CHAPTER V

PAKISTAN’S TWO LEVEL STRATEGY SINCE 1987

Introduction

The contemporary phase of Pakistan’s two level strategy on Kashmir is the result of its evolution right from the partition of the sub-continent in 1947, and has been already traced out in the past chapters, needless to mention that the strategy, as a result of this evolution, is much more refined and sophisticated because of lessons learnt from past failures and experiences gained over more than 40 years, and is therefore, much more effective. The single minded, determined approach of Pakistan from not deviating from its approach to this strategy must be appreciated. They have not only been implementing this strategy, time after time, war after war with unwavering conviction and faith, but have constantly made efforts to refine and redefine it in the light of changing socio-political, economic, and geo-strategic situations, regionally and internationally. Failures of the strategy, which have been many, during the last fifty years and more, have neither deterred, nor forced them to abandon it. Air Marshall (retired) Nur Khan of Pakistan Airforce while writing in an editorial in 'Jang' in 1987, hinted at Pakistan’s two level strategy, saying, “In 1948 a limited war was fought with India over the Kashmir issue... while we were fighting in Kashmir, our government was not owning full responsibility for this war... if the object of this ‘clandestine’ war was to liberate Kashmir, we failed to achieve it.... The second war with India was fought in 1965 (while the writer was the Chief of Air Staff)... but we were told that all was well and that the USA had assured us that there would be no attack from the Indian side... the truth is that some responsible member of the Pakistani government had without full preparations sent in their commando’s into Kashmir. Only a few persons in the cabinet knew anything about it. Then suddenly we were embroiled in a war”.1 This editorial by a very senior and responsible military officer of Pakistan lays bare the facts that allude to Pakistan’s two level strategy: (a) Pakistani politicians push in infiltrators/commando’s into battle in Kashmir while, all the time,

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denying their involvement; (b) Pakistani political leadership banks on the diplomatic/or military support of its foreign allies, be it USA or China; (c) Declare open war only after first sending in its Commando’s or infiltrators into Kashmir. The Kargil conflict of May-July 1999, is the latest, in line, with this strategy.

Ikram Sehgal, noted Pakistani journalist, writing on Pakistan’s current thoughts on operation Gibraltar-2, in Pakistan’s Defence Journal states: “A mixture of volunteers from the Army, mainly those belonging to Azad Kashmir and fresh recruits from our side of the Cease Fire Line (CFL) in Kashmir were hurriedly trained and launched into the valley in late July/early August 1965... Operation Gibraltar... failed mainly because, viz (1) conditions within Indian held Kashmir were not conducive (2) major percentage of the personnel of the guerrilla bands were neither well trained enough nor battle hardened and (3) there was no plan to support them with attack by either a main force or even a logistic replenishment”. The writer then expresses his views on the implementation of a similar plan, under the favourable conditions that are now available in the valley. He writes: “In our history there will not be a more golden opportunity than at the present time to settle the Kashmir issue once and for all... Let us go back to the fundamental criteria for Gibraltar which were ignored and which now exist, viz (1) conditions within Indian Held Kashmir now exist after a decade old internal revolt by Kashmiri Mujahideen (2) battle hardened Kashmiri Mujahideen now will form the core of the groups if allowed to cross over the LoC in strength (3) about 75,000-100,000 well trained battle hardened volunteer Afghan Mujahideen are only a day or two’s drive away from the LoC and (4) hopefully, something like Operation Grand Slam, the end run to take Aknur in 1965, will be attempted in strength at not one but over a dozen places with the Afghan Mujahideen to link up with the guerrillas within Indian Held Kashmir”.2 This precisely is the two level strategy of Pakistan in Kashmir since 1987, which this study is attempting to bring into focus. From Pakistan’s perspective, as highlighted by Ikram Sehgal, their level one phase of the strategy is on course and progressing well. As far as level two is concerned, perhaps they feel that as of now the regional and international environment is not fully favourable to its immediate implementation - their limited experiment in Kargil further endorses this view. Therefore, till the time is not right, Pakistan’s level two strategy during

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this period will be confined to the use of diplomatic force primarily, while it will keep the use of military force to the minimum, till the right moment presents itself.

FACTORS INFLUENCING RISE OF MILITANCY IN J&K

Notwithstanding the above, by now it must be clear, that the incipient seeds of dissent were always present in J&K, since partition. But the people of the state never rose up in a mass armed rebellion as they have done now. A Kashmiri is by nature a docile peace loving person, not given to violence, but at the same time there is a steely resolve of fierce independence in him, which has been in evidence since 1947-48. From the beginning, even a common man on the street in Srinagar would clearly and fearlessly proclaim that he is neither an Indian nor a Pakistani but a Kashmiri. Over the years he had accepted the fact that whether he likes it or not his destiny has been tied with that of India and he was quite happy about it. Though, periodic dissent in one form or the other kept occurring, mostly politically or religiously motivated. Fifteen years back if the possibility of an armed insurgency in Kashmir was ever discussed, it was duly disposed off with an indulgent and sometimes humorous, no. How come then, an impossible situation has become possible and has today reached a stage where it threatens the security of this country. A look at the factors contributing to the rise of militancy in the valley is therefore called for.

The Rajiv-Farooq Accord: Unfair Elections: The Rajiv Farooq Accord of November 1986 was a major cause for the present state in Kashmir. It was actually an unwritten accord, a mere declaration to work together and form a coalition government of the National Conference and the Congress (I). There was an informal understanding that power would be shared in the ratio of 60:40. The accord might have yielded positive results if it had been inspired by some reformative zeal and constructive approach. But both parties joined hands merely to serve their selfish ends. In practice, the Accord only resulted in enlarging the circle of predatory and insensitive oligarchy.

For the 1987 elections, the Jamat-i-Islami the Awami Action Committee and other small parties with fundamentalist leanings came together to form a Muslim United Front

4 Ibid.
(MUF). They decided to confront the National Conference and Congress (I) combine jointly. Despite the fact that the MUF enjoyed much more popularity and sympathy among the Kashmiris than the NC-Congress (I) combine, it just won only four seats. MUF took advantage of the situation and the popularity it enjoyed to convince the people that the elections were not only a sham but a fraud committed on the people by mass scale rigging. They fully exploited this opportunity to spread a pro-Pakistan and anti India wave in the valley. The new Government seemed oblivious not only to the distant thunder but in fact refused to hear the shrieking voices of the storm around the house.

The unpalatable reality is the sense of betrayal, mistrust, suspicion and most of all, loss of faith in the political leadership at the state and the centre level, felt by the common man in J&K, after the 1987 elections. This became one of the immediate causes for the birth of militancy in the State of J&K. The manner in which the State Assembly elections of March 23, 1987 were conducted caused grave misgivings about their fairness and the cry of “rigging” started ringing all over the state specially the valley. Inderjit Badhwar reported for India Today from Srinagar “Report of rigging and strong arm tactics kept pouring in from all over the valley.... The fact that details of the election results remained unannounced almost a week after the poling had ended gave credence to opposition charges that there was rigging and electoral bungling... The backlash has always been a flight to obscurantist or secessionist causes... In fact, the signs of a backlash are already there. Farooq faces a formidable challenge... if he fails, increasing numbers of young voters - there will be 24 per cent new ones in the next elections will be drawn into anti national causes as a protest". 5

Protests started in the valley almost immediately after the elections. They represented a growing movement against corruption, the dynastic rule of the Abdullah family and Farooq’s accord with a party that is seen as serving New Delhi’s interest. A series of agitations and violent demonstrations besieged the Chief Minister and spread throughout the valley like wild fire. It, in reality, was the festering resentment against the NC-Congress(I) coalition Government and disillusionment with politics in general that had manifested itself in a series of agitations that took place through the winter. The reactions were angry, it seemed open seasons for agitators, school teachers also struck work, demanding University Grants

5 India Today (New Delhi), April 15, 1987, pp.76-78.
Commission Lecturer grades. the agriculture department was paralysed with separate agitations. The repression that followed was so severe that the Kashmir Times ran an editorial against the Government. Even Mr. Rashid Kabli, the NC(F) MP and founder of the parties youth wing (in 1964) admitted “It is true we arrested Candidates, and innocent workers and youngsters are in jail. This has created a volcanic atmosphere. I pray that we don’t create another Punjab here”.6 Prophetic words indeed.

The rigging issue and the un-holy Rajiv-Farooq alliance eventually became the immediate cause of the current trouble in J&K. But, there were a host of internal and external events and issues that directly influenced the Kashmir embroglio. The year 1987, was significant in the political history of not only India but of the entire subcontinent. It was an eventful year that left indelible foot prints in the chequered story of Indo-Pak relations, and ‘inter-alia’ impacted on the Kashmir situation. A brief recapitulation of such events need necessarily be undertaken at this juncture, because of the fact, that 1987, has been taken as the Bench mark for the purpose of the research.

**Internal Security Environment: The Punjab Militancy:** The internal security environment of the country during the year was, perhaps, the worst ever experienced. New trouble spots had started erupting all around, in the country. Trouble spots, that had violent and dangerous undertones since they were associated with ethno-religious-separatist movements, and widespread sectarian violence was rife all over the country. The state of Jammu and Kashmir was being directly and indirectly effected by these events. In the neighbouring state of Punjab, militancy, was perhaps, at its peak and threatening to overflow into Jammu and Kashmir.

“The slaughter of 70 bus passengers in Punjab and Haryana in swift succession (July 6 and 7, 1987) suddenly brought Sikh terrorism into infinitely closer focus… In the last 30 days, 223 persons have been killed by terrorists, an average of seven everyday… That the Khalistanies have reached this final stage (of terrorism) is now evident”.7 "Presidents rule in Punjab had been imposed on May 11, 1987 for a period of six months (It had last been in force in Punjab from October 1983 to late September 1985). The reason was the parallel authority led by fundamentalist and/or extremists in the state and the lack of Government control led by Akali Dal Governments Chief Minister Surjit Singh Barnala. Gen. Arun Vaidya, who retired in late January 1986, as Army Chief of Staff, was assassinated in Pune on August 10, 1987 by Sikh

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6 India Today (New Delhi), September 15, 1987, pp.42-47 (as reported by Inderjit Budhwar).
7 India Today (New Delhi), July 15, 1987.
extremists. Gen. Vaidya had been in charge of Operation Blue Star in June 1984".8

In an editorial in the Hindustan Times, Pran Chopra, the eminent journalist stated “If New Delhi did not stop playing with fire in Punjab, it could loose Kashmir. Disorder and militancy would spread from Punjab to Kashmir and would cut off the valley from the rest of the country, first politically, then logistically.... Thereafter even if order was restored in Punjab it would be too late to do so in Kashmir because events inspired by Pakistan, and then Pakistan itself, would extinguish India’s option”.9

The writer further states, “Normal political processes were thus deviled in both states, plunging both in political and civil chaos. Events in Punjab so heated the atmosphere everywhere, especially in adjoining Kashmir, that they aided violence and terrorism. At the same time along the borders of both states with Pakistan and with each other, new entry points opened up for arms and trained subversives to come in: if they were blocked in one state they could enter the other and spread out in both. The fire not only spread to Kashmir from Punjab.... It began to burn more fiercely in Kashmir than in Punjab”.10 Inderjit Budhwar reporting for India Today from Kashmir, sent this despatch, "Says Mustaq a shopkeeper, pointing to an unpaved road: This is our ‘parikrama’ leading to our Akal Takht. It is here that the Indians will have to mount operation Red Star. But we are not afraid. When you come here next year you will have to bring your passport and the crowd around him intones in chorus ‘Inshallah’. This then was the extent of the effect of terrorism in Punjab on the Kashmiri’s.11

It would be relevant to surmise that the protracted state of militancy in favour of a demand for a separate state of ‘Khalistan’, taking place in the neighbouring state of Punjab, openly supported from across the border by Pakistan, was bound to influence the political environment of Jammu and Kashmir, which, as already brought out, was sitting on a tinder

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10 Ibid.
11 India Today (New Delhi), May 31, 1989, p.71 (Cover Story).
box. A vast majority of frustrated, dissatisfied and unemployed youth in the state were ready to heed the call of ‘Azadi’.

Call for ‘Gorkhaland’: The other contributory factor influencing the rise of militancy in J&K, was, perhaps, the call for ‘Gorkhaland’ raised by Subhash Ghising’s Gurkha National Liberation Front (GNLF), in the North Eastern hilly region of Darjeeling during 1987. Some 60 percent of India’s 1,500,000 Nepali speaking citizens live within the area claimed by GNLF, comprising the overwhelming Nepali speaking hill districts of Darjeeling, Kurseong and Kalimpong, parts of Jalpaiguri and Cooch Bihar districts. This area is considered to be of strategic importance to India, the Chumbi valley to its North (between Bhutan and the state of Sikkim) being recognised as a point of vulnerability on the Sino-Indian border. The GNLF, had written to King Birendra of Nepal outlining the GNLF’s case for a separate state and calling for Nepalese support. This letter was subsequently re-circulated in March 1985 to various heads of state and UN officials. GNLF became militant in 1985 and between 1985-87 more than 200 lives were lost in agitations/militant activities. Besides other, the major demand of GNLF was a separate state within the Indian Union.12

An analysis of the movements in J&K and Darjeeling reveal some major similarities that indicate that they could have been influenced by each other. Both the places were geographically of strategic importance to India. Both places had common borders with countries inimical to India. The movements in both places revealed proof of strong outside support. Both movements favoured internationalization of their dispute: The difference was that while one (J&K) was in favour of secession the other (GNLF) was in favour of a separate state within the Indian Union.

The ULFA and Bodo Movements in Assam: In the North East, besides the age old Naga and Mizo separatist movement, new militant secessionist movement also surfaced in Assam led by the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). A byproduct of the prolonged Assam agitation, the group enjoys winning public sympathy as it talks of the states neglect by the Centre and the necessity of retaining the Assamese identity. It also proclaims that it will eliminate the exploiters and the corrupt. In 1987, ULFA launched a violent campaign against non-Assamese businessmen and political leaders. So successful was UFLA’s reign of terror

12 Keesings Record of World Events, vol.XXXIII, no.6, 1987, pp.35202-35203.
During 1987, that, the streets in almost the entire state of Assam would be deserted by sunset and the political leadership and state police were rendered in effectual.

During the same year, the Bodos of Kokrajhar and Goalpara in Assam also launched a terrorist campaign for a separate state, spearheaded by the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB). Ved Marwah writes “They are near the strategic corridor which connects the North East by rail and road with the rest of the country. The demand for a separate state of Bodoland encompasses the whole of the Northern Bank of Brahmaputra... The demand of the Bodos as well as of the Karbis and Mishings for a separate state is due to the fear of domination by the non Bodo majority... By 1987, terrorism by Bodo militants had reached a new peak”.\(^\text{13}\) These new terrorist movements in Assam, in 1987, must surely have influenced the rise of militancy in Jammu and Kashmir.

The Impact of Meerut Communal Riots of 1987, on Jammu and Kashmir Politics:

The Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid controversy involving a mosque constructed at Ayodhya in 1528A.D. on the site which is believed to be the birth-spot of Shri Ram, has long been a ‘fault line’ between the Hindus and Muslims in India. In April 1987, communal tensions in Uttar Pradesh once against erupted on this issue. At Meerut a small and tragic misunderstanding between two colonies of Muslims, celebrating ‘Shab-e-Baraat’ with the traditional fireworks competition led to a clash between them. Hindus in the neighbourhood, confused by the commotion thought they were being attacked, quickly retaliated. “This was enough to leave a trial of havoc that left 10 killed, 23 injured, 52 shops burnt and property worth lakhs destroyed”.\(^\text{14}\)

During the month of May (Ramzan) 1987, massive communal riots broke out at Hashimpura in Meerut. In the 10 days of “unprecedented communal frenzy in which more than 150 people died and 1,000 were wounded. More than Rs.20 crore worth of property lay destroyed... but just as things appeared to be returning to normal, there occurred a massacre that will probably go down in police history as one of the worst cases of police brutality... Maliana, a small cluster of villages 5 kms from Meerut had not yet come under curfew. A PAC (Provincial Armed Constabulary) platoon had been sent there to keep the tension under


\(^{14}\) India Today (New Delhi), May 15, 1987, p.65 (Article by Tania Midha).
control... May 23, the PAC contingent arrived. Joined by some Hindu residents. They began burning down Muslim houses. It took them precisely two hours to complete the task they had assigned themselves. At the end of those two hours nothing stirred in Maliana.... The PAC unit was quietly withdrawn and the army sent in.... Army officers admitted on condition of anonymity that they had personally counted over 50 bodies when they arrived in Maliana".15

As it always happens under these conditions, Pakistan and under its influence, the state of Jammu and Kashmir were quick to take advantage of the situation and play their anti Indian/anti Hindu card. "This became amply evident, following the Meerut killings in May, when Farooq's party issued a call for a statewide bandh".16 Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, who was a Minister in the Central Government immediately resigned from his appointment in protest. Inderjit Budhwar, writing for India Today's said "His credibility has risen as the people see him as a committed fighter and the only Kashmiri who dared to quit a Central Ministership. And his condemnation of communalism after the Meerut riots has struck a sympathetic chord among Kashmiri Muslims".17 Pakistan also attempted to twist the incident in order to further incite the Kashmiris. Daily news, a prominent Pakistani English newspaper said "An explosion wrecked a small portion of the roof of the visa section at the Indian consulate at Karachi on May 27 morning... security and police officials investigating the case said that the Indians suspect Kashmiri extremists in the attack... to register their protest against the massacre of Muslims in Meerut and New Delhi".18 The Pakistani Press, as usual, took full advantage of the communal situation in India and tried to internationalize the plight of the Muslim minority in this country, as also attempted to incite them to rise up against the Hindu hegemony. Nawai Waqt an Urdu daily wrote "...ruler of Pakistan, leaders of the Organisation of Islamic Conference and Heads of Muslim countries do feel the gravity of the issue and express solidarity with the Indian Muslim. The organised violation of human rights in India should also draw the attention of international organisations".19 Jang another English

15 India Today (New Delhi), June 15, 1987, pp.30-38. (Cover story by Prabhu Chawla and Inderjit Bhudhwar).
16 India Today (New Delhi), September 15, 1987, p.47.
17 Ibid.
daily observed "The Islamic world will have to take some measures on its own for the protection of the lives of the Muslims who are living oppressed in some countries because they are in a minority" 20

The Meerut communal riots in 1987, therefore, became a contributory factor, towards the creation of the present state of anarchy in J&K by firstly providing the existing sectarian groups in J&K and Pakistan to incite the local people against the Government of the country and secondly by strengthening the cause of the separatist groups in J&K to play their "Islam is in danger of being swamped by Hindu hegemony" card.

**External Factors**

Other external factors that influenced the polity of J&K in 1987, were; heightened border tension on the Indo-Pak border, tension along the Sino-India border, the Sri Lanka intervention by the Indian Army and last but not the least, the Afghan crisis.

**Indo-Pak Tension During 1987** : Three major reasons can be cited for this tension; (a) Controversy over US aid to Pakistan (b) Controversy over Pakistan's nuclear programme and (c) Tension on the Indo-Pak borders. In February 1987 the United States and Pakistan began formal negotiations on a new US and Package to replace a six year agreement worth $3,200 million (equally divided between economic and military aid) concluded in 1981. In early October 1985, Pakistan was reported to be seeking a total of $6,500 million, but the figure eventually agreed between the two governments in March (subject to ratification by the US Congress) was $4,020 million to last for the period October 1987 to September 1993. This coupled with the continued US supply of military equipment, which included a considerable number of F-16 Jet Fighter Aircrafts and a proposed sale of Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) to counter and threat from the presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, raised fears in India that such weapons might be used against India.

Besides this, speculation over Pakistan's nuclear programme increased when on September 15, 1986, a nuclear energy cooperation agreement was signed between Pakistan and China and the Washington Post published an article on November 4, 1986, claiming the US intelligence reports have established that Pakistan was now able to enrich uranium to 93.5 percent (i.e., adequate for military purposes) and more specifically that between September 20

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20 Jang (Pakistan), May 23, 1987, POT, Ibid.
18 and 21 Pakistan had detonated a high explosive device as part of a programme to develop an "implosion" type of nuclear weapon. The UK Observer newspaper published on March 1, 1987, a front page story about the production of weapon grade enriched uranium at the Khan Laboratories some 30 Kms east of Islamabad with interview material in which the leading Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. Abdel Qadir Khan, was quoted as confirming speculation that Pakistan had assembled a nuclear bomb." 21

The Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka and Kashmir

During this critical year, another event that influenced the Kashmir situation, in an indirect manner, is the launching of 'Operation Pawan' by the Indian Army in Sri Lanka. Consequent to the Indo-Sri Lankan accord signed on 29 July 1987, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) landed at Colombo. The accord envisaged the bringing about of peace and security in the Island by disarming the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) by the IPKF. Pakistan, immediately commenced a tirade of criticism against this action by India and started to seek justification of a similar move by Pakistan in Kashmir.

In an article, Salim Durrani, a leading Pakistani writer states "Militarily Sri Lanka is not strong enough to drive the Indian troops out, should the later decide to stay indefinitely... one example to justify Singhalese misgivings may be found in Kashmir, a part of which India occupied by force, and despite their international commitment to hold a plebiscite have not done so". 22 Nawai Waqt another Pakistani daily writes in an editorial "India's armed interference in Sri Lanka should open our eyes... extending the Indian logic of armed interference in Sri Lanka, the Amir of Jamaat-i-Islami, Mian Tufail Mohmmad, has said that to control anti Muslim riots in India, Pakistan, too, should get an opportunity of sending its armed forces to those areas...". 23

Pakistan took advantage of the Indian action in Sri Lanka by hypocritically shouting 'foul' while all the time planning and doing a similar thing in Kashmir. It also found this to be the ideal time to commence active interference in Kashmir, while the bulk of the Indian army

22 Muslim (Pakistan), August 17, 1987 as reported in POT, vol.XV, no.155, August 18, 1987, p.3265.
23 Ibid., p.3348-49.
was involved in the North East and in Sri Lanka. Perhaps, it also found some twisted justification and encouragement by drawing a parallel between India’s support to Tamil’s in Sri Lanka with its support to Kashmiri separatists in Kashmir.

Impact of the Afghan Crisis on Kashmir

With the fall of the Shah of Iran, consequent to the sectarian Islamic fundamentalist revolution there, USA found its base in this strategic part of the world, all but vanished. In Pakistan, it found another bastion to protect its strategic interests in this region in more or less the same way as Iran had done. The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan came as an unexpected opportunity for America to dub Pakistan as a “Frontline State”. A high profile support of the Afghan Mujahideen served the interest of both, albeit with different objectives. The US pursued its Afghan-Pakistan policies as an extension of the ‘Reagan doctrine’ to roll back the ‘evil empire’ in the renewed cold war stage, establishing a military command structure for influencing and controlling its interests in this sensitive region. Pakistan’s agenda on the other hand was to build itself up militarily and economically in relation to India, pursue its nuclear weapons objectives, complicate India’s policy options and neutralize it to the extent possible (by the use of subversion within the Indian border states in the North East, Punjab and Kashmir, while all the time remaining under the protective shadow of USA), and extend its influence in the Islamic countries of the Gulf. Both the US and Pakistan did succeed substantially in their policy goals. The real price was paid by the Afghans on one side and India on the other.

In fact Zia can be regarded as the faithful protégé of the US in the worst period of the Reaganite Cold War. So important was Zia and Pakistan to the whole galaxy of US strategic specialists from Zbigniew Brezezinski and Casper Weinberger to Frank Carlucci, that all of them boosted Zia’s military dictatorship as the bastion against Soviet Communism. The American support of all type and the feeling the USA will keep quiet, may be, tacitly support Pakistani adventure in Kashmir also may very well have prompted, Zia to launch this Kashmir policy during 1987 onwards. Writing about the infusion of ‘gun culture’ in Pakistan during 1987, The Nation reported “The dealers will deliver the weapons anywhere in Pakistan. Picking up an automatic weapon has thus become as simple as going to the corner shop for some aspirin.... All this, places Pakistani society on a powder keg with a short fuze. There is a serious threat to internal peace and stability.... Given the ethnic, culture and
historical linkages, events in Pakistan often have an adverse effect internally in India, it is therefore not unlikely that the confusion in Pakistan may have unpleasant echoes in India, which could be a serious security concern for it". 24 As a matter of fact, by 1987, the Afghan influence and experience had already started showing up in Kashmir and the unpleasant echoes of bomb blasts, staccato sounds of Kalashnikovs and the screams of dying and injured innocents tore asunder the peace and tranquillity of the valley.

By end 1987, the Soviets decided to militarily withdraw from Afghanistan in favour of finding a peaceful political solution to the crisis. (The Geneva accord was signed in April 88 and the Soviets finally began evacuating in 1989). This, however, threatened to erode the success of Pakistan's policy goals. The US support would taper off and the artificially propped up economy would collapse leading to internal chaos. Above all the negative effects of Pakistan's Afghan policy had already started surfacing with a vengeance in the shape of threats to internal peace and stability. Drug trafficking, illicit arms (a large number siphoned off from the US supplies for the Afghan Mujahideens) and ethnic conflicts threatened to destroy the very fabric of Pakistani society and polity. In such a situation, as it has always done in the past, Pakistan, in order to divert the attention of its people once again turned to Kashmir and raised the Kashmir bogey more stridently than ever before.

President Zia-ul-Haq during his visit to Muzaffarabad in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK) from 19-22 July 1987, in a speech said "The people of Pakistan and Kashmir had shed their blood thrice for the freedom of Kashmir and the whole liberated area was witness to this... I can say with confidence that the sacrifices of Mujahideen and their blood would not go in vain and the people of Pakistan and Kashmir would achieve success". 25 During his four day visit Gen. Zia visited and spoke to troops in the forward areas on the importance of the defence of Azad Kashmir as on its successful defence depended the defence of the rest of Pakistan. However, the worst impact of the Afghanistan crisis is likely to be felt after the Taliban forces, which are presently in the process of capturing the entire Afghanistan finish their job. This would release a large number of Afghan Taliban fighters for employment in Kashmir. The Times of India quoting "Times" (of London) and "Janes Defence Weekly"

25 Muslim (Pakistan), 21 July 1987.
reported "Pakistan planned a quick sweep of the Taliban led offensive in Afghanistan followed by withdrawal of 30,000 to 40,000 of these mercenaries for infiltration into Kashmir for what was being calculated by a Pakistani general as a decisive phase in Kashmir".  

Besides the foregoing, internal and external events/factors that shaped the destiny of J&K in 1987, one of the most direct and significant factor was the internal dynamics of the state of J&K during this period. Three of them need to be highlighted.

**Internal Dynamics of J&K: Contribution to Proxy War**

Firstly, the state politics in the valley at this time was perhaps worst than ever. There was little direct liaison between the Government and the people. There were divisions within the Government, the ruling NC-Congress (I) alliance. Farooq Abdullah, was increasingly getting isolated from the people, his own party, his friends and above all the Congress (I). He was finding himself in trouble partly due to his own bumbling and ineptitude. He failed miserably to fulfill the promises of speedy development and efficient government. Congress (I), his political partner blamed him for not taking them into confidence even on such crucial issues as his disastrous proposal for a permanent durbar move to Srinagar. This proposal not only alienated the two partners and created tension between the residents of Jammu and the valley but also forced a critical self examination of the Congress (I)’s role within the ruling coalition. On its part, Congress (I) itself was split from within, with Rajesh Pilot supporting Ghulam Rasool Kar and his PCC (I) nominees and Gulam Nabi Azad and K.N. Singh supporting Ansari, Shafi Qureshi and Rafiq Sadiq.

Secondly, religious fundamentalism and anti nationalism have always gone hand in hand in the valley. During this period, both these sentiments pervaded the valley. The Jamiaat-e-Islami in South Kashmir and radical groups like the Peoples league continued to be of nuisance value, in being able to attract young cadre minded recruits who still questioned the states accession to India and demanded a return to ‘Nizam-e-Mustafa’ (Quranic rule). Such anachronistic demands are really latter day symptoms of a deepening political, social and economic malaise within the state. The Jammat, the Maulvis, the Wahabis and others, who ride the pro-Islamic and anti Centre sentiments were now arrayed against Farooq Abdullah’s secular policies and were ready to strike. The Muslim United Front (MUF) which

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26 The Times of India (New Delhi), September 17, 1998, p.1.
had garnered more than 40 percent of the votes in the last election was also appearing to neither be a force nor stay united. It also split into two factions, the fundamentalist Jamaat led by Ali Shah Geelani and a relatively less fundamentalist faction led by Abdul Gani Lone, Shia leader Maulana Abbas, Gul Shah and the Mirwaiz of South Kashmir, Qazi Nissar. The accent of Jamaat was on secession while the other faction was asking for economic justice and a better deal from the Centre.

The third factor that played an extremely important role on the Kashmir stage, was, corruption. This had always been a bane of Kashmir. During 1987-88, what weakened Abdullah’s standing among the people and contributed to the present state of militancy most, were the serious charges of corruption involving many of his ministers and members of his family. Some prominent one’s are:

- The renewal of the lease of government land to Salima Nedou, owner of the famous Nedou’s, Hotel and the Chief Minister’s aunt - for Rs.52,000 a month along with a stipulation that the land be sub-leased by her to Welcomegroup hotels for Rs.14 Lakhs a month.

- Another case involved the Governments role in fraudulent manipulation of rosters for admissions to medical colleges.

- It was also charged that Revenue Minister P.L. Handoo had misused his position to favour an allegedly illegal housing colony floated in Jammu by his son-in-law.

- In another matter raised in the Assembly - Gulam Nabi Mir, son of the Food and Transport Minister, Mr. Lasjan, was alleged to have floated a fraudulent company which collected money to supply Rs.1 crore worth of steel pipes to the Engineering Department, which it failed to do.

- To make matters worse, Power Minister Mula Ram was issued a show cause notice by the High Court for his alleged involvement in a rape case.

Because of the foregoing Geelani said about Farooq Abdullah: “He’s like a drowning man clutching at straws, I am despondent about Kashmir. Our silk industry is dying, our apples are no longer competitive, our shawls are loosing out to artificial creations from Punjab, our
youth "can't compete with the educated of India. What can I say...". Sheikh Abdullah's brother-in-law Gul Shah stated: "This state should return to Governors rule. Jagmohan was a far better ruler than Abdullah...".

Unfortunately for the people of the valley, in 1987, there was little doubt even in the mind of the poorest Kashmiri that democratic rule provided by the alliance was no match for the brief period of governors rule, when the state saw bold reforms and economic progress that touched the levels of the dispossessed. So desperate had a common man become that, in the midst of this political, economic and social chaos he, as often happens, turned to violence and anarchy for solace.

LEVEL ONE STRATEGY: PAKISTAN'S PROXY WAR IN KASHMIR

Seeing the state of law and order in the valley. Pakistan, as usual, decided to take advantage of the prevailing disorder and launched its proxy war in the beginning of 1988. Proxy war was the execution of level one of its two level strategy in Kashmir. "Operation Topac" the brain child of General Zia-ul-Haq, for the annexation of J&K to Pakistan, was promptly put into effect (The operation is covered extensively later on in a separate Chapter). This time, the proxy war launched by Pakistan was different in content and character, from its earlier versions of 1947-48, and 1965. The shrewed Zia had made sure that the earlier mistakes were not repeated now. This proxy war was to be much more planned in its conceptualisation and gradual in its execution and therefore more deadly and effective. A study of the progress of this 'internal war' reveals that it can be classified into two separate stages.

- Stage One: The Azadi Stage.
- Stage Two: The Merger Stage.

Kargil Review Committee Report, documents this aspects in very unambiguous terms: "Between 1987 and 1989, Pakistan agencies depended upon the JKLF for formenting militancy in Kashmir and later floated several pro-Pakistan militant groups like the Hizbul Mujahideen, Hizb-e-Islami, Allah tigers, Al Umar, Harkat-ul-Ansar, etc., which were totally

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27 India Today (New Delhi), October 15, 1988, pp.32-36.
28 Ibid.
committed to securing Kashmir for Pakistan. From 1990 onwards the JKLF and other pro-Pak militants cooperated in their activities but later the ISI began to marginalise the JKLF as this group stood for independence. Pakistan’s sponsorship of terrorism in Kashmir is well documented. The US State Department’s 1995 annual report on patterns of Global Terrorism referred to the violence by Kashmiri groups and said that “There are credible reports of official Pakistani support for militants fighting in Kashmir”. 29

Stage One: The ‘Azadi Intifada’: 1987-1990

This stage spanned for only three years, from 1987 to 1990, when the Kashmir liberation struggle was primarily an indigenous movement mainly led by the JKLF and some splinter groups; like, Al Jehad, Al Fatah, Azad Janbaaz Commando’s etc. The agenda of these groups was ‘Azadi’ for J&K, which meant that these groups did not desire merger with either of the main protagonist. The movement, actually complemented the historical cultural, and the religious ethos of the Kashmiri people. The fine amalgam of Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim and Sikh religion and culture in the valley for centuries which had given rise to the unique heritage of ‘kashmiriyat’. In the religious orders of the Sufis and Rishis of Kashmir, who co-existed and preached in Kashmiri, there were ingrained noble traditions of love, harmony, peace, secularism, co-existence and independence. This in spirit was Kashmiriyat. Thus the early phase of militancy in the valley was more in tune with the ethos of Kashmiriyat and therefore one of the reasons why the JKLF stood for independence rather than merger with Islamic Pakistan, despite the strong hold of the fundamentalist Jamaat-i-Islami in the valley. 30 And it was because of this very reason, Pakistan, later on, introduced the more fanatical pro merger groups, at the cost of weakening the JKLF. Amanullah Khan, the father of the militant struggle for independence of J&K while giving an interview to ‘India Today’ in February 1990, said about independence: “Seventy per cent of the youth are with me, yesterday I was alone. When I talked of independent Kashmir, Pakistan dubbed me an Indian agent. Today the JKLF is the most important party in the valley”. 31 On the other hand Sardar


30 My personal experiences of serving in Jammu and Kashmir during the ‘seventies’ and late ‘eighties’ revealed the ethos of ‘Kashmiriyat’ to me. Even in those days it was not uncommon to find a large number of Kashmiri Pandits talking about ‘Azadi’.

