Appendix

This is a literal English translation of the Sanskrit text of Pudgalaviniścaya, the ninth chapter of Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKBh) edited by Pradhan. Already in 1920, Stcherbatsky translated the text from Tibetan into English, under the title “The Soul Theory of the Buddhist”. Another English translation of the text was made when Poussin’s French translation of the AKBh had been translated into English by Pruden (1988). Duerlinger (1989) also translated the same into English from the Sanskrit text under the title of “Refutation of the theory of selfhood: A resolution of questions about persons”. However, since the third translation depends much on the Chinese commentaries, it causes confusion regarding the coherence of context.

The reason for me to add another to the list is that there is no English translation of the text available which is solely based on the Sanskrit text. As Pruden mentions in the preface of the English translation of AKBh, “the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya can best be understood from its Sanskrit original”.\footnote{AKBh(Poussin/Pruden), xxiii.}

There is possibility that the early translators could have translated the Agamas and Abhidharma texts almost contemporarily under the influence of Mahāyāna. There is another thing to be taken into account. As we know, Chinese characters are ideograms. The syntactical arrangement of linguistic categories of Chinese language is quite different from that of Sanskrit. Moreover, because of the cultural difference, some words are not possible to be translated, or difficult to
understand from the translation. We also have to admit that some of the Chinese translations distorted the original meaning of the text, especially when the translation is related to the delicate, doctrinal issues of the school the translator belongs.

Therefore, I tried to be as faithful as possible to the original Sanskrit text. I tried to understand the meaning of the text from the content formed by the Sanskrit text itself avoiding any intervention of Chinese version or its commentaries. The dependency to the commentary of Yaśomitra has been also made to the minimum. In fact, the Poussin’s translation has already offered sufficient reference to the commentary.

This translation forms the basis for my discussion of Vasubandhu’s argument in the last section of Chapter IV. While translating the Sanskrit text of Pudgalaviniścaya counterchecking with Chinese version, I have come across few discrepancies. However, I have not made annotation here, since it requires abundant collation work with Chinese and Tibetan sources, which is beyond the range of the present study.

This translation has been done under the supervision of my guide Dr. Pradeep P. Gokhale. Without his guidance the translation could not have come to the present form.
A Critical Analysis of the Concept of *pudgala* (Pudgalvinis'caya)

Also known as Denial of the Doctrine of Self (*Ātmavādapratīṣedha*)

[461] 418

<Opponent> Is there no Mokṣa outside Buddhism?

<Answer> There's none.

<Opponent> What is the reason?

<Answer> Because the other doctrines are corrupted by the wrong view of (the admission of the existent of) ātman. For, they do not determine the designation of the ātman with respect to the series of skandhas.

<Opponent> What do they do then?

<Answer> They imagine ātman to be another substance, and, all the defilements arise from the attachment to ātman.

<Opponent> How do you know that the name of ātman applies only to the series of skandhas and not to any other object?

<Answer> That is because there is no perception or inference. That is because the elements which exist are directly perceived, when there is no obstruction. For example, in the case of six objects of senses and manas. Moreover inference (is available for some objects), like in the case of five senses. This is an inference in their case: If a cause is present, (but) another cause is absent, (then) the absence of effect is seen. When (the other) cause is present then the effect is present again. (For example) Sprout.

The numbers in square brackets correspond to the page numbers of *AKBh*(Pradhan). This translation been done on the basis of *AKBh*(Pradhan) counterchecking with *AKBh* & *AKV*y(Shastri).
When the (twofold) cause (namely) the object which is present before the cognizer and his attention, is present, the absence of perception of object is seen in the case of blind and deaf etc, and the presence of perception of object is seen in the case of non-blind and non-deaf. Therefore in those cases also, the absence of another cause, i.e. sense organ, and the presence of it, are ascertained respectively. This is not the case with ātman. Therefore there's no ātman.

<Opponent> But, Vātsiputrīyas wish that let there be existence of pudgala!

<Answer> Here it should be thought as follows. Do they accept pudgala as a substance (dravya) or as a designation (prajñapti)?

<Opponent> What is meant by the expression 'as a substance', or 'as a designation'?

<Answer> If something is a separate thing like rūpa (i.e. visual form) etc, then it exists as a substance. If it is a collection like milk, etc. then it exists as a designation.

<Opponent> So what?

<Vasubandhu> If it (pudgala) exists as a substance, then it will have to be called different from skandhas because of its distinct nature, like each skandha which is different from each other. Moreover, we have to state its cause or call it unconditioned (asamskṛta). In that case (i.e. latter case) it will lead to accepting the view of other systems and it (i.e. unconditioned pudgala) will serve no purpose. If you accept pudgala as a designation, we also say the same thing.
<Vātsīputrīya> Pudgala exists neither as a substance nor as a designation.

<Vasubandhu> What then?

<Vātsīputrīya> Pudgala is designated as arising from the skandhas which belong to oneself and to which one is attached in the present.

<Vasubandhu> This is a blind statement without any clear meaning. We do not understand it. What do you mean by "upādāya (arising from)"? If the meaning is 'by making skandhas as the object', the designation pudgala applies to them (skandhas), like the designation milk which applies to visual form, and other things, by making them the object.

<Vasubandhu> If this is the meaning (of skandhan upādāya), namely "depending on the skandhas", because skandhas are the cause of the designation 'pudgala', then the same fault occurs.

<Vātsīputrīya> Pudgala is not designated like that.

<Vasubandhu> How is it designated then?

<Vātsīputrīya> Just as (the designation) fire is designated as arising from fuel.

[462] <Vasubandhu> How is fire designated as arising from fuel?

<Vātsīputrīya> That is because something is not designated as fire without fuel. Fire can neither be designated as different from fuel nor as non-different. If it is different from fuel, fuel would not be hot and if it is non-different from fuel, what is burned would be identical with what burns. In the same way, pudgala is not designated without skandhas. It can not be designated as different from the skandhas, because the problem of eternality will arise. Nor
can it be designated as non-different, because the problem of annihilation will arise.

<Vasubandhu> Well, sir. Tell me what is fuel and what is fire? Then we will know how fire is designated as arising from fuel.

<Vātśīputrīya> What should be said here? Which is to be burned is fuel, which burns is fire.

<Vasubandhu> This itself should be told here. What is 'to be burned'? What is that 'which burns'?

<Vātśīputrīya> Because, in the world, wood, etc., which is not (yet) kindled, is called fuel. It is also called the thing to be burned. Which is kindled is called fire and it is also called the thing which burns. Whatever is shining, hot, intense, inflames and burns it (=fuel), is that (=fire). Because, it brings about some changes in the continuum. Both of them are made up of eight substances. Depending on that fuel, fire arises. Likewise depending on milk, curd arises, depending on honey, wine (sukta) arises.

