore, here in the definition, śabda stands for the Vedic or Scriptural word and 'artha' for Dharma and Adharma which forms the subject matter of 'scripture'.

Kumārila does not restrict verbal cognition to Vedic injunction only. He devides this into two classes viz. (1) pauruṣeya (human origin) (2) apauruṣeya (non-human origin). Under the first category, words are included all words uttered by trustworthy persons while in the second category, words are included of the Veda. Both of them are valid, since the only ground of the invalidity of a word lies in the fact of its emanating from an untrustworthy source and this ground is as absent in the words of the trustworthy persons as well as in that of the words of the Veda.

Next, Kumārila asserts that it is a distinct means of cognition, because Bauddhas and Vaiśeṣikas have included the verbal cognition under inference. He deliberately says that it is only when verbal authority, in the Veda as well as in human utterances, has its validity apart from the character of inference and for the same reason the word as a means of valid cognition cannot be defined as 'the
teaching of a trustworthy person', since there is no such person in the case of the Vedic word. Therefore it is the conclusion that the cognition brought about by words verbal cognition and it is self-sufficient in its validity.

Kumarila has proved the difference between inference and word as means of cognition with long explanation and concludes that verbal cognition does not fulfill three conditions which are essential in Inferential process and hence it is a distinct from inference as sense-perception. However, Kumarila is of opinion that the knowledge derived from individual words might be included under inference and next he goes on to point out that the cognition provided by the sentence can never come under inference.

As regards the analogy, Śabara defines as such, upamāna (analogy) also brings about the cognition of things not in contact with the senses. For instance, the sight of the gayal brings about the remembrance of the cow as being similar to the gayal.

Kumarila explains this analogy as, 'being asked by the town people', 'like what is gayal? if the forester answers that a 'gayal' is just like thw cow', then it is commonly known as 'analogy'.

This is to say that the observer already knows a certain object (the cow), then on going to the forest he sees another animal already known to him, and afterwords there is a recall of formerly perceived cow which he cognises now as similar to the before his eyes. Then, it forms the objective of analogical cognition is the similarity as qualified by the previously known animal. It is true that similarity is perceived, while the cow is remembered, yet the two together, i.e. the cow, similar to the seen animal are not cognised either by perception or by remembrance. Therefore, for the cognition of the two together there is a need of analogy as distinct means of cog-
nition, like inference. The mountain is perceived by the concomitant with smoke, and yet since the object to be cognised is a qualified one, i.e. the mountain as containing the fire. Therefore a distinct means of right knowledge is established to inference 19.

As Śabara defines 'arthāpatti' (presumption) consists in the presuming of something not seen on the ground that a fact already perceived or heard would not be possible without that presumption. For instance, it is found that Devadatta who is alive is not in the house and this non-existence in the house leads to the presumption that he is somewhere outside the house, as without this, the fact of he is being alive and not in the house could not be explained 20.

Kumārila supplies the following definition of presumption, such as, in a case, where in order to avoid the contradiction or irrelevancy of any object ascertained by means of any of the six means of cognition, an unseen object is assumed is known to be one of 'arthāpatti' (presumption). Here, 'unseen' means 'not cognised by any of the five means of right cognition', because that produced by 'verbal authority' has been declared to be apart from 'seen', in as much as the verbal authority comprehends also the means of cognition and in this lies its difference from the other five 21.

Further, he classifies this presumption into six. They are as follows:

(1) Presumption based on perception, e.g. burning capacity in fire, which is based upon the perceived fact that it burns.

(2) Presumption based upon inference, e.g. we have in the presuming of the moving capacity in the Sun, which is based upon an inferred fact that the Sun moves from place to place.

(3) Presumption based on the analogy, e.g. we have in the presuming of the cognisability of the cow by the cognition born of the similarity between the cow and
the gayal.

(4) Presumption based on the presumption, it is found in the cognition of the denotative potency of the word through presumption the well-known fact that it denotes certain things and on the basis of said presumed denotative potency which cannot be otherwise explained, we presume the eternality of word.

(5) Presumption based on non-apprehension. In the case where the non-apprehension of Devadatta leads to the presumption of his being outside.

(6) Presumption based on the verbal cognition, e.g. when one hears the assertion, 'Devadatta is fat and yet he eats not during the day', he is led to the presumption that the man eats at night.

In regard to the last kind of presumption, there is a difference of opinion. Some people hold that the presumption is of the fact of the man eating at night, while the others, it is of the verbal assertion that 'he eats at night', and all are agreed regarding the last kind of presumption as not entirely different from āgama (verbal cognition). And the reason for this view lies in the fact that all cognitions derived from the Vedic text belong to this category and all these would be 'non-Vedic', 'non-scriptural', if this presumption is entirely different from verbal cognition.

Although the presumption has the character of verbal cognition, 'he eats at night', yet what we have consider is sanction behind this verbal assertion. This sanction cannot be held to be provided by perception, since the presumed assertion is not actually heard. Nor by inference, because no connection of the two has been observed. Nor can be derived from another verbal assertion nor from analogical cognition. Thus, this is the only sanction or proof cognition derived from the heard words 'he eats not during the day' lies in presumption only.
According to Śabara 'abhāva' (non-apprehension) stands for the non-existence (non-operation) of the five means of the cognition and it is what brings about the cognition that 'it does not exist' in regard to the things not in contact with the senses' 25. This is as explained by Kumārila that in the case of an object where the other means of cognition do not function towards the comprehension of the existence of that object we have the notion of non-existence of certain thing. The ascertainty of the non-existence of an object is got at is called 'abhāva' 26 (non-apprehension).

This non-apprehension is of four kinds 27 viz. (1) The previous absence, e.g. the absence of the curd in the milk.

(2) Absence after destruction, e.g. the absence of milk in the curd.

(3) Mutual absence, e.g. the absence of the cow in the horse.

(4) Absolute absence e.g. the absence of horns on the head of hare.

Next, he asserts that if non-apprehension is not accepted as a distinct means of cognition, then there might be cognition of curd in milk, of milk in curd, of the pot in a piece of cloth, of horn in the hare, of intelligence in the earth, of shape in the soul, of odour in water, of taste in fire, of form together with those two in the air, and of tangibility and there three in the ākāśa. Nor again, any usage with regard to the differentiation of causes and effects, if non-apprehension is not classified into those of different kinds. Hence it must be an entity, like the cow, because it is capable of forming the object of the notions of collective affirmation and differentiation and also because it is an object of cognition. The notion that a certain thing 'it does not exist' is not possible, without a notion of the object itself 28.

By means of the word 'pramāṇābhāva' (in the Bhāṣya) is meant the non-appearance of sense-perception and the rest and this is either a particular modi-
fication of the soul or the cognition of another object. Sense-perception and the rest apply to such cases where there is a comprehension of the positive form of an object, where, however, the object of comprehension is the non-existent form, the only actions of these consists in their non-appearance. The idea 'this is not' is never brought about by means of the sense-organs, because they are capable of having contact with positive forms only 29.

Further, he states that if you assert that 'non-existence' is not different from 'existence', hence the sense-organs could have contact even with 'non-existence', then the answer is that we donot of an absolute identity between the two. Even when there is an identity of the object, we admit of a certain difference among its properties like colour, taste etc. and the comprehension of these existence and non-existence depends upon the appearance of the one and disappearance of other 30.

Further, it does not have the character of inference, because there is no middle term. If it be urged that 'we have for such term, the positive form', then the answer is that this cannot be, because the positive form does not form an object of cognition at that time. Nor can this be the predicate of the minor premiss (pakṣadharma) as in the case of the word. And again no positivity is held to be concomitant with all non-apprehensions 31.

Thus it is a distinct means of cognition by which the non-existence is cognised.

Rebuttal of Perception by Jayarāsi - According to Jayarāsi, the sūtra defining perception is sometimes explained as one having the purpose of definition of perception, sometimes as that having the purpose of communicating the number of casual factors of perception and sometimes that having the purpose of repetition 32.
If it belongs to the first alternative, i.e., as one having the purpose of definition of perception, then the faultlessness of a cognition cannot be known neither by its being produced by faultless causes nor by the efficiency of activity nor its being free from sublation nor otherwise.

A person who does not have superior faculties does not apprehend that a cognition arises from a contact between sense and object, for the dependence of a cognition upon that contact is not apprehended, as the contact is beyond the reach of the senses.

If it be urged that the contact is assumed, because, otherwise the apprehension would be impossible, then the answer is that it is not true. If the sūtra (aphorism) has the purpose of communicating the number of causal factors, then the question is what is the purpose of this enumeration? Since light etc. are casual factors, they should have encremerated.

If it is belong the third alternative, i.e., the sūtra (aphorism) has the purpose of repetition, then this may be a fault, because one repeats what is well known, and is not what is unknown. If it be argued that it is known among people, then the answer is that it is not known, because it is apprehended as faultless. Nor is it known as the perception is produced by a contact with an existent thing and therefore perception is not apprehended and when it is not apprehended, its repetition is impossible. Because there is no motive for it. By repeating of only one affirms or negates something in respect of something.

If it be urged that this has been stated by us (Mīmāṃsakas), "Perception is not a means for the apprehension of Dharma (duty) because it apprehends an existing object and because it arises from a contact between sense and object", then the question arises: What do you mean by this statement that a perception
which arises containing the appearance of an object other than dharma, is negated
as a means for the apprehension of dharma? or the perception which arises con-
taining the appearance of dharma, is negated as the means for its apprehension. or
it does not arise? If a perception which arises containing the appearance of an
object other than dharma is excluded from the means for apprehension of dharma,
then it should be informed to you that we should not disagree. And again, if the
preception which arises as making dharma known is excluded, then you should be
confronted with a contradiction, i.e., on the one hand, the perception, arises as
making dharma known and on the other, it is not a means for the apprehension of
dharma. Otherwise, a cognition arisen from a Vedic injunction, which has arisen as
making dharma known would also be a means for the apprehension of dharma.
Further, if it be argued that whatever has not yet arisen does not make Dharma
known, then who says that what has not arisen makes Dharma known? It does not
even make a lotus leaf known, for it itself does not exist 37.

Next, he argues; what has been said, "because it arises from a contact with
the existent one", is not proper; because it has already been pointed how it does
arise from a contact with the existent one. And again, it has been said, "perpetual
cognition makes an existing thing known, since it apprehends an existing thing", if
so, then not only perception, but cognitions which are produced by all means of
valid cognition make an existing thing known 38.

It is asserted that the perception is the arising of cognition. However, there is
no means of valid cognition for the apprehension of cognition. It (i.e. cognition)
cannot be ascertained by perception, since it is not admitted. Nor can it be appre-
hended by inference, because there is no apprehension of an indicator which is
connected by it 39. If it is claimed that the cognition is apprehended by presumption,
for instance, a pot, then the apprehension of a pot would be impossible, because obtaining and avoiding of the object would be impossible. If you claim that the cognition must exist, because otherwise the object pot would be impossible, then this is not correct, because the pot is not the effect of the cognition, but the cognition is its effect. If it is assumed that a cognition because, otherwise obtaining and avoiding the pot would be impossible, then it may be false, because the cognition itself cannot subsist for several intervals of time. A person who is impelled by someone who prevails over him strives to obtain the pot even without a prior cognition of that pot or he may strive to get rid of the pot, because it has been destroyed. Hence, the presumption is doubtful. And the apprehension of a determined cognition is impossible without the apprehension of the relation between cognition and object. But when this apprehension of the cognition is not established by implication the assumption of senses is also impossible 40.

And again, if you assume a cognition because otherwise the apprehension of an object would be impossible, then this is also not proper, because there is no relation to a cognition. Then a question arises that how could presumption make known the cognition? When an apprehension is apprehended, i.e., a cognition is apprehended by perception, not it is apprehended by an apprehension. Because the words *avabodha* (apprehension) *buddhi* (cognition) and *vijñāna* (cognition) are synonyms. 'Is apprehended', and 'is cognised' have the same meaning 41.

**Refutation by Diṇnāga** - Diṇnāga, the author of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, refutes the first half as the definition of perception given by Jaimini. According to him, the Mīmāṃsakas says: "When a man's senses are in contact with something existent (*sat*) there is the rise of cognition, that is perception" 42.

Here, in this connection, he argues that the term '*sat*' (something existent) is
mentioned in order to exclude 'asat' (the non-existent) is not right because of the rule vyāpti (invariable contact) is only possible when there is existence of 'sat' (existent) 43.

And again, if the Mīmāṃsakas assert that the term 'sat' (existent) is used in the sūtra in order to indicate the counterparts (pratiyogin) of the senses, then the reply is that even if that should be the case, it is by mentioning those objects which are specified (viśiṣṭa) by the senses that one should indicate the counterparts. Those objects of the senses which are specified (by the corresponding senses) i.e. colour (rūpa), taste (rasa) etc., are properly called the counterparts of senses 44.

