CHAPTER 1
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The Pūrvamīmāṃśa school plays an important role in the development of Indian philosophy, through the ages. The object of that school seems to have been Vedārthavācā or the investigation into the interpretation of the Vedas. In order to understand the Vedas in the traditional manner, the Mīmāṃsāsūtras of Jaimini serve as an important tool of interpretation. Although it is difficult to ascertain the exact date of Jaimini, it is generally assumed that the Sūtras belong to the period about 400 B.C.¹

As a matter of fact, we do not find any direct references either to the Cārvākas or the Buddhist or the Jaina doctrine in the Sūtras themselves. The commentators like Śabara, Kumārila, Pārthasārathi clearly refer to the Buddhist as one of the major opponents attacking the orthodox systems of philosophy and trying to establish their own doctrines. The authority of the Vedas was frequently challenged and criticised by the anti-Vedic philosophers. Criticising the Vedic religion, they made an attack on the faith of the society in the Vedas and Vedic sacrifices. Under these circumstances, the exponents of Vedic religions had to review and reestablish their own systems by refuting the opponents.

The Sūtras of Pūrvamīmāṃśa of Jaimini were interpreted by some ancient commentators, such as, Bodhāyana and others; however, the interpretation made by them was not capable of refuting the arguments of Buddhists, for they did not consider Dharma as the object of investigation. According to these commentators, every one is expected to obey the Vedic injunctions without questioning their validity and without expecting any benefit whatsoever from the performance of the Vedic
rites. The system of Mīmāṃsā as interpreted by the early authors became unpopular, since none is likely to obey the Vedic injunctions, if their is not possibility of to achieving any desired object from the performance of sacrifices.  

Later, Śabarasvāmin (Circa ... 200 - 400 A.D.), had a two-fold purpose for writing a commentary on the Sūtras of Jaimini. First, he wanted to re-establish the proper meaning of the Sūtras of Jaimini by discarding the innovations made by ancient authors and secondly, he had to save the Dharmamīmāṃsā from the attacks of the non-Vedic tenets. He introduced, for the first-time, the epistemology in this system which proved the Vedic doctrine as valid and rejected the theories of Buddhism i.e. nīlāmbanavāda (no substratum theory) and śūnyavāda (theory of emptiness). Śabara explicitly mentions the Buddhists as Māhāyānikas. He established the theory that the duty is performed for producing individual merit and established the existence of soul as a separate entity enjoying the results of merit.

After the period of Śabarasvāmin, the Buddhist philosophers, such as, Vasubandhu, Diṅnāga, Bhāvaviveka, and Dharmakīrti made great efforts to disprove the doctrines of the orthodox systems, mainly those of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā. During the period, ranging from 3rd to 6th century A.D., the Buddhist philosophy and logic enjoyed greater popularity due to the writings of these authors. Until then, there were no works worthy of mention written by any author to support the doctrines of these systems.

The Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu (400-80 A.D.) gloriously presented the Sautrāntika position, refuting many other Buddhistic and non-Buddhistic thought. Vasubandhu was a well-known teacher of logic. He himself composed a large number of valuable works. Some of them are; Abhidharmakośa, Karmasiddhi, Viṃśatikā, Trinṃsatikā, Trisvabhāvanirdeśa and so on.
The Pramāṇasamuccaya, the masterpiece of Diṅnāga (circa 480-540 A.D.) marks an epoch in the history of Indian logic. The PS as its title states, is "a collection (of remarks) on the means of (valid) cognition". Diṅnāga's original Sanskrit works are not extant, save a few fragments collected and published by Prof. Randle and only Tibetan versions of them are at present available. The Tibetan text and Sanskrit restoration of the PS with critical notes are now offered to the public through the labours of H.R. Ramaswamy Iyengar. This helps us to lay the foundation of an accurate and scientific study of the history of Indian Logic.

Indian philosophical works written subsequent to Diṅnāga contain numerous references to him and a hundred of quotations from his works are found scattered in several subsequent works. Randle has collected and edited some of the fragments found in the Nyāyavārttika and its Tīkā by Vācaspatimiśra Ramasvamy Iyengar edited the passages found in the Ślokavārttikatīkā of Pārthasārathimiśra and identified them with the passages in the Tibetan text of PS. Diṅnāga first expounds his position and then goes on to criticise the views of other schools, like the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya and the Mīmāṃsā. Diṅnāga, with his profound insight into logic and the problems of epistemology, offered a challenge to rival Brāhmaṇical systems. Udyotakara of Nyāya school, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa of the Mīmāṃsā school, Mallāvādin of the Jaina school made vehement attacks on his doctrines as presented in the Pramāṇasamuccaya.

