CHAPTER II

PAKISTAN'S STRATEGY ON KASHMIR

General

To write about the strategic doctrines of another country closely resembles an attempt at firing and hitting a moving target at night. For one, Pakistan’s strategy on Kashmir, if at all such a document exists, will be classified nothing short of ‘TOP SECRET’ and practically inaccessible to any one but the elitist few in Pakistan, and that too on a need to know basis, and those who are in the know of it will have their lips sealed by the National Security and Secrecy Act. Very few attempts and that too mostly by foreigners, specially Americans, have been made to write on this almost forbidden subject. Stephen P. Cohen is one of them and his book “The Pakistan Army”1 does touch upon the subject though in a peripheral manner. Brian Cloughley’s (an Australian Army Colonel) latest book titled “A History of the Pakistan Army”2 written in 1999, totally skirts the subject. Even hazarding an intelligent hypothesis is fraught with dangers considering Pakistan’s complex security environment, both external and internal. Surrounded by India, Iran, Afghanistan, USSR and China most of whom are much larger and more powerful states, it has to constantly juggle its strategy from being a ‘Front Line’ state to nearly becoming a ‘Pariah State’. Domestically, the religious rift between Shias, the ethnic rift between Mohajirs and Pathans, Baluchs and Pushtoons and then between all of them and the Punjabis creates a centrifugal syndrome that threatens the very unity of the country, add to this the acute law and order problem created by criminals, smugglers and the drug cartels. This domestic environment heavily impinges on the national policies of Pakistan and ‘ipso-facto’ on the country’s strategy.

In order to glean the complex structure of Pakistan’s strategy in general, from the complex maze that is Pakistan’s political structure. Resort to all available writings, commentaries, and speeches, as well as certain actions by Pakistan that cast some light on their strategic thought on Kashmir has been taken into account. Awareness of the fact, that

few writings from across the border, offer coherent, articulated beliefs or a clear set of operating principles for Pakistani strategy. Access to all of them has been another major constraint.

Four principal factors have been identified that clearly impinge on Pakistan’s formulation of its Kashmir strategy. These are:

a) Historical Factors
b) Geographical Factors
c) Islamic Factors
d) Nuclear Factors
e) The Asymetric Conflict Factor

Historical Factors: Strategic Implications

The Partition of India in August 1947, into India and Pakistan by the British laid the historic seeds of conflict between India and Pakistan. The Partition led to the largest migration of human beings in the history of the world, 17 million ill fated people traded their homes, country and identity between India and Pakistan (8 million migrated) to Pakistan and 9 million from Pakistan to India, in the communal frenzy that followed hundreds of thousands of people from both religions were butchered ruthlessly. These were the first seeds of Hindu India animosity with Muslim Pakistan. Gradually, over the years this animosity has metamorphosed to a fundamentalist Hindu Rajya under the BJP, swamping the Muslims of Pakistan and vice-versa. In the context of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) the other seed of dissention was the accession of the State of J&K with India on October 26, 1947, when the ruler of the state, Hari Singh, executed the instrument of accession to India in strict accordance with the constitution forms and procedures. Lord Mountbatten, accepted the instrument of Accession on October 27. The same instrument of accession was signed by other 565 princely states of erstwhile British India, while acceding to India or Pakistan. In a separate letter dated 27 October, 1947, to Maharaja Hari Singh of J&K, Lord Mountbatten reiterated that the Government of India had decided to accept the accession of the state and he added that it was the wish of the Government of India to make a reference to the people of Kashmir, as soon as law and order was restored.
On November 4, 1947, in a broadcast to the Nation from Lahore Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan said “The accession of Kashmir to India is a much greater threat to the security of Pakistan. We do not recognise this accession.” The Pakistanis perception of the accession of the state of J&K to India is rooted in partisanism made by an indifferent Raj over and above the aspiration and interests of millions of Kashmiris and Pakistanis. Pakistan’s deep animosity with India on Kashmir hinges on five major factors. These are firstly, that the Radcliffe boundary commission (responsible for partition of India) has deliberately favoured India by making last minute changes in the boundary award under the manipulation of Lord Mountbatten and Pandit Nehru to suit the Indian geo-strategic imperatives. The cession of Muslim majority areas in Ferozepur and Gurdaspur (in former eastern Punjab) to India at the last moment have been always perceived in terms of India’s long time designs on Kashmir itself. (As, the only road link from main land India to J&K passed through these districts). Secondly, while Hyderabad and Junagadh, princely states with Hindu majorities but ruled by Muslim princes were annexed by India, similar set of arguments and factors operative in Kashmir were flouted by Delhi since they fully justified Kashmir’s integration into Pakistan. Thirdly, on January 1, 1948 India took the Kashmir dispute to the UN under article 35 Chapter 6 of the UN Charter, relating to pacific settlement of disputes and not under Chapter 7, which deals with threats to peace and acts of aggression. India failed to implement the subsequent UN resolutions of 1948 and 1949 pertaining to holding of free and impartial plebiscite, to which Nehru himself had pledged. Fourthly, Pakistan feels that demographically, ethnically, geographically and economically (major viable outside link for the Kashmiris pass through Pakistan) Pakistan has more rights on Kashmir than India. Fifthly, the separation of East Pakistan into an independent country, Bangladesh, by India in 1971 was basically rooted in Indian hostility to humble Pakistan and was a deliberate attempt to shatter its two nation ideology. Pakistan wants to even the score by annexing Kashmir.

Historically, therefore Pakistan perceives that Kashmir rightfully belongs to her. Without Kashmir Pakistan is incomplete, some even allude to the alphabet K in the word Pakistan denotes Kashmir. Lt. Gen. (Retd.) K.K. Nanda writes “with ‘K’ (for Kashmir)

missing, Pakistan remains a fairly moth eaten entity and she is determined to correct it, and hence systematic almost vicious and revengeful attempts all the way through, till today, to grab Kashmir. Pakistan’s President described the Kashmir problem in July 1990 as the ‘unfinished agenda of the partition’.

Kashmir is the “core issue” and no talks with India except on Kashmir is the latest catchword in Pakistani political vocabulary. The Kashmir bogey has been deliberately hyped up by the powers that be, each for their selfish ends. The politician has made the Kashmir issue a political and national agenda, the party which is more aggressive on this issue is likely to garner more support. for the military and the ISI, it is the reason for their very existence, the source of their power in Pakistan, without the Kashmir issue they would become a virtual non-entity. It is because of Kashmir that the Generals have controlled Pakistani politics for 24 of its 52 years history. For the ‘mullahas’ Kashmir is the “muezzin’s” call to gather the faithful and make them respond to Islamization and the waging of the holy Jehad. In short, Kashmir has become the ‘Raison d’etre’ for the very existence of Pakistan. Therefore, with Kashmir becoming such a neurotic obsession with Pakistan, it would stand to reason that history will need to play a pivotal role, as far as forming any National Policy of Pakistan is concerned, be it foreign, domestic or defence, and from this would flow the country’s strategy on Kashmir. The first issue related to Pakistan’s strategy that would now emerge is the identification of the aim or objective of the strategy, and that perhaps could be - the annexation of J&K.