<Vasubandhu> Therefore we say fire is designated as arising from fuel (indhanam upādāya). It (fire) is different from that (fuel), because they belong to different time. If pudgala arises depending on skandhas in this way, it will be different and non-eternal. If you say; whatever is the hotness in wood, etc. which is kindled, is fire, and other three elements which are produced with it are accepted to be fuel, (then we say) the difference between them is proved because their features are different. Moreover, you should state the meaning of 'arising from'. How is that fire designated as arising from that fuel? Indeed it
(=fuel) is neither the cause of that (=fire), nor of the designation of that (=fire), fire itself is indeed the cause of its designation. If the meaning of the word 'depend (upādāya)' is 'locus (āśraya)', or 'co-existence (sahabhava)', in that case skandhas also will become 'loci of pudgala' or 'co-existent with pudgala'. Hence pudgala is clearly asserted as different from the skandhas. In the absence of those (skandhas), the absence of pudgala follows. Like the absence of fire which follows in the absence of fuel.

But what you said; "if fire would be different from fuel, then fuel would not be hot"; what is the meaning of the word 'hot' there? If the word 'hot' means heat (hotness), then fuel is not hot (in that sense) because its own nature is different.

If hot means that which has hotness, then apart from fire which is essentially hot, other things will prove to be hot because they are associated with hotness. There is no fault in otherness. Do you accept now that everything kindled, whether it is wood etc. or fuel, is fire? Meaning of the word "arising from" should be stated in that case. If skandhas themselves are pudgala then inevitably identity obtains between them. Therefore this proposal can not be established namely that as arising from fuel, fire is designated, so is pudgala designated as arising from skandhas.

[463] If this pudgala is not to be stated as different from skandhas, then it should not be stated that there are five kinds of knowables; past, future, present, unconditioned and ineffable. It should not be stated because this (the category
of ineffable) can not be stated as fifth or non-fifth in relation to the other categories such as past.

And when the *pudgala* is designated, is it designated on apprehension of *skandhas* or that of *pudgala* itself? If on apprehension of *skandhas*, then the designation of *pudgala* will apply to them themselves because *pudgala* is not apprehended (separately). If on apprehension of *pudgala*, how is it designated as arising from *skandhas*, because the designation arises from *pudgala* itself.

If you opine that *pudgala* is apprehended when there are *skandhas* and therefore *pudgala* is said to be designated depending upon *skandhas*, then even the designation of a visual sense organ, attention and light because it its apprehended when they are there. That *pudgala* is different like visual form (from its designating condition) is clear.

Tell me now. Out of the six (types of) consciousness, by which consciousness should *pudgala* be known?

<Vātsīputrīya> By all the six consciousnesses.

<Vasubandhu> How come?

<Vātsīputrīya> We say that if one indicates *pudgala* depending upon visually knowable forms, then *pudgala* should be said to be visually knowable. We should not say, *pudgala* is either (identical with) visual forms or not (identical with them). Similarly, if one indicates *pudgala* depending upon the states knowable by mind, then *pudgala* should be said to be knowable by mind. But one should not say, it is either identical with mental states or non-identical with them.
<Vasubandhu> In that case, *pudgala* will be similar to milk etc. If one indicates milk or water depending upon visually perceptible forms, then milk or water should be said to be visually knowable. One should not say that it is either identical or non-identical with visual forms. Similarly, it should be said to be knowable by nose, tongue, and skin. One should not say that milk or water is either identical with tangible forms or non-identical with them. As milk and water are designated as visual form, etc. in their totality, so that there is no difficulty of attributing quaternary character to milk and water. Similarly, *pudgala* is designated as *skandhas* in their totality.

What is the meaning of the sentence which you utter, namely ‘one indicates *pudgala* as depending upon visually knowable forms’? Do you mean that forms are the cause of apprehension of *pudgala*? Or do you mean that one who apprehends forms apprehends *pudgala*? If forms become the cause of the apprehension of *pudgala* and *pudgala* is not supposed to be said as different from forms, then in that case, visual form also should not be stated as different from light, eye, and attention, because they are the causes of that (visual form).

If one who apprehends forms apprehends *pudgala*, does one apprehend it by the same apprehension or by different apprehension? If by the same apprehension, *pudgala* assumes of the same nature as form (*rupa*) or the designation of *pudgala* will apply to the form only. How can it be distinctly known viz, "This is the form, this is the *pudgala*."? If it is not distinctly known in this way, [464] how is it claimed that form also is there, and *pudgala* also is there? Because its existence can be subject to its apprehension. The same thing

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should be said with reference to all *dharmas*. If by another apprehension, *pudgala* becomes different from form, because it is apprehended at different time, like yellow which is different from blue, and a moment is different from another moment. The same thing should be said with reference to all elements.

If you say now that just like in the case of form and *pudgala*, apprehensions of the two should be said to be neither different nor non-different, then in that case the conditioned one also becomes ineffable. This would be a deviation from the (Buddhist) doctrine.

If you say: *Pudgala* exists, but it should not be stated as the same as forms or different from them. What then? Then (we answer) Lord (Buddha) has said "Form is not *ātman* and so on up to consciousness is not *ātman*". Moreover, does the eye consciousness by which *pudgala* is apprehended, arise depending upon the forms or depending upon *pudgala* or both? If the eye consciousness arises depending upon the forms, then it will not be able to know the *pudgala*, like sound etc (which arises from forms and yet is unable to know *pudgala*). In the case of eye consciousness, the object, depending upon which the consciousness arises, is the object type of condition of that consciousness. Do you say that consciousness arises depending on *pudgala* or both (form & *pudgala*)? This is against *sūtra*. In the *sūtra*, it is ascertained that consciousness arises depending upon two things:

"This is as follows. Oh, monk. For the arising of eye consciousness, eye is the cause and forms are conditions." "Why?" "Oh, Monk. Whatever eye consciousness is there, all that arises depending on eye and form."
Moreover, *pudgala* will be impermanent in that case. Because it has been stated in the sutra, "whichever are the causes and conditions, which lead to the rise of consciousness, all of them are impermanent." If *pudgala* is not the object, then it will not be known by that (=eye consciousness).

If *pudgala* is claimed to be knowable by six types of consciousnesses, it will become different from visual form, because it is knowable by ear consciousness like sound. It will become different from sound, because it is knowable by eye consciousness, like visual form.

The same thing is applicable to other forms also. Moreover, this statement of sutra will be contradicted:

"Oh, Brāhmaṇa... These five sense organs (*indriya*) which have various spheres (*gocara*) and various objects (*viśaya*). (They) experience their own respective spheres and objects. One (*indriya*) does not experience sphere or object of another (*indriya*). They are the sense organs called eye-organ, ear-organ, nose-organ, tongue-organ and skin-organ. Mind experiences spheres and objects of the five sense organs. Mind is their refuge." *Pudgala* will not be the object (of five *indriyas*) then. If it is not object, then it is not knowable.

<Vātsiputriya> If this would be the case, mind-organ is also not an exception. But it is stated in *Satprānakopama-sūtra* as follows: "These six sense organs have different spheres and objects. They desire (to have) their own respective spheres and objects".

