CHAPTER III

PAKISTAN'S TWO LEVEL STRATEGY: 1947-48

General

The evolution of Pakistan's two level strategy on Kashmir coincided with the partition of the country in 1947. When the state of Jammu and Kashmir decided to postpone the option of either acceding to India or Pakistan or to remain independent. Pending a decision on this, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir made an offer of a standstill agreement with both countries on 12 August 1947. While Pakistan signed it (and very soon reneged on it by imposing total economic and communication blockade on Jammu and Kashmir - all essential supplies and commodities like food grain, salt, petrol etc. were denied entry into the state). India on the other hand did not immediately sign the agreement, as it wanted more time to consider it and also wanted the representatives of the state of J&K to come to Delhi for discussions on the subject. V.P. Menon explaining this wrote: "Pakistan signed a standstill agreement. But we wanted to examine its implications. We left the state alone.... The Government of India was not immediately interested so much in Kashmir. The state had its own peculiar problems which could be resolved in course of time, our hands were already full and, if truth be told, for one simply had no time to think of Kashmir". However before the standstill agreement could be negotiated as desired by the Indian leaders, the invasion had already begun and hence the entire situation was radically changed.

On the evening of Friday, 24 October 1947, the Governor-General and the Foreign Minister of Siam were guests of Pandit Nehru at Dinner at the latter's house in New Delhi. During the evening, Lord Mountbatten was taken aside by his host, who told him that, news had come in of a large scale invasion of tribesmen from the North-West Frontier into Kashmir. Realising at once that a new and grave situation had arisen, Lord Mountbatten called a special meeting of the Defence Committee at 11 a.m. that morning. There an official report was received from General Lockhart, Commander-in-Chief, Indian Army, who had

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been informed by Headquarter's Pakistan Army, in Rawalpindi that "some 5,000 tribesmen had entered Kashmir three days previously from the West and had seized and burnt the town of Muzzafarabad on their way towards Srinagar." This was the first report of invasion of Kashmir by Pakistan in 1947.

**Level One of the Strategy**

Level one strategy, involved the commencement of conflict with the use of unconventional warfare, like, infiltration, subversion and proxy war. In 1947 Pakistan commenced operation by pushing in tribal raiders. The tribal Invasion was code named “Operation Gulmarg”. The actuality about preparing and launching the tribal invasion has come out in many writings of individuals in Pakistan who were directly or indirectly involved in the invasion. Major General Akbar Khan, who adopted the pseudonym ‘General Tariq’ (after the Arab General who led the invaders into Spain over a thousand years before). Major General Akbar Khan has himself stated in this context “A few weeks after partition, I was asked by Mian Iftikharuddin on behalf of Liaquat Ali Khan to prepare a plan of action for Kashmir. I found that the Army was holding 4,000 rifles for the civil police. If these could be given to the locals, an armed uprising in Kashmir could be organised at suitable places: I wrote a plan on this basis and gave it to Mian Iftikharuddin. I was called to a meeting with Liaquat Khan at Lahore where the plan was adopted, responsibilities allotted and orders issued. Everything was to be kept a secret from the Army.”

The Tactical Plan of Operation Gulmarg for the invasion of the Kashmir Valley was meticulously planned. D day for launching the operation was fixed as 22nd October 1947. It was to be launched at two levels. One, at the level of inciting internal trouble by infiltration, sabotage and subversion, by pushing in twenty Lashkars (20,000 trained tribal raiders) along four thrust lines, three of these columns were tasked to operate and attempt to Capture areas upto Banihal pass including Srinagar and the fourth column was to operate and attempt to capture areas of Poonch, Rajauri and Jammu. They were to incite the local population into a rebellion against the state forces. At the second level, depending on the progress of level one

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of the operation. Pakistan regular Army troops belonging to 7 Infantry Division were to concentrate in area Murree-Abbottabad by last light (evening) 21 October, with orders to be ready to move immediately into Jammu and Kashmir to back up the tribal raiders and consolidate their hold in the Valley. One regular Army Infantry brigade was also held in reserve at Sialkot to move to Jammu. Concurrently a political and diplomatic offensive would also be launched by Pakistan.

H.V. Hodson, commenting on the tactical plan states. "The timing of the invasion was well calculated to place the defence of Kashmir from India at a disadvantage. Winter was beginning to close in upon the passes. The troubles in Poonch were holding down many of the Maharajah’s police and soldiers. Whereas the invaders could be expected to master the central valley of Kashmir before the winter snows came, there was little margin of time left for forces to be assembled and deployed from India before the road from East Punjab became impassable".  

The same period for the same reasons was adopted by Pakistan when it invaded Kashmir in 1965 (Operation Gibraltar and Grand Slam), even till date all infiltrations into the valley by militants take place during this period. All this lends credence to the fact that this strategy had been carefully planned, perfected and continues to be implemented in Kashmir from 1947 till date. More on this later.

Before discussing the details of the actual plan an important fact needs to be brought to the fore. Even before Kashmir acceded to India, Pakistan resorted to its level one strategy when in July 1947 it prompted and actively supported armed rebellion in Poonch district of Kashmir. It was clearly inspired by Pakistan. By August, the revolt was accelerated. Its leaders proclaimed independence and established the first Azad Kashmir Government. Arms came from factories which had long been maintained by Pathan tribesmen across the border. By October, at the latest, the rebellion was receiving Pakistan support and weapons. Similarly a revolt was also initiated in the Gilgit Agency in far North East of Kashmir, the revolt was swift. Muslim soldiers deserted, pro-Pakistani sentiment made its appearance and the areas taken over quickly by forces sympathetic to Karachi. A week later, the Gilgit is occupied

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5 H.V. Hodson, op.cit., n.2, p.446.
Baltistan giving Pakistan control over a large slice of strategic mountain country in Northern Kashmir. All this was done much before the state of Kashmir acceded to India.\(^6\) Therefore, Pakistan launched its level one strategy even before the state of J&K had acceded to India thereby proving that it had not only broken international norms by invading a free country, but had also pre-planned the entire operation to annex Kashmir.

