CHAPTER 3
REFUTATION OF
SVATAḤ - PRĀMĀṆYA
CHAPTER III

REFUTATION OF SVATAH-PRĀMĀNYA

(SELF-VALIDITY)

Position of Mīmāṃsā - The doctrine of self-validity of knowledge (svatah-prāmānya) forms the cornerstone on which the whole structure of the Mīmāṃsā philosophy is based. The Mīmāṃsā philosophy asserts that all knowledge is valid in itself. The knowledge itself clarifies its own truth and it does not depend upon any other extraneous condition or on any other cognition for its validity.

Self-validity, according to Mīmāṃsā philosophy, is that the rise of knowledge is never perceived by us to be dependent of an object and all objective facts are dependent on it for its revelation. This is known as self-validity of knowledge in its production (utpatti). As soon as knowledge is produced, objects are revealed and there is no link between the rise of knowledge and the revelation of objects on which knowledge depends for producing its action. Thus knowledge is not only independent in its origination but in its own action as well.

In some cases of illusory perception, a later perception or cognition carries with it the notion that our original knowledge is invalid. Thus the invalidity of any knowledge may appear by later experience and then we reject the first knowledge. This is what Mīmāṃsā philosophy says that the validity of knowledge appears immediately with its rise and invalidity may be derived from later experience. A cognition or knowledge attained is proved invalid when later on a contradictory experience (bādhakajñāna) occurs in or when our organs etc. are known to be faulty and defective. (karaṇadoṣajñāna).
Thus the validity of knowledge certified at moment of its production or origin need not be doubted unnecessarily even after enquiry. All knowledge except memory is thus regarded as valid independently by itself as a general rule, unless it is shown to be invalid later on. Memory is excluded because the phenomenon of memory depends upon previous experience and cannot be regarded as arising independently by itself.

Jamini does not refer to self-validity of knowledge directly in his aphorisms. However, we can find the origin of the doctrine of self-validity in the definition of Dharma, while commenting this definition, Śabara clearly refers to the self-validity of the Veda, such as, the idea brought about by the assertion, 'Desiring heaven, one should perform sacrifices' is not an uncertain one. In fact, the idea is definitely certain that heaven should follow and when it is cognised for certain it cannot be false. It is never found to be checked by any other cognition at any time or in regard to any person or under any circumstances or at any place. Therefore it follows that it is not false or wrong.

That cognition alone is false which having appeared becomes checked by the notion, 'such is not the actual case'. In the assertion of ordinary men, if it emanates from a trustworthy person or if it pertains to something that is directly perceived by the senses, it must be true. On the contrary, if it pertains to something that cannot be perceived directly by the senses, this is unreliable. However, in the case of Veda, there is no room for illusion or wrong knowledge as there is no human agency involved, while in the case of human instructors, there is always a chance of mistakes, illusions and ignorance. On the other hand, in the case of teachings emanating from human sources is not always competable with truth. But in the case of Vedic assertion there is nothing to indicate its falsity.
In regard to validity of cognitions, a question arises: Is the validity inherent in the cognition itself or something extranious to itself? Four alternative views have been setforth by Kumārila in the Ślokavārttika, they are as follows:

a) Validity and invalidity are both inherent in cognition.
b) Both are extranious.
c) Invalidity is inherent and validity is extranious.
d) Validity is inherent and invalidity is extranious.

Kumārila rejects first three alternative views of the opponents, such as:

(a) The view of the Sāṃkhya that 'the validity and invalidity are inherent' is cannot be accepted, because both are naturally contradictionary.

(b) The view of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣikathat 'the validity and invalidity are wholly extraneous can be rejected unless a cognition by itself would be neither valid nor invalid and it would bear no character at all.

(c) The Bouddhaś view is that by its nature cognition by itself must be regarded as invalid and its validity as due to extraneous factors. This is to say that the validity of cognitions should depend upon efficiency and consequent reliability of persons. But in the case of the Veda, there is no author according to Mīmāṃsā system and therefore the Veda couldnot be reliable source of knowledge regarding Dharma.

It is the view of Mīmāṃsakas that all cognitions are inherently valid and invalidity that is imposed upon the cognition, when it is found in its source has been defective.

Jainas argument is that both alternatives i.e. knowledge is valid or is made valid by the situation, are true. But when it is remembered, or when it leads to some
action it may be valid either by itself (svatah) or due to something else \(11\) (paratah).

As far as the present topic is concerned, we discuss the refutation made by heterodox systems i.e. Bouddhas and Jainas, here regarding the self-validity of cognitions.

Kumārila, in this regard, declares that it should be understood that the validity of all means of cognition is inherent in them. Thus it follows that every cognition as cognition must be valid and it may be set aside when some defects are found in the cognition process as evidenced by the cognised object being in reality \(12\).

Kumārila rejects the validity of dream cognitions by saying that the qualities of the sense-organ alone is said to the cause of validity of cognition but the validity of these qualities of sense organ is denied for two reasons, viz. the occasional disorder of the organs of perception and the occasional absence either of the organs or of their capabilities. It is the mistaken idea that the cognition of falsity is due to faults in the cause. As a matter of fact, the invariable concomitance of faults leads to the absence of qualities and this absence establishes invalidity of cognition \(13\).

Moreover, he states the purity of cause must be admitted to be the means of validity of a cognition; while the invalidity being natural, can only be indicated by the absence of such purity \(14\).

For the opponents objection, i.e. 'as much as there is no human agency and of the impossibility of any purity belonging to it, there can be no validity for the injunction', Kumārila deliberately replies, 'You should understand that the validity is inherent in all means of cognitions. A positive by itself non-existing cannot be brought into existence by any other agency' \(15\). Further, he states that it is only for the sake of its birth that positive entity requires a cause, when it once comes into
existence its application to its various effects proceeds naturally out of itself 16.

If even on the birth of conception, the object not be comprehended until the purity of its cause has been ascertained by other means. In the sense, a cognition should be made to depend upon the qualities of its cause for the purpose of denoting the object. This second cognition would be true only on the ascertainment of the purity of its cause. Finally it would leads to an infinite regression. However, validity should be said to be itself for the cognition and nothing is needed. Because in the absence of any cognition of faults invalidity becomes precluded by itself 17.

Further, he states how invalidity takes place. As he says, invalidity is threefold, falsity, ignorance and doubt. Among these falsity and doubt are being positive entities and brought by faults in the cause. However, in the case of ignorance, we do not admit the action of such faults, because all ignorance is due to devoid of cause. As a matter of fact, invalidity of cognition does not lead to any infinite regression as is found in the case with theory of cognition of qualities being the cause of validity. Invalidity occurs to the cognition directly through contradictory cognition. So long as, however, the former is not cheked, the contradictory cognition cannot be produced. For instance, a snake with regard to the rope 18.

Even when the discrepancy of the cognition is known this knowledge refers to another object, but it is implied that two cognitions refers to common objects. Hence the first cognition is contradictory. However, this rule is not applicable to all cases. The second cognition in which there is neither the valid until there is cognition of any discrepancy nor contradiction in it. But when such a cognition arises, the second cognition becoming invalid and former becomes true. In the absence of cognition of discrepancies or faults, the validity of the cognitions is due to the cognitions by itself and where there is no such cognition of discrepancies there is
no chance for doubt. Thus, there is no need of postulating more than three conceptions. It is for this reason that we hold to the doctrine of self-validity 19.

Next, Kumārila proceeds to assert that the chance of discrepancies (faults) in an assertion depends upon the speaker. In certain places, the absence of faults is due to its having faultless speaker, because faults are removed by his good qualities and these faults cannot attach to his assertion or in absence of any speaker there could be no discrepancies as there is no substratum to them 20.

In truthful human assertions we find two factors viz., absence of faults and presence of qualities. The qualities must be held to help only in removal of faults and that (absence of faults) follows the absence of two kinds of invalidity and thus the fact of validity being inherent in words remains safe. At the time of ascertainment of cognition in the absence of faults there is no any active part of qualities, but they continue to be recognised all the same, because an absence of faults help by their mere presence 21.

Now, Kumārila states his argument on another point. In the case of the means of cognition other than Vedas, agreement with the object is not the criterion because more than one cognition treating the same object becomes alternatives and therefore the cognition of that object can be due to only one of these. That subsequent cognition could only serve to specify the conception of an object, where the preceding means has not succeeded to rightly ascertain its nature. Whether the validity of subsequent cognition is depending upon the another, than we would require one such means for the purpose of validity of every cognitions of knowledge and such then we would reach to an infinite regression 22.

In this connection, Kumārila replies vehemently for the objection (i.e. if you admit an inherent validity in any one of these) made by an opponent (i.e. Dharmakīrti
according to Nyāyaratnākara) such as, then to what special cause is due your repugnance to such inherent validity pertaining to the very first cognition? And again, if you say that the non-support of other cognitions is the ground for invalidity, then a perception by the ear would have to be considered invalid because that is non-supported by occular perception. If it be argued that 'one perception of the ear could be supported by some another perception', then in the Veda also there would be as many as hundred conceptions, following upon its alterance. In both cases, i.e., perception of the ear and the conceptions of the Veda, there is no conception produced by any other means of cognitions. Hence the conception that has been firmly brought about and does not stand in need of any support of other cognitions must be accepted to be valid means of cognition.

If it be argued that sense-perception and other means of cognitions are not comprehended as valid or is it not possible to carry on any business by such cognitions when they are not comprehended, then Kumārila replies as such, even prior to comprehension they have an independent existence of their own and they come to be comprehended subsequently through other cognitions. Hence, the fact of its being comprehended does not make any use in validity, because the experience of the object is gained by the former alone.