<Vasubandhu> In that statement the word 'sense organ' is not used in its usual sense of ‘*indriya*’. [465] Because, there is possibility of desire of seeing,
etc, neither in the case of five organs nor in the case of five consciousnesses. Therefore, mind-consciousness which is induced by the dominance of them (five sense organs) is called indriya (here). Mind-consciousness which is induced by dominance of mind only never desires the object of others (five sense organs). Therefore, there is no fault of this kind.

The Lord has stated "Oh! Monks, I will explain to you, the category of dharma as it is recognizable (abhijñeya) by all (sense organs)." Having said this, He continued, "Visual forms are the recognizable object of eyes. Eye-consciousness is the contact with eyes. Whatever arises inside as conditioned by the contact with the eyes, which is sensed as pleasant or painful or neither, is dharma; (the same thing applies to other sense organs) up to the object conditioned by the contact with mind. This is called the category of dharma, recognizable (abhijñeya) and penetrated (abhijñeya) by all (consciousness)."

Therefore only this much is ascertained as recognizable and knowable. Pudgala is not so ascertained. Therefore, this pudgala does not become knowable. Prajñā and vijñāna have the same object (viṣaya).

Advocates of pudgala doctrine who think that they can see pudgala by eyes are committed to the (wrong) view that we see self by what is not self (anatmanā atmanam).

In Manusyaka-sūtra, this has been literally said by the Lord. "The name pudgala applies to skandhas only." He continues,

"Eye consciousness arises depending upon the eyes and visual forms. Contact is coming together of these three. These four formless skandhas
(arūpinaḥ), i.e. eye-consciousness, vedanā, samjñā, and cetanā are born along with that contact. Visual-sense organ and the matter (rūpa) are the form-possessing (rūpinaḥ) skandhas. This much is called the personhood (manuṣya-tva). These are its designations: sattva, nara, manuṣya, mānava, posa, puruṣa, pudgala, jīva and jantu. In this context, it is stated "I see visual forms with my eyes." Here, this is the usage, "This is a fellow, having such and such a name, born in such and such a way, coming from such and such a family, having such and such diets, experiencing such and such pleasure and pain, having such and such a length of life, lasting for such a long time, limited by such a life.

Thus, oh, Monks, this is just a designation, just a usage. All these dharmas which are impermanent and conditioned, and are dependently originated."

The lord has regarded literally meaningful sutra as a refuge. Hence we do not examine it again. This is how it has been said, "Oh, Brāhmaṇa, when I say that all exists, it refers only to twelve āyatanas"

If pudgala is āyatana, it is proved to be non-existent. If pudgala is āyatana then it is not inefiable. "Oh, Monks, whatever is the eye, and whatever are visual forms and so on, Tathāgata makes all that to be known. He also makes to be known the designation (prajñāpti) of 'all'. In the Bimbisara-sūtra, it is said, "Oh, monks. Stupid, ignorant ordinary persons wrongly commit themselves to the designation as 'There is ātman' 'There is ātman'. But, here there is no ātman, nor anything belonging to ātman. Whatever arises, arises as suffering."

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419 In Pradhan's edition, sarvaprajñātīṁ ca'ti is added while it is not seen in Shastri's edition. AKBh(Pradhan), p.465, AKBh & AKVś(Shastri), p.933.
The female arhat Saila said. [466] "Oh, Māra. Why do you think there is
Being (sattva)? This is just your wrong view. This is a group of conditioned
things, which is void. There is no Being in it. Just as the name chariot is
understood because of the collection of parts, similarly something is called
Being by convention, depending upon skandhas."

In Kṣudrakāgama also, it has been said to the poor brāhmaṇa. "Listen!
Daridra. I shall explain to you the truth which removes all the knots, how the
mind becomes defiled, and how the mind becomes purified. There is no self
belonging to oneself. It is wrongly conceived. There is no being, no self in this
world, all these dhammas are caused. Only twelve parts constitute the world, viz.
skandha, āyatana, and dhātu. After considering all these, pudgala is not
obtained. See, everything internal is void (śūnya). See, everything external is
void. Nor is obtained the one who contemplates on voidness (śūnyatā)."

Likewise, there are five faults, in the acceptance of ātman. 1) One has wrong
view that there is ātman, and wrong view that there are living beings. 2) One
becomes indistinguishable from the followers of other schools. 3) One becomes
the follower of a wrong path. 4) One's mind does not enter into emptiness; it
becomes neither delighted, nor stable, nor free. 5) One's noble qualifications
are not purified.

<Vātsīputrīya> Perhaps, these fellows do not treat these texts as an authority.
<Vasubandhu> What's the reason?
<Vātsīputrīya> This text is not read in our Nikāya scripture.
<Vasubandhu> Is only Nikāya scripture authentic or Buddha's saying is authentic for them? If only Nikāya is authentic, then Buddha is not their preacher. And they are not the followers of Buddha. If Buddha's saying is authentic, why this text is not authentic?

<Vātsiputrīya> It is said that this indeed is not the saying of Buddha.

<Vasubandhu> What is the reason?

<Vātsiputrīya> It is not read in our Nikāya.

<Vasubandhu> This is illogical.

<Vātsiputrīya> What is illogical here?

<Vasubandhu> It will be just an adventure to say that the text which is mentioned in all the other Nikāya scriptures and does not contradict with sūtra or with the truth (of dependent origination), is not the Buddha's saying, because it is not read in our Nikāya scriptures. Moreover, they do not accept this sūtra also, viz. "all dharma (factors) are devoid of self".

[467] Here, it may be held by the opponent: "pudgala is not called a dharma nor is it called a non-dharma." In that case, it (=pudgala) is not proved to be knowable by mind. Because it is definitely understood that consciousness arises depending on two things. Moreover, it can be argued here that misconception consists in conceiving non-self as self and not self as self. What is understood by this? Skandhas, āyatanas and dhātus are not ātman. So what is previously stated, viz. "It should not be said to be identical with rūpa (forms) or non identical with them." stands rejected.
In another sūtra, it is stated "Oh Monks! Śramanā, Brāhmanā, whosoever contemplate, while thinking, that there is ātman, actually contemplate on the five skandhas of adherence”.

Therefore, all this is acceptance of self in place of non-self. Likewise it is said, "Those who remembered or remember or will remember their previous existence in their memory, actually, remembered, remember and will remember only these five skandhas of adherence."

<Vātsīputrīya> If this is the case, why does he say, "In the past, I was beautiful."?

<Vasubandhu> Thereby, he is demonstrating how people remember variously. But if he would see pudgala to be beautiful, then there would be an undesirable occasion of substantialistic view. Moreover we would be accepting a wrong version. Therefore pudgala is real only by designation like heap and stream, etc.

<Vātsīputrīya> If that is so, then the Buddha will not be omniscient. Because there is neither a mind nor any mental states which would know everything, because they are momentary, but pudgala may know (everything).

