CHAPTER 2
REFUTATION OF
VEDĀPAURUŚEYATVA
CHAPTER II.

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(NON-HUMAN ORIGIN OF THE VEDA).

Position of Mīmāṃsā - The main thesis of the Mīmāṃsakas is that the Veda is a reliable means of knowing Dharma and that it is not the creation of a human being. If there existed any author or the composer of the Veda, he should certainly have been remembered through the long tradition.

Jaimini Sūtras refer to the refutation of vedāpauruṣeyatva (non-human origin of the Veda) as follows: Some people regard the Vedas to have been composed in recent times, because they are named after particular persons and also because, we find a mention of ephemeral thing in them.

Śabara elaborates opponents view in the pūrvapakṣa, 'Vedic injunctions are the work of human beings. Veda belong to recent times, they have been composed in modern days and as the injunctions are all contained in the Vedas, they must be the work of human authors. As a matter of fact, we find that the Vedas are named after certain persons - being named as Kāṭhaka (composed by Kaṭha), Kāḷāpaka (composed by Kalāpa), Paippalāda (composed by Pippalāda) 'Maudgala' (composed by Mudgala) and so forth. Such a nomenclature would not be possible, unless the texts had some connection, with the person and the person can have no connection with a text except that the same he is the author. Qualification of a thing is always such, as is peculiar to that thing itself and the author can be only one for one text and the expounders might be many. Hence we conclude that there must be an author of the Vedic injunctions, even though we do not remember him.
Śabara, further sets forth again the opponents view. There are some statements in the Vedas which mention the birth and the death of some persons. For instance, see a statement viz. Babara, the son of Pravahaṇa, desired; Kusuravinda the son of Uddālaka, desired and so on. Audḍālaka must have been born of Uddālaka and if so, the text speaking of him could not have existed before his birth. In this way also the non-eternality of the Veda becomes established.

Śabara gives an answer for the objections raised by the opponent while commenting on Jaimini’s sūtras, he says that there is an unbroken tradition of the text among the students of the Veda. That there is no such presumption of an author of Veda is justifiable. People might call a text by the name of one who is not the author at all. Katha and other persons have done superior expounding of the text and there are people who the text after the names of such exceptional expounders. We remember that Vaiśampāyana was a student of all the Vedic texts, Kātha taught only one particular recension. Among many students of several recensions, if any one concentrates upon a single recension, he becomes an expert in that recension. And it is natural that he should be connected with that recension.

Moreover, Śabara replies to the objection of the opponent that the term Pravāhaṇi cannot mean ‘the son of Pravahaṇa. The prefix ‘pra’ is well-known as signifying excellence and the root ‘Vvah’ as signifying the act of carrying. As regards the ‘i’ (in the term Pravāhaṇi) it is known as signifying progeny as well as ‘agent of an action’ - so that the term Pravāhaṇi signifies one who carries things in an excellent manner (and it cannot mean the son of Pravahaṇa) the term ‘Babara’, it is only a word initative of sound. Thus the two words, Pravāhaṇi and Babara express the everlasting thing only.

In the context of relation between the word and its denotation, Śabara argues
that the said relation could never have been created by a human being, because no such person can be cognised by means of sense-perception and the other means of cognition are also preceded by sense-perception. 9.

Further, he asserts that if the creator had existed long ago, it would not be impossible to remember him. In the case of the Himalaya mountain and the like, it would be impossible to forget the creator. However, in the case of a builder of a wall, a garden and the like are forgotten due to disappearance of the builder or the extinction of his country or of his family. In the case of words and their meanings, there is no total disappearance persons making use of them.

If there were a person who created the relation and started its use, he would surely be remembered at the time of using the word. A certain usage becomes possible only when there is an agreement between the creator and the adopter of the usage. For instance, Pāṇini is the creator of the relation between the technical name Vṛddhi and the letters āt-ālch. A person not accepting the work of Pāṇini as authoritative, could never apprehend the word Vṛddhi. Consequently one who would be making use of the Veda would surely remember the creator of the relation of words and their usage.

Therefore we conclude that no person created the relations and then composed the Vedas for the purpose of making use of them.

Even if there is a possibility of the creator being forgotten, we would not admit a creator of the relation, unless there were proofs for it. Even though it is possible for an existing thing to be not perceived, merely on the ground of that possibility we do not admit the existence of the Haru's Horn, because there is no proof of it 10.

Kumarila asserts while commenting on the Bhāṣya that the study of the Veda is always preceded by its study by one's teacher, because it is mentioned by the
expression 'Vedic study', like the Vedic study of the present day 11.

This argument would apply to Mahābhārata also; but it is countermanded by the distinct declaration of an author for it (in the person Vyāsa). As for the mention of the names in the Veda, these must be explained as arthavada (explanatory passage) 12.

Students of the Veda do not have any idea of its author and they cannot be taken as pointing to an author; hence any idea of an author of the Veda cannot be mistaken 13.

So long as explanatory passages continue to exist in the Veda, there can be no assumption of any other grounds (for declaring the fact that the Veda has an author); as we find that even the people of the present day derive their notions of an author of the Veda from these (explanatory passages) 14.

It is the main argument of Mīmāṁsakas that the Veda is not a work a personal author and that being thus, they are free from any defects that are likely to be caused due to the authorship. The Veda must be regarded as the only source of knowledge (relating to Dharma), which is infallible in its self-sufficient validity.

Refutation by Cārvāka System: The system of the Cārvākas disregards the authority of the Veda. It maintains that the Veda cannot be a means of authoritative knowledge; the Veda is tainted by three faults, i.e., untruth, self-contradiction and repetition. Again, there are some Vedic scholars whose arguments regarding the authority of Vedic texts cancel each other. Again, they speak of the results that can never be achieved. In the Veda, there occur proper names which indicate that the Vedas were composed by human beings. Moreover, there are certain foolish statements resembling the savings of a madman 15.
'Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's staff and smearing oneself with ashes' - these are the means of livelihood for those who have neither intellect nor manliness - Thus said Brhaspati 16.

According to this system, the Veda is not only human composition but even worse than that. The buffoon, the knave and the demon are the three authors of the Veda. The mention of such as, 'jarbharī, turpharī' and so on is regarded to be the sayings of the learned ones 17. All the obscene rites commanded for the queen in the Horse-sacrifice have been invented by knaves and eating flesh has been commanded by night prowling demons 18.

Thus Carvakas maintain that the exercise of religion and the practices of asceticism are merely a means of livelihood for men devoid of intellect and manliness. Since the so-called sacred books - the three Vedas - have been composed by rogues; they can command no authority.

Refutation by Jayarāsi - The Tattvopaplavasimha is a treatise by Jayarāsi unique by itself. It is the only Sanskrit text of Carvakas which has come down to us in which a full-fledged scepticism is propounded. Here, in the TPS. the author Jayarāsi adopts a critical method. He is of the opinion that there are no valid means of knowledge and in order to prove his thesis, he examines theories as regards the valid instruments of knowledge. While criticizing the doctrines of Mīmāṃsakas some quotations had been traced by the author from the original viz., Mīmāṃsā Sūtras of Jaimini 19 and the Bhāṣya of Śābara 20 refute vedāpaurusēyatva non - human origin of the Veda, the main doctrine of the Mīmāṃsā, he puts forth the Pūrwapakṣa with citations from treatises of Kumārila and similar references from Śābara Bhāṣya 21. However, it is interesting to note that one of the verses cited by him is not found in the published editions of the Ślokavārttika but occurs in the Tattvasaṅgraha of
Śāntarakṣīta 22.

The pūrvapakṣa as presented by Jayarāśi is as follows - Some foolish say that the Veda is not being produced by human beings. Their speeches are not to be accepted, because of their invalidity due to passion etc. Brahman is not the author of the Veda. It is said that the Veda, like ether (ākāśa) is eternal, because its creator is not remembered. Therefore the faults related to Brahman did not appear 23.

He cites a verse from TS to support his pūrvapakṣa. The verse says that in the case of words uttered by human beings, there is always a room for doubt, whether there are defects or not. In the case of the Veda, however, since they have no author, there can absolutely be no suspicion for us regarding the possibility of defects 24.

Again, he cites a verse from SV which says that the conception produced by the Veda is authentic because it is brought about by faultless means - like the conceptions either by correct premise or by the assertion of a trustworthy person or by sense-perception 25.

The cognition produced by the Vedic injunction is not doubtful as it is not produced with a shape unlike other objects. It is not confused, because unlike other objects it is not obstructed in other places and so on. The cognition which is obstructed in other places, like perceiving of shining mote and knowledge of gold in red cloth, is not reliable knowledge. Therefore the cognition produced by Vedic injunction is valid 26.

According to him, the reason viz, unremembrance of the author, which proofs the eternality of the Veda is useless because in the case of such things as the builder of a wall, or of a garden and so on becomes forgotten and those are said to be uneternal. There is unremembrance due to disruption from country and time.
It seems that a person, desiring a particular thing, (i.e. proper reason) reaches the ground of faults (nigrahasthāna) 27.