Major General Akbar Khan, who, as has been brought out earlier, master-minded and commanded the operations in the valley, in his book, “Raiders in Kashmir”, brings out that, the plan for invasion of Kashmir had been finalised much before accession. He writes,

“A few days later (beginning of September 1947) Mian Iftikharuddin, then a leader in the Muslim League (the ruling political party), arrived at Murree from Lahore and he said that he had been deputed to go to Srinagar to contact the Kashmiri leaders and to assess the chances of Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan... He did not seem particularly optimistic about the outcome of his mission.... he asked me to prepare a plan. (for forcible accession of Kashmir) for him... ultimately I wrote out a plan under the title of “Armed Revolt inside Kashmir”, it was proposed that our efforts should be concentrated upon strengthening the Kashmiri’s themselves internally, and at the same time prevent arrival of armed civilians or military assistance from India into Kashmir... Out of 4,000 rifles that were to be issued, 1,000 were proposed for the (blocking) Kathua road and 200 for the Srinagar landing ground, the balance 2,800 were to be distributed over the rest of the area adjacent to Pakistan’s border... The whole situation was radically altered by the entry of frontier tribesmen into Kashmir an 23rd of October... I cannot say exactly when it was decided that an attack by tribesmen should be carried out in the manner that it was... In the morning I was informed that I was to be the military member of the Liberation Committee and Military adviser to the Prime Minister.... the Prime Minister said that all he wanted was to keep the fight going for three months.”\(^7\)

In this book the author also brings out facts as to the participation of Pakistan’s regular troops in civilian clothes, earlier during the war, and then the participation of Pakistan’s regular troops at the later stages of the campaign. The author also outlines the two level strategy in this book,

“In 1956, I wrote a 30 page pamphlet called “How to Solve the Kashmir Problem.” The gist of this was, we would have to help the people of


occupied Kashmir to rise for their own freedom and if in so helping them, the Indian Government accused Pakistan of interference so much the better, as this would lead to threatening the existing international peace and only then would there be reason for the United Nations again to take notice of the problem. If the worst happened and India committed aggression against Pakistan, the world would be forced to intervene against her... only 500 men at a time inside Kashmir would be enough. The terrain inside Kashmir was ideally suited for guerrilla and sabotage action... My emphasis was on the use of lesser and lesser numbers... Thus they would be impossible to detect and they would have no difficulty in going across the cease fire line.... They would have to be preferably locals or at least in local clothes, armed only with some dynamite for blowing up bridges, and pliers for wire cutting, for their own protection each could have a knife or a small local made pistol. They would not need to fight against troops or police, their targets would be unguarded bridges, isolated wires (electric and telephone) and unprotected transport... There would have to be a second batch of 500 to keep replacing these and a third batch of 500 under training... They would need 12 to 18 months operating in an unspectacular manner and only then would the occupied Kashmiri people themselves feel truly encouraged to rise en-masse.... In addition, our frontier tribesman, no less than 3,00,000 armed men who have for centuries found India an attractive hunting ground, can still be unleashed against the enemy border.”

The author states that 5,000 copies of this pamphlet were printed. This became the subject of heated debate in the Indian Parliament and received headlines in some of the Indian Press. Pakistan's President Iskandar Mirza readily approved of the Plan and deputed General Ayub Khan to proceed with the implementation of the plan. Subsequently some explosions did take place in occupied Kashmir, but nothing serious happened, presumably the whole plan may not have been implemented.

The logistics of the plan envisaged that every Pathan tribe was required to enlist at least one Lashkar of 1000 tribesmen. After enlistment these Lashkars were to be concentrated at Bannu, Wana, Peshawer, Kohat, Thal and Nawhera by the first week of September 1947. The Brigade Commander at these places were to issue them arms amunition and some essential items of clothings on paper showing these issues against some Pakistan Army units. Thousands of these Pakistan Army issue items were recovered from dead and captured tribal raiders by the Indian Army in Kashmir subsequently each Lashkar was provided a Major, a Captain and 10 Junior Commissioned Officers (JCO's) of the regular Pakistan Army. The

8 Ibid., pp.178-179.
Major was the actual commander of the Lashkar and was to act as the advisor of the tribal Malik (Leader) of the Lashkar. The Captain was to act as staff officer, while each of the ten JCOs was to be incharge of a company or group of Lashkar. The Pakistan regular Army Officers and JCOs were to be Pathans, and would dress exactly like the other Lashkars. For transportation approximately 300 vehicles and a large quantity of Petrol, which was, at that time a rationed commodity, and full transit facilities were provided to these Lashkars. The tribal raiders did not come into Kashmir in driblets but in large groups of hundreds travelling by vehicles over hundred of miles along main roads and over bridges guarded by Pakistani troops. In transit they were obviously and officially assisted with supplies of food, water and specially petrol which, at that time was, in acute short supply and was being rationed both in Pakistan and India.

There were 13,000 Pathans operating in Kashmir in 1947-48. Many of them were recruited by officials of the North-West Frontier Province and incited to ‘Jehad’ by the Premier of the Province, leaders of the Muslim League Party openly canvassed for aid, for the raiders. These facts have been documented in news/press reports “The Jamait-e-Alia” of Mujahadin in a message to the Chief Minister, North West Frontier Province, Khan Abdul Qayyam Khan, issued from their strong hold in the Hills of Buner says - the independent tribes warn the neighbouring state of Kashmir that if she decides to join the Indian Union even in the teeth of opposition of the 90 percent of its Muslim population, then such a step will be taken as a challenge and an invitation for a Jehad.”10 “Lahore, 29th October 1947 - Khan Abdul Quyyam Khan, Premier of the North-West Frontier Province, has strongly condemned the decision taken by the Maharaja of Kashmir to accede to the Indian Dominion. He has declared that the Pathan are determined to die to the last man rather than allow the invasion of Kashmir which is a Muslim majority state and belongs to Pakistan as a matter of right... He also appeals to the Governments of Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey and the Governments associated with the Arab League to get ready to face this new danger to that existence of Islam.11

9 O.S. Kalkat, op.cit., n.4, pp.40-42.
10 The Times of India (New Delhi), 17th September 1947; in “India’s White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir”, Documents on Kashmir Problem, Govt. of India, p.57.
Sindh’s Minister of Health, Pir Ilahi Bux, said in a statement that “It is not only the Pathans who have to carry on the struggle... He appealed to all trained and demobilized soldiers to proceed as volunteers to the Kashmir Front.12 “Mr. Jinnah’s Private Secretary, Khurshid Ahmed, was arrested here (Srinagar) this morning by the State police. Maps and other documents were recovered from him, Khurshid Ahmed who had come to Kashmir some days ago had gone underground for organising agitation against the administration. He was arrested in Jama Masjid, Centre of the Muslim Conference. National Conference volunteers brought Khurshid out of the hide out.”13 - (Khurshid Ahmed was subsequently repatriated to Pakistan in 1949).