Bhāvaviveka (5th cent. A.D.) an exponent of the Mādhyamika school of Buddhism did a valuable service to Indian philosophy. His famous work Madhyamakahādayakārikā with its auto-commentary Tarkajvālā supplies much information regarding the theories and the practices of Brāhmaṇical and non-Brāhmaṇical schools. The Tarkajvālā gives full exposition of the views of Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika,
Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā often quoting from the original texts. In the ninth chapter titled a Mīmāṃsātattvaniñayāvatāra, he elaborates some Brähmanical concepts mainly related to the Mīmāṃsā system, such as, mokṣa (deliverence), vedāpauruṣeyatva (non-human origin of the Veda), śabdāntitiya (eternity of word), śabdaprāmāṇya (validity of verbal cognition) and sōmapāna (drinking of Soma). He rejects yajñīyahiṃsā (killing of living beings in sacrifices), surāpāna (consuming liquor) and svarga (heaven) along with the concepts of Mīmāṃsā mentioned in the pūrvapakṣa.

Dharmakīrti (circa..... 650 A.D.) is the author of numerous works on logic. After Dinnāga, Dharmakīrti accepted the challenge of the opponents. He composed a detailed commentary i.e. Pramāṇavārttika on Pramāṇasamuccaya of Dīnīnāga in which he replied to the objections raised by the non-Buddhist philosophers. His other works on logic are; Pramāṇaviniścaya, Hetubindu, Nyāyabindu, Sambandhāntaraparīkṣā, Vādanyāya and Santānāntarasiddhi. Pramāṇavārttika is the main work among his all treatises.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (7th Cent. A.D.) appears to have composed five Vārttikas on the Bhāṣya of Śabarasaṃvuṁa. They are known as the Brhaṭṭīkā, Madhyamaṭīkā, Ślokavārttika, Tantrasvārttika, and Ṭuptīkā. Among these, the last mentioned three works only are extant now and they form a complete commentary on the twelve chapters of the Bhāṣya. As Ramaswamy Shastri opines that the SV is an abridged form of the Brhaṭṭīkā, a longer extent of the same subject. Nothing, however is known about the Madhyamaṭīkā of Kumārila. SV of Kumārila occupies a unique place, not only in the history of PūrvaMīmāṃsā, but in the whole Indian philosophy. SV is the most important part of the Mīmāṃsā and it has been raised to the status of an independent system of philosophy. There would be hardly any work on Bud-
dhism or Jainism where in a great number of verses of Kumārila are not quoted for refutation. The Buddhists and the Jainas have made great efforts to refute the well-established doctrines of Kumārila in their works 9.

Both Śabarasvāmin and Kumārila introduced several reforms in the Mīmāṃsā system, condemning the method of Bādari school, with a view to making the system more useful to the people. Kumārila opens his SV with a great contempt towards certain early Mīmāṃsākās who made the system akin to heterodox. He states in a verse that his attempt to write his Vārttika was meant to bring the system back to the orthodox lines 10.

Prabhākara (7th cent. A.D.) who follows the path of Bādari, had written commentaries on the Bhāṣya of Śabara, who really belonged to the opposite camp and deliberately attempted to establish his own contrary doctrines through the writings of Śabarasvāmin 11. However, people, in general, rejected the Prabhākara school later, adopted the Bhāṭṭa school in their daily actions, Vedic or non-Vedic and always preferred a determination in the beginning of every action where the result of action undertaken was openly declared by them 12.

As the controversy in Mīmāṃsā philosophy introduced by Śabara, has given ample scope to Kumārila for establishing the Mīmāṃsā system of philosophy on a sound basis and for refuting the arguments of Buddhists. Kumārila rejects the Buddhist doctrines in his works, especially in the Śloka-vārttika. Hence, it seems, he was considered to be a real opponent of Buddhism because he alone opposed the Buddhist's views, mainly those of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti, with sound arguments.