Mīmāṃsakas argue that here in the sūtra not only the contact of senses with objects, but also is implied the contact of the soul (ātman) with the mind (manas) although a mention of 'senses' alone made. Here the word, senses' must be taken as upalaksana (representative example) Diśnāga replies that this is also untenable, because the capacity of soul and others factors of cognition for contact is only for contact 'sat' 45.

It may be argued that in the case of a traveller in the desert sees a mirage of water that really does not exist. This example seems to show that a sense is able to come in contact with something unreal. The answer for this is that nothing is in contact with such objects as a mirage and the like which appear as objects of perception but do not exist, when a certain spot comes in contact with the faculty of sight, in a peculiar condition at a certain time., there arises an illusive mental cognition, in sequence although there is no real object. Therefore the term 'sat' which has been used for the purpose of excluding this kind of contact with an unreal object is not appropriate 48.

Further, if it be urged that a sense is said to be bound to a given object, since
it does not operate on any other object. Therefore, the contact (samprayoga) that is implied by the expression 'sat-samprayoga' (appropriate contact). When a sense has a special aptitude for a given object, that is called samyak (appropriate) because its yogyatā (compatibility) with the sense. It is contact with such an object that is meant by the expression 'satsamprayoga'. If it is so, then the answer is that in this matter, other things also are bound, such as the atoms are bound to the sense, is held to indicate a special attitude of the sense. It would follow therefore that perception would arise from a contact with such objects 47.

Again, if it be urged by the Mīmāṃsakas that this conclusion does not follow for the following reason. For instance, it is called a cow, because it goes (gacchatīti gouḥ) it does not follow that other things which go are also cows. In the same way, it is only the object of a sense that is called 'sat' because of being bound to the sense. If such an argument is made, then the reply is that the reference is disimilar, because the reason in this manner, by virtue of the commonly known usage. However it is not commonly accepted that the word 'sat' is applied to the object of a sense by reason of its being bound to the sense. Therefore, even if it is argued, it is not proper to use the word 'sat' in the definition 48.

Next, the position of Mīmāṃśā holds the view that the result (phala) is different from the means of cognition (pramāṇa) and states that since there is no result other than the rise of a cognition (buddhijanama), that from which a cognition arises is perception. On this matter, there is no cause (kāraṇa) of cognition which could be called perception apart from the contact (samprayoga) of the soul and other factors which is accompanied by impression. (saṃskṛta). This view is also untenable. If merely the assemblage of the causes are to be called perception, then, what would be the use of the words the rise of a cognition (buddhijanama) in the definition? And
again, in case the contact of object, sense, mind and soul as accompanied by impression are to be held to produce a cognition, then, why should the expression 'pratyakṣa' (which singles out the sense (akṣa) alone) be applied to the assemblage of all those factors? Therefore the contact of sense and object can properly be called 'pratyakṣa' (perception) for the reason that the sense alone is the specific cause of perception 49.

Further, the statement, perception is that by means of which an ascertain-ment (niścaya) in the form of 'this is a cow' or 'this is a horse' arises in regard to this perceived object is also not proper, because one cognises an object as a cow or the like when that is associated with cow-ness or other such characters. But sense-cognition (akṣa-buddhi) has no ability to bring about the association of the qualifier with the perceived thing. Hence, sense-cognition cannot result in the ascertainment of an object 50.

Moreover, the object of the sense (indriya-gocara) is the form (rūpa) which is to be cognised as it is (svasamvedya) and which is inexpressible (anirdeśya) although object of the sense is the possessor of many properties. Therefore the object is a cause of the rise of a cognition which possesses the form of that particular object. This is the cognition itself and therefore is self-cognisable. It is impossible to describe this as having such and such a nature because what is expressible is that which possesses a universal for its object. Furthermore, if the sense-cognition is established as a cognition of a thing in all aspects, then it could not be called as 'perceptual cognition' (pratyakṣa-buddhī) 51.

Next, the word pratyakṣa (perception) may be applied to three concepts viz., pramāṇā (a means of cognition), jñāna (a cognition) and viṣaya (an object). Among these applications the application to a means of cognition is primary (pradhāna) and
others are secondary (upacāra) and among these secondary applications, an object is called pratyakṣa (perception). Cognition is figuratively called 'pratyakṣa' because it occurs in dependence upon the sense and therefore it is equivalent to a means of cognition. Hence the sphere within which sense operates (indriya gocara) is limited by nature to specific (asadharana) objects. Thus, in any case, 'that from which cognition arises is perception' is not proper.

If it be argued that it is our doctrine that perception is nothing but the rise of cognition of something, then the answer is that, a result is different could not be found. Since as much as the cognition itself has arisen, there would be no result other than that cognition. Again, if the rise (janman) is different from the cognition, there would be inherence (samavāya) of a cognition in its own cause (i.e. the soul) Even, if this (inherence) is admitted to be a means of cognition, what (result) could come from that (inherence which is eternal)? If the rise is not different from the cognition, the cognition itself would be perception. Then, it would be useless to mention the term rise.

Moreover, if it is maintained that at the moment of the rise of a cognition the soul (puruṣa) changes its previous state and becomes cogniser (pramātṛ) then he must be considered as anitya (non-eternal) and if the soul is unchangeable, (being a non-cogniser) at the moment of the rise of a cognition, then he could not be a cogniser.

Refutation by Śaṇṭarakṣita - The Buddhist philosopher, Śaṇṭarakṣita proceeds to present the view of Kumārila on sense-perception, such as, 'At first there is only a pre-cognition (ālocanañāna) which is indeterminate (nirvikalpa), like the cognition of the infant, the dumb and the like. It is born purely of the thing cognised, at the moment when neither the universal nor the particular character is apprehended; all
that is apprehended is only a certain individual which is the substratum of both those characters. Subsequently, the things becomes apprehended along with the properties of the 'class-character' i.e. determinate (savikalpa) and the rest. Thus the cognition which is apprehended is regarded as 'sense-perception'.

Further, again and again, as more and more conceptual contents come in, there follow further apprehensions in the same connection. When a person moves from light into the inner room, things do not manifest themselves, but that does not meant that later on he does not perceive all those things by his sense-organs. At first, he perceives a mere semblance of the object and subsequently he perceives those objects in their true form with the properties of class-character and the rest. If after having pre-cognised the object, the person closes his eyes and then imposes conceptual contacts, the latter would not be "sense-perception" because there is no contact of the sense with the object.

The author proceeds to refute all the arguments of Kumārila. According to him, if the cognition appertains to the specific individuality of the thing, then even on the apprehension of the universal and other properties should remain free from verbal expression. Because specific individuality of things cannot be denoted by words. Therefore, the cognition that rests upon that must be free from conceptual content and association with words.

He emphasises that if the universal alone is apprehended, then the qualification would be something different. If it be urged that the subsequent cognition envisages the universal and the particular in as much as what they apprehend is the particular as characterised by the universal, and they cannot be said to apprehend the specific individuality only, then that one and the same cognition cannot comprehend both the specific individuality and the universal. Because, if such cognition is
conceptual, there would be no comprehension of the former. On the other hand, there could be no comprehension of the latter. If the universal and other properties have become already apprehended by the initial cognition, then the subsequent cognition would be apprehending only what has been already apprehended, and it would thus be like remembrance.

Refutation of inference by Jayarāśi - According to the Mīmāṃsakas, the inference of the self does not work, because, means of cognitions have for their objects which are not determined by other means of valid cognitions. Inference does not operate an object to be determined by perception and perception does not operate on an object to be determined by inference. Thus, both have objects which are mutually exclusive. What has been said that "in the case of special object there is no concomitance special is an object which can be apprehended by its means of valid cognition. When such an object is adopted, inference lacks concomitance. Concomitance is a relation, the apprehension of this is impossible.

Next the argues that if inference operates an object, even it is determined by perception etc., the object would be common in perception and inference. In the case of commonness, what has to be proved is already proved, because it has been proved by perception. Thus, the qualification 'anadhitārtha-gantram (agent of apprehension of an unapprehended object) is useless.

Again, he shows the different meaning. If the generality is established inference would be a means of proof, as it is asserted the Mīmāṃsakas, that the relation between what makes known and what has to be made known obtains between two universals. But the universal does not exist. Thus proving what is established means proving something existing. But the universal fire does not exist. When it does not exist, what does this make a thing known?
Or, another meaning; a means of proof which is established an existing means of proof. But universal smoke does not exist. How can this universal in as much as be a means of proof for another universal? or a means of proof is established means that inference becomes a means of proof in as much as it is cognised. But smoke is not cognised, because it does not exist itself 160.

Again, he continues that it is not apprehended, because there is no means of apprehending it. The universal has a recurrent form and this is not recurrent in itself nor in a single individual. However, many individuals are not apprehended at the time of inference, but only one individual smoke is apprehended. And in respect to single individual there is no cognition of the universal as having a recurrent nature and the universal does not have another form 61.

Refutation by Śāntarakṣita - As regards the inference, the author of TS Śāntarakṣita putsforth the views of Kumārila by saying that some people hold that inference is of two kinds 62 viz. (a) that based upon perceived particulars (b) that based upon generalised relationship.

(a) In the case of two particular things, such as the fire produced by burning dried cowdung and the smoke proceeding from that fire, the observer has the cognition of the things and later on while moving to another place, the observer happens again and again to recognise in other places the presence of the same fire through the indication of the same smoke seen before. It becomes recognised as a means of cognition distinct from perception. Because it brings about the cognition of a thing i.e. fire, the existence of which had been in doubt. This has been described by Vindhyavāsin as inference based upon the perceived relationship of particulars.

(b) Though, this inference is based upon generalised relationship, could be
exemplified on the basis of another fire and another smoke. The inference cited is that of the 'Sun moving', as this is based absolutely upon generalised relationship.

Next, he proceeds to refute the views of Kumārila by arguing that in as much as it has been proved that 'perpetual flux' is all embracing, there can be no inference by itself. If it be argued that 'the sameness is assumed on the basis of the sameness of the chain', then the answer is that no such sameness can have any real existence and what is merely assumed cannot be an entity. A cognition devoid of objects is not admitted and if the inference has an assumed object, it would clearly be devoid of an object.

If it is meant that 'even on the destruction of the individual (vyakti), the universal (ākṛti) persists, that cannot be, because if the universal persisted, that also would certainly covered by 'perpetual flux'. Further, on what grounds, have you asserted the restriction that these two particulars whose relationship has been cognised by sense-perception etc.? Then again, having once cognised a thing by means of inference, if the samething is cognised again by means of inference, why is not this later regarded as valid? What is the peculiarity in previous one? If it be urged that the later one is not regarded as valid, like remembrance, because it apprehends what has been already apprehended, then, why is it not the previous inference also regarded as the same? Again, if it be argued that in the former inference, there is this additional pecularity that it sets aside the doubt that has set in during the interval, then, why is not the same in the later also? Therefore, the later itself that sets aside the doubt as to something being present or not present.

Hence, the generalised perception is really independent.

Refutation of Verbal cognition by Bhāvaviveka - In his MHK, while refuting the Mīmāṃsakas, Bhāvaviveka argues in the pūrvapakṣa that the verbal testimony is an
independent means of knowledge. According to him, verbal testimony is different from the perception and inference, since it is another means of knowledge. The direct perception produces an understanding about one object at one time and so does the inference too. But verbal testimony produces an understanding of many objects in aggregation and again, it cognises unvisible objects like svarga (heaven), apūrva (unprecedented) i.e. new knowledge etc.

In refutation of this argument he includes verbal cognition in inference. He states that the reason used for establishing āgama (verbal testimony) as an independent means of knowledge namely pramāṇa (cognition) is inconclusive, because cognitionhood exists in inference and word is not different from inference. Again, the reason that it is the cause of emergence of cognitions of a different object will be unproved, because that the verbal testimony is different is not proved. Hence it is not different cognition. Again, he says that unseen matters like svarga etc. can be cognised by parārthānumāna (inference for the sake of others). It depends on the memory cognition about the relation. What has been said that it gives a new knowledge etc. in that case thus, the knowledge given by the verbal testimony will be impermanent.

Refutation by Śāntarakṣita - Śāntarakṣita proceeds to show that there are only two means of cognition. He says that there cannot be any form of cognition except the two i.e. sense-perception and inference, because all others that have been postulated, either do not possess character of the 'form of right' cognition or are included in these two.