“They look on this as a holy Muslim war. Some of them, I have seen, talk wildly of going to Delhi.... every where recruiting is going on and there is such excitement and enthusiasm at the success of the Muslims. This is happening not only in the tribal territories where Pakistan has no control but inside Pakistan itself.”14

Jammu, December 6th while King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan wanted his subjects to remain aloof and not to visit India this year as there was trouble, Pakistan officials have tried hard to persuade Afghans to join the raiders invading Jammu and Kashmir, Lal Mir, an Afghan from Ghazni captured by Indian troops said

“He left his home along with 1,000 Afghan for India via Khust. From Ghazni we marched in a caravan to Khust and thereafter reached Miran Shah, from here we were brought to Wazirabad. Pakistan Army, police as well as Frontier constabulary officials were present. Here arms and ammunition were issued to those who had none and good ones were given to those who had old rifles. There were different types of arms and we were asked to choose as we liked - all arms, ammunition, food and conveyance were arranged by Pakistan Government Officials in camps at Wazirabad.”15

London, February 20th - “there is no possible doubt that if India had not intervened last October, Srinagar and the lovely valley of Kashmir would now be a devastated and

12 The Times of India (New Delhi), Special Correspondent, Nov. 1, 1947; in “India’s White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir”, Documents on Kashmir Problem, Govt. of India, p.60.
13 The Hindustan Times, (New Delhi), November 2, 1947; in “India’s White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir”, Documents on Kashmir Problem, Govt. of India, p.60.
14 The Observer, Alan Moorehead Correspondent in Pakistan, 2 November 1947.
15 United Press of India (Jammu), 16 December 1947.
blackened ruin. Nor can there be any question that encouragement and aid had been given to the tribesmen in Pakistan.  

Level Two of the Strategy

Pakistan employed level two of its strategy sometimes during the beginning of May 1948 (The same month that it embarked on its Kargil venture 51 years later). The exact date, when Pakistan launched its regular troops into J&K is a contestable issue, as the study brings out subsequently. This level envisaged the unleashing of its regular army into J&K to beef up the ongoing operations by its irregular forces (raiders, infiltrators, militants and terrorists) which had been going on for more than six months now. The Pakistani leadership presumably felt that by now the Indian army which was battling the raiders would be either fired and exhausted and also some form of local uprising would also have commenced or they felt that their level one strategy was not succeeding as desired, whatever be the reasons, they decided to march in their regular army into J&K.

But before discussing the actual employment of its regular army. It would be worth the while to first bring on record the fact that the Pakistani regular army was already involved in combat with Indian forces much before May 1948. Their regular troops, disguised as tribals and Afghan’s were already fighting the Indian army alongside the raiders. This is proved by the fact that the so called raiders carried weapons and equipment that was only available with the regular armies of India and Pakistan. The method of warfare and tactics employed by the ‘raiders’ could only be resorted to by well trained army men. India’s white paper on Jammu and Kashmir (1947-48) records in this context: “The equipment used by the raiders was of the most modern kind and available only with the armies of both the countries. The radio sets used for communication and the procedure and codes utilized were exactly as done by the Pakistani Army. Surely tribesman and villagers would not have these sophisticated skills. The tactics employed by the raiders were in accordance with training in modern war-fare. There are records in existence where soldiers of the Indian Army recognised and identified their former comrades now serving in the Pakistan Army”.

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16 New Statesman and Nation (London), Mr. Kingsley Martin in a despatch from Jammu, 20 February 1948.

A similar observation was made by a London newspaper, reporting that "The Tribesmen are accompanied by men in civilian dress with obvious military training. The invading forces are well equipped with rifles and mortars and scores of Army trucks and ample petrol supplies. There is every evidence that their expedition has strong support and is being conducted with tactical skill."\(^{18}\)

Similar tactics was resorted to by Pakistan in the 1965 operations, when it infiltrated its regular troops in civilian clothes and recently during the Kargil conflict when it resorted to a similar ploy. Another ploy that Pakistan learnt to employ during this period, which became a standard practice to its plan of sending in its regular soldiers along with irregulars, was the policy of deniability. Having sent in raiders, trained, armed and sponsored by her along with her regular troops in civil disguise, she immediately proclaimed that it had no hand in the goings on in J&K and that it is all an internal rebellion supported by independent frontier tribesmen. She even took the same stand in the international fora. On 15 January 1948, Pakistan submitted its case in written in the form of three documents to the UN, followed by a speech by Sir Zafrulla Khan. The first of these documents was a refutation of India’s changes - Pakistan was not assisting tribal invasion of Kashmir, its territory was not being used by raiders and Pakistan was not providing any kind of assistance to the raiders. Liaquat Ali wrote to Nehru denying everything “As regards the charges of aid and assistance to the invaders by the Pakistan Government we emphatically repudiate them. On the contrary... The Pakistan Government have combined to do all in their power to discourage the tribal movements by all means short of war”.\(^{19}\) This, thereafter became its standard refrain and is being used through the years till date.

Coming to the use of its regular military force in J&K in 1947-49, a plethora of evidence exists to prove that Pakistan had moved its regular forces into J&K, much before she accepted she did. Like already brought out, level one strategy was launched between 20 to 23 October 1947 by the incursion of raiders into J&K. Level two i.e., employment of its regular forces commenced, by their own acceptance, sometimes in early May 1948. However, authentic reports, do record the presence of Pakistan’s regular army in J&K during


early January 1948. The war lasted for nearly 14 months, till ceasefire was enforced by UN during January 1949. Therefore, out of these 14 months, Pakistan’s regular army was in J&K for a minimum period of 7 months (if May 1948 be taken as the datum period) and for a maximum of 11 months (if January 1949 is taken as the datum period). Either-way, this proves that the Pakistan Army was involved in fighting in J&K in 1947-48 war for a better part of its 14 months duration. Therefore, Pakistan’s claim that it was just an uprising and its army was not involved in it, does not hold good.

In order to substantiate the above claim, reference to some authentic evidence on record needs to be made. One of the first steps taken by the “Quid-i-Azam”, who at the time of outbreak of hostilities was at Karachi decided to move closer to the scene of action, so he along with his important ministers and staff moved to Lahore for better command and control of the J&K situation. By then he had already formulated a plan for the capture of J&K. Lieutenant General Gul Hassan, who was at that time a Captain, was ADC to Jinnah writes in his memoirs “The Quid-i-Azam, with his acute sense of perception, decided to move to Lahore from Karachi on 27 October 1947. In Lahore, besides his proximity to the scene (Jammu and Kashmir), he could be in a position to confer with Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister, who was also the Defence Minister... In a meeting between the Governor of Punjab (Sir Francis Mundie) and the Prime Minister/Defence Minister the Quid-i-Azam unfolded his plan for the capture of Srinagar by regular army”.