<Vasubandhu> In that case, pudgala will not be destroyed even when the mind perishes. It amounts to acceptance of permanence (of pudgala). We do not describe the Buddha as omniscient, because of his awareness of everything. Why then? Because of his capacity. The continuum which is called the Buddha has this capacity, viz. that the true cognition arises in it, just by extension of mind, with respect to any object desired to be known.
And it is stated here,

"As fire is considered to be all consuming, because of its capacity through series. In the same way, the Buddha should be understood as omniscient, because he knows all things in sequence.

<Vātsīputrīya> How is it known?

<Vasubandhu> Because of statement about past, etc.

"Those Buddhas who are already passed, those Buddhas who are not yet come, and the one who is the Buddha of present. (each of these Buddhas) is destroyer of the sorrow of many."

{468} <Vātsīputrīya> You accept only skandhas not pudgala as belonging to the three periods. If skandhas themselves are pudgala, why did (the Buddha) say this, "Oh, Monks. I will explain to you. The burden, the acceptance of the burden, the abandonment of the burden, the bearer of the burden."

<Vasubandhu> Why should not Buddha say this?

<Vātsīputrīya> Burden itself is not proper to be called the bearer of the burden.

<Vasubandhu> What's the reason?

<Vātsīputrīya> Because it is not seen.

<Vasubandhu> It's not proper to say that it (pudgala) is ineffable.

<Vātsīputrīya> What's the reason?

<Vasubandhu> Because it is not seen. Moreover there will be the difficulty that acceptance of burden will not contain skandhas (because the pudgala being ineffable will not be able to accept the skandhas.)
With the same purpose, the lord indicated the bearer of the burden as,
"Whosoever is this fellow having such a name, staying for such a long time,
living for such a period of life," so that he is properly understood. It should not
be understood differently as either something permanent or ineffable. The
previous skandhas become the cause of suffering for later skandhas so they are
expressed (respectively) as burden and bearer of burden. Because burden is the
cause of (meant for) suffering.

<Vātsīputrīya> Pudgala exists. As it is stated, "It is a wrong view that
apparitional being does not exist."

<Vasubandhu> Who says this, 'There is no apparitional being'? We say that
in Manusyakasūtra the lord has classified the being as it exists. One who denies
that the continuum of skandhas called apparitional being is (transformed) in to
another being, says, 'There is no apparitional being.' This is his (Pudgalavādin)
wrong view. Because, (only) skandhas are apparitional being. If this wrong
view negates pudgala, by which means is it to be abandoned? It is not proper to
say that this wrong view is to be given up either by knowledge or meditation,
because of non-inclusion of pudgala among the (noble) truths.

<Vātsīputrīya> There are no skandhas (which are identical with pudgala)
because it is said, “one pudgala arises when the world is being born.”

<Vasubandhu> No. There is figurative use of the word 'one', even in the case
of a group. For example, there is a usage: one sesame cereal, one rice grain, and
also, one heap and one speech. Or, pudgala should be described as conditioned
as one considered it as having produced.
<Vātsīputrīya> Pudgala is not produced like skandhas which are produced without previous existence.

<Vasubandhu> How is pudgala produced then?

<Vātsīputrīya> By taking up another set of skandhas. Just as it is said that a sacrificer is born, a grammarian is born, because they take up the relevant knowledge. And it is said that a monk is born, a recluse is born, because they take some marks. Similarly it is said that he has become old, he has become sick, because he takes up another state.

<Vasubandhu> That is not so. Because, it has been denied. The lord has denied in the sūtra called Paramārthaśūnyatā itself.

“Oh, monks. karma exists and its fruit (vipaka) exists, but the doer (kāraka) who gives up these skandhas and takes up other skandhas is not obtained except the pseudonym (saṃketa) for dharma.”

It's stated in Phalgsūtra, "It's meaningless to say that somebody takes up. Hence I don't say that pudgala takes up new skandhas." Therefore there's no one who takes the skandhas up, nor anyone who gives them up.

Whom are you illustrating as the being to be released from the sacrificer onwards up to the sick man? [469] If you are illustrating pudgala, it is not established. Are you illustrating mind and mental states? "No, because they are produced every moment without previous existence." "Are you illustrating body?" "That too is produced like that."
Moreover, like body is different from knowledge, and marks, skandhas will be different from pudgala. E.g. old body is different (from the earlier body) and sick body is also different from the earlier body.

That is because the transformation theory of change (parināmavāda) of the Sāṃkhya is denied. Hence these are wrong illustrations. If you maintain that skandhas arise without previous existence, but pudgala does not, then pudgala is clearly illuminated as different from skandhas and as eternal.

Don't you express the difference (between skandhas and pudgala) when you say that there are five skandhas, there is one pudgala?

<Vātsīputrīya> Elements are four and form is one. Yet form is not different from the elements. (Similarly, pudgala could be non-different from skandhas)

<Vasubandhu> This defect belongs to some other sect. (Not to us.)

<Vātsīputrīya> To which sect does it belong?

<Vasubandhu> To the sect of exclusive elementist. Even in that case it becomes accepted that just as form is nothing but the elements, pudgala is nothing but skandhas.

<Vātsīputrīya> If you say pudgala is nothing but skandhas, why didn't the lord elucidate the question, viz. "Is living being identical with body or different from it?"

<Vasubandhu> Relative to the intention (āśaya) of the questioner. Because questioner asks the question with respect to living substance which is the person (puruṣa) operating inside (the body). Such a person does not exist in any one. How can it be elucidated as different (from skandhas) or identical (with them)?
It would be like (elucidating) the internal hardness or softness of the hair of the tortoise. Moreover, this difficulty has already been solved by the earlier scholars.

The king Kaliṅga approached the Elder Nāgasena and said, "I will ask you the venerable monk. Monks are talkative. You may elucidate only for what I ask." When told to ask, he said, "Is living being (jīva) identical with the body, or is the living being different and so is body?

"It can not be elucidated." said the Elder.

The king said, "Oh, venerable monk, you have already made the promise, viz. nothing else would be elucidated. Why have you said this, then which is totally different, viz. "this can not be elucidated." The Elder said "I also will ask the king now. Kings are also talkative. So, you may elucidate only for what I ask." When told to ask, he asked, "Does the mango tree in your harem has sour fruits or sweet ones?" He said, "There is no mango tree in my harem."

"The king has already made the promise that nothing else will be elucidated. Why have you said this then? Which is totally different viz. there is no mango tree".

He said, "How can I elucidate sourness or hardness of the fruits of that tree which is non-existent?"

"In the same manner, oh, king, there is no living being (jīva) at all. Then how can I elucidate the difference or sameness of the living being with the body?"
<Vātsiputriya> Why didn't the lord say, viz. it (=living being) does not exist at all.

<Vasubandhu> Relative to intention of the questioner. Because the questioner would understand that there's non-existence even of the continuum of skandhas (skandhasaṃtāna) which is called living being and hence he would be led to a wrong views because of ignorance of dependent origination. He (=such a questioner) is eligible to receive this kind of preaching.