Regarding the verbal cognition, he states the view of the Mīmāṃsakas. He says : other people have declared verbal cognition to that knowledge of imperceptible things which is derived from words and that cognition is derived from (a) the
eternal sentence (b) the sentence uttered by trustworthy person. This cannot be
the sense-perception, because of object apprehended by it is beyond the reach of
the senses. Nor is it inference, because it is devoid of the characteristic features of
inference. Until the subject (minor term) is definitely known to be possessed of the
probundam and also of the probans, it cannot be regarded as a case of inference
of that subject. In as much as the words speaking of the Agnihotra and other things
bring about unshakeable cognitions, the character of being right cognition cannot
be denied to them 67.

Now, he proceeds to show that the definition of verbal cognition is open to
change of being impossible. He says that as regards the "eternal sentence", its
possibility and expressiveness are both improbable. Hence, the first definition of the
verbal cognition is an impossible one. The sentence may be capable or incapable,
the cognition resulting therefrom would always come about or it would not comeabout
at all 68.

If it be urged that a certain meaning is actually comprehended from words,
they cannot be inexpressive or useless, then the answer is that such comprehension
can only be derived from explanations provided and in such cases it is found that
the expounder is free to explain things according to his own wish. If it be argued that
the word, by its very nature has the potency to denote well established things, in
that case its meaning would be comprehended also by one who has no knowledge
of the convention bearing upon the word and its denotation. Further, the lamp which
is illuminative by its very nature does not need a convention in illuminating things. If
there is another convention bearing upon the same word there could be no com-
prehension of that other thing from the same word. Even there may be a convention,
the lamp cannot manifest taste and other things. Nor can any such potency of
words be recognised. In this connection he asks a question: If there can be no cognition of the meaning of the Veda, how can there be any unshakeability in that cognition? Further, he asserts that it could be possible only on the basis of conventions and in this it would not be different from the words of human beings. In fact, persons well-versed in the science of reasoning do not recognise any difference between these two. However, it can be unshakeable only for the Śrotriyas (Mīmāṃsakas) who are ignorant of the ways of reasoning.

If it be argued that a person is regarded as trustworthy in regard to imperceptible things, whose assertions are found to be true in most cases, then the answer is that the mere fact of one's assertion being not true in some individual case, cannot prove that his assertions are never true. Nor can the fact of its being true, in one case prove that all his assertions are true.

Next, he proceeds to show in what way the verbal cognition is meant to be included under inference. He says that from all verbal statements there follows inference of the 'desire to speak' (i.e. intention on the part of the speaker). This is definitely known to be the cause (source) of the words through direct perception and non-apprehension. If it be urged that in the case of a man under illusion, his assertion is found quite different from what he desires to say. If the verbal statement cannot function towards bringing about the cognition, then the answer is that there is a clear distinction between the words used by the one who is not under illusion and those of the one who is under illusion. Clever men discern this difference through the context.

Further, he argues that in the case of those words also, there is no incongruity in the inference of the simple 'desire to speak'. Because it is always there, for the purpose of establishing the fact of its being produced by the speaker's breath and
so on. When the desire to speak is the thing to be inferred, there would be three features; the man is the (dharmin) the presence of the desire is the probandum (Sādhyā) which is proved by its effect in the shape of verbal statement which is the reason (hetu). For instance, the form of inference would be - “This man is cognised as having the 'desire to speak' of the tree, because he has uttered the word tree, just as I had done it in previous circumstances”. In such cases, where the other party has denied the presence of three features, we do not regard the verbal statement to be a means of cognition. In such cases, however, where the presence of the three features is admitted by the other party, the fact of its being three featured is quite clear and where the 'desire to speak' is to be proved, it shows that the three features are present there. Such being the case, the word is as good a means of inference as the smoke. Because it is equipped with the three features and because its objective is of the same kind 72.

Refutation of Analogy by Jayarāśi - Jayarāśi refutes the views on analogy of the Mīmāṃsakas. He says that having seen the gayal (gavaya) in the forest, the similarity of a household cow has been found, the apprehension of this, is the result of analogy, is not proper, because this analogy is based on perception. If the perception is not apprehended, then analogy cannot be apprehended 72.

Further, he sets forth a number of alternatives 74. Such as - What is this similarity between cow and gayal which has not been apprehended while the apprehension of the cow? and what is to be understood by this analogy?

i) is it the association of organs? or of

ii) the organs like hom etc., ? or

iii) the generality ? or
iv) any other object?

i) If you say that it is the similarity of association of organs, then the question arises: Is this association of organs acquainted upalabdhilakṣaṇa (definition of perception) or not? If it be pertained to the first among these, then, what is understood before the acquisition of the feature of perception? Having seen the gayal, it would not go beyond remembrance. Again, if it be said that it would not be gained even having features of perception, then we cannot find that in gayal too and further, there may be an apprehension, like, 'my cow is similar to this' and again it may be a subject of horse also. Further, if you say it is anupalabdhilakṣaṇa (not the feature of perception) then, there may be an upsetting apprehension, like, having seen buffello or horse, the apprehension would be 'my cow is similar to this'.

ii) The organs like viṣāṇa (horn) etc., said for the similarity, are previously understood and therefore the cognition arises that would go beyond the remembrance.

iii) If the generality of both cow and gayal is said for similarity, then this apprehension would not arise.

iv) If it belongs to any other object, then a question arises: Is that belong to senses or super-senses? If it pertains to senses, then the cognition being cognised is to be cognised and it would not leave the remembrance.

It this is not acquainted as the features of perception, then, a person should not say that 'cow is similar to this' even having seen or unseen gayal.

Refutation by Śāntarakṣita - With regard to analogical cognition, Śāntarakṣita states from the side of Mīmāṃśā, by saying that having seen the cow, when the man goes to the forest and sees the gayal bearing a manifold similarity. In this, the first cog-
nition on that he has of the gayal is one, that apprehends only its shape and this cognition is purely perceptional. The cognition that follows is in the more determinate form - the shape of this animal is similar to that of the cow; and this also comes only when the operation of the senses is there. This also is regarded to be perceptional. Though it is true that the said cognition apprehending the similarity follows after the remembrance of the cow, yet because as residing in the gayal, it would be in proximity to the senses, the similarity would be within reach of the senses. Under these circumstances, the cognition that appears in the form, the cow is similar to this animal, is what is called analogical cognition.

This analogical cognition cannot be regarded as sense-perception, because it is entirely devoid of the functioning of the senses. It cannot be regarded as inference, because there are no three features. For example, there is no proban and the similarity of the cow has not been previously cognised as subsisting in the subject. The similarity which is perceived in the gayal cannot bring about the inference of the cow. However, it cannot be regarded as not a form of right cognition. Because it makes known what is not already known, such as, before the perception of gayal, its similarity in the cow has not been apprehended at all.

Further, he proceeds to refute the view of analogical cognition by arguing that there is no object that could be cognised by this cognition. Hence it cannot be regarded as a means of cognition. The reason here put forward is not admissible for those who declare that anything cognisable in the form of commonalty or universal which falls under the catagory of the non-existent and in the case of the former of the two probandam the premiss becomes part of the proposition itself.

Next, he argues that as being the nature of remembrance, analogical cognition cannot be a valid form of cognition. He says that there are some parts in the gayal's
body which bring about cognitions similar to those brought about by the parts of cow's body. Therefore when the gayal is seen, there follows the remembrance of the parts of the cow's body that have been seen before repeatedly. For this reason, there does not arise any idea of the Horse and other animal through that similarity. However, it does arise when the gayal is seen 78.

It might be urged that the similarity seen previously was merely as existing, it was not seen in the form that 'this is the similarity between this gayal and the cow; while this is the form in which the similarity apprehended by analogical cognition. Hence it cannot be regarded as being the nature of remembrance. The author gives an answer to this is that even the similarity had not been previously apprehended under that name, it was apprehended all the same in its own form. Actually, the name does not form the 'essence' of things. When it has not been apprehended, the things could be regarded as not known by people who know the true nature of the self. If there is a slight element of valid cognition found in analogical cognition, it is to be regarded as an independent form of cognition, then there could be no limit to the number of such independent forms of cognition, as there are many ways in which small elements of cognition could be found 79.

Next the author proceeds to show the incongruities, giving an example that when a line of trees and such things are seen what is actually perceived is only one tree and yet some idea of the second tree being there, there follows the definite cognition in regard to the former tree that this is the first. This will have to be regarded as a distinct form of cognition, as it does not depend upon any element of similarity or other conditions. If it is denied in this case on the ground that it apprehends only what has been already apprehended, then the same might be said in regard to analogical cognition also. And again, when one sees the gayal, there
appears the notion of its dissimilarity to the horse and other animals, then, why cannot this be a distinct form of cognition? If it be urged that it cannot be so regarded because it is included under non-apprehension, then the same might be urged in regard to the notions of 'similarity which also are included under 'mutual non-apprehension'. Just as distinction from similarity is cognised in that case, so also is distinction from all common parts cognised in the other case also. In support of the same idea, an argument is put forward by the author is that because that cognition which apprehends the presence of 'several similar parts' would also falls under 'mutual non-apprehension, otherwise if it is the presence of all similar parts that is cognised, then there would be identity.

Refutation by Ratnaprabhasūri - The Mīmāṁsā account of upamāna (analogy) is such; A certain man comes to know that what a cow is but not a gayal is. Moreover, he has not the information, 'A gayal is like a cow', while he was roaming in a forest, he saw for the first time a gayal. At this sight, there arises in him a knowledge of similarity with regard to the cow which is not present at the time of the form; This is similar to cow, such knowledge is upamāna (analogy) which consists in a cognition of the fact of similarity attributed to that object. Hence this cognition, i.e. upamāna (analogy) comes under pratyabhijñā (recognition) a mode of parokṣa.

Further, he goes on to open a criticism on Mīmāṁsā theory of analogy, like, - you confine analogy to an apprehension of similarity only. Hence another cognition should be found out for such forms of knowledge as 'that cow is dissimilar to that which consists in a cognition of dissimilarity. As he holds, according to Mīmāṁsā, dissimilarity is non-existence (abhāva) i.e. want of similarity, and therefore cognition of dissimilarity comes under the abhāva which is different from upamāna. The Jaina commentator criticises this contention by showing a similar line of argument.
which would show that similarity is the non-existence or want of dissimilarity and that cognitions of similarity are thus modes of the cognition called abhāva. However, it might be urged by Mīmāṃsakas that the similarity cannot be said to consist in non-existence as judgements incorporating similarity are positive assertions. The Jaina thinker exposes this contention by saying that the judgements incorporating dissimilarity are also found to be positive assertions, so that there is no point in stating dissimilarity as only the non-existence of similarity and bringing the cognitions of dissimilarity under the cognition of non-existence (abhāva) 82.

'He is the same Jinadatta' is an instance where ūrdhvatā-sāmānya (hightness-substantial identity) is the subject matter of the pratyabhijñā (recognition). Here, it should be noted that there must be an element of recognition in all cases of conception but the second element in it need not always be a direct perception. Later on in the judgement 'that very first is inferred by me', here 'that' refers to the element of recollection; but the other element accompanying recollection here is not perception but a matter of inference. Similarly in the judgement 'that very object is hereby expressed' 'that' refers to the element recognition. But the other element is neither perception nor inference 83.

**vi) Refutation of presumption by Śantarakṣita -** The presumption which has been regarded as an independent means of cognition by Mīmāṃsakas. The Buddhist philosopher proceeds Śantarakṣita to examine the presumption, by quoting the verses from the original sources. The definition of the presumption is quoted from the Ślokavārttika, i.e. when a certain fact cognised through the six means of cognition, is found to be otherwise inexplicable and hence leads to the assumption of some other fact, this is called arthāpatti (presumption) 84.

This presumption is based upon six means of cognition as Mīmāṃsakas assert
Such as

(1) The assumption of the burning fire, based upon the perceived fact of its having burnt a certain things.

(2) The assumption of the mobility of the Sun based upon the inferred fact of its moving from place to place.

The potencies of all things are presumed on the basis of the inexplicability of effects produced by them. All such potencies that become cognised have not been known already and these are cognised without any idea of the relation of concomitance.

(3) 'He is corpulent and does not eat during the day' on hearing such words, one concludes that the man eats at night and this is presumption based upon what is heard.

(4) When the object cow is likened to the Gayal, there is in the cow the capacity to be apprehended by the analogical cognition, and this capacity is derived from the strength (presumption). i.e. based upon the analogical cognition.

(5) The denotation could not be done by words, could not be defined except through expressive potency. There is no other way of explaining such a potency without recognising the eternality of words. So that this cognition of the eternality of words is also obtained by means of another presumption.

(6) The absence of Caitra from the house has been cognised through absence (non-apprehension) of perception, the cognition of the presence of Caitra outside the house which is marked by his absence has been cited. This is to be regarded as another kind of presumption based upon non-apprehension.