Next, Kumārila says regarding the invalidity that even the invalid means does not by itself advertise its false character. The idea of silver really perceives the shell to be a piece of silver. Thus an invalid means, by itself, signifies its own character and leads to men accordingly. The falsity of an object is not perceived by its very first conception. The recognition of invalidity is due to one's conciousness of the falsity of its subject itself or of the falsity of the cause of that conception. Thus, thereby falsity alone is recognised and by no other means. The truthfulness or a validity of a conception is proved to be inherent in it. Hence, where the falsity or
invalidity is proved that is only by these two causes. If you argue that the validity of the Veda is not proved although there are many conceptions produced from the Veda, then, that is not proper, because assertion is due to malignity. The validity of the Veda cannot be proved by one’s own wish or command. Nor can any desirable conception be valid, because it is desirable. Hence, the Veda like light, being common to all persons, it is not proper to dispute on its validity. Due to the imperfections of human beings, there is every chance being open to contradiction. While in the Veda, the fact of its non-human origin, serves to establish its validity.

If the Veda is of human origin, then those who declare it to be true, false, would have to inherent without any grounds, its author, his merits, defects and its acceptance by great men, however, nothing is postulated by Māmāṁsakas besides what is directly seen i.e., the Veda alone is valid by itself.

Refutation by Śāntarakṣita - Śāntarakṣita vehemently begins the refutation of all arguments made by Kumārila. If it be urged that 'the things like, Jar stand in need of a cause, when once they have got their existence, they become operative by themselves towards their own effects', then, that cognition which you have asserted as not lasting after being born, becomes non-existent after having secured its existence. Then, what sort of activity could it have?

In a context, Kumārila has declared the unity and eternality of cognitions. Under this view, the proposition put forward would go against what has been accepted by the Māmāṁsakas. If the cognition is held to be non-momentary and even eternal, then this goes against what has been accepted and it is also nullified by following reasons.

(a) It has been demonstrated in detail that all things are in 'Perpetual flux'.

(b) As for the eternal thing, it is never produced; then what is the need could
it have of a cause? For these reasons, it can be said that by itself the cognition cannot be valid. The validity comes only later in relation to its effects, because it is featureless like the sky-lotus. Or cognition may be non-momentary and it may be itself be operative towards bringing about the conviction regarding its validity, but in that case why should there be doubt etc. In as much as certainty regarding its validity would be obtained from the cognition itself, there can be no chance for doubt or wrong cognition. This is because conviction and wrong cognition are mutually destructive, wrong cognition establishes itself only when becomes excluded. Hence the reason given by you for establishing the validity of the cognition arising from the Vedas viz. it arises from causes free from defects and so on, is of no use. If there is any suspicion of the two kinds of invalid cognitions (doubt & wrong cognition) then there would be no certainty regarding validity since the things would have formed the object of wrong cognition.

Next, the author proceeds to point out 'self-contradiction' on the part of the Mīmāṃsaka by saying that when a thing becomes the object of doubt or misconception there can be no certainty regarding the real form of that thing, such as in the case of post. Here, the author points out opponent's view is contrary to inference. For instance, the post is proved from the experience of crow, the fire from the smoke, and invalidity from the defects arising from causes. In this way, the absence of intrinsic validity is proved by inference. Because, validity has been found to be subject to doubt and misconception. Therefore it should be understood that any certainty can be obtained only extraneously.

The author then states the position of the Mīmāṃsaka that 'it is only in the sentence in which the negative word is found that there is denial of something and in all other sentences, it is the positive denotation itself that is apprarented' and
now the author comments that in your statement the cognition produced by the Veda is valid, the negative word has not been used'. Therefore, it does not mean the denial of invalidity 32.

Further, he asks if the validity of all cognitions is inherent in them by themselves, then why there is a difference of opinion among disputants? Some asserts that 'validity of cognitions is always inherent, self-valid, in themselves', while others assert that in some cases, the validity is self-sufficient, while in others it is due to extraneous factors. There is no rule in determining it. It means that the dispute is always the effect of misconceptions, and that is always contrary to firm conviction. Consequently, the proposition that 'the validity of cognitions is intransic is contrary to inference 33.

Further, he proceeds to say that where the conviction regarding self-validity is not obtained, what is cognised is invalidity after its birth of the knowledge of the defects arising from causes. Consequently the invalid cognition will equally intrinsic in its case cannot be said to be reverse to validity. Therefore no one would act in pursance of the cognition which is not confirm with reality, because there is always a certainty regarding its non-confirmity 34.

Next, the author proceeds to point out that the instance of jar etc. are inadmissible. In the case of jar, there is no time for action apart from the time of birth, because it has a momentary existence. Hence the instance of jar is inadmissible. For their birth, the jar etc. are not depend upon the potter and such cases. But they do depend upon their own constituent causes and other things. So that of the jar itself, there can be no action. This is to say here that no single jar is known to exist after the moment of its birth. For this simple reason that all things are momentary 35. The author then responds to Mīmāṃsaka view that the knowledge does not
depend upon causes for the ascertainment of its validity. It is like a jar, which depends upon causes for its production. But then it becomes independent and it no depends upon causes does not for performing the function of heating water etc.

According to the Buddhist, the first cognition pratical efficacy is intrinsically valid. But the later cognitions are extrensically valid. Here Mīmāṃsaka might ask, "what peculiar feature is in the second cognition than the previous cognition, why is it not regarded to be like previous cognition?" The author gives the answer for this question, like, 'it is confrmity with the real state of things that is called validity and there is no feature of it except the repeated cognition of effective action. The cognition envisaging effective action is clearly apprehended because confirmed by the same. Thus it does not stand in need of any subsequent cognition of the same effective action.

If the previous cognition does not envisage a real entity, then the second cognition, in the form of confirmation by confrmity to the real state of the thing wouldnot appear at all, because it cause would not be there. Hence it follows that so long as the cognition envisaging effective action does not appear. There is always a suspicion of the previous cognition being invalid, because of the causes of mis-apprehension. Regarding this, there are many chances for suspecting it to be wrong, viz. (a) The non-perception of its effect.

(b) Perception of similarity.

(c) Inefficiency of the cognition and so on.

When, there appears the cognition envisaging effect there are no such chances as there is direct perception of action.
It has been argued by Mīmāṃsakas, that the first cognition would need corroboration by the second cognition. So we seek for the corroboration of that corroborative cognition also. Then the answer is 'even in case where the validity has been apprehended, there can be no certainty regarding it, because of the presence of the causes of misconception and in such cases, the validity is ascertained only extraneously. Hence there is no need for further corroboration by another corroborative cognition as there is in the case of the previous cognition.

And again, he gives answer to the argument made by Mīmāṃsaka. The argument is that if the validity of some cognition be held to be self-valid, why should there be hostility to the same being the case with the previous cognition. The answer to this is that of the second cognition, the validity is self-valid, because there are no causes for misapprehension. However, the first cognition, cannot be self-valid due to the possibility of misapprehension.

In regard to the conch-shell before our eyes, it is found that the effective action resulting from its cognition is produced by white object. It is learnt that the cognition of the white conch-shell is not produced by eyes affected by jaundice. On the other hand, there arises the cognition of yellow colour in connection with the conch-shell made of gold. The validity of that cognition is ascertant on the cognition is produced from flawless causes. Just as this happens in the case of the cognition of the white colour in connection with the white conch-shell, which has led to effective action.

Now, the author proceeds to show that what has been said by him which should be quite acceptable to the Mīmāṃsaka. He says that 'the author of the Śabara Bhāṣya [SB 1.1.5] also has said the same thing by the mention of attack of hunger etc., hence it is through sheer delusion that the infinite regress has been
urged 44. It has been asserted by the Mīmāṃśaka that 'the validity must be regarded as inherent in all cognitions as a general rule 45. The author provides the answer, 'If self-validity of cognitions is the general rule and it is discarded when there is either an annulment of it or there is the cognition of defectiveness its sources, then validity becomes due to the absence of annulment and the cognition of the absence of the source being defective and thus, the validity becomes extraneous. This absence of cognition is an independent means of cognition and is called non apprehension 46.

For the same reason, the invalidity of cognitions may be proved to be inherent in them. Therefore it can be asserted that the self-invalidity of cognitions is the general rule and it is discarded when there is either absence of annulment or absence of the cognition of its source being defective. If you assert 'validity' on the ground of absence of sublating cognition, and absence of sublating cognition is known non-apprehension and the validity of the latter also is ascerted on the ground of the absence of sublating cognition, and this process leads to infinite regress 47.

Even when no sublating cognition is found, there arises suspicion due to doubt, because the non-apprehension of sublating cognition is not always concomitant with its absence. Even in a case, where no sublation has actually appeared its presence can always be suspected. Even though a man has the insublated cognition of conch-shell as yellow through out his life, such a cognition does not become valid. The author holds that suspicion of sublation is not due to stupidity but there is some ground for it. When there is cognition of the perfectness of the cause and that of confirmity to reality, there arises no suspicion in the mind of the wise. Mīmāṃśaka had refer to lord, Kṛṣṇa who condemned suspicion on this, the author says there lord Kṛṣṇa is refering to and condemning the suspicion which is made by
It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, that 'when in regard to a cognition a certain sublation is possible, and on being sought for, is not found; then regard to that cognition it has to be concluded that there is no sublation at all. The answer that author gives to this is that if the determination of validity is dependent upon the place, time, the man and the circumstances then, it is clear that the definite cognition of validity is dependent upon extraneous causes. For instance, the place and time have been ascertained through the absence of sublation, the ascertainment of validity of the initial cognition clearly follows from other means of cognition.