As to the timing of invasion by Pakistan’s regular army and the quantum of force deployed by it for the operation, a number of writers and documents allude to them. Major General O.S. Kalkat of the Indian Army, who at that time was a Major and still in Pakistan as an important staff in one of the Brigades that had been given to Pakistan consequent to the division of the erstwhile Indian Army between the two countries, by a coincidence became privy to the Pakistani plan. He, as has already been brought out earlier in this chapter, came to know that 7 Infantry Division of the regular army was concentrated at area Murree-Abbotabad by 21 October 1947, ready to move into J&K, another Brigade of the regular army was in reserve at Sialkot. Therefore, according to this writer when the tribal invasion

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began on 20/21 October 1947, Pakistan’s four regular army Brigades were poised for launching into J&K. This also gives indications of the existence of a plan for the capture of J&K. Lord Birdwood writes about it in a rather philosophical and poignant manner, saying: “with the new year (January 1948) and the gradual entry of Pakistan regular forces into the story, operations came to assume the aspect of a war. It is to this most ambiguous of wars that we now turn, novel in that never before can two armies in opposition have known quite so much about each other, nor really have been more surprised at finding they were expected to put into practice against former colleagues the lessons they had learnt together in the same school”. 21

Lord Birdwood, has in his book very candidly brought out that the Pakistan regular army was in the fray in J&K behind the raiders in January 1948 and not May 1948, as claimed by the Pakistani Government. He reveals: “Once again I draw attention to the obscurity surrounding the first use of Pakistan Regulars in the war... I was assured that no regular unit was moved before May. Yet a battery of mountain guns with an infantry escort were in action in an unsuccessful attack on Poonch on 17 March... On the Indian side, General Russel (Commander Delhi and East Punjab Command) believed that regular troops (of Pakistan Army) were involved in January.... Cariappa (General) was also convinced that at this stage Pakistan was using regular forces. He based his opinion on the fact that a number of prisoners of regular units (of Pak army) had been taken, and he faced his Pakistan friends with the charge”. 22 The same author goes on to corroborate, O.S. Kalkat’s revelation that Pakistan’s 7th (P) Division was assigned the task for operations in J&K. Writing about this Lord Birdwood states: “As early as February it was clear to the Pakistan Commanders that Azad forces by themselves could not possibly hold India’s Army... It was therefore decided that 7th (P) Division should occupy firm bases a few miles behind the Azad forces... Battalions were therefore deployed within Kashmir, but the Headquarters remained on Pakistan soil”. 23 The author also states that Pakistan Headquarters had issued orders that no British officers (at that officers serving in the armies of both countries) were to participate in Kashmir operations.

21 Lord Birdwood, op.cit., n.19, p.66.
22 Ibid., pp.67-68 (Brackets mine).
23 Ibid.
This to a great extent puts to rest the debate whether Pakistan regular troops got involved in the invasion of J&k in May 1948 or in January 1948. The date is important because it was subsequently to form the whole basis of the India accusation of an illegal act of international aggression. Which had an historical effect on the outcome of the final UN resolutions.

However, it was only during May 1948 that Pakistan started openly accepting that its regular army was also involved in operations in J&K. Major General Shaukat Riza of Pakistan Army writes: “From May 1948 a few Pakistani sub units were hesitantly introduced in Kashmir. They were sent in driblets, regular troops were mixed with local volunteers, an expedient which delayed but did not halt Indian advance. Towards the end of October 1948 Indian Army had about twelve Brigades operating in Kashmir opposing them were five Pakistan Brigades supported by fifty assorted guns”.

V.K. Krishna Menon during one of his many speeches at the Security Council read from the Korbel Commission Report (Mr. Korbel was the Chairman of a UN Commission for Kashmir). The report read: “The Foreign Minister (Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan of Pakistan) informed the members of the Commission that the Pakistan Army had at the time three Brigades of regular troops in Kashmir, and that troops had been sent into the state during the first half of May 1948”.

The Quantum of Pakistan troops fighting in Jammu and Kashmir rose to two division worth, approximately, 35-40,000 troops. In addition to its 7 Infantry Division that was already inducted sometimes beginning of January 1948, Pakistan inducted another division by mid 1948. Lord Birdwood writes: “By June it had become obvious that one division could not continue to hold the Pakistan extended front, and so with effect from 20th June the 9th (Frontier) Division moved to Abbotlabad and took over the line form Bagh upto Tithwal. Thereafter two divisions were the basis of the Pakistan defence”.

Hence, from May 1948 to January 1949 till ceasefire by the UN was effected, the battle in J&K was and overt war with the regular forces of both countries involved in it.

26 Lord Birdwood, op.cit., n.19, p.71.
The forgoing presents some revealing aspect of Pakistan’s two level strategy. Its regular army, as per records, overtly entered the 1947-48 war sometimes in beginning January 1948, though Pakistani sources insist that it was only in May 1948. It is also an accepted fact that some elements of its regular army in civilian disguise were already inside J&K along with the tribal raiders when they entered the territory of J&K sometimes between 20 to 23 October 1947 (the exact date, the tribal invasion commenced is yet debatable). This aspect has also got highlighted. A time lag of approximately six months was there between the implementation of level one and two of the strategy. This establishes five facts about Pakistan’s strategy on Kashmir, that were first initiated in 1947-48 and later became an intrinsic part of their strategy. These are, firstly, level one, i.e. subversion, infiltration and proxy war by irregular cadres (raiders, infiltrators, militants and terrorists) normally precedes level two, i.e., regular warfare by the army, presumably, with the intention of inciting an internal insurgency within Kashmir by the irregulars and once the objective has been suitably softened, then capturing it with the help of regular army. Secondly, combatants forming part of level one strategy are tribals/Afghans mercenaries, trained, armed and sponsored by Pakistani army. Thirdly, ‘Jehad’ against the infidels is the rallying call of these irregulars. Fourthly, Regular army troops in civilian disguise normally accompany the irregulars as expert advisors. Fifthly, the Pakistan army and government denies any involvement in the conflict and only accepts giving morale support to their Muslim brethren.