The Stcherbatsky called Prabhākara as a real bastard son of Buddhism 13. Although a disciple of Kumārila, Prabhākara stood against his teacher in the direction of more natural views. He denies the views of Kumārila on time, space, the
cosmic ether, motion and non-existence (abhāva) and so on. The perception of non-existence, according to him, was simply the perception of an empty place. In this point, he fell in the line with the Buddhists. He also agrees with the Buddhists in the most important problem of illusion. According to him, illusion is due to the non-perception of difference. He admits introspection (sva-sāṃvedana) as an essential character of all consciousness. Again, he admits the fundamental unity of subject, object and act of cognition and many other details. In this view, he stood against Kumārila and agreed with the Buddhists 14. It may be the reason as to why Buddhists do not refute the views of Prabhākara. Śāntarakṣita, the author of Tattvasaṅgraha dealt with the name and large quotations from the works of Śabara and Kumārila and not those of Prabhākara. The reason may be that Prabhākara does not materially deviate from Śabara where as Kumārila does deviate from him in his attempt to revive the orthodox system.

Prajñākaragupta (700 A.D.) the author of the Praṃāṇavārttikabhāṣya, was a disciple of Dharmaṅkīrti. He was a versatile scholar intimately acquainted with the work of his predecessors, belonging to different schools. It seems that his style has been adopted by the Mīmāṃsā exponent Pārthasarathi for his Śāstradīpikā 15.

Vārttikālaṅkāra or Praṃāṇavārttikabhāṣya professes to be a mere commentary upon Dharmakīrti’s Praṃāṇavārttika. It is, however, much more than an ordinary commentary. Prajñākaragupta naturally defends the Buddhist position on all controversial issues. He maintains that the existence of God, Soul, Space, the authority of the Vedas cannot be proved. The theory that the Vedas are apauruṣeya (non-human origin) is undoubtedly, logically untenable and Prajñākara finds no difficulty in dashing it to pieces 16.

The school of Cārvāka, otherwise known as Lokāyata dārśana plays an vital
role in Indian philosophy as a purvapakṣa in almost all the systems and Sarvadarśanasanāgraha of Mādhavācārya (circa. 14th cent. A.D.) No work, however, belonging to Lokāyata school is known so far. On exception to this, Tattvopaplavasimha of Jayarāśi evinces to its sceptical tendency of the Āravāka school.

It is clear that TPS is familiar with the philosophical doctrines of almost all important schools, Vedic and non-Vedic as well. A few quotations from the works by the Āravāka have been traced in the Mīmāṃsā sūtras of Jaimini, the Vaiśeṣika sūtras of Kaṇāda, the Nyāya sūtras of Gautama, the Bhāṣya of Śabara, Ślokavārttika of Kumārila, the Pramāṇavārttika and the Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti. He criticises the pramāṇa theory (theory of valid means of cognition), pratyakṣa (sense-perception), ātmānumāna (inference of self) sabdānityatva (eternity of words), sabdāpramāṇa (verbal cognition) upāmāna (analogy), arthāpatti (presumption), abhāva (non-apprehension) and vēdāpauruṣēyatva (non-human origin of the Veda) and so on.

After a careful study of the texts, it can be understood that Jayarāśi is a serious thinker as any other and it is true that the TPS of Jayarāśi adds a new chapter to the history of Indian philosophy.

Śaṅtarakṣita (705-762 A.D.), the author of Tattvasaṅgraha was one of the great Buddhist philosophers. It can be seen that in almost all stanzas, he arranges the words in a way that the minor term (pakṣa) major term (sādhya) middle term (hetu) and example (drṣṭānta) follow one after another in logical sequence. While stating the theories of his opponents, he finds out very essential grounds on which his theories are based and states them one after another till their firm establishment with logical reasons and arguments. It is a noteworthy fact about the writing of Śaṅtarakṣita that he rarely named the authors, whose views he either
quoted or explained in stating the position of his opponents before their criticism. He has quoted Kumārila extensively without naming him in all instances.

It is an important feature of the TS that it mentions a large number of authors and philosophers whose views it records and refutes them at length. Later, Kamalaśīla follows the same way. Kamalaśīla while stating the views of the different authors named only those who were the originators of those views. In the development of thought, hence, Śāntarakṣita’s contribution is an unparalleled one. Besides, Buddha and the authors of philosophical sūtras he has mentioned a number of important authors both from orthodox and heterodox systems.