Next he shows that what is itself unknown cannot serve as an indicator. He says that so long as the excellences are not recognised, the absence of defects cannot be perceived. Then it cannot be right that the assertion valid by itself is indicated by the absence of defects. Because, not being cognised the absence of defects cannot serve as an indicator. People know the stick, but they cannot have any idea of the stick-holder. Thus the idea of the self-validity being indicated by the absence of defects becomes discarded by self-contradiction. Here, it is to be noted that the absence of defects can qualify the word only when ascertained by that means of cognition which consists of non-apprehension and in this way validity of cognition would be due to something extraneous to itself. Even the excellences are there, the cognition of the defects can be appeared. If there is non-cognition of excellences there cannot be the knowledge of absence of defects.

Kumārila has argued that 'at the time of the cognition of the absence of defects the excellences do not function on being themselves cognised. Infact, it is by mere presence that they help in the cognising of the absence of defects.' Śāntarakṣita, however does not agree with this point. If the knowledge of excel-
ences is not necessary, then in the case of statement of reliable person, there will be neither a doubt nor a false apprehension with regard to existence or non-existence of defects in that statement. Actually someone does entertain a doubt or false cognition with regard to such a statement until he realises that the statement is locus of many excellences. It does not know the absence of two forms of invalid cognition (doubt and misconception). Hence there is no determination of validity.

Next, he points out that the assertion that "there is validity when there is absence of defects" refers to absolute negation *prasāja* *pratīṣedha* of defects then the latter can never be proved. It cannot be proved by apprehension as it is a negation. Nor can it be proved by non-apprehension as that would involve an infinite regress. Such as, if the absence of defects and that of the two kinds of invalid cognition are proved by non-apprehension and this absence of apprehension is proved by another non-apprehension then there is infinite regress.

Further, he states that, 'the relative negation, *(paryudāsa)* absence of defects would be the same as excellences. Hence he concludes that the cognition of the said absence also would be the same as the cognition of excellences. The absence of two kinds of invalid cognition also becomes same as valid cognition and also would be of the nature of the intended valid cognition. In case, the absence of the two kinds of invalid cognition is cognised by itself, then the question arises: 'How could you ascertain that the rest of it is valid? If it be argued that 'the ascertainment is through presumption, or through inference or through some other means of cognition, then this ascertainment will be extraneous. Again it follows that the invalidity is inherent in cognitions. As the same arguments apply to that view, (i.e. from excellences follow the absence of defects etc.) also. Therefore it is the absence of excellence that follows from the defects and from that absence follows absence of
validity. Therefore, the general law is undenied. In as much as this general law is concerned, it can be asserted in regard to invalidity, just as in regard to validity, because it is in the nature of apprehension that cognition is regarded as invalid. It is rejected by the right knowledge according to the reality of objects and by the cognition of the excellences of its sources. The invalidity, however, is not discarded by the excellences, because they have not been cognised. Therefore, he concludes that being not denied, the invalidity remains established as being inherent in cognitions.

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka that if validity of cognition depends upon its consistency with other valid cognitions then the cognition at an object which arises once and vanishes and not be valid, similarly no validity could belong to auditory cognition, because it could not be corroborated by the eye (pratyakṣa) and other means of cognition. The author gives an answer to this that it is not correct, there can be no corroborating of auditory cognition by the eye and other means of cognition, because colour, sound and so on are dependent upon same circumstances and are mutually concomitant and in the same line they are cause of each other. Through these, there is connection among their cognitions also: just as smoke and the effect of fire. Thus auditory cognition would be valid due to being corroborated by other cognitions. In the case of validity of sense perception, there is definite basis in the form of corroborating by other cognitions produced by other sense-organs. However, it is not found to be the case with the Veda. The first cognition of water, which appears is produced by the eye, then there follows the later cognitions related to drinking and bathing dependent upon the other organ and the body.

It has been asserted by the Mīmāṃsaka that 'the validity of verbal and other
cognitions is not to be proved by means of inference' 57. The author says in this connection that even the validity of perception is ascertained by means of the following inference. "A certain perception is valid, as it is produced by flawless causes, like other perceptions' 58. Here, it is noted that the eye and other organs do not apprehend things themselves, but they serve as the cause of cognition of those things.

Now he turns to refute the self-validity of the Veda. It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsakas that 'In the case of words emanating from personalities there is always room for doubt, whether there are defects are not. However, in the case of Veda, there being no author, there can be absolutely no suspicion regarding the presence of defects' 59. The Buddhist philosopher refutes deliberately by stating that there is always room for doubt in the words of emanating personalities whether there are defects or not. It has been proved that there must be an author of the Veda and it is not true that we have no suspicion regarding the presence of defects in it. It is not proper to accept that the validity of the Veda is accepted on the ground of its being self-sufficient, because, as a matter of fact, that is dependent upon the author. In case, however, there is no corroborative cognition nor perfection in its source, the appearance of doubt and invalidity is inevitable in the Veda 60.

Further, he emphasises that it is not correct to say that 'when the cognition brought about by any sentence is the same at all times and places and in all men' because, the cognition brought about by any one sentence is never found to be the same in all times and in all places and in all men. In all cases there arises a doubt like, is it true or not. For instance, 'Heaven is attained by the performance of Agnihotra' etc. are heard by all men. But it is devoid of all elements of certainty. Even in Brāhmaṇas there is difference of opinion is regard to Heaven and such things.
Hence the cognition derived from the Veda is not found to be the same in all men 61.

As regards the firmness of the conviction produced by the Vedic injunction is to be rejected. As a matter of fact the firmness is always doubtful, because it stands on the same foot as the notion derived from human assertions like, 'the performance of Agni hotra does not lead to Heaven'. Being this circumstance, how the Brāhmaṇas who are not omniscient, assert the cognition produced by the Vedic injunction is the same at all places and times 62.

Further, he states that there is a sublating cognition in the form of inference. Therefore by the rejection of the soul and other things mentioned in the Veda, it becomes clear that the cognition derived from the Veda cannot be valid. The fact of its having a defective source is always open to suspicion. If the capacity of validity is inherent in all cognitions just as the capacity to burn is inherent in fire, then such validity should belong to wrong cognitions also. Thus it opens to suspicion that the cognition provided by the Veda, proceeds from a defective source. For all this, the self-validity of the Veda is not possible and it should be accepted by you that the Veda has been composed and expounded by persons who are definitely recognised as free from defects. Here, this is to say that if this view is accepted then the validity would be extraneous, otherwise then there can be no validity at all 63.

Then again, according to your view, "that the validity of the Veda being self-sufficient, it always brings about certainty regarding its subject matter, so that there can be no delusion regarding it. As it is eternal, there can be no room for doubt or ignorance or misconception in the Veda". All the attempt that has been made by Vedic scholars to preserve the text of the Veda has been superfluous, for these reasons you should accept the view that there has been an author of the Veda who
is capable of seeing things beyond the things, who has shaken off the entire mass of darkness and ignorance and who is conversant with the meaning of the Veda and its divisions.

Refutation by Prabhācandra - According to Prabhācandra the determination of validity is intrinsic as well as due to some other cause. He explains that the validity of valid means of cognitions due to the other factors in their originiation. It is by itself as well as by other extraneous factors at the stage of consciousness.

In this connection the author directly attacks Kumārila by asking: What do you mean by saying that the validity of all means of cognitions arises by itself?

(1) Do you mean that the validity arises without any causes?; it will not arise because of the general rule of place and time.

(2) Do you mean that the validity is related to its causal factors (svasāmagrī), then there arises the fallacy of siddhasādhana (establishing the established) because it is a well known fact that all cognitions originate due their respective causes.

(3) Do you mean that the validity of all cognitions is due to the fact that they are cognitions? Then it can be said that the specific effect, viz. validity cannot be produced by the general cause, viz. cognition. Here an inference can be presented as follows: 'Validity is produced by its specific causal factors, as it is a specific product, like invalidity'. As the invalidity arises from the specific causes, viz. the defective sense-organs etc. in the same way we can argue that the validity also arises due to the specific causes, viz. the sense-organs etc. possessing good as there is no difference between the two cases.

Next, the author turns to the question of determination of validity at the stage
of consciousness. At the stage of consciousness the validity of cognitions would not
be intrinsic if one has not had a course of repeated observation. Because such
cognition may involve doubt or illusion. On the other hand both validity and invalidity
are determined by themselves when one has had a repeated course of observation
(abhyāsadaśā).

Next, the Jaina philosopher refutes Kumārila’s opinion, by saying that if accor
ding to Mīmāṃsakas, the perception cannot prove the qualities, then the ques
tion is; Does the non-apprehension of qualities prove the absence of them? If sense-
organ is the nature of power, then that will be absence of defects, like that of
qualities as well. As so the superstratum cannot be perceived if the substratum is
imperceptible. Hence there is no chance either for qualities or for defects to be
perceived in organs.

Again, if you say that it (sense-organ) may be proved by in the form of vyakti
(individual), then there also question arises: Can you prove the absence of qualities
by ātmapratyakṣa (self-perception) or by the perception of someone else? The
answer to the first option is that, like the qualities, the defects too will not be
proved, because the qualities or defects cannot be proved by self-perception. If you
hold the second option, i.e. the qualities cannot be known by the perception of
someone else, then the answer is that it is not proved. As the defects like jaundice
(decease of eye) etc. are perceived by others. In the same way, the qualities, like
nairmalya (cleaniness) etc. can be perceived by others.