These then were the ingredients of Pakistan’s two level strategy that were formed in 1947, accidently or deliberately, but have since then become an integral part of their strategy and were diligently adhered to in the 1965 and 1999 Kargil wars.

**Execution of the Strategy**

About the beginning of September, raids began to take place from Pakistan into the border areas of the state which quickly escalated in intensity culminating in the launching of Operation Gulmarg on 22 October 1947, Muzaffarabad, Domel, Uri, Baramula quickly fell to the savage raiders and by evening of 26 October 1947, the invaders were just 20 miles from Srinagar. After the Indian Army’s arrival on 27 October 1947, the raiders advance was halted. During these four fateful days the state was given over to plunder and rapine of the most repugnant kind. Hindu, Sikhs, Christians were hunted down and slaughtered without cause, property and houses were looted and burnt. Under such circumstances Maharaja Hari
Singh had no choice but to accede to India. Shiekh Mohmmad Abdullah wrote “On the question of accession, the Maharaja wanted an Independent Kashmir before he was compelled to sign the instrument of Accession, he had written to Lord Mountbatten stating that in view of Kashmir’s location and composition of its population he wanted independence. But Pakistan’s short sighted policy of invasion of Kashmir left him no alternative. There was no choice but to accede to India and ask for Military help.”

The instrument of accession duly signed by the Maharaja was brought to Delhi by Meher Chand Mahajan the Prime Minister of the State and V.P. Menon on 26 October, 1947. On the same evening i.e., 26th October, the Defence Committee and Cabinet formally accepted Kashmir’s accession to India. Thus, the State of Jammu and Kashmir became an integral part of the Indian Dominion, legally, morally and constitutionally.

Once accession took place, the duty bound Indian Government flew troops into Kashmir on the morning of 27 October 1947 and the operation to clear the State of Jammu and Kashmir of all invaders was launched by the Indian Army. Seeing the advance and successes of the Indian Army in stabilizing the Mirpur, Kotli, Poonch and Uri sectors by end November 1947. Pakistan army was ordered to move forward gradually to assemble behind the Azad forces. Eventually Pakistan Army was directly involved from beginning 1948 in all the battles in the areas of Thithwal, Uri, Poonch, Rajauri, Mendhar, Naushera, Kotli and Muzzafarabad. Lord Birdwood recalls the battle for Tithwal fought by Pakistan’s 10th Brigade, he writes: “10th (P) Brigade, relieved from elsewhere and already fired, under Brigadier Haji Iftikar Ahmed was rushed up the track from Muzzafarad towards Tithwal, and not only held the Indian advance but counter attacked and recaptured some vital ground.”

By end December 1948, when the war ended major portions of Jammu and Kashmir State were liberated by the Indian Army. However, Pakistan was in possession of one third of J&K state, which had acceded to India. This was a feat that could only be achieved by Pakistan’s regular army and not by the rag tag raiders.

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29 Lord Birdwood, op.cit., n.19, pp.70-71.
Restraint in the Retaliatory Use of Force by Indian Army

Efforts for restraint and peaceful reconciliation were not only restricted to the political leadership of India but even at the military level the Indian Armed forces were practicing the use of minimum force. Utmost restraint was ensured so as to not to invade Pakistani territory. Though on many occasions tactical prudence dictated that the capture of bases being used by raiders within Pakistani territory would have cut off the lines of communication of the entire invading force in Jammu and Kashmir, thereby rendering their defeat and eviction in a much more economical and time saving manner. However, in the interest of not escalating this conflict any further the Indian Army did not implement these plans. (Similar restraint was displayed by the Indian Army during the May-July 1999, Kargil conflict). This speaks a lot about the Indian Army who was much more stronger and therefore a more dominant force in the conflict. On numerous occasions appeals by Senior Indian Army Commanders were made to the invaders regarding the futility of fighting and to put a stop to it. Lt. Gen. (Later Field Marshall) K.M. Cariappa, who was then the General Officer Commanding in Chief of Delhi and East Punjab Command, which was planning all operations in Jammu and Kashmir, appealed to the conscience of the tribal raiders whom he knew during his Regimental service in Waziristan during pre-partition days “By remaining here, sacrificing your valuable lives and taking others for a cause which is not your direct or indirect concern, you are incriminating yourselves in the eyes of God... You Gallant men of Waziristan and the frontier I advice you to stop fighting.... I am perfectly willing to meet your spokesman to arrange for hostilities to cease. If you agree to do this please send a party of not more than six unarmed representatives carry in two large white flags. I shall meet them.”

Restraint by the Indian Army in the tactical battle field was on display in abundance, a case in point is the battle for the recapturing of the village of Badgam in which Maj. Somnath Sharma (later awarded the first PVC) and many of his soldiers were killed by tribal raiders hiding in the village while the Indian soldiers had not retaliated due to fear of killing innocent villagers “the point I wished to stress, however, was that Major Sharma had shown deep concern for the villagers and had not fired back at those who were harassing him, lest innocent people were killed or wounded. It was well within his right to have done so, as his

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command was being endangered, but he stayed his hand and spared the lives of the villagers."[^31]

By June 1948, India having agreed to the cease-fire began accepting the UN representation in both Delhi and Srinagar. Pakistan however remained non-committal. The Indian Government, in its enthusiasm to implement the UN enforced cease fire lost sight of even its own strategic aims "to liberate the entire Jammu and Kashmir of the invaders". It agreed to freeze all operations and accepted a truncated Kashmir. The 6 July, 1948, directive Delhi issued to Cariappa on the future conduct of operations in J&K ordered him "to cease all ground offensive operations against the enemy". This directive was the most unfortunate decision of the war, as it had serious tactical and long term strategic ramifications for India in Jammu and Kashmir for generations to come. While the Indian troops were obliged to accept and implicitly obey their Government's direction for a cease-fire, Pakistan took full advantage of this situation and launched offensives to capture vital areas in Uri, Tithwal and Kargil sectors. The Indian Army was left disillusioned and disappointed by this untimely and strategically myopic action.