Next, the author points out the defect that is common to all these.
Apart from the potent object, there is no such thing as potency which could be cognised by means of presumption and as far the potent object, it is cognised through perception itself. If the potency is something different, then the question is as to what that potency would be which brings about the effect, the object itself would not be an active agent at all. If the object does bring about the effect, then the potency would not be anything different, because the characteristic feature of the object is that which should be capable of effective action and that the object is learnt from perception itself 86.

If it be urged that "the potency is not something absolutely different from the thing as it is a dual character, being both different and non-different", then the answer is that it cannot be so, because of self-contradiction. And further, it is non-different from the thing would be cognised by perception. As other party asserted regarding its not being cognisable by inference, does not affect us, because in this case, we do not regard the cognition to be of the nature of inference 87.

It has been argued that "from the inferred mobility of the Sun, the potency is cognised by presumption" The answer to this is that when the Sun reaches another place what happens is that it is born again in a place different from its original place, as it is found in the case of fire-flame. A thing that remains permanent is of a totally different kind, otherwise such reaching of another place would not be possible. As regards potency, that is nothing apart from the thing 88.

The author next points out the objections against the example of "fat Devadatta not eating during the day" as illustrating presumption from what has been heard. He says that no certain cognition can result from the assertion that : the fat man eats not during the day", as the speaker might be asserting this through enmity or delusion and such other causes. If it be said that the indiction is through what is
expressed by the first sentence, then the objection urged before remains in force.

Next, he shows how the said cognition becomes included under 'inference'. He says that what is cognised is the man spoken of as related to eating at night, on the ground of his being fat while going without food during the day, like, other person. This is to say that the example is a corroborative instance and is a proban in the form of effect. He shows the relation of cause and effect between fatness and eating by saying that there is fatness when there is eating is known with certainty through positive and negative concomitance and therefore the cognition of one thing follows from the other which is thus related to it. Further he shows the incongruity by asking a question: 'How can a sentence be cognised which is devoid of all relationship? Otherwise all things would be cognised through a single word'. For instance, in the shape of a jar, all jars would become cognised. This, however, does not happen. The idea really is that there is a relationship between the two sentences.

It has been asserted that the presumption is based on analogical cognition, the author refutes this, by saying that the validity of analogical cognition is being refuted, the validity of presumption arising out of it becomes refuted as a matter of course. The cow has been held to be the objective basis of analogical cognition and it has been held that the objective basis brings about its own cognition by its mere presence. Under this circumstances, a question arises as to what would be the use of potency for the apprehension, where of the presumption based upon analogical cognition is required as a distinct means of cognition?

It has been argued that the absence of Caitra having been cognised through non-existence etc., the answer is given in the following way it cannot be right to
deduce the fact of Caitra being outside the house from the fact of his absence in the house, because there being a chance of his having died, the latter fact is capable of another explanation also. If it is being the absence of the living man in the house that is meant to be the basis of presumption, bringing about the idea of his being outside, this also cannot be right. Because the element of certainty would be lacking. When a man with ordinary powers of vision does not see Caitra in the house, he has no certain cognition regarding his being alive. Even the absence in the house is cognised from the fact of his not being seen through the eye, it shows that it is cognised through an inferential indicative. One who is not in the house is always outside of it. For example, the man standing in the courtyard seen by men at the gate. The man inside the house provides the term where the probandum is known to be absent. From all this, it concludes that presumption does not differ from inference 92.

Refutation by Prabhācandra - Prabhācandra includes presumption in inference. In this context, he asks a question, such as: Is the object gives rise to presumption not cognised or cognised as otherwise inexplicable? The first alternative, i.e., it remains uncognised is not acceptable, because it goes beyond the limits of its own-reason. If on the otherhand, second alternative is considered, i.e. the object of presumption is cognised, then there will be no distinction between presumption and inference 93.

Further, he states that the presumption means whole structure of inference only and thus it strikes against the number of means of cognitions 94.

Next, he examines the presumption which is based on non-apprehension. Such as; Caitra who is alive is somewhere else, Since he is absent in the house. Here he setsforth a question : How do you know the Caitra is alive? Is he alive in
the house or outside the house? If he is alive in the house, then his non-existence in the house will be contradictory. If he is supposed to be a live outside the house, then there is no evidence proving this. If presumption itself is the means, then there will be a fault viz., mutual dependence.

Next, if it be urged that his life which characterises his absence in the house is doubtful, how do you say that the presumption is valid? What is valid, that is inference. In this connection he shows an inference, such as -

1) Living Devadatta's absence in the house is based on his existence outside the house.

2) because, there is absence of living Devadatta in the house.

3) like the absence of a living person who stands in the outskirts of the house, etc.

or

1) Devadatta is outside.

2) because, he is the locus of his life not associated with the house.

3) like his own self.

Refutation by Ratnaprabhasūri - According to Ratnaprabhasūri, the cognition called arthāpati (presumption) to be included in inference. Here, the author asks; Does the fact raising 'the necessary presumption' (arthāpati - utthāpaka artha) i.e., the fact of Devadatta's fatness coupled with the fact of his not eating during the day (time), imply 'the fact presumed' (adrśtārtha, i.e., the fact of Devadatta's eating at night) by being determined as 'otherwise inexplicable' (i.e., without the presumption of Devadatta's fatness) or does it do so without being so determined? The latter can be rejected, for if the former fact (i.e. Devadatta's fatness) be not determined
'otherwise inexplicable' (i.e., without the fact of Devadatta's eating at night), the necessary presumption does not arise. Whether the former fact be known to be as 'otherwise inexplicable' then the question is; how is this 'inexplicability - otherwise' (arthānapadāyamānātva) determined? Whether it be argued that by arthāpatti (presumption) this inexplicability - otherwise is known then there arises the fallacy of parasparāśraya (mutual dependence). On the other side, if it be said that this "inexplicability - otherwise" (arthānapadāyamānātva) known by other sources. i.e. 'repeated observation' (bhūyodarsana) give the knowledge, then the question arises, like what is the matter of actual observation? If you say that 'in the abode of the proven' (sādhyadharmī i.e. Devadatta himself), you had the experience of this, 'inexplicability- otherwise' (arthānapadāyamānātva) then, arthāpatti (presumption) becomes useless, because the actual experience had already the matter of presumption as its matter. On the contrary if it be held, that one has this experience of 'the inexplicability otherwise' in the instances (dṛṣṭāntadharmī) then, the question may be asked : is the repeated observation of these instances competent to establish 'the explicability - otherwise'? If it is not so, then such 'repeated observation' becomes useless. If it so, then it is clear that then there is no difference between the fact, raising 'the presumption and the reason (liṅga) in an inference. If it be urged that not 'the repeated observation' but 'non-experience in the opposite' (vipakṣānapalambha) gives the knowledge of the inexplicability otherwise then, the author examines by asking a question : Does this negative experience (i.e. no eating at night and so fatness for a person who does not eat at the day-time) necessarily give rise to the knowledge of 'the inexplicability - otherwise'? If it is not so, then arthāpatti (presumption) is not a reliable source of valid knowledge. If it is so, then, arthāpatti (presumption) becomes a mode of inference which is based on a sure knowledge (niścita) of 'the impossibility - otherwise' (anyathānapapatti) It cannot be
said that the difference between an inference and presumption lies in the fact that whereas in an inference e.g. 'The hill is fierce, because it smokes', there is a reason (i.e. smoke) which abides in 'the abode' (pakṣa, hill), presumption is devoid of such 'a reason'. Here, it may be noted that there is an inference in which the reason is not abide in the abode'. This admitted by Kumārila himself when he says; the inference about the Brāhmaṇa-hood of a son from the Brāhmaṇa-hood of his father is admitted to be valid by all, although it does not depend on 'reason' abiding in 'an abode' 97.

Refutation of abhāva (non-apprehension) by Jayarāśī - Jayarāśi at first, quotes Kumārila's opinion to refute the cognition of abhāva (non-apprehension) He says that other people (Mīmāṃsakas) argue - "In the case of an object where the five means of knowledge do not function towards the comprehension of the existence of that object we have a notion of non-apprehension as the sole means of cognition 98.

Now, he setsforth many questions 99: Is it understood or not? If it is understood, then by which? by dispurse of apprehension? or by dispurse of a means of cognition? or by the comprehension of existence? If you belong to first alternative, i.e, by dispurse of apprehension then, how does it go? If you say, by dispurse of means of cognition, then there is a fault of mutual dependence. if it is to be understood by equal dispurse, then, it may be the condition as to what is started to know (jñāpya) becomes that which makes known (jñāpaka). But this is not the situation that one is to be known (jñāpya) while the other is one making known (jñāpaka), because of the dispurse of the means of cognitions is desired to make known. Next, the cognition should be understood by the apprehension of existence then, non-apprehension should be dispursed.
Further, if you say that an unknown thing can be known even in the absence of apprehension, then, Devadatta's absence is in another country would be an ascertainment of absence of Devadatta, although he is not alive 100.

Refutation by Śāntarakṣita - In regard to 'non-apprehension' (abhāva) Śāntarakṣita setsforth the Mīmāṃsā view by quoting several verses from Ślokavārttika, For instance, "In the case of an object where the five means of cognition do not function for the comprehension of the existence of that object, 'non-apprehension' is the only means of cognition'. Then the form of the cognition is the non-functioning of perception and other means of cognition. This may consist either in the non-modification of the soul or in the cognition of another object 101. This cognition is divided under four heads 102, i.e., prāgabhāva (previous-absence) and the rest. They are - (1) 'that the curd is not in the milk', is the example of previous absence 2) 'that the milk is not in the curd' is the instance of pradhvārisābhāva (destruction absence) 3) 'The non-existence of the horse in the cow' is a case of 'anyonyābhāva' (mutual absence) 4) 'The flat portion of the hare's head, being devoid of hardness and height, and therefore there being no horns in the hare. This is a case of atyantābhāva (absolute absence). If there is no such entity as non-apprehension, classed under these four heads, then, there could be no usage, based upon the differenciation of causes and effects.

It must be an entity, like the cow etc., because it is apprehended by exclusive and inclusive notions and also because it is cognisable. It must be different from perception and the rest. Because it is spoken of by the name of non-apprehension, or the absence of things must be cognised through a means which is of the same nature as itself. Because something cognisable, like the positive entity. For these reasons, this means of cognition must be a nature of one different from the positive
The above arguments in support of non-apprehension as a distinct means of cognition are answered by the author in the following way. At first he shows the impossibility of the definition as 'the non-modification of the soul', since the existence of the contrary of such a modification cannot be occasional. If it is meant that non-modification is only the absence of modification, then, as the entity concerned is eternal, it should be understood to be there at all times, as it never ceases 104.

Next, he points out the defect in the definition of non-apprehension, the 'cognition of some other thing' would come about, there would be non-apprehension of everything else, even of that which is not perceptible. The non-existence should be said to be of only that perception which envisages the perceptible object and not of others (inference and the rest) as that would be false. In this connection, he asks questions; How is it known that the cognition of the other thing has come about, when cognitions themselves are not perceptible? If it is known through presumption, how then is it itself cognised? If another presumption is suggested, then there is an infinite regress (anavastha). If the 'non-apprehension of cognition' is an entity, the 'non-apprehension of the cognised object' also should be same. Under these circumstances, it should be included under 'perception' itself 105.

He continues his argument by asking what is capable of effective action is said to be 'existent' other than what is said to be 'non-existent' because the two cannot exist together in the same substratum as they are mutually contradictory. But the same thing may be capable of that effective action which it can itself accomplish but incapable of another effective action. It is for this reason, that the dual character can never subsist in any single thing. If it is something else that is regarded as incapable of the other action. Then there are two things and the dual character does not belong to one and the same thing 106.
Further, the featureless object being devoid of the form of cognition, cannot be a means of cognition, as this is always of the nature of cognition. If it is urged that 'non-apprehension is a means of cognition', because it serves as the cause of cognition, like the eye etc., then the answer is that, what is entirely featureless can never serve as the cause of anything 107.

Again, being devoid of the form of cognition, how would the 'non-apprehension' be apprehended? If it is held to be apprehended by the absence of the cognition relating to it, then there would be no end to the assumption of such non-apprehensions. And again, if the non-existence of the cognition is apprehended through the absence of the cognised thing and the non-existence of the cognised thing is apprehended through the absence of cognition, then there would be mutual dependence (anyonyāśraya). Therefore the fact is that what is the perception of one thing is called the non-perception of another and said perception comes about by itself, because by its very nature it is not dark i.e. self-luminous. As a matter of fact, the apprehension of cognition through something else is not possible, either

(a) through inferential indicative, or

(b) through another cognition (perception) or

(c) through presumption.

