CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

General

The task of accurately and credibly stipulating the strategy of an adversary nation, in the absence of easy access to information on such a classified matter, is rather a daunting and difficult task. However, in the realm of international relations and in the interest of national security it becomes incumbent on a country to endeavour to clearly layout the opponent country’s strategy by a process of analysis, inferences and appreciation, derived from various sources at the disposal of the country seeking to construct an ‘identity kit’ framework of its antagonist’s strategy. These sources include the history, geography, politics, (both external and internal), economics, socio-religious factors, resources (both civil and military), ideology and the psychology of the nation in question. This exercise is necessary, as it not only assists in developing a viable counter strategy but also helps in anticipating and forestalling any future political, diplomatic and military plans of the opponent, by a process of analytical prediction. Since combat in any form is a two party affair where the need to guard is as essential as the need to hit, therefore, the need to logically predicate the appontent nations intentions assume increased significance. These are the ‘games nation’s play’ in the arena of ‘real politik’.

Strategy, per-se is a complex political phenomenon, comprising as many definitions as its myriad forms. From the highest form of strategy, sometimes termed as the grand strategy to pure or military strategy, to a host of alternate strategies that have gained prominence primarily because of nuclearization and economic and political cost-effectiveness, which seem to proclude large scale all out wars in todays context. These strategies are; limited war, guerrilla or insurgent war, proxy war, limited and low intensity conflict. These strategies, in fact, tend to reverse the famous Clausewitzian dictum of “war being a continuation of politics by other means” to “politics being the continuation of war by other means”. It is in this spectrum of alternate strategies, that this study has focussed on Pakistan’s strategy in J&K since partition in 1947, in general and since 1987, in particular. The use of coercive or pressure or blackmail diplomacy as a form of non military strategy by Pakistan as
an appendage to its military strategy has also been studied as an integral part of their strategy in J&K. It has been resorting to this strategy before using military force, as it offers it a chance to achieve reasonable objective in a crisis with less cost, with less bloodshed, with fewer political and psychological loss and in the case of war it has utilized it to garner international support. In the case of the on-going proxy war situation, it has depended on it for internationalizing the issue so as to seek third party mediation. In essence therefore, Pakistan has and still continues to use a combination of conventional, alternative and diplomatic strategies in J&K.

It is this fundamental idea that formed the bedrock of this entire work and the hypothesis that became the starting point was the fact that Pakistan has been, since its inception as a separate nation, following a two level strategy in Kashmir, as has been elaborated in the study. These are:

(a) **Level one of the strategy:** This involves the domestic aspect of the strategy, i.e., the use of irregular form of warfare in Kashmir by subversion, infiltration, sponsoring militancy and terrorism. In short, inflicting a state of low intensity conflict or proxy war in J&K.

(b) **Level two of the strategy:** This involves the international relations aspect wherein Pakistan resorted to the use of military force in symphony with the use of diplomatic force, to achieve its national objectives in J&K, i.e., annexation.

The development and implementation of this two level strategy has been analysed in fair amount of details in the study from its inception in 1947-48 till as late as June 2000. During these 53 years, amazingly, this strategy has sustained and survived without any drastic changes. The similarities between its strategy in 1947-48 and 1965 and recently in Kargil in May-July 1999, is yet striking. If political history is to be believed, then there seems little reason to believe that Pakistan will abandon this strategy in the near future, provided, geo-political and strategical status quo prevails in the sub-continent.