The second aspect of history that influences Pakistan’s strategy is the very subject of this study - its two level strategy on Kashmir which involves the use of subversion, infiltration, insurgency and sponsoring of proxy war at one level and involves the use of military, diplomatic and nuclear force at the second. The factor may be also be related to the Pakistani psyche of doggedness or the interjection “If at first you don’t succeed, try, again”. Pakistan has been persevering with this strategy since 1947, with minor modification, till date (Kargil being the latest example) despite failing each time, so much so, that, it has become a historical habit. This aspect will unweave itself during the course of the study.

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Geographical Factors: Strategic Implications

Whereas civilian strategists tend to treat states as abstract statistical entities, army staffs are taught to look first to geography and terrain. One Senior General, closely associated with strategic planning saw Pakistan's geo-military situation in these terms.

"Ideally a country is safe when it has a very large area but a very small frontier to defend, on the other hand a country that has a small area but must defend its entire frontier is very precariously placed. And Pakistan happens to be in that difficult position (although not quite so severely as Israel, another officer interjects). Although we have a large surface area we must defend our entire border, eleven hundred miles on the east and now (January 1980) an equal number of miles in the west, with Afghanistan and also an unstable Iran. And we have a coast line of almost five hundred miles to defend then in the north we have a not very friendly neighbour (USSR). So therefore, Pakistan finds itself in such a position that its geography forces it to defend almost every inch of its territory. Moreover the particular topography of Pakistan and the distribution of its population and lines of communication severely complicate the defence problem. "Pakistan is narrow, that is from North to South our lines of communications, our industrial centres, our towns, or major cities are fairly close to a country (India) that is not very friendly with us, and with which we have a border that has no geographical impediments, no major river divides us, no high range of mountains separate us from our potential enemy. It is an area where tanks can roll easily whether it is desert or plains of Punjab. Our other borders are not quite so vulnerable but they can be penetrated, even our sea coast is open".6

The Lack of territorial depth in Pakistan renders some inherent strategical and tactical disadvantages to it, and therefore, she, perforce has to tailor her military strategy around this geographical handicap. Since Pakistan cannot "trade space for time" she has to base her strategy on aggressive, pre-emptive strike options, with the aim of taking India by surprise and carrying the battle into Indian territory in other words their strategy has to be proactive. In all its wars with India it has followed this strategy, history is witness to this fact.

Another strategy that Pakistan has invented is called extenuation of strategic depth, or "Leaning on" First expounded by Bhutto and Ayub in 1965 - when they physically wanted to increase their territorial depth by capturing the Rann of Kutch, Chhamb-Jaurian and Kashmir. Psychologically, also Pakistan resorts to this strategy of extension of strategic depth by

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6 Ibid, p.142.
initiating and encouraging subversion in sensitive border areas, as it has been doing in Punjab, Kashmir and now in the North East also. In August 1965, while the infiltrators were fighting in Kashmir Bhutto, while briefing President Ayub said, “We must go all out to incite the Nagas and the Lushais in Assam and the Sikhs in the Punjab”.7

Elaborating upon this strategy Bhutto, in mid September 1965, even while the Indian Army was advancing in Punjab and Rajasthan sent a top secret memo to Ayub saying “The next target will be East Pakistan... The defence of East Pakistan would need to be closely coordinated with Chinese actions both in NEFA and also possibly in the region of Nepal and Sikkim. It would be necessary to provide the Chinese with a link up with our forces in that sector... I envisage a lightning thrust across the narrow strip of Indian territory that separates Pakistan (East) from Nepal. From our point of view this would be highly desirable. It would be to the advantage of Nepal to secure its Freedom from violation by India. It would solve the problems of Sikkim and Tibet and for us it would give us a stranglehold over Assam, whose disposition we could then determine.”8

In strategy, geographic assets and vulnerabilities of a nation are prime factors for consideration and formulation of grand and military strategies, specially, the later. Geography of a nation dictates the type of war it must resort to – whether guerrilla or conventional. Pakistan, like Israel is a classic case of a nation which was brought into existence to provide a religious – national home and was born in violence and partition, and whose strategy has been dominated, to a great extent, by geographic considerations. The narrowness of its territories and the threat it faces or used to face from India, Iran, Afghanistan and the USSR, makes it a vortex geographical entity from the strategic point of view.

Pakistan’s lack of depth makes it extremely vulnerable to land and air attacks, all its airfields are within striking distance from India. Indian surface to surface missiles (Prithvi) can cover almost the entire Pakistan. Agni I and Agni II need no mention in this context.

As might be expected this lack of strategic depth has exerted a powerful influence on

8 Ibid., p.93.
the formation of its strategic doctrine. During its 1948, 1965 and 1971 wars, Pakistani strategists adopted a proactive, pre-emptive strategy, for the combination of densely populated areas and no territorial depth made it imperative that Pakistan fight all wars outside its own borders. It must be noted here that the volatility of pre-emptive or “interceptive” strategies which are offensive on both the tactical and operational levels, makes them more likely than others to trigger unplanned confrontations, escalation, and war. As it transpired in all the three Indo-Pak wars in the past and could have happened during the Kargil conflict. This strategy was later ratified and accepted as a national war strategy after exercise ‘Zarb-e-Momin’ conducted in 1989-90 under the auspices of General Aslam Beg the then Pakistan’s Chief of the Army Staff.

The absence of territorial depth has also caused Pakistani military thinkers to emphasise on intelligence as a first line of defence. The Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence network is extremely active and effective in India. Pakistan has allocated so much of funds and resources to it that, today it stands out as an independent power centre in Pakistan capable of influencing its internal and external policies. The Chief of the ISI takes part, and is an essential member of all national level planning and executing bodies and institutions. Pakistan’s ISI has its bases all over India from the North East to Bihar, UP, Punjab, Kashmir and in Bombay, Gujarat in the west. In Madras, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala in the South

Geographic Implications on Pak Strategy: Guerrilla War

Another, and perhaps the most important out come of the geographical implication on the strategic thinking of Pakistan was the development of “guerrilla warfare or peoples war doctrine”. This strategy was evolved with the aim of establishing Pakistan’s strategic sphere of influence outside, its territory, an extended ‘border for operational purposes. This was an alternate method of increasing strategic depth. In formulating this strategy Pakistan was perhaps, influenced both by America and China, with whom it had military contacts since the fifty’s. Though the American doctrine was primarily concerned about suppressing such a war (Vietnam), Pakistan also studied it in terms of launching a people’s war against India, on developing a people’s army as a second line of defence.9

With US assistance, a special force unit, called the Special Service Group (SSG) was

9 Stepen P. Cohen, op.cit., n.l, p.65
established in 1959, and the professional military minds explored the concept of guerilla war in some detail. Studies were made of Algeria, Yugoslavia, North Vietnam, and particularly China; it was unanimously concluded that guerilla war is a “strategic weapon”, a “slow but sure and relatively inexpensive” strategy that is fast over-shadowing regular warfare”.

Maoist military doctrine was particularly attractive to many Pakistani military thinkers and planners because of Pakistan’s long and friendly connection with China and that doctrine’s apparent relevance to Kashmir. The prerequisites for people war were thought to be there: a worthy cause; difficult terrain; a determined warlike people (the Pakistanis); a sympathetic local population (the Kashmiri); the availability of weapons and equipment; and a high degree of leadership and discipline to prevent (the guerillas) from degenerating into banditry”. Indeed some of these tactics and strategies were employed in Kashmir in 1965, without much impact. The concept was put aside for a number of years until it re-emerged, under General Zia, in its new contemporary ‘Avatar’. We shall discuss it in later chapters.

