CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Wars and Armed Conflict in India-Pakistan Relations

The use of force in regional conflicts, historically has always been the chief characteristic of international politics. Although war, not surprisingly, is often regarded as an abnormal phenomenon - sometimes a blunder and sometimes a criminal act, it is, all the same, accepted as a necessary evil, which is as old as the history of man himself. In this century, the brutality of war has greatly influenced thinking about international politics. In fact, the destructiveness of war has grown so enormously as a result of Nationalism, industrialization and technological innovations that the very existence of the human civilization tethers on extinction, by the threat of a nuclear holocaust. Despite this fear, war and armed conflict cannot be isolated from Inter-Nation/International relations, irrespective of the fallouts, the Games Nations play, will continue. Each state will continue to advance its own interests in conflict with those of other states. In this pursuit of its national interests, a state will resort to the use of any form of force if it cannot achieve or defend its goals in any other way.

In as much as armed conflict/war cannot be separated from Inter-Nation/International relations - national interests, diplomacy, strategy, political commitments and military power are inseparables too. Though all these elements form a very important part of state-craft, this study will focus more on the strategy and diplomacy part of state craft, as the interrelationship between military strategy and foreign policy, and their instrumentalities namely defence and diplomacy, is symbiotic, the linkages between them are inextricable. Therefore, during the course of the study strategy and diplomacy will constantly figure in unison. Strategy will be studied as it is defined in the current and conventional manner, strategy that Pakistan has employed against India over Kashmir, since partition in 1947, in general, but since 1987, in particular. Before embarking on the understanding of Pakistan’s strategy on Kashmir, a brief and general understanding of the word strategy is called for.

Strategy: A Brief Explanation

Strategy is a word that has many definitions and as many interpretations. For a layman, this word evokes images of war, mayhem and destruction. This popular imagery is reinforced by one definition of the word, by Von Clausewitz, who defines strategy as “The employment of battle as the means towards the attainment of the object of war” or “War is nothing more than the continuation of politics by other means.” But the Layman’s understanding of the definition is not quite correct. Yes, strategy is about war, and the conduct of military campaigns but not only that, it also covers a whole gamut of achieving political objectives. It is for this reason that strategy is much wider than the study of wars. Von Moltke described strategy as “the practical adaptation of the means placed at a general’s disposal to the attainment of the object in view”. Liddel Hart posits: “The art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy”. It will be noticed that in both these definition the word war does not figure, implying that military power can be equally effective and purposeful in peace time too. However, in the nuclear age (when both India and Pakistan possess this capability) the definition of strategy may need a change. In this context, Liddel Hart puts it: “Old concepts and old definitions of strategy have become not only obsolete but non-sensical with the development of nuclear weapons. To aim at winning a war, to take victory as your object, is no more than a state of lunacy”.

This brief background to the meaning of strategy, as evolved by some past master on the subject, sets the stage for an overview of the definitions and understanding of the various types of strategies, their inter relationship with war and tactics. This would be necessary to fully comprehend Pakistan’s complex strategy in Kashmir, complex because Pakistan is not following any, one straight-forward strategy, but an amalgam of two or three or may be more of these strategies in Kashmir. The highest type of strategy, sometimes called the grand strategy (discussed in detail subsequently) is that which integrates the policies and armament of the nation that resort to war is either rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with maximum

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chance of victory. Pure or military strategy deals with achieving nations security, most economically, whether by battle or without it.

Nuclearization has brought to the fore the unwinability, legitimacy and rationality of total war, which stands obsolete now. In such an environment, more cost effective concepts of alternate strategies have gained prominence - Limited war, Guerrilla and Insurgent wars, Proxy war, Limited and Low intensity conflicts, have become the norms of advancing a nations purpose. As a matter of fact, in many ways, the Clausewitzian dictum of war being a continuation of politics stands reversed and could be read “politics is the continuation of war by other means”. It would be in this spectrum of armed conflict, viewed in the backdrop of the post cold war unipolar world order, that Pakistan’s strategy on Kashmir will be studied.

Some Relevant Types and Definitions of Strategy

Some definition of various types of strategies relevant to the study, have been undertaken here-in-under.