It is not possible to check the reason (hetu) with employing artificiary specialization (kṛtakātvaviśeṣṇa) from vipakṣa (contrary instance), on which negation of the thing is to be ascertained. The reason (hetu) viz. unremembrance of the author is not proved since the followers of Kaṇāda (i.e. Naiyāyikas) remember the creator of the Veda and, moreover, ordinary people say that the Vedas were created by Brahman 28.

Further, he raises a question: The reason, unremembrance of author of the Veda is dispersed from the remembrance of all people or some people; if it is of all people, then it is difficult to understand by the followers Brahman. Whether they understand, then they only become omniscient and they are not to be considered as the followers of Brahman. Whether the author is not remembered by some people, then the reason becomes an inconclusive (anaikāntika), because they donot remember the author even he is alive. And again, if you say, the author of the Veda is not remembered by some people, then there is a presumption, such as, that the author of the Veda is remembered as it is created by someone else 29.

There is no invalidity for the Veda, although it is produced by a person. Invalidity occurs, however, due to the faults produced by persons. Therefore the faults produced by persons to be removed and not the activities of persons. If you say that the faults belong to persons, then it is equal to the faults produced by senses, too 30.

The aapaureyatva (non-human origin) of the Veda is not proved by the reason (hetu) of unremembrance of the author, because unremembrance of the author can be gained from the speeches of the scholars. For instance, while suspecting the (author
of the) Veda, a scholar denies the Ātman such as 'I am not Vidhātā (Brahman) of the Vedas' 31.

If you say that there exists the validity for the Veda, due to the absence of the faults of a person (i.e. creator), then why do you not think that the Veda is invalid, due to the absence of the merits of a person (i.e. creator), if you think that the validity can be established on the basis of the intrinsic qualities and not the merits and demerits of the creator, then why do you not think of the invalidity due to the intrinsic faults of the same? Since it is possible to have a connection with the faults such as passion and so on, inspite of being of non-human origin, the same is possible in the case of the Veda 32.

Again, by employing the status of non-human origin, the fault i.e. authorship has been removed, but how can the faults of hearer be removed? Such as - while cognising the meaning (object), he will cognise the meaning not properly. Therefore, there may be contradictory reason due to the defects of instruments of the activities even though they have the status of non-human origin 33.

Moreover, with the word sublation, a cognition of an opposite object is designated. However, if the sublation is not produced, there arises a doubt : Is it because the cognition which arises from Vedic injunction is true or is it because of the deficiency of the cause, which may have produced the sublation?34

Apart from this, there are certain false cognitions which arise before the sublating cognition. Sublating cognition arises in course of different times; For instance, in some cases after a half month in some cases after a month, in some cases after two or three years. However, in other cases due to defects of the cause it will not arise at all. And the cognition which arises from the Vedic injunction is not valid just due to this reason 35.
Moreover, as regards the fact of being devoid of sublation, a question arises: Is it with regard to all people or is it with regard to some people? If it is with regard to all people, then it cannot be known, because the mental activities of all other people can hardly be followed. If you belong to second alternative i.e. the fact of being devoid of sublation with regard to some people, then the reason becomes inconclusive. For example, a person in whose case a cognition of real water arises in the place of unreal water, moves from one place to another and there he meets with death. There is no sublating cognition arising for him. Is this sublating cognition valid by that reason?

Or the cognition which produced by the Vedic injunction is false because of its being devoid of an object, since the object has the nature of duty cannot exist at the same time when the cognition through the Vedic injunction was produced or if it exists at the same time, the Vedic injunction will prove to be incompetent and sacrificial actions will be annulled. If the object which has the nature of duty does not exist, then how is it that the cognition derived from the Vedic injunction is not false? Otherwise, the cognition derived from the hair-net would not be false. If the cognition derived from the hair-net is false, then, in the same way the cognition derived from the Vedic injunction is also false.

Now one may argue: 'the object of cognition derived from the Vedic injunction does exist, therefore it is true. But the object of the cognition of the hair-net never exists', then the answer is; this is just like a maxim of the ascetic who proves the absolute truth but he himself consumes poison. The object of Vedic injunction at later time does not assist the cognition because at that time, the cognition is destroyed and at the time of cognition the object does not exist. Or it is the sublation which asserts the object that does not exist. For instance, it is found that the effect
(kārya) like cloth etc. is being produced by the activities of threads and shuttle of loom etc. and afterwards there is an advice to the producer that 'Do thou employ the threads etc'. By this, the relation of sādhya (probandum) and sādhana (probens) cannot be known and there is no apūrva (resulting agency) from which the advice becomes competent. Thus, like the above mentioned maxim, there is no validity for words by their stateness.

Refutation by Bhāvaviveka - Bhāvaviveka repudiates Mīmāṃsā concepts in the chapter Mīmāṃsāśāstravivarāihāvatāra (MTN) of his treatise Madhyamakahrdayakarika (MHK). As far as the Veda is concerned, he rejects the Mīmāṃsā principle that the Veda is not a work of human being. He wants to examine the argument of the Mīmāṃsakas by avoiding the poison of partiality.

He objects that whatever comes down to us without interruption can also be called Āgama then what is the truths as regards the authenticity of Āgama?

He gives an example of a goldsmith to prove the validity of speech of a human being. Although a goldsmith is a human being, people generally believe in his testimony as regards the purity of gold. Therefore the reason given for invalidity of human speech cannot be accepted.

What is said in the Mīmāṃsā to establish the validity of the Veda on the basis of argument that it has not been produced by any human agency, is not valid; because the reason far the argument is unique (asādhāraṇa) and it does not serve the purpose (asiddārtha).

Further he goes on to argue that since the Veda has come down to us by an oral transmission (anuvāda), it is regarded to be a non-human product, then for the same reason, the Buddhist doctrine can also be regarded as not produced by human being; because the truth realised by the former Buddha is transmitted by the
later Buddha \(^{42}\). Therefore the fallacy of inconclusiveness (asiddhatā) may occur by following reasons \(^{42}\).

1) Kṛtakaṭvānumāna - by the inference of production of human beings.

2) Pakṣabādhānumāna - by the inference of prohibition of minor premise.

3) Karturasmaraṇāsiddha - unremembering of any author.

If you think that the Veda existed before the producer of the mantras who was born along with the mantras, your treatise (i.e. Mīmāṃṣā) not produced by a human being. The treatise does have a composer. It is produced with the author like the work produced by one recollecting one’s former birth \(^{44}\).

Why cannot the statements of the Veda be accepted as the creation of a person? because they are in accordance with the knowledge or the expositions in terms of letters. And also the statements at the Veda are to be accepted as creation of a persons; because like a gesture (iṅgita) the Vedas also produced from the intellect possessing the intended meaning \(^{45}\).

It may be inferred that the Veda has been composed by wicked people, since it teaches killing of living beings, drinking of liquor and speaking lie, like the science of Magas (i.e. Pārasīka) \(^{46}\).

If you say that the killing of animals in the sacrifice is proper because it is accomplished by the mantras then it will be like giving poison as a gift which is also accomplished by mantras and a gift is recommended in the śāstra (then it will be) like, giving poison as a gift (which is also accomplished and a gift is recommended in the śāstra) and therefore, it is not desirable and conducive to harmful results \(^{47}\).

An argument made by you that the relation with woman (wife) according to scripture leaves to deliverance is inconclusive, because the intercourse with forbid-
den woman under the influence of hypnotising mantras, magic, powders etc. is also in accordance with the scriptures. And another argument that by consuming Soma one becomes immortal is also inconclusive because it is also applicable to drinking any liquor. 

The chanting of some of the mantras aims at cutting one's life, for that reason the use of such mantras is desired (by some people). However, it yields undesired fruit like the use of poison or weapons.

If the Veda is said to be resulting into the final deliverance as per the injunctions of one's own religions canons, then it is a common cause for the authoritative character of the other non-Vedic treatises too.

Refutation by Dharmakīrti - It seems that the objections raised by Kumārila against the Buddhists, specially against Diśnāga, were over ruled by Dharmakīrti in his magnum opus Pramāṇavārttika and also in his other philosophical treatises.

As far as the āpauruṣeyatva (non-human origin) of the Veda is concerned, he asks if faults of the sentences belong to the utterances of human beings and if the Veda alone valid, then why cannot the Veda considered as invalid, since the reasons for truthfulness of sentences and merits pertain to human beings.

Further, he argues: the reason for conveying the meaning is a convention (saṅketa) of human beings and therefore there is a possibility of untruthfulness for the sentences of āpauruṣeya (non-human origin).

If there is a rule, like, one meaning for one sentence (ekārthaniyama), then, there is no chance for another meaning. However, there may be a counterpart of opposition for sentence, since it conveys many meanings.

The status of non-human origin of the Veda is useless, like the bath of a
elephant. Elephant removes the mud from the body through the bath and again takes the bath from the same (mud) water. Similarly, having the relation of human-beings, the Veda stands in need of convention which belongs to human beings. It, being the status of non-human origin of the Veda is desired due to unremembrance of authors, however, it is found that there are many speakers (anuvaktvr) and, alas, darkness still pervades.