Further, Mīmāṃsaka holds that the qualities of sense-organs cannot be known
through inference, because the concomitance of the probans with the qualities
cannot be known either through perception or through inference. On this, the author
says that the invariable concomitance can be known through an independent cog-
nition, known as ṛha (probabilistic reason) and also there is question: How can you know the defects which prove invalidity of cognitions? Because the case of defect is similar to the case of qualities. The Mīmāṃsaka holds that cleanliness is nothing but the absence of dirt. So it cannot be regarded as positive quality. The author does not agree with this. Because, according to him, the absence of defects as the specific nature of an opposite entity. If it has no specific self nature at all, then it will be like a horn of a donkey, because it will not be the effect of anything.

Thus it should be accepted that the absence of faults does imply the existence of qualities, like cold is implied by the absence of fire. Because qualities and defects exist in mutual exclusion.

Therefore it may be said that the absence of invariable concomitance of the reason and absence of defects in the organs means the qualities of removing defects (malāpagama). It is rightly said by you that "the qualities must be held to any removal of defects and from the absence of these defects, proceeds the absence of the two kinds of invalidity". Thus by saying like, "qualities must be held to any removal of defects" you have said qualities must be from qualities only. Thus the validity is nothing but the two kinds of invalidity. And if that is due to the existence of qualities, then why should be not accepted that the validity is extrinsic?

You have said, "When an entity has been acquired existence its application to various effects proceeds naturally by itself". That is merely saying. Consistent knowledge is valid which is capable to determinate the object as it is. If it depends on causes for its own existence, then how will its application to the effects be their by itself? It is rightly pointed out that, 'in the case of jar (ghaṭa), the production of jar depends upon such causes as the lump of clay, the potters stick, the wheel and other things', as they are efficient causes. However, in the case of cognition a
cognition comes to an end immediately after it acquires its existence, then a ques-
tion arises: What kind of activity of it would be there by itself? 

Again, Jaina philosopher continues his attack by asking; What is the effect of
cognition towards which it becomes active by itself? There are two alternatives: (1) Right determination (2) Determination that the cognition is valid. If you accept the first alternative, then it would meant that the cognition create itself. That is im-
proper, because nothing can have activity with itself. The second alternative is not also accepted, because sometimes the determination that the cognition is valid does not take place due to the cognition of illusion etc. and sometimes even con-
trary determination takes place.

In the case of inference, the determination of invariable concomitance is the quality of reason and absence of invariable concomitance is the defect.

It is well known that the āgama (authoritative sayings) is valid, because it is a work of an intelligent person. Hence it is not proved as apauruṣeya (having non-
human origin), even though āgama is accepted as apauruṣeya. It cannot determine the truth by itself, because it would always do so. Vedas will not reveal the truth, if they are manifested by human efforts because human beings being subjected to the faults, like passions. Their manifestation cannot be proved to be true. Therefore acceptance of apauruṣeyatva (non-human origin) out of fear from invalidity, is like the bath of an elephant.

The author concludes that the validity is not intrinsic in its origination. Then he turns to show that the validity is not intrinsic in the state of its consciousness. Here the question is: Is this consciousness (cognition of validity) uncaused or caused? It cannot be uncaused, because in that case there will be absence of place, time and self nature. It cannot be caused, because then also question arises: Is the deter-
mination of validity caused by itself or by some other cognitions? It is not caused by itself, because self-illumination is not accepted (by Mīmāṃsakas). If it is the determination of validity caused by some other cognition, then there is no such activity of perception in the consciousness of validity (prāmāṇyajñāṇa) as the perception acquires the existence when the organs contact with an object. And there is no contact of organs with validity by mental perception (mānasapratyakṣa), because we do not have that type of experience, i.e. consciousness of validity.

The determination of validity cannot be proved by the means of inference, as there is no such reason which has invariable concomitance. If manifestation of the object is reason, then a question arises: Is the reason qualified by correspondence with real objects or is it not qualified at all? Is this qualification known the first cognition itself, or by some other cognition? If it is by the first cognition itself, then there is a fallacy of mutual dependence (parasparāśraya). If the qualification known by some other cognition, then there is infinite regress. (anavasthā) And again, if you say that the reason is not qualified at all, then there is ativyāpti (over applicability).

The Mīmāṃsaka has had asserted the fallacy of circularity in the thesis that the earlier cognition is proved to be valid through the knowledge of consistency with the practical efficacy. The author, however, contents that there is no such fallacy. A person suffering from cold feels enjoyment after touching the fire and associates the touch of fire with the visual form of it. Later on he sees the visual form he infers that there must be the hot touch as experienced before. This happens when he has not experienced the fire repeatedly (anabhyāśadaśā). If, on the other hand, he has a repeated experience of fire, then, he does not require any such inference.

The author shows that in the direct cognition of practical efficiency, the question of validity does not arise and rules out the Mīmāṃsā objection that Buddhists
Jainas are unduly discriminating between the very first cognition (the cognition of practical efficiency) and later cognitions.

Further, the Mīmāṃsaka had been consistency with the other cognitions is the ground for validity, then the auditory would have to be considered false on the ground of its not being supported by occular and other perceptions. This is also improper, because it is often seen that the doubt concerning the sound produced by Vīṇā is removed by perceiving the particular visual form of Vīṇā. Hence there is no consistency between two cognitions.

Next, the Mīmāṃsā statement, i.e. 'The determination of validity in a cognition is due to the absence of sublation and the faulty cognition causing factors', is also merely saying, because there also question arises: Does the determination of absence of sublation exist before the activity or after the activity? If you say that the determination of absence of sublation exists before the activity, then there may be validity for illusion also. And again, if you say that it exists after the activity, then the absence of sublation is futile, because the activity has already takes place. Moreover, there is no means to the determination of absence of sublation. If you say that the anupalabdhi (non-apprehension) is the means, then there is a question: Is this non-apprehension prior to the activity or later. If it is prior, then it cannot help one to determine the absence of later sublating factors. Nor can it be later, because before the activity any ordinary person cannot determine that there will be non-apprehension of sublating factors later on. Moreover, the later non-apprehension is futile, because the activity has already taken place. Now, does this non-apprehension pertain to all knowers or it pertains to oneself? You cannot accept the first option, because no ordinary person can ascertain that all the knowers will have the non-apprehension of sublating factors. The non-apprehension cannot
pertain to oneself only, because in that case it will be inconclusive.

It is also not proper, what you have asserted, that "In the case of the Veda, the assertion of freedom from reproach is very easy to put forward, because there is no speaker in this case and for this reason the invalidity of the Veda can never be imagined". However, the inference stands against to it. viz., "The conception produced by the Veda is not authentic, because it is produced by the causes whose faulty character is unrefuted, like the conception of two moons". The reason here is not unproved, because the absence of faults is not proved in the absence of speaker who hold good qualities. There is neither the fallacy of *anaikāntika* (unsteadiness) nor *viruddha* (contrary reason), because it is well known in the instance of false cognition, that there is an invariable concomitance between being caused by faulty causes and invalidity.

**Refutation by Ratnaprabhasūri** - Ratnaprabhasūri clearly states that the validity and the invalidity of knowledge at their origination are due to something other than itself, while their consciousness is due to itself and other.

There are clarifying attributes (*gunaḥ*) and mystifying attributes (*doṣāḥ*) in the factors that cause the origin of mode of knowledge. Where the knowledge causing factors are good then the knowledge is valid, if the that factors are faulty then the knowledge is invalid. Thus validity and invalidity of knowledge depending upon others viz. goodness or badness of the factors. Where from the observation of the same phenomenon, the same knowledge arises, then that knowledge is valid. But where the same phenomenon is observed at each time, but the knowledge is varying, then that knowledge is invalid. Thus where the observation of a phenomenon is repeated many times (*abhyāsadasāśa*) the knowledge of validity comes of itself and hence is intrinsic. Whereas when there is no repeated observation (*anabhyāsadasāśa*) of a
matter, the evidence and the aspects of the phenomenon under observation and relevant things are to be examined for the knowledge of validity (jñāpā). So the knowledge of valid in that case is not intuitive, but is dependent on other factors.

As regards the invalidity of knowledge, the Mīmāṃsakas maintain that it is extrinsic in origination, because it is due to faults in generating factors. And it is extrinsic in consciousness, because it depends upon the sublating factors.

The Jaina thinker criticises the Mīmāṃsaka's argument. If the faults are real and can be known, there is no reason why the qualities should not be real and cognisable in a like manner. If it be argued that the defects located in the sense-organs are perceived as real, then it may be said that the qualities also may be perceived as real. If it be argued that the qualities are not real but are only the absence of the faults, then such are not perceivable by the senses. Then why cannot the faults be conceived as the absence of qualities? Even if the qualities be held to be absence of the faults, they are not unsubstantial and unreal. It is clearly said by Bhaṭṭa, i.e. Kumārila that absence is not Tuccha or totally unreal. If it is so, the Jains' theory that 'the validity of knowledge is dependent on other (para) is practically accepted.

Here, Mīmāṃsā thinkers might say: Let, for the sake of argument, the qualities be real yet they cannot be directly perceived, as the senses in which they inhere are super-sensuous. We can perceive the qualities residing only in the loci of the senses. On this, Jaina says that the something would apply to faults as well. Since the senses are super-sensuous faults, residing them also super-sensuous.

On this Mīmāṃsaka might urge that although faults of senses are not perceived their existence can be inferred. On this the Jaina answer is that the same kind of inference can also be available on proving qualities in the senses. Hence
validity would be extraneous in its origination 90.