31 India Today, (New Delhi), February 28, 1990, p.28.
Abdul Qayyam (who is a non Kashmiri), the President of ‘Azad Kashmir’, who stands for J&Ks accession to Pakistan gives his reasons for merger: “Independent Kashmir would be an irritant to the Soviet Union and China. And also a stab in the back to both India and Pakistan”.32 A feature report in the London based ‘Economist’ states: “More important, the UN-mandated plebiscite does not offer Kashmiri what most of them really want: Azadi”. A 1995 poll found that 72% of the valley’s inhabitants wanted independence. Being mostly Muslims does not make them Pakistanis. Their separate identity is based on place, Kinship and culture as much as religion”.33 This report substantiates JKLF’s Amanullah Khan’s claim that the majority of Kashmiris want ‘Azadi’.

JKLF: The Origin of Species

During 1987, the first secessionist organisation to take the turf of J&K was the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). Born in UK on 12 May, 1977, by the merger of the Plebiscite front and the National Liberation Front (NLF). The founder members of the JKLF were Amanullah Khan (an ex Major of Pakistan Army), Maqbool Butt (by then, already a legendary terrorist) and Hashim Qureshi (one of the terrorists who hijacked the Indian Airline passenger plane, “Ganga” to Pakistan in 1971). In February 1978 Amanullah Khan was elected its General Secretary, “Its branches were set up in Pakistan and POK, and in UK. Later branches were set up in Denmark, Holland, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Germany, France and in USA in October 1979”.34 They adopted the NLF anthem as their party anthem. The anthem, catches the spirit of the party’s objectives, it goes:

“Ek Haal, Ek umang
Guerilla Jang, Guerilla Jang
Azadi Ka ek hi dhang
Guerilla Jang, Guerilla Jang”35

In the beginning the Party was primarily an instrument of projecting the cause of ‘Azadi’ to J&K more forcefully, and sometimes militantly, out of India than within India; e.g.

32 Ibid., p.29.
35 Ibid., p.56.
on 13 October, 1979 some party activists managed entry into the visitors gallery of the UN General Assembly, they shouted a few anti-Indian slogans and threw a few leaflets, before they were taken out. They staged an anti-India demonstration in 1982 when Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India was in Copenhagen and again in March 1982 in London when Mrs. Gandhi arrived there for the Festival of India inauguration. In 1983, the Indian Chancery at the Hague was burnt down, allegedly, by four activists of JKLF. Apart from these incidents, the group kept sending a steady stream of memos and letters to the UN, Non-aligned meetings, Islamic summits and Amnesty International drawing attention to their cause.36

But the event that made the JKLF truly a redoubtable militant group and which also paved the way for their effective entry into the body politic of the state of J&K in particular and the sub-continent in general was the abduction and subsequent gruesome murder of Ravindra Mhatre, assistant commissioner of the Indian Consulate in Birmingham (also the headquarter of the JKLF), on February 4, 1984. They had asked for the release of Maqbool Bhat, the co-founder of the group, who was in Tihar Jail, for murder and other anti-national crimes. They also demanded the release of the two hijackers of the 1971, IA planes (incarcerated in Pakistan) and 7 other Kashmiris arrested for violence during an India-West Indies cricket match in Srinagar in 1983. However, they murdered Mhatre even before some serious steps at negotiations could be started. The involvement of Pakistan in this episode was highlighted by “India Today” in a cover story: “Crisis group meets again and makes certain recommendations to Prime Minister including possibility of Pakistan involvement”.37 As a form of reprisal, the crisis management group, took the decision to hang Maqbool Butt. He was hanged at Tihar on February 11, 1984.

Butt, thus became the first martyr for the cause of “Azadi” Abdul Ghani lone, MLA and Chairman of People’s Conference in Srinagar said: “Maqbool is the first martyr on the question of Kashmir’s accession. The Centre and the Government headed by Farooq Abdullah have made a martyr out of him”.38 Interestingly Maqbool Bhat was a rabid ‘Azadi’ missionary. Hashim Qureshi, quotes Zafar Meraj a renounced Pakistani journalist on the

36 India Today (New Delhi), February 29, 1984, p.21-22 (cover story, “The Mhatre Murder”).
37 Ibid., p.20.
38 Ibid., p.24.
views of Maqbool Butt on Kashmir. He says: "Indira Gandhi regime representatives had held two round of talks with Maqbool Butt in the jail but he was not prepared to accept states accession to India. Instead, he argued for independent Kashmir asserting that independent Kashmir was necessary for bringing lasting peace to the subcontinent". 39

The repercussions of Butt's hanging were immediately felt in the valley, from Trehgam (Butt's birth place) to Anantnag groups of youths came out on the streets. The entire valley answered their call for a bandh. A "gayebana Janaza" (funeral prayer) for the martyr was held in Srinagar on the day of this execution, slogans were raised both against Indira Gandhi and Farooq Abdullah. In Anantnag over 400 demonstrators, mainly supporters of Jamait-e-Islami were arrested as a precautionary measure. February 11, was declared the "Martyr Day", and it continues to be observed, as such, till date. (The ghost of Maqbool Butt was to stalk the valley for many years to come). In Britain, the one lakh strong Kashmiri community vowed to avenge their hero's death. Amanullah Khan, the President of JKLF in Britain issued a warning: "...there will be more bloodshed and there will be more incidents like that of the killings of the diplomat". Hashim Qureshi another officiando of JKLF said: "Kashmiris will avenge the murder of Maqbool Bhatt. They will do so within India and within Kashmir, but they will also do so outside India and outside Kashmir". 40 This, therefore, also marked the entry of JKLF militancy back into the sub-continent. The membership of the group started increasing by leaps and bounds till by 1987-88, it emerged as the strongest, most popular militant group in the sub-continent.

Pakistan also felt the tremors of Butt's hanging, but in a different manner, the incident was secretly welcomed by their policy making czars, who saw, as they had done in the past, an opportunity to take advantage of the situation in the valley to once again implement their two level strategy in Kashmir. Butt's hanging became a national issue in Pakistan, where he was promptly elevated to the status of a National hero. Sunil Seth reporting for "India Today' from Peshwar said: "Wide spread protests in the Pakistan part of Kashmir and angry student demonstrations in Islamabad were followed by readings of "nawaz-e-janaza", or funeral prayers, in almost all cities... President Zia-ul-Haq, cornered by reporters... declared Butt a


40 India Today (New Delhi), February 29, 1984, op.cit., p.22.
freedom fighter... Pakistan Foreign Office... dubbed it - "a decision of a vindictive nature" -
In Karachi students went on the rampage outside the Indian consulate and the Indian Airlines
office in the city damaging an official car in the stoning".\(^{41}\) Pakistan media also went on an
offensive and published a plethora of anti Indian reports. Soon after, Pakistan expelled two
Indian Airlines (IA) officials, Naresh Chand and Janak Raj Gupta.\(^{42}\) Ostensibly as a
retaliatory gesture to the Butt hanging. The diplomatic war was now on between the two
countries. An analysis of the incident brings to fore some interesting deductions - The
reactions of Kashmiris in England, India and a State of general uproar in Pakistan clearly
brings to the fore a nexus between them, with Pakistan emerging not only as a focal point but
as a mentor - Zia's reactions confirm the fact that he had decided to implement the two level
strategy on the shoulders of the JKLF - finally, Kashmir always was, and would remain at the
core of Pakistan's domestic and foreign policy. And this time round their Kashmir policy
would under-go a subtle change. The uprising would be so manipulated that it would be
indegeneous and internal in content, with Pakistan's unstinted and full fledged support. Use
of military force from outside will have to wait for an ideal opportunity. 'Bleed India' would
be the bedrock of this strategy.

The JKLF, and its splinter groups thus “spearheaded the movement in the initial years
with the demand for "azadi". Pakistan based leader of JKLF, Amanullah Khan directed most
of its operations. Pakistan, never in favour of independence, went along with Amanullah for
its own reasons”.\(^{43}\) The reason was to give an indegeneous spark to militancy in the valley
and then give it a pro-Pak or merger slant at an opportune moment. The JKLF also went
along with Pakistan, because of commonality of interests and their dependence on Pakistan
for moral and material support. During this period the main stalwarts of the JKLF movement,
besides Amanullah Khan were; Javed Ahmed Mir, Shabir Shah, Yasin Malik, and Altaf Khan
(alias Azam Inqualabi) in the valley. Hashim Qureshi and Dr. Haidar in POK. Newer groups
with a pro azadi ideology also came up on the fringes of the JKLF. These were, the Jan Baaz
Commandos, Al Fateh; Allah Tigers, Al Maqbool Mujahedin and Dukhtran-e-Millat (women
wing). It was estimated that by the middle of 1990, atleast 44 terrorist organisations were

\(^{41}\) India Today (New Delhi), March 15, 1984, p.84.
\(^{42}\) Ibid., p.85.
operating in J&K under various names.\textsuperscript{44} Shakeel Bakshi, Chairman of the Islamic Students League talking about the unity of purpose between these groups said: “when it comes to the crunch, we will bury our differences”.\textsuperscript{45}

The JKLF manifesto is categoric about its aims: “complete independence for Jammu and Kashmir; a system of Islamic democracy; safeguarding rights of the minorities as prescribed in the Koran and Sunnah; an economy of Islamic socialism; and a non aligned foreign policy”.\textsuperscript{46} The manifesto put Pakistan’s hackles up and that is why, when it realised that JKLF is not likely to allow itself to be manipulated from Islamabad, Pakistan, started creating other Pro-Pakistan, “merger” outfits with a view to relegate the JKLF into the background of militant Politics in J&K. More on these groups later.

The number of terrorist incidents started increasing from 1988 onwards and have continued to increase ever since. “A total of 390 incidents of terrorist violence took place in 1988. In 1989 the number went upto 2154 - an increase of about 600 percent. It almost doubled in 1990, with the number of terrorist acts increasing to 3905... The situation did show signs of improvement in 1991 and the number of cases of terrorist violence went down to 3122".\textsuperscript{47} It was precisely during this period that Pakistan, realising that militancy in the valley under the JKLF, is firmly progressing along the ‘Azadi’ line which is counter to its Kashmir policy, that it decided to change its strategy and bring in the more fundamentalist, Afghan and other mercenaries into the valley and introducing the “Merger Strategy”. Robert Wirsing notes:

“A conscious policy decision appears to have been taken very quickly in Islamabad, in fact, to curb the independence sentiments that clearly lay at the foundation of the movement... The movement was getting huge in size and the cry for ‘azadi’ - independence of both India and Pakistan - was growing loud. In early February 1990, a meeting was held in Islamabad with Prime Minister Bhutto in the chair and the Army Chief, President and the Prime Minister of ‘Azad Kashmir’ in attendance. They considered the possibility that the uprising could boomerang on Pakistan and that Pakistan could lose not only Jammu and Kashmir but the Northern Areas as well (Amanullah Khan belongs to the Northern Areas), They decided to curb the azadi forces...\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., p.108.
\textsuperscript{45} India Today (New Delhi), January 15, 1990, p.13.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., p.10.
it was decided that the Pakistani army should take over the training camps and that the private camps that had sprung up be shut down. Bhutto addressed a press conference later that month... She said at this conference that accession to Pakistan was the only option open to Kashmiris. That understanding of the issue then became the policy of Pakistan, which was then focused on restricting both access to the valley and supply of arms to pro-accession forces.\textsuperscript{48}

Talking about the JKLF, Dr. Farooq Haider, the JKLF Chief in Pakistan, while saying that the proxy war in Kashmir would be the most perfect guerrilla war in history, stated: "This is not a sporadic uprising... it is the result of years of planning... we chose Srinagar and the Kashmir valley as the first stage of our attack. What has happened so far is the urban phase, mostly sabotage and hit and run tactics. Now that the Indian army is concentrated in the cities we are going to pull them out, just like chewing gum, towards the border and the rural areas, spreading them out over a large area where they will be vulnerable". The doctor claims that the Front has 10,000 armed supporters: "Everybody is with us".\textsuperscript{49}

True it is, that during this phase of militancy the JKLF militants enjoyed some local support - "everybody" may amount to exaggeration. The terrorists and their sponsors were aware that without popular support, terrorism alone cannot achieve its goal. The year 1987-88 to 1990, saw the popular upsurge against J&K’s accession to the Indian Union. The success of subversive activities of JKLF drew the support of young, uneducated and unemployed section of the society, a large section of people who were already disgruntled and dissatisfied by the sad state of politics, mal-administration and rampant corruption were just waiting for the kind of lead the JKLF provided at that time. Each year Pakistan’s independence day, 14 August would be celebrated with a profusion of green flags everywhere in the city, while India’s Independence day following that would be welcomed by hoots, abuses and black flags. Gen. Zia’s death in 1988, in Pakistan was mourned more in Kashmir, crowds came out on the streets spontaneously, shouting anti Indian slogans, violence and rioting followed. 11 February each year is celebrated as the 'Maqbool Batt Martyr Day' and it invariably becomes a major law and order problem, as from 1992 onwards JKLF supporters from POK try to


force a crossing into the Indian part of J&K; in 1989 the publication of the controversial book ‘Satanic Verses’ by Salman Rushdie caused major riots in the valley, leading to police firings and some deaths.

Most of the time the crowds don’t even know the reason for their outcry on the streets. They were just being manipulated by the JKLF leaders. Governor Jagmohan records in his diary: The youth is sullen and angry. It is taking refuge under religion whose appeal helps it to gain sympathy and support of the common folk. The main secessionist outfit J&K Liberation Front has already announced setting up ten hit squads”. 50 Talking about the average militant, Brigadier Arjun Ray in an Interview to India Today said: “The average Kashmiri militant is driven more by economic and political frustration than by religious fanaticism, and the movement for independence is sustained not so much by ideological reasons as by the deep-seated desire for revenge against the “tormentors” and “oppressors”... Most of them talked about corruption, the rich having got richer and they having been denied their dues... Ninety five percent of the 31 militants interviewed by the researchers for the study were not even matriculates only six of them held jobs... most of them came from large families... Frustration with the political system headed by the former Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah, economic backwardness and a feeling of oppression were motivating factors for even the better known militants, who are now important leaders... Power of the gun attracted 70 percent of the 31 interviewed. All of them were bellow 30 years of age, 15 of them were less than 20 years old”. 51 This was then, the profile of a terrorist in Kashmir during the early ‘Azadi’ stage of militancy.

This frustrated and dissatisfied section of Kashmiri society found an ideal outlet in the “Proxy War” plans of Pakistan. Recruits came openly to the numerous training camps in Pakistan. In February 1990, the “Friday Times” of Pakistan reported: “they arrived at the LoC bearing code letters from their organisations and are taken over by the Field Investigation Units (FIUs), the main grassroots operations and counter intelligence units of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The FIUs after interrogating them hand them over to their respective organisation like the JKLF and the Hizb”. 52 Sati Sahani also writes: “Next five

51 India Today (New Delhi), December 11, 1994.
52 Friday Times, (Islamabad), May 17, 1990.
years or so (1987-1991) he (Amanullah Khan, Chief of JKLF) spent in Pakistan and POK putting the act together. He interacted with ISI and other authorities in Pakistan. He made an arrangement for youth to be motivated in Kashmir Valley, to be brought across to POK for training and being provided with arms, ammunition, subversive literature and money before being sent back to Kashmir with proper directions".\(^53\) The biography of Farooq Abdullah also underlines this issue: "the Jammat-e-Islami began sending small batches of young Kashmiris for training to "Azad Kashmir"... exploiting the growing popularity of the JKLF, General Akhtar (Chief of ISI) got in touch with some of Maqbool Butts colleagues... Batches of Kashmiri boys were sent to "Azad Kashmir" during 1984-86 period, and the number of Pakistan trained militants in Kashmir rose during 1989 to 300".\(^54\)

After, the fiasco of the March 1987 elections, which resulted in the resurgence of anti-India and anti secular forces in the valley provided Pakistan with the opportunity for which it was waiting. Since the JKLF was then the only trained, organised and motivated group waiting to go into action, it was obviously chosen to lead the level one strategy of Pakistan - subversion. Even though the JKLF never had a 'happy' relationship with Pakistan mainly because of their ideological difference over the status of J&K, yet at this movement they both had no option.

However, despite these differences, the two Kashmir meddlers buried their hatchet for the time being and joined hands in fermenting trouble in J&K. Thereafter started the classic approach to insurgency. It was almost by the book, so ably depicted in "Operation Topac" by the Indian Defence Review. The tracing of the entire development of insurgency in J&K has been carried out by this researcher in a sequential Chapter titled "Operation Topac - Myth or Reality". Therefore, at this stage, only an overview, with some stress on influential incidents of insurgency in the valley is being attempted. The aim of the militants at this stage was to discredit the government and attract as large a cadre for recruitment to their ranks. This was to be done by carrying out some spectacular acts of terrorism. In the beginning all acts of terrorism were mainly targetted at creating sensationalism rather than causing real casualties. The early bomb blasts, explosions and incidents of firing, therefore, did not cause


any serious casualties amongst either the civilians or the security forces. The first act of 
political assassination was carried out on 14 September 1989, when Tikka Lal Taploo, an 
advocate and Vice President of the Bhartiya Janta Party was assassinated by the JKLF 
outside his house in Srinagar. On 4 November 1989, Mr. N.K. Ganjoo, retired District and 
Sessions Judge, who, as the presiding officer had sentenced Maqbool Butt to death was 
gunned down in broad day light.

The incident that actually fired militancy in the valley was the kidnapping of Dr. 
Rubaiya Sayeed, daughter of the Union Home Minister, Mufti Mohmmad Sayeed, in Srinagar 
on December 8, 1989, by terrorists headed by Yasin Malik. This stunned and sensationalised 
the entire nation. The Central Government bowed to the demands of the terrorists and 
released five top arrested JKLF terrorists in exchange for Rubaiya. Jagmohan writes: “The 
enthusiastic welcome that was given to the released youth by the willing crowds, who 
celebrated the victory, confirmed the impression that the ascendancy of the terrorists was total 
and the people had gone over to the side about whose victory they no longer had any 
doubt”.

On April 6, 1990, Mr. H.L. Khera, General Manager, HMT was kidnapped and 
later killed by terrorists belonging to Kashmir Students Liberation Front, an offshoot of 
JKLF. On may 21, 1990, Moulvi Farooq, the mirwaiz of Srinagar was assassinated by 
terrorists, creating a massive stir in the valley. On June 27, 1991 K. Doraiswamy, executive 
Director of the Indian Oil Corporation, was kidnapped by Ikhwanul Muslimeen but released 
subsequently. On April 6, 1990, Professor Mushir-ul-Haq, Vice Chancellor of Kashmir 
University was abducted and later killed on 10 April 1990 by the JKLF. On 11 January, 
1991, Shahbano Lone, daughter of Abdul Ghani Lone was kidnapped but released later, and 
on 27 February, same year, Ms. Naheeda Soz were abducted and later released.

This pattern of terrorist acts continued throughout the ‘Azadi’ phase of the 
movement, M.J. Akbar writes: “Till 19 January 1990 mass support for ‘Aazaadi’ was 
implicit, not explicit. That changed with the arrival of Jagmohan. Fist frightened and then 
discovering the courage of desperation, the people began pouring out in the streets that day... 
The administration got completely unnerved, and gave orders to fire... there is no doubt that 
paramilitary bullet left more than fifty dead in the cold at Gowkadal that day... 19 January

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55 Jagmohan, op.cit., p.334.
became the catalyst which propelled it into a mass upsurge. Young men from hundreds of homes crossed over into Pakistan Occupied Kashmir to receive arms and training in insurrection... In Srinagar, each mosque became a citadel of fervor; the ‘Khutba’ became a sermon in secession the loudspeakers played tapes that echoed against each other from the minarets, or picked up a dying chant and threw it further: “Hum Kya Chahte hain? Aazaadi... Aazaadi... Allah-O-Akbar.... Ever since 19 January it had been one long sequence of protests, violence, repression and curfew”.  

However, as has already been brought out, during this period the split between the JKLF and its Pakistani sponsors became more prominent. Aditya Sinha writes in Farooq Abdullah’s biography: “The JKLF always had the fight for freedom on its agenda, which was unacceptable to Pakistan. As a result there was a great deal of debate within the ISI on whether or not to provide the JKLF with sufficient fire power and weaponry”. 57 Sati Sahani talks at great length on this aspect, he avers: “Returning to Rawalpindi in the end of May 1990 he (Amanullah Khan) shocked Pakistan by declaring that Pakistan had no locus standi in Kashmir and asserting “Kashmir can never be a part of Pakistan”. 58 In 1990, Amanullah Khan again told the Press in the UN Headquarters at New York “that the armed struggle launched by JKLF in Kashmir had the objective of independent Kashmir reuniting areas currently held by India, Pakistan and China”. 59 On December 24, 1990, Dr. Ghulam Qadir Wani (a post graduate from JNU) reaffirmed JKLF’s commitment to continue to struggle for an “independent and sovereign state of Jammu and Kashmir. 1990 has given rebirth to Kashmir issue which was lying in cold storage for decades. The people of Kashmir have become conscious of their rights, which were deprived to them for so long and now they are ready to make any sacrifice for this cause”. 60

Soon thereafter Pakistan dumped the JKLF in favour of new, more fundamentalist and pro-merger groups, specially the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) and Ikhwanul-Musalmeen. Pakistan, now led by Bhutto brought about a shift to Zia’s Kashmir policy of “insurgency

57 Aditya Sinha, op.cit., p.190.
59 Ibid., p.42.
60 Ibid., p.44.
implosion” to a more aggressive policy of “insurgency explosion”. Sati Sahani notes: “With General Zia’s death the JKLF received a big jolt. After Ms. Benazir Bhutto came to power in December 1988, a number of terrorist organisations as rivals of JKLF, were raised creating much confusion... most of these groups were fundamentalists in thinking and committed to work for merger with Pakistan while JKLF is secular and wants an independent Kashmir”. 61

Needless to say that the JKLF and the ‘Azadi’ forces in J&K suffered a major setback with this change in Pak strategy of Proxy War in Kashmir. Even after the Kargil war Shabir Ahmad, one of the leaders of JKLF admits to Muzamil Jaleel of the Indian Express: “They should stop dreaming of Kashmir to be part of their country. And if they are our real friends, they should instead try to strengthen a movement for independent Kashmir... they claimed that Islamic militant groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen were up on the mountains. Why is it that only those who fight for Kashmir’s merger with Pakistan on religious grounds are there? Why not those who are struggling for an independent Kashmir”. This not only sums up the frustration and agony of the ‘Azadi’ groups but also highlights the pro merger shift in Pakistan’s proxy war strategy. 62

Stage Two: The Merger Phase: 1991- To Date

The merger of Kashmir to Pakistan is not only a political and emotional obsession, but is contained in the constitution of Azad Kashmir: “Paragraph 7, item 2 of the Interim Constitution granted by Pakistan to AK States: “No person or political party in ‘Azad Kashmir’ shall be permitted to propagate against or take part in activities prejudicial or detrimental to the ideology of the state’s accession to Pakistan”. 63 This means that the third option, i.e., the Independence of Kashmir, as propagated by the JKLF, is clearly not acceptable to Pakistan. Hence, its ‘raison de etre’ for sidelining JKLF in favour of the merger militant elements. In April 1992, Hashim Qureshi was interviewed by Indranil Banerjie of ‘the Sunday’, to a question by Banerjie if the JKLF is directly aided by Pakistani military and the ISI, Qureshi replied: “The JKLF at present has no military links with Pakistani

61 Sati Sahani, op.cit., p.310.
63 Hasim Qureshi, op.cit., p.68.
Government. We are getting no help from them... It is an open secret, however, Pakistan is giving military aid to other groups operating in Kashmir”.  

By 1991, therefore, Pakistan launched the Afghanistan type of ‘Jehad’ in Kashmir. The mercenaries or ‘foreign guests’ took over the reigns of proxy war in Kashmir. The JKLF sponsored indigenous movement was neutralised by eliminating most of its leaders. As a matter of fact, Pakistan’s proxy war strategy in Kashmir in the context of their support to militant groups or organisations underwent three significant changes. Firstly, after the JKLF had succeeded in igniting the secession movement in Kashmir in 1987-88, Pakistan’s ISI extended full support to them. Secondly, by 1989-90, Pakistan having realised that in JKLF they were not backing the right horse, because of its strident ‘Azadi’ call. They started raising and supporting a number of other parallel groups and organisations, some of them offshoots of the JKLF, whose ideological and political agenda was more flexible and malleable. An eleven party alliance was formed in ‘Azad Kashmir’ to help the freedom struggle in Kashmir. It was called the Tehrik-e-Huriyat-e-Kashmir (movement for the liberation of Kashmir). The JKLF, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Allah Tigers were some of its members. Thirdly, by 1991, Pakistan and the ISI realised that the proxy war in Kashmir was not progressing as well as it had in Afghanistan and therefore they decided to transpose the Afghan model in Kashmir. The only difference being the ‘cause’. Whereas, the Afghan militant in Afghanistan fought for his country, here in Kashmir he fought for the profits of economic and other gains - Pakistan would in turn gain by twisting the proxy war movement towards a merger line.

Suba Chandran writing for the Pioneer observes the shift in Pakistan’s strategy in a similar manner: “The transformation in the nature of militancy in Kashmir is not an abrupt evolution. There has been a gradual transition in the recent years... the most significant change has been the decline in the ‘indigenous militancy and the rise in “imported militancy”... The reasons for this change were manifold. One, normalcy was returning to Kashmir,... the local militants were also not happy with Pakistan. Kashmiri groups, such as the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) that preferred to pursue an independent Kashmir policy fell out of Pakistan’s favour”. Amanullah Khan, the head of JKLF in a

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64 Ibid., p.320.
recent interview to 'The News', London, states: "Pakistan based militant organisations are a big threat to the identity of Kashmir and have damaged the ongoing Liberation movement. These organisations, besides damaging the Kashmir Liberation movement have damaged Pakistan's image internationally and pasted a label of terrorist country on it". Amanullah said the presence of foreign militants in Kashmir have projected the Kashmir movement as a terrorist movement". 66

The Afghan invasion of the valley was prophesied by the 14th century Syrian Saint, Shah Naematullah Qadiri, who, being the forerunner of Nostradamus, saw tomorrow. Qadiri's predictions written in Persian included some for India. About the Afghan invasion he writes: "The brave men from the frontier will march like swarms to achieve their objective and the earth will tremble like a grave with their fury. The afghans will proceed like the army of ants and locusts and will be victorious... mountains, forests, rivers and deserts will be overwhelmed by their fire power and Punjab, Delhi, Kashmir, Jammu will fall to them with an unseen aid (from God). The forces inimical to deen-o-imman (religion of faith) will be wiped out". 67 These predictions are being interpreted by the secessionist elements in Pakistan and J&K, in the context of the ongoing militancy. It is being used as a vehicle of propaganda and finds space in a number of newspapers and magazines there. Forgetting that Kashmir had been invaded by the Afghans many times since the prophecy, starting with the invasion of Ahmed Shah Abdali in the 16th century, the Afghan's cruel rule in the valley continued for 67 years. Again in 1947-48 and in 1965 the Afghan raiders once again made their presence felt in the valley. Each time they were driven out. This time also, history stands witness, the result will be the same. The militants must be made to understand history in totality.

The Afghan onslaught in Kashmir Actually was a fallout of the Afghan war. After the soviet withdrawal, there were over three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, a number of them veterans of the war, armed to the teeth and spoiling for a fight. Pakistan knew that if this Frankenstein was not used elsewhere it would turn upon and destroy its own creator. The best place to utilize them was in Kashmir. "In early 1992 some of the Afghans were transferred to POK (Pakistan Occupied Kashmir). By early 1993 there were over 1,000 Afghan

Mujahideen in Markaz Dawatul Arshad (MDA), a centre for world wide Islamist activities, sponsored by ISI. (MDA is covered in detail subsequently). In 1991, the insertion of the Afghan militants started. At first they came in as ‘Fraternal colleagues’ and advisors to the JKLF cadres. In 1992, their numbers increased, by 1993 two major groups were inducted in the valley - The Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Harkat-ul-Jehad-e-Islami. These groups also included mercenaries from other Islamic countries like Sudan, Lebanon, Algeria, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Yemen. Soon afterwards these two groups were merged to form the dreaded Harkat-ul-Ansar (HUA). Maulana Masood Azhar (one of the militant leaders released in exchange for the passengers of hijacked Indian Airline plane IC-814), a Pakistani national was its chief.

The HUA has come to be known as one of the deadliest fundamentalist terrorist groups with an international reach. Having been pronounced as a terrorist organisation by the USA in 1997, it now calls itself the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM). Another prominent pro-Pakistan or merger group is the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), formed around 1994. This is the militant wing of the Markaz Dawat-ul-Arshad and at present is the most fundamentalist, well motivated, best armed and has the widest reach in J&K. Its strength is estimated to be around 1500 members. Along with Hizbul Mujahideen and Harkat-ul-Ansar, this group forms the unholy trinity of the most dreaded and effective merger terrorist groups in J&K. Besides these prominent “Islamic warrior” groups there are a few other smaller ‘Tanzeems’ or terrorist groups active in J&K now. Earlier, till 1990, Jagmohan listed 44 different terrorist organisation active in Kashmir. Amanullah Khan said there were 60 to 70 groups active in the valley in 1991.

Pakistan wanted a more effective pro accession movement to take over the work of JKLF, in the HUM, HUA and LET it found the ideal instrument of its new state policy (proxy war). In the words of Robert Wirsing: “The JKLF, by virtue of its espousal of Kashmir’s independence and a more moderate brand of Islam, is generally held to be the more popular of the two; but the HMJK (Hisb-ul-Mujahideen Jammu and Kashmir),

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68 Ved Marwah, op.cit., p.132.
70 Robert G. Wirsing, op.cit (India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute); As told to the author by Amanullah Khan during an interview at Rawalpindi, June 9, 1993, footnote no.26, p.132.
considered by most the better patronised by Pakistan, hence better trained and funded, and with greater fire power, is probably the more effective and feared... The pro-accession side has emphasized the movement’s newer and increasingly potent Islamist orientation, the pro-independence side its longstanding identity with secular Kashmiri nationalism”. 71 Javed Mir, then (1993) the acting President of JKLF, during an interview with Harinder Baweja, to a question whether Pakistan is only exploiting the Kashmiris replied: “Pakistan has floated its own groups in the valley... I am aware of that we will fight Pakistan too of the need arises...”. 72 Baweja in the same cover story article in ‘India Today’ writes: The group that has taken the most advantage of this atmosphere of uncertainty is the Hizb-ul-Mujahedeen. The Pro-independence JKLF, though keeping its popularity intact, has lost its military edge to this rabidity fundamentalist pro Pakistan group. The Hizbul has gained not only in terms of sheer members but its members are also better trained and have better quality weapons”. 73 In this manner, and with the change in its strategy, Pakistan was able to force the pro-accession philosophy down the throat of the Kashmiri by sheer terror and fear of death.

Islamic Fundamentalism and “Jehad” pervaded the valley after 1991. The combined fury of these extreme philosophies terrorised J&K and all but destroyed the ‘Azadi’ movement and the JKLF as the dominant force in the valley, through violent intercnenine rivalry between these two ideologies, which saw the extermination of practically the entire top leadership of the JKLF in the valley. The occupation of Hazratbal shrine in late 1993, and the taking over of the Char-e-Sharief shrine, and its subsequent destruction in May 1995 by Islamic extremist groups high lights the Islamisation of the movement, as both these shrines were built in the honour of the moderate Sufi saints, revered, both by the Hindus and Muslims, and represented the moderate and unique Kashmiri ethos of ‘Kashmiriyat’.

Commenting on this issue the “Far Eastern Economic Review” states: “For decades, the fundamentalist Jamiaat-i-Islami movement has been building up its network in the state. The Jamiaat hoped to bring Kashmiris into line with orthodox Islam... In the Jamiaat’s world view there was little room for the liberal doctrines of Sufi mystics...”. 74 The killing of Qazi

71 Ibid.
72 India Today, (New Delhi), May 31, 1993, p.39 (Cover Story).
73 Ibid., p.41.
74 Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), June 22, 1995, p.27.
Nissar Ahmad, 'Mirwaiz' (senior Muslim cleric) of southern Kashmir on June 20, 1994 by members of pro-Pakistan Muslim fundamentalist group also underlined the fact that moderates had no place in Kashmir. Far Eastern Times again avers: "The Hizb killed Nissar to discourage moderates from opening a dialogue with India or compromising the separatist goal". Qazi Nissar Ahmed 'Mirwaiz' was a moderate Muslim Cleric, in favour of a peaceful solution to the Kashmir problem.

The infusion of religion in the furtherance of its state policy was important because of a number of factors; firstly, "Jehad" provided a facade of a "Just and a holy war", thereby, drawing a horde of religious fanatics from all parts of the Islamic world to take part in it and making 'holy warriors' out of criminals and mercenaries. Secondly, a 'Jehad' in Kashmir would 'ipso-facto' lend a Islamic fervor to the movement, thereby making the entire movement pro-accession because the essence of the 'Jehad' would be anti Hindu and anti India. Thirdly, being a religion oriented movement, 'Jehad' would attract monetary, material and moral support from other Islamic states. Fourthly, an Islamic Jehad in Kashmir would keep the thousands of the Afghan war veterans from spreading mischief within Pakistan by keeping them engaged elsewhere.

Incipient planning to launch the Jehad may have started sometimes in the 1970's, with the religious base built around the 'madarssas' which cropped up all over J&K. According to Jagmohan there were 150 schools and madrassas in the valley teaching Wahhabi and Deobandi Islamic philosophies. This generation, fed on fanatical Islamic extremism, when they came into their twenties (when the merger movement began) became the pointsmen of the 'Jehad' in Kashmir. The impetus to the movement was provided by the 'imported' experts from across the border.