The reasons why Pakistan has relentlessly followed this strategy are numerous - it is economical, it affords it an avenue to pursue its policy of deniability of involvement, it is complimentary to its domestic and foreign policy objectives, it has been learnt from the Chinese strategy of 'peoples war', the American's Vietnam experience (in a reverse engineered form) and their own Afghanistan experience. Another reason for Pakistan to
subscribe to this strategy, would lead to seeking a relationship between strategy and politics as applicable to Pakistan, as the “politico-military” environment there is as paradoxical and unorthodox as it is unpredictable and unstable. four times since the birth of Pakistan has the military taken over the country through coups. In its nearly 53 years of existence, it has been ruled by the Army for more than 24 years (even today it is being ruled so), even during their remainder 29 years of civilian rule, it was the army that actually called the shots as an independent “Power Centre”. Calling Pakistan a “Garrison State” dominated by “Specialists in violence” would not be an over statement, because, the three wars the ongoing proxy war and the latest Kargil conflict in J&K have a military rule or a military dominated connection. in 1948, it was Col. Akbar Khan (later Major General) who launched “Operation Gulmarg”. In 1965 it was Field Marshal Ayub Khan the President and Marshall Law administration who launched “Operations Gibraltar and Grandslam”. In 1971, it was General and President Yahya Khan. In 1987-88, it was General Zia-Ul-Haq who planned and executed the ongoing proxy war in J&K. IN 1999, it was General Pervez Musharraf who planned and executed the Kargil conflict.

Almost no writers, either from the subcontinent or from around the world have ventured to write, exclusively on this, what appears to be a, ‘forbidden’ subject. The study identifies five factors that impinge on the formulations of Pakistan’s Kashmir strategy. These are; historical, geographical, Islamic or religious, nuclear and asymmetric conflict factors. The historical factor highlights, the partition, the accession of J&K to India, the UN resolutions following the 1947-48 war, the traditional Pak-Kashmir links and the 1971 war resulting in the separation of East Pakistan that became the bone of Indo-Pak contention and influenced Pakistan’s strategy in J&K. The geographical factor highlights the geostrategic locations of Pakistan, the lack of strategic depth and their impact on the development of Pakistan’s strategy in J&K. The Islamic factor focuses on Islamization of Pak society, the Quranic concept of war, the concept of Jehad, terror and indirect war as contained in the Quaran, which have all been incorporated in Pak strategy in Kashmir. The nuclear factor’s blackmail shadow, underlines the emergence of limited/proxy wars/terrorism as a means of achieving Pak’s national policy objectives and finally the asymmetric conflict factor, by which Pakistan a much smaller nation manages to engage India a much larger and stronger nation in confrontation, by evolving a strategy comprising of the concept of pre-emptive strike, limited
war option, guerrilla war and terrorism. Having thus formulated, the two level strategy on Kashmir, based on the above factors, Pakistan proceeded to implement it right from its inception in 1947 till date.

Pak's Two Level Strategy: 1947-48 and 1965

The continuum of Pakistan's two level strategy in Kashmir has been remarkably consistent. It may be recalled that in 1947-48, Pakistan sent in its irregulars first into J&K, while all the time pleading innocence, this was followed by the use of its regular army later. In 1965, again Pakistan resorted to this strategy when it inserted well trained and well armed infiltrators into J&K, claiming they were 'freedom fighters' and the Government of Pakistan was not involved with the 'revolt', in anyway. In reviving this technique nearly twenty years later (in 1965), Pakistan added a sophisticated refinement, by pretending to be just a friendly supporter for the attempt of a semi-independent Azad Kashmir to reunify the state through 'legal hostilities' as the 'resistance fighters' were legally entitled to cross the cease fire line (CFL as it was then known) since the entire Kashmir forms one unit, divided only by an artificial military boundary, and that the Indian army being a 'foreign occupation force' had no legal 'locus standi' to take action against them. This is the stand that Pakistan stubbornly insists on taking till date, despite a plethora of evidence available to the contrary and known by the international community.

Another refinement to the strategy that they added in 1965, was the strategy of guerrilla warfare which clearly conformed to the type practiced by communist patented national liberation wars. The strategy was akin to Chinese and Vietnamese "three step formula, in which, the first step is wild and aggressive propaganda, the second step is the infiltration of armed guerrillas to attempt to engineer an internal rebellion, followed by the final step, in which the regular army steps in to 'Liberate' the people of 'occupied' state".¹ Perhaps, Mao and Ho Chi Minh inspired Pakistan wants to convert Kashmir into another Vietnam. These three steps encompass Pakistan's two level strategy, to a great extent the first two steps form level one of the strategy, while step three forms the second level. Though, the 1965, strategy was more refined, it was yet not perfect. The fundamental flaw being the fact that the local population was not prepared for either rising up in revolt against the Indian

Government nor were they prepared to provide local support to Pakistani infiltrators, above all, there was absolute non existence of a ‘cause’ for a local surprising. In short, the basic reasons for the rise of militancy did not exist in the valley.