[470] This (i.e. the same thing) can be ascertained in the following way. The lord said, "Oh, Ānanda, if I elucidate that there is ātman to monk Vatsagotra when asked by him, then it would be improper to say that all dharmas are anātman. Oh, Ānanda. If I elucidate that there is no ātman to monk Vatsagotra when asked by him then the monk Vatsagotra who is already confused, would be led to greater confusion, viz, 'I had ātman but now I don't.' The view that ātman exists leads to eternality and the view that there is no ātman leads to annihilation." This is the elaboration. And it is said here:

"Like a tigress who moves its cub from one place to another, the enlightened ones (Lit. victorious ones) preach the truth (to the aspirants) taking into account (the possibility of) their being bitten by the tusk of (wrong) view and also (the possibility of) the down fall of their (good) deeds. Because if (the recipient of dharma) accept the existence of ātman he will be bitten by the tusk of the (wrong) view. And if he does not accept ātman will not accept transmigration and hence will drop down the cub, viz. the good deeds."

And it is also said,
"Because of non-existence of living being, the lord didn't describe living being as either identical with, or different from them (skandhas).

And he didn't say that living being doesn't exist; with the intention that the living being should not be non-existent even as a designation. In the continuum of skandhas, there is existence of results of good or bad deeds, and that is called a living being. This designation would not be there, if the non-existence of living beings is preached.

Nor did he say that living being exists in the skandhas only by designation. Because, those laymen of that time were unable to understand śūnyatā.

When asked whether ātman exists or it doesn't, he did not say that it does, relative to the intention of the questioner. If something exists then does he not say that it exists?

Relative to intention of the questioner, there's no explanation about the question whether the world is eternal, etc. If by the word 'world', self is intended, then fourfold elucidation will be improper, because the self is non-existent. If the whole transmigration is intended by the word 'world', then also it's improper. [471] If the world (in the sense of transmigration) is eternal, then ultimate extinction of no one would be acceptable. If it is non-eternal, annihilation of all would be acceptable. If both ('eternal' & 'non-eternal') are accepted, then by rule ultimate extinction of some would be acceptable, that of others would not be acceptable. In the case of the absence of the both, there will be neither ultimate extinction nor non-extinction.
Since the final extinction depends upon the path, determination of any of the four alternatives not been elucidated by the lord, like (life condition of) the sparrow in the hands of Nirgranthaśrāvaka (Jaina aspirant). For the same reason, there's non-elucidation of the four alternatives such as the world is perishable, etc. Because these four alternatives have the same meaning. It is like this. The wondering monk Muktika having asked about four questions, asked again, "Will the whole world attain extinction by this path or only a part of this world will attain it by this?"

The Elder Ānanda said, "Oh Muktika, You are asking the same question in this manner that you asked the lord first." That is all. The four alternatives such as "Tathāgata exists after death", are also not elucidated, relative to intention of the questioner. Because the questioner asked leaving aside the word 'ātman', and putting 'Tathāgata' in its place.

However, the person who believes in pudgala should be asked "why does the lord declare that the living pudgala exists, but he does not declare the existence of pudgala after death?"

<Vātsīputrīya> There would be a difficulty of eternality.

<Vasubandhu> Then why does the lord explain this "Oh, Maitreya. You will become Tathāgata, Arhat and Saṃyaksaṃbuddha (a completely enlightened one) in future. Why did the lord say about the disciple who had passed away, about his birth saying that such and such person is born in such and such place. Because in this way also, there will be difficulty of eternality. If the lord having seen the pudgala before, does not see it again as it attains extinction
(parinirvṛta). And he does not explain it due to ignorance, then the omniscience of the master will be objected to, or it should be accepted that pudgala does not exist. If (on the other hand) the lord sees, then it becomes proved that pudgala exists, though it is not expressed in words and that it is eternal.

<Vātsiputrīya> One should also not say, "Either he sees or he doesn't."

<Vasubandhu> Then, in that case, you may gradually make such statement of inexpressibility, “either the omniscient one exists or he doesn't, either there is lord or there is none”, etc.

<Vātsīputriya> Pudgala does exist because it has been said to be wrong view. 'As a matter of fact, really I don't have ātman.'

<Vasubandhu> It has also been said to be wrong view, viz. 'ātman exists.' Therefore, this is not decisive. The followers of Abhidharma say that both the views are included in extreme views, viz. eternalist view and nihilist view. That is correct, because it is stated in Vatsyasūtra,

"Oh, Ānanda. To say that ātman exists leads to eternity (of ātman), and to say that ātman does not exist leads to annihilation."

<Vātsīputriya> If then there is no pudgala, who is he who transmigrates? It is not proper to say that the transmigration (samsāra) itself transmigrates. The lord has stated, "Of the beings who are misled by ignorance, and who are having thirst, who transmigrate."

[472] <Vasubandhu> If it is pudgala then how does he transmigrate? Does he (transmigrate) by abandoning and accepting different skandhas? Answer of this argument has already been explained. Just as it is said that the momentary
fire is said to be moving because of continuum. The mass of skandhas which is called 'sattva' (being) is said to be transmigrating because of the craving (trṣṇa) and clinging (upādāna).

<Vātsiputṛiya> If this is nothing but skandhas, why did the lord say 'I myself was a preacher, named 'Sunetra' in that period.

<Vasubandhu> Why should this not be said?

<Vātsiputṛiya> Because skandhas are different (in different time).

<Vasubandhu> Then, what is pudgala?

<Vātsiputṛiya> He is same as that.

<Vasubandhu> Then he will be eternal. Therefore, by the words 'I myself am he', the lord indicates oneness of continuum to which skandhas belong. Like (one can say), the same fire has come burning. Moreover, if self (ātman) were there, Tathāgatas themselves would see it clearly. Attachment to the self and love for the self would be more firm in the case of those who see it.

"If there is idea of 'I', then the idea of 'mine' follows", from the statements in sūtra, (wrong) conception of self with reference to skandhas would be more operative in the case of such persons. This would be their belief in the existence of permanent self. When there would be the (wrong) view about mine, there will be affection for mine. Thus emancipation will go away from those who have accumulated bondages due to very strong affection for 'I' and 'mine'.

If you maintain, one never has any affection for self. (then we ask,) what kind of reasoning is this, "affection is generated with respect to non-self by misidentifying it as self, but no affection is produced with respect to self."?
Therefore, the wrong view has arisen like a tumor in this discipline: viz. some have a (wrong) conception is that there is pudgala, some have a (wrong) conception is that everything is non-existence. The defect of non-existence of mokṣa is non-waveringly applicable to the philosophers of other schools who maintain that self is another substance.

<Vātsiputrīya> If in that case self doesn't exist by any means, How does recollection or recognition of an object experienced long before occur in the momentary mind (ksanikesu citteṣu)?