Gradually the 'Jehad' was taken over, to a great extent, by well organised and structured Islamic religious groups. However, the actual executive control remained with the Army and the ISI. Initially, the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) took control of the 'Jehad', giving it the fundamentalist and fanatical flavour and guided it firmly along the 'merger' path. The Jamaat-i-Islami of J&K's agenda is roughly a replica of that of its mentor in Pakistan. The

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75 Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), July 14, 1994, p.25.
Jamaat and its adjuncts the Tablighi Jamaat (patroned by Gen. Zia) and the Jamaat-ie-Tulba became the centric force behind the proxy war in J&K. However, due to certain reasons including the coming back of Ms. Bhutto and the PPP to power, the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) another major Fundamentalist party took over power from the JI and along with it the onus of controlling and directing the proxy war in J&K, all funds now got directed to it. JUI went a step further and created more deadly and extremely fundamentalist Islamic groups and organisations for not only regional but global Islamisation, consequently, the dreaded Markaz-e-Dawa-al-Irshad (MDI) and its evil spawn the Taliban and the Lashkar-e-Toiba were born.

The deluge of foreign mercenaries into Kashmir also commenced during this time and the movement passed into the hands of the pro-Pak accession extremist foreign elements. The JKLF and the indigeneous ‘Azadi’ movement all but died. Highlighting this aspect, the Times of India, quoting the “Times” (London) reported: “There are no longer effective militant groups left in the valley and foreign mercenaries are firmly in control... Pakistan’s influence in spreading Islamic extremism in Kashmir is Pivotal. The Jamaat-i-Islami, the biggest fundamentalist group in Pakistan admits to training Kashmiris, Pakistanis and Afghans for guerrilla warfare in the region”. Quoting the “Janes Defence Weekly” the same report said that the foreign mercenary militant groups had “disarmed local Kashmiri insurgents”.

(i) Militant Training Camps

During the merger phase, between 1990-94, “Pakistan established 122 training camps for Kashmiri militants in Pakistan, POK and Afghanistan... In 1994... Pakistan started injecting an increasing number of foreign militants into J&K. These were mainly from Pakistan, POK, Afghanistan and some other Islamic countries”. During the Afghan war a number of militant training camps had come up in Afghanistan, a majority of them were on the Pak-Afghan border, some important ones are Al Badr I and Al Badr II Camps in the Khost area, targetted by American cruise missile attacks in an attempt to dessimate Bin Laden, “Al Badr is one of the main training camps for Kashmir bound militants. Initial reports suggested that at least 40 Kashmiris were killed in the US missile strike on August

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77 The Times of India (New Delhi), September 17, 1998, p.1.
78 Kargil Review Committee Report, “From Surprise to Reckoning”, (New Delhi), December 15, 1999 (USI Library Catalogue no.355.0209846; KAR; C-9289).
19, 1990”, prior to the Taliban take over, these camps were being run by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar (Afghan guerrilla leader). Soon after Taliban captured Kabul, these camps were reported to have been handed over to the Harkat-ul-Ansar (HUA). Al Badr I and Al Badr II are capable of training 200 and 160 recruits at a time.

About training a report states: “The basic course for recruits at Al Badr... is spread over 30 days, whereas the advanced course called the “Special Task Force” runs over 90 days... Besides training in the use of arms recruits are also required to commit to memory and be able to recite at least 10 chapters of the Quran, 15 Ahadis (sayings of the prophet Mohammed). All the six Kalimah (confession to the faith) and other day to day prayers or ‘du’a’”. This is the training capsule for Militant Islamic fundamentalism. Other camps in the Khost area are Omar, Al Khuldan, Abu Bakr and Zhawar camp which is being reportedly run by the Jalaluddin Haqqani faction of the Afghan guerrillas. Other camps in Pakhta, Nangarhar, Logar, Kunar, Kabul, Badakhshan, Kunduz, Takhar, Parachinar and Jalalabad provinces of Afghanistan also trained Kashmiri militants. Besides these some important camps are functioning in the NWFP of Pakistan: Al Sada, Al Qaidah (belonging to Osama bin Laden) Cherat and Teri Mangal. A total of approximately 78 such camps are located here. Besides these, around 44 training camps are also located in Pakistan and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). Important camps are: Aliabad, Arza, Athmugam, Bagh, Bhimber, Chinari, Domel, Garhi, Gilgit, Haji Pir, Hajira, Jabri, Jari Khas, Kel, Kotli, Lipa, Makri, Mang Bajri, Mangla, Mirpur, Muzzaffarabad, Nausheri, Palandir, Rawlkot, Rawalakot, etc.

(ii) Pro-Merger Militant Groups in J&K

Out of the 122 odd militant groups operating in the valley some of the more prominent pro-merger, mercenary groups along with their approximate strength are as tabulated below:

79 Asian Age (New Delhi), September 16, 1998, p.2.
80 Rajeev Sharma, op.cit., p.83.
81 Asian Age (New Delhi), September 16, 1998, p.2.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Operating in J&amp;K</th>
<th>Awaiting Infiltration</th>
<th>Under Training</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Hizbul Mujahideen</td>
<td>1630</td>
<td>1175</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>3465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Harkat-ul-Ansar</td>
<td>1170</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>2725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Harkat-ul-Mujahideen</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>1225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Lashkar-e-Taiba</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>2090</td>
<td>3294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Al Badr</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>A Jehad</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Tehrik-ul-Jehadi Islam</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Tehrik-ul-Mujahideen</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>JKLF</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4507</strong></td>
<td><strong>2985</strong></td>
<td><strong>4440</strong></td>
<td><strong>11905</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table generally gives out the extent of the proliferation of pro-merger fundamentalist groups in J&K. The figures are as per August 1999 estimates and appear formidable due to fresh infiltrations post Kargil. Lashkar-e-Taiba, the fanatically, fundamentalist and perhaps the deadliest of Pakistan's proxy war weapons in Kashmir, heads the list with the largest membership. JKLF, the only reckonable 'Azadi' militant group is at the bottom of the list with the least strength, thereby accentuating the pre-eminence of the merger militant groups over the 'Azadi' elements in the valley. The main reasons for the sudden downfall of the JKLF is not because of its loss of popular appeal amongst the people but it is due to the phenomenon of "terrorism within terrorism". One arm of Pak strategy in Kashmir after 1990 was to eliminate the influence of pro-merger elements like the JKLF. Hizb-ul-Mujahideen during the earlier stages then HUA during the later stages targeted the ranks of JKLF with a vengeance. Consequently, the writ of JKLF in the valley was practically erased due to terror and fear of the pro-merger terrorist groups.
Organisational Structure of Major Militant Groups

The table also reveals that the three main groups that lead the pro-merger crusade are the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen was formerly known as the Harkat-ul-Ansar or Al Faran (the group responsible for the kidnapping of five western tourists in July 1995, one was brutally killed, the fate of the rest is, till date unknown), this group remains branded as a “Foreign Terrorist Organisation”. Though these groups are loosely confederated under the ‘United Jehad Council’ (under which they fought the Kargil war), they do not constitute a monolithic entity and differences exist, in terms of their objectives, area of operations, organisation in Pakistan which support them and finally the level of support they receive from Pakistan’s Government, army and ISI. While the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen is focused on the Liberation of Kashmir from Indian occupation, the objectives of HuM and LET encompass the unity of the entire Muslim community in the world. For these Jehadis Kashmir is only a gateway to establish the rule of Allah throughout the world, and to win back the lost glory of Islam. The Afghan and foreign militant content of HUM and LET is significant, while HM consists mainly of Kashmiris.

Laskar-e-Toiba Armed Wing of Markas-e-Dawa-ul-Irshad: It is the militant wing of Markaz Dawa-ul-Irshad, (MDI), whose twin objectives are preaching and Jehad. “The Markaz is a religious organisation founded in 1987 and is located in 190 acre of land in Muridke, a small town 30 miles north of Lahore. Initially funded by the Arabs and Pakistan, the Markaz has resources like iron foundries and garment factories to generate its own income. It runs about 30 schools with 5,000 students. All the students do not become Lashkars, but those who opt into the movement are given military training in Pakistan and Afghanistan... The Markaz and the Lashkars are not entirely under the control of either the ISI or the Pakistani government... Bin Laden has been contributing to the Markaz liberally and has a certain influence over it”.84 Professor Zafar Iqbal is the present Amir (Chief) of the Markaz, while Zaki-ur-Rehman is the Chief in J&K. Out of the at least 15 magazines launched by various militant organisation in Pakistan, which contain inflammatory material,

84 Indian Express (New Delhi), October 19, 1999, p.9 (Express Focus by Suba Chandra).
two of them "Al-Dawa" and "Kasheer" are the most popular. They are published by 'Markaz-Dawa-ul-Irshad' (MDI) and are the mouth piece of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET).  

**Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM): Militant Wing of Jammat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI):** "HUM was earlier known as the Harkat-ul-Ansar and changed its name after the US declared it a terrorist group in 1997. The HUM is associated with the Deobandi-Wahabi faith and is closely linked to the Maulana Samiul Haq Faction the Jammat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI)... Most of its members are from... Tabligi Jamaat. HUM members are mostly Afghans and were trained in the use of weapons (including Stinger missiles) by the ISI and CIA to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan". After the end of the Afghan war the HUM fighters were diverted to Kashmir. "It is also associated with the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. The present chief of the group is Mohammad Azar Masood of Bhawalpur in Pakistan. Released from Jammu jail in exchange for the hijacked passengers of IC-814 during February 2000.

**Hizbul Mujahideen (HM): Militant Wing of Jammat-e-Islami (JI):** Is pre-dominantly a Kashmiri militant group, with a fair sprinkling of Pakistani and Afghan militants. "Founded in 1989, its popularity increased once the pro-independence groups of Kashmir fell out of 'Pakistan's favour. The HM has strong links with the Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan and most of its members are from the Islami-Jamaat-e-Tulba, the student wing of the JI.... The HM, unlike the HUM and the LET, does not have any training bases in Afghanistan because of its proximity to the Jamaat-e-Islami. The Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) has close links with Gubuddin Hekmatyar, who is fighting against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Contrary to popular belief, the JI does not support the Taliban's influence with-in Pakistan. Though supported by the ISI initially, the HM today is not under the total control of the ISI". The present Chief of HM is Syed Ahmed Salahudin. He is also the Chairman of the 14 party United Front Jehad Council.

**The Foreign Face of Terror**

The moment Pakistan decided to raise the ante of terrorism to pro-merger levels, it also decided to infuse J&K with battle hardened foreign mercenaries, who had neither sympathy nor respect for the local militants call for 'Azadi' or for the philosophy of...
'Kashmiriyat'. the first signs of these 'guest militants were seen in 1990, "which is corroborated by the way Indian security forces eliminated 10 Pakistani nationals and four Afghan guerrillas in 1990".\(^8\) Thereafter, the graph of the presence of foreign militants has constantly been going up each year. As per the figures released by the Director General of Police, J&K, Shri Gurbachan Jagat: "Against the 14 killed (foreign mercenaries) in 1990, the figure shot up to 90 in 1993, 122 in 1994, 85 in 1995, 139 in 1996, 197 in 1997 and 55 during the first six months of 1998. In 1990 two foreign mercenaries were arrested, 20 in 1992, 32 in 1993, 33 in 1994, 32 in 1997 and 10 during the first six months of 1998. Among the 155 arrests, 130 belonged to Pakistan, 23 to Afghanistan, one to Lebanon and two to Bahrain. Among the 725 mercenaries killed during the last eight years, 190 belonged to Pakistan, about 155 to Afghanistan, seven to Sudan, four to Yemen.\(^8\) In another publication titled 'proxy war', issued by Headquarters Northern Command, Udhampur which is in-charge of operations in the valley. The Army authorities quote that "1,703 mercenaries of 13 countries have been killed and 136 others arrested between 1990 and December 1998. The mercenaries belonged to Afghanistan, Bahrain, Burma, Bangladesh, Chechenya, Iraq, Iran, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Turkey and Yemen besides from Pak occupied Kashmir. The maximum number of 400 mercenaries killed during the period belonged to Pakistan, followed by 190 of Afghanistan, 48 of PoK, five each from Bangladesh and Sudan, two of Turkey, one each of Bahrain, Chechenya, Iraq, Iran, Karakhistan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.... Among the arrested mercenaries, maximum number of 59 belonged to Pakistan, 30 of PoK followed by 24 of Bangladesh, 11 of Afghanistan, five of Burma and one of Kazakhstan. It also said that 7,776 militants were killed and 24,029 apprehended between 1990 and December last year (1998). Besides, 1,823 ultras surrendered during the period".\(^9\)

Though, on computation of the year wise details of killed and arrested may not tally in details issued by the police and the army. One thing that prominently emerges and which is of significance is the fact that there was a massive influx of foreign Islamic fundamentalist militant into the valley lending credence to the Pakistani strategy of cross border terrorism by highly motivated pro-merger foreign militants. The Army report also goes on to refer to Gen.

\(^8\) The Tribune (New Delhi), July 11, 1998 (Article in Saturday Plus by M.L. Kak).
\(^8\) Ibid.
\(^9\) The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), August 23, 1999, p.10.
Zia’s ‘Op Topac’. The character of militancy in J&K has thus undergone a major change with foreigners taking over its complete control. Mr. Girish Saxena, the Governor of J&K while speaking at a seminar organised by Headquarters 16 Corps at Jammu, on 16 November 1999 said, “We have to view it in the background of the threats that India and particularly some sensitive State like J&K are facing from cross border terrorism. Militancy has undergone a significant change and foreign militants, mostly Pakistanis and Afghans affiliated to militant organisations like Lashkare Toiba and Harkatul Mujahideen based in Pakistan, had now taken over the control of armed militant movement. The local militants were playing a subsidiary role of providing local intelligence and logistics besides striking at soft targets like political activists, surrendered militants and other innocent civilians. The militancy has thus shed much of its earlier colour of being an indigenous insurgency and has acquired the form of a proxy war”.

M.L. Kak reporting for ‘The Tribune’ further substantiates the argument stating: “At present these outfits have 80 percent foreigners as their activists and the 20 percent local militants are simply used as guides. They are forced to do menial jobs... Pakistan pushed into Jammu and Kashmir mercenaries to ensure that the militants operating in the state followed the directions from Islamabad in letter and spirit. Islamabad had got confused with reports that a large section of people in Kashmir were either for greater autonomy or for an independent status for the state, and this line was against the interests of Islamabad which has been aspiring for incorporation of Kashmir with Pakistan”.

It is therefore true that indigenous militants movement has been practically crushed by Pakistan and Kashmir remains at the mercy of the terrible terror cabal of foreign Islamic terrorist, who have successfully killed the real political desires of the Kashmiris with the use of unimaginable terror. The non-Muslim community of the valley has abandoned their land for good, this includes a fair number of Muslims too, who now live in refugee camps all over India. The remaining Muslims in the valley have lost their voice and their will. They have been turned into these foreign militants puppets to do what they want them to do. Under such condition the chances of giving justice, political, economic and social, to the people of

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92 The Tribune (New Delhi), July 11, 1998, op.cit.
Kashmir, to meet their genuine demands becomes an impossibility. Till these foreign invaders are either exterminated or made to leave the valley by other means and Pakistan ceases to resort to cross border terrorism, this scourge shall continue to ravage J&K and indeed the rest of the country.

Even United States of America, a one time close ally of Pakistan has openly accepted the reality of Pak involvement in cross border terrorism. In 1996, American Assistant Secretary of State, Robin Raphel told the media: “we have been concerned about support from Pakistan for militant groups in Kashmir, and we have told the Pakistanis and continue to urge them to do every things they can to end that support”. The 1998 report on patterns of global terrorism released by the US state department described as “credible, the reports on official Pakistan support for Kashmiri militant groups that engage in terrorism, such as Harkat-ul-Ansar”. In 1999, US state departments spokesman James Rubin said: “We do believe, however, that militant groups, with leaders and infrastructure in Pakistan, are among those connected with killings of civilians in Indian held Kashmir”.

Again in 1999, Michael Sheehan, Coordinator for counter terrorism at the state department said: “Within Pakistan, there are numerous Kashmiri separatist groups and sectarian groups involved in terrorism which use Pakistan as a base... the United States is privy to information of Pakistani material support for some of these militants”. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said in Washington on 17 February 2000, “We have been concerned about the fact that groups like the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen which we believe was involved in the recent hijacking of Indian Airlines (Flight) 814, operate in Pakistan and that they have been a transit point for terrorists”.

President Clinton, during his March 20-25th visit to India and Pakistan also, for the first time, openly came out with Pakistan’s abetment in cross border terrorism. On March 22, the Asian Age reported that the US President, for the first time admitted: “I believe that there

94 Asian Age (New Delhi), May 7, 1998, p.5.
96 The Pioneer (New Delhi), November 21, 1999, p.7.
97 The Times of India (New Delhi), February 18, 2000, p.14.
are elements within the Pakistani government that have supported those who engage in violence in Kashmir... I just don’t think that this is the way to deal with Kashmir and I don’t think its good enough reasons to drive, in effect, the whole existence, the whole policy of the Pakistani government”. \(^98\) The Hindustan Times reported: “In a significant shift the US today came out in clear support of India’s stand that the dialogue with Pakistan can be resumed only if the Line of Control (LoC) is respected and cross border terrorism is ended.... The US President’s specific reference to cross border terrorism was a clear diplomatic triumph for New Delhi”.\(^99\) During his brief stop over in Islamabad on 25 March, 2000, Clinton emphatically told Pakistan to stop cross border terrorism. The Hindustan Times reports: “In a hard hitting speech broadcast on the national radio and television network (of Pakistan).... Clinton also emphatically told Pakistan to stop cross border terrorism, create conditions for resumption of Indo-Pak dialogue and warned Islamabad of more isolation if it continued to support violence”.\(^100\)

During, this historic visit another major incident occurred in Kashmir which further highlighted the proxy war strategy of Pakistan. On March 20, 2000, about 17 militants belonging to the pro accession, Lashkar-e-Taibya and Hiz-ul-Mujahideen, ruthlessly butchered 35 members of the minority Sikh community belonging to Chattisinghpura village in Anantnag district. This, massacre besides being the largest in the history of militancy in J&K was also the first aimed at the Kashmiri Sikhs - Perhaps to highlight the Kashmir story to President Clinton or to force the migration of some 80,000 Kashmiri Sikhs from the valley, in the same manner as was done with the Kashmiri Hindu’s, which is in tune with the Pakistani strategy of ‘ethnic cleansing’ of the valley.

On March 26, 2000, Union Home Minister Shri L.K. Advani visited the sight of the massacre at Chattisinghpura: “Advani advised the Sikhs in Kashmir against migrating... some Sikh leaders had earlier decided to migrate from the valley following the massacre”.\(^101\) Even some separatist leaders, including Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and Shabir Shah, appealed to the Sikhs not to leave Kashmir. Shabir Shah reportedly said: “You (Sikhs) can leave the valley

\(^98\) The Asia Age (New Delhi), 23 March, 2000, p.1.

\(^99\) The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 22 March, 2000, p.1.

\(^100\) The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), March 26, 2000, p.1.

\(^101\) The Times of India (New Delhi), March 27, 2000, p.1.
over our dead bodies. You will not be allowed to leave beyond Jawahar tunnel in Banihal.”

To a gathering at the Sikh village he confessed that “the Kashmiri Muslims were already feeling hurt as the pandits had not been able to return to the valley. The decision of the Sikhs would further aggrieve the wounds of the Kashmiri Muslims.\textsuperscript{102}

This besides highlighting the Pak policies of effecting ethnic cleansing in the valley also highlights the existing spirit of ‘Kashmiriyat’ and in the process expresses the differences existing between the Pak policies in Kashmir and the real desires of the local Kashmiri people. The Asian Age reported: “Thirty-five members of the minority Sikh community were butchered by heavily armed gun men.... The carnage was the first such against the Sikhs.... The national security adviser, Mr. Brajesh Mishra, said the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen were behind the massacre”.\textsuperscript{103} President Clinton later expressed grief at this ghastly incident and said: “No system of belief can ever justify the deliberate killings of innocents”.\textsuperscript{104} On March 25, the army managed to kill 5 of the militants involved in the Sikh massacre. All of them were foreign mercenaries belonging to the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. The information about their hideout was given by a local of Chhatisinghpura village, Mohammed Yaqoob Wagey, who admitted that he was himself involved in the shooting. He also told the security agencies “that of the 17 attackers from Hizbul Mujahideen and Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist outfits, most were foreign mercenaries”.\textsuperscript{105}

A joint study report of the American Asia Society and the Russian Institute of Oriental Studies, sums up the state of militancy in the valley during the pro-merger period, stating:

“In early 1990 a wave of secessionism, Islamic Fundamentalism and militancy swept over the Kashmir Valley, where the state’s largest city, Srinagar, is situated (the rest of the State of Jammu and Kashmir remained relatively calm). The Kashmiri ‘freedom fighters’ (as the militants style themselves) engaged in widespread violence, including murder, terrorism, arson, and bombings.... Leaders of established political organisations of all social groups, including moderate Muslims who advocated a political settlement of the Kashmir issue, were targetted. Later, in 1991, a number of

\textsuperscript{102} The Times of India (New Delhi), March 29, 2000, p.1.
\textsuperscript{103} The Asian Age (New Delhi), March 22, 2000, p.1.
\textsuperscript{104} The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), March 26, 2000, p.1.
\textsuperscript{105} The Times of India (New Delhi), March 29, 2000, p.10 (op.cit.).
innocent citizens came under threat and attack including the valley’s large Pandit (Hindu Brahmin) minority.... Even the leaders of the main separatist groups have undercut Pakistan’s statements about the spontaneous nature of events in Kashmir.... Amanullah Khan disclosed in January 1990 that the protest in Kashmir had been carefully planned and supported by well trained armed insurgents coming from Pakistani territory. We received a curious response from senior officials in the Pakistan government in response to our question regarding these training camps: they stated that the government did not initiate the creation of such camps, but that they could exist beyond government control. We were also informed concerning the participation of Kashmiris in the Afghan war and Mujahideen in the events in Kashmir.”

The above report clearly brings out the state of militancy in the valley during the pro-merger period of 1990-91. The tactics employed by the militants to root out the moderate “pro-Azadi” elements, the attacks on the Hindus to hasten the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of the valley (coalesce the above mentioned Sikh massacres to this, and a more transparent picture of the ethnic cleansing tactics of the pro-merger militants emerges). The issue of cross border terrorism, the existence of training camps in Pakistan and the presence of foreign mercenaries - the Afghan’s is clearly brought out. Today, the obvious involvement of Pakistan in the Kashmir valley, specifically in the form of a systematically orchestrated proxy war, has been a part of Pakistan’s design to bleed India of its resources without indulging in any open ended conventional military confrontation. The shift from the ‘Azadi’ to the pro merger stage has been gradual but planned. The rise of militancy Post-Kargil has been meteoric and more deadly. the direct attacks on well guarded security forces camps by groups of ‘Fidayeen’s’ (suicide squads) and increased hostility on border posts on the LoC has been the outcome of a more aggressive pro-merger strategy in Kashmir. The aim is to demoralise the security forces which will have a corresponding adverse effect on the morale of the civilian population of the valley also. The fallout would be the increase in the popular support of the pro-merger groups, even if it is out of sheer fear of them. A chart given bellow shows the details of militant attacks on security forces. 


107 Outlook, January 17, 2000, op.cit., p.16.
Post-Kargil Militant Attacks on Security Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Number Killed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 13, 1999</td>
<td>BSF camp at Bandipora</td>
<td>DIG, 4 others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 6, 1999</td>
<td>Army camp at Natnoos</td>
<td>Major, 2 JCOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 7, 1999</td>
<td>Army camp at Trehgam</td>
<td>Colonel, 3 guards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 13, 1999</td>
<td>Army camp at Beerwah</td>
<td>3 soliders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 12, 1999</td>
<td>15 Corp HQ at Badamibagh</td>
<td>10, including Defence PRO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 3, 1999</td>
<td>Army cantonment at Srinagar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2, 1999</td>
<td>Army HQ in Baramulla</td>
<td>JCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 13, 1999</td>
<td>Civil Lines area in Srinagar</td>
<td>5 policemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 15, 1999</td>
<td>Army camp of Rafiabad</td>
<td>Many injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 27, 1999</td>
<td>Special Operations Group HQ in Srinagar</td>
<td>11 SOG personnel, 1 Dy. SP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 7, 2000</td>
<td>Meteorological centre in Srinagar</td>
<td>4 CRPF men killed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The level of this pro-merger proxy war can be gauged from the fact that: “According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, substantial amounts of weapons/explosives were recovered from militants by the Indian security forces. The weapons recovered during 1988-1999 included: 889 rocket launchers, 1124 machine guns, 20,193 AK series rifles, 302 sniper rifles, 8061 pistols/revolves, 3136 thousand ammunition (assorted), 34,141 grenades, 3047 rockets, 1527 rocket boosters, 5669 mines, 1570 guns, 21,332 kg explosives, 1970 bombs, 314 grenade launchers, 127 mortars and 2118 WT sets (wireless radio sets)... Terrorist violence included kidnappings, extortions, attacks on Security Forces, explosions and arson and destruction of property. During 1988-99 (March).... 20,506 persons were killed in terrorist violence which inter alia, included 9,416 militants, 7,463 Muslims, 372 government officials, 151 politicians and 1819 security personnel”. 108

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was not enough, the Indian security forces recovered two micro light Pak flying machines from terrorist hideouts in the dense forests of Rajauri area. The Director General Police of J&K, Mr. Gurbachan Jagat told a news conference that: “The pilot-less mini-flying machines could be flown into a high security area with the help of the remote controlled device. Each machine could carry one and a half kg of RDX which could blow up a major installation”.

This kind of weaponry added more sophistication to the militants armoury. The amount of weaponry recovered could easily equip more than one division of the Indian army (Approximately 18,000 men). The possibility of providing, equipping, training and sending such a large quantity of men and material across the border cannot be undertaken by any organisation but the government of Pakistan, the Pakistani army and the ISI.

LEVEL TWO OF PAKISTAN’S STRATEGY

Pakistan commenced implementing its level two of the strategy, namely, the use or threat of use of its military force in conjunction with the use of Diplomatic force, with the ultimate aim of annexing J&K. However, due to a situation which is commonly referred to as a ‘no war no peace’ situation in military parlance (the aphorism is self explanatory) which was existing in the valley. Pakistan could not resort to the use of military force in the classical sense, but it did employ it in a rather oblique manner. In as far as the use of Diplomatic force is concerned it pulled out all stops and applied it with all it was worth. During this period, it was Pakistan’s use of its level one strategy in Punjab and J&K that was catalytic in the concurrent implementation of its level two strategy. Pakistan’s proxy war in J&K was gradually gaining momentum after 1987-88, to counter it India had to resort to the use of its armed forces to suppress the growing law and order situation in the valley and to seal off the border to prevent further infiltration. Pakistan promptly objected to it, accusing India of, firstly, posing a military threat to Pakistan by amassing such a large quantum of troops so close to the LoC and secondly, by raising the bogey of militarization of the valley with a view to gagging the true aspirations of the people of the valley, by resorting to human rights violations. This aspect was aimed at gaining international support. Pakistani and its supporting group propaganda in the US and UK often quote a figure of 600,000 Indian troops in the valley, which amounts to half of the Indian Army. These figures are totally inaccurate.

and grossly exaggerated and need to be contested. According to Maroof Raza "The entire Kashmir region of J&K falls under the Army's Northern Command. (India has five regional commands - Northern, Southern, Eastern, Western and Central Commands), which has a total of some 3,00,000 troops. This Northern Command has the responsibility to defend over a thousand Kilometers each of the border and LC with Pakistan, and an equivalent length of the Indian border with China. whereas, Pakistan has almost deployed 2,50,000 troops... opposite the Indian Northern Command... with the (Indian) Army's commitments along the borders, it is left with at best only three divisions in the valley (i.e. an entire force of 40,000 troops). Besides the Army, add another 40,000 Border Security Force paramilitary men and 30-35 companies (at best 5000 men) of the Central Reserve Police. And even if we are to add the induction of 10,000 troops of the newly raised Rashtriya Rifles who were in any case inducted to allow the exit of an equal number of regular Army soldiers - the entire figure can well be rounded upto, at the most, a hundred thousands soldiers of all types. Thus,... the false articulation of figures by Pakistan has now begun to be accepted and acknowledged even by diplomats and academics.... it is at best a malicious misinformation exercise... with some 1,00,000 troops battling... nearly 20,000 militants, Indian troops have performed commendably by any yardstick".110

In order to exert pressure on India, Pakistan has resorted to the use of force in the following manner:

a) Pressure on the LoC by the use of military force.
b) Conduct of big military exercises/troop movement close to the border/LoC to pose a military threat.
c) Nuclear threat.
d) Use of diplomatic force.

**Pressure on the Line of Control**

On the 740 km long Line of Control (LoC) that divides the state of Jammu and Kashmir between India and Pakistan. Troops from both sides are deployed in well entrenched posts in what is commonly referred to as "Eye ball to Eye Ball" posture - meaning, the troops

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are so close to each other that they can see each others eye balls. These positions on the LoC are not only bristling with troops and armament but with highly charged sentiments and emotions. Consequently, the LoC has and remains a highly volatile place where exchange of small arms fire, Artillery fire, rocket fire and even small scale physical attacks and raids on each others positions is a rule ;rather than an exception. Manoj Joshi reports: “On the night of August 22, when an unprecedented barrage of shells pounded virtually the entire length of the 740 km Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistani forces belonging to the 12 Infantry Division and the Force Commander for Northern Areas (FCNA) used everything they had, including long range field guns and deadly-mortars. Perhaps the most lethal were the technically obsolete 37mm anti-aircraft guns converted for direct firing against exposed Indian positions”.Pakistan has converted this environment to its advantage by bringing the LoC alive by resorting to use of military force mainly for the following reasons:

a) Keep the J&K issue internationalized.
b) Assist in intrusions by militants.
c) Scuttling peaceful measures to find a solution to the problem.
d) Keeping Indian Army under pressure with the aim of diverting their attention from militancy within J&K as also to lower their morale.
e) Keeping the civilians of border villages under pressure, so as to show the local administration and the government in poor light.

The most prominent example of this tactics was the Kargil conflict which is covered in a subsequent chapter, separately and in detail, as it possess all the classical attributes of Pakistan’s two level strategy in J&K. Pakistan actually intensified its pressure on the LoC from 1987-88 onwards, when its sponsored militancy both in Punjab and J&K was on a ‘roll’. Keesings Record of Worlds Events, records: “During this period, border tension was heightened, due to renewed fighting in Kashmir and controversy over Pakistani assistance to Indian Sikh activists. Troop clashes occurred at several places on the Indo-Pak border from Siachen to Punjab. In the first week of June 1987, five Pakistani soldiers were killed and four wounded on the Siachen glacier... over 100 pro-Pakistan militants’ were arrested in

\[111\] India Today (New Delhi), September 8, 1997, p.50.
Kashmir... beginning of December both countries began ammasing troops on their respective borders in what were said to be routine annual exercises, although in both cases the number of soldiers was believed to be considerably higher than usual". This in short gives out what is known as ‘activation of the LoC’. The LoC is activated by Pakistan, mainly at the initiative of the Pakistani Army which wants to convey the following messages:

a) To the politicians of Pakistan - you don’t have a free hand to bargain away Kashmir.

b) To the Pakistani people. We are the ultimate guardians of your interests.

c) To India, elections in Kashmir does not mean peace there.

d) To the International Community, Kashmir is a burning fuse that cannot be put out by India and Pakistan alone.

Pakistan uses pressure on the LoC to invite international mediation by raising the ante there. When the Indian Army retaliates they immediately file a complaint to the United Nations Military Observers Group in India and Pakistan - which is still active in Pakistan but not in India, as India considers the UN resolutions superseded by the 1972 Shimla agreement. Manoj Joshi commenting on this aspect says “The real aim (of the firing along the LoC) is to arouse world opinion and pull Pakistan’s Chestnuts out of the fire”.

Manoj Joshi and Ramesh Vinayak, in another article write: “Pakistan will review efforts to push the US to intervene and this could mean more clashes on the border. The forthcoming visits of US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Under Secretary of State Tom Pickering will be the focus of Pakistani activity... its entire effort is targeted at raising tensions in the state and on the LoC to the point where the US feels compelled to intervene”. It has been resorting to this gimmick from 1947-48 onwards and the latest and most significant example of this type of use of force is the Kargil conflict.

Pakistan has also been resorting to this ‘modus operandi’, whenever it wants to assist large groups of militants from infiltrating into J&K through unguarded mountain passes and ranges. The aim is to divert the attention of the Indian troops deployed on the LoC by


113 India Today (New Delhi), Ibid., p.52.

114 India Today (New Delhi), October 13, 1997, p.36.
bringing down sudden and heavy volume of fire on them and in the ensuing confusion facilitating intrusions. A news report reveals: “Pakistani troops continued their salvos of the rocket attacks in the Poonch sector... The Pakistani army... has reportedly fired about 60 rockets in the last fortnight in the Poonch and Rajauri sectors... the rocket attacks could be an attempt... to push into Indian territory Pakistan-trained terrorists and foreign mercenaries”.

During a heavy episode of LoC firing by Pakistan in August 1997 “Army and intelligence sources say the Pakistani action was designed to push militants across the border. The target was the vital second tier of the Indian Army’s operational plan to check infiltration... According to Ashok Kapur, (Brigadier General Staff) at the Corps headquarters in Srinagar, there is evidence of infiltrators having got through. “Three militants were killed on August 25 near Baramulla”... Intelligence sources have confirmation of one group of some 17 militants having come through last week”. Surinder Singh Oberoi in an article similarly writes: “Defence spokesman and incharge of operations, Brigadier Arun Kumar Chopra said, “In the continuous exchange of fire fight, atleast 25 to 30 Pakistani soldiers were killed and more than 100 Bunkers were destroyed in retaliation to unprovoked Pakistan’s firing on civilian population... while on our side four civilians were killed and equal number of Indian soldiers died... Brigadier Chopra alleged that Pakistani troops opened heavy unprovoked artillery fire in Kargil, Kupwara and Uri towns intentionally, ahead of winter month, to ‘infiltrate the militants in our area... In the last two months, atleast seventeen militants... were killed by the army... in frontier Kupwara, when they tried to sneak into this side of Kashmir”.