Pak’s Two Level Strategy: 1971

In 1971, for a change the focus of conflict was not Kashmir but East Pakistan. Therefore, though Pakistan’s strategy in J&K was more defence oriented. It did learn a lesson from the Indian ‘two level’ strategy in Bangladesh, which it, later employed in Kashmir post 1987. 1971, was also the year when local militancy and terrorism in the form of ‘AL Fatah’, the JKLF, and plebiscite front germinated in J&K, with the hijacking of the Indian Airlines plane ‘Ganga’ to Pakistan, and other minor terrorist incidents that occurred in J&K during this period. It was during 1971, that Pakistan incorporated another significant change in its two level strategy, by incorporating its intelligence agencies for carrying out subversion in J&K. During the 1947-48 and 1965 conflicts these activities were basically being planned and implemented by the army and politicians. Later, level one of their strategy was majorly controlled by their inter-service intelligence (ISI). The 1971 war also sowed the seeds of the current conflict because of two reasons. Firstly, by the creation of Bangladesh, the ‘two nation theory’ which was the ideology for the creation of Pakistan lay shattered and defunct. Secondly, Pakistan’s military defeat left it humiliated and shamefully shattered. It was therefore left with a burning desire for revenge, for which, it had to wait for almost two decades to inflict a proxy war in J&K, in order to redeem its ideology, its pride and its honour.

Having thus developed their two level strategy in J&K from its incipient stage in 1947-48, Pakistan has travelled a fair distance in this field during the intervening nearly 53 years and has by June 2000 (which is the cut off period for the study) perfected it to a fair degree of adroitness through the process of evolution over the years and learning from their past mistakes and failures. The result is conspicuously evident by the going’s on in J&K during the current stage of the conflict commencing from 1987 onwards which happens to be the defining period of this study.
Pak's Two Level Strategy: 1987 Onwards

1987, has been taken as the starting point for the study because of the fact that it was this year in which most events contributing to the rise of the current phase of Indo-Pak conflict and ipso-facto the implementation of Pakistan’s two level strategy in J&K occurred. These events were - the 1987, Rajiv-Farooq Accord and the consequent unfair elections, the peaking of Pak sponsored militancy in Punjab, the GNLF call of an independent Gorkhaland, the ULFA and Bodo separatist movement in Assam, the Meerut Communal riots of 1987, increase in Border tension due to the Indian military exercise, 'Brass-tacks' in 1987, and Pakistan’s retaliatory military exercise ‘Zarb-e-Momin’ in 1988-89, the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka, the Afghan crisis, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and finally the pathetic state of administration and governance in J&K itself.

Because of the foregoing factors, the situation in J&K was in the midst of a political, economic and social chaos, and as it happens so often under such conditions, the common man turns to violence and anarchy for solace and redemption and when this happens the state inimical to you steps in to take advantage of the situation, which Pakistan promptly did and unleashed its proxy war/low intensity conflict/limited war in conjunction with an aggressively mounted diplomatic offensive. This precisely was the opportunity Pakistan had been waiting for since 1971, and the Afghan-Strategy of ‘Bleeding by a thousand cuts’ was duly enforced. the first step in this form of warfare naturally is sponsoring of subversion and militancy.