The use of ‘people’s war’ strategy by Pakistan uncannily resembled the current conflict in Kashmir. A statement by U. Thant the Secretary-General of the U.N. made during the 1965 conflict will highlight the similarities:

“...A sizable number of infiltrators continue to operate on the Indian side of the cease fire line. Also, in addition to the regular forces engaged, tribesman from the North-West Frontier are becoming increasingly involved in the conflict arriving at the front for the most part through Rawalpindi”. The then Indian Ambassador Parthasarthi informed the Secretary General on October 14 of “the Continued recruitment and training of irregulars in Pakistan occupied Kashmir and in the tribal areas of Pakistan and the preparations for fresh armed infiltrations across the Cease Fire Line in Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian government had learnt that 14,000 raiders from the North-West Frontier have been recruited and despatched to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir by the Pakistan government. The North West Frontier provided the tribesmen who invaded Kashmir in 1947. In addition, the Pakistan government made efforts at the end of September to recruit twenty new platoons of irregulars in one sector of Azad Kashmir. In another area, one group of 400 guerrillas completed training, and it was said that another 1,000 youths were being recruited in another district... the Pakistani

11 Stephen P. Cohen; op.cit., n.1, p.66.
leaders had given a clear directive to the armed infiltrators in Indian Kashmir that the cease-fire did not apply to them."

Islamic Factor and Strategic Implications

The movement for a homeland for South Asian Muslims was not led by the extremely orthodox, but middle and upper class Muslims. These lawyers, politicians, and doctors, most of them from the educated Muslim communities of northern India and Bombay, saw their struggle in historical and practical terms, not as a theological quest. Many were not particularly religious in their private lives (Jinnah was notorious in this respect), but they thought of Pakistan as a state where they would be free from the domination of their more numerous Hindu counterparts. Although the Muslim league was dominated by such men, revivalist Muslim groups such as the ‘Jammat-i-Islami’ did not favour an independent Pakistan but rather sought to preserve the unity of the Indo-Muslim community.

The shift from the concept of an Islamic Pakistan, as a state run largely along British Indian secular principles, to a Pakistan that became a laboratory of Islam occurred after independence. The shift reflected the increased influence of traditionalists and conservatives, deferred and delayed because of the great power of the highly westernized bureaucracy and officer corps during Ayub and Yahya’s regimes. The supreme irony of Pakistani politics is that when the state did come into existence, its semi-secular leaders then came under pressure from orthodox and conservative Muslim groups. Ever since, they had to make the necessary concession to appease these groups, until now, perhaps for the first time, there was in Zia a leader who took Islam seriously as a guide for Pakistan society. Sharif, a Zia prodigy, too contributed towards this when he introduced the Shariat Bill in 1991 and finally in 1998 managed to get it passed through the parliament, thereby, making Pakistan a country guided and governed by the “Ullema” or Islamic principles.

The Islamisation in the true sense, of the military and civilian society began during General Zia’s regime. In the civilian social arena he introduced a number of banking and commercial practices based on Islamic laws and traditions, be introduced punishments, such

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13 Ibid., p.390.
as lashings and amputations, drawn from the Quran. He began Islamic reforms in many areas of Pakistani society.

In the Army also, the recurrent theme of the military literature of Pakistan is that the officer should be careful about his religion, it is one way he can preserve his honour. Islamic teachings have been introduced in Pakistan Military Academy. Islamic training and thought has also been introduced as a part of the curriculum at the command and staff college at Quetta. “Of particular note are the lectures of Prof. Col. Abdul Qayyum (ultimately printed in book form with a forward by General Zia), which provide the intellectual basis for these changes. Qayyum is an officer-scholar of enormous range. He is adept in dealing with Islamic theology and doctrine but is remarkably open and rationalist in his approach. Qayyum points out, that those educated in a western tradition are in a specially difficult position in Pakistan - They are caught between being Muslim and being non-Muslim. This basic dichotomy in their lives means that they must push forward or retreat; there can be no split between life and faith, career and religion. Furthermore, the professional soldiers should not look scornfully upon the “Mullah”. The Mullah is a bridge for the officer between the westernized profession and his faith. “For he, the Mullah, has kept at least the husk of Islam alive, and we (the so called “educated”) have neither husk nor substance. And if someday (and I pray that day may come soon) we should get to the substance of Islam, we shall do so rising on the shoulder of the Mullah...The Keeper of the base is not any the humbler than the climber who climbs to the summit.”

In words that have been echoed by Zia and other officers, Qayyum insists that the gift of western education is not an end in itself and that the Pakistani must not merely be “a professional soldier, engineer, or doctor” but must use this to become “Muslim soldiers, Muslim engineers, Muslim doctors, Muslim officers, and Muslim men”. The Pakistan army is being taught to intensify their studies of Western strategic and military doctrine, but to do so in a way that strengthens their Islamic core values. They are urged to make Quran their base and from there to move in any direction in search of strategical and historical truth. The Quran itself demands that an officer should explore the writings of Western, non Muslim, and

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15 Prof. Col. Abdul Qyyum, On Striving to be a Muslim, (Lahore: Islamic Book Centre, 1978), p.16.
16 Ibid., p.16.
Asian writers.

Islam and Strategy: The arguments revolve around the strategic implication of a new Muslim state, in South Asia, not how that state's internal Islamic character could shape its strategic doctrine. This is a relatively recent question, and not much work or research has yet been done on it, although it is of great importance for Pakistan and other Muslim states that are avowedly “Islamic”. As already stated, as did Muslim states win independence, they invariably inherited a western-trained military establishment; even where these armies have made adaptations to Islamic traditions in their internal organisation, they have rarely abandoned the doctrines of deterrence and warfare taught at military institutions in the west.

There is an historical logic to this: the Muslim states lost their independence to the British, French and others not because their soldiers lacked martial qualities but because they were saddled with inferior military technology and lacked a 'modern' doctrine of warfare. There is considerable reluctance, therefore, to abandon the theories of Clausewitz, Liddel-Hart, Schelling etc. Also, these strategies and doctrines are the outcome of years of great wars fought between modern armies of the time, and almost all of them in the west. These theories are the ‘Juices’ of the greatest and the best military minds involved in the greatest and most famous of all battles fought in the world. Therefore, they have to be accepted as they are. Any changes, would only be cosmetic and environment specific. Therefore, most Pakistan Army officers would also not do so, but a movement to develop a synthesis of Islam and Western theories of warfare has begun, and some go so far as to reject or radically reinterpret basic trends of Western strategic thought. Such Pakistani strategists face several problems. The first is that western theories of deterrence and war have worked or at least are fully developed. The Quran's guidance in these matters is not entirely elaborated in any single 'Sura', but must be pieced together or interpreted and supplemented by the study of significant battles in the early history of the survival and spread of Islam.