Another reason, why the LoC is activated by Pakistan is generally to scuttle any measures that are being taken for the peaceful settlement of the Kashmir issue. Specially, when either politicians or bureaucrats of both the countries are involved. This has been the trend during the ten rounds of foreign ministers talks, or during the six rounds of Home Secretaries talks or during the six rounds of talks on the Siachen issue. This is, perhaps the Pakistani army’s language to tell its leaders that they will not accept any political solution to the Kashmir issue. During the 9th round of foreign secretaries meet in New Delhi between 15-18 September 1997, the border, “witnessed several incidents of unprovoked heavy firing

115 The Times of India (New Delhi), 26 January 1994, as quoted by S. Gajrani, op.cit., p.81.
116 India Today (New Delhi), September 8, 1997, op.cit., p.51.
by Pakistan in Kargil and other sectors of the Line of Control, as well as, along the International Boundary in Jammu and Kashmir. During the bilateral discussions, Governments serious concerns regarding these acts were conveyed to Pakistan”.118 India Today similarly reports “Kargil has become the main battle zone for an offensive launched by Pakistan that may not only destroy the official level talks between the two countries, which resumed recently after an embarrassing gap of four years, but even demolish the much acclaimed Gujral doctrine” 119 Pakistan army’s latest example of scuttling any peaceful solution to J&K was following the Lahore declaration in 1998, when it resorted to the use of military force in Kargil.

Perhaps the worst sufferers of this type of use of force by Pakistan are the innocent villagers inhabiting villages close to the LoC for whom the Indo-Pak war has not stopped since 1947-48. Several hundred families living close to the LoC have fled to safer areas leaving their homes and hearth behind. Hundreds have been killed, many more have been maimed for life and even more have suffered financial and economic damage (to crops, homes and live stock). The apathy of the local administration and the government is seen to be believed. These people are confused, insecure and terrified, and are easily bought over by Pakistan to be trained as militants, motivators, recruiters, informers or guides for a few thousand rupees.

**Army Exercises, Repercussions on J&K**

Army exercises held by Pakistan (and India) are another instrument of use of force. 1987 can be singled out as a unique year, from the point of view of military training snowballing to a state of inter-state war. During this year, two such large scale army exercises were held one each by India and Pakistan in 1987-88 and 1989-90 respectively, on the Indo-Pak border, that could have culminated into a threat to peace in the subcontinent. These exercises had a direct impact on the state of J&K in particular and on the security environment of the region in general. Though such exercises are elemental to all armies, normally the aims and objectives of these exercises is purely to test and rehearse operational plans, major planning parameters, doctrines and new concepts under simulated battle

conditions and are normally held in the border areas over terrain resembling the actual area of operations, sometimes, an aim plus in the form of sending a signal to an adversary which may act as a deterrent to any planned aggression or adventure this may also be termed as "Force Projection". But exercise Brasstacks by India and exercise Zarb-e-Momin by Pakistan, is also incorporated which, as events subsequently proved, not only boomeranged but proved rather costly in terms both of economics and politics of the two countries. These are discussed below:

**Exercise Brass Tacks:** General Sundarji the then Chief of the Army Staff, and a very accomplished soldiers was the moving force behind this gigantic effort. The concept was a deep penetration maneuver in the deserts of Rajasthan with the aim of reaching the Indus or (at least the green belt, well inside Pakistan's hinterland). Such a move would cut Pakistan into two halves by severing major North-South communication lines. This would force Pakistan to commit its major reserves to contest the Indian Army and thus face defeat in a short span of time. When the exercise commenced in Rajasthan, Pakistan got alarmed, despite the fact that the exercise was being conducted 70 km on the Indian side of the IB, and Pakistan had been informed about it earlier. It moved its offensive forces up North and poised them against Amritsar, Gurdaspur and Pathankot and Jammu, thereby, forcing India to modify and curtail its exercise, as the bulk of its forces during this period were down south in Rajasthan. A period of tense politico-military situation prevailed in both countries for some time.

A lot of motives were attributed to India's political leadership and General Sundarji by various political and military thinkers, writers and analysts in India and Pakistan, implying that the exercise was to be converted into a surprise offensive into Pakistan, much in the same manner that the Egyptians did to Israel in the 1973 'Yom Kippur' war.

On the other hand, having been able to disrupt the exercise Pakistan felt elated and many in Pakistan thought that 'Brass Tacks' represents a victory for the Pakistan Army as they were able to foil India's aggressive intentions by their bold maneuvering towards the sensitive state of Punjab.

This rhetoric, notwithstanding, the fact that emerged was that Pakistan moved its reserve offensive formations in a manner that "established a potential for Pakistan to
undertake a pincer movement to capture a salient in Punjab or attack Jammu and Punjab simultaneously to disrupt communications between India and the state of Jammu and Kashmir." Consequently, during the conduct of the last phase of exercise Brass tacks, a sequenced exercise called “Operation Trident” was launched by the Indian Army to counter Pakistan’s Army movements in Punjab and J&K.

**Operation Trident:** This exercise was an adjunct to ‘Brasstacks’ and was to be launched in tandem with it. Operation Brasstacks was planned as an offensive operation in the plains, Operation Trident was planned to be launched in the mountains. “Trident was to be an attack by Indian 15 Corps on Skardu and then Gilgit with the object of recapturing the Northern Areas of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK).” With the capture of the Northern Areas, firstly India would have recovered all areas lost to Pakistan in 1947-48 and secondly, the success of this operation would have assured permanent security against any threat to Kargil-Leh-Siachen and ipso facto to the Srinagar-Leh highway. (Possibly, then the Kargil crisis of mid 1999 would have never occurred). Finally, the recapture of the Northern Areas would have made our defences against the Chinese more viable in the Ladakh sector. A cover story in India Today written by Inderjit Badhwar and Dilip Bob also supports this theory. They write, “Brass Tacks was originally intended as a massive strategic deception to focus Pakistani attention on Sind while India went for the Northern Areas.” However, when Operation Brasstacks got aborted so did Operation Trident.

Pakistan however, having heard of these plans from the above mentioned sources, would have very well decided to pre-empt any such future actions by India, by stepping up proxy war in Kashmir so that the Indian Army is kept tied down on internal security operations. An Indian Defence Review Research team, while supporting this hypothesis states “It appears that Pakistan’s ‘Plan X’ (on sponsoring militancy in J&K) was prepared after a widely read fortnightly (India Today) of New Delhi reporting on exercise Brasstacks gave

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122 India Today (New Delhi), May 5, 1988, p.84.
brief comments on certain offensive plans for Northern Kashmir (POK) conceived during this exercise".123

The surprising outcome of this exercise was the worsening of militancy in Kashmir immediately after termination of this exercise. Kanti Bajpai and others in the above quoted study have this to say "to the surprise of most Indians and Pakistanis the Indian portions of Kashmir erupted...".124 The 'surprise' may be explained thus: firstly, Pakistan felt that the 'new look' powerful Indian Army could, if it desired, inflict a crushing blow to Pakistan in a conventional war scenario, and therefore, a higher level sponsoring of proxy war in the sensitive border states of Punjab and J&K would keep the Indian Army tied down, to their advantage. Secondly, by this time, the Afghan embroglio was on the brink of settlement, the resources in men and material at the disposal of Pakistan's ISI and Army could now conveniently be directed to fan the flames in Kashmir. Finally, aftermath 'Brasstacks' Pakistan was probably convinced that Sindh could be defended, the centre of gravity from its point of view were Punjab and Kashmir. As per its two level strategy, both states needed to be kept red hot internally, "combined with irregular campaigning by tribesmen, led by the Pakistani Regular Army Officer Corps. At one remove, the operational level gambit which will detach Kashmir (and a part of Punjab to boot) is offensive operation's in the plains of Punjab and south Jammu province".125

Exercise 'Zarb-e-Momin': In the winter of 1989 Pakistan responded to India's exercise Brasstacks by launching its biggest ever military exercise called 'Zarb-e-Momin' - roughly translated means - "blow of the faithful". The exercise was conducted over three weeks. Two Corps, 11 Divisions and the equivalent of 57 infantry brigades were exercised.126 The exercise was conducted in Southern Punjab bordering Sindh, called the 'Thal Region'. The operations envisaged an 85 km armoured thrust in the Punjab (Indian). "it must be mentioned here that operations in Kashmir would have been dovetailed in their entirety into Zarb-e-

124 Kanti P. Bajpai, P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen and Sumit Ganguly, op.cit., p.5.
126 Ibid., p.148.
Momin, both irregular as well as regular warfare aspects" (Both levels of Pakistan strategy).

The strategical concept of the exercise which is commonly referred to as the “Beg Doctrine”, after Gen. Aslam Beg, the then Chief of Army Staff (COAS) of Pak Army, who conceptualized it. The exercise was primarily designed to test out the concept of offensive defence, as a strategic option. “The ‘raison de etre’ of the new strategy being, that after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, Pakistan is no longer faced with a two front situation. Hence the new defensive strategy, in the words of Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul (who was the Chief Umpire for the exercise), demands that the war is carried into the ‘enemy’s’ territory in case of threat (The enemy in this case obviously being India). The concept envisages the use of a part of the force as a defensive shield to blunt enemy’s offensive, and then to use the remaining part of its force to launch a counter offensive against the enemy. This is by no means a new concept being introduced. In Kashmir the Pakistani army had been practicing this concept from 1947-48, till date. In 1947-48, it used a large part of its regular forces as the defensive shield, while using irregular’s in the form of tribals to carry out the offensive part of her strategy. In 1965, Pakistan again implemented the same concept. Even, in the ongoing proxy/low intensity war Pakistan is implementing this very strategy, the strategic defence is being provided by her regular armed forces, backed by a nuclear threat, and the offensive is being conducted, by proxy, by a force of mercenary militants, trained and sponsored by it. Another mode of this strategy was tried by Pak during the Kargil crisis of May-July 1999.

In analysing the Zarb-e-Momin concept in relation to J&K, an extract of an article by Abbas Nasir in the Pakistani daily “The Herald” of December 1989, would be relevant:

“While the primary reason for the evolution of the Beg Doctrine is the creation of large reserves in the wake of the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan, defence experts point out that this is not the only factor. Other factors cited by them include the situation in the India Punjab, where extremists are well organised and in the event of war may compel the Indians to deploy a much larger force to guard their lines of communication.... Experts attach a great deal of significance to this factor, as well as to the fact that the Afghan

127 Ibid., p.150.
mujahideen who have considerable experience in guerrilla warfare in the
mountainous terrain of their own country, may well participate in any future
operation in Kashmir, with its broadly similar terrain. “Although there is
nothing concrete or formal in terms of an agreement with them, don’t you
think the Afghan Mujahideen would like to repay their debt to Pakistan? And
have we not supported their cause fully?” asks an army officer in
Rawalpindi... The officer paints a scenario where the Afghan mujahideen, in
conjunction with ‘Liberation Forces’ in Indian held Kashmir, will play havoc
with Indian troops stationed there. The heroic struggle of the Afghan
mujahideen has given a fillip to the liberation movement in Indian-occupied
Kashmir... the turmoil in Srinagar and other towns, as reflected in the
frequent break down of law and order, the imposition of curfew and a general
increase in lawlessness, substantiates his views.”

The foregoing not only reflects the relevance of exercise “Zarb-e-Moin” with regard
to J&K, but also expresses the fact that while the Pakistan Army was planning this mock war
with India in 1989, it was also planning the proxy war in Kashmir, by gradually upgrading the
ongoing low intensity conflict in Kashmir, by inducting highly trained and better equipped
Afghan mercenaries into the valley.

The impact of these exercises on the ground situation in the valley immediately
became apparent when nascent militancy immediately exploded into a state of full blown
insurgency in 1989-90. The ‘toy war’ got converted into a state of ‘real war’ in the valley in
no time. This heightened state of Indo-Pak tension instead of getting translated into a
conventional war, got translated into raising the level of Proxy War by Pakistan in Punjab and
initiating it in a more aggressive manner in J&K.

The Sino-Indian Tension: During 1987, Sino-Indian relations reached a level that could
only be matched with the tension during 1962. The Ministry of Defence, annual report, 1986-
87 states “China’s intrusion in the Sumdrong Chu Valley, its protests over the grant of
statehood to Arunachal Pradesh... and the hardening of its stance on the border issue, cast
strains on the bilateral relations”.130 Tensions between the two countries were already built up
due to the Chinese incursion into Somdrung Cho in the Kameng division of Arunachal
Pradesh on 15 July 1986. What compounded an already delicate situation was the conferring

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129 Strategic Digest (New Delhi: IDSA), March 1990, p.2006. (Abbas Nasir, “Back to the Front”, The
Herald, Pakistan, December 1989).

130 India Today (New Delhi), May 15, 1987, p.130.
of statehood on Arunachal Pradesh on February 20, 1987, which took the Chinese totally by surprise. They vehemently objected to this move, in the ensuing tension, India moved a whole brigade of Army into the Wangdung area in Arunachal Pradesh. The Chinese reacted by quickly moving in their heliborne forces into the same area. India Today reported “Already, in an area in the eastern sector about 30 km long and 7 km deep, Indian and Chinese troops face each other in ominous positions”. Simultaneously, India launched a massive military exercise called “Chequer Board”. Wherein a large quantum of force was moved up to the Indo-Chinese border in Arunachal Pradesh.

While the attention of the Indian political and military leadership of the country was fully concentrated eastwards, in an effort to counter a possible Chinese threat, Pakistan found it an ideal opportunity to implement its predetermined strategy in Kashmir, by launching more vigorous and aggressive subversive operations in the valley. How Pakistan subsequently made use of the Sumdrong Chu incident in Kashmir is elaborated in a succeeding chapter on the Kargil conflict.

Nuclear Threat

In May 1998, Pakistan along with India, gate crashed into the club of Nuclear haves and finally unveiled its oft repeated Islamic bomb, fathered by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who first referred to it, when he said: “we were on the threshold of full nuclear capability when I left the Government to come to this death cell (in 1977). We know that Israel and South Africa have full nuclear capability. The Christians, Jewish and Hindu civilizations have this capability. The communist powers also possess it. Only the Islamic civilization was without it, but that position was about to change.” Bhutto was so obsessed with possessing an Islamic bomb that his historic statement of 1965, reflects his desperation to acquire one at any cost. In a speech he said: “If India developed an atomic bomb, we will have to develop one even if we have to eat grass or leaves or to remain hungry.”

131 India Today (New Delhi), June 30, 1987, p.127.
The strategic compulsions for both India and Pakistan going overtly nuclear are clearly very different, though the events of Pokhran II and Chagai may convey a different picture. Whereas, India's nuclear programme is and has always been driven by principled international and regional strategic consideration, specially with a not too friendly nuclear China as a neighbour. Pakistan's nuclear programme is solely India centric. As Stephen P. Cohen has written "India’s nuclear program has always been strongly influenced by the China factor... Pakistan has been more purposive. From the beginning Bhutto wanted a nuclear weapon. He saw the bomb as a way of balancing India’s conventional superiority, neutralizing the Indian nuclear threat and reviving Pakistan’s shattered strategic reputation." For India, China obviously is the greater threat, given the history of past territorial dispute, as also the potential clashing of strategic interests in the arena of ideology, politics and economics, not only in the regional but in an international context, so if there is at all an arms race with a nuclear content, it is between India and China and not India and Pakistan. In the case of the Latter, India was or would have been content with the overwhelming conventional arms superiority that it possesses.

Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee, the Prime Minister of India is believed to have sent a communication to American President Bill Clinton, explaining the compulsions of conducting the nuclear tests of May 11 and 13. The contents of the communiqué were published by "The New York Times" and later by the Indian media. It read: "We have an overt nuclear weapon state on our borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962. Although our relations with that country have improved in the last decade or so, an atmosphere of distrust persists mainly due the unresolved border problem. Suspicions had been heightened by material help this state had rendered another neighbour of ours to become a covert nuclear weapon state. Relations with this latter neighbour were especially embittered by three aggressions in the last 50 years and by the unremitting terrorism and militancy sponsored by it in several parts of our country."135

This statement when read in conjunction with the statement of George Fernandes, the defence minister, issued a few days before the Pokhran II tests saying that "China is India’s

135 Frontline (Chennai), June 5, 1999, p.5 (Cover Story).
threat number one”, confirms the fact that India going nuclear was China specific. Fernandes, further substantiated this fact when he went on to say: “China’s defence strategy has been working to encircle India. China has provided Pakistan with both missiles as well as nuclear known how. China has nuclear weapons stockpiled in Tibet right along our borders. On the eastern frontier, the Chinese have trained and equipped the Myanmarese Army... from 170,000 six years ago, its strength today is 450,000 and by the turn of the century, it will be half a million... 11 airstrips in Tibet had been lengthened to house new generation Sukhoi combat aircrafts... China must be perceived as a threat by any person who is concerned with India’s security.”

However, for Pakistan, who had but one enemy in India, going nuclear was only India specific and Kashmir centric. After the Chagai tests, Nawaz Sharif, in his address to the Nation clearly stated that Pakistan had “settled its scores with India.... It was tit for tat.” Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed said in a statement, “Contemporary history held only one lesson for us. The answer lay in credible deterrence. Today we have proved our capability. There are not doubt left any more. The era of ambiguity is behind us.” These statement’s clearly point to the fact as to where the Pakistani nuclear bomb is aimed.

**Centrality of Kashmir**

The development of nuclear capability by Pakistan in 1987, with Chinese assistance, provided Pakistan with another tool that endowed it with the where with all to add another potent armament in its strategy of use of force in Kashmir - Nuclear blackmail. Which, it has used against India ever since. Knowing, that the mere use of the deadly word will make the world look up and take notice. Till those fateful days of 28 and 30 May 98 (when Chagai happened) the threat of nuclear blackmail by Pakistan was just in being, after that, it became real, and therefore, more potent. In a text of a an interview given by Sartaj Aziz, Pakistani Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Mr. Robert Karniol of “Janes Defence Weekly” Karniol writes: “The Jammu and Kashmir issue is the ‘underlying problem here... it is after India and Pakistan conducted their matching nuclear test explosions earlier this year that the international community began to take the 50 year old dispute over sovereignty seriously.

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136 Praveen Swami, Ibid., p.105.
137 *Frontline* (Chennai), June 19, 1999, p.5 (Cover Story).
Islamabad is seeking third party mediation which New Delhi has tragically rejected “If our problem with India is resolved, we won’t need a nuclear capacity”, the foreign minister argues. This statement sums up the centrally of Pakistan’s desire for possessing a bomb and the strategy there of.

The fact that Pakistan even turned down Prime Minister Vajpayee’s offer declaring that India would never use nuclear weapons first and that both countries should enter into a strategic dialogue on peace, security and stability in the nuclear context, made in the Lok Sabha on August 4, 1998. Confirms the fact that Pakistan wants to retain the nuclear balance of fear in its dealing with India on Kashmir. Of course, the endgame was quickly achieved, when General Musharraf said “Pakistan would not hesitate to use the bomb if attacked”. His counterpart on the other side of the border, General V.P. Malik, put his nuclear card on the table stating that “a limited set piece war could be the order of the day”. These two statements portray the difference of strategic perception and threat response within the nuclear umbrella, by both countries.

Having acquired nuclear capability Pakistan promptly set about using it as a tool in its Kashmir strategy. K. Subrahmanyam, the noted defence and security analyst quoting Stephen P. Cohen writes: “Stephen Cohen an eminent American specialist on Pakistan and India wrote in March 1998, (even before the nuclear tests were carried out by both countries)... that it would provide the umbrella under which Pakistan could reopen the Kashmir issue; a Pakistani nuclear capability paralyses not only the Indian nuclear decision but also Indian conventional forces and a brash, bold, Pakistani strike to Liberate Kashmir might go unchallenged if the Indian leadership was weak or indecisive.” Very prophetic words, Kargil happened precisely under the above nuclear umbrella in May-July 1999, when the Indian caretaker Government under Vajpayee was perhaps at its weakest. However, the Pakistani strike failed to paralyse either the Indian defence forces nor the political decision, and the Pakistani plan was made to blow away and freeze in the icy mountains of Kargil.

The Pakistani leadership has been a good pupil of the thesis that irrational behaviour generates pressure on rational actors and can yield rewards. Pakistan has used nuclear

blackmail against India on at least three occasions (1984, 87 and 1990, details of these occasions are covered subsequently) in the past and all three times, when it was not even an overt nuclear capable state. An editorial in ‘Friday Times’, titled “Its now or never” talks of the nuclear threat vis-à-vis Kashmir in very candid terms: “... Pakistan cannot win a conventional war with India, because the conventional balance has been seriously eroded against Pakistan in the last decade, Pakistan will lose the war; when Pakistan is about to lose the war, it will be obliged to use nuclear weapons to thwart defeat; that is why it is imperative to show India that we are not bluffing when we say we have the bomb and will use it if it is necessary to protect our country.”

Also, Pakistan having gone nuclear with active Chinese help and tacit US consent seems to be confident of Chinese and American support, in its use of nuclear blackmail over Kashmir. If not, how does one explain Washington’s soft response to declaring Pakistan a “terrorist state”, while considering Iran as a state sponsoring terrorism though more US citizens have been killed by Pakistanis than by Iranians. How does one explain the fact that despite Washington’s stern warnings coupled with promises of loads of ‘goodies’ in return for not going overtly nuclear, Pakistan ignored all and went ahead with Chagai. How does one explain that despite warning Pakistani military not to stage a coup, it merrily went ahead with it. The only plausible answer is that Pakistanis are conscious of USA’s helplessness in dealing with them. They treat Washington with a certain amount of condescension. It appears to be a kind of Stockholm syndrome with USA, as a hostage, becoming a sympathiser of Pakistan, the hijacker. No big surprise then, if Pakistan goes on with its adventurism in Kashmir, without much fear of big brothers USA/China. K. Subramaniyam, writing about this postulation states: “Presumably in pursuance of that long established strategic doctrine Pakistan unleashed the covert war in Kashmir following its acquisition of nuclear weapons... There was an implied threat that if Pakistan did not get what it wanted, viz, Kashmir, the covert war, might escalate to overt conventional war, and perhaps to nuclear exchange. The western nuclear proliferation theology came in handy for Pakistan’s attempted blackmail. Some sections of the US State Department openly took a partisan line on Kashmir, thereby encouraging Pakistan further in its blackmail attempt.”

140 Friday Times (Lahore), May 29-June 4, 1998, pp.1 and 5.
the other way” policy and even supported Pakistan in acquiring the Islamic bomb because of its policy of ejecting the “evil empire” from Afghanistan.

The Nuclear threat-proxy war linkage is explained in an editorial in the Times of India; “in the light of mutual nuclear deterrence, limited conventional wars are not very likely but there is an increasing probability of proxy war... There is a widespread belief in the Pakistani military and political establishment that they can deter India with their nuclear weapons, tie down the Indian forces with terrorism and mercenary militancy and seize Kashmir at an appropriate moment... Hence General Musharraf’s emphasis on proxy war.”

Within the ambit of this assumption Gen. Musharraf as the CEO of Pakistan has enhanced the intensity of proxy war in J&K, after Chagai and Kargil. A change in the tactics of the post Kargil proxy war in the valley has also been introduced to make it more deadly and effective. This aspect has been covered subsequently in detail.

On analysis, clearly, Pakistani strategy smells of nuclear blackmail, knowing that a nuclear war would decimate it forever and only damage India. Therefore, the practicability of such a scenario actually being enacted is remote. At best it can only use its nuclear deterrence as a tool of strategic blackmail. No wonder then, it was freely employed exactly a year later during the Kargil crisis, forcing America and President Bill Clinton to take drastic steps to avert a major situation from developing in the subcontinent. Nuclear blackmail as a strategic tool had earlier been used by Pakistan against India, on three occasions, in 1984, 1987, and later in 1990, a brief review of these events will facilitate understanding of this strategy.

In a critically acclaimed book titled “Critical Mass”, the writers have come up with a frightening fact as to how India and Pakistan came close to a nuclear war in at least three occasions in the past (It would well be four if the Kargil crisis is also added). The first time was in 1984, when “Pakistani intelligence learned - perhaps from its great friend CIA Director William Casey - that India was about to launch a surprise attack against Pakistan’s own nuclear research facility at Kahuta... Pakistan therefore sent an explicit message to New Delhi through diplomatic channels to the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. If India attacked Kahuta on October 21 as planned, the Pakistanis warned, there would be a reprisal that would cost them dearly. Fighter bombers would strike every nuclear installation in India, civilian as

well as military... The consequences of such an attack were readily apparent to the Indians. Massive amounts of radiation pouring out of shattered reactors and nuclear storage sites would contaminate vast areas. Indians would die by the thousands... The Indians backed down."  

The purported Indian airstrike against Kahuta would have been very much on the lines of Israel’s airstrikes on the Osirak reactor in Iraq in 1981. There was some talk of the Israeli involvement in the Indian plan also. However knowledgeable military sources say that in 1984, Pakistan did not have a single fighter aircraft that could hit India’s nuclear facilities which were all hundreds of miles away from their range. The nearest one being 800 km (Bombay) and the farthest over 2,000 kms (Madras). This was perhaps the first time that Pakistan used the tool of nuclear blackmail as a part of its strategy against India, though in an ingenious manner, by threatening to use India’s own nuclear capability against itself. The second time it did so was in 1987. 

That, by 1987, Pakistan did possess some kind of a nuclear device was evident from a host of sources. “In 1987, Dr. A.Q. Khan (the father of the Islamic bomb) told Indian journalist Kuldeep Nayyar that Pakistan had the bomb. At about the same time the CIA operative in Islamabad Richard Barlow reported to Washington that Pakistan had assembled the bomb... General Aslam Beg wrote in the ‘Nation’ that the bombs were assembled in 1987 and Ms. Bhutto was fully briefed on it during her Prime Ministership. Dr. A.Q. Khan kept up a stream of declaration about Pakistan’s nuclear weapon prowess.”  

“Experts aver that Pakistan carried out one cold test in September 1986 in the hills west of Chagai to verify a Chinese nuclear weapon design”. 

From this time onwards American intelligence kept a close watch on Pak’s nuclear development and despite some very conclusive and real evidence regarding the presence of a nuclear device with Pakistan, USA deliberately turned a blind eye to it all, their degree of awareness was reiterated more authoritatively by Richard Kerr, a senior, CIA official, who remarked in 1993, “There is no question that we had an intelligence basis for not certifying...”

(the Pressler Amendment) from 1987 on". In effect, by 1987 the US had good reasons to assume that Pakistan had acquired a nuclear explosive device. However the US President chose to certify that Pakistan met the Pressler amendment criteria in 1987, 88, 89. Perhaps the reason for doing so lay in the American policy in Afghanistan during this period.

The Pakistani military top brass made no secret of their nuclear capability in 1987. General Aslam Beg, the former Pakistani army chief, confirmed in a recent interview that: "When I was Vice Army Chief (March 1987), Pakistan had attained the capability of making an atom bomb". In another article in a Pakistan daily General Beg offers a very interesting chronology of events relating to the development of the Pakistani nuclear weapon. He says: "Islamabad embarked upon all the nuclear steps simultaneously: (1) enrichment of uranium up to 95 percent and above (2) preparation of the device of integrating all its elements (3) Laboratory testing of different elements of the device; (4) Final test of the integrated system, either by detonation, which is termed hot test, or without it, through a cold test (Pakistan, as has been brought out earlier, did it by conducting a cold test); and (5) developing the delivery system through special aeroplanes or missiles technology."

No sooner had Pakistan acquired covert nuclear capability in 1987, it unleashed the covert war on Kashmir. Level one (subversion and proxy war) of Pakistan’s two level strategy on Kashmir got underway, under the implied threat of a nuclear umbrella. One reason why India did not opt for striking militant bases across the LoC was of the escalation the conflict to a nuclear level. Therefore Pakistan continued to escalate the proxy war against India in J&K, without the risk of Indian military retaliation. Air Commodore Jasjit Singh wrote about it, saying: "General Aslam Beg, as Army Chief, used to exhort his officers to interpret the Holy Quran ‘to instill terror into the hearts of your enemies’. The tools to achieve this against a more powerful neighbour could only rest on terrorism and/or weapons of mass destruction.... The nuclear deterrent was to provide the defence while a proxy war would

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147 "Pakistan Went Nuclear in 1987 says its Ex-Army Chief", The Hindu (New Delhi), April 12, 1996.
constitute the offensive component of the new strategic doctrine.\textsuperscript{149} This stratagem appears to have been effective and the suggestion that Muslim separatists in Kashmir valley escalated their militancy is valid in this context.

During this period Pakistan was so emboldened by its covert nuclear acquisition that it even made India dilute its massive military exercise - "Operation Brasstacks" by making use of, perhaps for the first time, the use of nuclear blackmail. Dr. A.Q. Khan, the creator of the Pakistani bomb, was explicit in a January 1987 interview with an Indian reporter, when he said: "what the CIA has been saying about our possessing the bomb is correct. They told us, Pakistan could never produce the bomb and they doubted my capabilities, but they now know we have it." Of course Pakistan did not want to use the bomb, Khan continued, but "If driven to the wall there will be no option left". The "drive" he had in mind may have had something to do with Operation Brass Tacks.\textsuperscript{150}

The writers of "Critical Mass", cite 1990, as the third instance of a possible India-Pak nuclear war, which was again triggered off by events in Kashmir. In 1990, the Farooq Abdullah led NC-Congress alliance broke up leading to total breakup of local administration and enhancement of militancy in Kashmir. India was forced to send additional troops into Kashmir to tackle the rising law and order situation. On the other side of the border Benazir Bhutto was trying to establish herself and her nascent new democratic government in Pakistan and during one of her over-enthusiastic moods, while on a trip to Pakistani occupied Kashmir, she passionately vowed a "1000 year war to free Kashmir from India". B.G. Deshmukh who was the principal secretary to the Prime Minister of India during 1990, records "As the summer of 1990 advanced and with it, the approach of the monsoons in Punjab, our anxiety became acute. We got definite information that Pakistan was planning to make a pre-emptive attack in northern Punjab... The Pakistani terrorists would then declare in Srinagar, on August 14 (The Independence day of Pakistan), their secession from India and invite Pakistan to send its army to protect them... this would be enough grounds for them to officially and legally enter Kashmir and show to the world that India was the aggressor."\textsuperscript{151}

\textsuperscript{149} Jasjit Singh, "The Wars that Never Were", \textit{India Today} (New Delhi), February 28, 1994, p.65.
\textsuperscript{150} William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, op.cit., n.50, p.77.
\textsuperscript{151} B.G. Deshmukh, "The Inside Story", \textit{India Today} (New Delhi), February 28, 1994, p.63.
The Indian Prime Minister Mr. V.P. Singh replied in the same tone telling the nation to be prepared for war. Internationally too the region was in turmoil, Soviets had withdrawn from Afghanistan, consequently American interest in this region was under review. Iraq had invaded Kuwait and a prelude to the build up of Operation Desert Storm was already set in motion. All in all the geo-political environment of the subcontinent was getting hotter each day.

Pakistan, aware of India’s overwhelming conventional military superiority had only one way to checkmate it. It made the nuclear move. “Critical Mass” contains near authentic sequence of this move: “The first intelligence probably came from a National Security Agency intercept... The orbital flight paths of reconnaissance satellites were moved to get better views... of key nuclear facilities in both countries... Kahuta had been evacuated out of apparent fear of attack... A second indicator was more ominous. At Chagai... imagery analysts believed that they had spotted a nuclear storage facility... A source inside Pakistan, for example, had revealed that A.Q. Khan had recently visited Chagai... another reconnaissance satellite... had picked up a convoy of trucks that moved exactly the way their US counterparts did when they delivered nuclear weapons to US bases. Finally, at that base, there appeared to be the smoking gun; F-16s were on full runway alert... and ordnance hanging from the fighters wings. One analyst remembered his reaction quite vividly: “I believed that they were ready to launch on command and that message had been clearly conveyed to the Indians who were saying, ‘Oh, shit We’ve been watching the revolution in Kashmir, the internal problems in India and we look at the Pakistani pre-positioning. These guys have done everything that will lead you to believe they are locked and loaded.”

The alarmed White House promptly despatched Deputy National Security adviser Robert N. Gates to Pakistan and India. Mr. Gates could not meet Benazir Bhutto because she was travelling around the Persian Gulf trying to rally Muslim support for her country’s position on Kashmir. But it is reported that he told the Pakistani President Mr. Ishaq Khan and the Chief of the Army Staff General Aslam Beg very firmly: “General, our military has war gamed every scenario between you and the Indians and there isn’t a single way you can win... Don’t expect any help from us”.

152 William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, op.cit., n.50, pp.82-83.
153 Ibid., p.84.
Prime Minister that Pakistan had agreed to close training camps for terrorists. He also mentioned that Pakistan had been told not to expect any help from the Americans if they stated the war. Six weeks later, "Pakistan and India pulled back from the brink of what would have been the first nuclear war." 154

The overt nuclearization of both the countries in May 98, made India feel that nuclear deterrence would make the chances of another Indo-Pak war over Kashmir remote. However, the western concept, that 'mutually assured destruction' (MAD) will put an end to wars stands redundant in the sub-continental context. Pakistan proved it by doing 'the Kargil' on India, it not only resorted to nuclear blackmail by ensuring that the war remained limited geographically but also ensured that Kashmir was brought back into centre stage once again. As former foreign secretary J.N. Dixit has argued that because of nuclear parity, Islamabad is emboldened to "feel it can indulge in broad territorial adventure without provoking an Indian reaction across the international border. Secondly, in their calculations even if due to some compulsions India proceeds to give a strong reaction, Islamabad can argue that since New Delhi is taking drastic measures, it can be compelled to use nuclear weapons, thus activating the big powers or the UN Security Council" 155 The use of nuclear blackmail was aptly commented upon by Mr. Jaswant Singh, the foreign minister of India, during an interview with the 'Outlook': "To a question that whether going nuclear encouraged Pakistan to go in for the Kargil misadventure, he replied "... Pakistan did assume they could use their capability to raise the antennae of concern of the world community. But the world community dubbed it nuclear blackmail." 156

Pokhran II was therefore a blessing in disguise for Pakistan. By becoming overtly nuclear Pakistan in one stroke at Chagai neutralised India's conventional weapon's superiority by strategic parity. Pakistan soon after wards was quick to realize that while possession of nuclear weapons by both sides would definitely put constraints on a full scale conventional war, to the same extent it facilitates the institutionalisation of low-intensity, localised or limited wars. Therefore they could well indulge in creating more Kargils, which in a nuclear backdrop would invite international attention, international attention to the J&K

154 Ibid., p.85.
155 Outlook (New Delhi), June 28, 1999, p.25.
156 Outlook (New Delhi), August 16, 1999, p.42.
issue is the objective of its long standing strategy. Pakistan, has therefore, now incorporated the nuclear tool as a part of its two level strategy on Kashmir.