<Vasubandhu> It is due to the particular mind (cittaviśeṣa) which is connected with the cognition of the object of memory.

<Vātsiputrīya> What kind of particular mind is it, immediately after which memory takes place?

<Vasubandhu> It is (1) the mind which is bent towards (ābhoga) the object of memory, and (2) the mind which has a cognition which resembles or is connected to that (object). (3) The mind should also be such that its influence is not obstructed the things such as the particular support (āśraya), grief and distraction.

The particular mind which is similar to the earlier one but not related to it, is not capable of generating the particular memory. Similarly, the particular mind which is related to the earlier one but similar to something else, is also not capable of generating the particular memory. But the mind is capable, if both the conditions are fulfilled. Memory occurs in this way. Because, the capability of producing memory is not seen in any other kind of mind.
<Vātsīputrīya> How does a mind recollect that which is seen by another mind? Because by the same token, Yajñadatta's mind will recollect what is seen by Devadatta's mind.

<Vasubandhu> No, that is not the case, because of non-relation. Because there's no relation between the two (i.e. the minds of Devadatta & Yajñadatta). Because there's no cause-effect relationship between them, like there is the one between two items belonging to the same continuum. We are not saying that one mind remembers what is seen by another mind. But we are saying that from perceptual mind a different one, i.e. recollective mind arises.

It happens by means of evolution of a continuum (samītati pariṇatī), as we have said before. What is the fault then? Moreover, recognition arises from recollection.

<Vātsīputrīya> When ātman does not exist, who is this who recollects?
<Vasubandhu> What is the meaning of the word 'recollect'?
<Vātsīputrīya> He grasps the object by recollection.
<Vasubandhu> Is that grasping different from recollection?
<Vātsīputrīya> Who makes recollection (according to you) then?
<Vasubandhu> It has been stated as to who makes that. [473] It is the particular mind which is the cause of recollection.

<Vātsīputrīya> Then, what about the statement that Caitra remembers?
<Vasubandhu> The statement 'Caitra remembers' is made from the point of view that recollection arises from the continuum called Caitra.

<Vātsīputrīya> If there is no ātman then whose memory is this?

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<Vasubandhu> In what sense is this genitive case used?

<Vāṭśīputrīya> In the sense of owner.

<Vasubandhu> Who, for example, is the owner of whom?

<Vāṭśīputrīya> For example, Caitra is the owner of cow.

<Vasubandhu> How is he the owner of hers (cow's)?

<Vāṭśīputrīya> Because utilization of her for carrying and giving milk, etc, depends on him.

<Vasubandhu> Then, where should the recollection be utilized, the owner of which is being searched for?

<Vāṭśīputrīya> [Recollection is to be utilized] for the object to be remembered.

<Vasubandhu> For what purpose should it be utilized?

<Vāṭśīputrīya> For the purpose of recollection.

<Vasubandhu> How intelligent are the statements of the idle ones! The same thing is to be utilized for the purpose of the same! Moreover, how should it be utilized? Is it by producing or by sending it?

<Vāṭśīputrīya> It can be utilized by producing because memory can not move.

<Vasubandhu> So the owner here becomes the cause, and the effect is the owned object. Since cause has the mastery over the effect, and because of the effect cause becomes the possessor. That is because the memory belongs to the one who is the cause of it. The series of the conditioned things which is named
as Caitra is called the owner of something called cow in one sense. The series called Caitra is the cause of movements and other changes in the cow.

Indeed, there is neither single entity called Caitra nor called cow. In that example also there is no relation of ownership setting aside the causal relation. The same thing can be said in the cases like "who knows", "who has cognition", etc.

Here, the difference is that the cause of the cognition consists of sense organ (indriya), objects (arthā), attention (manaskāra) etc, as they may be applicable.

<Vātsīputrīya> "Since every action requires some agents, all actions are related to agents. In the sentence "Devadatta goes", going is the act which requires the goer, namely Devadatta. Similarly cognition is an act. Therefore, there has to be someone who cognizes."

<Vasubandhu> Whosoever said this, should be answered as follows. "Who is this Devadatta? If he is ātman then this itself is to be proved. If he is a person (puruṣa) as called in common usage, even then he is not a single entity. They are just conditioned things which are called by this name. In that case, as we say "Devadatta goes", in the same way, we say "Devadatta cognizes."

<Vātsīputrīya> How does Devadatta go?

<Vasubandhu> The conditioned things which are momentary, which are unbroken series, and which are confused as Devadatta by ignorant persons by taking it to be a single being or organism, are described as 'Devadatta goes' when they become the cause of their own series in another place. Going is the
production (of the series) in another place. It is like the use of the words "goes" or "going" in the case of flame series and sound series.

Those very conditioned things, when they become the cause of cognition (vijñāna), are described as "Devadatta cognizes". Noble persons also describe them by their names (such as Devadatta) for the sake of conventional practice.

<Vātsiputra> What does the cognition do when it is described in the sūtra as "cognition cognizes"?

<Vasubandhu> It doesn't do anything. For instance, we say that effect follows the cause because it attains its own identity through similarity without doing anything.

Similarly, we say that cognition cognizes because it attains its own identity through similarity without doing anything.

<Vātsiputra> What is the similarity of it (cognition with what it cognizes)?

[474] <Vasubandhu> That is having the same form as the object. Therefore we say that cognition cognizes the object, and not that the sense organ cognizes, although cognition is produced from the sense organ. Or, as we have seen before, the series of cognitions are the cause of (individual) cognition. So the statement "cognition cognizes" is faultless, because the word 'agent' can be used in the sense of a cause. This is like the statement "Bell rings." And we also say "cognition cognizes", like one says "lamp moves". Then how does the lamp move? The word "lamp" is used indirectly to mean the series of flames. When it arises in another place, we say that it moves to the other place. In the same way, the word 'cognition' is also used indirectly to mean the series of
minds. When it arises with respect to another object, we say that it cognizes that object. Just like, when we say, 'the material object arises' or 'the material object stays', there is no separate agent (bhavatṛ viz. the material object) apart from its existence (bhava), the case of cognition would be similar.

<Vātsīpatrīya> If cognition arises from [previous] cognition, not from ātman, why does it not arise always resembling the earlier cognition? Or why not in the proper order like sprout, stems, leaves, etc.?

<Vasubandhu> Because lasting and continuous change (sthityanyathārva) is the defining characteristic (lakṣaṇa) of conditioned things. It is the very nature (svabhāva) of a conditioned thing that its series necessarily undergoes change (prabandhasānyathārva) Otherwise, in the case of those who are content with an extreme meditation will not come out spontaneously from meditation even afterwards, since similar body and mind which arise (in meditation) are not distinguishable from the earlier momentary occurrences.