In the course of twenty seven different examinations, he examines almost all systems of Indian philosophy, mainly those of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā. Very frequently he criticises Kumārila. It seems that the TS was composed mainly to refute the arguments and theories of Kumārila and Udyotakara as the two were deadliest antagonists of Buddhism in those days. He refutes the Mīmāṃsā doctrines on the soul, sense-perception, inference, verbal cognition, analogy, presumption, non-apprehension, validity of the Veda, eternality of word and sentences, self-validity of all means of cognitions and so on.

Kamalaśīla (circa. 740-797 A.D.) the author of the Madhyamakālaṅkāraṇapāñjikā was follower of Śāntarakṣita. He criticizes the Buddhist doctrines of Sarvāstivāda, Sastrāntika and Yogācāra schools as well as non-Buddhist doctrines and proclaimed the Mādhyamika as the highest doctrine of all.

Jñānaśrīmitranibandhavalī of Jñānaśrīmitra (11th cent. A.D.) shows that his knowledge of different Śāstras was much above the common level. Apart from the works of his own system and those of the Naiyāyika who were his philosophical opponents, he had utilised the works of other systems too. Mīmāṃsakas have been
given more prominence by him. Brhaṭṭīkā of Kumārila (but now lost) along with his Šlokavārttika has been quoted by him in his Nibandhāvalī. He has made general mentions of Bhaṭṭa (i.e. Kumārila) along with his followers. Sucaritamiśra the author of Šlokavārttikakāśikā, has also been quoted. Among the works of Mīmāṃsā, however, Nyāyakaṇṭikā of Vācaspatimiśra has been given more prominence here. Long passages from it have been quoted and criticised 21.

Bodhibhadra (circa... 1st cent. A.D.), the author of Jñānasārasamuccayanibandhana introduced the specific doctrines of four schools of Buddhism as well as included non-Buddhist -Indian philosophical schools 22.

Jainism, one of the major systems of Indian philosophy differs from the Mīmāṃsā system in rejecting the authority of the Vedas, eternal relation between the words and their denotations, the ethics of ritualism and in advocating the ethics of ahimsā (no killing of living beings) and strict observance of morality.

Tattvārthadīghamasūtra of Umāsvāti (1-85 A.D.) fluctuates between the meanings of valid knowledge and the means of valid knowledge. In its former sense means of cognition is of two kinds, viz. 1) parokṣa (indirect knowledge) and pratyakṣa (direct knowledge). Umāsvāti contends that inference, verbal testimony, analogy, presumption, probability and non-apprehension are not separate sources of knowledge. He includes them under parokṣa (indirect knowledge). According to him the majority of them are the result of the contact of the senses with the objects which they apprehend and some of them are not sources of valid knowledge at all. All perceptions are indirect apprehensions in as much as the soul acquires them not of itself but through the medium of senses. The words parokṣa (indirect knowledge) and pratyakṣa (direct knowledge) are thus used in senses quite opposite to those which they bear in Brāhmaṇic logic 23.
S. C. Vidyābhūṣāna opines that with the commencement of historic period 453 A.D. systematic logic of Jainism developed scholars from the both Śvetāmbara and Digambara sects who devoted themselves to the study of logic with great interest and enthusiasm. They wrote treatises on logic which along with similar works of the Buddhists, contributed to the formation of medieval school of Indian logic. However, it is an interesting point to note that during the whole period of Indian philosophy Jainism was not considered as a major opponent by other systems. Systems like Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā hardly mention Jainism in their literature. However, since the time of Akalaṅka, the Buddhists have paid more attention to Jainism. Śāntarakṣita quotes and rejects the views of Jainism. However, some of the Jaina scholars criticise the doctrines of orthodox systems along with Mīmāṃsā.

The contribution of Samantabhadra (600 A.D.) is very important in the philosophical literature of the Jainas. He is the author of the Āptimāṃsā, Yuktyanuśāsana and Svayambhustotra. Among these, the Āptimāṃsā discusses logical problems and explains the philosophy of non-obsolution. He was a Digambara preceptor.

Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka (7th cent. A.D.) was a great Digambara author and commentator. He was a contemporary of Kumārila. He composed philosophical treatises in Sanskrit, such as, Laghīyastraṇya. Nyāyaviniścaya, Pramāṇasaṅgraha and Siddhirviniścaya. He rejects the doctrines of non-Jaina schools by quoting the original texts, like, Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti, Ślokavārttika of Kumārila etc. Vādirājasūri (11th cent. A.D.) wrote 'Vivaraṇa' a commentary on this work. He has traced the views of Śaṅkāra, Kumārila, Praśastapāda, Īśvarakṛṣṇa and so on for the refutation of orthodox schools.
Haribhadra (circa... 11th cent. A.D.) a famous Śvetāmbara writer composed a large number of works both in Sanskrit and Prakrit. He was an eminent author in verse and prose. His Śaḍdarśanasamuccaya, is an important treatise on Indian philosophy. It gives a summary of the six philosophical systems of India.

Aṣṭasāhasrī of Vidyānanda (circa... 800 A.D.) is an exhaustive sub-commentary on the Āptamīmāṃsā of Samantabhadra. It contains an elaborate exposition of various logical principles. He criticises the doctrines of the Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Vaiśeṣika, Advaita, Mīmāṃsā and Buddhist philosophy. He mentions Diṅnāga, Udyotakara, Dharmakīrti, Prajñākara, Bhartṛhari, Śabara, Prabhākara and Kumārila in various contexts. He treats the views of non-Jaina schools as pūrvapakṣa and exposes his views as Siddhānta in each section. He criticises śabdaniyatva (eternity of words) svataḥprāmāṇya (self-validity) mainly alongwith bhāvanā and niyoga, the doctrines of Mīmāṃsākas. He frequently uses the views of Kumārila and Prabhākara. Vidyānanda is a distinguished Jaina philosopher belonging to the Digambara sect. His Aṣṭasāhasrī a commentary on Aṣṭaṣatī (Akalaṅka’s commentary on the Āptamīmāṃsā of Samantabhadra) is perhaps, the most difficult of all the Jaina philosophical treatises.

Pramāṇamīmāṃsā of Hemacandra (1088-1172 A.D.) occupies an important position in the philosophical literature in India in general and in Jaina philosophical literature in particular. It is a standard text book on Jaina logic and epistemology. He criticises all means of cognitions of Mīmāṃsākas, especially those mentioned in the Ślokavārttika of Kumārila. He cites some quotations from Śābarabhāṣya, Ślokavārttika etc. Hemacandra was the most versatile and prolific Jaina writer of Sanskrit. He belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect. His Ayogavyācchedadvātriṃśikā forms the first part of his hymn called Dvātriṃśikā and the second part refutes the
doctrines of the non-Jaina systems. It serves as an excellent treatise on Jaina
philosophy.

Prabhācandra (circa. 9th cent. A.D.) a famous Digambara writer composed a
number of commentaries on philosophical and other works. His
Prameyakalamārtanda is an exhaustive commentary on the Parīkṣāmukhasūtra
(a work on Jaina logic by Māṇikyanandin) and Nyāyakumudacandra another com-
prehensive commentary on the Laghīyastraya (a work on Jaina logic by Akalanīka).
Both treatises deal with all important philosophical problems. In his
Prameyakalamārtanda he has mentioned Upavarṣa, Śabara, Bhattṛhari, Bāṇa,
Kumārila, Prabhākara, Diṇṇāga, Udyotakara, Dharmakirti, Vidyānanda and so on.
He refutes the doctrines of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Śaṅkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta,
Bauddha etc. with logical reasoning. He refutes the views of Kumārila mainly on
vedāpauruṣeyatva (non-human origin of the Veda), svatah-pramāṇya (self-validity),
śabdanityatva (eternity of word), and all means of cognitions. He cites opponents
views first as Pūrvapakṣa and refutes them as siddhānta.

Vādi Devasūri (1086-1169 A.D.) composed Pramāṇanayatattvālokāṅkāra which
is an important treatise on Jaina categories and Naya. The author was an eminent
logician well versed in different systems and fully steeped in Jainanyāya treatises.
He wrote an exhaustive commentary namely, Syādvādaratnākara on his
Pramāṇanayatattvālokāṅkāra a standard work on the Jaina mediaval logic and
epistemology. This treatise and its commentary contain and develop at first the
views of opponent schools set them aside and finally establish the theories on the
Śvetāmbara school of Jainism.