Militancy in J&K was perpetrated by Pakistan in two phases. Phase one was the 'Azadi' phase which lasted for 3 to 4 years from 1987-88 to 1990-91, during this phase, militancy was primarily an indigenous movement led by local Kashmiri groups importantly the JKLF, sponsored and supported in every way by Pakistan. This was meant to lead to a general uprising by the people of Kashmir. When his did not happen, and the people seemed to be more enamoured by the concept of 'Kashmiriyat' and 'Azadi', Pakistan changed track and soon dumped the JKLF in favour of more fundamentalist and deadlier foreign mercenary and pro-merger groups. Phase two or the merger phase thus got under-way. Pakistan's subversion strategy of "insurgency implosion" thus changed to "insurgency explosion". This phase is continuing till date and is characterised by fundamentalism, "Jehad" and merger to Pakistan, led by Afghan dominated terror groups like the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Ansar. Lashkar-e-Tayyaba etc. This form of militancy forced the pro-
accession policy down the throats of the people by sheer terror and fear of death. Very soon the JKLF and the pro-azadi movement practically vanished from the valley. The occupation of the venerated Hazratbal shrine in 1993, and the destruction of Charar-e-sharif shrine in 1995, both symbols of moderate sufism and icons of the spirit of ‘Kashmiriyat’ sounded the death knell of the pro-azadi phase.

The tactics employed by the militants to root out the moderate pro-azadi elements, the attacks on non-muslims in J&K to hasten the ethnic cleansing of the valley, the issue of cross border terrorism, the existence of training camps in Pakistan, the presence of foreign mercenaries, specially, the Afghans, the obvious involvement of Pakistan in sponsoring proxy war and cross-border terrorism proves the existence of Pak inspired an instigated pro-merger movement. The rise and the shift in the strategy of militancy post-Kargil has been prominently exemplified by the direct attacks on well guarded security forces camps, including the Headquarters of 15 corps (the highest controlling militar organisation in the valley) at Badamibagh, by ‘fidayeen’ (suicide squads) groups and increased hostility on the Line of Control by Pakistan’s regular army are all indicative of Pakistan’s two level strategy in J&K.

Another latest phenomenon complimenting this strategy is the infusion of Pakistan’s regular army troops amongst the militant ranks aimed at boosting militancy in J&K. This is not a new tactic by any means, but a repetition of its 1947-48, “Operation Gulmarg” and more relevantly its 1965, “Operation Gibraltar” strategy. In resurrecting this strategy Pakistan seems to have been influenced and enthused by, firstly, its Afghan experience where its regular troops are, till date, fighting, ‘incognito’ alongside the Taliban militia. Secondly, by the Kargil conflict, which, majority Pakistanis claim and believe was a brilliant tactical stroke, undone by a weak civilian government. Thirdly, by the constant propagation and encouragement being given by some very senior serving and retired military officers and defence experts, to the implementation of, what is being commonly referred to as, ‘Operation Gibraltar-2’, now, when the conditions in J&K are much more favourable for insurgency than in 1965. And if this experiment shows some signs of success then the involvement of Pakistan’s regular army in yet another direct conflict with the Indian army across the LoC in J&K at some future opportune moment may, perhaps, become a possibility. Yet again, proving the authenticity of its two level strategy.
Coming back to the question of pro-Azadi and pro-merger phase of militancy in J&K, it is felt that a bit of further deliberation and analysis of this phenomenon is warranted with a view to arriving at a future prognosis. This interpretation is restricted to level one of their strategy, though it may have some over-flow into level two as well, mainly, as far as the diplomatic and international systems are concerned. Pakistan has experimented with sponsoring and supporting both the pro-azadi and pro-merger elements in the valley. Their support of the latter has been much superior both qualitatively and quantitatively for obvious reasons. However, if one weighs the performance of these two philosophy's in terms of success achieved in totality and across all political parameters, it will be found that the scales are fairly evenly balanced and there is little to choose from either of them. Both have actually failed in achieving the objectives of their mentors from across the border. While, in terms of purely spectacular short term tactical achievements the pro-merger philosophy may be able to tilt the balance in its favour, but if viewed from a long term political and strategic perspective the pro-azadi philosophy still continues its pre-dominance, both, domestically and internationally. Domestically, a majority of the people of J&K are now arrayed against the 'modus operandi' of the pro-merger elements, their deep rooted cultural heritage does not permit them to easily accept the fundamentalist's dogma, and they seem to be openly tiring of the fall outs of this form of militant philosophy which has blighted their lives for more than a decade now. The domestic ramification of this philosophy is not only restricted to J&K but also permeates and influences the domestic scenario within Pakistan, where the mercenary 'Jehadi' - Taliban - fundamentalist nexus has already started having fallouts in the form of politico-sectarian violence and unrest within the Pakistani socio-political milieu. Internationally also the world including their allies have now openly started disassociating themselves from displaying open solidarity with Pakistan, as the world has now come to know of Pakistan's complicity in sponsoring cross border terrorism in J&K, specially post Kargil and post IC-814 hijacking. It narrowly escaped being branded a terrorist state by the US. Consequently, it stands isolated in the international arena to a great extent. Chagai and the military coup there have not helped matter either. Logical analysis, would therefore, dictate that Pakistan's over-all interests would be best served by not pursuing the pro-merger philosophy, for the time being at least.
The ‘Pro-Azadi’ philosophy on the other hand seems to be a better option, primarily because of the acceptability factor. Though, it ideologically rebels against Pakistan’s (or for that matter India’s) stated policy stand on it. Domestically, the people of J&K, atleast a majority of them, are more amenable to it. This form of a movement has higher chances of gaining the status of an ‘implosive’ insurgency. Internationally also it is liable to gain more sympathy and support, while allowing Pakistan to rid itself of the badge of a state sponsoring cross-border terrorism.