Next argument on the Mīmāṃsā theory is that the knowledge of the validity of a knowledge arises from samvādīvedanā (consistent knowledge) Jainas hold that kāraṇagunajñāna (knowledge of good qualities inherent in the knowledge causing factors) and bādhakābhāvajñāna knowledge of absence of sublating the absence of sublating are included in consistent knowledge. It consists in a knowledge of the form ‘the object of the present knowledge is apprehended to be similar to that of the previous knowledge. Such consistent knowledge gives the knowledge that the given previous knowledge is valid. The knowledge of good-qualities inherent in the knowledge causing factors is possible, because qualities like defects are real and knowable. Such knowledge gives the knowledge that the given knowledge is valid.

The refutation continues on the Mīmāṃsā contention about the impossibility of the knowledge of absence of sublating. When a knowledge arises there cannot be any other knowledge along with it, sublating it. Two modes of knowledge, a given knowledge and the knowledge of the sublating cannot be simultaneous. However it is true that absence of sublating knowledge does not refer to any sublation. It refers to the future sublation. It is also true that we cannot directly perceive future things. But this, not need of invalidate any inference about the future. For instance, the rise of constellation, Kṛttikā, then the constellation Śakaṭa will arise next. This inference is quite sound. Hence there will be nothing sublating in future 92. According to the author consistent proves validity of knowledge is either the knowledge of same object as is given before or the knowledge of some other object. For instance, a pitcher is perceived in a dimlight; lateron, when the same object is brought into clear light, the later perception shows that the earlier perception of a pitcher was
valid. The determination of some other object than the given object may sometimes show that the given knowledge was valid. For example *arthakriyājñāna* (knowledge of the practical efficiency) is different from the knowledge of the original object yet it proves the validity of the later (knowledge of original object). There is no *cakraka* (circular reasoning) here. For the generation of *pravṛtti* (the urge) the original given knowledge need not be known to be valid at the very beginning. The urge arises from the doubt about the validity of the given knowledge and a consequent desire to determine the validity or otherwise. The *arthakriyājñāna* (knowledge of the practical efficiency) determines it and gives the knowledge of the validity of a given knowledge. 93.

According to Jaina thinker, the knowledge of the practical efficiency involves repeated observation and is certain in its origination. The validity of the knowledge of the practical efficiency arises thus in and from itself. Next point is that the observation of an object different from the object of the given knowledge, when the both objects belong to the same class, sometimes gives the knowledge that the given knowledge is valid. If the two phenomena do not belong to the same class, the experience of one of them may sometimes confirm the knowledge about the other phenomenon. For instance, the knowledge of the taste of a fruit confirms the knowledge of the colour of that fruit. Hence it can be said that when two phenomena belong to the same class and do not contradict each other, the experience of later phenomenon is consistent knowledge and such gives the knowledge that earlier experience about the other phenomenon was valid. 94.

The Jaina thinker proceeds to examine the word 'sva' (itself). He asks: What do you mean by 'sva' (itself)? It cannot mean the given knowledge (*ātmā*). *Mīmāṃsaka* is bound to mean by 'sva' (itself), the knowledge which grasps something related
to the given knowledge (ātmīya) And if he means the later, he has already accepted the Jain position, viz validity proved by the related knowledge 95.

In this connection, the Jaina thinker refers to the Mīmāṃsā theory that the process of cognition is proved to be valid by the same means by which the cognition itself is proved. That is, it is proved by arthāpatti (presumption) that arthaprākatya (clarification of the object) of cognition would otherwise be inexplicable. Now question arises: What is this clarification of the object? If it means the revelation of the true nature of the object, then again question arises as to how this true nature of the object is known? It cannot be said that true nature of the object becomes clear when the knowledge of the object is known to be valid. Then it would lead to parasparāśraya (mutual dependence). Again, it cannot be said that the true nature of the object becomes clear due to some other valid knowledge, because in that case there would be anavasthā (infinite regression).

According to Mīmāṃsā, the knowledge of the nature of the object of cognition arises from the knowledge itself and that gives rise to the knowledge of the validity of the knowledge and that is due to the given knowledge itself. The Jaina thinker, however, points out that it may be argued in some way that the knowledge of invalidity of a knowledge also is due to the given knowledge itself 97.

And again, if it be urged that the knowledge of invalidity of a knowledge is due to the knowledge of Bādhaka (sublating) and not to the knowledge itself, then, it is to be said against the Mīmāṃsā theory that the knowledge of the validity of the knowledge is due to the knowledge of the sāṃvādaka (consistent knowledge). If arthaprākatya (clarification of the object of cognition) is meant simply the apprehension of the true nature of the object of cognition, then it is clear that such arthaprākatya (clarification of the object of cognition) does not give the knowledge
of the validity of the knowledge only but also the knowledge if invalidity which is against the Mīmāṃsā theory **.
Foot Notes :-

1) Dasgupta, HIP, pp. 374-75.

2) Ibid, p. 375.

3) Ibid.

4) न च 'स्मर्चाकामो यजेत' ......... न च निधित्वमवग्यमानामिदं मिथ्या स्वात् । M.D. Anandashrama ed. p. 17.

5) यो हि जनित्वा प्रव्यासते ......... तावथपुरुषः बृजः प्रभवः प्रमाणम् । Ibid.

6) सर्व्वज्ञानविषयमिदं तावथपरिश्वरताम् ।

प्रमाणान्व्यान्वय्यसे स्वतः किं परिवर्तन ।। SV. 2,33

स्वतः सत्यान्व्यान्वय्यवस्तिः केचिदाहुद्द्वयं स्वतः ।

अपरेन कारणोपन्नुषु गुणावधायानां ।। SV, 2.34, Jha Eng. trans.

7) स्वततावद् हर्मनानि विविधानूं परस्ते न च ।। SV, 2.35 ab., Ibid.

8) निन्यायात्मत्मते हि ज्ञानवें प्रस्तावते । SV. 2, 35 cd.

तथ्यात्मत्ववत्तिकं तेषामप्रमाणत्वमिथ्यान्वय्य ।

प्रमाणान्त परापक्षम् अन्त्र च्यायोपविधीयते ।। SV. 2.38

अप्रमाणान्तवत्तुत्वान्न स्वत्त्वकरणहोवेतः ।

वस्तुत्वातु गुणास्तेस्वप्रमाणमुपजन्यते ।। SV, 2.39., Ibid.

10) Jha G. N. Pürvamāṃsā ।।।। p. 85.


12) स्वतः सर्व्वप्रमाणान्त प्रामाण्यस्तति गम्यताम् । SV, 2.47 ab., Jha Eng. trans.

13) इन्द्र्यादिदु गुणादु नायां कारणम्, तदस्य द्वित्ता ।

गुणान्विन्यादिनीनाम令वें च्यतत्यममय्य वा ।। SV, 2.42.
अत एव च वो भ्रातिदोषेमिवध्यात्मिं धीरिति ।
तद्वपालोऽयुगनामावस्तत्तुता ध्यानमणाता ॥ SV, 2.43.
अन्तःयवतिरेकध्यायमाणां न दोषतः ।
नाजाने दश्यते होतत्त्वारणामावहेतुके ॥ SV, 2.45., Ibid.

14) तस्मातः कारणशुद्धत्वं ध्यानध्यायमकारणाम् ।

स्वभावतो स्वभावतं तद्भवेन लक्ष्यते ॥ SV, 2.44., Ibid.

15) स्वतः सर्वध्यायानां प्रामाण्यमिति गम्याम् ।

न हि स्वतोसतती शक्ति: करुपमन्येन शक्यते ॥ SV, 2.47., Ibid.

16) आत्मानं च भावानं कारणेप्यंता भवेत् ।

स्वधातन्तः स्वकाँरुपा प्रवृत्ति: स्वमेव तु ॥ SV, 2.48., Ibid.

17) जातेवपि यदि विद्व्याने तवनाथवायव्याप्ते ।

यावत्कारणशुद्धत्वं न प्रामाणातरात् भवेत् ॥ SV, 2.49
तत्र ज्ञानान्तरोपयो: प्रतीश्च: कारणांतरात् ।
यावद न परिच्छन्ना शुद्धिसारसतसमा ॥ SV, 2.50
तत्यापि कारणे शुद्धे तत्ज्ञाने स्वातः प्रामाण्यता ।
तत्यापेय्यमितीच्छेद: न कविद् व्यवस्थितत: ॥ SV, 2.51.
यदा स्वतं प्रामाण्यतं तद्वन्येन्यैव गृह्यते ।
निवर्तते हि मिथ्यास्ते दोषानांदयन्त: ॥ SV, 2.52., Ibid.

18) अप्रामाण्यं त्रिद्व भिन्नं मिथ्यात्वाज्ञानांलं: ।

वस्तुवादुः विक्षेपव्यात्र सम्भवो दुष्टकारणात् ॥ SV, 2.54
अविज्ञाने तु दोषाणां व्यापरो नैव कल्यते ।
कारणभावस्तेव तत्सिद्ध नत्त्वदुस्तिवत् ॥ SV, 2.55
दोषत्त्वप्रामाण्यं वस्तः प्रामाण्यवादिनाम् ।
गुणःगानवस्थावन्न दोषेषु प्रसन्तते ।। SV, 2.56

साधितिपर्यङ्गानांश्चत त्यग्नाणताः ।

पूर्वःभावेन नोत्सवर्ततस्य हि सिद्धति ।। SV, 2.57., Ibid.

19) दुष्कारणोपेक्षा तु सिद्धेऽधि विश्वान्तरः ।

अर्थतुल्यार्थांतः प्रायः बायों ........ ।। SV, 2.58 abc.