Secondly, it is not evident that the modern state system (in which Muslims live apart from each other with different armies) is entirely a legitimate creation. As A.K. Brohi has written “Even Iqbal went so far as to suggest that Muslims states, to begin with, be treated as territorial states and that, too only as an interim measure since these are later on to be incorporated into a Commonwealth of Muslim states. Each one of these states has first to acquire strength and stability before it is able to prepare the ground on which a unified state
of Islam can appear on the historical scene." 17

Despite these and other problems there have been several noteworthy attempts in Pakistan to interpret the Quran so as to develop an Islamic doctrine of war and strategy. In the 1960s a series of text books were prepared for use in Pakistani colleges and schools. More recently, military officers have regularly written on various technical and strategic aspects of famous Muslim battles, and occasionally on the relationship between Islam and Pakistan strategic doctrine. These efforts are sanctioned by the Quran and were encouraged by General Zia. They are not only abstract exercises; in at least one area, the use of nuclear weapons, they may provide the conceptual framework for a Pakistan nuclear arms system.

One important contribution of the new literature on Islamic strategy has been to give a clear definition of the oft-repeated and variously used word ‘Jehad’. Jehad has long been misrepresented as a “religious duty” included in the Quran on the followers of Mohammed to wage war on those who do not adopt the doctrines of Islam. Contemporary Pakistani writers, and most scholars reject this. A.K. Brohi, stresses that the Quran commands man to struggle against the forces of evil and to defend the interest of believers by Jehad, “a word which is untranslatable in English but, broadly speaking, means, “striving”, “Struggling”, trying to advance the Divine cause or purpose”. 18 There are many aspects of Jehad, and force is only the most extreme and intense form; in fact, while urging Jehad, the Islamic tradition also proclaims that “the ink of the scholar is more holy than the blood of the martyr”. 19 However, a dispassionate and indepth analysis of the word Jehad actually means what is commonly understood by all, one can couch the extreme nature of the meaning in whatever interpretations and trappings. Moreover, to a common Pakistani or Muslim the word ‘Jehad’ means to wage war against the non-believers or ‘infidels’. But to some Pakistanis, this is an important issue because it leads them to conclude that Islam does not promote a doctrine of total war and, indeed, urges upon its followers reconciliation with the enemies.

Raxanne L. Euben a professor in the University of South Carolina, while analyzing the political theory of Sayyid Qutb an influential Islamic fundamentalist theorist, contained

18 Ibid., p.ii.
19 Stephen P. Cohen, op.cit., n.1, p.100.
in his (Qutb's) book "Ma'ālim fi-L-tariq" (Signposts along the Road), maintains that Qutb divides the world into two, one that strictly follows the code of Islam and the other called the 'Jahili' society or 'Jahils'. These are ones that refuse to submit to Allah's sovereignty in the realm of belief, worship and law, through denial of his existence, restriction of his authority, or dilution of his sovereignty with false "gods". According to Qutb, history is an arena of battle, a story punctuated and defined by the cosmic struggle between faith and disbelief, Islam and Jahiliyya, Tyranny and Justice. This paradigm of warring opposites recalls the Quranic model of the perennial battle between the forces of God and those of Satan ('Iblis').

In a familiar paradox, Qutb argues that God's will alone guarantees the victory of the believer, but it is necessary that humans coordinate their activities with those of the divinity. Such an individual should have already taught the greater battle [al-Jihad al: akbar] within himself against Satan and against anything that is non-Islamic. Once this battle is won, the conclusion is inevitable: the individual's struggle both presages and inaugurates the worldly endeavour to realize Islam as a social system. He emphasizes the intrinsic value of pious martyrdom, for it is a Quranic injunction not only to implement Islam within one's own life, but to strive to destroy Jahiliyya wherever it appears in the world.20

The form of this activism is 'Jihad'. Connoting struggle, but also holy war. For Qutb, Jehad is the liberating force that sets humans free by bringing about the Kingdom of God on earth. It is not defensive as several Muslim apologists have argued. On the contrary, it is unapologetically offensive, the necessary response to an increasingly strident enemy. In this way, Jehad simultaneously defines the range of legitimate action and endows such action with existential weight. For despite man's special status as vice regal of God on earth, Qutb insists that such vice regency is not given, nor it is fulfilled by words alone; action in the context of Jehad realizes the promise of man's vice regency by bringing human endeavour into accord with God's will.

For Qutb then, Jehad is the means to eradicate a Jahili society in favour of an Islamic society. But how can Qutb justify war on this account, given that the Quran states (2:256) "there is no compulsion on religion. Qutb maintains that humans must be forced to be free and that coercion is justified in the pursuit of liberation from slavery. Islam not only has the

right, but the obligation to realize human freedom. After-all the Quran states that “oppression is worse than killing. (Sura 2:217) Islam means freedom from Jahiliyya, freedom to choose. The paradox is that Qutb both claims for Islam the status of liberation from oppression and insists that freedom be exercised in acceptance of Allah’s sovereignty.

Another important ingredient of Islamic military strategy is the concept of terror which is central to the Islamic conduct of modern war: “Terror struck into the hearts of the enemies is not only a means, it is the end in itself. Once a condition of terror into the opponents heart is obtained, hardly anything is left to be achieved. It is the point where the means and end meet and merge. Terror is not a means of imposing decision upon the enemy, it is the decision we wish to impose upon him.”

A number of Quranic passages have used the word “terror” for example Anfal 12 of the Quran reads “Remember, the Lord inspired the angels (with the message) I am with you: give firmness to the believers: I will instill terror into the hearts of the unbelievers.” This is not dissimilar to N.J. Dawood’s translation “Allah revealed his will to the angels, saying: I shall be with you. Give firmness to the believers. I shall cast terror into the hearts of the infidels.”

It is important here to make a linkage between the concept of terror and the Pakistani strategy. They insist that a strategy that fails to strike terror in the heart of the enemy will suffer from the inherent drawbacks and weaknesses, and should be reviewed and modified, further more, this standard must be applied to nuclear as well as -conventional wars. The strategy of nuclear deterrence can not work unless it is capable of striking terror into the hearts of the enemy. To do this, his (the enemies) faith must be weakened whereas the Muslim soldier must adhere even more firmly to his own religion. Neither nuclear war nor conventional weapons are to be used on a random, haphazard basis, but they must support and strengthen this central objective of Islamic war. Terror will weaken the enemy’s faith in himself, and that in turn will lead to his destruction. War is a matter of will and faith, and even instruments of most destruction have a clear-cut and (in one sense) a limited, pin point role in war “Nuclear weapons are modern terror weapons, and Islam enjoins us to strike terror into the hearts of the enemy, it provides moral guidance, a set of principles for going to

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22 Ibid., p.57.
In the Islamic or Koranic concept of war, the two aspects that stand out are ‘Jehad’ and the use of ‘terror’. Both these concepts have been and are being used by Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir, right since 1947-48 till date. These have been employed more directly and more vigorously during the contemporary phase. Commencing from 1988 onwards, when trained and armed ‘Mujhadeens were and are being inducted into Jammu and Kashmir by Pakistan with the aim of waging “Jehad” by using “terror” as the basic arm, against India. This is war through terror in the most blatant and transparent terms. The infamous credit for unleashing this Islamic Jehad in Kashmir must unquestionably go to the fundamentalist minded General Zia alongwith the CIA, ISI and Pakistan army, keeping with his strategy of “Keeping the pot boiling” in Afghanistan, he turned towards Kashmir, as soon as the Soviets evacuated Afghanistan and applied the same policy there. The fact that the Afghan strategy was replicated almost one for one is noted by more than one analyst, and, indeed even a cursory presentation of facts reveals that terrorism is the primary method of warfare so that India can not resort to a conventional war and gets embroiled expensively in tackling terrorism and militancy in the valley. The cry oft heard in the street of Srinagar are “Jo Kare Khuda, Ka Khauf, utha Le Kalashnikov” (Those who fear God must pick up Kalashnikovs). This sentence aptly sums up the lingage between Islam and terrorism.