Ratnākarāvatārikā of Ratnaprabhasūri (1181 A.D.) is a commentary on
Pramāṇanayatattvāloka can safely be judged as a source book of Indian logic that
was fully developed in the twelfth century. It discusses all important topics of Indian logic of that period. Vāḍi Devasūri enhanced the utility of the work by Syādvādāratānakara writing a commentary on that work. As its name suggests, it is an ocean in depth and extent. Hence, the author’s pupil Ratnaprabhasūri composed a brief and elucidatory commentary Ratnākarāvatārikā on it. He rejects the main doctrines of Mīmāṃsā like Vedāpuruṣeyatva (non-human origin of the Veda), svatah-pramāṇya (self-validity), śabānityatva (eternality of word) and all means of cognitions.

Research work done so far - Regarding the controversy between the orthodox and heterodox systems we can find only a few modern works. However, some scholars like, Th. stcherbatsky, H.N. Randle, R. Samkrtiyayana, H. Nakamura, Eli Franco, P. T. Raju, and others give as many as hints regarding the controversial notions between the orthodox and the heterodox systems in their works. However, as against to the controversial notions, there are two more works which expose Buddhism in orthodox systems. They are; Buddhism as presented by the Brāhamanical systems by Chitrarekha V. Kher and the Buddhist philosophy as presented in Mīmāṃsā Ślokavārttika by Vijaya Rani. But there are few works which show the controversy between both orthodox and heterodox systems. They are as follows.

Fragments from Diṅnāga - H.N. Randle.

This work of H. N. Randle deals with a study of logic in the early schools contains seventeen fragments attributed to Diṅnāga by Vācaspatimiśra and also confirmed by the Tibetan version of the Pramāṇasamuccaya. The fragments constitute the Sanskrit text transliterated in the Roman script, translated and annotated into English. The text deals with the various topics of logic, such as perception, inference, verbal testimony, analogy and apoha etc.
The book is divided into twenty two sections. Section 1 is an introductory one which discusses the date of Diññäga and section 2 deals with probable arrangement of topics in the Pramāṇasamuccaya. Sections three to twenty two contain seventeen fragments which deal with the different topics of Indian logic. Their range is wide. From the description of the valid means of knowledge they extend to the definition of Vāda and cover the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of soul.

Diññäga on Perception - Massaki Hattori.

This work consists the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Diññäga's Pramāṇasamuccaya from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions translated and annotated by Massaki Hattori. This volume is the first attempt in a Western language to furnish both source and interpretation for a major body of Diññäga's thought. The English translation of M. Hattori shows that the minimum addition is necessary for the modern reader to get at the Diññäga's intention. The translation furnishes clear English syntax when read in its complete form. To furnish the background of philosophical opinion and dispute against other schools, Hattori has used the technique of annotation. This annotation helps us trace the original sources of a large number of quoted fragments. It shows the tracking down of the arguments of other schools both Buddhists and Hindu, referred to by Diññäga.

Perception, Knowledge and Disbelief - Eli Franco.

This treatise consists of an introduction, detailed analysis, edition and translation with extensive notes of the first half of the TPS of Jayarāśi. In the introduction, Jayarāśi's affiliation to the Lokdāyata school is reassessed and his place in historical development of philosophy evaluated. New-evidence for the dating of Jayarāśi is examined and a new dating is suggested. Methodological problems concerning the interpretation of Jayarāśi's arguments are discussed.
The sections of the text are devoted to the various definitions of means of knowledge in general and perception in particular. The schools criticised are: Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā (Bhāṭṭa and Prabhākara schools as well as older commentators (Bhavadāsa), (Vṛttikāra), the epistemological school of Buddhisms (Dīnāga and Dharmaññā) and Śāṅkhyā (Varṣaganyā and Vidhyavāsin). In the section of notes, the opponent behind the different arguments are identified, their positions are reconstructed, and put into historical perceptive. In addition, parallel passages both from the TPS and from later works are assembled and translated.

A history of early Vedanta philosophy - H. Nakamura.