Having thus analysed both the pro-Azadi and Pro-merger philosophies it would be safe to assume that Pakistan, would, in the near future favour an amalgam of both these philosophies, so as to acquire optimum gains. It may, at one level, again enhance its support to the more popular pro-Azadi elements like the JKLF in the valley thereby gaining popular local support, as also, continue the strategy of “bleeding by a thousand cuts” to drain India’s military and non-Military resources. At the other level, it may give more impetus to the process of merger in a non-violent, constitutional and political form, by supporting and encouraging the existing political groups like the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC), and the Muslim United Front (MUF), etc., who are already inclined towards merger, to mount an overt political and non-violent campaign for merger by asking for plebiscite, preferably, after acquiring political dominance through the electoral process. This form of a two pronged attack sponsored by Pakistan is a likely future option which has the highest success potential of all other strategies implemented by it till date. Such a strategy will give the movement more international legitimacy and sympathy because of its democratic content.

As far as the implementation of its level two strategy in J&K in concerned during the post 1987 period. Pakistan restored to and banked more on the use of diplomatic force rather than in the use of overt military force which was precluded by, besides other factors, a status, commonly referred to as the “no war no peace” state which means the absence of peace and presence of limited use of military force on the LoC, mostly confined to trans-border firing duels and minor skirmishes. However, even under such conditions Pakistan did resort to higher level of use or the threat of use of military, force. Specially, in 1987, during the Indian ‘Exercise Brasstacks’, in 1989-90 during their exercise “Zarb-e-Momin”, it is still continuing to use force in the Siachen glacier area till date, and finally, during the Kargil conflict in 1999. It has, during all these examples of use of military force, utilized the Nuclear-threat as an
instrument of coercive blackmail, to carry on its proxy/limited war in Kashmir. It is doing this under open support of China, which is assisting its nuclear weapons programme and perhaps, also the covert support of ‘look the other way’ policy of USA.

In as far as the use of Diplomatic force by Pakistan is concerned. It is characterised by five factors; one, the policy of ‘deniability’, under which it has constantly denied its open involvement in Kashmir. Two, its ‘spill-over’ policy, under which there is little or no distinction between its domestic and foreign policy on Kashmir. Three, the “Brinkmanship” policy, under which Pakistan has been creating situation that, time and again bring both countries to the brink of a war, so as to attract international attention. Fourthly, the ‘Zero Sum-Game’ policy, by which Pakistan ensures that no solution to the Kashmir issue is found or succeeds, it is, in fact, a contest between India’s policy of bilateralism and Pakistan’s policy of Multilateralism. Fifthly, its ‘Interventionist’ policy in Kashmir, which is in line with its Afghan policy.