There is also a person who can be able to speak or write a treatise, which can be composed by others without any tradition.

There are many reasons, they are vitiated and cannot prove the beginninglessness (anāditā) as well as the non-human origin of the Veda. If the apauruṣeyatva (non-human origin) is attributed to Veda, then that can be applied to the usage of Mlecchas as well as the sentences of heterodox systems, because in their cases too, the continuity of the previous impressions is devoid of beginning. Then, even though the non-human origin of that kind is established, what merit does it have?

The whole order of alphabets is created by men. This can be understood with the help of a maxim of the fuel (being the cause of) fire. When one sees the fire and understands that it is produced by the fuel (i.e. wood), one can apply the same logic with regard to any fire, similarly, when one understands that a particular order of alphabets is created by a human being, one can apply the same logic to any order or alphabets - Vedic and non-Vedic as well. One may argue that the Vedic mantras used for removing poison etc. produce the results beyond imagination due to their being of non-human origin. In this case, it should be understood that the knowledge and the efficacy (prabhāva) of the persons creating the order of mantras is absent in others. Hence their uniqueness is established.
There are some knowers of technique, who produce mantras. It is the provers of their lord (achieved) by following the procedure to by him. Therefore a person desirous of result should call the mantras as artificial and created by human beings.

Words themselves do not say that this is the meaning and this is not. Then the meaning should be comprehended by people. But they are subjected to passions and so on. Then who has made the difference that one is the knower of truth and not the other? In the similar way, it should be thought that there might be a scholar and his sentences should be non-contradictory (avisāṁvādi) as well as meaningful (arthavat).

And, there is no possibility of cognitions in imperceptual objects and that is the only means of cognition which is non-contradictory. It can be concluded that, the knowledge (non-contradictory) is known as āgama (scriptural sayings) and the status of non-human origin becomes useless. If there may be a possibility of the knowledge of anāgama (non-scriptural sayings) in imperceptual objects, then it might be said that there must be a super-sensible person because a common man cannot cognise the meaning of the Veda due to his passions etc.

The Veda itself does not convey its meaning. Then what is the fate of the meaning of Veda? There is a Vedic injunction, viz. 'one who desires the heaven should perform the Agnihotra. What is the logic, if one says that it does not mean that one should consume the flesh of a dog?' If one says that the meaning is a well-known popular saying, then who is here who can see the meaning beyond the capacity of the sense-organs and who has explained the meaning of the words that possess several meanings? The word such as 'heavan' or 'Urvasî and so on is seen as having a non-conventional meaning.
Refutation of Śāntarakṣita - So far as the apauruṣeyatva (of non-human origin) of the Veda is concerned, he repudiates on several grounds, such as this is the product of false pride of the twice-born (dvijā) people. There is no truth in this, even by the slightest chance, like the maxim Ghuṇākṣara.

Even though there is no author, the Veda cannot be regarded as saying what is true, because absence of excellence in its source which makes it truthful, like, as in the absence of defects the word is regarded as true.

It is only in the works of persons that the question arises, as to whether the excellences are there or not. However, there is no need for such an enquiry in the case and there is no slightest idea of being any excellence of all.

The Veda is reduced to futility like, such sentences as six cakes. It might be argued that meanings of the Vedic sentences comprehended in respect of actions and active agents. Then the answer is that there may be such comprehension. Where there is explanation supplied by men, such as the deeds of Īrvaṇi.

Truthfulness does not become proved even there be no defects, because, another alternative must be accepted that is meaninglessness.

It might be said that the Veda stands in need of explanations. and these explanations appear in succession, the cognitions brought about by the Veda are held to be successive. However it cannot be so.

If the Veda was previously inefficient and is made efficient now by the explanations, then it becomes a source of knowledge through the help of personalities and therefore it is the work of a person.

The Veda, provides no knowledge to us until it is explained by persons who act as lamps. Consequently there is no reason for argument which is not the work
of a person, because, the knowledge proceeds from the explanations provided by persons. Thus the character even though it may be present in the non-human origin. Veda is of no use, because the only result produced by the Veda, i.e. knowledge is dependent upon persons 70.

Persons, being the agents, proceeding to explain the Veda, according to their whims could never be checked by any one. Consequently, with such defects as delusions, vanity etc. (Mohamanādi) they might provide wrong explanations of the Veda. Hence there is a room for such suspicion 71.

The Veda, by itself without any support cannot make known its meaning, infact it stands in need of explanations by persons. Such explanations are like the stick held by the blindman 72.

When pulled up by the explanations, the Veda might fall into a wrongpath, and then it would not be right to regard the Veda as the eye common to all, like the light 73.

Further, he continues his refutation on the same ground as follows - even though by itself, the Veda may be able to bring about cognitions, yet its validity cannot be clear because it is dependent on personalities 74.

The validity of a means of cognition is accepted on the ground of its bringing about cognitions in accordance with the real state of things. If the Veda depends upon explanations of men, the assumption of its validity cannot be right. The validity and reliability of the Veda may be due to eternal connection expressive of true things. Hence, all human beings by themselves are incapable of seeing things, because it is beyond the senses. The Veda certainly doesnot say 'such and such is my connection with the meaning' as regards the 'connection of the meaning' that would be fixed by men and it wouldnot differ from being the work of person 75.
Again, he goes on refuting the Veda on the ground of tradition: While the Veda not having been proved to be valid, any beginningless line of pupils and teachers, even though assumed, cannot make it faultless, because not a single person among them is held to be capable of perceiving supersensuous things. Therefore, even though assumed, the traditional line of pupils and teachers can be only a line of blind persons. When a blindman is led by another blindman, he is not sure to get the right path. Hence the assumption of the beginninglessness of the line of the pupil and teachers is entirely futile.

And again, refutation continues on the grounds like uncertainty, faith etc. If it is said that the cognition arises in regard to heaven and such things from the Vedic sentences like, Agnihotra etc. are found to be free from doubt and uncertainty. But it is not so. Because uncertainty does arise just in the same way as in another contrary assertion. Intelligent people do not perceive any difference between the two cases; in the sense, in regard to things beyond the senses there can be no certainty regarding their existence or non-existence. If it might be urged that 'this certainty does arise from Vedic sentence', then the answer is that there cannot be certainty regarding the contrary from another sentence.

The Vedic scholars derive their unshakable notions through their minds influenced by faith and this is equally present in other people's mind in respect of other assertions. For instance, similar unshakable notions are derived also by the Buddhists regarding trouble and suffering from sacrifices which involve the killing of animals, of this notion, we do not find any sublation till now. If it be said that there may be a sublation of it at some future time and place, the same is equally possible of the Vedic sentences also.

The author continues to refute the apauruseyatva (non-human origin) of the
Veda. If it is said that the Veda, not being the work of an author, has an inhering capacity of asserting true things, in the same manner it might be suspected that by itself it brings about the cognition of what is not true.

Further, he goes on posing a challenge to the opposition: If you are really eager to regard the Veda as valid and reliable, then try and prove that it is the work of a person free from defects and so forth. If it is composed by a faultless author, and is expounded by faultless expounders, it certainly be the means of cognition of truth.

As a matter of fact, the Veda cannot be regarded as a source of right cognition, because it is not a work of man and it has been found that such thing as forest fire and like (which are not the work of man) are the source of false cognitions.

From all this it follows that the reasons in support of (1) the Veda not being the work of a person, (2) its being a manifestation (3) its being eternal and (4) the eternal connection between the word and its meaning - have all been set forth uselessly.

Even though not cognisable by the five means of cognitions, the author of the Veda is not amenable to 'non-apprehension' (abhāva) alone. He is just like the author of story-books, whose author is not known. If the author of the story-books is inferred from the fact of their being expressive of clear meanings, then why cannot the author of the Veda be the same? Through the perception that the readers of the Veda are recognised as the 'makers' (Kartāraḥ) it cannot be right to regard them as 'manifesters' (vyañjakāḥ), because the manifestation of eternal things is impossible.

The Vedas being perceptible in their character, there is appearance of them,
when there is operation of the manifesteer. If they existed evey before the operation then they should be perceptible at time also.

The Veda is recognised as capable of being treated as the effect produced by the manifesteer because it appears only when this is present like the sprout (anukura) in the form of seeds.

And also, because they appear in the sequential form in which they become manifested, like dramas and stories. The Vedas must be a work of an author and thus the author is cognised by means of inference also. Otherwise (if the Veda is not the work of a person) as the Veda would be eternal and all-pervading, there could be no sequential order in it; in the sense, there can be no sequence in what is eternal, as there can be no manifestation of it.

It is to be noted that the Veda is the work of a human, as it speaks about wrongful sexual acts, killing of animals and telling of lies. The characters of like difficult to pronounce, the agreeableness of sounds, difficulty of comprehension, disagreeableness to ear etc., of the Veda are found in the words of heterodox systems too. As regards such properties as capacity to cure poison etc. are found to be true and also found in the incantations of Vainateya and such persons.