The theory of nuclear deterrence, in the conventional sense, therefore, seems to be partially if not fully disproved in the subcontinents context General George Lee Butler, ex-head of the US strategic command, who was once a major practitioner of the deterrence theory, in an interview to ‘Frontline’ magazine said: “Fundamental in my critique is, in the final analysis, it is not what you think that deters, it is what your opponent thinks”. There is therefore a fundamental flaw in the perception of deterrence and that is, you are not in control of it, it is your enemy. This is more true if your enemy is totally alienated and isolated from you and therefore prevents you from gauging his intentions and motivations. In the Kargil case. It was Pakistan that made use of the deterrence theory, but in an inverse manner - It deterred India from launching a full scale war or even crossing the LoC into Pakistan while it (Pakistan) went about its business of launching a covert and overt war against India in Kargil. Thereby, perhaps achieving its objective of ‘internationalising’ the Kashmir issue.

Use of Diplomatic Force by Pakistan in Kashmir: 1987 Onwards

The Kashmir Policy: 1987-88 to date

The Kashmir policy has been developed through a national consensus over the past more than a decade, say from 1987-88 onwards, when Pakistan applied the “bear trap” on India by transposing its Afghan policy on Kashmir. Started by Zia, the national consensus was supported by successive governments, both civil and military, which mark this period of extreme political instability. The state of political instability can be gauged from the fact that between December 1988 to October 1999, ten governments have changed hands in Pakistan. Each new government made the Jehad in Kashmir a major ingredient of its manifesto to garner support. The state owned media made an overkill of popularising the championship of Jehad in Kashmir, amongst the people of Pakistan-Kashmir thus acquired a unique status in Pakistan’s body politic, where it became a fundamental input in the formulation of both its domestic as well as its foreign policies. For the people of Pakistan it became a passion,— for

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157 Frontline (Chennai), July 2, 1999, p.9 (editorial).
the politician, an obsession for the army, a means of survival, and for the clergy a spiritual crusade.

In such a milieu, Pakistan has no way but to keep following the ‘policy of confrontation with India on Kashmir’. The present policy is nothing but a refined form of the 53 year old policy that it has followed every since the great divide of 1947-48. A brief look at the salient features of Pakistan’s policy on Kashmir that have dictated its diplomatic strategy there, would be imperative for this part of the study.

The Policy of ‘Deniability’: Pakistan adopted this policy of deniability very soon after its formation. It denied that it was involved in the invasion of Kashmir in 1947-48, it denied “Op Gibraltar” in 1965, it denied its involvement in the Ganga hijacking case in 1971, it denied the committing of inhuman atrocities on the East Pakistanis in 1971. It has been consistently denying the active support being given to cross border terrorism first in Punjab and now in Kashmir, it openly denied the presence of its regular forces in the Kargil war of May 1999, it even refused to take back the bodies of its dead soldiers - an act no other self respecting country would dare do. Finally, it outrightly denied its complicity in the hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC-814, during February 1999, though, unrefutable proof of the hijackers and the militants released in return for the hostages, being present in Pakistan, exist in plenty. Khaled Ahmed, writing in Friday Times, on this aspect states: “Pakistan embraced the practice of a deniable foreign policy and made it permanent.... The militants for Kashmir were also trained in camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Jehadi militias operating in Held Kashmir straddled Pakistan, making a bridge out of it. Their proliferation gave birth to rogue and semi rogue outfits that Pakistan had to tolerate to save its foreign policy, from collapsing. It sacrificed security, sectarian peace and an impartial establishment to this foreign policy. A suffering but brain washed public added to the pressure of continuing a policy that was frequently seen as hurting the interests of Pakistan”.

Ironically, Pakistan’s civil society and the Army both seem to be involved in supporting this policy. The militants have been allowed to wield power within the civil society, becoming an alternative to the state itself. A vast majority of Pakistan’s civil society

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derives immense vicarious pleasure in supporting the Jehadis. The multitudes that attend the annual congregation of the Lashkar-e-Taiba and other such terrorist organisations where they contribute liberally to the Jehad fund is proof enough of a brain washed civil society. The Army on its part is forced to favour the Jehad not only because it is a part of the civilian consensus but more importantly, it is the very ‘raison d’etre’ of its existence and the pre-eminence that it derives within the Pakistani social and political hierarchy from its stance on Kashmir. Without Kashmir there would be no Pakistani army, so as to say. Thus, the ‘deniability’ policy has become a doctrine of consensus in Pakistan with the entire country being a part of it.

The ‘Spill-Over’ Policy: The term refers to the extent of distinction between Pakistan’s domestic policy and its policy on Kashmir. Most states have a clear demarcation between their domestic and foreign policies. In the case of Pakistan, there is so much ‘spill over’ between these two elements of policy that very little distinction exists between what is internal and what is external. Commenting on this aspect Professor M.S. Rajan gives his own reasons for Pakistan’s ‘spill over’ policy: “A very sad aspect of Pakistan’s self stultifying policy is to involve relations with India as a factor in its domestic politics: so that (a) there is competition among politicians for a sort of one-upmanship in hostility towards India; (b) so that it does not matter who is in government an who is in opposition; (c) each of them use the India posture as a cover for the commissions and omissions of the government or opposition in power.... it has certainly distorted Pakistan’s foreign policy, not only in respect of India but also towards all other nations”. Najam Sethi, editor of Friday Times, (Lahore) says: “If foreign policy is supposed to be rooted in and geared to domestic objectives and concerns, we have reversed the order of things. Our foreign policy... dictates our domestic policies rather than the other way round”.  

Pakistan’s greatest and most significant policy ‘spill over’, in as far as India in general and Kashmir in particular is concerned, has occurred because of its policy of Islamisation, introduced by Late Zia-ul-Haq, who with the intent of legitimising his dictatorship took

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159 M.S. Rajan, Recent Essays on India’s Foreign Policy (Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 1997), p.178.
160 USI Digest, (New Delhi, March-August 1999), vol.1, no.2, p.27. (Text of a Lecture delivered by the author at the India, International Centre, New Delhi on April 30, 1999, for which he was arrested by the ISI on his return to Pakistan).
support of Islam. In his efforts to domestically Islamize the Pakistani society, he undertook a number of steps. He reconstituted the council of Islamic ideology by giving it more power, imposed ‘zakat’ (alms giving), ‘ushr’ (agricultural tax), ‘riba’ (non charging of any interest) and imposed an Islamic penal code. The ‘Shariah’ and ‘Majlis-e-Shoora’ form of law was introduced and the creation of ‘Nizam-i-Islam’ (The system of Islam) was announced. In this way, the entire domestic policy of Pakistan including politics, laws, courts, economics, education, culture, worship and women were islamized. Consequently, radical Islamic organisation and groups like the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), Lashkare-e-Taiba (Let), Sipah-e-Sahaba etc, started gaining prominence and strength in the domestic arena.

Zia also leaned on Islam in the formulation of Pakistan’s foreign policy towards India. Professor Satish Kumar writes in this context: "Pakistan fell prey to the temptation of nurturing militancy in the name of Islam, and thought this to be an easy option as a means of promoting its strategic goals in the region, particularly in Afghanistan and India. Pakistan called it ‘Jehad’. Obviously, the intention was to mobilise and motivate the Pakistan Army and irregular armed forces of all kinds in the name of Islam".161

Islamic fundamentalism was extended from the domestic policy arena into the foreign policy realm by the introduction of Islamic Jehad and became a foreign policy tool in Pakistan’s politics, employed in Afghanistan first against the Soviets in 1979 by Pakistani trained “Taliban, a force which grew out of Afghan refugee students who got their religious and military training in Pakistani madrassas and started making their impact on the battlefield from 1994 onwards”.162 It is in these madrassas and training camps that Kashmiri militants and other mercenaries are trained for carrying out militancy in Kashmir, “Over the years, the western region of Pakistan and the southern region of Afghanistan became a vast network of training camps for highly motivated militant youth... Some of these camps, in the Khost region in southern Afghanistan, acquired publicity when the United States launched missile attacks on them in August 1998 in retaliation for Islamic terrorist attacks on the American

Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania earlier in the year. The spill over of Pakistani policies is so obvious that Satish Kumar states: “Carried away by their successes in Afghanistan and by the clout acquired by them through militancy within Pakistan, the Islamic parties have of late started pressurising the governments in Pakistan on matters of domestic and foreign policy... Together, the Islamic political parties and the militant outfits have given rise to what may be called a ‘Jehadi’ culture, with ‘Jehadi’ movements and ‘Jehadi’ strategies which are deployed inside and outside the country by vested interests”.

The Brinkmanship Policy: Another foreign policy element of Pakistan and an important cog in its two level strategy in Kashmir, during the period 1987-88 to date, has been its strategy of ‘Brinkmanship’. Which, in the context of Indo-Pak relation, means the controlled use of provocative force to a level which does not result in the outbreak of open war between the two countries but brings them perilously close to it. Pakistan has resorted to this strategy on numerous occasions, as has been brought out, in 1987, during ‘Operation Brasstacks’ which was a declared Indian Army exercise being conducted well within Indian territory, Pakistan moved its forces ‘en mass’ to the border in such a manner that war could have resulted. Again, in 1990, Pakistan resorted to sabre rattling over the issue of Kashmir, armed forces of both countries occupied battle stations and a war appeared imminent, but Pakistan backed down against some pressure from USA, which felt that a confrontation between the two countries could result in a nuclear stand-off. in 1994, tension again mounted to a feverish pitch when Pakistan declared that it would take the Kashmir issue to the Human Rights Commission in Geneva. This forced India to unanimously pass a resolution in the Parliament “reaffirming the nations will to fight to preserve its integrity, but also asked Pakistan to vacate the part of Kashmir occupied by it”. Such a resolution was not only the first after the 1962, Indo-China war, but it was also the first time since partition that India had staked a claim to Pak occupied Kashmir. In 1999, came the Kargil war which brought both the countries close to a nuclear conflagration, again US intervention prevented a full scale war. The ongoing proxy war in Kashmir since 1987-88, is simmering on the edge of a full scale war. The recent hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC-814 to Kandhar and the consequent release of three top militants in exchange for the passengers, keeps the flames fanned.

163 Ibid, p.34-36.

This policy of ‘Brinkmanship’ which is practiced by Pakistan is a deliberate and well thought strategy with multifold gains. These could be:

a) To detract public attention from internal trouble by creating a situation on the border with India. This happened in 1990, when the newly formed Benazir Government was not in a steady platform and there were rumblings and accusations about mismanagement, corruption and failure in defence and foreign policies. Benazir was also getting enmeshed in internal crisis. Tensions between Sindhis, Mohajirs and Punjabis in Sindh had erupted into violence. This eventually led to her dismissal by President Ishaq Khan supported by the Chief of Army Staff, General Aslam Beg and Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, the leader of the opposition, who was later sworn in as caretaker Prime Minister. Similarly during the crisis of 1994, Pakistan’s internal situation was once against shaky because of personal differences between the President Mr. Ghulam Isaq Khan and the Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif. The President dismissed Sharif’s Government but within two months he was reinstated by Pakistan’s Supreme Court. This was again a short lived tenure and Sharif had to once again relinquish power in favour of Benazir sometimes during late 1993. Thus Pak Policy of distracting its people has been serving them well for years through the instrument of Brinkmanship.

b) The second reason is the Pak policy of keeping India off balance and entangled in some crisis or the other, so that its economic, social, political and security aspects and plans keep getting derailed. In short, it aims to keep India’s domestic and foreign policies unstable. To elaborate, the border crisis of 1987, 1990, 1999, and the ongoing proxy war in Kashmir has not only taken a heavy economic toll thereby setting back India’s economic progress, but has encouraged many other divisive and separatist forces in the country to follow suit. It was because of the insecurity created by Pakistan’s policy of brinkmanship that India were forced to shape and reshape her foreign policies - from seeking support of the Soviet bloc at one time and then that of the western bloc at another, while all the time doing a balancing act with China and the member countries of the OIC. The nuclearization of both the countries, has further given a boost to Pakistan’s policy of Brinkmanship. While, loudly proclaiming South Asia as a ‘nuclear flash point’ it embarked on its Kargil adventure followed by the
hijacking episode of IC-814, followed by a quantum increase in militancy in J&K. All these incidences have impacted on India’s domestic and foreign policies.

c) The third reason for resorting to ‘Brinkmanship’ by Pakistan is perhaps the most significant. It views it as a very potent tool to keep the Kashmir issue alive, regionally and internationally which is one of its most important foreign policy element. This is because India and indeed a vast majority of countries in the international community view the Kashmir issue as purely a domestic problem, as Kashmir has been and is an integral part of India. The militant movement is an insurgency which is defined as a “revolt by a section of society against the established authority”, which is India. It has never, except by Pakistan, been referred to as a freedom struggle by any other country. India therefore favours a solution to the problem by bilateralism. Pakistan on the other hand considers Kashmir to be a disputed territory between the two, and wants international mediation or intervention for solving it. It also actively supports and sponsors cross border terrorism in J&K. Therefore, in its quest for such foreign intervention it often resorts to ‘Brinkmanship’ with the aim of attracting international attention. Since the aspect of internationalization of the Kashmir issue by Pakistan forms a part of its two level strategy i.e., use of diplomacy, it will be tackled in greater detail later in this section.

The Zero Sum Game-Bilateralism Versus Multilateralism: Another, prominent aspect of Pakistan’s foreign policy in regards to J&K is the concept of ‘zero sum game’ it plays as far as talks and parleys to settle the dispute is concerned. History is witness to the fact that most talks on important issues at the bureaucratic/political levels between the two countries on Kashmir have either failed totally or have seen very few successes, specially during the post 1987-88 period. This is because of a deliberate act on the part of Pakistan to ensure that bilateralism fails and is replaced by multilaterism. India has been eschewing commitment to the 1972 Simla agreement, articles 2 and 6 which states that “the two countries are resolved to settle differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations... the two sides will meet to discuss further modalities and arrangements for a durable peace and normalisation of relations including the question of... a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir”.165 India’s

policy of bilateralism follows the belief that any direct international involvement in Kashmir would amount to degrading India’s independence while at the same time jeopardizing its integrity.

Pakistan on the other hand has been insisting on the 1948 UN resolutions as the basis of a settlement on Kashmir and/or third party mediation. UN resolutions, because it caters for a plebiscite in J&K. And third party mediation because, Pakistan feels that a multilateral decision on Kashmir will be in its favour primarily because of the feeling that international community favours the right of “self determination”. Robert G. Wirsing alluding to this states: “Pakistan government, the holder of the weaker hand in Kashmir conflict, has been far more willing that its Indian counterpart to gamble on international involvement. Pakistan has clung tenaciously, of course, to the Security Council resolution that initially defined the UN’s responsibilities in regard to Kashmir, and in particular have given unequivocal support to prospective UN supervision of a plebiscite in Kashmir”. 166

Other factors that force Pakistan to ensure failure of any dialogue are, firstly, the internal power dynamics of Pakistan which is quadrangular in nature - The Political force, the Fundamentalist force, the ISI and the Army. India-Pak dispute cannot be resolved without the participation and unanimous agreement of this quadrangular force structures. Professor S.D. Muni writes “This is an inherent dilemma of the Pakistani state ever since it came into existence and started consolidating itself. In 1950-51, when the Army appeared amenable to accepting a resolution of the Kashmir problem on the basis of turning the United Nations ceasefire line into the international boundary, the idea was opposed by the political leadership. Subsequently in 1953 when Nehru-Bogra tried to find a political settlement of the Kashmir question, the army and influential sections of the civil service sabotaged it”. 167 Secondly, Pakistan is not sure that in the occasion of a plebiscite whether the Kashmiri’s will opt to join Pakistan. They are well ceased of the real Kashmiri sentiment of ‘Azadi’. They therefore use the UN resolution and the plebiscite card more as a tactical diplomatic ploy, necessary for India bashing and internal political manoeuvring. Thirdly, Pakistan gains more by stoking the fires of the ungoing militancy than by finding a solution to it. As, the proxy war option is

166 Robert G. Wirsing, India Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute, op.cit., p.190.
167 Frontline (Chennai), October 9, 1992, p.34.
more cost effective and gives disproportionate pay-offs to them, internationalising the issue ensures it greater strategic significance in the region, more so, now with the nuclear angle added to it, the Kashmir situation also projects it as an important element to be considered in an environment of growing Indo-US strategic relationship. Fourthly, the continuation of Indo-Pak conflict over Kashmir affords Pakistan the alibi to carry on with its nuclear option and to deflect any international pressure to cap it. Fifthly, Pakistan does not seek a resolution to the conflict because of the fear of what would the multitudes of Pak sponsored Afghan mujahideens, mercenaries and other militant fundamentalist organisation do once they find themselves cheated out of a job by a Indo-Pak reconciliation on Kashmir.

It will thus be seen that any plan for a conflict resolution in Kashmir has, from the beginning of the dispute, been caught between these governmental policies of Pakistan. Consequently all efforts to find a lasting solution to the Kashmir dispute have failed. Which include the ten rounds of foreign secretary level talks on Kashmir and the six rounds of Defence Secretary level talks on the Siachen glacier issue.

The message therefore, is that the solution to the vexing Kashmir problem is not through human talk but through gun talk. History stands witness to the fact that any changes that have taken place in J&K have been through war, be it in 1947-48, 1965 or 1971. This is what Pakistan believes in, “there is little chance that any amount of goodwill and any length of talks can harmonise what appear to be irreconcilable elements... there was genuine euphoria over Rajiv Gandhi’s meeting with Benazir Bhutto and the resumption of Indo-Pakistani dialogue in 1989. That initiative was expected to quickly resolve the Siachen problem.... The election of Sharif and the sudden ascendancy of the Gujral doctrine once again raised expectations.... Sharif’s sudden hardline posture is being attributed to the pressures he is facing at home from the Army as well as the religious parties”. 168

The above facts get substantiated further by the recent Kargil conflict of May 1999. This conflict also succeeded a peace making process - the Lahore declaration, between Sharif and Vajpayee, this conflict was also initiated by the Army, this conflict also followed an election in J&K and finally this conflict also invited the attention of USA and other countries of the world.

Another curious fact that is a significant pointer to Pakistan's mind set on the zero sum game as far as parley's go, is that almost all the initiatives taken since 1987-88, to bring about a peaceful solution to the Kashmir issue have been by India, despite the fact that it has a stronger case, it is a much more powerful country and therefore can remain content with a status quo situation. Some of the more important initiatives on peace in Kashmir are as under:

(a) **Operation Brasstacks and Cricket Diplomacy:** During beginning 1987, when operation Brasstacks threatened to degenerate into an Indo-Pak conflict it was Prime Minister Junejo of Pakistan who initiated a dialogue for the return of peace in the sub continent, to which Rajiv Gandhi readily agreed. Quoting J.N. Dixit on this: "Pakistan Prime Minister Junejo telephoned Rajiv Gandhi on 27 January to ascertain the latters reactions on defusing border tensions. Rajiv was prompt in extending an invitation to Junejo to send high level representatives to resolve the problem. Pakistan Foreign Secretary Abdus Sattar arrived in New Delhi on 30 January 1987 and stayed on for five days for detailed discussions to de-escalate the border crisis... it was agreed on principle that a gradual withdrawal of troops from both sides should commence as early as possible." This was perhaps the only time in more than a decade since Brasstacks that Pakistan ever took initiative in starting a peace process. Though, Zia is often linked with this peace initiative it would be pertinent to mention that Zia visited India at the invitation of the Indian Board of Control for Cricket to witness the Jaipur Indo-Pak one day cricket match. His visit was from 21 to 23 February 1987, and was primarily aimed at projecting an image of a peace loving Pakistan to the regional and international community. It was more of a public relations exercise.

(b) **Rajiv Gandhi's First Visit to Pakistan December 1988:** On December 2, 1988, Benazir Bhutto was sworn in as the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Rajiv Gandhi’s attitude after the election of a democratic Government in Pakistan changed dramatically and he set out an initiative to improve Indo-Pak ties and find a solution to the Kashmir problem within a new constructive framework. Rajiv Gandhi first visited Pakistan in December 1988, this was the first visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Pakistan since 1960, when Prime Minister Nehru had visited to sign the Indus water treaty. This Indian initiative raised hopes of improvement in bilateral ties, indicationing that both the Prime Ministers were serious about tackling all

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issues including Kashmir. However, the results belied the initial euphoria. It is believed that the Pakistani Army and the ISI who had always had independent agendas on the Indo-Pak relations, specifically pertaining to Kashmir, did not seem happy with the run of events. J.N. Dixit observes: “Her general response was positive, but stilted, because the Pakistan armed forces establishment, their intelligence services and Ghulam Ishaq Khan were not quite happy about these initiatives”\(^\text{170}\) Echoing the same views, Robert Wirsing states: “Their military wanted a solution when Zia was still in power, but when Benazir took power... the Pakistan army changed its tune and wouldn’t allow Benazir to get a settlement.”\(^\text{171}\)

(c) **Rajiv Gandhi’s Second Visit, July 1989**: Between 16 and 17 July, Rajiv Gandhi accompanied by Mrs. Sonia Gandhi and a high level delegation again visited Pakistan. However, the visit produced nothing of consequence. Benazir’s earlier ‘open minded’ attitude seemed to have been replaced by a closed Kashmir centric stance, ostensibly with a view to please the military and Islamic constituencies who were accusing her of being soft on India at the cost of Pakistani interests. Rajiv Gandhi was more than willing to go forward with the process of normalization. He was willing to sign a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation, to meet Pakistani concerns, which was not accepted by Pakistan. The treaty about not attacking each others nuclear facilities had already been signed at his initiative. Though he was willing to go and meet Pakistan more than half way across, all his efforts were stonewalled by Benazir’s Government apparently on the advice of the Army, ISI and the religious lobby.

(d) **Sharif and Chandra Shekhar Meeting 25 May 1991**: Nawaz Sharif came to Delhi to attend Rajiv Gandhi’s funeral, an impromptu meeting between the two Prime Ministers was held at 7 Race Course Road on 25 May 1991. During the meeting both leaders emphasised the need for improving bilateral relations, Nawaz Sharif even stated that he was personally not in favour of Pakistan’s support to anti Indian activities in Kashmir. However, soon after reaching Pakistan Sharif changed this tune and launched an anti India tirade against human right violations in India held Kashmir.

\(^\text{170}\) Ibid., p.116.

\(^\text{171}\) Robert G. Wirsing, op.cit., p.205.
(e) Narasimha Rao-Nawaz Sharif Harare meet, 17 October 1991: The two PMs meet again during the Harare, heads of Commonwealth Summit on 17 October 1991. They agreed that the two sides should re-double their efforts to find solutions to all outstanding issues. Kashmir was touched upon in general terms. However, despite everything cross border terrorism in J&K continued unabated as did the transborder firings along the LoC.

(f) Rao-Sharif Colombo SAARC Meet, November 1991: Both PMs again met during the Colombo SAARC meet, again nothing substantial was achieved during this meet also. Rao reminded Sharif that no manifestation on the ground of the assurances given to him at Harare were visible. “Pakistan's tormenting anti India sentiments about Kashmir did not abate throughout January and February. Separatists rallies, public meetings and Seminars were held to uphold the 'rights of self determination of Kashmiris'”.

(g) Rao-Sharif Davos Meeting: The third meeting between the two was held at the Davos (Switzerland) world economic conference, on 2 February 1992. Though the meeting was inconsequential “Pakistan’s motivation was to prove to the international community that it wished to interact with India on the Kashmir Issue. Within three days of the meeting. Nawaz Sharif called for a nation wide strike in Pakistan to express solidarity with Kashmiris”, exposing their real intent behind the sham of bilaterism. Soon after in March Pakistan encouraged a JKLF backed crossing of the LoC in which 14 JKLF activists were killed as a result of firing by Indian armed forces. This incident became an excuse for Pakistan to internationalise the Kashmir issue.

(h) Rao-Sharif Rio-de-Janeiro Meeting: The fourth meeting between the two was held at Rio-de-Janeiro during the Earth Summit. While, once again reiterating their desire to solve the Kashmir issue under article 6 of the Simla agreement and holding the sixth foreign secretary level talks at Delhi. Pakistan again did a ‘volte face’ and now directed its cogitational attention to the Babri Mosque Controversy.

(j) Rao-Sharif Meeting at Jakarta, 3 September 1992: Their fifth meeting was held at the Jakarta non-aligned Summit on 3 September 1992. This meeting also followed the usual trend, with Pakistan raising a hue and cry over the Ayodhya developments. Large scale

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172 J.N. Dixit, op.cit., p.163.
violence and demonstration against India occurred all over Pakistan, Pakistan National Assembly passed an unanimous resolution condemning the demolition of Babri Mosque.

(k) **India’s Six Proposals:** On 24 January 1994 India sent six proposals to Pakistan for improvement of bilateral relations. These proposals in outline were, firstly, steps regarding maintenance of peace and tranquillity along the line of control, secondly, steps regarding withdrawal and redeployment of troops away from the Siachen Heights within a definite time frame, thirdly, steps on fixing boundary along the middle of Sir Creek, fourthly, regarding negotiating on Tulbul Navigation Project, fifthly, on revival of the technical sub-commissions of Indo-Pak joint commission dealing with economic, trade, industrial, education, health, cultural, scientific and technological subjects and sixthly, on bilateral agreements on confidence building measures—J.N. Dixit commenting on the six proposals states: “Indian proposals, sent on 23-24 January, were specific, they were action oriented. They dealt with issues across the spectrum of Indo-Pakistan relations and they suggested some additional and concrete confidence building measures... Pakistan first delayed a response... and then rejected them in February 1994”.174

(l) **The Gujral Doctrine:** From February 1994 to 1997 there was a three year suspension of all diplomatic links between India and Pakistan. This freeze began to thaw after the introduction of the Gujral Doctrine in the sphere of the subcontinental diplomacy. The Doctrine was first articulated by I.K. Gujral, the then Foreign Minister of India, in a speech in London in August 1996. He said: “First with neighbours like Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives and Sri Lanka, India does not ask for reciprocity, but gives all that it can in good faith and trust. Secondly, no South Asian country will allow its territory to be used against the interest of another country of the region. Thirdly, none will interfere in the internal affairs of another. Fourthly, all South Asian countries must respect each others territorial integrity and sovereignty. And finally, they will settle all their disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations. He added that scrupulous observance of these five principles would recast South Asia’s regional relationships, including the ‘tormented’ India-Pakistan relationship”.175 Consequently, improvement of relations and initiation of Confidence Building Measures

174 J.N. Dixit, op.cit., pp.177-78.
175 Frontline (Chennai), April 4, 1997, p.5.
(CBMs) with Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka began in right earnest. In Pakistan also, the doctrine was well received and gave a filip to the mood for resumption of bilateral dialogue between the two countries.


Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda, also took initiative for the resumption of the Foreign Secretary level talks that had remained suspended since January 1994, vide a letter dated 17 February 1997, written to Nawaz Sharif. Consequently three rounds of talks were held, in Delhi from 28-31 March, in Islamabad from 19-23 June and again in Delhi from 15-18 September 1997.

However, Islamabad’s whole attitude towards any dialogue on Kashmir posses the biggest stumbling block in the success of these talks. Commenting on the prospects of the Ninth round of foreign secretary level talks, Abha Dixit writes: “Islamabad remains convinced that the route to better Indo-Pak relations lies through Kashmir... Islamabad is now working to ensure that New Delhi must accept the fact that there is a dispute in Kashmir and that it is a “core” issue... the changed Gujral approach does not appeal to many analysts and large sections of the Pakistani establishment continue to remain highly sceptical about his “ulterior motives”... Gohar Ayub, the Pak Foreign Minister is reported to have said: “If Kashmir is not on the agenda... then there will be limit to the number of sittings and meetings we can have”. Under such suspicion on the part of Pakistan, these talks also failed to achieve the designated objective.

177 Ibid., p.638.
The Lahore Summit: Perhaps the greatest and most spectacular landmark initiative taken by the Indian political leadership, in its quest for mending fences with Pakistan during this period was the historic visit to Lahore by Shri Vajpayee, the Indian Prime Minister, on the inaugural run of the Delhi-Lahore-Delhi bus service on 20-21 February 1999. His visit was part of India’s consistent efforts to build peaceful, friendly and cooperative ties with Pakistan and establish a relationship based on mutual respect and regard for each others concerns. Underlining the significance of the visit, the Ministry of External Affairs, annual report of 1998-99 records: “India’s basic policy approach towards Pakistan was underlined by Prime Minister Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee’s declaration that a stable, prosperous and secure Pakistan was in India’s interest. This sentiment was reaffirmed by him from the Minar-e-Pakistan in Lahore on February 21, 1999.... It was also the first visit undertaken by the Prime Minister of India to Pakistan in a decade. During his visit, the Prime Minister conveyed to the Government and people of Pakistan India’s deep desire for peace and friendship with them and for developing a comprehensive structure of cooperation for the benefit of the two peoples. The Prime Minister and the Pakistan Prime Minister signed the Lahore Declaration which is a landmark for peace and security of the two countries”.

In a matter of a mere three months Pakistan, perhaps, committed an act of improbity against India which will remain unmatched in the history of the two Nations - The Kargil incursion. With this, hopes of any semblance of trust and good-will between the two died. Kargil also provides the best and the most irrefutable proof of Pakistan’s Zero Sum mind set in finding a peaceful solution to the Kashmir problem.

Interventionist Policy: Another important ingredient of Pakistan’s foreign policy in Kashmir, in particular, and otherwise, in general has been its interventionalist policy in the form of use of force. In Kashmir, as the study has amply brought out by now, they intervened in 1947-48 and 1965. Since 1987-88 they have been following this policy, which culminated in the Kargil crisis. This policy has a historical background to it in the form of Afghanistan, Punjab and J&K, with the possibility of it being implemented in the republics of Central Asia.

and certain provinces of China. Intervention in J&K has always taken the form of the two level strategy.

With this as the background, a survey of Pakistan’s Coercive Diplomacy, post 1987-88, to date would be put in the correct prospective.

**Pakistan’s Use of Diplomatic Force: 1987 to May 2000**

The period 1987-88 to May 2000 has seen renewed efforts by Pakistan to break away from ‘bilaterism’ and adopt ‘multilaterism’ as the main instrument of diplomatic negotiation. The aim - “Internationalism” and “mediation” by a third party with the bogey of protection of “Human Rights”. The “Plebiscite and ‘Kashmiri self determination’” issues became the fourth cornerstone of this new Pakistani policy on Kashmir. The adoption of this policy, which had been practically defunct since 1972, was encouraged by the uncertain state of Indian domestic polity, post Indira and Rajiv Gandhi era. In its efforts to ‘internationalize the Kashmir issue Pakistan resorted to all the means at its disposal, and in doing so it often over reached itself, resulting in near catastrophobic situations - be it media blitz, use of International bodies and organisation, high profile diplomatic visits to the capitals of the international community, use of Non-Resident Kashmiri/Pakistani lobby in USA and UK, use of the Pakistani lobby amongst the Governments of USA and European Countries including favourable NGO’s there. To the more aggressive methods which included, the increased terrorist violence in J&K, kidnapping and other acts of terrorism specially against foreigners in Kashmir, Mosque terrorism; threat of war, hijacking, Kargil and finally the use of Nuclear and Missile blackmail.

Pakistan was thus trying to renege on the Simla accord of 1972. Rajesh Kadian writes about the two timing Pakistani diplomacy by saying: “(Pakistan will) continue to pay lip service to the Indian position that all outstanding issues between the two countries be handled in a bilateral manner and settled through peaceful means. At the same time try to internationalise the question of Kashmir by involving United Nations, various Islamic organisations and other international bodies concerned with human and civil liberties Brigadier Abdul Rehman Siddiqui (Retired), Editor of Pakistan’s ‘Defence Journal’, said as
much and added that his country should continue “diplomatic efforts to project the Kashmir case as a challenge to the world conscience”. 179

During this important and most pertinent period of the study, Pakistan orchestrated the use of Diplomatic force in symphony with the other elements of its Kashmir policy i.e., level on and two of its strategy, in a manner that produced mixed results, if it succeeded in one sphere, it failed in the other. Whereas, it did manage to obtain the support, if only tacit from some countries, mainly, OIC, China, USA and the UN during the beginning of the Kashmir crisis, but slowly and gradually it began losing it, mainly, because of India’s deft handling of the issue at the diplomatic, military and political level as also because of some blunders created by Pakistan at the military, political and diplomatic levels, regionally as well as internationally. The watershed years would be 1991-92 when this shift occurred. The reasons for the shift are numerous but the main one’s are - the end of the cold war, the blatant fundamentalism that threatened even China and USA who were its allies, the nuclearisation of Pakistan, the Kargil, Kashmir, Kandhar trilogy, the military coup of 12 November 1999 in Pakistan and last but not the least the economic factor that has now assumed a life of its own in the shifting paradigms of the post cold war international system.

Talking about USA, China, OIC and the UN as integral elements in the Kashmir and South Asian dynamics, a brief discussion on their position on Kashmir is necessitated. We will start with the position of the UN.