The aim of its diplomatic campaign has been “internationalisation”, “mediation by a third party”, “Human Rights” issue and “Plebiscite” or return to UN resolutions. The countries and international institutions that it is mainly targetting are China, USA, OIC and the UN. The tools that Pakistan has employed besides the conventional political and bureaucratic diplomacy are the use of a Pro-Pak lobby in the US parliament comprising of hired senators and politicians, the Pro-Pak Kashmir lobby led by Dr. Ghulam Nabi Fai and other Kashmiri NRI’s and hiring of very high profile PR firms like Black, Manfort, Stone and Kelly (who managed George Bush’s Presidential campaign) and Dennis Neil and Company (whose services are said to cost $600,000 a year).

The dissertation has also deliberated on the role of the ISI in the Kashmir affair and has been compared to CIA’s Contra Affair of the 1980’s, because of the striking similarity between the two. As a matter of fact, CIA could well have given Pakistan a blueprint of its Contra operation, which the ISI first replicated in Afghanistan and later in Kashmir. That the ISI is an independent power centre in Pakistan is common knowledge. As a matter of fact the implementation of Pakistan’s level one strategy in Kashmir during the post 1987 era is primarily the work of the ISI whose expertise in subversion, terrorism and institution of proxy war, after the Afghan crisis, has become legendary. Its main weapons are - Fundamentalism, Jihad, training, motivation and induction of indigenous and foreign militants, clandestine
procurement of weapons and equipment to wage proxy wars. Post Afghan crisis the ISI siphoned off nearly 60% of the resources supplied to it by the CIA which was meant for the Afghan war. The vast unaccounted resources in terms of arms, ammunition, trained mujahideens and finances collected through US and Saudi Arabian doles and drug money, were now directed toward India by the ISI, it was Punjab followed by Kashmir which became their targets. The powers that be, in Pakistan provided full support to it as it also amounted to diverting ‘Frankenstein’s’ attention elsewhere, lest it turned upon its own master. The fury of Pakistan’s proxy war under ISI’s tutelage reached a crescendo where the USA was forced to issue a warning to declare Pakistan a terrorist state during end 1992. However, ISI continued with its evil designs on Kashmir, culminating in the Kargil crisis and the IC-814 hijacking. ISI is making full use of the expertise gained from the CIA during the Afghan war, in fermenting trouble in J&K. It is following a four pronged action programme, at the political level, propaganda level, Para-military level and covert action level. Its ultimate objective is to achieve merger of J&K and in so doing, it will leave no stone unturned and a peaceful settlement of the dispute is not at all a part of its agenda on J&K. The failure of the ten foreign level secretaries talks between the two countries is a case in point.

“Operation Topac”: ‘Operation Topac’, Zia-ul-Haq’s mysterious masterpiece of operational planning to annex J&K was executed in 1987-1988. Mysterious because, since its first appearance in print in the Indian Defence Review of July 1989, there has been a running debate whether the operation was a reality or a mere figment of imagination. The research team which authored the article themselves claim it to be “part fact, part fiction”. The so-called ‘Op Topac’ as enunciated by General Zia has been depicted in the article, in the first person in the form of a briefing being given by Gen. Zia himself to his senior military commanders, representatives of the ISI, the Government of POK officials and some other select persons.