If it be urged that at all the times persons are found telling lies, just as there is no confidence in regard to things present and also there is none regarding description of past events. By this reason of your own, there can be no person recognised as the author of any work at all, even though he may be declaring it to be his own work, then, abandon all hope in the truthfulness of the word which does not proceed from a personality. Some words have meanings contrary to what has been said in the Veda.

And again, in this way what could be proved would be only beinglessness,
not freedom from personal authorship. Under this, if the Veda is regarded as not the work of any person, then the same may be said in regard to the others also. The customs of the Pārasikas and others are based upon others and the doctrines of heterodox systems also may have its source in the ideas of other people. Even such freedom from authorship is proved, what is good would be, your attempt has been made only towards the establishing of truthfulness 87.

Regarding the time and person, the negative concomitance (vyatireka) is doubtful, because it has not been proved that man is incapable of doing the work. By saying this, the idea of manifestation is also rejected. Hence the speaker himself should be regarded as the author. Thus, then in arguments, the instance is devoid of the probandums (sādhyasūnya). Because it is depending upon the teaching of men and it has proved to be the product of effort. Therefore freedom from the speaker does not reside in the subject (dharma) nor in the instance (drṣṭānta) 88.

The eternality of the sentence has been rejected, the character of proceeding from the eternal sentence is recognised as non-existent in the subject and in the instance. Thus, the fact, the Vedic injunctions not being a work of person as well as reasons being uncentrain 89.

Thus, the Veda is something from which subject-matter is not known to men and it is like darkness for which only dull-witted people have an attachment, like the attachment of Pārasikas. Those Pārasikas also ignorant of its meaning and they have recourse to such sinful acts like killing of animals and the like 90.

Thus, it has not been proved that the Vedic injunctions are valid means of right knowledge of duty (dharma), because its meaning cannot be ascertained by any one; either by himself or with the help of others. Therefore, a person is needed whose inner darkness has been dispelled by the light of knowledge and who is
capable of teaching the clear meaning of the Veda.

Refutation of Prabhācandra - According to Prabhācandra in devoid of all means of cognition, *apauruṣeyatva* (non-human origin) of the Veda, cannot be proved. He takes to refute all means of cognitions one by one: Pratyakṣa (perception) cannot prove the *apauruṣeyatva* (non-human origin), because it is known for cognising only the wordness (*śabdamātragrahana*) and it does not perceive the things like human or non-human origin. Sense-organs contact those things which are present. There is no relation of sense-perception with *apauruṣeyatva* (non-human origin) because *apauruṣeyatva* is said only in the case of such things as have beginninglessness.

Further, it cannot be proved by inference, because it is borne by the reason either the author is not remembered or it is borne by the stateness (*vācakatva*) of the study of the Veda.

Here, the author raises many questions: What is this assumption? Is this an unremembrance of the author or is this a prohibition of the remembrance of the author? If there is an unremembrance of author, then this reason cannot prove the status of non-human origin of the Veda, its being in wrong location (*vyadhikaraṇa*), because the *apauruṣeyatva* (non-human origin) is found in ātman (soul) too. Again, it might be argued that the non-creatorship (*akartrkatva*) of the Veda can be proved, because there is another example to be cited. The remembrance or the non-remembrance is possible, only in the case of a thing which has a creator, and not that which has no-creator, like Hare's horn as there is no remembrance of the author, then this reason becomes useless, just like donkey's horn (*kharaviśāṇa*)

Moreover, it might be said that it can be proved because of its unbroken tradition and the author is not remembered then the reason becomes variable (*anaikāntika*) because there are found many sentences which have an unbroken
tradition and their author is also not remembered, such as Vaṭe vaṭe Vaiśravaṇaḥ' (Vaiśravaṇa is in each and every tree). Hence, non-human origin cannot be applied for these types of sentences. In this manner, reason becomes unproved (asiddha).

And again, Paurāṇikas remember the authorship of the Brahma such as 'Vaktrebhyo vedās tasya vinissṛtāḥ' (Vedas came out from the mouths of Brahma), 'Pratimanvantaram caiva śṛtiranyā vidhīyate' (In every period of Manu, there is laid down a different śrutī). 'Yo Vedāṅśca prahiṇoti' (one who conveys the Vedas) etc. Smṛti, Purāṇa etc. and the various recensions (śākhāḥ) of the Veda like Kaṇva, Mādhyaṇḍina, Taittirīya etc. are known after the name of sages. If it might be argued that they have been seen by the sages or they came to be known by the sages, then a question arises as how they were put aside even there is an unbroken tradition?

In the Veda, there are a number of contradictory statements about the remembrance of the author. Some people say that the Hiraṇyagarbha (Brahman) is the author, and others remember the author of Aṣṭakā Smṛti etc. This type of contradictory statements, however, also can be seen in the authorship of Kaṇḍambārī etc. Buddhists and others also remember the author of the Veda but the Mīmāṃsakas do not. Therefore authorship as well as the unrememberence of the author could be considered to be invalid. So the reason is unproved (asiddha).

If there is an author; he should have remembered while in the practice of religious acts, because people believe certainly unseeing fruits in those religious acts, and that believeness in unseeing fruits is due to the remembrance of an adviser, just like, people say - because of the advice of the father etc., we perform the acts. In the same manner, there may be a remembrance of the author of the Veda, while performing the acts laid down by the Vedic scriptures. Grammarians remember the
author of the Grammar i.e. Pāṇini. Hence the inference that the Veda is *apauruṣeya* (non-human origin) because of unremembrance of its author even being able to remember' is invalid 97.

And again, an argument that the *apauruṣeyatva* (non-human origin) of the Veda might be achieved independently then there may be doubt, such as the Veda is *apauruṣeya* (non-human origin). It is because of the unremembrance of its author or because it is identical with words and sentences. Hence the reason becomes invalid due to aforesaid doubt. If it may be argued again, such as, the unremembrance of the author might be accidental (Prasaṅga), then the remembrance of its author is also same. By this, what is said that 'the study of the Veda is always preceded by its study by one's teacher, because it is mentioned by the expression 'Vedic study' like the Vedic study of the present day' is also rejected 98.

It has been said that 'the chance of discrepancies in the words, depend upon the speaker and in certain places the devoid of discrepancies is due to its faultless speaker, because those removed by his good qualities, cannot possibly attach to his word and again in the absence of speaker there could be no discrepancies as those would have no substratum' is not good, because, there may be a question like: Can the *apauruṣeyatva* (non-human origin) of the Veda, be achieved by any other means of cognition? i.e. by the stateness of the study of the Veda or by itself only? If it belongs to the first option, then the reason that the stateness of the study of the Veda becomes useless, otherwise that can be cognised by the inference through that reason only. Therefore, the reason as being no character (nirviśeṣaṇa) is not proper 99.

If the reason is identical with character, then the characterised thing, i.e. *apauruṣeyatva* (non-human origin) may be useless, because the character becomes
only the indicative (gamaka) and not the characterised thing. In the same way, 
abhāva (non-apprehension), arthāpatti (presumption) and anumāna (inference) are 
not the proofs for the character, viz. unremembrance of the author (kartrasmaraṇa)

It has been said by Kumārila that an object where the five means of cognition 
do not function towards the comprehension of the existence of that object we have 
non-apprehension as the sole means of cognition. The ascertainment of the non-
existence of an object depends upon the validity of this as a means of cognition. 
There is no dispurse, however, that has been found in the case of five means of 
cognitions, because there is an existence of inference which proves human-origin of 
the Veda. By saying this, not only the inference but the presumption is also rejected 
which is also a proof and decisive factor of the unremembrance of the author as 
accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas to achieve the apauruṣeyatva (non-human origin) of 
the Veda. By arguing this, 'The time viz. past and future consists of their being an 
absence of the author of the Veda, because 'time', just like the present' is also 
refuted, since it is an inference 101.

Āgama (authoritative sayings) cannot be a proof to achieve apauruṣeyatva 
(being the status of non - human origin) because there is a chance of itaretarāśraya 
(mutual dependence) such as - validity of the Veda can be achieved only if there 
is apauruṣeyatva (non-human origin) and that can be achieved when the āgama 
(authoritative saying) is considered to be valid. There is no such sentences found in 
the Veda, which ascertain apauruṣeyatva (non-human origin) and validity is not said 
for other sentences apart from the Vedic injunctions by the Mīmāṃsakas, otherwise, 
pauruṣeyatva (human-origin) may occur for those sentences, like 'Hiranyagarbhas 
samavartatāgre' (Hiranyagarbhas, i.e. Brahman stood as first) 102.
This *apauruṣeṣyatva* (non-human origin) cannot be achieved by analogy through similarity, since there is an absence of a word or a sentence of well-known means of cognitions in relation to *apauruṣeya* (non-human origin). Again, it cannot be achieved by presumption, because of the absence of object of otherwise inapplicable which is against of *apauruṣeṣyatva* (non-human origin) 103.