Brigadier S.K. Malik in his book ‘The Quranic Concept of War’ States: "Broadly speaking the war aims of any Muslim armed force engaged in fighting have also been stated in Sura Mohammad verses 1 and 4: “Those who disbelieve and hinder (men) from the path of God, their deeds will Lord render astray (from their mark)... Therefore, when you meet the unbelievers smite their necks; at length, when you have thoroughly subdued them build a barrier against them.” In Sura ‘Infa’al’ Chapter 8, verse 39, it is said “And fight on until there remains no more tumult or oppression and they remain submissive only to God.” To the same effect all the words used in Sura ‘Toba’ verse 9, “Fight those who believe not in the Lord, nor the Last Day, nor hold the forbidden which has been forbidden by Lord and His Apostle nor acknowledge the religion of truth (even if they are) of the people of the book, until they pay

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24 Cohen, op.cit., n.1, p.103.

‘Jazya’ with willing submission and feel themselves subdued.”26 After the battle of Badr, Mohammad gave the instructions “And fight them on until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah altogether and everywhere” (Anfal:39-40).27 The Quran further states that Islam should be embraced by all Pagan tribes around Mecca, a grace period of four months was to be given to those who did not do so, after which the Holy Quran directed the Muslims to “fight and slay Pagans where ye find them (Tauba:5).”28

The above verses of Quran preach violence against the non-believer till he is converted to being a believer. This has made all the non Islamic nations and people suspicious and wary of the Islamic world. Most of the western and non-western scholars have pointed out the fact that the world of Islam is in a perpetual struggle against the non-Muslim. They feel that the world is polarised between the “world of Islam” and the “world of war”, thereby giving validity to Huntington’s thesis on the clash of civilizations. In which he says that the next pattern of conflicts after the end of the cold war will be based on racial, religious, ethnic and cultural fault lines in the world. He went on further to state that the International situation would be afflicted by a clash between the Muslim and Christian civilisations and that this confrontation would replace all previous factors which have affected international relations. “Conflict along the fault line between western and Islamic civilizations has been going on for 1,300 years. After the founding of Islam.... The conflict of civilization is deeply rooted elsewhere in Asia. The historic clash between Muslim and Hindu in the subcontinent.”29

In the Quranic concept of strategy, writes Brigadier Malik, the first step is to understand the difference between total strategy, that is Jehad, and military strategy. The term, Jehad, so often confused with military strategy, is, in fact the near equivalent of total or grand strategy or policy in execution. Jehad entails the comprehensive direction and application of power while military strategy deals only with the preparation for and

27 Ibid., p.28.
28 Ibid.
application of force. Jehad is a continuous and never ending struggle waged on all fronts including political, economic, social, psychological, domestic, moral and spiritual to attain the object of policy. It aims at attaining the overall mission assigned to the Islamic state, and military strategy is one of the means available to it to do so. It is waged at individual as well as collective level: and at internal as well as external front.\textsuperscript{30}

The words “internal and external” used in the foregoing paragraph are critical and need to be explained in the context of this study. As the strategy of Jehad has been and is being truly implemented in Kashmir by Pakistan in this manner. This, perhaps, can also be equated with the two level strategy of Pakistan which is the precise subject of research here. The author, in the above paragraph alludes to the use of military power as being part of Jehad when he states “Jehad entails the comprehensive direction and application of “power”... and military strategy is one of the means available to it to do so.”\textsuperscript{31} A viable interpretation of this, in the context of Kashmir is the consistent, use of force in that state since 1947, both, military and by armed subversion instigated and supported within the state of J&K from outside. Further the writer states “Jehad is a continuous and never ending struggle waged on all fronts including political, economic, social, psychological, domestic, moral and spiritual to attain the object of policy.”\textsuperscript{32} This can be translated to the use of coercive diplomacy and politics to force the state or people to fall in line with your requirements of statescraft.

The author while writing on the subject further states “waged in its true spirit, and with the multiple means available to it, the Islamic concept of total strategy has the capacity to produce direct results. Alternatively, however, it creates conditions conducive to the military strategy to attain its object speedily and economically. Military strategy thus draws heavily on the total strategy (Jehad) for its successful application. Any weakness or strength in the formulation, direction or applications of the total strategy would be a matter of exception, not rule. Conversely, optimum preparation and application of the military instrument forms an integral part of Jehad.”\textsuperscript{33} In this paragraph the author makes a direct connection between Jehad and war. Stating that both are related intangibly, and that, war or use of military

\textsuperscript{30} Brigadier S.K. Malik, op.cit., n.26, p.54.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., p.54.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., pp.54-55.
instrument always forms an integral part of Jehad. Meaning thereby that, as in Afghanistan, Jehad in Kashmir has to be implemented with the assistance of military instrument and war, as has been done in the past and may also be resorted to in the future too.

On the use of terror, the Quran further states “soon shall we cast terror into the hearts of the unbelievers”\(^{34}\) (Al-i-Imran:151 of the Quran). On the question of instilling terror into the hearts of the enemies, a reference is also available in Sura Ahzab 26-27, “And those of the people of the book who aided them, Allah did take them down from their strongholds and cast terror into their hearts, (so that) some ye slew, and some ye made prisoners. And he made you heirs of their lands, their houses, and their goods, and of a Land which ye had not frequented (before). And Allah has power over all things.”\(^{35}\) This sentence implies the importance of the use of terror for conquering new lands and people. The writers says that on all these occasions, when God wishes to impose his will upon his enemies, he chooses to do so by casting terror into their hearts.\(^ {36}\)

“The Quranic military strategy thus enjoins us to prepare ourselves for war to the utmost in order to strike terror into the hearts of the enemies, known or hidden, while guarding ourselves from being terror stricken by the enemies. In this strategy, guarding ourself against terror is the ‘Base’; preparation for war to the utmost is the ‘cause’, while striking terror in the hearts of the enemies is the ‘effect’. The whole philosophy resolves round the human heart, his soul, spirit and faith. In war, our main objective is the opponent’s heart or soul.”\(^{37}\)

The writers further states,

“Terror struck into the hearts of the enemies is not only a means, it is the end in itself. Once a condition of terror into the opponents heart is obtained, hardly anything is left to be achieved. It is the point where the means and the end meet and merge. Terror is not a means of imposing decision upon the enemy, it is the decision we wish to impose upon him,... Terror cannot be struck into the hearts of an army by merely cutting its lines of communication or depriving it of its routes of withdrawal. It is basically related to the strength or weakness of the human soul.... A strategy that fails to attain this condition suffers from inherent drawbacks and weaknesses; and should be reviewed and modified. This rule is fully applicable to nuclear as well as

\(^{34}\) Ibid.
\(^{35}\) Ibid.
\(^{36}\) Ibid.
\(^{37}\) Ibid, p.58
conventional war. It is equally true of the strategy of nuclear deterrence in fashion today. To be credible and effective, the strategy of deterrence must be capable of striking terror into the hearts of the enemy.”