United Nations (UN)

India and Pakistan have divergent views on UN mediation, these according to Wirsing are: “UN’s presence in Kashmir symbolized for Indians their continuing failure to win full international support of their official position, namely that Jammu and Kashmir state, at least that part of it under India’s direct control was an integral part of India and that there no longer was a valid dispute over its possession. For the Pakistanis in contrast, the UN presence in Kashmir was physical testimony to the basic legality of their territorial claim - to the very existence of the dispute”. 180 Added to this was India’s stand of bilateralism after the 1972 Simla agreement in which UN or any other party had no role to play in Kashmir.

Consequently, India supported the removal of the United Nations Military Observers Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) from India. Pakistan on the hand, not only stood for its presence but demanded its reinforcement.

Since then, despite the best efforts of Pakistan and its allies to involve the UN in getting another resolution passed have regularly failed till a stage has now been reached when the UN is seriously considering removing the Kashmir issue from the UN list of agendas. However, this notwithstanding, the UN has often tried to intervene in Kashmir, under pressure of Pakistan and its UN Lobby. The first time that Pakistan referred to Kashmir at the UN, after 1972 was in 1990, following the already referred to crisis. This was the beginning of its new diplomatic offensive in Kashmir. Having set the level one of its strategy in motion by commencing subversion and cross border terrorism in Kashmir in 1987-88. It, now went about firing its level two strategy, namely the use of military and diplomatic force in Kashmir. It had already threatened India with the use of its military force on the LoC in 1987 and 1990. Now it wanted to supplement the overall offensive by employing the weapon of ‘internationalising’ the Kashmir issue, and what better agency than the UN to exploit in this regard. Writing about it V.P. Dutt, former member of the Parliamentary Consultative Committee on Foreign Affairs, and a former Pro-Vice Chancellor of Delhi University, states: “It was not surprising that Pakistan took the opportunity of the general debate in the UN General Assembly to make strident references to the Kashmir issue and it became a handy annual since then... The issue was raised by Pakistan in virtually every UN forum... Pakistan claimed that the Simla agreement did not inhibit it from raising the issue in international fora”. In 1993, Pakistan again mounted a diplomatic offensive at the UN with the hope of getting a resolution passed regarding the revival of UN jurisdiction over J&K, but some fairly aggressive counter offensive by the Indian delegation led by External Affairs Minister, Dinesh Singh led to the resolution being aborted.

But Pakistan was able to convince the Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros Ghali to make a special reference to the situation in Jammu and Kashmir in his report to the General Assembly, Mr. Boutros Ghali, it may be mentioned was from Egypt and therefore, possibly, more inclined towards its IOC brother country Pakistan. Shekhar Gupta, writing for India

Today, states: "Indian policymakers are extremely suspicious of Ghalis motives and his keenness to find a role for himself in the Kashmir situation. In essence, India does not see him as an honest broker".\textsuperscript{182} This assumption is supported by further efforts by the Secretary General to play a mediators role in Kashmir. In October 1993, Mr. Dinesh Singh met Mr. Ghali, where he expressed his desire for helping resolve the Kashmir impasse at a personal level, writing about it Mr. J.N. Dixit states: "during the course of this conversation, (Mr. Ghali) said that he was quite willing to be of assistance to India and Pakistan in resolving the Kashmir issue... his assistance need not be construed as an intrusion by the Security Council or the United Nations".\textsuperscript{183} Once again in the beginning of 1995 Mr. Ghali tried to play the 'honest broker' between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. Dr. B.P. Saha writes: "Mr. Boutros Ghali, the UN Secretary General visited Delhi in 1995 beginning. He offered to mediate... he asserted, "I promise to be honest broker in encouraging dialogues between the two countries".\textsuperscript{184}

In July 1994, Pakistan again attempted to move a resolution on human rights excesses at the UN. However, this also failed, despite Benazir Bhutto's blitz of diplomatic visits to the capitals of 36 countries. Shekhar Gupta writing in India Today states: "Politically Benazir has herself to blame for compounding, the impact of her failures, her prolific international travels and high-profile, personalised style of diplomacy, have seen her take appeals of international intervention in Kashmir to the Capitals of 36 nations".\textsuperscript{185} During February-march 1994, another very significant event took place in the arena of internationalization of Kashmir by Pakistan, in the form of the 50th session of he UN Human Rights Commission held in Geneva. Since the event became a turning point in the history of India-Pak-Kashmir crisis vis-a-vis the international relations aspect, it will be dealt separately in detail. Suffice to say that in this contest held in the international arena Pakistan was forced to concede defeat.

The next UN diplomatic offensive, after the UNHRC debacle at Geneva, that Pakistan launched was in 1997, when Nawaz Sharif ousted Benazir and came to Power. This

\textsuperscript{182} "An Embarrassing Retreat", India Today (New Delhi), November 30, 1994, p.101.
\textsuperscript{183} J.N. Dixit, Across Borders: Fifty Years of India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., p.254.
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid.
time also it was to be through the offices of the UN Secretary General, Mr. Kofi Annan, who, the Pakistani foreign office said was amenable for facilitating parleys between the foreign ministers of both countries, P.S. Suryanarayan, reporting for Frontline from Islamabad writes: “Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan has spread the word that UN Secretary General Kofi Annan would like the two foreign Ministers to meet over dinner in his presence in New York during the next General Assembly session. This perceived offer is not being portrayed by Pakistan as an essay in mediation. But there is a method in Islamabad’s game plan of wishing to keep alive that notion (perhaps, an illusion) that a third party is waiting to facilitate parleys even after it has accepted bilateralism in practice”. 186

However, despite Pakistan’s best efforts to strengthen its bench strength by garnering the support of the UN through the offices of its Secretary General, the 1997 Annual Report on the work of the organisation submitted by Kofi Annan did not even mention Jammu and Kashmir at all. A news report in ‘The Pioneer’ states: “The 1997 Report on page 47 only says, ‘The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan continues to perform its functions. I am encouraged by recent moves towards dialogue between the parties’”. 187 This was the first time since 1993, that J&K had not figured in the annual report of the UN. The 1993 report submitted by Mr. Ghali said, “In the Simla Agreement of 1972, the two countries affirmed their commitment to respecting the cease-fire line and to resolving the issues peacefully through negotiations. I have repeatedly urged both sides, in the context of preventive diplomacy, to find a peaceful solution to this difficult and complex problem...”. Similarly, the 1994 report said: “India and Pakistan have affirmed their commitment to respect the ceasefire line and to the peaceful resolution of the issues in accordance with the Simla agreement of 1972”. The 1995 and 1996 reports have referred to the Simla agreement in a similar fashion.... The 1998 Annual Report submitted on Monday said: “The rising tension between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and other issues is also a major cause of concern as the stalemated peace process in Cyprus”. 188 This leads us to the deduction that Pakistan with its aggressive use of diplomatic force was able to get the issue of J&K included

186 Frontline (Chennai), May 2, 1997, p.55.
188 Ibid.
in all the UN annual reports since 1993, except in 1997. With this, they were successful in keeping the Kashmir dispute alive in the UN.

1998, was indeed a very eventful year as far as UN and Kashmir was concerned. The cause for this extra attention by the UN, possibly were the Indo-Pak nuclear tests. In June 1998, Mr. Annan called “Kashmir an issue of global concern”. He also called the nuclear tests by the two countries as a “highly disturbing development”. On June 6, 1998 the UN Security Council had passed a resolution condemning the nuclear tests by both India and Pakistan. While taking umbrage to the resolution Pakistan blamed the Kashmir issue as the cause for tension: “We regret the UN Council has failed to incorporate the predominant view of the international community that the root cause of tension is Kashmir”.189 Pakistan also took this opportunity to ask for a third party mediation. Thereby putting pressure on India. During June 1998, itself the UN secretary General sent a special team consisting of Assistant Secretary General Alvado de Soto and two members of the UNSC’s political affairs department, Rolf Knutsson and Horst Heidmann. A report in the ‘Economic Times’ said: “India today rejected outright any attempt at outside mediation on Indo-Pak relations. The UN secretary general’s special team of envoys, currently on a visit to South Asia to gauge the situation here will be visiting Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, but, in a significant development, will omit India.... India has said that India-Pakistan issues including Kashmir were purely bilateral and had to be resolved through bilateral dialogue only”.190 Pakistan on the other hand has been “pleading for UN, US or any international mediation on the issue of Kashmir. It has clearly decided to use Mr. de Soto’s visit to accelerate its lobbying for outside interference in the region”.191 In a letter to Mr. De Soto, Pakistan leadership has written “we request you (UN) to encourage and support the development of a comprehensive framework to address the interlinked issues of peace, security, conventional imbalances, confidence building, conventional and nuclear arms control and disarmament in South Asia”.192

Pakistan chose the NAM summit at Durban, on 02 September 1998 as the next platform to stage its diplomatic act. A group of powerful Pakistani and Kashmiri (POK)

189 The Times of India (New Delhi), June 8, 1998, p.1.
190 The Economic Times (New Delhi), June 26, 1998.
191 The Asian Age (New Delhi), July 8, 1998, pp.1 and 3.
192 Ibid.
organisations along with the Pakistani delegation at the summit spearheaded the charge and zeroed on Mr. Nelson Mandela, the NAM President, and convinced him, to very uncharacteristically, comment on Jammu and Kashmir. While addressing the 113 member summit in Durban, Mr. Mandela said, “all of us remain concerned that the issue of Jammu and Kashmir should be solved through peaceful negotiation and NAM should be willing to lend all strength we have to the resolution of this matter”. 193 Though this portion did not form part of the NAM resolution, it did give a boost to Pakistan’s effort to internationalise the Kashmir issue and seek third party intervention. Here, Pakistan seemed to have gained by its disinformation campaign.

Post Pokhran II and Chagai, when the international attention was focussed on the sub-continent, Pakistan was quick to take advantage of the situation. It described Kashmir as a “Flashpoint”, a “root of tension” and the “Core Issue” between the two countries and did not let even a half chance slip-by for raising the issue at any international fora be it the UN, the NAM, the OIC, Commonwealth meet or such non political one’s like the international Telecom Union, the International Labour Oragnisation or the Food and Agriculture Organisation. This ensured that the Kashmir issue was constantly attracting attention. The Kashmir theme had faded from the international radar screen for some time, but the events of 1998, suddenly brought it back as a big blimp in the centre of it.

Another issue that enhances Pakistan’s concern with the UN is the question of India obtaining a permanent seat in the security council, in which eventuality it fears that their interests in Kashmir and elsewhere will be harmed by the Indian veto. In the words of Abdul Sattar “India’s aim of obtaining a permanent seat on the Security Council has raised another danger on the horizon.... If India succeeds, it would be in a position to veto any decision” 194 that would adversely effect Pakistan politically, economically, and militarily as India would, as a member of the Security Council, be better placed to further its policy objectives on Kashmir.

The year 1999, proved to be a different year altogether, the 1998 theme which made India suffer “the kicking of sand in its face” syndrome by the international community, it was

193 The Economic Times (New Delhi), September 3, 1998.
Pakistan that became the punching bag of the international communities ‘big boys’ in 1999. The reason were a string of ignominious events starting from Kargil, leading to the military coup and ending up with the hijacking of IC-814. The diplomatic angle of the Kargil battle has been dealt in a separate section of this chapter.

Pak Diplomatic Force and USA

The period under study can be termed as a watershed period in the Pak-US relations and diplomacy as far as Kashmir is concerned. It has also been a period which witnessed a see-saw flux in the US-Pak-India relations. The Kashmir conflict has always factored in the Indo-Pak-US relationship right from the beginning. To state that, like India and Pakistan, US is also held a hostage to the Kashmir problem would not amount to any misrepresentation of facts. USA’s policy on Kashmir was linked with its relations with Pakistan. As is well known, the post cold war US-Pak relations were based on Pakistan being considered a “front line state” by the US. This US perception which was formed in the 1950’s reached its peak in the 1980’s as a result of the Afghan embroglio, when the US promised a $4.2 billion military and economic assistance programme spread over five years. Under this aid package Pakistan received large quantities of advanced military hardware. According to Robert H. Pelletreau Jr., Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for the Near East and South Asian Affairs, “the Reagan administration is willing to equip Pakistan with military strength not only to strengthen Afghanistan’s resistance group operations against the Kabul-Soviet forces, but also for the contribution of stability and moderation in the Persian Gulf”.

The fact that immediately thereafter (1987), there was heightened tension on the border with Pakistan (Exercise Brasstacks), there was an increase in militancy in Punjab and the first signs of a similar militant movement germinating in Kashmir, cannot, but he related to this US policy towards Pakistan. US remained ambivalent to Pakistan’s involvement in the growing proxy war in Kashmir, which by 1990, was in full swing. However, during this the international security and strategic scenario underwent a drastic change due to the breakup of the Soviet Union, which directly impacted on the US-Pak-India equation in the subcontinent.

Pak-US Relations at a Low: By 1990, the US-Pak relationship that had stood strong for nearly four decades, suddenly started to go into a tail spin, the main attributable reasons could be:-

(a) American objections to Pakistan’s clandestine Nuclear programme, Maleeha Lodhi, the present Pak Ambassador to the US, while giving a talk in Pakistan’s National Defence College, Rawalpindi in December 1992 said, “fresh American allegations over Pakistan’s nuclear programme, which led to the suspension of US assistance... under the Pressler Amendment... some $564 million of assistance for 1991 was halted. But more than this, it put at risk the whole relationship. The essence of the nuclear dispute lay in the American contention, that in the Spring of 1990, when tensions with India were at their height, Pakistan reactivated or accelerated its programme of nuclear enrichment to prepare for its use in nuclear weapons”. 196

(b) Pakistan’s acquisition of Missiles from China was another bone of contention. America expressed discontent at China’s supply of M-11 missiles to Pakistan, thus violating the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to which China is a signatory. Ms. Lodhi writes: “the missile issue threatens to cast a new shadow over ties between the two countries... this could lead to American sanctions on both the supplier and the recipient country”. 197

(c) Pakistan’s sponsoring of International terrorism, including J&K. In mid April 1992, the director of the CIA, James Woolsey, told Congress that Pakistan was “on the brink of being designated a terrorist state... But it was in December 1992 that the outgoing Bush Administration issued the strongest warning yet that Pakistan could be put on its official list of states sponsoring terrorism... Three dimensions of the terrorism issue lie behind a situation which nearly brought two former allies to the brink of severing a longstanding relationship the first has to do with the American concern voiced over the past two years regarding alleged Pakistani support for militants in Kashmir and Punjab. The second dimension relates to the Indian effort to exploit the Pak-US hiatus, while the third concerns the complaints of Arab

197 Ibid., p.53.
countries about the activities of Islamic militants who first came to Pakistan during the 1980s to participate in the Afghan Jihad”.

Pakistan was quick to launch a two pronged diplomatic offensive aimed at vigorously countering charges of terrorism and improving Pakistan’s international image. Among the measures it took were, firstly, on March 21, 1993. Pakistan’s foreign minister Siddique Kanju announced a number of steps including an offer to the international community, including India, to send parliamentary and observer groups, mediamen and human rights organisations to freely visit and inspect areas of Azad Kashmir and Pakistani Punjab to verify any signs of cross border terrorism, an anti terrorist cell was established to counter terrorist activity. This announcement was timed to come on the eve of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s visit to Germany and Britain who are close partners of US. Persuading these countries was also with the intent to influence positive opinions amongst the G-7 states about Pakistan. Ms. Lodhi describes it thus: “The initiative therefore seems to mark what one official described as “the high season of Islamabad’s diplomacy in the West”... The Prime Minister’s special assistant, Chaudhry Nisar, is expected to visit the US in April 1993. There is also a possibility of the Prime Minister visiting Washington just before the expiry of the deadline set by the American Administration on determining whether or not Pakistan ought to be put on the list of ‘terrorist states’...” It can thus be seen that Pakistan devised the policy of launching diplomatic counter-attacks at the international level whenever confronted with issues concerning their support to cross-border terrorism in Kashmir. Accepting this, as truth Ms. Lodhi goes on to state: “The purpose of the move (diplomatic counter attack) ties in with the policy that has been pursued since at least 1990 when the Americans first started talking to Islamabad about the consequences of support for militant Kashmiri groups that Washington said were committing acts of terrorism in the valley. In the following years Washington, while strengthening ties with India, conveyed in much stronger terms its anxiety over Pakistan’s alleged support for Kashmiri groups engaged in actions that under the definition devised by US Congressional law constituted ‘terrorism’.

\[198\] Ibid., pp.66-67.
\[199\] Ibid., p.78.
\[200\] Ibid. (Bracket mine).

210
Prior, to this the Pak-US diplomatic manipulations got activated during the 1990 Indo-Pak crisis, which has already been dealt in detail in an earlier chapter. However, a brief recounting of the events here is relevant and necessary. Pakistan deliberately created war hysteria with nuclear portents. In 1989-90, it had mobilised its forces close to the border for the conduct of 'exercise Zarb-e-Momin'. Benazir Bhutto shrilly repeated her fathers pledge for a thousand year war with India. The Army, Chief General Mirza Aslam Beg had already ordered the last screws to be lightened on their nuclear bomb. The US, meanwhile, had received reports of Pak army’s build up with a nuclear strike capability. Tensions were running high. President George Bush, despatched the former Chief of CIA and present deputy national security advisor, Mr. Robert M. Gates to the sub-continent to defuse the tension and bring both countries back from the brink of a nuclear holocaust. Though 1990, the Bush administration continued to press both sides to talk to each other. The effort was coordinated by Richard N. Haass, special assistant to the President. "Some of his ideas (Haass's) were put across in an address to the Asia Society, and became the basis of a seven point package of confidence-building measures that India offered and Pakistan rejected in June 1990".

The 1990 Indo-Pak crisis was a classic example of Pakistan’s avowed policy of "Brinkmanship" intended to bring the Kashmir issue into 'International focus' with the threat of a nuclear war hovering over the sub-continent. This strategy of coercive diplomacy by Pakistan did force the US to intervene to defuse the tension. Everything went according to plan and as per the level two of their strategy in J&K.

Pak-US Relations on a High: Another example of Pakistan’s use of diplomatic force occurred in March 1993, when the US sent John Malott, the principal deputy assistant secretary of state to the subcontinent to carry out a first hand review of the state of Indo-Pak relations, who testified to the House foreign Affairs Sub-Committee on Asia Pacific Affairs that “a military standoff continues along the Line of Control that needed attention, and in the valley, militants had launched an insurgency and were resorting to terrorist attacks. While the Indian security forces committed “human rights abuses (in tackling them)”. He called for

202 Ibid., pp.319-320.
bilateral talks as per the Simla agreement and offered US help if both sides agreed. Enunciating USA's policy on Kashmir, he said in New Delhi on May 1993 that:

“(1) We consider all of Kashmir to be disputed territory, on both sides of the line of control.

(2) This is an issue to be settled peacefully by India and Pakistan, taking the views of Kashmiris, both Muslims and Non-Muslim, into account; and

(3) The United States is prepared to be helpful in the process, if this is desired by both sides.”

Malot, while making his assessment, was probably prompted by Pakistan to include the human rights abuses issue as a tool for internationalizing Kashmir (This aspect has been dealt in a separate section in detail). The question of continuing military stand off on the borders and the state of insurgency in the valley and USA's offer of assistance in finding a solution to the problem. (The two level strategy) was again aimed at projecting J&K as a potential flash point with a nuclear content, with the obvious intent of inviting a third party mediation, as well as, internationalizing the issue. This continues to be Pakistan's strategy till date, Kargil being the latest manifestation of the Malaise that afflicts the subcontinent.

Another benchmark of Pakistan's diplomacy in Kashmir, during this period is 'L' Affaire Raphel' (as Manoj Joshi prefers to call it). The Raphel period assumes significance because of the success of Pakistan coercive diplomacy, due to which the American stance on Kashmir showed a definite shift. Raphel was appointed the first assistant secretary of state for the South Asian Affairs, early 1993, by the new Clinton Administration. Her actions, after her appointment clearly reflected a pro-Pakistan stance, which was fully utilized by Pakistan to gain a diplomatic edge over India on Kashmir. Sometimes during end of October 1993, while briefing some South Asian correspondents on the eve of her visit to that region, she unveiled the changed US stance on Kashmir. In her answer to a journalist question in regard to Kashmir she said: “We (the United States government) view Kashmir as a disputed territory and that means that we do not recognise that Instrument of Accession as meaning that

203 Ibid., p.320.
Kashmir is forever more an integral part of India".204 Dilip Bobb, writing for 'India Today' comments: "Raphel's remarks smacks of indirect support for militancy in the valley. The Indian aide memoire in reaction to Raphel's briefing, stated that "It only encourages Pakistan to persist with its interference and added; "we perceive... a studied tilt on the part of US towards Pakistan". 205

To explain Raphel's political attitude, it would be essential to put some facts on record, firstly, she is very close to Clinton personally: "She is also what is known as an FoB (Friend of Bill). She knew President Clinton when they were at Oxford together and has unrestricted access to the White House". 206 Secondly, "Her status as FoB is now being redefined at South Block... as 'Friend of Benazir'". 207 Manoj Joshi writes: "Raphel had known her (Benazir Bhutto) from earlier times". 208 Those earlier times were when Raphel's husband, Arnold Raphel was US Ambassador to Pakistan during the late 80's. That he died in the air crash along with President Zia-ul-Haq in 1988, must have created a soft spot in her heart for Pakistan. Thirdly, before being appointed to the Clinton administration, when was a political counsellor at the US embassy in New Delhi and it is believed that during that tenure she acquired a pro-Pakistan tilt on Kashmir as she interacted with Abdul Ghani Lone on human right abuses in the valley. Lone was a member of the pro-Pak APHC and therefore, his views on the issue must have been partisan. Fourthly, the Indian leadership and bureaucracy was already at logger heads with Raphel, as they felt that she carried a chip on her shoulder. Manoj Joshi writes: "Indian officials, however, ascribe their new difficulties in Kashmir in 1993 to their falling out with Raphel, problems, they claim, that arose from her expectations of being treated as assistant secretary designate even before taking office. She wanted to meet officials and ministers at levels which were not appropriate for a mere political counsellor. What she saw as an opportunity was seen as presumptuousness on the part of the hierarchy conscious Indian bureaucracy, perhaps a little resentful of her sudden

205 Dilip Bobb, "Turning the Screw", India Today (New Delhi), November 30, 1993, p.61.
206 Ibid., p.59.
208 Manoj Joshi, op.cit., p.324.
promotion. Even while the Indian officials were being coldly proper their Pakistani counterparts wooed her". 209 Fifthly, having been appointed as the Assistant Secretary of State for the newly created south Asia desk, it became her duty to bring the region back into international focus and one way of doing it was to try and change the US policy structure of the region, leading to regional and international turmoil.

These, then could be the reason for the L’affair Raphel. However, be that as it may, the US tilt on its Kashmir policy did effect the subcontinent in a fairly intense way. For one; it allowed Pakistan to be taken off the terrorist states watch list. It encouraged Pakistan to mount a fresh offensive to ‘internationalize’ Kashmir at the UN and UNHRC (Geneva). Shekar Gupta writes: “Indian and Pakistani diplomats were locked in fierce combat not merely at Geneva but at several national capitals... Pakistan did succeed in at least internationalising the Kashmir issue”. 210 It also encouraged Pakistan to step up militancy in Kashmir and finally it indicated to both India and Pakistan that “Washington has now decided to indulge in ‘creative diplomacy’... that we are ready to help in resolving the dispute but without actually being identified as mediators”. 211 Everything favoured Pakistan.

The US policy shift that provided a boost to Pakistan strategy of use of force against India in J&K (the use of military, subversive and diplomatic force included) got a further flip by few other incidents that occurred during this period. These were firstly, “a somewhat maladroit use of a rhetorical device by President Clinton. On 27 September 1993, while addressing the UN General Assembly, the President referred to the prevalence of ‘bloody ethnic’, religious and ‘civil war in a region from’ Caucasus to Kashmir”. 212 These remarks in an international forum like the UN sounded like sweet music to the ears of Pakistan who along with their Kashmiri ‘todies’, the Hurriyat took full advantage of it. Pakistan set about garnering support from the international community for moving a resolution at the UN and taking up the Human Rights aspect at the forthcoming Geneva conference of the UNCHR while formally appealing to the US to repeal the Pressler Amendment. Soon thereafter another remark of Clinton confirmed the policy shift and gave much cheer to Pakistan and its

209 Ibid., p.321.
210 India Today (New Delhi), March 15, 1994, op.cit., p.54.
212 Manoj Joshi, op.cit., p.325.
supporters. While accepting the credentials of Pakistan’s new ambassador, Maleeha Lodhi, on 16 February 1994, Lodhi used the formal ceremony to excoriate India for its brutality in Kashmir. What took Indians aback was Clinton’s response “we share Pakistan’s concerns about human rights abuses in Kashmir”. Pakistan’s diplomatic offensive was in full cry by now.

The pro-Pakistan lobby in J&K also swung into action. Mirwaiz Umar Farooq stepped up the rhetoric on self determination declaring that the US stand was “realistic assessment of the situation and the Instrument that the people do not recognise cannot and should not be accepted. Syed Ali Shah Geelani said that the changed international situation was to the advantage of the Kashmiris and the best proof of this lay in the US presidents remarks which were a pointer to the international pressure building on India. The JKLF also joined the band wagon and called for the world to act against India’s stubborn attitude.

This was perhaps the best and the most successful period of Pakistan’s use of diplomacy as a strategic tool. The reasons for USA’s tilt in its Kashmir policy, besides the one already highlighted, could be its concern for India’s rapidly developing nuclear and missile programme and in keeping with its National policy of imposing NPT and MTCR in the region it felt that, perhaps, by putting pressure on India in this manner, they would be able to achieve something. Also, the US was also getting concerned about a nuclear flare-up between India and Pakistan. Subsequent events did show that some measure of success was achieved by the US. Manoj Joshi commenting on this writes: “Though the Rao government had more or less told the Americans that the Agni programme was over and Prithvi slowed down, no commitment had been given to the five-nation conference on nuclear disarmament on what the US wanted and believed the Indians had committed themselves to”.

Pak-US Relations on a Low

The Indo-US relations did not remain strained for long, soon followed an era of an ‘up swing’ trend in their bilateral relations. Post 1994, the guiding principles of international relations became more biased towards trade, commerce, business interests, globalization, free market economy etc., in short, economy assumed an upper-hand over politics in the

213 Ibid., p.331.
214 Ibid., p.333.
international arena, and a new term “politico-economic diplomacy” came into usage Shekhar Gupta writes: “US officials say that India should ignore the odd indiscreet statement and look at the figure of US investment which crossed the Rs.3,200 crore mark in 1993... several American investors in India writing back to their Congressmen that growing anti-US feeling here could hurt their interests”.215 During this period the Indian economy under Dr. Man Mohan Singh’s guidance was thriving and attracting foreign investors in droves. America as usual wanted to lead the pack as the largest foreign investor in the Indian economy, obviously, it had to suitably change its policy stand accordingly. This change became visible in all US actions at the international fora, including the crucial UNHRC convention in Geneva in 1994. B.P. Saha writes: “a perceptible shift in the US policy was noticed in the speech of President Bill Clinton delivered before the UN General Assembly. The United States avoided any reference to the human rights situation in Kashmir... the US delegation at Geneva informed Pakistan that the US would abstain herself from voting”.216

All this happened in 1994. During the period 1994-1998 Indo US relations as far Pakistan was concerned remained fairly amicable, though differences related to nuclear non proliferation, missile development, comprehensive test ban arrangements, transfer of sophisticated technologies and the structuring of new agreements for the management of international trade and environment, remained. The appointment of Frank G. Wisner as the US ambassador to India played a significant role in bringing peace and stability to the Indo-US relations. “He made efforts to shift the India-Pakistan gridlock out of what he termed a 'time warp'. In a speech to the Command and Staff College at Quetta, Pakistan in July 1996, he told the assembled top brass, that it was the Pakistani imperative to move from confrontation to reconciliation with India... Wisner’s statements on Kashmir, principally calling for new forward looking solutions and stressing the US even-handedness, turned out to be a prelude to a wider reassessment of US South Asian policy in 1997”.217

The May 1998, nuclear tests by India and Pakistan brought a distinct change in the US policy towards both the countries. J.N. Dixit writes: “These countries (USA and other Western Countries), concerned about a nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan, are

215 India Today (New Delhi), March 15, 1994, op.cit., p.58.
216 B.P. Saha, op.cit., p.178.
now more assertive and coercive in their desire to expedite a solution to the Kashmir issue. 218 But the immediate adverse effect fell in the sphere of international relations. As expected the test brought world wide condemnation for both countries, with the US leading the ‘Posse’. US Secretary of State described it as “a felony against the future” she also said that she intends pushing Kashmir into the global agenda “I think international attention on it will help”. 219 Strobe Talbott, the Deputy Secretary of State said: “The path down which India and Pakistan have started to move with these tests is a dead end and no one should follow down that path”. The United States strategy was centered on pressure on India with the support of P-5 and G-8 nation.

As expected US slapped sanctions on both countries which denied them, exchange of any nuclear/missile technology, restriction on import of hi-tech equipment for military and civil use, US also stopped all government credits, credit guarantees and loans, restrictions on aid by private banks and organisations have also been imposed. Financially, India would suffer because of the sanctions. US investment from 1991 till 1998 amount to $10 billion (Rs.42,000 crores). D. Sampath Kumar, for ‘Frontline’ reports: “Estimates of the likely financial fallout for India consequent on the imposition of US sanction vary. One such reported estimate placed the impact of sanctions on India at $20.7 billion... unnamed officials in the Union Ministry of Finance as saying that this figure is vastly exaggerated. In their opinion, the impact would be of the order of $1.1 billion only”. 220 However, on 11 December 1999 “USA had removed 51 entities from the list of 200, on which sanctions had been imposed... further revisions are expected”. 221

Even before Pakistan resorted to its retaliatory nuclear tests, it first preceded it with a diplomatic/propaganda blitz. It claimed that India was about to attack Pakistan’s nuclear facilities. This was done with the objective of justifying their soon to follow nuclear tests and to once again invite international attention to Kashmir. Manoj Joshi writes: “Pakistan played its cards with characteristic brashness. On the eve of its tests, Pakistani officials rang alarm bells across the world with a bizarre claim that India was about to attack Pakistan’s nuclear

218 J.N. Dixit, Across Borders: Fifty Years of India’s Foreign Policy, op.cit., p.248.
219 India Today (New Delhi), June 29, 1998, p.46.
221 The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 18 December 1999, p1.
facilities. The aim was to heighten fears of a nuclear war arising out of the tense Indo-Pakistan situation. Initial moves by the permanent five in the UN Security Council... and the Group of Eight... indicated that the Pakistani strategy was working. Officials such as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and the Japanese Prime Minister... Keizo Obuchi began to speak of the immediacy of resolving the root cause of the Indo-Pakistan conflict-Kashmir”.222 After Chagai Pakistani propaganda changed lanes and started propaganda on the post test effects.

On the impact of sanctions on India, Pakistani media played up the political and economic fallouts of the sanctions as being disastrous for India “Thus we find that... the Pakistani press played up the international condemnation and imposition of sanctions on India”.223 Pakistan also went to the extent of stating that its nuclear tests were much more advanced, sophisticated, powerful and better than that of India. But the biggest gain that Pakistan got out of this dangerous game was converting Kashmir into a nuclear flashpoint and thereby inviting intervention/mediation. Ejaz Haider, for the ‘Friday Times’ (Pakistan) writes, “It is clear that India wants to keep the international community out of Kashmir. Pakistan is relying heavily on that very intervention and using the threat of nuclear exchange in any future conflict on Kashmir as the bait with which to draw the US and its western allies into arbitrating in the matter”.224 Pakistan added further bite to this strategy by refusing India’s offer of a ‘no first use’ pact. How far this strategy succeeded was amply proved by the Kargil war of 1999. On this Ejaz Haider had rightly prophesied, when he wrote: “It is time for Pakistan to not only develop a viable nuclear strategy but also rethink the option of linking the bomb with Kashmir on the simple question of how far and how long will such linkage remain credible”.225 President Clinton in an interview to the CBS said “The Kashmir issue is perhaps the most dangerous one in the world today because you’ve got two nuclear powers there who are somewhat uncertain about one another and we have to work hard to avoiding that”.226

222 Manoj Joshi, op.cit., pp.442-43.
225 Ibid.
This interview was taped before the hijacking of IC-814, the US therefore, remains concerned about Kashmir and to that extent, Pakistan, it must be admitted, has been successful in its coercive diplomacy against India on Kashmir.

The use of diplomatic force by Pakistan, involving the US, during the Kargil conflict is covered in the section titled “Kargil: Pakistan’s Bay of Pigs”.

**Pak-US Relations at a Low**

Pakistan’s use of diplomatic force in the USA-India-Pakistan spectrum went for a nose dive post Kargil, hastened by the military coup in 1999, followed by the hijacking of IC-814. Islamic Fundamentalism and the bin Laden phenomenon hastened US policy paradigm tilt in India’s favour. How far and with what results the tilt eventually manifests itself in the given equation will become evident only with the passage of time. This ‘tilt’ was most evident during President Clinton’s visit to the subcontinent. Initially, there was a question mark to whether Clinton will visit Pakistan at all. However, the state department, the Pakistani diplomacy and the pro-Pak lobby in USA forced a official/working six hour halt at Islamabad vis-à-vis a five day visit to India.