**Higher or Grand Strategy**: Strategy is an application on a lower plane of ‘grand strategy’. While practically synonymous with the policy which guides the conduct of war, as distinct from the more fundamental policy which should govern its object, the term ‘grand strategy’ serves to bring out the sense of ‘policy in execution’. For the role of grand strategy -higher strategy- is to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political objective of the war - the goal defined by fundamental policy.6

Grand strategy should both calculate and develop the economic resources and man-power of nations in order to sustain the fighting services. Also the moral resources - for to foster the people’s willing spirit is often as important as to possess the more concrete forms of power. Grand strategy, too, should regulate the distribution of power between the several services, and between the services and industry. Moreover, fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy - which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, of diplomatic pressure, of commercial pressure, and not least of ethical pressure, to weaken the opponent’s will.

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6 Liddel Hart, op.cit., n.4, p.334.
Furthermore, while the horizon of strategy is bounded by the war, grand strategy looks beyond war to the subsequent peace. It should not only combine the various instruments, but so regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of peace - for its security and prosperity. The sorry state of peace, for both sides, that has followed most wars can be traced to the fact that, unlike strategy, the realm of grand strategy is for the most part “terra incognita” - still awaiting exploration, and understanding.\(^7\)

**Pure, or Military, Strategy**

Having cleared the ground, we can build up our conception of strategy on its proper plane and original basis - that of ‘the art of the general’. Strategy depends for success, first and most, on a sound calculation and coordination of the end and the means. The end must be proportioned to the total means, and the means used in gaining each intermediate end which contributes to the ultimate must be proportioned to the value and needs of the intermediate end - whether it be to gain an objective or to fulfil a contributory purpose. An excess may be as harmful as a deficiency. A true adjustment would establish a perfect economy of force, in the deeper sense of that oft-distorted military term. But, because of the nature and uncertainty of war, an uncertainty increased by lack of scientific study, even the greatest military ability could not achieve a true adjustment, and success lies in the closest approximation to truth. This relativity is inherent because, however far our knowledge of the science of war be extended, it will depend on art for its application. Art can not only bring the end nearer to the means, enable the end to be extended. This complicates calculation, because no man can exactly calculate the capacity of human genius and stupidity, nor the incapacity of will.\(^8\)

**Aim of Strategy**

This statement may be disputed by those who conceive the destruction of the enemy’s armed force as the only sound aim in war, who hold that the only goal of strategy is battle, and who are obsessed with the Clausewitzian saying that ‘blood is the price of victory’. Yet if one should concede this point and meet its advocates on their own ground, the statement would remain unshaken. For even if a decisive battle be the goal, the aim of strategy must be to bring about this battle under the most advantageous circumstances. And the

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\(^7\) Ibid.

\(^8\) Ibid., p.337.
advantageous the circumstances, the less proportionately, will be the fighting. In the case of a
state that is seeking, not conquest, but the maintenance of its security, the aim is fulfilled if
the threat be removed - if the enemy is led to abandon his purpose.

Strategy of Guerrilla and Insurgent War

Clausewitz, in his book On War, described a "people's war" in this manner: "A
people's war...is a phenomenon of the nineteenth century. It has its advocates and its
opponents, the latter either considering it in a political sense as a revolutionary means, a state
of anarchy declared lawful, as dangerous to social order at home as to the enemy; or on
military grounds believing that the result is not commensurate with the expenditure of force.
The first point does not concern us here, for we are considering a people's war merely as a
means of fighting, therefore, in its connection with the enemy; but with reference to the latter
point, we must observe that a people's war in general is to be regarded as a consequence of
the way in which in our day the elemental violence of war has burst its old barriers; as an
expansion and strengthening, therefore, of the whole ferment which we call war..."9 In recent
years, many different phrases and expressions have been used to describe guerrilla warfare
and insurgent war. One reads and hears of "insurgency operations", "irregular warfare",
"partisan warfare", "para-military operations", "internal war", "revolutionary warfare", and
"guerrilla warfare". This diversity of expression can only lead to confusion because of the
difficulty encountered when trying to define terms. In order to provide a basis for discussing
"guerrilla warfare" and "insurgent war", a look at different types of warfare might be useful.
The types to be considered are general war, limited war, and insurgent war. The definitions
are as below:-

a) **General War** is a struggle between two governments each with the aim of destroying
the other by using all means at their disposal. Although World War II was considered
a general war at that time, today a general war would involve the use of thermonuclear weapons.

b) **Limited War** is an armed conflict between governments where each is prepared to
use only limited resources to secure a restricted or limited aim the war is limited
geographically and in the use of weaponry. Korea was a limited war from the point of

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view of American and Communist China. The Gulf war and more recently in our context the Kargil conflict are all examples of limited war.

c) **Insurgent War** is characterised by a struggle between an established government and an anti-governmental force. The anti-governmental force may be organised and/or supported by one or more outside governments with the primary aim of overthrowing the existing government.