The writer in his work also relates Liddel Hart’s strategy of ‘Indirect Approach’ to the Quranic concept of war. The Book, at Anfal:12 says “.. and smite all their finger tips off them”. Since most of the body parts of Koraish warriors were protected by armour the book taught them to strike at the vulnerable parts first,

“In battle, therefore, we should first identify and strike at the most sensitive and vulnerable points of our adversary and aim at finishing him off completely. When that is not possible, our efforts should be to choose those targets which when struck, will deprive him of this ability to use his weapons or combat strength against us. We should always avoid hitting the enemy’s strength directly with our weakness.”

The foregoing clearly enunciates and underlines the importance of the instrument of terror the use of psychological warfare and the strategy of indirect or unconventional approach in warfare. These very instruments of war have been practised by Pakistan in Kashmir. Subversion, terror and infiltration (Indirect approach) are the level one strategy of Pakistan in Kashmir. Terror is in fact a special mode of violence, which may be briefly defined as coercive intimidation. It involves the threat of murder, injury or destruction to terrorize a given target into conceding to the terrorists will. Oxford dictionary defines terror as the action or quality of causing dread or a thing or person that excites terror or awe. Terrorism is defined as a policy intended to strike with terror those against whom it is adopted. Pakistan has in the past and is continuing to sponsor proxy terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir as a form of coercive diplomacy and subversion against India. Perhaps, the Quranic concept of war has been instrumental in instigating terrorism in the Middle East, and Pakistan has drawn a leaf out of it and has implemented it in Afghanistan, Punjab, Assam and Jammu and Kashmir.

38 Ibid., pp.59-60.
39 Ibid, pp.64-65.
Nuclear Factor: Strategic Implications

With the series of nuclear test during May 1998, Pakistan overtly became a nuclear weapon power like India, and like any two opposing nations, this technology of mass destruction becomes a major factor that impacts on their strategic doctrines, policies and of course warfare. Though generally it was known that Pakistan possessed nuclear capability since 1987, it is only now that the threat has become real, creating entirely new possibilities in the regional and international environment. What would the strategic implications of the ‘Islamic Bomb’ with Pakistan have, is the question. Before tackling the question proper, it would be appropriate to first have a brief over-view and background of strategic doctrines prevailing in the world of the ‘haves’.

The nuclear bomb is the most terrible gift of the west to the rest of the world. Since they (America and the former USSR) were the pioneers in this field. It is their nuclear strategy we will look at, before discussing Pakistan’s nuclear strategy. The West’s nuclear strategy passed through a series of evolution beginning from the fifty’s till date. In the beginning it was the strategy of ‘deterrence’ advanced by the US to counter USSR’s overwhelming conversational forces. The argument was that in the event of an attack by superior Russian forces the Americans would retaliate by an atomic bombardment, which would deter the Russians from launching a conventional initiative. It was primarily an operational defensive posture. Once USSR also acquired compatible nuclear powers, America came out with the strategy of “Massive Response” which implied a massive nuclear response to any Russian attack. Then when Russia took the lead in the nuclear race in the 60’s, USA came up with the strategy of “flexible response”, which implied a regulated response to a Russian attack. Then in the seventies both nations acquired massive second strike capabilities through their nuclear submarines and ground based nuclear silos, with this came an era of nuclear balance which was termed as “Mutually Assured Destruction” (MAD). Which retains viability till now, with certain derivatives such as the “Counter Force Strike”, ‘Counter City Strike’, etc.

However, as has been illustrated in an earlier chapter, the current definition of the word strategy needs a rethink. Nuclear war is not a continuation of politics. Therefore, it is from this view that all the above discussed nuclear strategies must be seen. If MAD has kept the world safe from a nuclear holocaust for the past 55 years or so, it must still not be taken
for granted. "When the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons by states comes to be accepted as legitimate by their peoples, it is inevitable that some members or groups highly motivated to achieve objectives different from those of the majority would also develop perceptions that there was nothing illegitimate about similar use of mass violence by them in pursuit of their goals... (such) groups will not flinch from the use of mass terror to achieve their ideological objectives".\textsuperscript{41} Such a possibility is much more alive in a situation of asymmetric conflict between a bigger and more powerful country like India and a smaller, weaker country like Pakistan. The danger gets accentuated when the smaller nation has serious ideological, religious, political and socio-cultural differences and is headed by a military dictator.

**Centrality of Kashmir**

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema writing about the centrality of its nuclear development to Kashmir states: "Two factors seem to have further strengthened Pakistani resolve not to abandon its nuclear option. first, the continuing freedom fight in Kashmir... The Kashmir dispute is viewed by a vast majority of the Pakistanis as a symbol of India’s broken pledges and its high-handed attitude towards its smaller neighbour. A Pakistani Prime Minister in recent times clearly stressed that the road to denuclearization passed through Kashmir".\textsuperscript{42}

In the case of the 'Islamic Bomb' there is till date, no indication of a strategic doctrine that suits the regional scenario, except a premise that it is a India specific and Kashmir centric weapon. Pakistan has always been determined to wrest Kashmir from India, twice it has tried to settle the issue by force of arms. On each occasion its efforts have been thwarted by the people of Kashmir and by the superiority of Indian army. Furthermore, on both occasions Pakistan has been prevented from committing larger forces to the Kashmir front because of the threat from India to Pakistan’s territory in Punjab and Sind. But now this strategic situation stand changed as do the contours of any future conflict with it. One aspect of this changed scenario was made visible by the recent Kargil war when it used the nuclear threat as a potent instrument of ‘deterrent blackmail’. When it did not allow India to enlarge a


\textsuperscript{42} P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Iftekharuzzaman (Ed.), *Nuclear Non-Proliferation in India and Pakistan* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1996), p.133.
limited conflict in Kashmir, so much so, it even prevented India from crossing the Line of Control because of fear of escalation.

The second nuclear strategy that Pakistan could resort to may be, termed as a 'nuclear-cum-conventional' strategy in which Pakistan would clearly specify that it intends to use its nuclear weapons in a defensive capacity only, i.e., as a deterrent to an Indian attack on Pakistani territory. This threat would allow it to thin out its armed forces from the Punjab, Sind and Rajasthan sectors and use a massive concentration of its forces in a conventional mode to annex Kashmir. In case India resorts to a counter offensive in any of the plains sector, Pakistan would unleash its nuclear arsenal on India, of course it would then have to contend with the ramifications of such an action. But with an unreasonable enemy anything, however rash and illogical, is possible.

The third possible strategy that it could employ is the strategy of Internationalization and multilaterism of the Kashmir issue under a nuclear threat. The international community, specially the US is extremely sensitive to the use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world. Therefore, any Pak conventional threat to Kashmir pregnant with nuclear conflagration is bound to make the international community jump from their seats and come rushing to the sub-continent. Pakistan tried this strategy during the Kargil misadventure but being a very limited conflict, it back fired on them.