This treatise consists the history of Vedānta philosophy before the period of Śaṅkara, although the period of Śaṅkara is called early Vedanta philosophy. This work proposes to examine that neglected history of early Vedanta philosophy as comprehensively and thoroughly as possible. It deals with the topics the chronological divisions of early Vedanta philosophy as seen by the Indian schools, like by the Buddhists, by the scriptures of early Jainism and it appears in orthodox Brāhmanical literature. It discusses the internal controversy and internal relation of the various schools of Indian thought. It may be said that it gives an idea to study the controvertial notion during the early period of Vedānta philosophy.

Epistemology of Bhāṭṭa School of Pūrvamīmāṁsā - Govardhan P. Bhāṭṭa.

This work on Bhāṭṭa school is authoritative, scholarly and comprehensive. It is well- documented and based on the intensive and critical study of Sanskrit texts. Authors treatment of topics is logical and critical. Author examines philosophical problems with the views, of exponents from various schools i.e. Nyāya, Buddhim, Prabhākara and Bhāṭṭa comparatively and tries to expose the development of thought in these schools. He shows some controvertial notions of other schools with the
Bhāṭṭa school of Pūrvamīmāṃsā.

Mīmāṃsā chapter of Bhavya’s Madhyamakārhdayakārikā - Shinjo Kawasaki.

The Madhyamakārhdayakārikā has not yet been edited completely. However, a number of scholars have critically edited and translated some of the chapters of the text. Seventeen verses of the Sanskrit text of the ninth chapter, Mīmāṃsātattvaniṃayāvatāra have been investigated and edited by S. Kawasaki. In these seventeen verses Bhavya or Bhāvaviveka presents the views of Mīmāṃsā as pūrvapakṣa.

'Refutation of the Mīmāṃsakas by the Buddhists' with special reference to Madhyamakārhdayakārikā of Bhāvaviveka - Shripad Bhat.

In this M.Phil. dissertation, an humble attempt is made to study the ninth chapter, Mīmāṃsātattvaniṃayāvatāra of Madhyamakārhdayakārikā of Bhāvaviveka which throws a light on the views of author on Brāhmaṇical religion based on what he calls the doctrines of Mīmāṃsā. The first chapter of the dissertation gives an outline of the chapter Mīmāṃsātattvaniṃayāvatāra and the origin of the controversy between Mīmāṃsakas and Buddhists is discussed here. A comparative study of Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of MTN is also attempted to a certain extent.

The second chapter of dissertation deals with the sources of MTN, traces to the original works of Brāhmaṇical schools and that of Buddhism. The third chapter studies the position of Mīmāṃsā as reflected in MTN and its refutation made by Bhāvaviveka. The contents of MTN are classified as -

(i) Position of Mīmāṃsā and its refutation by Bhāvaviveka.

(ii) Position of so-called Mīmāṃsā and its refutation by Bhāvaviveka.

Certain observations have been made while studying the MTN. Bhāvaviveka
has tried to refute the whole Brāhmanical religion under the title of Mīmāṃsātattvaniṇayāvatāra. In the Pūrvapakṣa (position of Mīmāṃsā) he elaborates a few Brāhmanical concepts mainly related to Mīmāṃsā system. Such as, mokṣa (deliverance), vedāpuṣṭeyatva (non-human origin of the Veda), śabdanyatva (eternity of the word), śabdaprāmāṇya (validity of verbal conition) and somapāna (drinking Soma). Besides, there occurs criticism of logicians and the omniscience of Buddhism. In the Siddhāntapakṣa (refutation of Mīmāṃsā) he rejects yajñīyahiṃsā (killing of living beings in sacrifices), surāpāna (consuming liquor) and svarga (heaven) alongwith the concepts of Mīmāṃsā mentioned in the pūrvapakṣa. His refutation on Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Maheśvara and so on are not directly related to Mīmāṃsā. He has tried to refute Mīmāṃsā on the basis of his knowledge of orthodox systems by using the syllogisms. Moreover, he does not pay more attention to defend the position of logicians and omniscience of Buddha which is criticised in the pūrvapakṣa.

However, the work is important for reasons more than one. It is perhaps, the first attempt of Buddhist, especially those belonging to the Mādhyamika school to refute other systems and establish their own doctrine of śūnyatā (emptiness). Only one hundred thirty eight verses have been studied for the M.Phil. dissertation.