Further, if the *apauruṣeṣyatva* (non-human origin) of the Veda can be said in the form of 'Prasajyapratिशेदha (it is laid-down by the use of negetive particle (नजू) connected with a verbal activity) then question arises: Is it cognised by the cognitions which function towards the comprehesion of the existence of the object or is it cognised by the cognition *abhāva* (non-apprehension). However, there is a prohibition of five means of cognitions which function towards the comprehesion of the non-existence of the object for the achievement of *apauruṣeṣyatva* (non-human origin) of the Veda and non-apprehension is not capable of cognise the absence of human authorship, because of its non-existence, it cannot be argued in the form of paryudāsa (it is laid down by the use of negetive particle (नजू) compounded with a noun) it also leads to a number of questions 104.

Let the Veda become *apauruṣeya* (non-human origin), then, it leads to many alternatives; Is it explained or not? if it is explained, then by whom? by itself only? However, it is not possible, because the Veda itself did not say, 'this is the meaning or this is not the meaning of my words and sentences' any whereelse and also there may not be a split in explanations too. Whether it is explained by the persons, there may be many faults, because people explain the Veda according to their own whims etc. and in different ways. If the explainer is super-sensuous then there may be contradiction in the Dharma (duty) and also there may not be such assumption, like, Vedic injunction is the only valid means of cognition in the Dharma (duty) 105.
Refutation by Ratnaprahhasūri - Ratnaprahhasūri, the author of Ratnākarāvatārikā refutes Vedāpauruṣeyatva (being the status of non-human origin of the Veda) more elaborately. He criticises the doctrine of Mīmāṃsakas by quoting some verses from Ślokavārttika of Kumārila under the title of Śrōtriya school. According to him, Vedas are not apauruṣeya (non-human origin). If by the Vedas, only some Letter-sounds are meant then the Vedas cannot be apauruṣeya (non-human origin), because letter-sounds are only peculiar modifications of matter. On the other hand, if it be considered to be a body of unchanged scriptural sayings then the question arises as to how you call it the apauruṣeyatva (non-human origin)? Perception cannot prove the apauruṣeyatva (non-human origin) of the Vedas as it deals with the present. It is said in S.V. that Eye etc. perceive only what are connected with them and are existent at the present time 106.

It is contended that pratyabhijñā (recognition) shows that the Vedas which one studied in his young age remain self-same even in his old age. Thus is may be a proof. The Jaina thinker argues that this is proved only by such atheistic sayings like, 'the body which is only a collection of material substances'. If it be urged that the Vedas are to be distinguished from the heterodox sayings in as much as the latter do not exist after they are uttered and that the Vedas, after they are uttered do still exist, although not in an explicit form, then the answer is that even the heterodox doctrines continue to exist in an implicit way when they are no longer studied 107.

Pratyabhijñā (recognition) revives only what has been perceived. It revives the facts of only some past incarnations. Then, how is it possible for recognition to establish that the Vedas were composed during the beginningless time? There is no ability to perception 108.
Inference also does not prove the apauruṣeyatva (non-human origin) of the Vedas. It would be opposed by the following inference, like, 'The Vedas were composed by some men, because they are embodied in letter-sounds (vārṇātmaka), like the Kumārasaṃbhava and other books'. The Jaina contention is that there can be no book unless it is composed by a man who conceives its plan and arranges words in accordance with it. There are no sounds which have consistent meanings and which are expressed in letters, from anything, like, a conch-shell or a sea or a cloud which is other than a man. 109

Inference about the apauruṣeyatva (non-human origin) of the Vedas would be opposed by the following āgama (scriptural saying) 'There was Prajāpati only; the day was not; the night was not; he contemplated; thence arose enlightenment (tapana) from the enlightenment, the four Vedas originated. It may be urged that this scriptural saying is not authoritative as well as it does not state or laydown any duty. The Jainas contend that such scriptural sayings as 'There was Prajāpati only' etc. do point to the fact of the Vedas having their authors and are authoritative to the Śrotriya, not withstanding the fact that those sayings do not embody any command about duty. Hence there is also contradiction to āgama (scriptural saying). 110

The next argument of the Jaina thinker shows that how the said inference of Mīmāṃsakas is vitiated by fallacies in its reasons (sādhana or hetu).

The reason, 'unremembrance of any author of the Vedas' about the apauruṣeyatva (non-human origin) is invalid. He asks a question: Is this reason unqualified (avīśeṣaṇa) or qualified (saviśeṣaṇa). If it be 'unqualified' then it is vitiated by the example of an ancient well, mansion, pleasure-garden etc. the author or the builder of a thing is unknown. In the case of an ancient well, an ancient house, or an ancient garden, people may not know who built it in ancient times, the name of
its creator may have been forgotten long back, but nobody would be prepared to say that the well or the house or the garden is *apauruṣeya* (non-human origin). On the other hand, if the reason is qualified, then, that would be unproved-with-respect-to-location' (*vyadhi karapāṇāsiddha*). The author criticizes the argument, 'The Vedas are *apauruṣeya* (non-human origin) because there being an unbroken tradition (Sampradāya) their authors are not remembered,' as the reason, 'unremembrance of the authors of the Vedas' does not inhere in the said unbroken tradition, but in something else, i.e. in man \[^{111}\].

And again, if it be urged, like, 'The Vedas are *apauruṣeya* (non-human origin) because their authors are not remembered, although there is an unbroken tradition of the Vedas, like the sky', then Jainas suspects like the qualifying element (*viśeṣaṇa*) viz., the unbroken tradition is doubtful. A house which has admittedly a beginning can claim no absolutely unbroken line of its processors, it is doubtful if the Vedas which are claimed to be beginningless can have an unbroken line. This qualified element (*viśeṣaṇa*) being 'proved doubtful' \[^{112}\](*sandīgdhaḥ-siddha*).

Further, he points out that the reason 'unremembrance of the author' shown by Śrōtriyas is invalid, because it is 'unproved-to-both-sides' (*ubhaya-siddha*), as it can be shown neither by the Śrotriyas nor by their opponents, i.e. Jainas. We follow the passages which point to the fact of their having been made, such as 'One who makes the Vedas', 'Prajāpati made the king Soma and from him the three Vedas were made'. Apart from these, we find that various parts of the Vedas are attached to the names of some sages, e.g. Kārṇa, Mādhyanā, Tittiri etc. and these were the authors of those parts of the Vedas just as Manu (author of law-book) and so on. If it is urged that those parts of the Vedas were first revealed to or republished by them at the beginning of the present age, then, Jainas set aside this doctrine by
saying that time is beginningless, so that if the parts of the Vedas were remembered at the beginning of each Kalpa to a particular sage whose name is borne by that part, then each such part would have borne the names of an infinite number of such sages, to whom it was revealed in the infinite number of past Kalpas 113.

On the other hand, the Jaina's have their own theory about it, viz., there was a devil, Kālāsura by name, who composed the Vedas.

And again, if it be said that there would be difficulty if the authorship of the Vedas be ascribed to a particular person, then the reply is, that particular person may not be held to be their author and it does not prove that the Vedas had not their authors at all 114.

Further, he refutes the two reasons shown by Kumārila 'All study of the Vedas is preceded by its previous study by the teacher; because it is only the study of the Vedas that is talked of just like present day study. The times both past and future are devoid of any author of the Vedas because they are times, just like the present time". Such as, 'The mind of those who have their eyes like those of the deer, is brittle like the horn of the deer', the study of this passage that is talked of just like any present day study as well as above said another reason were competent then the passage under consideration might as well be held to be a self-existent one from the beginningless time 115.

After the criticism of perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) now he takes arthāpatti (presumption) Śrōtṛiyas argue that it is because the doctrine of apauruṣeyatva (non-human origin) of the Vedas is found to be consistent with the facts and not inconsistent with them. Word is tainted with the faults of its speaker. If the speaker is free from faults, his words may be faultless, but as the Vedas cannot be said to have been composed by a faultless speaker, speakers good or
bad, cannot be the authors of the Vedas. If the Vedas are faultless, its only consistent explanation (by arthāpatti) would be that they were *apauruṣeya* (non-human origin) 116.

Now he begins his criticism on the argument of Śrotriyas based on arthāpatti by questioning the cognitionhood of the Vedas. The Vedas are invalid, as the instructions and injunctions contained in them are vicious, owing to insistence on the killing of the animals. Words are valid, only if they emanate from a qualified person. It is well known that the utterances of a person, who is given to emotions of attachment etc. are false. If the argument is neither a good person, nor a bad person made the Vedas, then the Vedas would be no better than meaningless sounds. The words of our forefathers which are relied on as words of authoritative persons turnout to be true. In the same manner, if the Vedas are to be treated as authoritative, their instructions are actually found out to be true in matters which can be experienced. In some cases, they do not turn out to be true and these should not be rejected as false but it is to be supposed that the results are somehow prevented due to defects in their operative conditions. Thus the Vedas are to be looked upon as authoritative and made by highly qualified person, who is absolutely free from all faults. (He is Arhat). He composes the āgama (authoritative sayings) and explains it in humanly intelligible language. Therefore, the ordinary words as well as words of the Āgama (scriptural sayings) belong to humanly intelligible language 117.