तत्र दोषान्तरां शायतिर्वरा न चेतु ।

तदुद्भूतीं द्वितीयवस्था मिह्यावादादादामः ।। SV, 2.59.

स्वतं एव हि तत्रापि दोषानात्माणताः ।

doषानें त्यजूः न श्रवणे निष्प्रमणाता ।। SV, 2.60

एवं विचारति दृश्यान्तरां नातिका मतः ।

प्रायःते तावतःवेकं स्वतः प्रामाण्यमधुरः ।। SV, 2.61., Ibid.

20) शब्दे दोषोद्वस्तातांत् वक्रधीन इति स्थिति: ।

तदभव: कथनेत तावद् गुणवद्वस्तातप्तवः ।। SV, 2.62.

एतद्गुणप्रकृत्याः शब्दे संक्रांत्यसर्वभवात् ।

यदा वक्रस्वाभाव न स्थिरः निराश्रयः: ।। SV, 2.63.

21) पौरुषेः वर्त प्रत्येकं दोषाभावाः गुणात्मतः ।

प्रामाण्यं तत्र गुणातृत्वे पौरुषस्य कथितमचात् ।। SV, 2.64.

तत्र गुणोऽदर्शे दोषान्तरां शवेषभवातः ।

अप्रामाण्यद्वस्तां तेनीत्सङ्कोषप्रतिविद्: ।। SV, 2.65., Ibid.

22) अप्रामाण्यं प्रामाण्यं संप्रतिक्रियात्वाः वास्तवम: ।

गुणधर्मानां विवेकद्वारेकं तत्र हि बोधकमः ।। SV, 2.73.

चत्वाः प्रयांत परिच्छेदः प्रामाण्यन्तः पुनः ।
23) प्रथमाय तथापि उपेक्षा किं निवन्धन। । SV, 2.76 cd

24) न नूतु प्रमाणजस्ते उपेक्षा न गृह्यते।

25) अन्तः पुनः स्वर्ग्याहकं स्वात्मकः तत्त्वम्।
तावतेव च मिथ्यावर्ग गृह्यते नान्येतुकम् ।

उत्तमवर्गं चैवेदं प्रमाणितं मीयते ।। SV, 2.87.

अतो यन्त्रपि मिथ्यावर्गं परेभ्यः प्रतिपादयते ।

tतत्राध्येतद् द्वयं वाच्यं न सु ताध्यमात्रकम् ।। SV, 2.88, Ibid.

26) तक्ष्येवायांवोधकैत् ताहथम् भविष्यति ।

ममासिद्धमिदं किन्तु वेदाजातेववयोधने ।। SV, 2.92.

वर्तं न देयमाच्छेन युयाते सत्यवादिना ।

हेषाबधसम्भलाधां न च स्यादप्राचारोऽति ।। SV, 2.93.

न चालेच्छायमुखाध्यां प्राचार्यम्बन्धते ।। SV, 2.94 ab

न चामिलापिकं ज्ञानं प्राचार्यनावाध्ययते ।

तत्सादातोकवद्द्वेदे सर्वसाधारणेः सतिः ।। SV, 2.95.

नैवं विप्रतिपतत्वम् ।।

पुरुषभर्तितत्वं साप्तवद्वद्वनमव: ।। SV, 2.96acd

वेदस्थापीलेखन्ते सिद्धा त्वेवं प्रमाणता ।। SV, 2.97ab, Ibid.

27) कर्मात्वे तु वेदस्य स्मापिठमिथ्यावलयाविद्धम्: ।। SV, 2.97cd

कर्मां गुणाः दोषाः महाजनपरिग्राहः।

एवमादि विना युक्ताः कल्याम् मीमांसाके: पुनः ।। SV, 2.98, Ibid.

28) आत्मानं घटादीनां कारणप्रक्षिपेते ।

लघ्यात्मकं स्वकार्यकु मृ मृत्य: स्वयमेव तु ।। TS 2920.

यतु ज्ञानं लघ्यापीलं जन्मानंतरमस्येश्च ।


29) व्यापार: कारणानं ।। व्यापितेन्द्रियाविद्वन्तु ।। SV, 4.54-55.
30) अध्यायक्षणिके ज्ञान निंयं चाम्युपमयते।

अभ्युदू विरोधवोऽवेव युक्त्यावधानम्।। TS, 2024।

साधित्वक्षणाभः हि सर्व वस्तु साभितरम्।

नित्यं च जन्मते नेति कारणापेक्षीतः का।। TS, 2925।

अतत् शक्यते वचमेव स्वतं: एव न वर्तते।

पश्चात् प्रमा स्वकार्येऽु पैच्यादुः गगनाभ्यातू।। TS, 2926।

असु वा अक्षर्णिके ज्ञानं स्वतं: एव प्रवर्तते।

स्वाभाविकनिष्ठे वेदू कष्ठं संशयादाय।। TS, 2927।

प्राभावनिष्ठे यस्मात् तत्र तत्मान्वभावः।

तत्त्वम् जाते च सदेहविपर्ययासाधनास्वदी।। TS, 2928।

निष्क्षर्पणसोभ्याध्याधकमेव।

तत्त्वं चौदनाजन्यतत्त्वाध्याधकमेव।

दोषविरवियज्ञमाभ्याध्याधिकरपश्चाय।। TS, 2930।

प्रामाणयात्मकं वयदि वर्ततं तत्र तु।

प्रामाण्यनिष्ठे न स्पदु भ्रात्या तद्विष्ठ्यूंकः।। TS, 2937। Jha Eng. trans।

31) य: सदेहविपर्ययात्म्येविविन्यूकृत:।

स्थानुकवः हि तत्रसति तदः तदुपनिष्ठ:।। TS, 2938।

बलस्मृतसबसुचशोपाथप्रत्येक्यः।

स्थानुकवः प्रामाण्याति पर्ययो भवसीतः।। TS, 2939।

वस्तुदेहविपर्ययासविक्षु गतां तथा।

परस्त्र निष्क्ष्यसत्य प्रामाण्यत्स्य गम्यताम्।। TS, 2940। Jbid।
32) अंग च भवतां पशुः यवं वाक्ये नजः: श्रुतिः।

त्रैवायायायवचे: ख्यातैन्याय गम्याते।। TS, 2941.

चोदनाजनिताबुधः: प्रमाणामित्, नेहच।

प्रयोगोऽधिकत नस्तेन नाप्रामाण्यप्रवर्तनम्।। TS, 2942., Ibid.

33) किंच हर्षप्रमाणानां प्रमाणं निश्चितं यदि।

क्यतः एव तदा कस्मात् मतभेदः प्रवाहिनाम्।। TS, 2943.

वेमेके: स्वतः: एवेति प्राधीनियम उच्यते।।

किंचित् स्वतोऽन्यत: किंचित् परेदानियमोपमः।। TS, 2944.

विवादो आतितो यस्मात् सा च निन्द्यताविदिता।

निन्द्यतात्सतसतत्वं विवेदर्नव वादिनः।। TS, 2945., Ibid.

34) नियते यस्य नैवाचित: क्यत: प्रमाणनिश्चयः।

पारिश्चिक्षालात् तत्समन्याम्यं प्रतीतः।। TS, 2951.

अर्यान्यावतेस्तूत्यदोषज्ञानपेश्या।

ज्ञानान्तरमेवात्सतद्प्रमाण्यनिश्चयः।। TS, 2952.

अप्रमाणे प्रमाणत्वविपर्यायोः न सह्यतः।

अतोसंवादिनो नैव किंचित् वत्ते तद्यथः।। TS, 2953., Ibid.

35) जन्नातिरिक्तकालेच क्रियाकाले न विध्यते।

क्षणिकत्वादू घटीनामित्वसिद्ध निदर्शनम्।। TS, 2954.

तेशपुनर्गांहि कुलादनरेप्शिणाम्।

स्योदानाधेपेश्वरालू स्वतो नालि प्रवर्तनम्।। TS, 2955., Ibid.

36) जनने हि स्वतन्त्राणं प्रमाण्यवाचविनिधित्वे।

स्वहेतुनिरेश्यानं तेषां वृत्तिचतुर्विविद्युत्।। TS, 2849.
37) ननु कोतिश्यतसंघ्य प्राक्तनादिति चेन तत्त
परतः पूरविङ्गानिमिव नाभुपागायते । तत् TS, 2957.
उच्यते - स्वसूंविवाद: प्रामाण्यपरिवर्तिते ।
तत्स्य वायक्रियाभास्वानादन्द्न्यन्त्र रुप्तम् । तत् TS, 2958.
अर्थक्रियाभासं च ज्ञानं संवेदयते स्वसूंम् ।
निधीयते च तमात्मभावमायेश्वेतसा । तत् TS, 2959.
अतिन्तत्र स्वतः: सम्प्रामाण्यस्य विनिध्वयत् ।
नीतरामक्रियाप्राविन्त्यय: समपेयते । तत् TS, 2960., Ibid

38) आधे द्वसस्तुतिवियये वससूंविवादलक्षणम् ।
क्तित्वेत न प्रवृत्त यथा हेतोसर्वम्भावतु । तत् TS, 2962.
तस्मादक्रियाभासं ज्ञानं याृवन्न जायते ।
तत्तवादेशप्रभावशल्क्का जायते प्रभावितहेतुतः । तत् TS, 2965.
अचरात् फलादृष्टि: सादश्योपोपम्मन्तम्)
मतेनोदुपोद्विद्यद भाविकारणमात्र च । तत् TS, 2966.
कार्यवाक्यमिविन्मातेजते त्वेत् त्वेत मिवावते ।
साक्षाद्वसस्तुतिबाद्य: क्रियाय: प्रतिवेदनात् । तत् TS, 2967.
कथ्यचित्र तु यदिन्येत स्वतंत्र प्रमाणतः ।
प्रयम्बस्य तथानाद्वप्रस्य: केन हेतुततः । तत् TS, 2854., Ibid

40) तस्मान् सदि मानस्य विनिधे कु न शवचते ।
उत्तराधिक्रियाभासात् केवलं तत्त प्रतीष्यते । तत् TS, 2870., Ibid
41) मैलके च प्रभाणते प्रभाणात्सरसाध्यता । TS, 2852ab., Ibid

42) प्राणिशेषोसदभावाद् खत्ततरय प्रभाणता ।
प्रयथस तदभावे प्रक्षेषो प्राणि सम्बत्तात् ।। TS, 2972., Ibid

43) सितसाध्यक्रियायापथ्य यथा शार्के पुरुषःतिथि" ।
कामलकान्तनेत्रोत्त्वय विज्ञानं नैति गम्यते ।। TS, 2990.