Guerrilla warfare may have a role in any of the above types of war. It is defined as "military and para military operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominately indigenous forces". In a general war, guerrilla forces may be employed by the weaker side as a "last stand" after thermonuclear weapons have been used, or they may be used in a supporting role to regular forces as they were used by Russia in World War II. They could also be used in a supporting role in a limited war as were North Korean Guerrillas during the Korean War. In an insurgent war, guerrillas may play a dominant role during the early phases when anti-governmental forces are too weak to deploy regular armies. However, an insurgent war may be carried on without resort to guerrilla warfare. The Army Dictionary describes an insurgent war as: "A struggle between a constituted government and organised insurgents frequently supported from without but acting violently from within, against the political, social, economic, military and civil vulnerabilities of the regime to bring about its internal destruction to overthrow...."

From this, it is obvious that guerrilla warfare and insurgent war can be used in different circumstances and can be carried out in a variety of ways. Today, since the threat of nuclear war is always a clear and present danger, it is conceivable that guerrilla warfare and insurgent war may be two of the few methods of warfare capable of being conducted by man without destroying himself and the world.

**Strategy of Limited War**

Before a discussion of limited application of military power can be used in the dialogue of strategy and war, its main constituent - limited war - must be defined. In its broadest sense it is defined as: "Armed conflict short of general war, exclusive of incidents, involving the overt engagement of the military forces of two or more nations".  

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10 Karl Von Clausewitz, op.cit., n.2, p.596.
This definition, excluded both guerrilla and unconventional warfare from limited war. Interestingly, the definition does not refer to objectives or the “ends” to be achieved. Ambassador Robert McClintock has derived a definition which incorporates these essentials and adds reference to objectives: “Limited war is a conflict short of general war to achieve specific political objectives, using limited forces. As between great nuclear powers, the maintenance of the global strategic nuclear balance of power would preclude the use of strategic nuclear weapons, and fear of escalation would inhibit the use of tactical nuclear weapons.”¹¹ This definition associates the use of force with the attainment of specific political objectives and incorporates the risk that is inherent in many confrontations in the nuclear age. More precise perception of war limitations have been categorised as limitations of purpose (objectives); limitation of levels of violence (weapons); limitations of duration (time); and limitation of locale (geography).

**Strategy of War by Proxy**

Throughout history, there have been examples of states employing mercenaries or paying other countries to help them fight their enemies. The development of strategy of war by proxy or vicarious beligerency is the result not only of the invention of nuclear weapons and of the consequent need for nations to avoid coming directly into conflict with each other. On the contrary, the strategy has been evolving since the beginning of this century and nuclear weapons have only strengthened this tendency. Since World War II the supply of armaments to beligerents and to states on the verge of beligerency has become a major facet of the strategy of the superpowers. Arms transfers have also become an important way in which one nation can signal to another the significance which it attaches to the outcome of a current conflict or a possible future one - as the United States showed in 1980 by offering to supply arms to Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan conflict. Arms transfers enable the United States to support Israel and the Soviet Union to arm the Arab states without becoming involved in the Middle East wars themselves.

The Spanish civil war introduced one of the other new elements in contemporary strategy, the practice of sending pseudo-volunteers to fight in foreign wars. Mercenary armies

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are, of course, as old as history. Genuine volunteers still exist in the modern world. Jews from
the United States and other Western countries volunteered to help the Israelis in recent
Middle Eastern wars out of national or religious sympathy, while Iranians, Pakistanis and
other Muslims have volunteered to fight for Palestine, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Chechnya,
Dagestan and Kashmir. White soldiers of fortune have fought in the Congo and in the
Nigerian civil wars. They also volunteered to join the Rhodesian armed forces out of political
sympathy, the desire to participate in combat and perhaps to earn the wages offered. There is
a spectrum of aid in proxy wars, from financial assistance, through arms supplies and the
attachment of advisors, to the employment of pseudo volunteers in combat and finally to the
formal commitment of ground troops. American involvement in Vietnam moved through this
whole spectrum of proxy war. Pakistan has utilized this spectrum in Afghanistan and
Kashmir to a large extent.