"The Indian Government's decision to impose serious operational limitation on him (Cariappa) in July 1948, when the Pakistan Army was in full cry was loudly protested by him (Cariappa). The government's unfortunate strategic Paranoia prompted by political reasons saw the end of a clear direction on the military operations in J&K. The dimensions that the J&K problem has assumed now is a direct outcome of that strategic blunder... The responsibility for leaving two fifths of J&K under Pakistani occupation had serious long term ramifications."[^32]

Another significant outcome of this conflict was that wittingly or unwittingly Pakistan found an issue to exploit both in its domestic and foreign policy. This issue also in-explicably entwined with the - genesis of the two level strategy of Pakistan in Kashmir. It may be said that Pakistan does not need Kashmir - it needs the Kashmir issue, a bone of contention, a focus for its definition. Jinnah in a letter to Nehru dated 30 December 1947, laid the Kashmir issue in perspective and is since being used with modifications constrained by changing geo-


political situations through the times, he wrote “The case of Kashmir is simple and our attitude has been explained frankly and repeatedly both in our communication to you and our official statements to the press. The Pakistan Government has not accepted and cannot accept the so called decision of the Jammu and Kashmir state to India. We have said it before and repeat that the accession was fraudulent as much as it was achieved by deliberately creating conditions with the object of finding an excuse to state the accession. It was based on violence because it furthered the plan of the Kashmir Government to liquidate the Muslim population of the state. The accession was against the well-known wishes of an overwhelming majority of the population and could not be justified on any ground whether moral or constitutional, geographical or economic, cultural or religious proving beyond doubt the existence of a well-settled plan of extermination of the Muslims.... the Government of India intends by all possible means at their disposal to destroy Pakistan”.

Jinnah’s ire was not as much directed towards the accession of the State of Jammu an Kashmir as it was towards the fact that his two Nation theory that Hindus and Muslims constitute two separate nations, the basis of formation of Pakistan, had been challenged. Actually, the question of the religious complexion of the population of the princely states was certainly not a factor. The ruler of the State decided to accede to India or Pakistan. The British Governments announcement of June 3, 1947, had made this very clear. Therefore there is no ground to support Pakistans argument that being a Muslim majority state Kashmir should have become part of Pakistan. Even so, the accession of the state to India was supported by the National Conference, the largest political party in J&K and there was no voice of descent from any other political faction there.

Therefore the contents of Jinnah’s 30 December 1947, letter besides becoming the basis of Pakistan’s case before the UN also laid the foundation for Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policy on Kashmir and ipso facto the development of the concept of the two pronged strategy of Pakistan on Kashmir. It became evident that Pakistan wanted to side track the major issue of aggression of Kashmir, broaden the scope of the reference to the UN, invoke external assistance in thrashing out her difference with India, work up an imaginary threat of aggression against Pakistan and keep alive the persecution complex among the Muslim of the

33 “India’s White paper on Jammu and Kashmir”, Documents on Kashmir Problem, Govt. of India, pp.129-130.
Indian sub continent which partition should have removed. This became a part of its foreign policy for all times to come. If Pakistan's destruction was India's immediate aim, the issue of Kashmir would surely not have been referred to the UN. Perhaps, political compulsions and the internal instability in Pakistan at that time was to a large extent contributory in determining their approach to Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah said in an interview to the Hindustan Times on 5 November 1947: “The Government had to justify the establishment of Pakistan founded on the hymn of hate, by bringing peace and plenty to the people.... This called for a policy of reconstruction which the Pakistani Government could not formulate and, to avoid pessimism in the people, it had launched a policy of jingoism to keep public enthusiasm... A counter move, preferably aggressive, was needed to kill the Pathanistan movement in the frontier launched by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Pakistan could not feed the Pathans from their central exchequer like the British; so by helping the tribal people to plunder Kashmir, Pakistan hoped to solve the economic problem for the time being.”

Use of Coercive/Pressure Diplomacy in 1947-48

After India and Pakistan became two independent states on 15 August 1947, Kashmir also attained the status of an independent state as it had still to decide its future status. From this day onwards, the history of Kashmir was a story of pressures exerted by Pakistan and its supporters inside Kashmir to accede to that dominion, leading, eventually to open coercion in the form of armed invasion. Prior to this one 14 August the government of Kashmir included a standstill agreement with Pakistan which guaranteed that all existing agreements and administrative arrangements would continue between the two governments.

On 29 July, the day that Jinnah had assured the states of their freedom to decide their freedom to decide their fate, the Dawn in an editorial gave up its earlier policy and openly asked for Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. Meanwhile other Pakistani leaders including Jinnah were openly asking for, Kashmir's accession to Pakistan including use of couched threats. But, the biggest example of Pressure diplomacy came with the total economic blockade of Kashmir by Pakistan in the later part of August 1947, despite the existence of the stand still agreement. Rice worth Rupees six lakh (Four months quota), two month quota of wheat, 189 bales of cloth, ten wagons of salt and almost the entire quota of 384,000 gallons

34 The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), November 5, 1947.
of petrol was withheld. In an effort to coerce the state into accession to Pakistan, the Pakistani authorities cut off supplies to Kashmir of food, petrol and other essential commodities, and hindered the free transit of trade between Kashmir and Pakistan. Economic pressure was thus applied simultaneously with military pressure in the form of border roads”.  

The strategy of coercion continued when the comment of Pakistan despatched one of its emissaries, Major Shah to force the Government of Kashmir to accede to Pakistan. The then Prime Minister of Kashmir Mehr Chand Mahajan says “The same day, Major Shah, a responsible officer of the Pakistan Government who had arrived in Srinagar, sought an interview with me... Before the arrival of Major Shah, Pakistan had started an effective blockade of the state... The object of the blockade was to bring pressure on the Maharaja and to coerce him to accede to Pakistan. Major Shah armed with this weapon and with the threat of a tribal raid was there to negotiate the terms of accession... From his talk it was clear that he was suggesting immediate accession of the state to Pakistan and that if this was not agreed to, there was bound to be trouble”.  

The ultimate tool of coercion that Pakistan unleashed on Kashmir to secure its accession was the sending in of tribal raiders on 22 October 1947, when 60,000 fully armed ferocious tribesmen under command of regular Army Officers entered Muzaffarabad on buses and truck and by 26 October 1947 had laid waste the entire Kashmir from Muzaffarabad to Srinagar. The strategy backfired and instead of Kashmir acceding to Pakistan it acceded to India on 26 October 1947, whereafter Indian Army flew into Srinagar for the successful launching of Operation Liberation.

Use of Coercive/Pressure Diplomacy by Pakistan at the UN

At India’s request the United Nations Security Council was formally called upon to deal with the Kashmir situation on 1 January 1948. The Indian case was put forth in the form of a written memorandum submitted on 1 January itself, followed by a speech on the issue by Gopalaswami Ayyangar, the Indian Head of the delegation, delivered to the Council on 15 January 1948. The reference to the council was simple and straightforward and concentrated

35 “India’s White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir”, Documents on Kashmir Problem, Govt. of India, p.3.
on stating briefly the facts regarding invasion of Kashmir. These were (1) Immediate stop to all fighting; (2) The withdrawal and expulsion of raiders and invaders. The future status of the state was to be decided by the people of the state.