44) सुदायनुपहाराधकराधनादिदेवनुपुरकावान् ।
भा्यकारोऽऽयतो नोहोदनवस्येव चोधते ।। TS, 2993., Ibid

45) यदि स्वतः प्रभाणात्सर्वत्रीतिर्लिङ्गं स्थितम् । TS, 2996ab., Ibid

46) यदि स्वतः प्रभाणात्सर्वत्रीतिर्लिङ्गं स्थितम् ।

47) अन्यकौशोपत्याः स्वाध्यात्मकं स्वतः ।

तत्रापि शक्ते चर्कु यथमान्यत्सर्वत्रीतिर्लिङ्गमीहः ।। TS, 2999.

तपस्तु स्वतः प्रभाणात्सर्वत्रीतिर्लिङ्गं स्थितम् ।

बाध्यकारणुदुस्त्रे ज्ञानाभावान् स्वाध्यात्मकं स्थितम् ।

बाध्यकारणुदुस्त्रे ज्ञानाभावान् प्रभाणात् ।

44) सुदायनुपहाराधकराधनादिदेवनुपुरकावान् ।

45) यदि स्वतः प्रभाणात्सर्वत्रीतिर्लिङ्गं स्थितम् । TS, 2996ab., Ibid

46) यदि स्वतः प्रभाणात्सर्वत्रीतिर्लिङ्गं स्थितम् ।

47) अन्यकौशोपत्याः स्वाध्यात्मकं स्वतः ।

तत्रापि शक्ते चर्कु यथमान्यत्सर्वत्रीतिर्लिङ्गमीहः ।। TS, 2999.

तपस्तु स्वतः प्रभाणात्सर्वत्रीतिर्लिङ्गं स्थितम् ।

बाध्यकारणुदुस्त्रे ज्ञानाभावान् स्वाध्यात्मकं स्थितम् ।

बाध्यकारणुदुस्त्रे ज्ञानाभावान् प्रभाणात् ।

47) अन्यकौशोपत्याः स्वाध्यात्मकं स्वतः ।

तत्रापि शक्ते चर्कु यथमान्यत्सर्वत्रीतिर्लिङ्गमीहः ।। TS, 2999.

तपस्तु स्वतः प्रभाणात्सर्वत्रीतिर्लिङ्गं स्थितम् ।

बाध्यकारणुदुस्त्रे ज्ञानाभावान् स्वाध्यात्मकं स्थितम् ।

बाध्यकारणुदुस्त्रे ज्ञानाभावान् प्रभाणात् ।

47) अन्यकौशोपत्याः स्वाध्यात्मकं स्वतः ।

तत्रापि शक्ते चर्कु यथमान्यत्सर्वत्रीतिर्लिङ्गमीहः ।। TS, 2999.

तपस्तु स्वतः प्रभाणात्सर्वत्रीतिर्लिङ्गं स्थितम् ।

बाध्यकारणुदुस्त्रे ज्ञानाभावान् स्वाध्यात्मकं स्थितम् ।

बाध्यकारणुदुस्त्रे ज्ञानाभावान् प्रभाणात् ।

47) अन्यकौशोपत्याः स्वाध्यात्मकं स्वतः ।

तत्रापि शक्ते चर्कु यथमान्यत्सर्वत्रीतिर्लिङ्गमीहः ।। TS, 2999.

तपस्तु स्वतः प्रभाणात्सर्वत्रीतिर्लिङ्गं स्थितम् ।

बाध्यकारणुदुस्त्रे ज्ञानाभावान् स्वाध्यात्मकं स्थितम् ।

बाध्यकारणुदुस्त्रे ज्ञानाभावान् प्रभाणात् ।

47) अन्यकौशोपत्याः स्वाध्यात्मकं स्वतः ।

तत्रापि शक्ते चर्कु यथमान्यत्सर्वत्रीतिर्लिङ्गमीहः ।। TS, 2999.

तपस्तु स्वतः प्रभाणात्सर्वत्रीतिर्लिङ्गं स्थितम् ।

बाध्यकारणुदुस्त्रे ज्ञानाभावान् स्वाध्यात्मकं स्थितम् ।

बाध्यकारणुदुस्त्रे ज्ञानाभावान् प्रभाणात् ।
तथा हि बाधकामात्र प्रामाण्यं भवतोच्चयते ।
बाधकामावघमावघं प्रमाणान्तरनिश्चयते ।। TS 3002.
तत्स्यापि बाधकामात्र प्रामाण्यमविधीयते ।
तत्र तत्प्रविधायां व्यवस्था नोपल्पयते ।। TS 3004., Ibid

48) यदि चोत्वयते श्रद्धामूल्यमेवति संशयात् ।
बाधाभावविनामूलं यस्मात्प्राप्तमभमनम् ।। TS 3012.
तत्त्वाधाबधाधोनामेवश्च बाधकं पुनः ।
छलेन वस्तुतंत्रं न हि जात्वलिष्टते ।। TS 3015.
आज्ञाविधतात् समुपपन्नं बाधप्रत्ययवर्तितम् ।
श्रद्धं पीतनीमं ज्ञानं प्रमाणं न हि जापते ।। TS 3016.
सनमितिवेत् तेनेयमाशंका न तु मोहतः ।
शुद्धसंवाददृश्यं तु नाशकं सुधियो भवेत् ।। TS 3018.
अन्तर्पित यः पुनः शंकं कष्टत्वकृ तं वत: ।
संशयात्मकान्ततेषु मन्यते तं प्रतिमिनिद्वा ।। TS 3020.

49) देशाकलरावस्थामेवेतशक्तप्रक्षिप्तते ।
प्रामाण्यनिष्क्रियेन्यस्माद् चतुं प्रामाण्यनित्वित: ।। TS, 3021.
तथाहि देशाकलदी बाधाभावतु सुनित्विती ।
प्रमाणान्तरं: प्राच्ये ज्ञाने प्रामाण्यनिष्क्रिय: ।। TS 3022., Ibid

50) स्थतो वाक्यं प्रमाणं तदृ दोषामावोऽपरक्षितं ।
न युक्तमपरिवाछानं दोषामायो हस्तश्रयम् ।। TS, 3038.
न हि दण्डपरिवाछे पुः प्पीयं दण्डित्वः ।
तत्स्यापि स्थतो मान्यमित्वेत्य नयेतम ।। TS, 3039.
51) तदा न व्यापिस्यते तु: ज्ञानमानस्तया गुणा: ।

दोषाभाये तु विख्येये सत्तामात्रोपकारिण: ।। TS, 3043; SV, 2.67., Ibid

52) यथेष्म, संशयो न स्वाद विपर्यता मतिलस्था ।

दोषा: सन्तुष्ट नो वैति सन्तुष्टेवत्वायस्माते ।। TS, 3044.

तत्सदेहविपर्यायसी भवतश्चात्र कस्पचित् ।

यावद् गुणणाधार इत्यसी नावगम्यते ।। TS, 3045.

दोषाभायस्य चाज्ञानाद्व्रमाणयनास्तिता ।

कथं प्रतीयते येन भवेतुप्राणणणिध्यप: ।। TS, 3047., Ibid

53) दोषाभाये प्रमाणत्वमित्वीं च निषेधनम् ।

केवलं यदि कल्पयेत तत्सतिनेन सम्भवेतु।। TS, 3058.

अभावानुपममेन तत्सतिनेनकल्पते ।

अपनाविनिदोषाध न युक्तानुपममत: ।। TS, 3059., Ibid

54) पर्यवासात्मकं तथेतु तद्विविक्षकायन्दर्शनात् ।

दोषाभायपरिज्ञानं गुणज्ञानायत्मकं भवेतु ।। TS, 3061.

विविक्षाप्रमाणज्ञानवयुं च प्रसन्यते ।

अप्रमाणद्वास्तव्ययां तद्वितंतरेण क च ।। TS, 3062.