Mind has a well-regulated order. Because the mind arises from that cause alone, from which it should arise. Among (different) similar minds, only a particular mind is capable of producing (certain other mind) though it is similar to another mind because it has a different root (gotraviśeṣa). Whenever an ascetic thinks of a woman, immediately the mind having hatred of her body follows. Or, in the case of a layman, a thought about her husband and son, etc arises, and subsequently by the maturation of succession (saṁtati pariṇātaya), the thought about the woman arises again. Depending on root (gotra), the mind having hatred of body arises, or the thought about her husband, son, etc. arises.
It is not capable otherwise. Or alternatively, the thought (citta) about woman may give rise to various minds or some kinds of mind with greater intensity or proximity because of the power of the respective contemplation. This happens except in the case of the specific immediate bodily or external experience.

<Vātsīputrīya> Why doesn't the same powerful contemplation (bhāvana) produce its result every time?

<Vasubandhu> Because lasting and continuous change are the defining characteristics of the conditioned things. This changing character is appropriate to the producing of the result of a different contemplation. This is just the direction for (understanding) all types of mind. The Buddhas, however, are expert in knowing immediate causes.

This is how it is said “Even a single eye of the peacock's feather has all sorts of causes. They can not be known by non-omniscient persons, because the power to know them belongs to the omniscient person.” (If this is the case with material form) what to say of the different kinds of minds which are non-material? [475] There is someone belonging to a heretic school (Vaiśeṣika) who thinks that mind (citta) arises from the ātman. He becomes subject to this clear objection. Why does it not always occur in the same form, or in the fixed order like this: sprout, stem, leaves, etc.

<Vaiśeṣika> [Mind (citta) arises like that,] because mind (citta) depends upon the specific conjunction (samyoga) of ātman with manas.

<Vasubandhu> No, because conjunction as a different category (from the conjoined objects) is not established according to us. Moreover the things
having conjunction are limited in size, and conjunction by definition (lakṣaṇa) is attainment (prāpti) of one thing by the other after non-attainment (aprāpti) of it. Hence, there will be the undesirable situation that ātman will be limited in size. In that case (if ātman has a limited size), when there is movement of manas, there would be movement of ātman also. Or there would be destruction of ātman (because anything with limited size is subject to destruction).

<Vaiśeṣika> There is a conjunction of manas with the region [of ātman].

<Vasubandhu> No, a thing can not be the same as its region. Or let there be conjunction even then. But when manas is always the same, how is a different specific conjunction possible?

<Vaiśeṣika> It is possible depending upon the different cognition (buddhi).

<Vasubandhu> The same is being objected the above (namely) how is different cognition possible?

<Vaiśeṣika> (There is a different cognition) because of the conjunction between ātman and manas which is relative to different impression (saṃskāra). (of prior experience).

<Vasubandhu> Why not let these arise from mind (citta) relative to different impression (saṃskāra)? No power is seen in ātman. Just as the recitation of the 'Pha! Svāha! etc.' by a cheating-doctor has no power in bringing about the effect of a medicine. If you say, “When ātman exists, they (citta & saṃskāra) are possible, it is only words [without truth]. If you say, "ātman is the support (āśraya)", we may ask "who is the support of whom?" They (=cognition) are
not the super-strata like a picture or a jujube fruit. Nor is ātman properly a substratum like a wall or a vessel [respectively]. It can not be the support [of citta & sāṃskāra], due to the two defects, namely resistance (pratighātītvā) and conjointness (yutatva) [that is existence in different places]. In what way [is ātman substratum] then? If you say that it is like earth in relation to smell etc, we are too satisfied with this [explanation]. This (explanation) rather shows us that there is no ātman just as there is no earth apart from smell, etc. Who is the gentleman who ascertains earth as other than smell etc? Verbal description like 'there is smell in earth' is meant only for distinguishing [earth from water etc]. So that only smell, etc. should be known as having that name, [namely, earth] and nothing else. It (i.e. the nomenclature of smell etc. as earth) is like the nomenclature of statue of wood as body.

<Vasubandhu> Even though it (the connection between ātman and manas) depends upon a specific kind of impression (sāṃskāra), why do not all the cognitions arise simultaneously?

<Vaiśeṣika> Out of those impressions a specific kind of impression whichever is the most powerful obstructs other impressions.

<Vasubandhu> Why does not always the most powerful one produce the result? Whatever the reasoning is applicable to impression [that is sāṃskāra viśeṣa according to Vaiśeṣika], let the same be applicable to contemplation meditative cultivation⁴²⁰ (as accepted by Buddhist). But ātman is imagined without any purpose.

⁴²⁰ bhāvana, it could be the same as vāsanā, latent impression of past actions.
<Vaiśesika> Ātman should indeed be postulated. Because memory, etc., belong to the category of quality (guna), and that category of quality resides necessarily in a substance (dravya). And they can not have any other things as a support (āśraya).

<Vasubandhu> I don't accept it. It is not proved that they (memory etc.) belong to the category of quality. [476] Everything that exists is a substance for us. It is said that "There are six substances (pañcaskandha and asamskṛta) which are the results of Śramānahood. Nor is it proved that they reside in substances. The notion of support (āśraya) is already examined. Therefore what you say is not worth consideration.

<Vaiśeṣika> In the absence of ātman, what is the purpose behind starting any action?

<Vasubandhu> Let me become happy; let me not become unhappy. This is the purpose.

<Vaiśeṣika> Who is this 'I' which is the object of this notion of I?

<Vasubandhu> The skandhas are the object [of the notion of I].

<Vaiśeṣika> How is it known?

<Vasubandhu> Because of the attachment towards them (skandhas). Since the notion of fairness etc. refers to the same subject (as I). [We say] I am fair; I am dark; I am fat; I am thin; I am old; I am young etc. In this way the notions such as I are seen as referring to the same subject as the notion of I.

These are not seen as the kinds of ātman. Therefore, for this reason too, this notion of I is known to be applicable to skandhas.
<Vaiśeṣika> The body which is useful to ātman is also called ātman in derivative sense. For instance, whatever is he is the same as me, my servant is the same as that (me). The derivative use of the word ātman is possible in the case of a thing useful (to ātman), but the notion of I is not so possible.

<Vaiśeṣika> If the notion of I can assume body as its object, why does it not accept other bodies as its objects?

<Vasubandhu> Because of the absence of connection (asambandha). The notion of I arises only with the body or mind (citta), with which it has connection. It arises nowhere else, since this has been recurring in the beginningless world process.

<Vaiśeṣika> And what is the connection?

<Vasubandhu> The relation of cause and effect.

<Vaiśeṣika> If ātman doesn't exist, to whose notion of I is this?

<Vasubandhu> Again the same question has arisen. "What is the meaning of this genitive case?" The notion of I belongs to that whatever is its cause.

<Vaiśeṣika> And what else is the cause?

<Vasubandhu> It is [nothing but] a defiled mind which is influenced by earlier notion of I and has its own continuum for its object.

<Vaiśeṣika> If ātman doesn't exist, who is the one who has pleasure or pain?

<Vasubandhu> It is the support (āśraya) in which pleasure or pain arises. It (=the expression, one is pleased or displeased) is like the expressions "tree is flowery" and "forest is full of fruits".