There may be possibility of objections being raised against all these, then there would be several infinite regresses. Therefore it must be admitted that as among things equall capable of being apprehended, the apprehension of one leads to the definite cognition that the others are non-existent 108.

As regards the assertion that "non-apprehension must be cognised, by a means which is of the same nature as itself", this is entirely superfluous, as what
we assert there is that sameness of nature 109.

Refutation by Prabhācandra - Prabhācandra says that it has been said, there are three characters of non-apprehension, viz., Pramāṇapañcakaḥbhāva (absence of five means of cognitions), tadanyajñānam (cognition of another object), ātmā vā jñānanirmitto bhavyapramāṇam (soul which does not have the cognition), this is the nature of non-apprehension. But this is not proper, since the non-existence of all five means of cognitions is harmless, then how does it ascertain the absence of the object? because the ascertainment is the property of a cognition. If it be urged that the non-existence of five means of cognitions giving arise the cognition of absence is deliberatly called as a means of non-apprehension, then the answer is that it is not so, because the absence being a non-object cannot produce any cognition. The only an object produces knowledge and not a non-object. Since it is devoid of all capacities, like the horn of donkey. Moreover, we cannot ascertain that wherever therfo is non-existence of five means of cognitions, there would be the knowledge of absence, because something will be applicable to the specific functions of other minds 110 (there is absence of the five means of cognitions with respect to the functions of other minds. So this will lead to the knowledge of absence of these functions).

Further, in the case of second category, viz., tadanyajñānam (cognition of another object), he says that such a cognition is perception only, because from the paryudāsa (a prohibitive rule), it can be known that the cognition of bhūtala (a spot) which is different from the ghaṭa (a jar) called as non-apprehension is agreed to us 111.

Further, in the case of third alternative, viz., soul which does not have the cognition, Prabhācandra setsforth many questions as follows : Is soul entirely releaved
from the cognition or somehow? If entirely he is releaved from the cognition, then there may be self contradiction, like an assertion, 'my mother is childless'. And how does he become the one who ascertains the absence? since, ascertainment is the property of the cognition. If he is one who ascertains of the absence, then how is he supposed to be releaved from cognitions? On the second alternative, such as, soul has an apprehension of the object which is absent, then that apprehension of absence may be means of cognition but not the soul. In that case, that is nothing but perception since it is caused by sense-organs.

Next, he refutes the four kinds of non-apprehension viz., prior absence, absence after destruction, mutual absence and absolute absence. Prabhācandra says that it is merely saying. Because pots are made with their distinct self-nature due to their own causes, such as, wheel, potter and so on and they cannot mix up with other objects, because they may convert themselves into other objects.

The distinctness of an object does not lead to the category of absence, because in that case the absence will again be distinct, this distinctness will lead to another absence and this will lead to infinite regress.

Next, he refutes itaretarābhāva (mutual absence), such as, if due to mutual absence a pot is excluded from cloth etc., then the question arises; Is the mutual absence excluded from existence and non-existence, such as previous absence, by itself or due to some other factor? If that is excluded by itself, then the pot also would be excluded by itself from others. If the mutual absence is excluded due to some other factor, then the question is : Is the mutual absence excluded by any unique property or by another mutual absence? On the first alternative i.e., mutual absence is excluded by a unique property, then it could be proper that etc. also have a unique property. If that is excluded by another mutual absence, then there
may be an infinite regress 115.

Further, he argues that there is no existence of prior-absence, since it cannot be apprehended as another object. It may be urged that there is an inference regarding the prior-absence, such as, a experience of the form, there was no pot before its production" refers to the non-existence, since it is different from the experience of existence. The experience which refers to existence is not from the experience of existence. For e.g. the experience of the existence of substance and this experience is different from the experience of existence. Hence it refers to non-existence. Through this inference, there is apprehension of the prior-absence which is different object. This view is not correct, because the cognition like, 'the absence after destruction' etc. are in the prior-absence. This inference is inconclusive, because the probans also applicable to experience of forms. Prior-absence is not the same as destruction. If this experience also refers to absence, then there will be infinite regress 115.

Pradhvaṁśabhāva (absence after destruction) is also of the nature of existence. It may be urged that existence of which regulates the disaster of a thing is called destruction. If it is unreal by its nature then the application of a stick etc. will be futile. On this, the author asks: Is the destruction which is produced by the application of stick etc. different from the pot or the same? If it is different, then the pot etc. will remain as it is and will not be cognised as destroyed. If it is supposed to be cognised as destroyed because of its relation with destruction, then the relation between the destroyed and destruction to be stated. Is it be the nature of identity or the causation or the character and characterised. However, none of these is told 117.

Moreover, what has been said in SV, viz., the non-existence of curd in milk'
etc. would be tenable only and absence is a nature of existence because the prior-absence of curd etc. in the form of milk, decided by perception. Therefore non-apprehension is not a distinct means of cognition 118.

Lastly he declares that there are only two kinds of cognitions viz. perception and inference i.e. direct and indirect 119.

Refutation by Ratnaprabhasūri - According to Ratnaprabhasūri the cognition abhāva (non-existence) is not an independent source of knowledge, but it is included in the cognition pratyakṣa (perception).

As the author says, it is found that when we have the positive apprehension of thing (e.g. spot of land) and we recollect another thing (e.g. a pitcher) which is not there but was connected with it some time ago, there arises in us a cognition of non-existence, a cognition which is internal and independent of the senses. In this connection, he asks: When we have the positive perception of the spot of land, is it perceived as related to the pitcher or as unrelated to it in order that a cognition of non-existence may arise? The former cannot be, because if the spot is perceived as something related to the pitcher, the cognition which has for its object the non-existence of the pitcher and thus opposed to the positive perception cannot have any tendency to arise. Even if it be supposed to have a tendency to arise, it is not cognition, because at the time there is positive idea of the pitcher and the cognition abhāva instead of representing it 120.

The second option also be rejected, such as, if it be supposed that when we have the positive perception of the spot of land, it is for the purposes of the cognition abhāva, perceived as unrelated to the pitcher, then so called cognition abhāva is useless, as the perception itself shows that there is no pitcher. If it may be contended that perception gives the cognition of non-existence, because its
object is only the thing itself; hence for the purpose of cognising the non-existence of a thing the cognition abhāva is necessary. Then the Jaina author says that if we perceive a thing, we must perceive it as related or unrelated thing to it. He maintains that a thing is existent (in some respects) and non-existent (in other respects) and that perception grasps it in both its aspects. So, that non-existence is within the scope of perception. Hence there is no need to admit the cognition abhāva as an independent source of knowledge 121.

Further, he says that the smaraṇa (memory) which sometimes gives the cognition of non-existence of the form 'that spot of land had no pitcher in it' and again, this is that spot of land which had no pitcher in it'. This assertion is based on a cognition of non-existence by pratyabhijnā (recognition). The statement 'whatever has no fire in it, has no smoke in it', is based on a cognition of non-existence by reasoning (tarka). An example of the cognition of non-existence by inference (anumāna) is the reasoning, 'here there is no smoke, because there is no fire here'. The realisation of non-existence is due to an authoritative instruction (āgama) when one is told 'Garga is not at home'. It is thus a recognised source of valid knowledge which variously yields the cognition of non-existence and the cognition called abhāva need not be admitted as an independent source of knowledge 122.
Foot Notes :-

1) सत्ताप्रयोगेपुरुषस्येन्द्रियां बुद्धिज्ञम् तत्प्रत्यक्षम...। JS 1.1.4.

2) ..........अनिमितं विध्यानोपम्मन्तत्वात्। JS 1.1.4.


4) स्वाधीनान्तनिवृत्तिया फलं तथ्य भविष्यति।


5) प्रत्यक्षतत्वमेव हेतु: श्रेष्ठं हेतुप्रसिद्धं।

अत्मादाय प्रसिद्धतत्वं योग्यर्मभिधीयते।। SV, 4.21. Ibid.

6) अतीतानगतेः यथै सूचे व्यवहितेषु च।

प्रत्यक्षं योगिनामिः कैश्चनिमत्ततात्मनामिः।। SV, 4.26.

विध्यानोपम्मन्तत्वमानिः तत्र तान् प्रति।

भविष्यत्यथा वा हेतुप्रसिद्धव्यभिचारिता।। SV, 4.27. Ibid.

7) अविध्यानंसंयोगात् स्पष्टं प्रत्यक्षमी: क्षिति।

भविष्यतमि धर्मं स्वाच्छश्वेत्वाह सदित्वम्।। SV, 4.33.

प्रत्यक्ष: प्रागुष्ठानि धर्मोऽनुष्ठितोषप्खि वा।

फलसाधनतपेयं तदानं वेन नास्यति।। SV, 4.34.

अस्मात्प्रत्यक्षव्यभाषपि विध्यानोपम्मन्तम्।

प्रत्यक्षं ध्यापनं धर्मं प्रत्यक्षव्यभाष नेवते।। SV, 4.35.

सत्ताप्रयोगं तु लभ्यत सदर्य: कल्याणा पुनः।

वरेषा वारणीयेने सत्ताप्रयोगम् नेवते।। SV, 4.37. Ibid.

8) सम्भवायेः च संश्चाद्वा दूष्योचिततिवारणं।

प्रयोग इन्द्रियां च व्यापारं वेयु कथ्यते।। SV, 4.38.
9) पुरोपिन्नवयमची च व्यवधाननं निर्विकल्पम्

पुरोपिन्नवयमची च व्यवधाननं निर्विकल्पम्।। SV, 4.52.

द्रध्यतं श्रानस्य नन्दत्यां विकृतिः।। SV, 4.53.

द्रध्यतं श्रानस्य नन्दत्यां विकृतिः।। SV, 4.54.

द्रध्यतं श्रानस्य नन्दत्यां विकृतिः।। SV, 4.55.

द्रध्यतं श्रानस्य नन्दत्यां विकृतिः।। SV, 4.56.

द्रध्यतं श्रानस्य नन्दत्यां विकृतिः।। SV, 4.57. Ibid.

10) अति झालोचनं झानं प्रथमं निर्विकल्पकम्

बालमुकोविज्ञानसद्खुटवस्तुम्।। SV, 4.112.

नविशेषो न सामायं तदनीमनुस्यते।। SV, 4.113.

तत्स: परं पुनर्वसु धर्मेनायातिभ्यं।। SV, 4.120. Ibid.

11) अनुमानं ज्ञातसम्बन्धवेदीकेश्चरणानादकेश्चारणानतोयसनीकृत्तेः

तत्तत: विज्ञानम् - प्रत्यक्षतो हस्तसम्बन्धो सामायतो हस्तसम्बन्धो च।

प्रत्यक्षतो हस्तसम्बन्धो यथा - धूपाकृतिदर्शनादायकृतिविज्ञानम्।

सामायतो हस्तसम्बन्धो यथा देवदत्त्यस गतिपूर्वकं देशान्तरस्मितिपुलभ्यविद्यगतं स्मरणम्।

MD, Anandarsharma ed. p. 43-44.

12) शास्त्रं शब्दविज्ञानादसनीकृत्तेः विज्ञानम्।
13) सामान्यरुपमण्डतज्ञकाराद्विशिष्यते।

चोदना चोप्येद्वश्च शास्त्रेमण्डतुमाहृत्व।। SV, Šabda 12.


14) तस्माइश्वरणमेदेन यदि शब्दप्रमाणता।

समा लोके च वेदे च सिन्धा वेदप्रमाणता।। SV, Šabda 51.

पुरस्ताद्वर्णितेऽहृतः, तस्मायच्छवदेन या मतः।।

तस्या: खल: प्रमाणतं न चेत्तु स्य्याद दोषद्धर्मम्।। SV, Šabda 53. Ibid.

15) तस्मादनुमणान्याः शद्ये प्रत्यक्षबद्धमभेदत्।

बैरूस्त्रिप्रहितवेतन ताहर्यक्षयवर्णनात।। SV, Šabda 98. Ibid.

16) प्रमाणमुक्ताः या यथापि स्यात्पदामभेदतः।

वायुयाध्यायमायायाद्वै दोषो नागमवात्तनात्।। SV Šabda 108.

वायुयाते तु पदार्थेऽत्संख्यतं: समबन्धानुभवाद्वें रहस्ते।।

बुद्धिरुद्धते तेन भिन्नातसाधुवचुनित्यतु।। SV, Šabda 108. Ibid.

17) उपमानमणिसाहित्यसन्निकृष्टेऽन्तु चुंबिन्दुवत।।

MD, Anandashrama ed. Vol. I p. 44.