On 15 January 1948, Pakistan submitted its case in writing in the form of three documents followed by a speech by Sir Zufrulla Khan. These were full of offensive statements. The first of these documents was a refutation of India’s charges, (Pakistan was not assisting tribal invasion of Kashmir, its territory was not being used by raiders and Pakistan was not providing any kind of assistance to the raiders) document two dealt with counter charges against India. It dwelt on the well planned campaign of persecution of Muslims and genocide; aggression against Pakistan in form of occupation of Junagadh and Manavadar; a conspiracy against the people of Kashmir to annex the state; an attitude of hostility to Pakistan in the implementation of the partition agreements and destruction of the State of Pakistan and that the State of J&K was annexed by fraud and violence. Document III elaborated the Pakistani case. The facts and conclusions of both countries differed during the presentation, India wanted that the first condition for any solution to the problem was the withdrawal of invasion, vacation of all territory occupied by the invaders before holding Plebiscite. Pakistan’s new point was getting Kashmir back to the accession situation and asking some international authority - the UN or the Commonwealth to organise the Plebiscite. Pakistan’s tactics was thus clear - firstly they wanted to delay the settlement of the Kashmir issue, secondly, widening the scope of UN investigation and thereby expanding international interference in the affairs of the nascent states in many more ways. This political strategy of Pakistan on Kashmir has endured till date.

UN Resolution

After much debate and discussion in the UN on the Kashmir issue, three sets of resolutions were passed by the UN in the month of April 1948. The first related to restoration of peace and order by Pakistan securing withdrawal of tribesmen and their nationals from the entire territory of the state of Kashmir and cessation of all hostilities. Once the UN Commission was satisfied that the tribesmen were withdrawing and a cease fire had become effective, India should in consultation with the commission put into effect a plan for the progressive reduction of their forces till a minimum strength required for the support of civil authorities for the maintenance of law and order was left, as small a number as possible
would be reclaimed in the forward areas. The second section of the resolution related to the
details of plebiscite and the third section dealt with general provisions under the resolution to
include that a representative each of India and Pakistan would be attached to the Commission
and the Commission would establish observer in the state of J&K. However, before the
commission could commence its work, in the very first interview with Pakistan's Foreign
Minister, Sir Zaffrulla Khan informed the commission that “Three Brigades of regular
Pakistani troops were in Kashmir since May. However the fact which came to light soon after
was that Pakistani troops were operating in Kashmir since January 1948”. Since the
pressure of Pakistan's regular troops in Kashmir was before the April UN resolution it
constituted a material change in the situation.

The UN took it seriously as violation of international law which was in contravention
to the UN Charter. On 13 August 1948, therefore the Commission adopted a resolution
which was different from the resolution of 21 April. This was also divided in three parts. Part
one related to imposition of a cease-fire. Part two enumerated the principles of truce
agreement, here the Commission noted Pakistan's violation of international law and important
inclusion in the part was; the Government of India was to begin to withdraw the bulk of its
force after the tribesman and Pakistani nationals had withdrawn and the Pakistani regular
troops were also being withdrawn. Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final
settlement, India would maintain, within the cease-fire line, the minimum forces which in
agreement with the commission are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the
observance of Law and Order. Part three of the resolution dealt with the Plebiscite issue and
details thereof.

The legal and valid position of the UNCIP resolution, as far as India's concerned is
that Part I of the resolution was implemented with the coming into effect of a cease-fire on 1
Jan. 1949 and the signing of the Karachi Agreement in July 1949, demarcating the cease-fire
line. Part two could not be implemented because Pakistan refused to withdraw its forces from
Jammu and Kashmir. As part two could not be implemented the question of implementing
Part three (Plebiscite) did not arise as it was inter alia related to completion of part two. For
these reasons the UN failed to sort the Kashmir issue out. Pakistan, however, without regard

37 Lord Birdwood, India and Pakistan: A Continent Decides, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
to implementation of Part two of the resolution wants Part three of the resolution implemented which does not stand to any reason and has therefore never been accepted by India.

Pakistan and the Commonwealth

It was not only in the UN that Pakistan tried its coercive diplomacy but it resorted to this amongst the Commonwealth Nations also, of which, both India and Pakistan were members. In its attempt to ensure that the Kashmir issue is raised in as many international forums as possible, it tried to get this issue included in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference of 1951 scheduled to be held at London, and even threatened to boycott it, should the Kashmir issue not be included in the Agenda. The Pakistani Prime Minister, Mr. Liaquat Ali, only agreed to attend it at the behest of Prime Minister. Atlee of UK and Mr. Nehru assuring him that the matter would be discussed informally only. Nothing tangible emerged from these discussions. Following the failure of these talks, British and American press attacks grew in volume. The Times wrote on 24 January “A plebiscite must be held soon if the quarrel is to be settled peacefully and there can be no fair plebiscite unless India alters her attitude... His (Nehru’s) country has now a great chance of applying the same high principles to her own affairs (as India applied to Korea) when Kashmir is discussed in the Security Council”. The New York Times of 17 January wrote “Mr. Nehru has been giving us all advice about a settlement of the Korean conflict. Evidently he finds it easier to solve the problems of the world than the one in his backyard”. The Le Monde of 13 January said “As long as this Kashmir problem is a source of conflict between India and Pakistan it will not only be a threat to the relations between these two states, but it might create a crack in the Commonwealth system”.

It is against this background that Pakistan mounted fresh pressure for the inclusion of this issue again in the forthcoming UN Security Council meeting and to back up this demand even threatened the withdrawal of its delegation from the UN. Consequently the matter was again put up on the UN agenda for its 21 February 1951 meeting. Dr. Frank Grahm, an American Diplomat was appointed as the UN representative to solve the issue. Meanwhile, in an effort to influence Dr. Grahm, Pakistan once again set out a campaign of raising war hysteria and cries of holy Jehad against India were re-used to stoke the fires of tribal sentiments. The Frontier Premier, Khan Abdul Quuyum Khan, said, “If India was not
agreeable to having a free plebiscite there was no other alternative except war”.38 Addressing a tribal meeting in Gilgit, Governor General Nazimuddin said “The liberation of Kashmir is a cardinal belief of every Pakistani. It is an integral part of Pakistani resolution and Pakistan would remain incomplete until the whole of Kashmir has been liberated”.39 Forces of both the countries were once again mobilized towards the border.