अप्रमाणप्रमात्यात् जले स्वतन्त्रतोऽवयः ।

परिशिष्टः प्रमात्मेति भवसो निश्चयः कृत: ।। TS, 3063.
अन्यथानुपपत्ति एवं धान्याद्वारायणति भवेत्।

अगुमले वपतो वापथ स्वादेव निद्रयोिँ: यत्वः।। TS, 3064।

अस्मादेव च ते न्यायाद्रामायणमम स्वतः।

प्रस्तरं शक्यते वचूं वस्मात् तत्रायद् सुखस्म।। TS, 3065।

तस्माद् दोषेः गुणानमभावस्तद्भावतः।

प्रामाणरुपतातित्वः तेनेत्योजनोऽन्वितः।। TS, 3066।

वस्मादुत्तरस्वभावोऽर्वविवक्षात्रार्थितः।

शक्योऽनिधातुः विस्मयप्रामाण्यविवेच्यो।। TS, 3067।

यतो बाधात्मकत्वम् बुधे: प्राप्ताः प्रामाणता।

विधायंत्वमहेत्तयुग्माणादपरमः।। TS, 3068।

गुणेशायमायमात्वानाध्रामायणमपरमः।

अन्वोदितसिद्धः च स्वतस्तदिपः संविधितम्।। TS, 3069., Ibid

55) सकृणातिविवेचे च भवेनायत प्रामाणता।

श्रेष्ठधीप्रामाण्यम्यानेवादिपिभिरप्रस्थात।। TS, 2899., Ibid

56) श्रेष्ठधीरिपि व्यक्ता नेवादिपिभिरप्रस्थात।

एकादामग्राहीं हि रूपश्वासि वर्तिते।। TS, 3079।

परस्मार्थिनिर्माणात सत्यायात्मकारणम्।

तेषामेवेव सम्बन्धस्ते तत्तुपरिप्रकृतम्।। TS, 3080।

तद्वियामपि तदविरा धूमेरचणनिविभारचत्।

श्रेष्ठधीपिसत्तमाण्यम्यात तद्व्यमातितिस्वगतः।। TS, 3081।

एवं नानेद्रियाधीनिविभाजनात्तस्वगतः।

प्रत्येके कारणं करतां वेदें लेखे न देहते।। TS, 3083।
तथा हि सलिलश्राममाधुर्यपायमधुरिष्टविनम् ।

पानस्माधिदिन्तिमष्टिमि सलिलक्षायम्प्रक्षिप्तम् ।। TS, 3084., Ibid

57) साध्या न चाँगुनाने शब्दस्वीयन्वितं प्रमाणात् । TS 2905ab., Ibid

58) सिद्धितोकाणुमानेन प्रत्यक्षारण्यापि भावात् ।

शुद्धकारणस्यन्यस्यतः तद्रामाण तद्न्यायत् ।। TS, 3090., Ibid

59) दोषाः सत्त्व न सत्त्व दोषेयेद्यु कश्चयते ।

वेदे कलुरभाविष्टे दोषशाक्षेख नालिकान् ।। TS, 2894., Ibid

60) दोषाः सत्त्व न सत्त्व दोषेये पुष्पकश्चयते ।

करुःदिक्षणं सिद्धार्थवां दोषशाक्षक न नालिका न: ।। TS, 3070.

अतो यदनेश्वरलोकं वेदे प्रामाण्यमुच्यन्ते ।

तदसिद्ध यतः सोपणं कर्तारं सम्पेक्षन्ते ।। TS, 3071.

यदि संवादविचारं न या हेतुविशिष्टता ।

निर्देशेऽसंशोधयौपरित्यक्तं वेदे न मानतत् ।। TS, 3072., Ibid

61) एकेनापि तु यावेनेन देशकालन्तरादितु ।

लभ्ये नामसंवादं: स्वयमिदं संशोधयादितु ।। TS, 3085.

अमिन्होत्सर्ववस्तं इत्तथं श्रूततें समस्येण ।

निष्कास्यविमुख्युक्तं हि शब्ददूर्मात्राक्रमम् ।। TS, 3086.

स्वर्गविदेश्वं सिद्धवात्बयं विप्रतान्तरिणी दृढ्यते ।

लभ्ये नामसंवादं: तस्मादिह नरादितु ।। TS, 3087., Ibid

62) चोदनाजनिते जाने दा०ये प्राप्तविष्ठितम् ।

सन्तिष्टपूर्वकं तथामवयस्तृत्तव्यैन्यत्सृत्ततमां ।। TS, 3088.

असर्वदशयिन्धिनी: कृत प्रत्य विनिश्चितम् ।
63) नापि झानानतरेणव तत्कालेः सनिधानतः ।
तत्थाव्यक्तमात्रावत्तानि शास्त्रपियो वा ।। TS, 3102.
बेदे तु बाधकं मानमुखेवोवाताः श्रवण-कः ।
तंकुटात्माय ते हरस्मानां न युग्मते ।। TS 3103.
पीरपेयसत्सिद्धेषा श्राद्ध्या दुर्दानिन्नताः ।
वंशरूप वतः शचरिमित्यारङ्गे वा भवेतु ।। TS, 3104.
चोदनाप्रभवं झानमतो दुर्दानिन्नतकम् ।
श्राद्ध्यं, हर्षेरोपाय् श्राद्ध्यं न भिध्यते ।। TS, 3105.
तस्मातःत्वं प्रामाण्यं वेदस्यावि न युग्मते ।
तेन निधित्वनिर्णयं कृतं तत्थाव्यत्तमात्माः ।। TS, 3106., Ibid

64) ततः प्रामाण्यश्च तु निधिरं कुरूते ततः: ।
वेद: स्वार्थस्वरूपे च ततं मोहेतिसम्भवः ।। TS, 3118.
अतक्षाराणस्य: विपुर्यासास्यः कथितः ।
नोमोधेस्मेषकेत भिन्नपोः शक्नं ।। TS, 3119.
अत्विक्षयन्यावं चैनित्ये सा न्त्वपाकृता ।
अतो रक्षामपि प्राज्ञा निष्कामस्य कुर्विते ।। TS, 3121.
अतीन्द्रियार्थिक तत्मात् विधौतात्तस्मझ्यः ।
वेदार्थप्रविधानः कर्ता भास्मेवमप्रमाख्यः ।। TS, 3122., Ibid

65) तत्स्य स्वाप्त्यवित्यादिविश्लेषणस्य ......... अथ्यतनांभासापेक्षा ।

PKM, Mahendrakumar Shastri, ed. p. 149.

66) ये तु सकलप्रमाणाः ......... गुणवित्तेषणबिशिष्टेष्यो विशेषायावतः । Ibid, p. 150.

67) झत्यावनमयासदशायाः ......... तत्कार्यकारि नान्यथा । Ibid, p. 151.
68) यत्तायदुक्तम् ........ गुणदोषाणामयभावः | Ibid, p. 159.

69) अथवचकित्रहः ........ नेर्मलयदयी गुणा अपि | Ibid.

70) यथोत्तर्मुखप्रेसर्वम् ........ स्वरनिवार्यावतः | Ibid, p. 160.

71) तथा च गुणदोषाणां ....... शीतसद्धार्य वत् | Ibid, p. 161.

72) ततो हेतोनिर्मितविरहस्य ....... कथं न परत: प्रामाण्यम् | Ibid, p. 161.

73) यथोत्तर्मुखम् वञ्चात्मनं स्वकार्यः ...... वृत्ति: स्वयंव स्वातः | Ibid, p. 164.

74) किर्म, प्रामाण्यसे किं कार्यं ....... कवितविषययवर्तनांग इबीद, p. 165.

75) अनुमानोपत्यावकेशिततोतु ...... तद्वेकल्य दोषः | Ibid.

76) आगङ्गः तु ........ अपीरुपयत्वसिद्धः | Ibid.

77) अपि च, अपीरुपयत्वनापि ...... गजसानम्नुक्रोति | Ibid, pp. 165-66.

78) तन्न प्रामाण्यसर्सर्ती ...... एवं विधानुभववाभाद | Ibid, p. 166.


80) यद्द संबादपूर्वस्य प्रामाण्ये ...... प्रामाण्यं निधित्व स्वपन्नं | Ibid.

81) अथक्रियाज्ञानं तु ...... इत्यादि प्रकर्पमात्रम् | Ibid, p. 168.


83) प्रामाणे बाधकारण ...... तत्नायुपब्धिनिमित्तम् | Ibid, pp. 172-73.

84) तत्त्वुद्देशमुक्तमुख् ....... मिथ्याज्ञानं नुस्मित्तववादः | Ibid, pp. 175-76.

85) तदुभयंमुक्ताति परत एव झाणी तु स्वतः परत्वः 


86) ज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यमप्रामाण्यं च ...... जायमानोससी परत छृति | Ibid.


88) अन्तरामिदमथं ........ कथं न परत: प्रामाण्योपतिः | Ibid, p. 115.
89) अधाृतसतं नैर्मिकयायोगुणा: .......... दोषा अपि प्रत्यक्षब्यस्य: स्थु: | Ibid.

90) अध अप्रामाण्य ...... तथा गुणानुमानेरी | Ibid.

91) यदायैचि ...... प्रामाण्यप्रकृतिरनिवारणात् | Ibid, p. 117.

92) यत्रु बाधकाभावव्यापनप्रे ...... शक्तोद्यावन्मानं नासन्निवाट | Ibid.

93) यत्रुन्तरवादि ‘संवादवेदनं तु’ ...... संसापादि भावात् | Ibid, pp. 117-18.

94) अर्धक्रियायान्त्र तु ...... पूर्वात्शानगोचरयोरयोनीमार्गस्थ्रेष्ठ | Ibid, p. 119.

95) किस्म स्वतं एव ...... प्रामाण्यनिर्णयस्य स्वेदत्वत् | Ibid.

96) अध शेषाय ज्ञानमात्र ...... प्रामाण्यदिति | Ibid, p. 120.

97) अध स्वतततितिश्रेष्ठग्रहणम् ...... प्रामाण्यवद्धामाण्यस्यापि स्वतो निर्णीतिन्तर स्वात्? Ibid.

98) अध तत्र बाधकादेव प्रामाण्यनिर्णयो एव ...... तत्त्रापि सद्भावाभ | Ibid, p. 121.