Strategy of Low Intensity Conflict

As the international system enters a new phase of maturity and optimism, there is
growing realisation of the ‘un-winability of nuclear war, and the inconclusiveness of war as
an instrument of state policy’. The current international strategic environment indicates the
emerging significance of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). Although this form of warfare has
existed for centuries in its various manifestations, seldom has it been used to better effect than
during the last 40 years. In fact, LIC may euphemistically be referred to as the ‘Warfare of
the Future’. A trend analysis of the conflicts after 1945 indicate an increasing inclination of
nations to resort of LIC. This is so because mutual deterrence between nuclear/non nuclear
powers has proved so effective as to prohibit potential aggressors from initiating any
direct/overt conflict. Consequently, LIC has become the norm of international warfare and has
been pervasively embedded in the international system. This is especially so for the Third
World Nations which will undoubtedly see the vast majority of such conflicts. In our regional
context, a re-assessment of our threat perceptions appears to be necessary. India today finds
herself embroiled in combating an effective LIC situation, instigated by Pakistan, in J&K.
Having failed in her earlier attempts of annexing Kashmir by force, and realising the futility of
carrying out an armed adventure in the existing security scenario, Pakistan has adopted the
strategy of ‘low intensity conflict’.
Till a few years back LIC in the Third World tended to be viewed as a by-product of the decolonization process and a hazy reflection of superpower confrontation. It has now been accepted as a universal phenomenon, not necessarily a Third World ‘peculiarity’. LIC is a combustion of racial, tribal, religious and regional struggles which are manifested primarily in insurgency, subversion and terrorism.

The term LIC covers a wide variety of armed conflict. Any attempt to define all the terms such as Civil Disobedience, Insurgency, Guerrilla Warfare, Subversion, Terrorism, Revolutionary War, Insurrection, Partisan warfare, irregular/unconventional war etc., is more likely to lead to confusion rather than enlightenment. In any case there are no cut and dry labels that can be affixed to any particular conflict. Briefly, LIC can be described as confrontation short of full scale war. However, a more elaborate definition could be that ‘LIC is a conflict that takes place at levels below conventional war but above the routine peaceful competition among states. They often involve a protracted struggle between principles and ideologies’. These conflicts are generally waged in ‘peace-time’ in own or neighbouring countries with the aim of encouraging secession in a neighbouring country, upsetting existing borders, creating disorder/subversion or overthrowing a legally constituted government.

It could be waged by a combination of means, including the use of political, economic, informational and military instruments. The term LIC may prove to be a misnomer as it is only low from a global perspective: for insurgents/terrorists or a Third World government battling them, the conflict is just as total as the World Wars were for the great powers and may well mean national survival for that country. Low level operations are generally confined to specific geographical or ethnic areas and are often characterised by constraints on weaponry, tactics and level of violence. Inspite of being termed as low level, this kind of war can have far-reaching strategic aims. It is an attractive low cost option largely free of the dangers of a conventional/nuclear war.

The term LIC covers a wide variety of armed conflicts for political purposes. It could embrace insurgency, guerrilla warfare, terrorist or anti-drug operations, trans-border raids and even peace keeping operations which may generate low intensity conflicts. Beginning in the late 1960s, a rapid rise in the incidence of LIC has made this lower end of the overall conflict spectrum more complex and presented some of the more intractable security problems globally.
Having stated what LIC is, it would be of interest to see what high and mid intensity conflicts are. These could briefly be described as:-

- **Mid-Intensity Conflict** This is armed combat between regularly organised military forces and describes the activity which most of the world’s armed forces are organised, trained and equipped to conduct.

- **High-Intensity conflict** This could be briefly defined as combat involving the use of mass destruction weapons, as was witnessed by the use of two atomic weapons during the last days of World War II.