The earlier experience of aggression on the one hand, and the growing evidence of political instability in Pakistan on the other, made India adopt defensive measures to forestall the possibility of another armed conflict. Any fresh conflict in Kashmir would strengthen the Pakistani case for stationing a UN force there, as also, for expanding the scope of UN intervention, something that was in line with their policy and strategy on Kashmir. This worsening of the general state of Indo-Pakistan relations took place when Dr. Graham was striving to bring the parties nearer. Naturally, he noted this tension as a factor detrimental to the successful implementation of his mission. However, he carried on with his efforts to bring out a formula for peace between the two countries. He submitted five reports to the security council, but, to no avail, the deadlock continued and finally the UN recommended a settlement through direct Indo-Pakistan negotiations. While many points were raised during these negotiations, the essential area of disagreement was Pakistan’s insistence upon maintaining Azad Kashmir as an armed and viable state under Pakistan’s control, which it has used as a beachhead for maintaining continual pressure on Indian Kashmir till date. Nothing viable emerged by the direct talks that ended in 1956.

Pakistan’s Defence Pacts with the West

Though the crisis of 1950-51 mercifully passed without the outbreak of war, the experience convinced Pakistan that in order to get their way over the Kashmir issue they needed a powerful friend to support and strengthen them against India. When Liaquat told Commander-in-Chief Ayub Khan in 1951 that he was tried of the delay in settling the

39 Dawn (Karachi), 19 September 1951.
40 On 9 March 1951, the Rawalpindi Conspiracy case was unearthed, wherein, a group of Army Officers including Major Gen. Akbar Khan who had commanded the Kashmir raiders in the 1947-48 conflict, had planned a coup in the country. Leading to widespread commotion and unrest in Pakistan.
Kashmir issue and that they should go to war against India, Ayub reminded him that Pakistan had only thirteen tanks with about forty to fifty hours engine life in them to face the Indian Army. "Not only politician but our troops were itching to settle accounts with India", Ayub recalls 'It was my job to hold them back which, thank Heaven I did". 41

By 1951 therefore, Pakistan had begun seriously to look around for a protector. Her overtures to the Commonwealth and the Muslim countries for special ties had failed to elicit the desired response and Pakistan was not yet prepared to turn to the Communist countries because of ideological differences with them. By August 1951 Ayub, for one, was definitely thinking in terms of requesting aid from the USA. By a co-incidence it was in the same year of 1951 that any hope the US may still have entertained that India might join the west in its confrontation with the East, was extinguished by the Indian role in the important question of the Korean war and the Japanese peace treaty. Pakistan on the other hand proved himself a good friend of the western powers on there and other issues. All the signs had thus begun to point towards a closer relationship between Pakistan and the US". 42

In pursuance of this objective Pakistan signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the USA on 19 May 1954, then joined the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in September 1954 and the Baghdad Pact on 24 February 1955. Besides these, it also signed the Bilateral Agreement of cooperation with the USA on 19 August 1959 which was renamed CENTO (Central Treaty Organisation). Because of these treaties and Pacts, Pakistan gained so much, economically and militarily from USA that the power equation in subcontinent swung positively in Pakistan’s favour consequently the fate of Indo-Pakistan talks on Kashmir got sealed. Now, Kashmir which was essentially a bilateral issue assumed the contours of a trilateral relationship with USA as the Third Party.

This also heralded the induction of big power rivalry into the Indian subcontinent and the commencement of arms races in the subcontinent. An Indian Scholar on these developments commented "The US military build up in Pakistan demonstrated that the local arms race to the offshoot of American involvement in the regional politics of the Indian subcontinent. It is bound to destabilize the whole region for a long period. Its immediate

41 M. Ayub Khan, Friends Not Master, op.cit., p.40.
consequence has been to induct big power rivalry into the Indian subcontinent". US now openly sided with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, thereby creating a pressure situation for India.

"It added to India’s anxiety about Pakistan, particularly because Pakistan had once been involved in aggression against India and there were persistent demands within Pakistan for further aggressive action against India. At any rate, the availability of modern arms and equipments to the defence forces of Pakistan free of cost added tremendously to India’s burden. Above all this alliance amounted to the formal entry of external forces into the subcontinent and the end of India’s hope that the area would be kept free from cold war pressures".

Internationalisation of the Kashmir problem by Pakistan thus gained a new dimension in its strategy on Kashmir and has remained thus till date. Emboldened by these alliances Pakistan again put the Kashmir question in the security council and with the support of the western powers especially USA, ensured that a resolution reaffirming the implementation of Plebiscite under UN auspices is approved by the UN on 24 January 1957. Thereafter, several American backed resolution were passed by the UN on Kashmir including one on Jarring Mission, another on Graham mission and finally President Kennedy wrote to both Ayub and Nehru on 24 January 1962 suggesting the mediation on Kashmir of Eugene Black, the President of the World Bank. Fortunately for India none of these resolution’s bore fruit, as most of them were pro Pakistan.

It will thus be seen that, it was in 1947-48, that the foundation of Pakistan’s two level strategy in Kashmir was laid. Ample proof has emerged that Pakistan first resorted to subversion by infiltrating bands of frontier tribals, recruited, armed, trained and sponsored by them. This has been revealed by non other than the Commander and chief master-mind of the operation himself, Major General Akbar Khan and many other senior Pakistani leaders and members of foreign Press. This was level one of the strategy. In level two, again irrefutable evidence has emerged insinuating that Pakistan resorted to the use of force, both by its regular army and its politicians and diplomats. This fact is substantiated by Lt. Gen. (then

Captain) Gul Hassan Khan who heard the ‘Quid-e-Azam’ himself planning the capture of Srinagar by the regular army, Maj. Gen. Shaukat Riza, Sir Owen Dixon, the UN representative and Sir Zuffarullah Khan, Pakistan’s foreign minister, all have accepted this fact. Another, element of the second level of the strategy that first found feet during this period was the ‘internationalization of the Kashmir issue’ that Pakistan has since included in its policy on Kashmir. The Kashmir issue also acquired an image for use by Pakistan in its domestic and foreign policy. The image gradually kept on growing over the years, till it acquired a larger than life stature, whose shadow pervades everywhere in Pakistan and holds sway on every aspect of Pakistan’s life.