The fourth strategy that Pakistan has discovered after going nuclear is the strategy of proxy war. Having, possibly become nuclear in 1987, it promptly set about commencing its proxy war in Kashmir and escalating it in Punjab. Perhaps, secure in the knowledge that any escalation to a state of full fledged war would be effectively deterred by the perception of mutual nuclear deterrence. To a great extent it has been successful in following this strategy for the last 12 years in J&K, without a full-fledged war breaking out.

Finally, most experts there propose that because of India’s military superiority over Pakistan in troops ratio and conventional arms, in an conflict situation, India’s army will be able to exert pressure beyond endurance and be able to break through their defences, as a last resort then, at some stage in battle Pakistan will be forced to employ its Nuclear weapons to stabilize the situation. In short therefore, Pakistan sees its nuclear capability as a means to offset India’s superior conventional war making potential. In such a scenario, Pakistan
Nuclear Doctrine would therefore revolve round the first strike option, even if the Indian attack is with conventional weapons. Lt. Gen. (Retd.) F.S. Lodi, a leading Pakistani defence analyst, quoting Stephen P. Cohen says: “Professor Stephen P. Cohen feels that Pakistan would use what he calls an ‘option-enhancing policy’... This would entail a stage by stage approach in which the nuclear threat is increased at each step... The first step could be a public or private warning, the second a demonstration explosion of a small nuclear weapon on its own soil the third step would be the use of a few nuclear weapons on its own soil... The fourth stage would be used against critical but purely military targets in India... Some weapon systems would be in reserve for the counter-value role”. 43

The other important strategic issue that emerges from the ‘Islamic Bomb’, is the question of provision of strategic depth to Pakistan. This vision of Z.A. Bhutto gets realized, to a certain extent by acquisition of nuclear capability. After Pakistan loss of Bangladesh in 1971, Bhutto realized that Pakistan, being a narrow strip of land needs strategic depth against any future aggression by India. It therefore, adopted a strategy of offensive Defence or forward defence, which meant that it should define its defence parameters inside the territories of its neighbours. Therefore, in pursuit of this strategy it, firstly, initiated a proxy war in Punjab and Kashmir, assuming that in an event of a war with India, the secessionist elements in these states will pose such a threat to the Indian army so as to make it cautious and concerned about its rear. Besides, the outside chance of these states being able to secede from India. Secondly, Pakistan has already acquired some form of strategic depth in its western borders by Talibanization of that country thereby accruing some form of right on Afghan territory, besides being able to end its trouble on its western border. The Islamic states of Iran and Central Asia close to its Southern and Northern borders also added to its strategic depth and, thirdly, by going nuclear, Pakistan has been able to achieve an abstract form of depth, not in the classical geographical form, but in a more psychological form by threatening to pose a threat with its nuclear arsenal deep inside Indian territory thereby deterring India from planning or executing invasion of Pak territory and thereby, denying India the military advantage provided by the narrow geographical width of the country, which lends itself to being cut off by a rapid deep thrust by the Indian army.

The nuclear threat aspect is dealt in more specific and greater details later on in the study.

Asymmetric Conflict Factor: Strategic Implications

History has witnessed over and again challengers and defender both strong and weak, pitted against each other on the battle field. Traditional schools of power politics, such as balance of power, view the outbreak of war among equal powers as less likely because power parity neutralizes chances of victory of both sides or preponderance deters war. Attacks by weaker powers against stronger opponents are seen as improbable given the notion that national decision makers would not engage in such risky ventures which they are likely to loose. It would be worth looking at the empirical question of why, repeatedly in history weaker powers have engaged in wars against stronger adversaries. This is termed a asymmetric conflict. History is replete with examples of such conflicts. In this study, however, the focus will be restricted to conflicts between India and Pakistan.

It is assumed that decisions to pursue war and peace are made by decision making groups with particular external and internal motives, but they need not be the only decision-making unit. It is assumed that power group surrounding them play significant roles in war decisions. In Pakistan specifically, these power groups are the Army, the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) and the religious Mullha lobby. Before a decision on making war is taken the following four pre-conditions are normally required to be fulfilled

1. The presence of serious conflict of interest which is Kashmir in Indo-Pak context.
2. The weaker side values higher the issue in dispute. Pakistan’s obsession with Kashmir verges on paranoia.
3. The weaker side is dissatisfied with the status quo. Pakistan wants annexation of Kashmir.
4. The weaker side fears a deterioration from or no change in the status quo in the future. It fears that Kashmir will continue to remain a part of India - unless...

The conflict generally becomes more intense as attempts at a negotiated settlement fail (as they have in 1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999) or a chain of actions and reactions between the parties escalate it into a crisis. The initiator, which is a weaker power, attaches greater value to the object in contention and is willing to demonstrate the resolve to use force. The defender, which is the stronger power

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wants to preserve the benefits of the status quo situation. This happens to be the case in the Indo-Pak matrix over Kashmir.

The continuation of a status quo that is unfavourable to the weaker power has implications for the outbreak of war. The leadership of a weaker nation might decide to go to war if it perceives that the long term prospects for resolving the issue are slim, and therefore finds the status quo intolerable because the existing trends may define the long term developments. The initiator can perceive that if it does strike now, then as time passes it may suffer serious long term political and economic disadvantages. Thus the decision of Pakistan to go to war with India in 1948, 1965, 1971 and now in the Kargil conflict.

Under what conditions a weaker nation commits war on a more powerful adversary. The answer lies in the four variables which are – (a) The politico military strategy. This strategy is mainly limited to limited aims/fait accompli strategy which implies the achievement of limited war objectives i.e. capture of limited territory whose condition, becomes irreversible following the conclusion of war. This may have been Pakistan’s assumption when it initiated the Kargil war. (b) The possession of offensive weapons systems –This refers to possession of weapons systems conducive to offensive actions i.e. tanks, deep penetration air crafts, etc. (c) Great power defensive support - implies the military’s economic and political support of a third and strong power or country or group of countries in the form of an alliance. Pakistan has been banking on the support of China, IOC and USA in this respect. (d) Changing domestic power structure — this refers to the chief executive and the decision making group that surround him. The word “power” is used in an overall term, defined in terms of geography demography, economic and military i.e., active population, gross national product, per capita income, industrial capability, technological process, the total strength of armed forces and weapons systems.

As to the strategy of war employed by a weaker state. The best strategies are limited aims/fait accompli strategy which envisions seizure of a portion of territory by a limited offensive for future negotiations and the attrition strategy, in this posture, the initiating weak nation must avoid static fighting but must resort to guerrilla tactics, favourable terrain and local support are important ingredients for success.45 The experience of US in Vietnam,

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USSR in Afghanistan, France in Algeria, India in Sri Lanka and now India and Pakistan in Kashmir lend support to this contention.

Other factors that a weak initiating nation must consider are, the conviction of taking initiative and striking first which entail certain strategic and tactical advantage (Pakistan resorted to this in all its wars with India). Then is the time factors, the initiator must not allow the battle to be protracted in nature. Surprise and mobility are the other two key factors that the weaker initiator must take advantage of Pakistan has made both these factors a part of its war strategy against India. Alliance support involving a great power is an important factor for a weak initiator, so that the great power can intervene and use its influence at the right time to bring hostilities to an end, when the weak initiator is still in an advantageous position. Also, in case of need, hardware, economic and diplomatic support is also available from the great power partner. This factor assumes added importance in a bipolar or multipolar power scenario, when a smaller state can engage in war with its stronger opponent with the expectation that is great power ally well provide support, especially if the adversary belongs to the other side of the bipolar or multipolar equation, as did happen during the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak war, when China and USA, respective, came out in overt support of Pakistan. Thus, weaker allies tend to exhibit a tendency to exploit the great power security umbrella in order to enhance their own national interests.