The difference between military operations in LIC and mid or high intensity war is in the objective. In the latter, success is measured in terms of winning battles and campaigns. In LIC, success will consist of achieving national security objectives that cannot be met with the use of military power alone. A comprehensive strategy incorporating political, economic, social, psychological and military programmes and initiatives is important.

**Use of Diplomacy as a Strategic Tool**

Having broadly discussed strategy, the other tool of state craft, i.e., diplomacy also needs to be attended to, John G. Stoessinger defines diplomacy as “the conduct of international relations by negotiation. It is a process through which nations attempt to realize their national interests.... When a nation has decided in favour of war, the instrument of diplomacy becomes superfluous. but so long as the national interest dictates the avoidance of war, diplomacy works on behalf of peace. And since most nations feel most of the time that their policies may be realized by means short of war, diplomacy has been, and remains a major highway to political order”. However, during the course of this study besides the classical employment of diplomacy, its more aggressive derivatives like ‘pressure, blackmail and coercive’ diplomacy will also be perused due to their relevancy. Kennan defines coercive diplomacy as one that compels an opponent to stop something, or to undo something, and therefore requires the compelling side to initiate action to take the first step... this is more offensive”. Alexander L. George has said about coercive diplomacy “The aim may be

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limited to merely stopping the action. A more ambitious aim is the reversal of what has already been accomplished. An even more ambitious aim is a cessation of the opponents hostile behaviour through a demand to change in the composition of the adversary's government or in the nature of the regime.\footnote{\textsuperscript{14} Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, (ed.), \textit{The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy} (Boulder USA: Westview Press, 1994), p.8.}

Coercive diplomacy in its true definition is therefore a form of non military strategy which may be tried before resorting to war. It may also be noted that it is an attractive strategy because it offers the user nation a chance to achieve reasonable objectives in a crisis with less cost, with much less bloodshed, with fewer political and psychological lost, and often with less risk of unwanted escalation than is true with traditional military strategy. A crisis resolved by means of coercive diplomacy is also less likely to contaminate future relations between the two sides than in a war. However, precisely because of these attractions, coercive diplomacy can be a dangerous tool. Leaders of some states may at times be erroneously tempted to believe that they can, with little risk, intimidate an opponent into giving up their challenge to a status quo situation. But the other state may be strongly motivated by what is at stake and refuse to back down, in effect calling the bluff of the coercing state. The latter, then, must decide, whether to back off or to escalate the crisis into a military confrontation. This is precisely what happened in 1947-48, and 1965 when the ploy failed and eventually led to a full scale Indo-Pakistan war. First, therefore, we need to clarify how we are using the concept of coercive diplomacy in this study and to differentiate it from other ways in which threats are used as instrument of policy. It is intended to translate this form of diplomacy in as much as it relates to the India Pakistan embroglio in Kashmir, specifically as to how Pakistan has been, and is continuing to employ it in order to achieve its political objectives and aims in Kashmir. Since Pakistan has and is using coercive diplomacy wherein coercive threats have constantly been employed aggressively to persuade India to give up Kashmir without resorting to actual use of military force, or limiting the use of military force, it will be better to designate it as 'blackmail diplomacy'. Pakistan has also been using coercive diplomacy as an appendage and a precursor to the employment of military strategy in order to gain quick and decisive military/political victory in Kashmir. As it attempted in 1948, 1965, and the Kargil conflict and is attempting to do so in a vastly
increased aggressive intensity during the contemporary phase in Kashmir as a low cost option to open military confrontation.

Another important adjunct to the policy is the employment of Pressure Diplomacy. The heading itself is fairly self explanatory, it broadly implies the use of Pressure Diplomacy in the field of economics, politics and Psychology. George F. Kennan in one of his lectures at the National War College elucidates this policy thus “Now let’s go on to measures of pressure... If you want some examples of measures that they (totalitarian Governments) are capable of taking, I can only mention from my own personal experience that they include persuasion, intimidation, deceit, corruption, penetration, subversion, horse trading, bluffing, psychological pressure, economic pressure, seduction, blackmail, theft, fraud, rape, battle, murder and sudden death... Those are only a few stray suggestion”. The writer labels these as measures short of war or modes of non hostile redress for settlement of bilateral disputes. A scrutiny of this list reveals that Pakistan has been indulging in many of the activities enumerated above, in its dealing with India on the Kashmir issue. However, here I choose to dialect more upon those pressure method that the democratic states have at their disposal. However, considering the fact the Pakistan has in the past not been a purely democratic state, I shall also touch upon certain more non amicable and unpleasant methods employed by Pakistan in Kashmir.