While in India, Clinton was all praises for India. Anthony Spaeth of the ‘Time’ wrote: “Considering the past, Clinton’s trip was a diplomatic marvel.... The work didn’t go badly either, as Bill went on a one-man crusade to dissolve decades of mistrust between India and the US, “It was a great visit, absolutely great” said an aide to the Indian Prime Minister... A Clinton advisor agreed: “It was almost as if you could hear the ice melting... giant India was Clinton’s main destination and that part of the trip had a honeymoon glow from start to finish.... Before India’s parliament, Clinton gave an adroit, nationally broadcast speech that sideswiped Pakistan... what came out was music to almost all Indian ears. He said he shared India’s concern about Pakistan, “your disappointment that past overtures have not always met with success, your outrage over recent violence”. He also said that part of the problem was a lack of ‘respect’ for the line of control, the defacto border between the two countries forces in Kashmir. India staunchly maintains that the only problem in Kashmir is a proxy war supported by Pakistan... Clinton’s comments were the closest that the US has come to
agreeing with that view. "This is a vindication of India’s stand" said an External Affairs Ministry Official". 227

On the other hand, "The stop in Pakistan had tension written on it from the start. Clinton debated for weeks whether to pay respects to General Pervez Musharraf... security was always a worry, and Islamabad was virtually sealed off for the six hour visit... while in Islamabad he went on TV and Radio to tell the public that military rule, support for terrorism and nuclear proliferation and increasing tensions with India would get Pakistan nowhere with the US sounding like a guidance counselor with a student whose chances were running out, he ended the speech by saying "It is all in your hands". The tone was sterner". 228

The President highlighted some hard facts, when he told the Pakistani Nation during his televised address to the people on 25 March, 2000, "There are obstacles to your progress, including violence and extremism... no grievance, no cause, no system of beliefs can ever justify the deliberate killing of innocents. Those who bomb bus stations, target embassies or kill those who uphold law are not heroes... for this era does not reward people who struggle in vain to redraw borders with blood... the absence of democracy makes it harder for people to move ahead.... I understand your concern about Kashmir.... There is no military solution to Kashmir. International sympathy, support and intervention cannot be won by provoking a bigger, bloodier conflict... it is wrong to support attacks against civilians across the Line of Control... we cannot and will not mediate or resolve the dispute in Kashmir. Only you and India can do that, through dialogue... there is danger that Pakistan may grow even more isolated,... moving even closer to a conflict no one can win". 229 India Today, reporting on the American press’s view on Clinton’s visit, says ““The Washington Times’ ran the lead story with the heading “Clinton Blasts Pakistan, calls India Great”... The Washington Post declared “In India, Wooing with Praise” 230

The visit of the American President to the sub continent laid bare, in essence, the change in the American foreign policy towards the sub-continent. The period. 1998-2000,

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228 Mainstream (New Delhi), April 22, 2000, p.9. (Text of President Clinton’s televised address to the people of Pakistan, 25 March, 2000).

229 Ibid.

230 India Today (New Delhi), April 3, 2000, p.38.
saw Pakistan’s use of ‘diplomatic force’ towards India and Kashmir touch rock bottom, as far as USA was concerned and this was a rare occurrence. From the 1960’s, right through to 1990’s, Pakistan was able to diplomatically win the Indo-Pak diplomatic bout over USA. It was only in the 1990’s, that, too post Kargil in 1999, that Pakistan’s diplomacy on Kashmir got really mired in the quick sand of the subcontinent’s politics.

An analysis of the Presidential televised speech to the Pakistani Nation, an unusual occurrence in itself, conveys the fact that the President too spoke about the two level strategy of Pakistan in Kashmir and warned it of its consequences. When he said “There are obstacles to your progress including violence and extremism… no grievance, no cause, no system of beliefs can ever justify the deliberate killing of innocents. Those bomb who bus stations, target embassies or kill those who uphold law are not heroes… It is wrong to support attacks against civilians across the Line of Control. Here, the President openly hinted at cross border terrorism, subversion and proxy war, which is the level one of their strategy. When he said: “people who struggle in vain to redraw borders with blood… There is no military solution to Kashmir. International sympathy, support and intervention cannot be won by provoking a bigger, bloodier conflict… we cannot and will not mediate or resolve the dispute in Kashmir only you and India can do that through dialogue”, he intentionally or unintentionally hinted at the level two of Pak strategy of the use of military force to change borders and the use of diplomatic force to seek international/third party mediation in Kashmir and reiterated that the solution to the problem lay in a bilateral dialogue.

**Pak-Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) - Kashmir**

The initiative to establish the OIC was taken by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, and the immediate cause of its formation was the disastrous 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the burning of the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem on 21 August 1969. The OIC was established during September 1969, with its headquarters at Jeddah. Since then has become a brotherhood of 55 Islamic nations of the world; and their guiding principle is the concept of “ummah”, which means that all the Islamic countries of the world are bound together by Islam. They collectively strive to play an important role in International affairs, bolstered by the geo-strategic location and petro-wealth of many of them. Although it is on organisation of Islamic countries not all its members have declared Islam as the state religion. Besides upholding the cause of its member states, its charter also vows to uphold the cause of Muslims belonging to
non-member states. The charter pledges to strengthen the struggle of all Muslim people, with a view to safeguarding their dignity, independence and national rights. This violates the UN Charter which prohibits interference in the domestic affairs of another state. Saudi Arabia, is the most important and powerful member of the OIC mainly because of its financial backing. It controls and directs all its operations from its headquarters located at Jeddah.

Since its first conference held at Morocco in 1969, Pakistan has made OIC a forum to try an internationalise the Kashmir issue. The earlier OIC resolutions harped on the settlement of the Kashmir issue as per the UN resolution and bilateral dialogue. Recently, however, the OIC has taken to passing resolution on the Human Rights issues in Kashmir and defining Pakistan's proxy war as Kashmiri's struggle for self determination. This stand of the OIC seems strange as Saudi Arabia, its founder country, is not even the member of the UN Human Rights Commission. It may be recalled that during the March 1994, UNHRC meet at Geneva the Pakistani resolution was sponsored by Saudi Arabia, who itself is an observer member. Notwithstanding the Indian success at Geneva, the OIC as a forum is the staunchest supporter of Pakistan on Kashmir, even though the tangible effect of its voice is limited.

Pakistan has everytime gone out of it way to get India denounced in almost all the OIC summit meets till date. Pakistan even considers itself to be the torch bearer of the organisation, the leader of the Islamic revolution in the world. Pakistan has diplomatically used the OIC to internationally put India on the defensive on Kashmir, and this trend started, in a more vigorous manner after 1989, when Pakistani sponsored proxy war in Kashmir had gained a fair amount of velocity. Between, 1972 to 1989 when there was peace in Kashmir, Pakistan and the IOC kept relatively quiet on the issue. Mr. S.K. Singh, India's former foreign secretary writes: "Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, other OIC members and the rest of the world community, have to remember that between 1972 and 1989 neither side thought of raising Kashmir seriously anywhere". 231 Which brings us to the conclusion that the strategy of internationalisation was built into the strategy of proxy war in Kashmir, as Gen. Zia-ul-Haq had visualized in his plan ("Op. Topac" or the "Zia Plan" or the "Kashmir Plan"). The Human Rights issue in Kashmir only started gaining voice after 1990 - was this also a part of

the plan? Yes it was a part of Pakistan’s two level strategy on Kashmir, as subsequent analysis will prove.

In 1990, at the OIC foreign ministers conference at Cairo, Kashmir was included in the conference for the first time. It was on the agenda but not a separate one. Manvendra Singh writes: “It seems Kashmir is on the agenda not as a separate item but as part of a section devoted to “conditions of Muslims around the world”.” During discussion the resolution that was passed briefly spoke of human rights violations in India by security forces (reference to J&K in particular was avoided). Where did the question of human right go when in 1979, during an “operation to free the Grand Mosque at Mecca from Sunny Zealots, French and Saudi commandos flooded the basements where the militants were hold up and electrocuted about 250 that were still alive”. India did not raise a hue and cry at all then. Till 1992, the OIC was fairly neutral as far as J&K was concerned, but a change occurred in their attitude after the Babri Mosque episode in December 1992, prompted by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

In 1993, Pakistan tried to garner the support of the OIC to internationalise the Kashmir and the human rights issue at the conference on human rights at Vienna. Mrs. Nusrat Bhutto, mother of Ms. Benazir Bhutto was sent as the leader of this delegation, but despite their best efforts they were unable to get any resolution on Kashmir passed.

However, the test of mettle of IOC and Pakistan on Kashmir was the UNHRC. Convention at Geneva and the UN General Assembly session on 1994, which is being covered in detail later. During both these international meets Pakistan even with the help of OIC could not get a single resolution passed against India.

The Casablanca OIC summit held during December 1994, at Morocco was perhaps the most ‘anti-India’ OIC summit. Pakistan lobbied and worked hard, diplomatically, in getting a number of resolutions passed on Kashmir. Mr. Bhim Singh, who attended the Casablanca summit as an independent articulates: “Lacking in International decency the resolution called for a peaceful settlement in accordance with the UN resolutions and as

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233 Ibid., pp.139-40.
agreed upon in the Simla agreement and condemned India (as non Party) in absentia for continuing massive violation of human rights of the Kashmiri people including their right of self determination... After blowing hot and cold during the deliberations, the hawks led by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan liberally hijacked the conference leaving King Hassan II of Morocco a frustrated host... The move smacked of a mischievous strategy to bail out Pakistan.... The summit declared to send a three member OIC team to Kashmir to investigate human right violations... Biased in favour of Pakistan it expressed full support to the effort of the Government of Pakistan... OIC’s bias for Pakistan was manifest when it carefully chose to keep out of the plight and sufferings of nearly two million Kashmiris living in the Gilgit-Baltistan regions". 234 Representation from the Hurriyat conference had also been invited for this summit.

At the OIC summits Pakistan presented the Kashmir issue as an Islamic issue, promoting Lord Eric Avebury of Britain to admit that “he considers it a dangerous trend that the OIC nations are identifying Kashmir as an Islamic Issue”. 235 At Casablanca, therefore, Islamabad was able to pull off a diplomatic coup by persuading key OIC members to allow resolution to be passed on J&K even though it was not permissible under the OIC’s manifesto and constitution. The repeated efforts of Pakistan to internationalize the Kashmir issue in recent years through resolution at UN conferences, have displayed some notable common features. On each occasion they have been preceded by appropriate resolutions adopted at OIC meetings. Using these as springboards, Pakistan has relied on a core support of OIC states for its move in the UN forum. 236

Pakistan kept the diplomatic pressure up when it forced the OIC’s contact group meeting at Geneva to issue a statement, preventing India from holding Assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian foreign ministry was forced to issue an official statement against it, which read “A declaration of the OIC Contact Group on Jammu and Kashmir, issued in Geneva on 15th April 1996, has come to our notice. As with OIC statements on Jammu and Kashmir in the past, this declaration too bears the stamp of Pakistan’s, hostile and malicious propaganda against India. It is regretted that OIC has once again allowed itself to

235 Ibid., p.80.
236 The Pioneer (New Delhi), November 14, 1994, p.6.
be used by Pakistan to promote its anti India tirade... India’s traditions for holding free and fair election is universally acknowledged. The election process in Jammu and Kashmir will naturally be in keeping with this tradition. It is a complete travesty of the truth to allege otherwise''.

In 1996, during the OIC foreign ministers conference at New York, just prior to the annual UN General Assembly debate. Which was addressed by Benazir Bhutto the PM of Pakistan and Mirwaiz Mohammad Umar Farooq, Chairman of the All Party Hurriyat Conference who had been invited as a guest observer. Both made allegations of repression and human rights violations by the Indian security forces and said election were not a solution to the issue. She also alleged that India’s nuclear and ballistic missile programme together with the development of a blue water navy posed a threat to the states of the region extending from Yemen to straits of Malacca (which comprises of a majority of OIC members). She also referred to the dangers of the rise of Hindu Militancy with an obvious reference to its threat to Islam. Report in the ‘Pioneer’ states that Bhutto alleged: “The world cannot remain indifferent to the rise of a fundamentalist Hindu India bent on producing and deploying nuclear capable missiles... India has tried to divert world attention by initiating a so called political process by holding sham elections. But the presence of over 600,000 military and para-military forces, the continuation of repressive laws, the failure to initiate a dialogue with the all parties conference, or to release hundreds of activists shows how hollow even the so called political process is...” Mirwaiz Farooq said...”The electoral misadventures, the economic packages, greater autonomy and also wanton use of force by Indian authorities, have neither produced a solution in the past nor will this serve the Kashmiris in future”.

Following the meeting, the Muslim ministers issued a statement urging India to respect the human rights of the Kashmiris including the right of self determination. The OIC ministers also declared that elections held under foreign occupation cannot be a substitute for the right of self determination of the Kashmiris... Bhutto, who met UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Gali immediately after addressing OIC meeting spoke in similar vein there”.

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The entire manner and the tactics used during this OIC conference reveals the level and intensity of Pak diplomatic offensive in Kashmir. First, Mirwaiz Farooq, the Chairman of the APHC had also been invited, secondly, the conference was held at New York just before the UN General Assembly session, thereby ensuring a world wide audience and media coverage and thirdly, Benazir Bhutto also met the UN Secretary General and spoke to him about similar issues.

In the 1997, special summit of OIC was called at Islamabad, where, once again Pakistan, in its home ground, was in full anti India cry. The OIC meeting was in celebration of Paks 50th anniversary. Here again the OIC issued an anti India declaration on Kashmir. The declaration was so vituperative that Soumyajit Pathak writing for the Pioneer state: “The OIC summit has five important implications for this country, first, President Leghari has only reiterated Pakistani Army Chief Jehangir Karamat’s forceful assertion that Kashmir cannot be “thrown on the backburner”... Its a grim reminder... that on matters related to Kashmir, the civilian leadership must toe the establishments line... it also fructified the Pakistan’s dogged policy to make it a larger Islamic issue. Second, Pakistan’s diplomatic skulduggery has succeeded in equating Kashmir with Palestine and Bosnia... India, specially must ponder over the statements of... President Yasser Arafat.... that the Kashmir issue should be resolved through international resolutions. Third the presence of Iranian President Refsanjani in the OIC summit in Islamabad and Tehran’s acquiescence to the anti-India declaration may throw a spanner into the wheel of growing Indo-Iranian ties. Fourthly, the presence of the Taliban, second-in-command Mullah Mohammad Rabbani in the summit as observer has facilitated the young zealots one step forward in mustering international recognition. Fifth, the OIC action may just be the beginning of a concerted move by the Islamic countries to bring more pressure on India. India may face similar collective Islamic diplomatic action in the UN... and other international fora”.

Close on the heels of this special OIC summit came the Eighth Summit of OIC, held at Tehran during the last week of December. This summit again had significant repercussions on the Kashmir issue but for a different reasons, as during this summit, for the first time in many years, the OIC toned down its tenor on Kashmir. Though it expressed concern over

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239 The Pioneer (New Delhi), March 26, 1997, p.9.
“human rights violations in Jammu and Kashmir and urging the ‘umma’ to give support to Kashmiri Muslim... Several Kashmiri organisations have criticised the Teheran declaration for ambiguity on Kashmir”.240 There are reasons to believe that in the original draft there was no mention of Kashmir. However, the Pakistani lobby swung into action and got Kashmir included in the resolution. “The Pakistan government and its officials have been boasting of their success in getting the resolution adopted at the recently concluded OIC summit in Teheran”241

The last OIC summit was held at Ouagadougou the capital of Burkina Faso, during the first week of July 1999, here again luke warm resolution on Kashmir were passed. An Indian Express report states: “the Islamic countries passed a resolution. Nay, two. One on Kargil and the other on Kashmir in general. The former lauded what it was pleased to call “Pakistan’s peace initiatives”. The later condemned human rights abuses in Kashmir... To pass resolutions is the core business of the OIC... It is difficult to recall when the OIC last achieved anything meaningful”.242

From the forgoing it will be seen that out of all the international forums in the world, it is the OIC that always passes resolutions on Kashmir and always at the insistence of Pakistan. Earlier these resolution were severe in content, however post 1997, and after Kargil in 1998, there has been a perceptible dilution in their severity. Saeed Naqvi writes “The situation however has shown some change in the past five years. There are signs that things have gone against Pakistan. Moreover Islamic capitals have now registered the fact that Indian secularism protects among 950 million others, the worlds second largest Muslim population, greater than the population of Pakistan and that any issue, including Kashmir, must therefore be addressed in such a way as not to impair India’s secular fabric. This magic mantra has changed perceptions world wide and Islamic countries have not remained untouched by the infection”.243

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242 The Indian Express (New Delhi), July 5, 1999, p.8.
243 The Sunday Pioneer (New Delhi), December 14, 1997, p.4.
Pakistan will continue using OIC, for whatever it is worth, for fulfilling its own selfish ends. Pakistan, has from the day OIC was formed, kept the Chairmanship of the Science and Technology sub-committee. Pakistan has military missions in 38 of the 52 OIC member countries; these military missions tend to give them a lot of political clout amongst the OIC, besides making a substantial impact on their psyche. A.K. Pasha, articulates “it must be pointed out that anger and resentment is visible in some OIC states towards India on Kashmir... despite relations which appear normal on surface. If there is a repetition of Ayodhya or serious violation of human rights in Kashmir... this could undoubtedly have serious consequences on our bilateral ties with a fairly large number of OIC states”.

Pakistan, will more than anyone else, welcome such an opportunity. Kalim Bahadur in his afore quoted article vocalises: “Since the OIC is an organisation of states which adhere to the United Nations Charter has arrogated to itself the right to sit in Judgement over the issues which are entirely within the domestic jurisdiction of India. OIC has been taking a unilateral view under the pressure of one of its members (Pakistan) against another state which is not a members (India)... It must be stated that either the OIC or any of the OIC members have ever paid any attention to the gross violation of human rights in their own countries. The fate of Bahais and Kurds in Iran of Ahmadiyas in Pakistan”.

Pak-China-Kashmir

China, has for most parts kept a low profile on Kashmir, despite its relations with Pakistan and its strategic and political stake in J&K. Using the term ‘low profile’ is actually in comparative terms. Yes, it has not been as vocal and active as the US or the OIC, but it has been quietly assertive in its opinion on the Kashmir issue. Unlike other countries, China has a higher stake and therefore, a more important role to play in the geo-politics of the subcontinent as it shares a border with both countries running along J&K. It’s low profile is also because of the fact that the Sino-Indo relations have mended faster than anyone expected. However, the ‘low profile’ angle should not be misunderstood. What should be understood is that China will at some future stage, play a more active role in this matter.

A close examination of China’s Kashmir policy in the past four decades reveals that there have been four clear cut phases of the evolution of its Kashmir policy. First phase, from 1950 to early 60’s China’s policy was of non-involvement in the Kashmir issue, and considered it an Indo-Pak problem. Second phase, during the early 60’s, the border question between China and Pakistan was settled and to that extent it got involved in J&K, however it still did not take any sides. Third phase, during the 1965 war China’s attitude changed and it openly supported Pakistan, this policy continued till the late 70’s. Fourth phase, China again reverted back to a neutral stance from 1980, onwards and is continuing to do so till date.

It was on June 19, 1980, that Wang Bingham, a seasoned Chinese diplomat in relation to India-Pak-Kashmir matrix, during the visit of the Indian foreign secretary Eric Gonsalves to that country, said: “Kashmir is a question between India an Pakistan... we will not interfere in this question”.246 Two days later, on June 21, Deng Xiaoping in an interview to an Indian magazine stated: “we think this (the Kashmir issue) is a question only between India and Pakistan. This should not come in the way of our relations”.247 The change was also visible during Chinese Premier, Zhao Ziyang’s visit to Pakistan in 1982. The Joint Communiqué issued by him and President Zia-ul-Haq, did not make any reference to the Kashmir issue, although Zia-ul-Haq, had raised the issue in his banquet speech.248

With the end of the cold war in 1990-91, improved Sino-Soviet relations and the ‘fade’ in the Indo-Soviet relationship, China started contemplating a more straight forward relationship with India. The final break in the ice came during Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s China visit in September 1993, resulting in the signing of the agreement on maintaining peace and tranquility in the India-China border areas along the line of Actual Control. From the Chinese perception the main irritants in Sino-Indian relations were the border dispute and the question of Tibet. Now since the irritating border issue has been frozen, to be resolved at an appropriate future time. As far as Tibet was concerned India had already been committed to recognising Tibet as an autonomous region of China by the signing of the ‘Panchsheel


247 Ibid., pp.543-544.

Agreement' between Nehru and Zou en lie in 1954 and officially declaring Tibet as an autonomous region of China since 1989. Therefore, there is now no immediate bone of contention between the two countries.

The above notwithstanding, the relations between India and Pakistan have kept deteriorating, more so, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the increased Pakistani interference in Kashmir by resorting to sponsoring the proxy war there. Therefore, further exploration of China’s present foreign policy and diplomacy relating to the Kashmir issue would be essential. Despite Pakistan’s best efforts to woe China over to her side on the Kashmir issue have proved futile. China has unmovingly struck to her stance of Kashmir being a bilateral dispute between India and Pakistan and needs to be settled by the two. On February 27, 1994, the visiting Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, addressed a news conference in Dhaka and clearly stated China’s stance on Kashmir. According to a PTI report, Qian said: “We feel the Kashmir problem is a left over from history. The United Nations has discussed it and India and Pakistan signed the Shimla Agreement. but all the UN resolutions and the agreement remain unimplemented. This (question) should be resolved between India and Pakistan according to the spirit of the UN resolutions and the spirit of the relevant agreement” Qian ruled out Beijing acting as a mediator in resolving the Kashmir problem between India and Pakistan. Qian also said China’s relations with India had improved and “we are very satisfied with our relations with India but we want to assure that improvement of our relations with India would not be at the cost of our relationship with other countries in the region. In fact, we hope our growing relations with India will be beneficial for the entire region”. We therefore see an even handed approach by China towards Kashmir.

During the more than 12 years of ongoing militancy in Kashmir, China has been careful not to be drawn into or take sides on it. The only time it came close to it was during the UNHRC convention in Geneva in 1994, it was a crucial show-down between India and Pakistan and, as will be brought out in detail later it was China which persuaded Pakistan to withdraw the resolution. Perhaps it was prompted by the fallouts of such a resolution, if


passed in favour of Pakistan, on Tibet. And one of the biggest reason for China’s non support to Pakistan’s sponsoring of militancy in Kashmir and its demand for plebiscite and right of self determination, is the repercussions that it may have on Tibet. The other one being the fear of a similar sponsored uprising in Xinjiang province of China which is mainly a Muslim area. The Chinese government has already communicated its concern to the Government of Pakistan about the efforts of some fundamentalist Islamic groups based in Pakistan and Afghanistan to penetrate China’s Muslim areas.251

However, Sino-Indian relations suffered a set-back during pre and post-Pokhran II, George Fernandes describing China as ‘a major threat’ and ‘India’s number one enemy’, and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee’s mentioning the Chinese threat as an impulse for India’s nuclear weaponisation in his letters to the heads of government of nuclear weapons states, changed the tranquility of Sino-Indian relations. After the nuclear tests, the relations between the two countries further deteriorated precipitously. Despite all this, China remained neutral during the 1999, Kargil crisis despite Pakistan’s best efforts to win her over to its side. This aspect has been covered in a separate section of this chapter.

Internationalisation of Kashmir Dispute

Having repeated failed to take Kashmir by force in 1947-48, 1965, 1999 by resorting to all-out and a limited war, and after making no headway in the nearly 12 years old on going proxy war. Pakistan realised that it was beyond her capacity to wrest Kashmir by force. Therefore, Islamabad’s think tanks and strategist on Kashmir decided to Lean hard in trying to internationalise the dispute, so as to attract third party mediation, which, the Pakistanis feel may be the most potent tool to get the Kashmir dispute settled in their favour. However, while doing so, the proxy war was kept kindled within J&K, as also, the pressure on the LoC, either by Pak troops or militant activists trying to forcibly cross the border (JKLF’s attempted crossing in 1992). In short the two level strategy of Pakistan in Kashmir continued. The only mid-course change that they did, sometimes in 1989, was the stress on internationalisation, and the major tool it selected for this purpose was the Human Rights issue, besides other aspects aimed at internationally highlighted the issue.

251 Hasan Askar Riziv, op.cit., p.97.
Before we proceed ahead, it would be correct to first understand the term "Internationalisation". It has been defined thus: "Internationalization is a process through which an international conflict structure expands and acquires cross boundary dimension owing to a definite involvement (active or passive; covertly or overtly) in varied forms of party or parties originally external to the given conflict, thereby influencing its course and outcome. Thus the fundamental factor which determines internationalization of a conflict is definite external involvement whatever may be its form, level and purpose to the extent that the given conflict is brought under the influence of one or more third parties".  

Pakistan's efforts to internationalize Kashmir, follow the definition to a tee. Pakistan has been striving to ensure that Kashmir acquires cross boundary dimensions, actively and passively, covertly and overtly by getting itself involved in the conflict, which actually is India's internal matter, by the medium of sponsoring a proxy war there, by creating situations like kidnapping and murdering foreigners, by hijacking, by nuclear blackmail, by creating not only war like situations on the border but by actually resorting to open aggression under the shadow of a nuclear umbrella, while all the time loudly proclaiming that Kashmir is a 'Nuclear Flashpoint', by propagandizing violation of Human Rights in Kashmir. The objective of all these external means of involvement in Kashmir by Pakistan is to somehow bring the issue under a third party mediation.

Having understood the term internationalization in relation to Pak-India-Kashmir context, it would be in order to now see as to how Pakistan has gone about internationalizing Kashmir, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, a noted Pakistan strategic and security matters expert posits: "While advocating its original stance on Jammu and Kashmir of the desired plebiscite as incorporated in the UN resolutions. The Pakistani authorities gradually began to build the requisite momentum towards the internationalization of the dispute. A multi pronged approach was adopted. To begin with, Pakistan allowed the local as well as the international press, including the Indian media to cover the consequences of the crisis on this side of the Line of Control (LoC)... Pakistani authorities began to publicize the acute human rights violations.... The second aspect of the approach consisted of Pakistani government's efforts to

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place the dispute before a number of international organisations, including NAM, OIC, Commonwealth etc.... The third aspect of Pakistan’s diplomatic initiative was to contact the UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali (and later Kofi Annan) and the Secretary General of the OIC in order to attract their attention to the Kashmir dispute.... Readily agreeing for interview to foreign journalists including the Indians, is the fourth strand of current governments Kashmir strategy.... The fifth aspect... is an integral part of the visit diplomacy. By visiting many countries and personally appraising most of the heads of governments... to invoke interest... of the incumbent dangerous situation in Kashmir. In fact almost all Pakistani heads of governments had been engaged in educating many of their counterparts in other countries.... Sixth, the Kashmiris living outside the subcontinent were also encouraged to play a greater role in mobilizing world public opinion. Seventh, marches organised by Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and other Kashmiri parties to cross the Line of Control did accelerate the process of internationalisation of the dispute. Finally, Prime Minister Benazir’s government has also despatched small groups of parliamentarians, accompanied by prominent journalist and officials, to visit various countries with the expressed objective of familiarising nations with the complexities of the ongoing dispute”.

Mushahid Hussain, journalist and former minister for information and broadcasting in the recently ousted Nawaz Sharif government stating his views on internationalisation of the Kashmir dispute opines: “two aspects pertaining to India can be viewed as pluses of Pakistan in the present situation. First, India can no longer be assured of social and unstinted Soviet diplomatic or military support on Kashmir issue... The Soviet have stopped looking at Pakistan through Indian eyes... Second, India is today on the defensive diplomatically and its international image has been considerably dented as a consequences of its brutal suppression of the uprising”.

Analysising the two opinions, the common strand that comes out strongly is that they are both partial and partisan, but then this is natural and expected, both writers being Pakistanis. But what is prominent by its absence in Iqbal Cheema’s opinion, is the stark non-

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reference to the ongoing proxy war sponsored form across the border, the nuclear and missiles aspect and other means of sensational violence like mass executions of a particular community, kidnapping and killing of foreigners, destruction of Mosques, non recognition of the LoC etc., as tools of internationalisation and finally, the non-mention of the Pro-Pak lobby in the US that Pakistan has built up and hired to espouse their cause in the US parliament, led by Congressmen Dan Burton, Dana Rohbrabacher, Floyd Flake, Texas Democrat Charles Wilson, Pete Geren another Democrat from Texas, Vic Fazio, other Congressmen dyed in anti India colours are Republican Christopher Cox and Democrat Gary Condit. Then there is Dr. Ghulam Nabi Fai, a Kashmiri NRI and founder of the Kashmiri American Council “who admits to funding Burton”.255 Robert M. Hathaway writing in Arms Control Today records: “The situation is slightly more favourable for Pakistan in the senate, where several members including Brownback, Harkin and Robert Torricelli, are viewed as particularly sympathetic to Islamabad”.256 Besides these lobbyists Pakistan had hired “a renounced American firm, Monfort, Stone and Kelly... to Lobby in the Capitol Hill and in the American media. The said firm is such a costly and high profile firm that even George Bush had entrusted his publicity work to it during 1988 Presidential election. During 1992, another high priced Lobbyist, Dennis Neil and Company (whose services are said to cost $600,000 a year) was utilized. The firm, Black, Monfort, Stone and Kelly managed to get four or five resolutions sponsored in US Senate against India”.257 Mushahid Hussain may not be completely right in stating that Russian support for India has diminished over Kashmir. Incidents like the Kargil war and the IC-814 hijack prove the supposition wrong. The Human Rights aspects, as referred to by Hussain, shall be taken up and discussed in detail in a separate section.

Pakistan’s aim of Internationalization of the Kashmir dispute has been changing from time to time on the advice of its allies or lobbyists. It is told that Pakistan has even hired the services of professional consultancy firms, which specialize in conflict resolution matrix. J.N. Dixit writing on this postulates: “Pakistan, on the advice of Western advertising agencies and lobbyists whom it had employed to garner international support for its advocacies on

255 India Today (New Delhi), November 15, 1993, p.209.
Kashmir, changed track and adopted advocacies which would be acceptable to the international community.” Currently, it is seeking two types of interventions. Firstly, Humanitarians Intervention, by projecting the Kashmir issue as a human rights problem caused by excesses inflicted upon unarmed civilians in J&K by Indian armed forces. Thereby attracting intervention by either an International Governmental Organisation (UN, Commonwealth, OIC) or a International non-Governmental Organisation (Amnesty International, Red Cross, Asia Watch, etc.). Such an intervention will not be on political ground but purely on moral and ethical grounds. Pakistan hopes that such an intervention can later be converted into a political intervention.

Secondly, Pakistan is also looking at a conflict resolution type of intervention, through mediation by a third party, which could either be a country or an international organisation, which could involve getting both countries to discuss Kashmir and find a mutually acceptable solution, it could also involve coercion on one or both parties by way of use of force or other means such as economic and other sanctions. Somehow, Pakistan feels that outside intervention would settle the issue in its favour. In this belief it has gone all out to internationalise Kashmir.

Human Rights Issue: Genesis

Human Rights were internationally legalized on 10 December, 1948, when they were adopted by a universal declaration by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Abul Hasnat Maonjurul Kabir says: “In defining what we mean by human rights, we may emphasize on three most fundamental categories of human rights: Firstly, the right to be free from governmental violation of the integrity of the person such as torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary arrest or imprisonment, denial of fair public trial. Secondly, the right to the fulfillment of such basic need as food, work, shelter, health care and education. Thirdly, the right to enjoy civil and political liberties, freedom of thought, of religion, of assembly, of speech, of the press and freedom of movement both within and outside one’s own country”.  

The declaration also stated that these human rights are the direct and legitimate concern to all participating states and do not belong exclusively to the internal matters of the state concerned. This declaration was followed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1996. The UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement officials including military authorities exercising police powers of December 1979 and the Convention Against Torture of 1984 are other norm setting documents. The Vienna Declaration of June 1993 reinforced affirmative action on human rights by the world community. India has acceded to, and is a signatory to all these acts and rights.

**Derogability of Human Rights:** The Human Rights are derogable under certain specified conditions, such as proclamation of National emergency, on this, Dr. S. Subramaniam writes: “Wars, rebellions, national disasters, economic or financial breakdowns create emergent situation in nations... A state of emergency is proclaimed and civil and political rights are curtailed... A state has to face the dilemma of derogation of Human Rights.... Article 352 of the Constitution of India empowers the President to make a declaration of emergency.... No derogation from article 6, 7, 8, 11, 15, 16 and 18 can be made under this provision”. Rights under these article are: right to life, immunity from torture or inhuman treatment, freedom from slavery or servitude, immunity from imprisonment for non fulfillment of contractual obligations, immunity from retro-active or ex-post facto criminal laws and penalties, right to be recognised as a person before law and freedom of thought conscience, religion.

**Human Rights Organisations:** Globally UN acts as watchdog on human rights from its human rights headquarters at Geneva (United Nations Human Rights Commission). Numerous Governmental and non Governmental human rights organisations have come up for the purpose of monitoring HR violations in different parts of the world. Sometimes the voice of their protest against HR violation in a particular area of the world is dispassionate and unbiased, sometimes it is not – the opponent country/organisation may influence their opinion by lobbying or even by the lure of lucre. In a TV programme called ‘App ki Adalat’, Mr. K.P.S. Gill, the ex-DG Police Punjab, in reply to a question on human rights groups

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261 Ibid., pp.323-324.
categorically stated that most of these NGO, HRs groups are funded by USA and Pakistan and therefore their reports are invariably biased and support their client/mentors stand. Arun Shourie commenting on this writes: “As for the organisations that specialize in human rights, first we must subject their reports to the closest professional scrutiny. This should include the fullest enquiry into the disclosure of the amount of work that the authors have actually put in”.\(^\text{262}\) Some prominent Human Rights Organisations active in Kashmir are:-

(a) **Amnesty International:** It is London based, set out to promote Western cause against socialist countries. It is biased in its views in favour of Western nations opinions on HR.

(b) **Asia Watch:** A New York based organisation. It is concerned with HR in Asia. This organisation has in the past shown anti India stand on HR in Kashmir. Probably influenced by Pro Pak lobby and funds.

(c) **National Human Rights Commission:** It was set by an ordinance on 29 September 1993 by the President of India. Its jurisdiction ranges from inquiry into excesses by Public servants, armed forces and para military forces.

(d) **State Human Rights Commission:** Headed by the Chief Justice of High court it is a smaller body functioning at the state level.