The chances of war initiation by a weaker state increase when the power structure in the state rests with an insecure, militaristic group. Such a group may view a limited war as an attractive option for the attainment of their domestic and international goals. Changes in the decision making group may occur as a result of coups or transfer of power via internal power struggle. These groups may obtain support of other pressure groups that demand militaristic solution to that dispute with their more powerful adversary. Also, of a regime's legitimacy and popularity are low, diversionary wars can be an effective means to attain popular support.

Pakistan v/s India

Having now studied the theory of Asymmetric wars we shall do well to analyse it in the context of Indo-Pak wars and see why has Pakistan, a smaller and weaker state, continues

to aggress against India a stronger and larger state.

Pakistan launched “Operation Gulmarg”, in 1948 and “Operator Gibraltar” in 1965 to capture Kashmir. Both operations were planned and launched by the army. If the mission to capture and annex the valley failed, then the operations were expected to raise the prospects for serious negotiations by bringing the Kashmir issue into international focus.47

The major conclusion form the foregoing study of Pakistan’s wars with India reveal that all the four conditions required by a smaller and weaker nation to wage war with a stronger and larger nation, as discussed earlier, were present in all the occasion but more so in 1965 and Kargil conflict. The military and political calculations of the Pakistan leadership were based on a limited/fait accompli and guerilla war of attrition strategies. Pakistan had acquired sufficient short term offensive capabilities for a short war, specially during the 1965 war, by way of M48 Patton tanks, Sabre and Star fighter Jets and thus waiting would have been disadvantageous. The alliance structure had also shifted in its favour, largely as a result of China’s alignment with Pakistan and the expected US neutrality in the conflict of 1965. In the domestic spectrum, the arrival of Bhutto into the decision-making structure which was already militaristic under Field Marshal Ayub Khan, favoured war initiation by the weaker side. The deterrent threats that India made were not credible given India’s past behaviour in conflicts involving Pakistan and China. Its political steps in Kashmir increased the civil unrest there, providing Pakistan with another favourable condition for military operations.

To rate the relative importance of factors that favoured war in 1965, the alliance relationship, the calculations based on limited aims strategy, and the short-term advantages in quality weapons seem most critical. This is largely inferred from the fact that Pakistan’s unwillingness to go to war in 1962, just after the Sino-Indian war, was the lack of an alliance support. The strategic calculations of Pakistan had changed dramatically by 1965, with the perceived successes in the Rann of Kutch operations and the shaping up of the offence-dominant military doctrine by the army. In 1962, there was no guarantee that the war would remain limited or that Pakistan would achieve its strategic goals in a fait accompli operation. The acquisition of short term offensive weapons seems to be the third crucial factor that

played a key role in the calculations. The leadership feared that Pakistan’s short term advantage in armour and aircrafts would soon be overtaken when India completed its defence modernization programme. The changes in the decision-making structure would be considered the further factors. The rise in influence of Bhutto in the governing structure made a difference in choosing the war option in 1965, especially with his ability to convince Ayub Khan the President’s credibility and popularity would improve if Pakistan went on the offensive in Kashmir.

During the current military phase, Pakistan is still resorting to the fulfillment of the four variables for initiating war with a larger and stronger India in Kashmir. Though the term war is being applied to the ongoing proxy war or low intensity conflict. The politico-military strategy, tends to be indirect, i.e., in the form of a combination of militancy, guerilla war and terrorism. The terrain is suitable, local and outside support, including provision of equipment, training, logistic bases financial support and communications and available from across the border from Pakistan. Afghan and other foreign mercenaries are abundantly available. In such a situation, the cost tolerance of the stronger side can be tested to the limit by a weaker foe through protracted resistance. This strategy is also cost effective for the initiator and has become, over the years, a favourite with weaker nations against strong countries. This strategy was the brain child of General Zia, who in 1985 is said to have unfolded his plans for a proxy war in Kashmir. Code named “Operation Topac” it drew heavily from Pakistan’s experience during the Afghan crisis, where the strategy of “Keeping the pot boiling” was immensely successful. Also, the success of Zia’s strategy in spreading insurgency and terrorism as Punjab in the 80’s further encouraged him.

The possession of offensive weapon systems which is the second variable may not be too significant a factor in this kind of an environment - but still the Pakistan army is providing these ‘dogs of war’ with the latest and the best subversion and proxy war compatible equipment which includes stinger missiles, advanced small arms weaponry, and explosives and ultra modern radio communication equipment. Another factor that needs consideration is the nuclearization of Pakistan, which affords more confidence to the subversives’ operating in Kashmir.

The third factor of great power support, implies the combination of military, economic, political and morale support provided by a third Great power. This support is
often non combative. In the instant case it is China that has been providing Pakistan with all
out support. It is China that gave to Pakistan the philosophy and doctrine of guerilla warfare. 
Pak officer and men were trained by China in this form of warfare. China provided arms and 
equipment, including all assistance in the manufacture of the Pakistani nuclear weapons. The 
answer to the question as to why has China entered into an alliance with Pakistan, is simple 
Sino-Pakistani security, military and national interest coincide over Kashmir. It was natural 
then, that, they should get united against India. The value of Chinese support both diplomatic 
and military can be gauged from the role that China played in the 1965 conflict-when 
militarily it gave an ultimatum to India over Sikkim and diplomatically supported the Pakistan 
stand everywhere. In the current phase also Chinese slant is clearly pro-Pakistan. Though in 
the Kargil issue, it adopted an ambivalent stand.

The other factor pertains to the changing domestic power structure. The creator of 
the current phase of military in Kashmir was General Zia-ut-Haque who, it is reported, 
planned the infiltration into Kashmir in 1985 and implemented it in 1988. It was thus the 
militaristic political group that conceived the so called “Operation Topac” in Kashmir. It was 
however, implemented with fill vigour in Kashmir in 1988-89 by Benazir Bhutto who had 
taken over Pakistan after Zia’s death in an air crash. The Benazir administration in order to 
hold on to its untenable position, specially in regard to the military and the clergy, had no 
alternative but to espouse the Kashmir issue most vehemently and forcefully. Her fire and 
brimstone speeches on Kashmir at Mankiala and Lahore, had a telling effect on her popularly. 
A senior politician noted “Kashmir has come to her rescue just as Mghanistan did for Zia”. 
Therefore, the initial hypothesis that the chances of war initiation by a weaker state are greater 
when the power structure changes in that state and when an insecure group, assumes control 
of the decision making process, very well fits into the Kashmir crisis.

From the foregoing, it clearly emerges that smaller nations i.e. Pakistan engage longer 
nations i.e. India in war fare, initiated by them (smaller nations) through the instrument of 
subversion and proxy wars with a view to achieve their political and strategic goals. 
Therefore, Pakistan has incorporated this form of war in its level one strategy on Kashmir.