Psychological measures consist not only of direct informational activity like propaganda, or radio broadcast, or distribution of magazines. They consist also of the study and understanding of the psychological effects of anything which the modern state does in the war, both internal and external... the second category at our disposal today is economic that would include trade embargo’s, blockades, measure to cut off or reduce monetary aid from other countries/institution’s, severance of all trade and economy related activity. The third measure in the political arena which involves the cultivation of solidarity with other like minded nation on every given issue of foreign policy. These include establishment of facts, agreements and treaties of all kinds (economic, cultural and military). On the diplomatic front it may include severance or restriction of diplomatic relations, reduction or stoppage of people

to people interaction, denial of visits by people for business or pleasure, denial in collaboration in cultural or technical matters.16

Pakistan has been since 1947-48 to date, been resorting to coercive and pressure diplomacy in tandem with its military strategy as part of its two level strategy on Kashmir. Lawrence Ziring an authority on Pakistan states "The Pakistani's believe their cause in Kashmir is just. Kashmir is disputed territory and has been so recognised by the international community. Thus they distinguish between their support for the Kashmiri Liberation Front and an overt attack upon what they perceive as India proper. Most Pakistani's freely admit and indeed publicize their support for the Kashmiri Muslims. Although the Pakistan Government hedges on whether or not it is responsible for arming and training forces for conflict in Kashmir the activities of the Pakistan Army in the Summer and Fall of 1965, as in 1948, are known and substantiated.17 The use of diplomatic force by Pakistan is an integral part of its two level strategy on Kashmir and has been analysed in depth in this study.

**Pakistan's two level strategy**

Pakistan has been following a two level strategy of Armed conflict in Kashmir since 1947, albeit in different forms. In Pakistani perception, the Kashmiri Muslim is shrewd and intelligent, persevering in adversity, though not physically courageous and is a master of political intrigue. Secondly, the freedom struggle in the valley is indigenous and aimed at their right of self-determination. With this as the basis, Pakistan's two level strategy in Kashmir has been to ferment internal trouble and subversion, supported by mass infiltrators from across the border on one level, and then to use force externally by employing its regular armed forces directly, in conjunction with political and diplomatic offensives launched to garner support of the international community of nations and institutions, on Kashmir, at the second level. The use of political and diplomatic force is also resorted to during implementation of level one of the strategy. The strategy, therefore, in short is:

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16 Ibid., p.9, 10 and 11.
(a) **Level One:** This involves the domestic aspect of the strategy, i.e., the employment of internal subversion for fermenting trouble, supported by mass infiltrations, and sponsoring insurgency, terrorism and proxy war in J&K.

(b) **Level Two:** Involves the international relations aspect of the strategy, i.e., the employment of external force by regular army in conjunction with the ongoing proxy war and the use of political and diplomatic offensive to garner support of international community and institutions.

This strategy has been fairly well defined by Dr. Shireen M. Mazari, a Pakistani expert on defence and security matters and currently a contributing editor with the prestigious ‘Defence Journal’ of Pakistan. Her postulation in a recent edition of the magazine, after the Kargil war, compliments and reinforces the hypothesis of this study. She writes: “Pakistan even now has many opportunities it needs to exploit.... Pakistan needs to operate on two fronts:

One - On the military level Pakistan needs to prepare specialised units for low intensity operation that cannot only be sustained over a period of time but also contained within very precisely defined and limited parameters of escalation. Such preparedness would require not only special doctrines but also specialised conventional arms.

Two - On the subversion level Pakistan needs to act on all the fronts identified in the illustrated table (Given bellow). To begin with there are many conflicts prevailing in India - from the Sikh problem to the insurgency in north east to any number of ethnic conflicts - that can be exploited. Pakistan also needs to develop a more cohesive policy on subversion within India.”