Thus, neither perception nor inference nor presumption nor scriptural sayings prove the *apauruṣeya* (non-human origin) of the Vedas.

Lastly he points out that it is impossible to say that the Vedas as a systematised body (*ānupūrṇī*) of letter-sounds must be either an arrangement of different parts or of successively rising parts because of the order in which they become
explicit. This explicitness of letter-sounds is due to human efforts. Hence the systematised character of the Vedas, depends upon an order in which different parts become explicit. Thus status of the Vedas becomes a composition by human effort.
Foot Notes:-

1) वेदांतिके सन्निकट पुरुषाय्य; | JS, 1.1.27. Jha Eng. trans.

2) अनात्यदर्शनाघ | JS, 1.1.28. Ibid

3) पीछेरेखाशोधना इति ........... आत्मवाच्यमाणेप्रि चोदनायात् कर्ती स्वातु | MD, Anandashrama ed. p. 120.

4) जननमारणयत्वशक्ष | एवमननित्यता | Ibid, P. 121.

5) Tai, Sam. 7.1.20.

6) Tai, Sam, 7.2.20.

7) यदुकं कर्तुकः श्रद्धा ...... प्रकृष्ट्यादासाधारणमुपपधते विशेषणाम् MD, Anandashrama ed. pp. 122-23, Jha Eng. trans.


10) ननु चिरकृतत्वात् ........ नैतात्तवा विना प्रमाणेन श्रवणिणां प्रतिपादियामेव | Ibid, 63-66.

11) वेदायणयानं सर्व गुरुद्धिवयनपूर्वकम् ।

12) भारतेःपिर भवेदेंव कर्तुकृता तु बाध्यते ।

13) पारम्पर्यार्य कतरिं नाध्येतात्: स्मरिति हि ।

14) तेषु च स्मृयमाणेपु न मूलान्तरकल्पना ।

15) अनुत्त्यायतुनरुक्तदोषोपृष्ठितत्त्या .......
16) अनिहोत्रं त्रयो वैदिकत्रिधिः भर्गुणाशयः।
बुध्ममपरिप्रेक्षितं जीविकेति बृहस्तति: । | Ibid, p.s.

17) त्रयो वैद्यक कर्तारो भण्डपूर्तिनिशाचरा: ।
जर्मवीरुद्धीर्ष्यादि राख्यानां च:स्मृतम् । | Ibid. p.14

18) अश्वयां द्रह शिश्रं तु पल्लिग्राहं प्रकृतिरस्तम् ।
भण्डैतदुपूर्वे परं वै ग्राह्याणां प्रकृतिरस्तम् ।।
मांसानां ह्राणाः तदनन्निशाचरसमीरस्तम् । | Ibid,

19) सत्तमयोगो पुरुषर्योविनियमाः बुध्ममसं तत्त्वपत्त्वम् ।JS 1.1.4; TPS, Sanghavi and Parikh ed.
p. 58.

20) यत्न च दुःस्तं करणं यत्र च मिथ्यते प्रत्ययं: स एव असार्थीन: प्रत्ययः । | SB on JS, 1.1.5;
Ibid.

21) i) चोदनजनितायुक्तः प्रमाणं दोषावर्धितः ।
कारणजनितायांत्यात् विद्वन्तोत्तकशबुद्धिवत् । | SV, 2.184.

ii) नित्यो वेदः ।। कृष्णारमदिवदसरं भविष्यमहति ।
SB on JS, 1.1.5, MD, Anandashrama ed. p. 63.

iii) न च स्वर्गकारो यन्ते ।। मिथ्याप्रत्ययः ।
SB on JS, 1.1.2, MD, Anandashrama ed. p. 17.

22) दोषा: संति न सर्विति पौरुषेऽयुः युक्ते ।

वेदे कर्तृर्मावकु दोषात्स्केव नास्ति न: । | TS, 2895, TPS. p116.

23) अन्यं तु कुमारितमावुसारिणो वदनि .... तदायता दोषा व्यंग्यता भवन्ति । | Ibid.

24) See no. 22 above.
25) चोदनाजनिता बुद्धि ... इत्यदातोकालबुद्धिवत् । Ibid,

26) न च चोदनाजनिता ... तस्मादविविधम् । Ibid.

27) यत्तापुरुक्तम् ........... हेतुतरं नाम निग्रहस्यानन् । Ibid.

28) अथवा सत्कोषि विशेषणोपादाने ....... ब्राह्मण वेद: प्रणीता इति । Ibid, p. 117.

29) अपि च किमशेषजनस्मरणनिन्दति ....... विशेषग्रंथितेष्य शेषाच्युतायणव्यावहार्यत् । Ibid.

30) न च पुरुषान्यांत्वने ......... सर्वत्र प्रामाण्यानाथासः स्तातु । Ibid.

31) न च अस्तयमाणकृतकेतने ......... वेदाण्यं विधाता इति । Ibid. p. 118.

32) भवतु वा अपीरेतेवेदः ......... तथा वेदेष्पियः भविष्यति । Ibid.

33) तिच, अपीरेतेवेदः ......... याब्यान्यं प्रमाणार्थतः । Ibid.

34) तिचिच, बाधाशब्दने ......... इति सदिनहते । Ibid.


36) किं च बाधारहितत्वमि ........... किमेतावता ततप्रमाणं भवतु ? TPS, p. 119, Ibid. pp. 304-05

37) अथवा चोदनाजनितविज्ञानस्य ......... तदर्थापि तदेवशसु। TPS, p. 119, Ibid.

38) अथ चोदनाजनितविज्ञानार्थस्य ......... वाचकर्मेऽपि प्रमाणां न चुञ्छन्ते । TPS, p. 119.

39) सम्प्रदायानुपत्त्वेदादास्तंगमत्वं: ।

40) नूताकृ चेदा दोषदुष्टत्वादप्रमाणामिताष्ट्रे ।
    सौरिण्यकादि वाचकेऽहसुस्यादृ व्यभिचारान् ।। MTN 23., Ibid, p. 105.

41) प्रमाणमथ वेदस्य साधयेतुकर्त्तृपति: ।
    असाध्यानता हेतुपपयोस्यस्यार्थानापि च ।। MTN 24, Ibid.
42) अनुवादादरकवृत्ते बीडमण्यसत्यकर्तुकम्।
पूर्वकुञ्जिमसब्रजं यतो बुद्धरूपते।। MTN 25, Ibid.

43) कृतकस्याणुनामां पक्षाधारानुपानमातः।
कदुर्वसराणातिसिद्धेनः स्वदसिद्धता।। MTN 26, Ibid.

44) समन्नाश्यं सम्भूतमन्नादः पुरा यदि।
शास्त्रं व: समभिप्रेतं तत्कर्तुक्तमकर्तुकम्।। MTN 27.

45) प्रतिपत्तानुपयोगेऽं वर्णानायायादापि वा।
गृहिते वेदायायानं न किम पुरुषकर्त्ता।। MTN 29.

46) अनुमेय्ध्व वेदोऽयमसत्यवरूपनकर्तुकः।
भूतसिद्धानारायणमित्येकं मृगशास्त्रवलं।। MTN 31, Ibid.

47) विशेषपुतिविविधं यदिमन्नाश्यार्हति।
नामीशतिष्ठत्वकद शास्त्रोत्वपि दानवः।। MTN 32, Ibid.

48) मन्नारथ्यामृणौपराधीर्गम्यायामणं हि यत्।
तेनानेकानिकः पूर्वं मध्यपानेन चोतरः।। MTN 33, Ibid, p. 106.

49) आचुकेद्यदयोगमलादिष्टो मन्नारिग्रहः।
अनिष्ठकः कदुर्विश्वास्त्रक्योगवत्।। MTN 34, Ibid, p. 107.

50) व्यास्तः एव चेतुको सिद्धसांसारिकः।

51) गिरार्मिथ्यात्त्वेतुत्तत्ता दोषान्ं पुरुषाश्रयत्। PV, 3.225 ab.
गिराम सत्यत्वेवतृत्वानु गुणानां पुरुषाध्यायात्।
अपीलेपं मिथ्यार्थ संग नेत्यन्ये प्रचक्षते। || PV. 3.226.

52) अर्थाधान्सत्तुहै संबंधेत: पुरुषाध्य:।
गिरामप्रेमलोकलोकसत्यात्मस्रवय:। || PV. 3.227.

53) गिरामप्रभारिनिनेम न स्वादर्शितारे गति:।
अनेकाध्यात्मस्बस्कले विश्वासकालस्यः। || PV, 3.229.

54) असंस्कर्थयतयः पुरुषः सर्वथा स्वाच्छिन्नर्गता।
संकारोपमे मुखः गजलोकममिदं भवेत्। || PV, 3.231.

55) अपीलेपत्तापीत्ता कर्त्तृकृतस्यमूलते: किरु। PN. 3.240 cd.
सन्त्याच्छन्यनुक्तर इति चित्र व्याख्या तथा:। || PV, 3.241 ab.

56) वर्तुः सर्वथा: पुरुषात्मान्येवशेषत: कथन।
अन्यो व सर्वत्र ग्रांतः सम्ब्राजावः क्रोते परे।। PV, 3.242.