The three phases of this operation, in fact, clearly enunciate the two level strategy of Pakistan in Kashmir. The opinion in India and Pakistan and indeed, amongst the military experts, media and academics around the world are split as to the authenticity of the plan. Some have called it the ‘Zia Plan’, some have referred to it as the ‘Kashmir Plan’, some call it the ‘Liberation Plan’ and some have labelled it ‘Op. Topac’ whatever be the name attributed to the plan, the fact that stands out in this study is that there did exist a well thought
out plan by Pakistan on Kashmir. This student, after extensive research attempts to prove the reality of such a plan by producing a repletion of oral, documentary and circumstantial evidence from both sides of the border, as well as, from beyond. In doing so, an amplitude of written material from varied sources have been referred to but the aspect that really puts the debate at rest is the fact that the translation of the verbal ‘Op Topac’ plan into reality on ground is so exact and precise that it defies all chances of any undesigned and unintended coincidence or accident. Logic and the law of averages also preclude any such thing. The researcher has, gone to great length to prove reality from figment by transposing Zia’s verbal plan into real and actual happenings on ground in J&K. ‘Op Topac’ there fore is a reality, whatever one may say, Pakistan will never accept it for obvious reasons and India will do the same either to protect its source of information or for political and security expediency or for fear of accountability - now that so much of the plan that had come to our notice in 1989, has proved to be correct including the Kargil conflict. In this chapter the researcher has also conceptualized a phrase for Pak sponsored militancy in J&K and termed it as “Concentric Crescent of militancy” by which Pakistan intends to fire up the outer ring consisting of areas from Siachen to Drass, the middle ring consisting of areas involving Poonch, Rajauri, Naushera, Jammu, Doda and Kishtawar and the inner ring consisting of the valley. the implementation of ‘ethnic cleaning’, ‘Mosque Militancy’, ‘Temple Terrorism’ and ‘Media Militancy’ have also been extensively highlighted.

The Kargil Conflict

The latest and perhaps a near perfect example of Pakistani two level strategy in Kashmir is the Kargil conflict of May-July 1999. It can rightly be termed as the culmination of the development of this strategy through 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and 1987-88. That it eventually turned out to be Pakistan’s “Bay of Pigs” is a different matter. What it reflects is that Pakistan, as in the past , will continue to persist with this strategy in future, their boast of ‘many more Kargils to follow’ therefore cannot be and must not be taken as just an idle boast. There is ample proof that the Kargil plan was conceived sometimes during Zia’s tenure in 1987 and formed a part of ‘Operation Topac’ but for reasons highlighted in the study it was implemented by General Pervez Musharraf. Level one of the plan envisaged the infiltration into unheld and vacant areas in Kargil, Drass, Batalik and Mushkoh by mixed groups of trained Mujahideens and Pak regulars in civilian disguise (reminiscent of 1947-48 and 1965
wars). This was preceded by subversion of the locals of the area. At the second level Pakistan launched its military campaign using its regular troops, while simultaneously unleasing an aggressive diplomatic offensive, with the aim of internationalizing the issue and seeking third party mediation - and they were successful in attracting the attention of the President of USA, the most powerful man on earth, who interceded as a “facilitator” which Pakistan claims is another word for mediation.

As in the past, Pakistan continued with its policy of denial here too, stating that its regular army was not involved. Later, this lie lay shattered along with the bodies of hundreds of their soldiers which were recovered by the Indian army (some of them were handed over to Pak authorities including that of captain Karnal Sher Khan who was awarded the highest Pakistani war decoration, after the war). The hand of General Musharraf in doing the Kargil on India is evident from the fact that he was involved in the Afghan war, he was also the Commander of the Pakistani Brigade opposite Kargil in 1986 and therefore knew the area well. The study, also brings out the fact that Musharraf was impressed and therefore studied the Indo-Chinese ‘Wangdung Incident’ of 1986-87, when Chinese troop intruded and occupied unheld areas in Arunachal Pradesh, at this time Musharraf was commanding the Pakistani Brigade at Skardu opposite Kargil and perhaps, must have decided to do a ‘Wangdu’ on India at a future date. Kargil is significant as the probability of the same operation being implemented else where or on the larger canvass of entire J&K, some times in future, cannot be ruled out.

This study has attempted to bring out the development, refinement and the continued implementation of Pakistan’s two level strategy in Jammu and Kashmir since 1947, till a late as June 2000. However, with this, only one part of the problem has been identified, albeit the most fundamental and significant one. Equally important is part two of the problem that naturally flows out from this, which is the development, by India, of a counter strategy, to the two level strategy of Pakistan, in Jammu and Kashmir. This study needs to be attempted to construct the frame-work of a defined and structured counter-strategy which would assist in the quest for solving the enigmatic Indo-Pak jigsaw puzzle over Jammu and Kashmir.