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Pakistan followed this strategy in 1947, when it first inflicted total economic squeeze on J&K with a view to create anarchy, violence and misery on the people of the state. All essential commodities like petrol, diesel, kerosene, salt, cloth, wheat, medicines, etc., were held up by Pakistan at Rawalpindi and Sialkot and all road and rail communications were blocked. This was followed by the launching of “Operation Gulmarg” on 22 October 1947. The operation was preceded by pushing in tribal raiders and infiltrators into J&K with a view to ferment and fuel internal trouble against the Maharaja. The operation was led by Maj. Gen. Akbar Khan alias ‘Tariq’ (code name) assisted by Brig. Sher Khan. This is dealt with in some detail in a separate chapter subsequently.

In 1965, ‘operation Gibraltar’ was essentially launched based on this strategy and the perceived political advantage that the situation in the valley in the spring of 1965, gave to Pakistan by the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah. They felt that his arrest would influence the staggering agitation triggered by the Hazratbal incident. The main architects for the instigation of the political motivation were the then foreign minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and the foreign secretary, Aziz Ahmed in connivance with Maj. Gen. Akhtar Hussain Malik. They pressurised the President, Field Marshal Mohammed Ayub Khan to take advantage of the
situation and order the Army to send infiltrations into the valley for guerrilla activities and to help the locals in organising an uprising against India. “Operation Gibraltar” was launched preceded by a force of 7000 infiltrators, which eventually failed both due to strategic and tactical reasons.

Based on our knowledge of ‘Operation Gulmarg’ and ‘Gibraltar’, we will do well to assess the manifestation of “Operation Topac”, (whether ‘Op. Topac’ was hypothetical or real has been analysed separately in the study) which is actually proving to be their updated version with similar aims, and finally, the study of the Kargil war in the context of the two level strategy will also be attempted. Today the situation in the valley is more favourable for Pakistan to launch clandestine operations in the valley. While one can argue that the situation in the valley is still not ripe for a full fledged guerrilla war, aided, abetted and instigated by Pakistan, it will be naive to rule it out. The current situation is an insurgency situation which has the moral and material support of Pakistan. In the valley today, it has inducted trained militants equal in number to the one used during “Operation Gibraltar”. The major content of these militants is indigenous and they have established themselves in the valley effectively. There is local support available to them from within the political, social and religious organisations and segments of the administration and police force of the state. Despite efforts of the security forces, the elections and formation of an elected Government in the valley the fuze continues to burn, ready to explode anytime. All these issues will be dealt in detail subsequently in the study.

Reverting back to the subject of strategy as it pertains to this study, we shall proceed with the definition of strategy as applicable in particular to India and Pakistan.

Michael Howard has said that “...the whole field of international relations constituted a battle field in which the communist powers, thwarted in the use of force by the nuclear stalemate, were attacking the west by indirect political maneuvers such as infiltration and subversion”.\(^\text{19}\) In this definition if we transpose the words ‘communist powers’ and ‘the west’ by ‘Pakistan’ and ‘India’ respectively, then it could very well be applied to Pakistan’s strategy in Kashmir in general. However, a more relevant definition is by Robert Osgood,

who has suggested that “Military strategy must now be understood as nothing less than the overall plan for utilizing the capacity for armed coercion - in conjunction with the economic, diplomatic, and psychological instruments of power - to support foreign policy most effectively by overt, covert and tacit means”. The catch words in analysing Pakistan’s strategy in Kashmir, in the context of this study are - armed coercion; diplomatic and psychological instruments of power; by overt; covert and tacit means. Herein Pakistan is, in its pursuit of National objective, using armed coercion by resorting to violence, both in the conventional sense (use of regular army in war) and unconvention sense (use of subversion infiltration militancy and terrorism). It is doing this in conjunction with diplomatic and psychological instruments of power by attempting to garner international support or intervention to annex Kashmir. It is utilizing both these instruments, i.e. armed coercion and diplomatic and psychological means; in an overt, covert and tacit manner. Overtly, by openly declaring that Kashmir is a part of Pakistan and using armed aggression by its regular armed forces three times till date. Covertly, by using subversive methods in 1948, 1965, the current ongoing militancy and at Kargil during May 1999. The psychological effect of such actions impact the minds of military commanders and the civil population of the effected area who feel insecure, trapped and dislocated. It unbalances the military and civil, both mentally and physically. ‘Stonewall’ Jackson the famous American civil war General aptly expressed this in his strategical motto - “Mystify, mislead and surprise”. For to mystify and to mislead constitutes destruction, while surprise is the essential cause of dislocation. It is through the destruction of the commanders mind that the destruction and dislocation of the forces follow. Pakistan has resorted to this two level strategy variably, interchangeably, singly or both together, since 1948.