57) हेतुः प्रब्वत्त्वे सर्वं ते प्रभक्षिन्नद्र:।
सर्वथा स्वनिदित्वा सिद्धोदेवं नापुरुषाध्य:। || PV. 3.245.
तस्मादप्रेमलोकस्वाद्योपत्तिः।

58) कहैसंकर्तात् मित्रम् सहितं कार्यतेकृत।
सा चानुस्तूर्विविवानानु प्रस्थृत चर्चनकृत। || PV, 3.307.
सर्वोऽर्जन्रम्: पुष्पो दहनेचन्द्रयुक्तिस्वतः।
असाधारणते सिद्धा मन्त्रार्जुनकर्मकारिणाम। || PV. 3.309.

59) पुनः ज्ञानप्रभावायायमेवां तदभवत्।
60) अयोध्यायनामययो न इति शब्द वदन्ति न। PV, 3.313 cd.
कल्योगमययो: पुरुषोत्त च रागादिसंपुर्णः।
तत्तैकस्तत्तत्विनान्यः इति भेदः किं कृतः। PV, 3.314.
तदतः पुस्ते कथमपि ज्ञानी कथितौ कथं न व:।
यथा प्रमाणमविसंवादः वचनं सोद्वेद्य यदि। PV, 3.315.

61) न व्यतनपरोश्रुपु प्रमाणस्यार्थं संभवः।
यथा प्रमाणविसंवादः वचनं तत्कृतं वचः। PV, 3.316.
स आगम इति प्राप्तं निर्भयं पीरुषेयतात।
यथात्यतनपरोश्रुपुनागमसामवचः। PV, 3.317.
अपैतिन्यार्यदित्तिविशिष्टिवित्तम्भमिता भवेतः।
स्वं रागादिसंवातः वेति वेदवच नायतः। PV, 3.318.

62) न वेदयति वेदविति वेदार्थस्य कुतो गति:।
तेनावनशेषं जुहुवात्त्वाकाम इति श्रुति। PV, 3.319.
खदेत्यमालमित्येष नार्थ इत्यत्र कार प्रमा।
प्राप्तो लोकयत्तत् तत्र कोष्ठित्यार्यदत्तः। PV, 320.
अनेकायोषु शब्देषु वेदार्थोऽविवेर्षितः।
स्वगौर्यविशिष्टवच ह्रदयपुर्वकार्याचकः। PV, 321.

63) सर्वामेतद्व निजातिनां मिथ्याप्राप्तविजृतिमयः।
धुमाकारवदपच सूक्ष्म नेत्रां हि किष्कन। TS, 2351, Jha Eng. trans.

64) कर्त्तव्यस्ताप्ति श्रेणा नेत्र सत्यार्थं निप्पेतु।
तत्त्वस्तुपण्यवेक्तं दोषाभावे मृदाय्यवतः। TS, 2352, Ibid.
65) गुणा: सत्ता न सत्तीति पौरुषेऽयु शक्यते

आनर्थक्यमत: प्राप्तं गुणाशक्तिवेय नासि न: ।। TS, 2353, Ibid.

66) आनर्थक्यमत: प्राप्तं छड़पूपादिवाचक्यवत्

अयत्वेत् सम्प्रतीयन्ते क्रियाकार्यायोगिन: ।। TS 2355

एषा स्वात् पुरुषायनान्तर्घरी चरितादिवत्

प्रतिपत्तिरताद्यथेः स्वयम्प्रकृतितत्व ।। TS. 2356, Ibid.

67) दोषाभावे सत्तवं न सिद्धात्माभावं

आनर्थक्यायम्भयसंति तत्माद् राज्यनात्मं परस्म। ।। TS 2357, Ibid.

68) अयापि सहकारोणण व्याख्यादीनि व्यपेशते

तेषां व क्रमसद्भवात् तत्क्षणं क्रमवेत् ।। TS. 2362, Ibid.

69) प्रागशक्: सम्याः यदि तै: क्रियते पुनः

प्रतस्त: पौरुषेऽयुं ज्ञानावर च नराध्यात् ।। TS, 2364, Ibid.

70) न हि तत्तु स्थितोष्णेय ज्ञानं वेदं: करोति न: ।।

यावनं पुरुषदे पीपुलेनु: प्रकाशित: ।। TS, 2365.

तत्तत्त्वपौरुषे वर्तें भूतार्थशाकारणम् ।।

न कल्यं ज्ञामेतति वं ज्ञायनात्मवति ।। TS, 2366.

सत्यप्रेषा निरयाहितो वेदव्यासपौरुषगता ।।

बन्धिर्न फलस्या च हि ज्ञानं तद्प्रसा भित्रतम् ।। TS, 2367, Ibid.

71) स्वतन्त्र: पुरुषाशके वेदे व्याख्या यथार्थवि

कृष्णाण: प्रतिबंधुं ते शक्यन्ते नैव केनि तिद् ।। TS 2369.

मोहमादिविधिवेशेति स्म विज्ञुता: भूते: ।।

विपरीतानामपि व्याख्या कुण्डतित्तमिश्राश्च ज्ञाते ।। TS 2370, Ibid.

72) वेदो नरं निरारंगं ब्रूतेऽर्थ न सदा स्वत्: ।।
73) स तथा कृष्णमाणक्ष कुलर्तन्नापि समतेत्।
ततो नालेकवद् वेदवधुपूर्णत्वं युव्यते। TS, 2374, Ibid.

74) स्वतंत्रश्च व विज्ञानजनकते सति स्कुटम्।
प्रामाण्यपि नैवाय सम्बायं पुरुषेश्चान्॥ TS, 2375, Ibid.

75) यथार्थबोधवहलावत् प्रामाण्यं झाक्यते।
पुंवायहायेश्च वाच्य न साध्या मानकापना॥ TS, 2376.
सत्यायनसत्यसम्बन्धमात्र प्रामाण्यमल्लवा॥
अतीतन्त्र तु तं योगेऽन्नेत्वादृढ्यवेयति॥ TS, 2381.
अतीतिक्रया यत्तवेऽयोत्तत्त्वो योगेऽत्तविनिर्णयः।
अनन्यवश्च: सरङ् नाराजीते स्वतसः॥ TS, 2382, Ibid.

76) इत्य माने सिद्धे वदेद् श्रीवायावरपरमपरा॥
अनादि: कल्पमणापि नादोषत्वाय युज्यते॥ TS, 2377.
यथादेकौपि तत्त्वं नैवायतिनिर्णयः॥
अनादि: कल्पताप्रेयसा तमादन्तपरमपरा॥ TS, 2378.
अन्येनान्त: समाकृप्त: सम्पवर्त्य प्रयत्ते॥
. धूर्वेऽन्नेत्र ग्रायं प्रविशासनादि कल्पना॥ TS, 2379, Ibid.

77) न्यायेकादिनिनुसा वर्गादि गायते मति:।
अग्निहोत्रादिवचसो निष्क्रियाशुभिविशत:॥ TS, 2386.
नैवं संशयतात्वाविनिर्विकार्यायवतः।
प्रेषायतो हि नैत्तेऽम् गेत् पश्चनि कथन॥ TS, 2388.
नातिनिरिये हि युज्यते सदस्तताविनिश्चयः।
निष्क्रियो यदवायाध्यायस्त न किमन्यत:॥ TS, 2389, Ibid.
78) श्रीनिवासानं तु नित्कपादकर्त्तिकछोपजनायते ।
श्रीनिवासानं शुद्धिनां सान्योगमन्यत: समा ।। TS, 2390.
तथा हि सीगादिनां धीरकम्योपजनायते ।
अपयुद्धमृत्युगातु प्राणिवधपानविन्तत: ।। TS, 2391.
अथ न धियः काविक्षु बाधा सम्प्रति दशष्ट: ।
क्षिपत कन्दलविच्छेदः चेन्द्रदीपयः पि ता समा ।। TS, 2392, Ibid.

79) अर्थ चापीहे यथा प्राकृतिमथते ।
सत्यस्ततमस्तत्वमेवभावाशक्यते न किम् ।। TS, 2397.
स्वतः सत्यस्ततोधाः हेतुचात्रसत्यतस्य हि ।
एवं मिथ्याबोद्धोपि हेतुचारं श्रद्धयते स्वतः ।। TS, 2398, Ibid.

80) किंच वेदप्रमाणाय निर्बोध यदिः वो धारमः ।
निर्देशस्तत्वादि तत्त यती विभीषयताम् ।। TS, 2399.
निर्देशस्तेन हि कर्जायं कृतोझोषः प्रकाशकः: ।
पौर्णमिण्ड लोकेस्मिन् पूर्णार्थमानसाधन: ।। TS, 2400, Ibid.

81) न नराकृतिमिन्य यथार्थार्थानकारित तु ।
हस्ता हि दाबयह्यवेदिन्द्रायामानेषु पि हेतुताः ।। TS, 2402, Ibid.