<Vaiśeṣika> Again who is the support of these two (pleasure and pain)?
<Vasubandhu> Six āyatanas are the support. How they are so is already explained.

<Vaiśeṣika> When ātman doesn't exist, who is the doer of these actions and who becomes the enjoyer of the fruits (of this action)?

<Vasubandhu> The doer. What is the referential meaning of the word 'doer'?

<Vaiśeṣika> One who does is the doer. One who enjoys is the enjoyer.

<Vasubandhu> You are stating the synonym, not the meaning.

<Vaiśeṣika> Grammarians explain the definition of doer as "doer is the one who is self-dependent." Someone has self-dependent role in some actions. In the world, it is seen that Devadatta (some person) has freedom in the actions like bathing, sitting and going.

<Vasubandhu> Whom are you referring to as Devadatta? If you are referring to ātman [by the word Devadatta], he (ātman) is to be proved. If you are referring to the sets of five skandhas, he is the doer.

This action is threefold, namely bodily, verbal and mental action. Out of them in the bodily action, body becomes active depending upon mind. Mind is also active with respect to body depending upon its own causes. The latter is also active depending upon its own cause and so on. Hence nothing is self-dependent, because all the things are active depending upon their causes. Ātman also can not be proved to be self-dependent because he can not be accepted as a cause independently [of other factors]. Therefore, the doer with this characteristic (viz. self-dependence) is not obtained.
Whatever is the principal cause of anything, that is called doer of that thing; and ātman is not seen anywhere to be a cause. [477] Therefore, in this way also, ātman can not be the doer. From memory (smṛti), there arises a desire (chanda); from that desire arises thought (vītarka); from thought arises effort (prayātma); from effort arises motor energy (vāyu); from motor energy arises action (karma). What does ātman do in this [process]?

Moreover, what is the enjoyment of result by doing which ātman is regarded as an enjoayer? If you say that enjoyment is experience (upalabdhir), then (we say,) ātman has no capacity for experience, because the capacity of ātman in the case of consciousness (vijñāna) is refuted.

<Vaiśeṣika> When ātman does not exist, why does not the non-sentient being (asattva) accumulate merit and demerit?

<Vasubandhu> Because non-sentient being do not possess sensation (vedāna) etc. The supports of sensation etc. are the six-āyatanas, not ātman. How ātman is not the support is already stated.

<Vaiśeṣika> In the absence of ātman, how is the production of result in future possible from the action which is destroyed.

<Vasubandhu> Even though ātman exists, how could there be the production of the result in future from an action which is destroyed?

<Vaiśeṣika> The production of result is from the merit and demerit which reside in ātman.

<Vasubandhu> ‘Who resides in what’, this kind of argument has already been answered. Therefore, let the fruition arise from merit and demerit which
are not supported by anything. Never we speak of the production of the result in the future from destroyed action. What then? (We say,) It arises from this specific transformation of continuum of karma, like the fruit (which arises) from (the specific transformation of the continuum of) the seed. We say that the fruit arises from the seed; we don't say that it arises from the disappeared seed. Nor does it arise immediately from the seed. What then? That arises from the specific transformation of continuum which arises by certain order, i.e. sprout, stem, leaves etc., and which is completed by flower.

<Vaiśeṣika> How then the fruit which actually arises from flower is said to be the fruit of that seed?

<Vasubandhu> Because the power [to produce the fruit] is put in the last flower by that (i.e. seed). Because if that (flower) had not arisen from the earlier cause (i.e. seed) then it would not have been capable of producing fruit of that kind. So it is said that fruit arises from an action (karma). Neither that (fruit) arises from the destroyed actions nor from immediately after the action. How then? It (=fruit) arises from the specific transformation of continuum of that (=action).

<Vaiśeṣika> And what is continuum? What is the transformation? What is the specificity?

<Vasubandhu> The rise of mind one after the other before the action (karma) is called continuum. Transformation is its production in another form. Now the transformation which is capable of producing the result immediately is this
specific transformation, because it is specified by the last transformation. For example, the mind at the time of death is the cause of the next birth.

Although the fruit is preceded by three kinds of action, the capacity (to produce the fruit) is indicated to belong to that action which is either heavy or proximate or repeated and not as belonging to any other action.

"In the transmigration of karmas, these will be maturing first in order. That is, heavy karma, proximate karma, repeated karma and the karma performed previously (that is, in previous life)." The capacity deposited in actions by the maturation cause (vipāka-hetu) to produce the effect by maturation ceases after giving the mature result. The capacity of defiled actions to produce the effect of uniform outflow (niṣyanda-phala) which is deposited in them by the homogeneous cause (sabhāga-hetu) ceases due to the rise of the opposing factors. In the case of non-defile actions, the capacity ceases due to complete cessation of mind series (cittasantāna) when one obtains parinirvāṇa. [478]

<Vaiśeṣika> Then, why does not arise another maturation (vipāka) from one maturation, just as another fruit arises from the fruit arising from the seed?

<Vasubandhu> Everything does not become similar from an analogy, but even in that case another fruit doesn't result from the fruit itself.

<Vaiśeṣika> What then?

<Vasubandhu> It arises from a particular transformation (of the fruit) caused by particular wetting (viklitti). The kind of element (bhūta) which produces the sprout is its seed, none else. Even the earlier continuum (for example, dry seed) is called 'seed' either by way of future indicating term or due to similarity. In

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the same way, if from a mature fruit there arises impurely (sāsrava) good or bad transformation of mind caused by the particular causal conditions such as suggest listening to right or wrong moral teaching, then, there arises another mature result. It will not arise in another way. The two cases are similar in this way. Or this idea may be understood in this way. If a Mātulūṅga flower is sprinkled by the liquid lac, a red fiber arises in its fruit due to a particular transformation of the continuum. But from this red fiber, no other red fiber arises (in the fruit produced from that fruit). Similarly, from the mature result (vipāka) which arises from action, there is no arising of another mature result (vipāka).

We have demonstrated this in a gross way as was intelligible to our intellect. But, the Buddhas only can have knowledge of this kind: These continua which are scented by different actions (karma) having various kinds of powers (sakti) have reached this stage and are producing this kind of fruit (phala).

Actions, its impression, attainment of its operation and the fruit caused by it. None other than the Buddha can ever know this by rule.

Having listened to this dharmatā (the doctrine of non-self) taught by the Buddhas, which is pure due to the well arranged path of argument, the good-sighted persons produced (from saṃskāra to nirvāṇa) by rejecting the doctrines of blind heretics characterized by various machinations of wrong dogmatism. This selfless (nirātmatām), the only path to the city of nirvāṇa, is illuminated by the words of Tathāgatas like the rays of sun. This path is traversed by thousands of saints; although well-explained it is not perceived by the short-
sighted. I have stated this just as a direction for the very learned; it is like directing poison to the wound through which it will diffuse by its own power.