Now, in order to understand the political complexity of Pakistan’s strategy in Kashmir, it would be necessary to first understand the relationship between politics and strategy in general and then, as it applies to Pakistan in particular. Today, strategic thought is so inextricably entwined with international or national politics that it would be misleading and dangerous to try to separate the two. The definitions so far considered have all emphasized that strategy is fundamentally all about ‘means’ rather than ‘ends’. It has, thus, been assumed

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that setting political goals is the proper business of politicians, and that strategic planners are only interested in how given military resources can be usefully applied to the achievement of those goals. Their job, in other words, is to harness military power to the national interest, but their mandate does not extend to determining what, in a particular situation, the national interest is. The subordination of strategy to politics, implicit in this analysis, is now generally accepted. In democratic societies, specially, few would wish to challenge either the supremacy of political direction, or the view that strategic analysis should concentrate on identifying and evaluating the various choices available to states in their use of military power for ends clearly defined by political authorities. However, for achieving optimal results it is now accepted that in defining political goals or making high level political decisions the advice of strategists is not only desirable but essential. To be sure, politicians must exercise ultimate control, but the decisions they arrive at ought to be moderated by the advice from strategic specialists. If, as Clemenceau has said, “war is much too serious a business to be left to the generals”, it must be understood that it is also too serious to be left to the politicians”.

At this point it would be worth analyzing the relationship between strategy and politics as applicable to Pakistan, as the ‘politico-military’ environment and matrix in Pakistan is a dilemma. It is as paradoxical and unorthodox as it is unpredictable and unstable. Four times, since the birth of Pakistan on August 14, 1947, has the military taken over the country through coups. The first, was in 1958, when General Ayub Khan brought the military into the political arena claiming that the politicians had failed to provide good governance to the people of Pakistan, the second was in March 1969 when General Yahya Khan took over as the President and Chief Martial Law administrator in 1977, when General Zia-ul-Haq took over the government from Zulfikar Ali Bhutto following a coup d’etat and finally in November 1999 when General Pervez Musharraf took over from Prime Minister and Nawaz Sharif. Pakistan in its life of 53 years has been ruled by military for more than 24 years, even during the remainder 29 years of civilian governance it was actually the Army that continued to rule the country, though, indirectly. The persistent political intervention of the Pakistan Army is the consequence of an array of factors, like, incompetent civilian governments and creation of political vacuum by inept, corrupt and selfish political system. Ambitious military leadership which has already acquired a “taste” for power and holds politicians in contempt. The foreign policy factor, which provokes the Army to take over whenever a civilian
government talks or attempts rapprochement with India which the army perceives as an anathema. The final factor is the continued Punjabi dominated army's desire to keep the rest of Pakistan Punjabi dominated. Whatever be the factors, the fact is that, the Army in Pakistan is an autonomous "Power Centre" and will continue to influence governance whether in or out of it. As John Garnett says "while it is widely acknowledged that military power is necessary to protect democratic states from aggression and subversion, it is also recognised that the mere existence of this power in the hands of a few represents an inherent threat to the very democratic values it is supposed to protect." And this is exactly what has been happening in the body polity of Pakistan since the inception of the state.

The influence that the military has on National policy and decision making, has, and still is quite substantial and therefore, to borrow H. Lasswell's metaphors and calling Pakistan a "Garrison State" dominated by "Specialists in Violence" in the decision making process would not be an exaggeration. It is because of these military 'hawks' in Pakistan that three wars in the past and the ongoing proxy war have been fought between the two countries. In 1948 it was Col. Akbar Khan (later Major General) who launched 'Operation Gulmarg', in 1965, it was Field Marshal Ayub Khan who launched 'Operation Gibraltar' in 1971, it was General Yahya Khan and in 1988 it was Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, who planned and executed Pakistan's military strategy in Kashmir. In 1999, it was Gen. Pervez Musharraf who planned and executed the Kargil operation. More on this will be covered in subsequent chapters.

21 Ibid., p.73.