82) अत्याधारुपेत्वत्वसत्वत्त्वसाधनम् ।
नित्याशिष्यप्रेमगार्गः व्यर्थ एवोपर्वाणि: ।। TS, 2406.
सम्यग्योप्योपिः नाभावो नैव गम्यते ।
कर्तां श्रुतेविविज्ञातं कत्वकाकायाधिकार: ।। TS, 2412.
अथापि सार्धकतेन विभक्तार्थवापि वा ।
तेषां कर्ताः सुमीयेत, श्रुतेः पि तत्त: न किम् ।। TS, 2413.
अध्येतार्थक वेदानां कर्तारोपूर्वात्कत: गतः।
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न हि ते व्यञ्जका युक्ता नित्यानं व्यञ्जकसम्बन्धाः ।। TS, 2417, Ibid.

83) उपलभ्यात्मानाः तद्वापरे समुद्धवः ।

तेषां प्राणपि सद्भावे उपलभ्य: प्रसज्ज्वते ।। TS, 2418, Ibid.

84) तत्त्वायंवहारादिः योग्यो वेदेवावस्यते ।

तद्वापरोमः सद्भावाः बीजादेहदुर्भावदिव्वत् ।। TS, 2419.

व्यञ्जकनक्रमरुपत्वानावत्कायायाविकाविद्वात् ।

वेदानां पौरुषेयत्वमनुमायवगच्चति ।। TS, 2420.

अन्यथा क्रमरुपं नित्यावः व्यञ्जनितवः न ।

नान्नित्वक्रमान्तिः नित्यवेयत्क्षयोऽग्नत: ।। TS, 2421, Ibid.

85) सम्भायते च वेदस्य विस्पर्यं पौरुषेयता ।

कामित्वयाक्रियाप्राप्तिःकारिःसत्याविभिः तथा ।। TS, 2786.

दुर्भावानुविद्वाक्ष्ट्ववास्तवःकद्वयात्वदः ।

वेददर्म्ख हि दशयते नातिकादि चाचस्यापि ।। TS, 2787.

विषाणमभूतयादि यद्द विविधतासमीयते ।

सर्वं तद्वैनस्यादि मन्त्रवादेःपि दशयते ।। TS, 2788, Ibid.

86) सर्वदा चैव पुरुषः: प्रायोपानुत्वदिन: ।

यथागतः न विश्रामस्यातात्तकृतावत्कहिः ।। TS, 2792.

इत्यतेनत्वदुक्त: न्यायेन च सिद्धति ।

कर्त्तवा कहितत् कहिचित् ग्रन्थे स्वा कृतिः कथयन्नः ।। TS, 2793.

तत्वार्थोपरेषु सत्यम्य स्त्यात्तमयः ।

वेदायिकारत्व हि तेषां: प्रतिपदिताः: ।। TS, 2794, Ibid.

87) अष्टि चानाविता सिद्धेदेवं नानासंशयः ।

तस्मादकर्त्तुवेवा स्पदन्योपयागमोऽकृतः ।। TS, 2795.
तथा हि पारसीकारं व्यवहार: पराध्या: ।

ि नासिकाना च सिद्धाता: परसंस्कारभाषिक: ।। TS, 2796.

ईदस्यककुज्जद्वे च क: सिद्धैपि गुणातव ।

अवैतवाच्यनिनिमिति हि यत्नाःभवतोरखिल: ।। TS, 2797, Ibid.

88) कालत्युत्पत्तवाही सन्निगध्वचतिरिक्ता ।

पूर्ववत्तिकारणाशस्त्ररणामग्रामसाधनात् ।। TS, 2798.

व्यक्तिकं प्रतिक्षितवात्, वका कर्त्ताय एम्बयात् ।

तत्त्वागदिवेवेवुकां साध्यान्वेव निदर्शन्त: ।। TS, 2799.

नरोपेशियाश्चतात् कृतकस्य च साधयता ।

स्वार्थे वक्तन्येयस्य धर्मिष्टेदान्योर्व्यत् च ।। TS, 2800, Ibid.

89) नित्यलेखेते च वाक्यस्य धर्मिष्टेतान्योर्वर्ण्य ।

नित्यवाक्योदभववत्यस्य स्पष्टासिद्धां प्रतिपतेते ।। TS, 2801.

इत्यं चापीरेवेते चोदनाया अनिधितस्ये ।

सन्धिस्तित्तंतादोष: पत्थिनेष्टिपि हेतुपु ।। TS, 2802, Ibid.

90) नाराजिस्तत्वादेशं समयवृत्तं ततः स्थिते ।

वेदेनुरुगो मन्त्रानं स्वाच्छे पारसीकवतः ।। TS, 2806.

अविस्त्रतःद्विध्य पापनिवन्यये ग्रंथगत: ।

तैलीयानी प्रवर्तने धारिण्यिहितेविकल्पे ।। TS, 2807, Ibid.

91) धर्म प्रति न सिद्धात्तोदनानं प्रमाणता ।

स्वतोन्नेप्यस्य मन्देवभस्तदर्द्वानवधारणात् ।। TS, 2808.

अनानोक्वर्णतान्तरतंगराशिः पुमानन: ।

श्रुतस्वरूपं विविधानामपुदेशकृतिविविधानम् ।। TS, 2809, Ibid.
92) अपीलवच्चसाधक्मक्रमाणाभावाय …….. तत्साध्य सत्तेनायसंक्षगात् | PKM of Prabhācandra, Mahendrakumar Shastri ed. pp. 391-92.

93) नायनुमानं तत्प्राध्यक्षम …….. शब्दाध्यक्षप्रविष्टविनिः वा श्यात् | Ibid. p. 392.

94) किंविंद कर्तुरस्ररण नाम …….. खरविषणवत् | Ibid.

95) अथ समस्तायाविच्छेदे …….. किनार्कित्तत्वं स्मार्द्धिशेषाभावात् | Ibid pp. 392-93.

96) अथ वेदे सविगानकहरुविशेषे …….. तथा चासिर्दी हेतु: | Ibid. p. 393.

97) ननु वेदे कर्नलसभामायुगमे …….. तद्यथामध्यम् | Ibid, p. 394.

98) किच्च, अतः स्मार्द्धिशेषाणिशेषयत् …….. पौरस्तायावस्ताकान्मानस्य भायसा, इत्यथि प्रत्याख्यातम् | Ibid, pp. 395-96.

99) अथ गुणद्वृकस्त्रायेव …….. तन्न निनिवेश्येनाययेव हेतु: प्रकृतसाध्यातन: | Ibid, pp. 397-98.

100) अथ सविषेषण: ……….. प्रामाण्यस्येष प्रतिशिष्टात: | Ibid.


102) नायणमन्तोऽपीलब्ध्यसिद्धि: …….. इत्यथिभुवंतर वेदवायायाः सङ्क्रमान्त् | Ibid, p. 399.

103) अपीलब्ध्यायावर्धसाधतता …….. कस्यविधायाबायात् | Ibid.

104) किच्च अपीलब्ध्याय त्रस्ताय: प्रत्याविष्टेढ़रुपं …….. प्रतिपादितवत्वात् | Ibid, p. 400.

105) अस्तु बादपीलब्ध्यो वेद: …….. धनेः चोदनेव प्रामाण्यम् इत्यथिभुवाणापपतिः | Ibid.

106) ये तु श्रीसिद्धो: …….. इति चनात् | RKT, Dalsukh Mahvania ed. Part II. p. 89.

107) द्वादश्तत्त्वमा प्राणायाधि: …….. इति सकलं समानम् | Ibid.

108) किच्च असुभावानुवरणचतुरं …….. तन्न तद्य प्रत्यक्षं क्षमते | Ibid.

109) नायनुमानम् …….. विशिष्टप्राणायाधित्वकल्यास्त्रायु छायमातःमध्यन्नाद् | Ibid, 91-92.

110) प्रजापतिवेदेतेनकमासीतु …….. सिद्ध आगमवाधोशि | Ibid, pp. 93-94.
111) यहु तर्कस्वरण साधनम् ...... अन्यत्राभ्ये पृष्ठ वर्त्तनात् | Ibid, p. 96.

112) अयापीरुपेयी शुरूः ............. तत्र करुः स्थरणात् | Ibid.

113) मनु श्रोतियः शुरूः ........... कालेषुन्नतमुनीनामाभिक्ततवं तासां स्यात् | Ibid, p. 97.

114) जैनाक्ष कालाधुर्गतेर तत्तारं ...... न पुनः कर्तुमात्रस्मरणमि | Ibid, p. 97.

115) वेदस्याध्ययनं सर्वं ...... वर्तमानकालचतुः इतिद्ययोजनकल्पतु | Ibid, p. 97-98.

116) अय अयापस्तेरपीरुपेयत्वातिरिण्यो ......

अन्यथानुपपस्तेरपीरुपेयोऽयमिति | Ibid, p. 99.

117) अतु ताल्यत्र ...... एवास्योत्कर्षदभावात् | Ibid, pp. 99-103.

118) अषि च इयानुपूर्वी ...... पौरुषेयी शुरूः | Ibid, p. 103.