PREFACE

Conflict in the lower spectrum of war (guerrilla war, insurgent war, limited war, proxy war, militancy and terrorism) has always attracted me - perhaps, because of the inherent rebellion in my generation to anything conventional, be it warfare or anything else. This lure for the unconventional, further got accentuated when I joined the Army and experienced real war in the 1971, Indo-Pak conflict in the J&K sector. Later, in an effort to simultaneously enrich my professionalism practically and academically in this area of unconventional warfare, I opted for "International Terrorism" as the subject for my post graduate dissertation from Madras University, and followed it with an M.Phil from Indore University on "The Psychology of a militant - A Chink in the Armour". It was natural then, to further research the subject in depth for a doctoral degree.

After some intense discussions with Professor Sushil Kumar of the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, I decided on investigating the 'Use of Force in Regional Conflicts: A Study of Pakistan's Two Level Strategy in Kashmir Since 1987' mainly for two reason's. Firstly, I wanted to supplement my practical experience of having served in J&K for nearly a decade especially in an environment of insurgency with an academic experience which would help me to understand the complexities of the problem in a complete form. Thus enhancing my professional acumen as a soldier. Secondly, the subject itself was 'terrorizingly' challenging. Because, by the very nature of the subject very few scholars/writers had ventured to probe it in any great detail. During the course of my research I did not find much exclusive and direct work on the subject of Pakistan's strategy on Kashmir, though references to it were found on record in a rather oblique, obtuse and incomplete manner in some written material from sources in India, Pakistan and the West. It was thus, not easy to glean the contours of Pakistan's two level strategy clearly, from what may be termed as 'shades of grey'.

The study attempts to put these shades of grey in clear black and white so as to build up a well defined and intelligible image of Pakistan's strategy in Kashmir, which is an essential input for the formulation of our own counter strategies, policies and objectives at the highest civil and military level.
Kashmir is a prime reason for the blighting of Indo-Pak relations for the past nearly 53 years, during which, it has defied all attempts at solution through political, diplomatic and military means. Pakistan's strategy in Kashmir has been pitched at two levels. One, at the domestic level, by resorting to subversion, proxy war, militancy and terrorism, and two, at the level of international relations, by resorting to the use of military and diplomatic force. These two levels have been employed by it singularly, in tandem, alternatively and simultaneously to suit its foreign policy and domestic interests, right from 1947-48 till Kargil in 1999, and during the on-going proxy war in J&K.

The study deals with the subject in nine chapters. Chapter I, consists of Introduction, where-in, Strategy in general is explained with the help of definitions of various types of strategy pertinent to this study, namely, guerrilla and insurgent wars, limited war, proxy war and low intensity conflict. The employment of diplomacy as a strategic tool is also explained. Chapter II, specifically deals with Pakistan's strategy on Kashmir and the factors contributing to its development, Chapter III, deals with the 1947-48 first Indo-Pak war on Kashmir and the maiden implementation of its two level strategy during "Operation Gulmarg". Chapter IV, deals with the 1965 Indo-Pak war and how it implemented an improved version of the two level strategy during its "Operations Gibraltar and Grandslam" in J&K. This chapter also briefly touches upon the relevance of this strategy during the 1971 war. Briefly, because the focus of the operation then was on East-Pakistan and not J&K. Chapter V, onwards, the subject proper is studied in detail, which is Pakistan's two level strategy post 1987 till date. It includes level one of the strategy and factors influencing the rise of militancy in the state. Level two of the strategy dialects on the use of military and diplomatic force during this period. Chapter VI, VII and VIII are adjuncts of Chapter V. Chapter VI, attempts to prove the reality of Zia's "Operation Topac". Chapter VII, discusses the substantial contribution of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in fueling the Kashmir embroglio. Chapter VIII, deals in detail with the Kargil conflict of May-July 1999, the latest and perhaps the clearest example of Pakistan's two level strategy in J&K. Chapter IX concludes the study.

I wish to acknowledge all those who made this endeavour a possibility. Foremost I acknowledge my debt to my Supervisor and Guru, Professor Sushil Kumar, whose
stimulating intellectual engagement with the subject guided me, a professional soldier, through the pitfalls of academic research. In him I have truly found a lifelong guide friend and philosopher. Prof. H.C. Narang, JNU, whose active encouragement led me to the portals of this university.

My daughter Niharika who kept my spirits up from far-away Washington, where she is pursuing her masters in 'International Relations' from SAIS. My son Arjuna whose incredible curiosity and nimble fingers provided me a fund of information on the internet. My deep appreciation to the United Services Library (USI) whose coffers of knowledge made my job easy. Commander Vijay Dalal of the Indian Navy, Dr. S. Kalyanaraman and the staff of the library - Raman Shukla, Anita, Renu, Urmil, Santosh, Maurya, Ved and Charanjit - were always all too eager to assist me and allow me use of the library premises as my second home, for two stimulating years.

A special thanks to my family and friends who stood by me through out. To my late sister-in-law Parijat Roy who prayed for my success till her very last breath. Dr. Minoti Chatterjee, and Dr. Meenakshi Bharat who have taken special interest in my work, and countless others whose contribution, directly or indirectly, must be complimented. I specially acknowledge the committed hardwork that Mr. Rajender Kumar has made to give my handwritten draft its present shape.

I wish to dedicate this study to my wife, Dr. Roopali Sircar, Senior Reader in English, Delhi University, who first stirred my mind to take up this project, and whose faith in me kept me going.

Last but not the least my deepest and heartfelt gratitude to the Indian Army for permitting me a two year sabbatical from exigent front line duties.

Finally, I put on record, that the views expressed in this study do not represent the views or policies of either the government or the armed forces. Any flaws and inadequacies are entirely mine and I take complete responsibility for them.

(Pranadhar Gaur)