18) 'कोट्योपवर्यं लोत्ता नागरिकविदि।


19) प्रत्यक्षास गण्यस्तावतः साध्यस्मृतिरत्र तु।

ननु साध्यसुप्रकटेऽन्तु समविद्ययुद्यद्याद्गति।। SV, upa, 7.

तस्मादाद्वस्मिन्त तत्स्यादत साध्येत्यस्वस्यनिर्देष्यताम्।।

प्रमेयपुनामान्यसाहित्य यथा तदन्नयत्।। SV, upa, 37.
20) अर्थात्तिरिक्त हथः: श्रुतो वात्योऽन्यः नोपपयत इत्यत्तकल्पना ।

यथा - जीविते देयदते गृहाभाव दशनन बहिर्भवस्त्राः प्रस्थत्कल्पना ।


21) प्रमाणपदकविवशातो यत्रायें नायत्त्स भवेत् ।

अर्थः कल्पयेदन्य सार्थात्तिरिदःहाता ।। SV, Arthāpati. 1.

हथः: पप्परियप्र अस्माद् भेदनोक् श्रुतोदभवा ।

प्रमाणपरिहिषणेऽवरस्मात् पूर्वविवश्न कल्पना ।। SV, Arthā. 2. Jha Eng. trans.

22) तत्र प्रत्यक्तो ज्ञानाद् दाहात् दहनशक्ता ।

वहेसुरामितात्पूर्वः यानात् तप्तिकियोऽः ।। SV, Arthā. 3.

शुल्कार्यात्तिरिदः परस्तादिभधायते ।

गव्योपि मया गीतासारायिक्ता मता ।। SV, Arthā. 4.

अविधायप्रिद्वियम् अत्यपात्यबोधितात् ।

शब्दे बोधकसामायिकतु तत्नित्तत्त्वप्रकल्पनम् ।। SV, Arthā. 5.

प्रमाणमात्तिरिभिचाराभाविपीतात् ।

गेहाऐवहबहिभवसिद्धिः तिख दर्शिता ।। SV, Arthā. 8.

तामात्तिरितात्मसायम् अर्थात्तिमुदाहरेत् ।। SV, Arthā. 9.

23) तमात्तिरिवर्णां केषदु अपरेशुप्प्रायम् ।

कल्पनति, आगमवधैनामभिः प्रतिज्ञाता ।। SV, Arthā. 52.
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प्रायश्चित्याय वेदे व्यवहारे व्यवस्थतः ।

सौरवेदिक: प्रसज्जयत यथोषा भिन्यते तत: ।। SV, Artha. 53.

24) न ह्रुतुक्तिः वाक्ये प्रस्तुक्तं तावद्विषयते ।

नानुन्ताः न वेदे हि ह्रस्तं तेन सह कवित् ।। SV, Artha. 60.

अथितत् वाचि कल्प्यते वाक्यमन्यत् तथेव च ।। SV, Artha. 71
d.

श्रुतवाक्येन सादृश्यं नाश्रुतस्यासिं किंचि ।

tतमादनुपमावस्तम्, अर्थयाप्यनया दिशा ।। SV, Artha. 74.

अतः श्रुतस्य वाक्यस्य यद्यिर्मितपदनम् ।

tददातलम एव स्याद् बिना नेत्येवतिदिषयते ।। SV, Artha. 76. Ibid.

25) अभायोद्यपि प्रमाणाभावो नासीद्यायार्थ्यासारसिकृतस्य ।


26) प्रमाणपक्षं यत्र वस्तुरुणे न जायते ।

वस्तुसताव्योधाय तत्रामाप्रमाणता ।। SV, Abhava, 1. jha Eng. trans.

27) श्रीर दद्यादि यन्तिः प्रामाण्याः स उच्यते ।। SV, Abhava 2
d.

नासिताः पयसे दद्यन प्रामाण्याभाव इष्यते ।

गाढ़ि योध्वायावस्तु सौरन्याभाव उच्यते ।। SV, Abhava 3.

शरस्थव्यक्ति निन्दा वृद्धिकालिन्यवर्जिता: ।

श्राद्धन्नादिरुपेण सौरन्याभाव उच्यते ।। SV, Abhava 4. Ibid.

28) श्रीर दद्य भेदेद्व दद्यन श्रीरं घटे पत्त: ।

श्रेणे वृत्तां पृथिवयादि चैतन्यं मूर्तिर्लक्षितिः ।। SV, Abhava 5.

अप्सु गन्धो रसाश्चान्नी वायी कपेण ती सह ।

यथोम संस्पर्शिता ते च न चैद्यस्य प्रमाणता ।। SV, Abhava 6.
न च स्याद् त्वमावरृतेः स्वरूप गतिः स्वरूपतिः निवृत्त रूपमात्रः।

प्रागभावदाद्विदेशः स्वाभावः विद्यते यथाद् निल ।। स्व, अभावः 7।

न चावल्लुन एते स्तुण्डमात्रनामः स्वायत्ता ।।

कार्यदीनामाभाषः को योक्तभाषः कारणादिति ।। स्व, अभावः 8।

ङ्गङ्गायुवित्यावृत्तिजातीयो यतःत्वायम् ।।

तत्साद् गवादित्व वसूल स्वेत्यात्माधं गम्यते ।। स्व, अभावः 9।

29) प्रत्यक्षादेवनुस्ततः प्रामाण्याभाव उच्चते ।।

साक्षात्: परिणामो वा विज्ञानं यथावल्लुनि ।। स्व, अभावः 11।

भवपरस्परलाभ्यं नित्यं सदस्वात्मक् ।।

वसूलुन ज्ञाते कैद्धिक रुपं किष्ठितः कदाचनः ।। स्व, अभावः 12। इबिदः।

30) ननु भावविभूति तृणमानां धम्मवर्मोपस्ततः तेन च ।।

नभवत्स्तमेदेशः धम्मविबिधिहापि नः ।। स्व, अभावः 19।

धर्मवर्मेदेशः इत्यहि धर्ममेदेशः नः स्थिते ।।

उद्भवविभूत्तावतानां ग्रहणं चावल्लुनि ।। स्व, अभावः 20। इबिदः।

31) न चावल्लुनानात्वं धम्मविभूति प्रतीपते ।।

भावांशो ननु त्वमात्र स्याद्, तदानां नानविभूतः ।। स्व, अभावः 29। इबिदः।

32) एतत्सूचेत्तत्तत्तमर्यादा कदाचित्ताद्वचनपूर्वः ।।

TPS Sanghavi and Parikh ed. p. 58; Eli Franco, Perception ..... p. 275।

33) तथादि लघुणपरस्ततः नाभाषया वा,

इबिदः, इबिदः।

34) नापि इत्वायर्थसमयोगानात्त्वं तत्तैतरे ।।

इबिदः, इबिदः।
35) अथ कारक .......... परिसंख्येयानि भवति ।
Ibid, Ibid, p. 277

36) अथ अनुवादपत्रता .......... प्रतिविध्यते वा ।


39) Ibid, Ibid.


42) मीमांसक आहु: .......... प्रत्यक्षांगति ।

43) सता एव .......... सवारी न उपजते ।

44) Hattori M, Diññāga........ p. 64

45) सत: सता वा .......... यदाल्पविषयकज्ञानविपक्षे तदनि प्रत्यक्षं भवति ।
इन्द्रियाणामपरक्षांगार्यम् ।
PS of Diññāga, Iyengar ed. p. 91-95, Hattori, M. Diññāga........ p. 64.

46) योीवं मरीचिका .......... तत्सन्निहितप्रत्यथविशेषवेशयोवस्तते: ।
Hattori M., Diññāga........ p. 64.

47) यदवधिविद्यमन्यत्राप्रायुः: .......... प्रत्यक्षश्चासङ्ग: ।
Hattori M., Diññāga........ pp 64-65.
48) यथा गोशब्रो ....... न भवति ।

PS of Diśnāga, Iyengar ed. p. 100.
Hattori M., Diśnāga....... p. 65.

49) बृहत्कारणसामग्रां ....... न शक्योऽधुर्जनितः ।

PS of Diśnāga, Iyengar ed. P. 104.
Hattori M., Diśnāga....... p. 67.

50) Hattori M., Diśnāga ...... p. 67

51) त्वसंवेदयुगकीर्तिः ....... स्थितं प्रत्यक्षाधिकृतः ।

PS of Diśnāga, Iyengar ed. p. 105,
Hattori M., Diśnāga....... p. 68.

52) प्रत्यक्षाधिकृतेऽयुगो थांत्र शब्दवाच्यो न भवतीत्ययः ।

Hattori M., Diśnāga....... p. 68.

53) बृहत्कारणसरसृजः ....... दृष्टं वृष्णा

Hattori M., Diśnāga....... p 68-69.

54) बृहत्कारणसरसृजः ....... प्रमाणतिः न युज्यते ।

Hattori M. Diśnāga....... 69.

55) अस्त ब्राह्मचन्दनामां स्थतित्वर्तिकालकृतम् ।

बलमुकस्यविद्यानिरक्षतं शुद्धवस्तुपुस्तम् । TS 1285.

न विशेषः न सामात्यं तदानिन्तरुप्यस्ते ।

तयोराधारभूततु स्वतिरेवावलीयते । TS 1286.
तत: परं पुनर्वत्तः धर्माविविधगतिविद्यया ।

बुध्यावसीयते सापि प्रत्यक्षेऽवेष सम्भवता ।। TS 1287.

पुन: पुनर्विकल्पः प्रायावतिधयः भवेत् ।

तत्सत्तचात्मानुसारेण सर्व प्रत्यक्षकाविष्यते ।। TS 1288.

न हि प्रविष्टमात्राणामुणाम् गर्भपुष्टहिंद्रु ।

अर्थम् न प्रतिभान्त्तीति गम्यान्ते नेत्रवेयः पुनः ।। TS 1289.

यथा त्वाभासमाभेषेऽपूर्व ज्ञातः स्वरूपः ।

पद्धतः तत्र विकृत्यथा तथा ज्ञात्यात्धर्मः ।। TS 1290.

यदि त्वालेच्छ सम्प्रदयः नेत्रे कधिचः विकल्पेत् ।

न स्वात: प्रक्षता तत्र सम्बन्धानुसारः ।। TS 1291. Jha Eng.trans.

56) तद्युत्कः यदि ज्ञानं तत्र प्रवृत्तं व्यवस्थणे ।

अनविपद्धारां त्वायत्वात्मिगणः इति हि ।। TS 1292.

तथा त्वायामेवं साधित: प्राकृतव्यवस्थणम् ।

तत्सम्बूतं च विज्ञानं सिध्यतं विकल्पकम् ।। TS 1293.

जातिमात्राः सु ते स्वाभूमित्व विभिन्नता ।

विशेषणाः नैतिक परिर्वतं ज्ञाभिदितम् ।। TS 1294.

यदि हेकान्ती भिन्नेण विशेषाय व्यक्तिशेषणम् ।

स्वाभावणां तदमु बुद्धं विशेष्ये जनंपेत् कथम् ।। TS 1295.

विशेषणावालोप्यपुरुसं ज्ञानं हिंका न वेदकम् ।।

सिद्धान्तात्मार्थम् प्रकृतवा परिभाषणम् हि ।। TS, 1296.

एकान्तने प्रदेशावचार्याध्यायों चेद्युतम् ।

विशेषायविध्यानुत्तरेऽपं स्मार्तज्ञानसंम परम् ।। TS, 1297, Ibid.
57) तथा भीमानांकमलेनापि ....... तद्विश्वासानुपलित:।

TPS of Jayarāyi, Sanghavi & Parikh ed. p. 82,

Eli Franco, Perception ...... p. 400.

58) अर्थे ........... च अपार्यकमः। Ibid, Ibid.

59) अथवा, सामान्ये सिद्धे ......... कार्येदं ज्ञापकमः। Ibid, Ibid. pp. 400-401.

60) अथवा, सिद्धे साधने ......... तत्त्वविद्यानां सामान्यमः। Ibid; , Ibid. p. 401.

61) अथवा, सिद्धसाधनम् ......... न चाकारान्तरसामान्यम्। Ibid, P. 83, Ibid. p. 401.

62) दैवित्यानुपायः केवलदेव प्रकाशे।

विशेषषट्टसामान्यपरिष्कारत्वमेवतः।। TS 1441.

प्रत्यषट्टसंबंधं व्योऽस्व स्वाधो:।

गोमयेश्वरनदृश्यविशेषादिशमति: कृता।। TS 1442.

तदेवश्येन तेनेव गत्वा कालान्तरादि तमः।

यदीनं बुध्यते तन्थ गृहोधातुन: पुनः।। TS, 1443.

विशेषषट्टमेवत्स लिखितवत्व विन्यासिना।। TS 1444.