Apart from these works, there are two more research articles regarding the controversial notions between Buddhism and Mīmāṃsā. They are as follows:

(i) Kumārila and Diīnāga by H. R. Rangaswamy Iyenger, Indian Historical quarterly, Sept. 1927, pp. 603-06.

The article compares some passages of the Ślokavārttika of Kumārila and its ūkā, the Nyāyaratnākara of Pārthasārathimīśra with the passage of the Pramāṇasamuccaya of Diīnāga, now available only in Tibetan translations. A comparative study of these passages with those of Pramāṇasamuccaya would convince
that Kumārila vehemently attacks the views of Diṅnāga.

(ii) The controversy between Bhāvaviveka and Kumārila was examined by Yasunori Ejima, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Vol. no XX, no. 2. 1972 pp 99-104.

Significance of the study - Here, it is proposed to undertake the study on the 'Refutation of the Mīmāṃsakas by the heterodox systems of Indian philosophy with the help of original Sanskrit texts and the works on the Pūrvamīmāṃsā system.

The study of the heterodox systems plays a vital role in the modern philosophical studies. Due to the limitations of this thesis, only a few texts are chosen as their role is significant from the point of view of controversy with orthodox systems. Unfortunately we don't have a large literature or original Sanskrit sources of Cārvāka system. A large number of original Sanskrit sources of Buddhist philosophy have been lost. In the course of time they were either destroyed or were taken outside India. P. V. Bapat shows the reasons for complete disappearance of Buddhist literature from India. They are as follows:

1) The study was kept in limitations to the appointed monks and beginners residing in the monasteries.

2) The literature was mostly religious and was preserved in manuscripts in the libraries or in the cells of monasteries and was never kept in the houses of laymen.

3) With the decay or destruction of monasteries the Buddhist manuscripts were destroyed.

A major bulk of the Buddhist works available to us is in the form of manuscripts collected from the countries like Ceylon, Burma, Nepal, Tibet, China and Mangolia. Some of those works are the discoveries in various places. Besides
there are some manuscripts collected, copied and photographed in Tibet by scholars, like, Rahul Samkrityayana and G. Tucci. The original Sanskrit manuscripts were found mainly in central Asia, Gilgit, Nepal, Tibet and other countries. These discoveries have thrown a light on the development of Buddhist literature and the language in which it was written.

The Jaina philosophy was developed out of the canonical works of Jainas. Many glosses and commentaries were written on the sacred texts. Philosophical literature was first written in Prakrit and then in Sanskrit. A number of eminent scholars composed their treatises in Sanskrit. Hence, now we have a large literature to study from the point of view of philosophical problems. However, for the purpose of present thesis, I have confined myself to study a few major works of the Cārvākas, Buddhists, and of the Jainas. They are Cārvāka system as being in the Sarvadarśanasāṅggraha of Mādhavācārya, Tattvopaplavasimha of Jayarāśi, Pramāṇasamuccaya of Diśnāga, Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti, Mīmāṃsātattvanirṇayāvatāra, the ninth chapter of Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā of Bhāvaviveka, Tattvasaṅggraha of Śāntarakṣita, Prameyakamalamārtāṇḍa of Prabhācandra and Ratnākaravatārikā of Ratnaprabhasūri.
Foot Notes - 1) Shastri Ramaswami, Introduction to Tantrarahasya, p.xxv.


3) यथःप्रत्युक्तः स महायानिकः पष्टः I SB on JS 1.1.5, MD, Anandasharma ed. P.61.

4) Kher Chitrarekha, Buddhism ........................., p. 12.


6) Rani Vijaya, Buddhist phił ............................, p. 12.

7) Bhat S., Refutation ................................., Pp 8-10.

8) Rani Vijaya, Buddhist phił ............................, p. 12.


10) प्रायेन्येव हि भीमांसा लोके लोकायतीकृता ।
    
    तामसातिकपये कहुमध्ये यल्लः कृते मया ॥ SV, 1.10.

11) Shastri Ramaswamy, Introduction to TR, P. XVI.


14) Ibid.


16) Ibid.

17) Bhattacharya B., Foreword to TS, p. xiv.


29) Ibid, p. 32.


32) Ibid, p. 211.


35) Ibid.