(e) **Army Human Rights Cells:** Apart from the US the Indian Army is the only army that has its own human rights organisation. It has a cell at the Army Headquarters and one each in four operational commands (Northern, Eastern, Southern and Western Commands). The Army HR cells have been very effective, e.g., on 29 July 1994, two soldiers accused of rape in Srinagar were sentenced to 12 years RI by army court within six weeks of the commission of the offense.\(^\text{263}\)

(d) **NGO’s:** A number of NGO’s are functioning in India prominent among them are “Peoples Union of Civil Liberties (PUCL), Peoples Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) and South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre. All these are located at New Delhi.


Legal Internal Security Legislations

In order to tackle and respond to the rising problem of regional dissidence, the Indian government was forced to employ a broad range of internal security legislations, which at times have been abused by the security forces, and have attracted the wrath of HR groups. There are mainly four legislations that have been the object of wide HR attraction, these are:-

(a) The Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958: Enacted first for Assam and Manipur, and in 1972 enlarged to incorporate all the states of North East. This act was introduced in Punjab and J&K in 1983 and 1990, respectively. Under this act the whole or part of a state can be declared a ‘disturbed area’ by the State’s Governor or the Central Government. Under this act the security forces are empowered with, extra-ordinary powers, which include, power to maintain public order, power to fire upon and even cause death to persons disobeying certain laws in these areas, after being duly warned, it prohibits assembly of five or more persons, carriage of weapons and explosives, power to arrest a person or to search a premises without a warrant. Above all else those persons acting in good faith under the act are immune from prosecution.

(b) The Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978: This act permits detention of persons without charge or trial for a maximum period of one year to prevent a person from acting against the security of the state. The detained person is not entitled to any legal representation.

(c) The Terrorist and Disruptive (Prevention) Act, 1985 (TADA): Its purpose is to provide for deterrent punishment to terrorist acts and disruptive activities. Terrorist acts are punishable by a minimum prison term of five years to a maximum of life imprisonment, for those terrorist causing death the punishment can lead to death penalty. Disruptive activities includes any speech or action that could question or disrupt the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India. An appeal against this can only be made to the supreme court.

(d) Declaration of President’s Rule: Under article 356 of the Indian Constitution, if the President determines – on the advice of the Prime Minister, that a state cannot be governed according to the provisions of the Indian Constitution, the elected state government can be suspended and the central government then administers the state through an appointed governor. President rule can be applied for six months at a time.
Pakistan's Internationalization Strategy through Human Rights

It is these laws and legislations that Pakistan is taking advantage of propagandizing that these laws are draconian, inhuman and amount to legalised brutality. The Kargil Review Committee Report says in this connection: "In this exercise Pakistan created Non-Government Organisation (NGOs) to project its case in the matter and got involved with prominent international NGO's like Amnesty International, Asia Watch etc. to whip up international opinion against India on Kashmir. In a carefully orchestrated campaign, Pakistan aided, abetted terrorism and the proxy war. This inevitably resulted in human rights violations which it then cited at every conceivable fora to brand as a major violator of human rights, with a view to securing third party involvement in Kashmir". 264

Dr. S. Subramaniam, an expert on Human Rights issue also expresses a similar view: "Similarly the Disinformation and proxy war apparatus have promoted the formation of a plethora of non-governmental organisations in Pakistan, Jammu and Kashmir and abroad, which have a single point agenda of spreading baseless and highly exaggerated accounts of human right violations by the Indian security forces in Kashmir. Two of these so called NGO's located in the UK and the USA, are actually headed by two Kashmiris from the valley who were in the first batch to be trained by the ISI in guerrilla warfare, well-funded and well-equipped, these NGO's have been in the vanguard of anti-India propaganda abroad". 265

Realising the growing concern of the international community to the human rights issue around the world, Pakistan decided to draw international attention to Kashmir by taking advantage of this cause. Human Rights issue became an important objective in their foreign policy from 1992 onwards. Patricia Gossman, of Human Rights Watch Asia, says: "One thing that has emerged clearly from the discussions on Kashmir is how much human rights has become a part of global discourse in international relations. Accusations of human rights abuses have become a way for governments to undermine the interests of their neighbours and enemies.... Now it is the Pakistani government that buys copies of our reports in volumes". 266 This can be defined as misuse of human rights for political purposes, but the

264 Kargil Review Committee Report, op.cit., p.38.
The fact is that human rights have assumed such a powerful status in the international community that it can sway their opinions on a political issue to any side. The legitimacy provided to it by various international laws on the subject, make human rights so potent that no government, however powerful it may be, can afford to be accused of their violation.

Pakistan’s strategy of Internationalizing the Kashmir issue was given an impetus by the false and fabricated charge of alleged mass rape of twenty two young girls in Kunan Pospora in Kashmir in 1991. The issue was raised in the US Congress and house of commons as well as in the OIC summit. Though the charge was proved to be a hoax orchestrated by militant groups and their sympathisers and mentors in Kashmir and Pakistan, by an independent inquiry conducted by the committee of the Press Council of India comprising of B.G. Verghese, and K. Vikram Rao, the damage had already been done. The other incident, which drew international attention was the Bijbehara massacre, when BSF opened fire on a rioting mob killing 40 rioters in October 1993. These incidents were followed by the burning of the Hazratbal and Charar-e-Sharif shrines.

Recently, Yasin Malik, the JKLF chief and a leading number of the Huriyat Conference has threatened to go on a fast unto death unless the government does not restrain the security forces from ‘committing genocide’ in the valley. He alleges that as many as 76 people were tortured to death in custody or killed in fake encounters between January 1 and May 19, 2000. He said that since October 1996, 6,354 civilians were killed by security forces, 1072 of them in custody, 2007 private houses were burnt or blasted and 216 women raped and molested. He is also stated to have said “then I would go to Delhi and start a fast unto death to rouse the conscience of the civilised world and well meaning people in India who have always supported us on the human rights situation”.

All this is ready made, highly volatile material for Pakistan to exploit, to its advantage, amongst the international human rights organisations and countries around the world.

Pakistan has also included the right of ‘self determination’ of the Kashmiri people as a fundamental human right and its deniability by India is construed as infringement of human rights. Pakistan has based the plebiscite issue on the 1957 UN resolution recommending it. Despite the change in this resolution brought about by the Tashkent declaration of 1966, and

267 The Asian Age (New Delhi), 23 May, 2000, p.3.
Simla agreement of 1972, by which bilateral framework became the basis for settlement of Indo-Pak disputes over Kashmir, Pakistan has insisted on raising the self determination issue at the UN and other International fora with persistent regularity. On 4 October 1989, Mrs. Nusrat Bhutto, head of the Pakistani delegation, made a statement in the UN General Assembly, seeking a settlement “in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions which recognise the right of the people of the state to decide their future”.\(^{268}\) In March 1990, Pakistan raised the HR issue at the UNHRC in Geneva. This needs to be covered in more details, as it became a landmark issue on the subject.

**Pak’s Diplomatic Offensive: Geneva 1994**

One of the most intense use of diplomatic force by Pakistan, on its efforts to internationalize the Kashmir issue, was launched at the 50th session the UN Human Rights Commission held in Geneva during February-March 1994. Under item 12 of the agenda, Pakistan had tabled a resolution on “Question of the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in any part of the world with particular reference to colonial and other dependent countries and territories. The resolution sought to express grave concern, the gross and consistent violation of the human rights of the people of Jammu and Kashmir”.\(^{269}\) This was the first time that Pakistan was taking the issue to the UNHRC, which comprises of 53 member nations and is the highest international body on Human Rights.

Pakistan moved into overdrive in its intent and determination to ensure the success of their resolution in Geneva. The Pakistani delegation was led by Mr. Nawaz Sharif, Ms. Benazir Bhutto was also to make an appearance and comprised of Mr. Ahmed Kamal the Pakistani Ambassador to the UN, Ahiya Inayatullah, a former Pakistani Minister, Mr. Shafqat Kakakhel, a diplomat, Mr. Iqbal Akhund, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, Chairman of the bipartisan committee on Kashmir, Mr. Aseef Ali. The Indian team was led by Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee, who was then the leader of the opposition, Mr. Salman Khurshid, the Minister for State for External Affairs, Mr. Hamid Ansari, India’s permanent representative at the UN, Farooq Abdullah (who joined the delegation at Geneva), Satish Chandra, Permanent Representative at Geneva, Ambassador Prakash Shah from Tokyo, V.K. Grover

\(^{268}\) *Asian Recorder* (New Delhi), November 19-25, 1989, p.20875.

\(^{269}\) B.P. Saha, op.cit., p.177.
and Brijesh Mishra, Mr. Manmohan Singh, the Finance Minister, went as a visitor. Seeing the high number of Muslim delegates, one Pakistan delegate described them as “rented Muslims” which was strongly condemned by India.

Pakistan embarked on a lobbying spree prior to the Geneva convention. The lobbying blitz was spearheaded by Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto herself. Just before the convention she visited Riyadh the capital of Saudi Arabia to extol it to use its influence on the IOC brother-hood which forms a formidable bench strength at the UNHRC at Geneva. Salman Khurshid writes: “Benazir Bhutto is exceptionally articulate and blessed with a personality which the electronic media of the west takes to very enthusiastically. She had immediately upon becoming Prime Minister for the second time, made a whirl wind tour of the important capitals in Asia, Europe and North America. She left no diplomatic stone unturned. She came to Geneva to make history. Her team had come equipped, charged and determined to execute her grandiose plans.... The battle cry...was sounded with the opening address of Pakistan’s Prime Minister.... In a shrill pronouncement she made it clear to her own people, to us, and to the world that she was not going to withdraw. Pakistan was not prepared to accept the repeat of what happened at the UN General Assembly in 1993”. 270 (Where Pakistan had to take back its resolution on Kashmir from being moved in the UNGA). But these issues are not decided by rhetoric alone but need to be proved on the floor.

Pakistan’s relentless lobbying and man to man contact was consummately neutralised by the Indian contingent, to the extent that the resolution was not even put to vote and unceremoniously withdrawn by Pakistan. Most member countries either favoured abstention or vote in India’s favour. Even Pakistan’s closest allies Iran, China and IOC advised Pakistan to withdraw: Salman Khurshid states: “Many countries felt uneasy about a vote. Iran and China had a strong reason to prevent a division. Iran took the initiative of asking Pakistan to withdraw even as the vote was announced. China added its voice and 20 other countries followed suit. Interveners including Mexico, very categorically said that this was a bilateral issue and ought to be settled bilaterally. And Pakistan withdraw”. 271

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271 Ibid.
The reason's for Pakistan's diplomatic failures have been well compiled by B.P. Saha, "...the changed attitude of the US and the EU's stand to abstain from voting considerably worried Islamabad. Perhaps, it was realised that OIC's support was unpredictable. Secondly, Indian diplomacy succeeded in neutralising several member countries. Thirdly, no member was keen to pick up a row with India as they looked forward to taking advantage of India's liberal economic policy. Fourthly, India's open policy and transparency over Kashmir had impressed several members". Though there were no restrictions on diplomats of any country from visiting Kashmir. India during the convention, invited ambassadors of Muslim countries based in India, to go to Srinagar.

However, there is also a downside to this Indian victory and an obtrusive and limited success for Pakistan. The events at Geneva Internationalised the Kashmir issue just as Pakistan wanted. India had to grant access to the world to Kashmir to discuss the issue at a world forum, and also invited a spate of applications from foreign diplomats to visit Kashmir and in international diplomacy there is nothing called a neutral umpire. All these foreign representatives report would be along the lines of their national policies. Such a deluge of foreigners would naturally also cramp the security forces, Zahid Hussain in Karachi writing for ‘India Today’ averred: "...Pakistan succeeded in internationalising the Kashmir issue...Pakistan had achieved a spectacular victory by forcing India to allow a delegation of diplomats from Islamic countries to visit Kashmir". This of course amounts to a face saving gimmick. The fact is that Pakistan once again failed in internationalising Kashmir. The post Geneva Pakistani rhetoric is much like the post Kargil claim of Pakistan, of having internationalised Kashmir.

Pakistan’s efforts to raise this issue continued unabated. As a matter of fact, it even made Yasser Arafat, a good friend of India, to speak in favour of plebiscite during the OIC meet at Islamabad on 23 March, 1997, he said "...as a friend India. We are looking forward to (implementation) of the UN resolution". He did not explain his new pro-Pakistan stand. India's stand in response to Pakistan's efforts to play the self-determination card is based on

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273 India Today (New Delhi), March 31, 1994, op.cit., p.79.
274 Ibid., April 30-May 6, 1997, p.25424. [Excerpted from Indian Express, (New Delhi), 'The Times of India, (Mumbai)].
two basic issues: Firstly, India holds that the principle of self-determination is inapplicable to its integral parts. Secondly, if Pakistan feels so strongly about self-determination for the people of J&K then it must first apply the same principle to its Northern Areas, to Sind, where the people are demanding a separate state, to POK, where the JKLF is demanding complete independence for the people of Kashmir, and finally, Pakistan's action of ceding 5,000 sq. kms. of J&K territory to China, was done without resorting to the principle of self-determination. Pakistan, therefore, has no ‘locus standi’ to demand the right of self-determination of the people of a state which is a legal part of another country, when it is itself totally opposed to applying the same principle to itself.

Pakistan accuses Indian security forces for committing human rights violations in Kashmir. "The so-called atrocities and excesses of the Indian security forces include killing innocent men and women in the name of cordon-and-search operation, firing on civilians, extra judicial killings, arbitrary arrests, torture, burning of houses, gang rapes and custodial deaths. Pakistan complains that in the campaign of suppression by Indian troops since 1990, the forces are above the law, free from any restraint and immune from any investigation or punishment of their conduct. Pakistani scholars recriminate India for the six monthly extensions of President's rule in the state since July 1990. They accuse New Delhi of using the imposition of President's rule as an instrument for furthering oppression in the State". 275

Dr. Iftikhar H. Malik, a Pakistani scholar writing for "Strategic Studies" a Pakistani Quarterly states in detail the Pakistani perception of HR violations in Kashmir, he writes: "All through early 1990's one noticed a growing global consciousness on human issues in Kashmir... More than 25,000 Kashmiris - most of them civilians - have lost lives in 'encounters', human right activists, journalists and hospital staff are routinely harassed by Border Security Forces, countless women with varying ages from 8 to 80 have been deflowered by troops, and many thousand unaccounted Kashmiris remain incarcerated. The heinous practices such as 'roller treatment' resulting into renal failure, indiscriminate shooting at funerals and torching Muslim properties have been daily features of the state led brutalization of a people... Mass-murders, executions of unarmed civilians under the pretext of 'cross fire, torching the shops and houses with inmates being burnt alive, unrecorded incarceration of...

hundred of Kashmiris, gang rapes daily molestation of medical personnel.... The grotesque face of Indian atrocities has been recorded by a number of investigation teams. James A. Goldston and Patricia Gossman of the Asia Watch, the authors of "The Crackdown in Kashmir"...went to a great detail in exposing gross human violations perpetrated by the Indian security forces". 276 Malik goes on to state that similar facts have been reflected in the annual reports of Amnesty International and by a Paris based organisation called 'Federation Internationale Des Ligues Des Droits De L' Homme' (FIDH).

Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, another Pakistani expert on South Asian affairs, writing in the same magazine states: "India has indulged in all conceivable brutal methods to suppress the freedom movement. More than 600,000 troops and security forces are stationed in the valley. In pursuit of their sole objective (namely to forcefully crush the freedom movement) the Indian security forces have employed all kinds of uncivilised and brutal suppressive techniques.... During the last 5 years of freedom struggle more than 40,000 Kashmiris have been killed by the Indian security forces in one form or the other. Arbitrary arrests, rape, torture, burning of suspects shops or houses, instant clamping of curfew have become regular features of life in the valley.... Almost all human rights watchers, including Indian groups, have consistently drawn the attention of the Indian government towards the ongoing human rights violations.... Despite repeated reminders by the international human rights associations not much action was initiated against those who were directly involved in unthinkable human rights abuses". 277

The writer further goes on to state that the response of the International Organisations to Pakistan's complaints on Human Rights violation has been disappointing. About the UN he says: "Perhaps the most disappointing response has been that of the United Nations.... Lack of interest on the part of UN has not only disenchanted many Kashmiris but also caused the perpetuation of the crisis... What the UN had failed to take notice is that the prevalent situation inside Kashmir is dangerously alarming which can degenerate into a war...the perpetration of massive human rights violations certainly deserve active concern of the


UN”. About USA’s response Cheema writes: “The American response to the crisis has not been all that impressive”. About UK, he writes: “Even today the role of the British does not appear to be constructively oriented”.

The attitude of the leading players in the international community perhaps stems from their knowledge of Pakistan’s game-plan of internationalizing Kashmir by hook or by crook, and in its exuberance to do so, it is resorting to means fair and foul. In short the credibility of Pakistan in the eyes of the international community, as far as Kashmir is concerned is not only low but suspect. Pakistan is using the human rights issue as a tool to put India in the dock internationally. By bringing international cognition to the so called human rights violations by the Indian security forces, it hopes to bring down the morale of the force which are working in extremely trying conditions, secondly, by doing so, it hopes to divert international attention from its real purpose of sponsoring the ongoing proxy war in Kashmir and bleeding India white and thirdly, by doing so it believes that it would be able to divert international attention from its domestic human rights violations against the Ahmedya’s, the Mohajirs in Sindh, the Balti’s in Northern provinces and against women in Pakistan itself. Human rights therefore is not a serious issue of the good of the people of J&K but a mere tool in the hands of Pakistan to further its own domestic and anti India interests.

The Other Side of the Coin

The world is also realizing the fact that a very large number of human rights violations are being committed by the Pak sponsored militants and mercenaries who have resorted to mass slaughter of Hindus, Sikhs and even Muslims in the valley. The latest such incident occurred on June 2, 2000 at Pattan, near Srinagar where Maulvi Iftekhar Hussain Ansari the religious head of the minority Shia community was addressing a religious meeting. A powerful bomb-blast triggered by militants killed 16 Shia’s and seriously injuring maulvi Ansari. ‘The Hindu’ in its report stated: “The attack is seen as a part of a pattern in which Pakistan backed militant groups have been trying to target minorities - the Hindu Pandits, later the Sikhs and now the Shias. The attack on the Shia congregation reveals.... the agenda

278 Ibid., p.70.
279 Ibid., p.73.
280 Ibid., p.75.
of ethnic cleansing being pursued by the 'Jehadi' outfits". The mass exodus of 350,000 residents of the valley of Kashmir comprising about 300,000 Hindus and some 50,000 Muslims now living in refugee camps in Jammu, Udhampur, Nagrota and even Delhi. This is also in line with the Pakistani strategy of ethnic cleansing of the valley. The Afghan mercenaries have no love lost for any body in Kashmir, they have no cause, no ideals and no scruples - wanton murder, rape and loot is their actual objective, it matters little as to who their victims are. Gossman of the Human Rights Watch Asia, says in this regard: "Human Rights Watch has also reported extensively on abuses by militant organisations in Kashmir. Many of these groups have murdered civilians including members of the Hindu community, civil servants, and politicians accused of supporting the National Conference party or other political groups opposed by the militants. Militants have also summarily executed captured Indian soldiers. Militants have also committed rape, ... kidnapping and extortion".

The International community is also coming round to accepting the difficulties of security forces in countering terrorism in the valley where things are in shades of grey, it is not always easy to discriminate between friend and foe, between an armed terrorist and an unarmed civilian. All terrorist actions invite a counter action from the security force and sometimes co-lateral damage in the form of loss of innocent human lives or material becomes unavoidable. Innocents die or are wounded in cross fire between the militants and security forces. Building or monuments like the Hazartbal Shrine and Charar-e-Sharif get damaged because the militants deliberately convert them into their strongholds and use them to their advantage.

The International Community is also aware of the fact that a number of reports and articles coming out of the valley both in the print and electronic media are either concocted by the sponsors of terrorism or are given out under threat. "Ever since the militancy gained roots in the valley, the Press has been gagged by gun-toting militants. Anybody writing against the militants had to either leave the valley or was eliminated". Four leading newspapers of Srinagar, "Aftab", Al Sada', 'Srinagar Times' and 'Greater Kashmir' have been forced to

281 The Hindu (New Delhi), June 4, 2000, p.1 (Headlines).
282 Dr. S. Subramaniam, vol.II, op.cit., p.484.
284 The Tribune (New Delhi), 22 September 1993.
suspend their publication from time to time.\textsuperscript{285} There are innumerable incidents of intimidation, harassment, threats, even physical elimination of newspapers and media persons and yet the so called Christian-Liberal-humanitarian-democratic societies and their front organisation like the Amnesty International and Human Rights groups have preferred to remain silent, in some cases, they have connived and abetted the crimes.\textsuperscript{286}

The fear of militants is so great that a vast majority of print has bought peace with the militants (by paying ransom or protection money to them), some amongst them have a foot in both camps. The second category is that of the sympathisers and corroborators, financed by the ISI, who dish out tailored reports, or give the right kind of slant to curry favour with the militants.\textsuperscript{287} The electronic media, with its power of reach is even more devastating. Clandestine radio stations, ‘Sada-i-Hurriat’ from Pak occupied Kashmir beams programmes that are tailored by Pakistan with the aim of vilifying India domestically and internationally. Contrary to popular belief, the record of the Indian armed forces in the respect and adherence to the laws of human rights is nothing less than admirable. A survey of the current state of rights implementation by the security forces through analysis of sample data on alleged rights violations by the Army for the period 1990 to 1997 and its analysis is contained in the succeeding paragraphs.

A report filed for ‘Times of India’ by Dinesh Kumar States: The NHRC received a total of 584 complaints of human rights violations by the army in J&K out of which 578 were investigated. The NHRC found that out of these 556 complaints were false (registered under duress/orders of the militants and ISI). Violations were proved in 22 cases. In which 56 Army men (comprising of 21 officers, 3 Junior Commissioned Officers, 32 other ranks) were convicted. The type of offences and the number cases were: molestation-7, rape-21, custodial deaths-10, failure of command and control-2, theft-8, miscellaneous-8.\textsuperscript{288}

\textsuperscript{285} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{287} Ibid., p.1590.
\textsuperscript{288} Dinesh Kumar, “88 Armymen Indicted for Rights Violations”, The Times of India (New Delhi), 3 July 1997, p.1.
An analysis of the above sample data reveals that the percentage of complaints vindicated is only 4.87 percent. Over 95 percent false allegations underline the vulnerability of the Armed forces of politically motivated militant propaganda with intention of falsely highlighting the excesses of the Army and violations of human rights of the civil population of the valley. Reported incidence of violence in Jammu and Kashmir during the period involving the security forces are 34,768. Assuming that 60 percent of these involved are Army personnel, allegations of human rights violations in 20,860 incidents work out to 2.7 percent while those proved to 0.1 percent. Thus the quantitative magnitude of the problem is limited and indicates that the armed forces have been and are operating creditably within the laid down human rights parameters. It is Pakistan that is instigating all the false allegations and raising the issue in all international fora with the sole aim of internationalizing the Kashmir issue, as per their strategy.

**Hostage Taking as a Tool of Internationalization**

Kidnapping and hostage taking has always been one of the most important tactics in the dictionary of terrorism. In Kashmir, this tactics has and is being put to use with good effect. The precedence was set in 1989 by the kidnapping of Dr. Rubiya Saeed daughter of the then Union Home Minister, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, by the JKLF. She was subsequently released in exchange for the release of five top terrorists. The militants soon started resorting to kidnapping foreigners with the intention of getting their governments involved in the negotiation process. This was being done to bring international attention to the Kashmir issue.

On 6 June 1994, two Britons, Kim Housego and David Mackie were kidnapped by the Harkat-ul-Ansar from Pahalgam. They were subsequently released on 23 June due to mounting international and local pressure on the kidnappers, but not without making it “into a major public relations event, by presenting their captives with token gifts and embracing them”. On 26 July 1994, four foreigners were kidnapped and held hostage at Gaziabad and Saharanpur in U.P. Bela Joseph Nuss of California (held at Gaziabad) and three Britons - Miles Croston, Paul Ridout and Rhys Partridge (held at Saharanpur). They were kidnapped by one Ahmed Omar Sheikh, a British national of Pakistani origin, belonging to the Harkat-

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289 Manoj Joshi, op.cit., p.345.
ul-Ansar outfit. The kidnappers were seeking the release of six top Ansar leaders including Azhar Masood, Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar (both of them were subsequently released in January 2000, in exchange of the passengers of flight IC-814 at Kandhar), Langaryal, Sajjad Afghani, Mushtaq Ahmed Bhat and Ahsan Dar. However, the UP police got the hostages released after a sensational rescue operation.

But the most sensational and publicity drawing kidnapping occurred in July 1994, when Al-Faran (offshoot of Harkat-ul-Ansar), a new terrorist outfit, effected the kidnapping of six foreigners - John Childs, Donald Hutchings, Keith Mangan, Paul Wells, Hans Christian Ostro (a Norwegian) and Dirk Hasert (a German). John Childs, an American managed to escape from the clutches of the kidnappers. Their demand was the release of 21 jailed militant leaders including the famous three some of Langaryal, Afghani and Azhar Masood all belonging to the Harkat-ul-Ansar. When their demands were not met, the terrorists beheaded the Norwegian, Hans Christian Ostro in August 1994. His decapitated body was found near a village in Anantnag district.

This kidnapping, involving hostages from USA, UK, Germany and Norway became an instant focus of world attention the world media swooped on India and Kashmir, and photographs and audio recordings of the hostages released by the kidnapper were flashed around the world. Instant international publicity, one of the terrorists objectives had been achieved. International diplomatic activity promptly got underway to seek the release of the hostages. The American and European Community appealed to Pakistan to assist in getting the hostages released. “White House officials woke up Benazir Bhutto and asked her to intervene.... This episode scared the western diplomats and negotiators”.290 Hashim Qureshi, mentions the same in an elaborate manner, he writes, “The Times”, London published in its issue of August 23, 1995 a report filed by its correspondent Christopher Thomas from Srinagar. It said: “With minutes to spare, the White House woke up Benazir Bhutto...in the middle of the night...with an appeal to intervene personally to save the lives of four western hostages.... A crisis meeting was immediately summoned in Srinagar between western diplomats and top level Indian security officials while the White House made its unprecedented intervention, backed by Britain and Germany”.291 “Personnel from the FBI

290 Ibid., p.379.
and British counterparts from Scotland Yard arrived in India in mid August. Later, media reports spoke of personnel of the US Delta Force, the German GSG-9 and the Special Air Service of the UK landing near Pahalgam for a possible rescue operation.\(^{292}\)

‘Al Faran’ also kept themselves in focus by periodically releasing photographs and audio cassettes of the hostages to the foreign media, sometimes saying the hostages were well and sometimes stating that they were wounded or in ill health. The family members of the hostages also appealed to the International Community and Pakistan on T.V. and Radio to help them in getting their loved one’s back. However, the abductor’s did not relent. Till date there is no trace of the where-abouts of the hostages, although unconfirmed sources say that they have been executed.

Pakistan’s complicity in the entire episode is proved by the following pieces of evidence; firstly, John Childs who had escaped from the clutches of the kidnappers later revealed that the kidnappers were speaking in Pushto (the language of Afghans) and Urdu (the language of Pakistanis) and that he was convinced they were getting their orders from Pakistan.\(^{293}\) Secondly, Nasir Mehmood Sodozey, the finance chief of the Harkat-ul-Ansar and a Pakistani was arrested on 25 April 1996, said “Qari Zarrar, acting on the orders of the Pakistani handlers, and bypassing the valley based leadership, including the Markaz Amir (Centre Chief), Mohammed Zubair, had ordered a special lashkar led by his own associate, Abdul Hameed Turki, to carry out the kidnapping”.\(^{294}\) Thirdly, an offer of mediation came forth from Maulana Fazlur Rahman, senior Pakistan politician, a member of the Pakistani National Assembly and most importantly a cleric. Sukumar Murlidharan writing for ‘Frontline’ states: “Within the political landscape of Pakistan, the Maulana represents the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islami (JUI)...allegedly the ideological progenitor of the militant grouping Harkat-ul-Ansar. A credible theory that offered itself was that the American and British governments had leaned on their Pakistani counterparts, holding out the suggestion that they would have to take the responsibility for the deeds of their proteges in Kashmir. And while the Pakistan Government could not formally own up in sponsorship of the Al Faran - which is suspected to be a front organisation for the better known Harkat - it could conceivably initiate

\(^{292}\) Manoj Joshi, op.cit., pp.378-79.
\(^{293}\) Ibid., p.369.
\(^{294}\) Ibid., p.371.
a damage - limitation exercise through purportedly non-official channels.... He (Rahman) admitted to having spoken telephonically three times over the preceding week to the abductors, but he would open negotiations only if the Indian Government desired.... he did not rule out the possibility that the individuals involved might have had connections with him in earlier times.... Rahman cut short his visit and flew home”. Perhaps, Pakistan realized that if Rahman’s mediations succeeded then surely the Pakistan-Al Faran link up would become an established fact in the eyes of the world.

Hashim Qureshi, writes that what Pakistan stands to gain from this kidnapping is “by the act of kidnapping and murder, Pakistan wants to highlight the Kashmir problem in order to mount foreign pressure on her (India) to resolve the tangle” 295. Yes, Pakistan by stage managing this episode did manage to internationalize the Kashmir issue. Till then, no single terrorist incident had created such a furor in the international community.

**Hijacking: An Instrument of ‘Internationalization’**

Hijacking in the context of this study pertains to seizure by illegal force of a passenger aircraft and commandeering it while in flight for the purpose of committing an illegal, criminal or anti-national activity, by using the aircraft and its occupants as hostages as bargaining chips for an extremist-politico concession or favour. In most countries it is an offence punishable by long prison terms or execution. In political terms hijacking can be defined as a kind of war by other means when used by politico-extremist organisation against a target country namely - Arab terrorists against Israel, Irish Republican Army against England. In India, Punjabi/Kashmiri terrorist against India. Besides other political and material gains that the hijackers may be seeking, their main objective is the propaganda and internationalization of their cause, that the act provides. the media unknowingly assists them in this regard. In India there have been 13 incidences of hijacking commencing from the first one in 1971 which was hijacked by Kashmir terrorist and the thirteenth was the hijacking of IC-814 on 24 December, 1999 again by Kashmiri militants. 296

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Since the hijacking of IC-814 is the only one that pertains to the period covered by the study and is considered more pertinent to the subject, it will be covered in a little detail.

On 24 December 1999, flight IC-814, an Airbus A-300, took off from Kathmandu for New Delhi carrying 189 passengers and crew members. Half an hour after take off the flight was hijacked by 5-6 Kashmiri terrorist. The aircraft after flying to Lahore, landing at Amritsar and Lahore took off for Dubai via Kabul (where they were refused permission to land). It landed at Dubai on December 25, where a passenger, Rupin Katyal was killed by the hijackers and 27 passengers were released. The aircraft finally landed at Kandhar in Afghanistan. They demanded the release of some Kashmiri militants and wanted a UN team to mediate. This action was clearly aimed at internationalising the Kashmir issue. A three member UN team led by Mr. Rrick de Mul was despatched to Kandhar.

An Indian negotiation team also arrived in Kandhar. After six days of hectic negotiations by the UN and Indian teams the drama ended with the release of hostages in return of three hard core Kashmiri militants. They were, Mohammad Masood Azhar, a Pakistani National from Bhawalpur and a leader of the dreaded international terrorist group the ‘Harkat-ul-Ansar’, Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar alias ‘Mushtaq Latram’, a Kashmiri terrorist who was the head of ‘Al-Umar Mujahideen’ another terrorist group. The third person released was Ahmed Umar Saeed Sheikh, a British national of Pakistani origin was also a member of the Harkat-ul-Ansar.

This eight day old hijacking was the longest ever in the history of Indian Airlines. This was also perhaps the most well covered event by the world media giving the episode an international image, even if it was bad publicity, it was publicity all the same. Most countries of the world got involved in it, in one way or another, mostly condemning the dastardly act.

“Russia assured every possible assistance to India... Foreign Minister Igo Ivanov expressed Moscow’s outrage at the hijacking. Washington termed the hijacking as an ‘inhuman terrorist act. France strongly condemned the hijacking and urged the safe release of hostages without delay... Japan termed the hijacking as unacceptable, inhuman and a criminal act (one Japanese woman was a passenger in the aircraft)... China hoped for a quick end.... China’s foreign ministry spokes - women Zhang Qiyue said in Beijing “The Chinese Government is firmly opposed to and condemns all forms of terrorist activities.... We hope the hijacking is over as soon as possible...” Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohmad expressed regret at
the incident "I feel very sad.... The idea of taking hostages to obtain certain concessions is very unfortunate". All this proves that by indulging in this dastardly act the Pakistani backed terrorist were able to draw the attention of the international community to the Kashmir issue.

Soon after the end of the drama the hijackers were identified and Pakistan’s role in the hijacking was confirmed “Addressing a Press Conference in New Delhi on January 6, 2000. Home Minister L.K. Advani said Pakistan’s involvement in this diabolic drama has been proved beyond doubt because of the ISI and militant outfit links of the hijackers and conspirators...”. The hijackers have been identified as Ibrahim Athar (Bahawalpur, Pakistan), Shahid Akhtar Sayed (Karachi), Sunny Ahjmed Qazi (Karachi), Mistri Zahoor Ibrahim (Karachi) and Shakir (Sukkur city). The crew and passengers of the hijacked Aribus identified the photographs of the hijackers.... Athar is the brother of Maulana Masood Ashar, the Pakistani cleric freed by India with two other militants in exchange for hostages on board the hijacked plane.... Giving details of what led to their identification, the Home Minister said the Mumbai police working in tandem with the Central intelligence agencies had nabbed four ISI operatives who comprised the support cell for the five hijackers of the IA plane. The four nabbed ISI operatives were activists of the Harkat-ul-Ansar (HUA) the fundamentalist Tanzeem based in Rawalpindi in Pakistan...the four HA operatives were identified as Mohammed Rehan and Mohammed Iqbal (both Pakistan nationals). Yusuf Nepali (Nepali Citizen) and Abdul Latif, the principal ISI agent in India.... On interrogation, they disclosed the hijackers identity and that they were also the part of the ISI conspiracy to hijack the plane". 

297 Ibid., pp.130-31.
298 Ibid., pp.132-33.