अभिमुखान्तरमेव तु याच्यो सामान्यतो मिती।

समान्यषट्टमेकान्ताद् गृहेश्वरादिट्य उच्छते।। TS 1445. Jha Eng. trans.

63) तद्व्र श्रणांतप्यत्व व्यापिनः प्रतिपदनात्।

प्रात्तन्त्यश्रने तेनेव नानुमानस सम्भव:।। TS 1446.

कल्पितं चेतु देवकस्य प्रवचनावधिक्यः।

न तत्त्वार्थस्थितं कविच्छ बस्तुद्वं न च भाविकम्।। TS 1447.

न च निर्विषयं ज्ञानं युणाभिरुपनयते।
विकालितार्थताओं च व्यक्त निर्विषय भवेत् || TS 1448.

व्यक्तिरूपयो नाशेःयि तिष्ठतेिितिलयिोऽः ।

यदि न क्षणभएवोभि तत्त्या अपि ध्वुवम् || TS 1449.

प्रत्यक्षेष: सम्बन्धो ययोरेव विशेषयिोः ।

इत्यि नियमशेषो कुमाभि: केन हेतुना || TS 1450.

त्वस्येक्तादावानिे तत्त्वेय ह्यामुि पुि: ।

प्रमाणि नेष्टे कस्मात् को विसेषो हि िूिकि || TS 1451.

विज्ञातार्थिधिगात्ुिवान् प्रमाणमिदं यदि ।

स्मार्तविन्द्रात्तोिभेतिि समानि किंंि वीक्ष्यिे || TS 1452.

अन्तराण्वृत्ताय सदेहस्य िियत्तिात् ।

आधिक्यि तत्र चेतेतदायिि तद्यि न किम् || TS 1453.

तस्मात्ति किंमिति नास्तीिि सदेहविनिवृत्तिकृतिूि ।

स एिेििि निररक्षमेतिि सामाय्यदशििन् || TS 1454. Ibid.

64) अनुभाग्यात्मकः चासी प्रमाणत्वादन्यिि ।

एकानेकार्थिविषयप्रितपितायिि वा || MTN. 8.

अहास्तििःसाम्बन्धपदार्थिितिहिुि: ।

भिन्नोचरभेषज्ञात्वादन्यिि वा || MTN. 9.

अपूर्वीिि क्रियायायिः क्रियामोकेडिपि साधििन् || MTN, 10a, Bhat S., Refutation...... p. 102.

65) अनुभाग्य प्रमाणत्वच्यिि भिन्नि च न तदात्मि: ।

अतोिैककिको हेतु: प्रमाणत्वादसीििि: || MTN, 50.

भिन्नोचरतात्सिस्थितोऽथ स्यायसिद्धि ।

भिन्नोचरभेषज्ञात्वादन्यिि नेति: || MTN 51.
अनेकार्याविनाभावकालमानमापितते ।
नैकार्यप्रतिपादनतृतीयवाच्याकाल मिलते ।। MTN 52.

अद्वितीयतम्भने परार्थवाच्यानन्तः ।
प्रतिपादितयतोरथोथे तस्मादर्थान् न सः ।। MTN 53.

नानुमानातृतुक्षणवर्धनः परोक्षमिलितवाच्यानन्तः ।
सम्बन्धसमृद्धप्रेक्षावाच्यान्तुमः यथा विनः ।। MTN 54.

नाकृत्विकृत्विक्रियावङ्गः शब्दार्थक्यस्यष्ठवः ।
घटायाद वायुवधविकेषुपुरुषोऽनित्य इत्यादाः ।। MTN 55. Ibid, p. 110.

66) उच्चतः, न दयादन्तः प्रमाणान्युपाधः ।

प्रमाणार्थार्थयोगात् योगे चार्तं माधवः ।। TS, 1487.

शब्दार्थार्थप्रेरोहं शाब्द में ज्ञात: ।

तत्त्वज्ञानकेकतो वाक्यादाद यद्य प्रत्ययगोर्दितात् ।। TS 1488. Jha Eng. trans.

67) इति च किल नाप्रकार परोक्षविविधतः ।

नानुमानां च घटते तत्वविविधयोगः ।। TS 1489.

धर्मी धर्मविशिष्टो हि लिंगोऽंतुसन्निस्विद्वतः ।

न तत्त्वानां च यथात् तत्त्ववः न तत् ।। TS 1490.

यथात्र कल्पते धर्मी प्रमंजोश्य स एव च ।

न चानवधृते तत्त्वानां सत्त्वविविधधारणाः ।। TS 1491.

अन्त्यत्रेऽविषयानांन्यान्याध्यानात्मक: ।

तत्त्वार्थार्थार्थयोगिन्यन्त्रमाणन्तः ।। TS 1498. Ibid.

68) तत्त्वार्थविद्य विद्यार्थवाच्यसंवृद्धतिः ।

तत्त्वार्थतपन व्रत्तमां प्रथमां शब्दार्थार्थणां ।। TS, 1499.

शाकार्थार्थार्थसंवृद्धानुवर्तनात् ।
तदा तद्भवितिविज्ञानं भवेन्द्रो वा करावन ।। TS 1500. Ibid.

69) अर्थप्रतीतितो नों वेदेः व्याख्यानातो भवेत् ।
व्यासनं हि पुमान् इदं व्याक्ष्ययोधितंमिथ्य ।। TS 1503.
भूतार्थं गोले शक्ति: प्रकृति वियतास्य वेण ।।
अन्तरसमयविपि भवेदर्थांगतितात् ।। TS 1504.
प्रकृत्या दीपको दीपों न संकेतमपेस्ते ।
समयात्माभवे च न स्यादर्थान्तरे गति: ।। TS 1505.
न हि संकेतमाभवेः पि दीपों गन्धर्यासदिकम् ।
प्रकाशाति विवातुः सा शक्तिनं च शक्यते ।। TS 1506.
अतोस्वर्धप्रत्ययोगात् तस्य निक्षम्पद कुलः?
स तु सामायम् युक्तं भुवामभुतानं गुणते ।। TS 1507.
न्यायस्वैः तत्तोः कविद्विगेशः प्रतिपदते ।
श्रेयस्विद्यमं त्वस्मवर्म्यात्मात्योऽवलोकनानम् ।। TS 1508. Ibid.

70) प्रायं: सम्प्रत्यो होधो यस्मावातुः तस्य गुणते ।
परोक्षप्रतिपत्यथा वाक्यं प्रत्ययः स वेत् ।। TS 1510.
नान्यत्र प्रत्ययाभावात् पूर्वप्रत्ययेऽपि हि ।
एकाराशिक्षे तत्र सर्वं निममौ न हि ।। TS 1511. Ibid.

71) वचनस्य निपितेऽपि विवेकानुगीतवते ।
प्रत्यक्षात्पुमभाभायं तस्मेत्: सा हि निपितात् ।। TS 1514.
ग्रान्तायुनिविश्वाय वाक्यं चेवाद्विशयः ।
प्रयाविविश्वपेत्तल तस्मानाय वयते ।। TS 1515.
ग्रान्ता-ग्रान्तप्रुपातां वैविश्वाय परिस्फुटम् ।
72) विवशायां च गम्यायां विस्पदैव त्रिरुपता।
पुनिधमिगिः सा साध्या कार्येण वचसा यतः॥ TS 1520.
पदपार्श्वविवशायां पुरुषोत्तमं प्रतीयते॥
वृक्षशब्दप्रयोगलक्ष्यं पूर्ववशायां। यथा॥ TS 1521.
अतो यथं परीवर्त्य बैसुधान्यं निराकृतम्॥
शब्दानामिन्यं तत्र नैदास्मभिः प्रभाण्ता॥ TS 1522.
यत्र लेखामभेदो व्यक्तं तत्र जिरुपता॥
विवशायां तु साध्यायं वैन्त्यं प्रकाशितं॥ TS 1523.
एवं स्थितेनुमानन्तं शब्दे ध्वनित्वं भवेत्॥
बैसुधान्यसहितेन ताहिवस्त्वस्त्वतः॥ TS 1524. Ibid.

73) तथा, उपमानमिपि ........ तत्त्वाययपमात्॥

TPS, Sanghavi and Parikh ed. P. 110.


75) गां दुष्प्रात्मवसामण्यायं गवं वीससंते यदा॥
भृगोद्वपवसामण्यभांगं वर्तुखिकादकम्॥ TS, 1527.
तदास्त्रयं गवं ऋणं रूपमात्रववोधकम्॥
प्रत्यक्षवेद यदासि विश्रेष्ठेण विकल्पकम्॥ TS 1528.
गवं सहस्त्रपसयं परिव्यस्तत्वदशीकम्॥
अक्षवापरसद्भस्य जाते प्रत्यक्षमिवंय॥ TS, 1529.
तद्र यदासि गां स्मृति तत्ज्ञानपुम्पजयते॥
सन्निधेषग्यप्यस्तवाद् भवेदिनिष्ठ्यगोचरम्॥ TS 1530.
76) न हि प्रत्यक्षता तत्त्व विज्ञानस्योपपहले ।

77) प्रभेद्यावतःभावेण नामित्रेतायूः मानता ।

78) एवं तु युग्यते तद्भ्य गोरूपायवैशास्तिह ।

79) सत्तामाचेन विज्ञानं साह्यं च गवामनि ।
प्रमिलायुपमा त्रैंबं वैस्लक्षण्यं ततः स्मृतः ॥ TS, 1552.

यदि नाम गृहीतं नो नामा तेनेव तत्तुरा ॥

गृहीतं तु स्वरूपं यद्वन्तयं भिन्निधीयते ॥ TS, 1553.

न नाम रूपं वस्तुतां यत् तत्स्याहं सति ॥

परिज्ञातामत्तत्वानाम्यब्धिभास्ता भवेत् ॥ TS, 1554.

एतावतं च लेशेन प्रभावात्वन्यविभिष्टते ॥

नेपता स्वात् प्रभावानामन्यथापि प्रभावतः ॥ TS, 1555. Ibid.

80) तत्तुपक्त्वक्षर्वादस्त्यात्वेकपादपद्मनात् ॥

व्यतिशचिविज्ञानादाताद्वितिविद्युनि विन्ययः ॥ TS, 1556.

प्रभावानात्मकं सार्दश्चाचन्यक्षणात् ॥

गृहीतप्रहणान्तो चेत् सामायुपांस्यधिष्ठि ॥ TS, 1557.

व्यवस्थोपक्षमेव च तुरंगादी प्रवतते ॥

तद्भवसार्धश्चविज्ञान्य विस्तरन्य प्रथा न किम् ॥ TS, 1558.

अभावात्मतं नो चेनायेभावालप्यनात् ॥

अन्योपभावात्माः वा समं सार्दश्चविन्धु ॥ TS, 1559.

सार्दश्च विचेरको हि यथा तथा प्रभावते ॥

सर्वस्मायुपांस्यधिष्ठानो गम्यते तथा ॥ TS, 1560.

भूययुपांस्यधिष्ठानो चेनाधिगम्यते ॥

सर्वस्मायुपांस्यधिष्ठानो तत्त्वं प्रस्वते ॥ TS, 1561. Ibid.

81) मीमांसकमेव तु ....... प्रत्यभिज्ञायामदानन्तरभावविभिष्टते ॥


82) मीमांसकोपि ....... तद्वितरस्त्रापिवल्लभम् ॥

84) प्रमाणपटकधिशातो यज्ञायो नानया भवन् ।
अहं कल्याणयं सार्यपतिलुष्याहता । TS 1586. Jha Eng. trans.

85) तत्र प्रत्यक्षो ज्ञातां दाहाद् दहनशक्तिः ।
वहर्मुदितास्वरूपं यानातु तत्त्विकिरोगिता । TS, 1587.
शक्त्य: सर्वभावां न कार्यार्थपतिशाधना: ।
अपूर्वात्साध गयथे सम्पन्नग्रहणान् । TS 1588.
पीयो दिया न भुक्ते चेत्यमादिवच: द्वूती ।
रावितम्भोजिनविज्ञान श्रुतार्थपञ्चरुच्ये । TS 1591.
गवयोपमिता या गौतमानयाग्राहेशकता ।
उपासकसम्पूतासाध्य्यन प्रतीयते । TS, 1598.
अवभय नानया सिद्धेदिति वाचकशक्तिः ।
अर्थारथवाग्यावती तदन्नयते: पुनः । TS 1599.
अर्थारथवाग्यान शब्दनित्यसनिधय: ।
अनितयो हि न संकेताब्यवहारावृत्तिमान्यु । TS 1600.
प्रमाणाभानिष्ठाङ्गिति चात्राभावस्विशेषितताः ।
गोहरक्रियाबहुविधिविकिरिष्यक कळह वर्णिता । TS 1601. Ibid.

86) तत्र शास्त्रातीर्क्षण न शक्तिनाम कारण ।
यांधार्यपत्यागमये शक्तिशाख्या एव हि । TS 1606.
दाहादींनः तु यो हेतु: पादकादि: समीख्यते ।
असंवत्यविख्यांश्च शक्ति: काय्या भवेत्त: । TS 1607.
व्याकरण तु कार्येण तत्त्व एवेश्योगतः ।
भावोद्धारण एवकयाप्रणागो न भविषी ।। TS 1608.
अर्धक्रियासम्पर्क हि स्वरूपं शक्तिलक्षणम् ।
एवमात्माच भावोद्ध प्रत्यक्षाद्व व्यवस्यते ।। TS, 1609. Ibid.

87) नैकालते विगतता वेदांतके: सांख्यभाष्यभाष्यका ।
न विद्याभादु भवेत् त न विश्वासान्वत्तापि यत् ।। TS 1613.
प्रत्यक्षस्य स्थिते चास्यांकुशान्वत्यवरणम् ।
क्षत्रये नैव प्रेमविभवतु विषये नानुप्रेष्यते ।। TS 1614.

88) उपादानसामने च देशे जातिर्णस्तरम् ।
रघुवेशानामाब्यपत्या ज्वालादेररिवाणते ।। TS 1617.
स्थिरास्त्रो विशेष्यवान्वनयेएष्य प्रसन्यते ।
तत्त देशानामाब्यपति: शास्त्रस्थित्या निराकृता ।। TS 1618. Ibid.

89) पीयो दिबा न भुक्तीः चविष्म्मनयेन न निध्ययः ।
रघुप्रभोहन्तियागङ्गायाण्यापि वदेतु पुष्यान् ।। TS 1619.
अर्थगतिन्पक्षेण यदि वाक्यान्तरं पुनः ।
सार्थमालिकये तेन स्वादास्मृतो व्यक्तारे ।। TS 1620. Ibid.

90) क्षापामोचनस्माक्षी पुष्पांलिङ्ग: प्रतीयते ।
दिवापौजनभैलक्ष्यनतवेवन तदन्वतः ।। TS 1622.
भोजने सति पीन्तमन्यययव्यतिरंकतः ।
निक्षितं तेन सम्बन्धां वस्तुनो वस्तुनो गति: ।। TS 1623.
सर्वसम्बन्धशृव्यां नि कत्म वाक्यं प्रतीयते ।
एकस्मात् वाक्यः सर्व प्रत्येकतत्त्वां पुनः ।। TS 1624.
तथा द्रास्ति सम्बन्धे सति चालनाधारिते।

गन्धारनिमिदं वाक्यं प्रस्प्येताप्रमाणकम्। | TS 1625. Ibid.

91) उपमान: प्रमाण्ये विस्तरण निराकृते।

अर्थापत्तलोक्यपथा वारितेव प्रमाणता। | TS 1631.

उपमानग्रामणयो गौतमालब्धोमनिष्ठे।

स्वस्तपद्धव चारूभों स्वाज्ञानजनं मतम्। | TS 1632.

तत् किंमक्षन्ययो शक्तवा यदात्वयथेन्द्रपश्यते।

अर्थापम्ब: प्रमाण्यः सुप्रमाणसाध्ययम्। | TS 1633. Ibid.

92) गेहाभावातु चैवस्य बहिर्भार्यो न युग्यते।

मरणाश्यक्यो यस्माद्वियाप्यन्ययवद्धते। | TS 1640.

जीवनत्वेऽदृ गृहाभावो बहिर्भार्योप्रसिद्धये।

अर्थापत्तः किंहोद्यहेतै नैव तत्त्वार्यनिश्चयात्। | TS 1641.

वेशमन्यन्यत्वशोऽन द्वारार्द्धिन: प्रमा।

तस्य जीवनत्वःधिधि कवळदधिपि वर्तते। | TS, 1642.

अयो श्यावातिना तस्य जीवननिष्ठये सति।

सद्भूम्यभवेऽभिवाद्य निष्किंतंस्य: प्रमाणता। | TS, 1643.

तदापि गेहापुक्तं हस्यां दश्याः देवविनिश्चितम्।

अततस्तहिर्भार्यों द्वियाप्यदेवतसीयते। | TS 1644.

सदस्मा यो दाससेवातो नियतं बहिर्स्वती।

गेहाप्रकटिको द्वषु: पुमान्त् ब्यः स्वितेतिरिव। | TS 1645.

विशेषःपि भवत्यव सदनानांगो नरः।

अर्थापपिंदे च तस्माद्विमनानान्म भिषते। | TS 1646. Ibid.
93) अर्थात् त्वनामने प्रतार्थव: तथाहि ........ । द्वितीयप्रतिलेख्यात्रविशेषापि ।

PKM of Prabhācandra, MahendraKumar Shastri ed. P. 193.

94) तथा चार्यनिषिद्धति ...... संख्याव्यूहात: । Ibid, P. 194.

95) याब्धायापरिषिद्धति: ....... तत्क्षण तत्तविनिरिद्धितः । Ibid, Pp. 202-203.

96) अथ न विनिषिद्धति तत्त्विनिरिद्धितः । गृहसंसूचकजीवनाधारात्वत्वात्ववृत्तिः । Ibid, p. 203.

97) अर्थात् तत्त्वात्ववृत्तिः ...... यथा प्रक्षर्यविवाहनमेतव नातिनीति वाच्यम् ।


98) अपरे तु अभावायं प्रभावं ...... अभावविवधयः ।

TPS, Sanghavi and Parikh ed. P. 112.


100) अथ अन्यतितमेव ........... देवदत्ताभावनिन्य: स्थातः । Ibid, P. 113.

101) प्रभावपत्तं वच वस्तुरुपे न जायते ।

वस्तुसत्तालोधाय तत्त्वाभावप्रभावला ।। TS, 1647.

प्रत्यक्षारत्नस्याति: प्रभावाभाव इत्यते ।

सालमोकरिन्यो व विज्ञान वाच्यस्वरूपः ।। TS 1648. Jha Eng. trans.

102) प्रभावाभाव वस्तुसत्ताभावः सम्प्रस्तिते ।

विषय वस्तुसत्ताभावः विभिन्नोत्सी प्रभावाभावादि भेदतः ।। TS 1649.

क्षेरे द्वायदि यन्त्यस्य प्रभावः स कथयते ।

नातिस्थल पयसो द्विन प्रक्रियाभाववक्षणाम् ।। TS 1650.

वापि योः प्रभावाभाव सोः प्रायोगिकाभाव उच्चयते ।

परस्यां व न तस्त्वीति नाति तेनात्ममा सतः ।। TS 1651.

शिरसोऽऽथववा निद्धा वृद्धिकाठिन्यपरिषिद्धिः ।
शशश्रुंगादिकृष्ण सात्यन्त्याभाव इत्यते ।। TS 1652.

न च स्याद्वाच्यारोऽवश्यं करणादि विभागः।

प्रागभावादि वेदेन नामावो विचारते यदि ।। TS 1653. Ibid.

103) यद्यनुवृत्तिवायुतिलितिबुध्योप्राण्ड्यो यत्तत्तयप्राचरणात्

तस्माद् गवावितदवस्तु प्रमेयत्वाच गम्यताम् ।। TS 1655.

अभावशब्दवायुतात् प्रत्याशेदेशं विचारते

प्रमणानामभावो हि प्रमेयानामभाववत् ।। TS 1657.

अभावो वा प्रमाणेन स्वानुरुपे भीयते

प्रमेयत्वाद्यथो भावस्माद् भावाभस्तश्च पृथ्विकृ ।। TS, 1658. Ibid.

104) तदृश नित्यतत्त्व विप्रकारायो निराकृतः।

तपस्याश्रयसद्भावं काव्यभिर्न घुमते

तद्विद्ये भाष्यमात्रास्मि स चेदेत्र विचित्रः।

सर्वथा वस्तुनिरुत्तितवं गम्यतारस्वायत्ववर्तमात्राः ।। TS 1660. Ibid.

105) अन्यस्तुनि विज्ञाने तृते सर्वस्य नालितता।

अदश्यापि गम्यं प्रत्येकायभावसंवर्गः ।। TS, 1661.

शक्यस्ते नित्यत्त्वभावप्रत्येकः नालितता।

एवं सति समाधेयस नान्येः व्यभिचारिणी ।। TS, 1666.

अन्यस्तुनि विज्ञानं जातं या जायते कथम्।

अधिक्षेत्र मनो बुद्धिमाणयकारणति यदि

अध्यात्मान्तं स्नेवान्तं प्रेमस्भव्यते ।। TS, 1667.

सापि ज्ञानास्तिक्षेति तत्त्या अपि कुतो गति।

अध्यात्मान्तंस्नेवान्तं प्रेमस्भव्यते ।। TS, 1668.

यदि वस्तु प्रमाणावो नीतावस्तर्व च।
प्रत्येकेन्तर्गतः भावस्था सति कथं न ते ।। TS, 1669. Ibid.

106) अर्थशैवसम्बन्ध च सदसदन्त्युद्वृत्तः ।

समाजेशो न चैकं तयोपपेक्ष विरोधत: ।। TS, 1674.
सत्यसाध्यां समयं वेदद्वयव्याम्ययं ननु ।
वदेतत्थ विदर्भतः नैवेककालिः वस्तुति ।। TS, 1675.
अन्धकालसम्बन्ध तु यथायवव्यवित्तः ।
डे तदा वस्तुति प्राप्ते तन्नैकस्य विदर्भतः ।। TS, 1676. Ibid.

107) नीरुपमः हि विज्ञानरुपानानि प्रमाणातः ।

न युन्ते प्रमेयस्य सा हि संविदितक्षणः ।। TS, 1678.
तत्तुत्त्वातः प्रमाणं वेदशृद्धुरादिवुद्वृत्तः ।
न नीरुपमः हेतुतसम्बन्धोऽसि कदाचन ।। TS, 1679. Ibid.

108) ज्ञानरुपविविक्तः सोऽभावो गम्यते कथम् ्?

तत्तूत्त्वार्गमभावावदेयं न त्वनवास्थितः ।। TS, 1680.
वश्वभावातः प्रमाणाय प्रमाबध्वाय वस्तुनः ।
नासिनः यदि गम्येत भवेव्यस्मांश्यः ।। TS, 1681.
तस्मात्व्यथ: ता हृदेः: तात्वानादिरुच्यते ।
सा च स्वत्त्वनसिद्धा स्वरूपणालिकः ।। TS, 1682.
बुद्धेशु परत: तित्तितिनिमात्व बुधनारादिपि ।
अन्यथानुपस्तेव वर्णमात्र न सम्भवः ।। TS, 1683.
वर्णपुरूपायस्य प्रत्येकं सति सम्भवे ।
अन्वयस्यातः बहुव्रो विशिष्यः: स्थुतः ते ।। TS, 1684.
तुल्योपायमनसादेवेक्षीवोष्पभन्नः ्।
109) अभावो वा प्रमाणो स्वानुसूचियम सहितत तदा ।

110) व्याख्यानप्रदलकाभाषा: ......... परिच्छेदसूचियम अवलम्बित ।


111) द्वितीयसंके तु यतद्विशालं ततात्वविशिष्टमात्र ।

112) तृतीयसंके तु किमसे सर्वदा ज्ञानिन्दृक: ......... प्रत्यक्षमात्र ।

113) यदयत्वीम पश्चात् तत्त्वारत्त्वमपररस्कृताः ।

114) न चान्यातो ...... परिकल्पनायानवस्था ।

115) यदि भेतरेतत्तराभाववशादु ......... बहुविभिन्नतरेतत्तराभावत्त्वथाय नात्त्वरस्कृताः ।

116) नाय यापावास: ......... मुख्यमापाकन्तत्वक्षणसदृश्यः ।

117) प्रथमसभावोपिद्व भावस्वाभाभ एव ......... प्राण्यवात्वन्त्वात् ।

118) क्षीरे दध्यादि यन्त्रति ......... प्राणस्वाभावत्त्वव्यवहारस्वाभाभ एव प्राणात्वन्त्वात् ।

119) स्थितमेन्तप्रत्येकत्वमेशदेव द्वैतवच प्रमाणमिति ।

120) प्रत्यक्षेदारुपरिमिति: ......... प्रतियोगिन: सत्य्यपि तद्वृत्ते: ।


121) द्वितीयसंके तु ......... प्रत्यक्षेदारुपरिमिति: ।

122) केवलः तदस्मृतस्मृत दिति स्मरणेः .... काहावप्रामाण्यः प्रवृत्तसमृतः ।