CONCLUSION
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The Cold War has been the defining phenomenon for the past four decades. There was no warfare between the super powers but there were conflicts between the allies of the two as well as contests for political power in Europe, Asia and the Third World. There were crises over rights in Berlin, war in Korea ballistic missile crisis in Cuba, and protracted and agonizing war in Vietnam. Open nuclear threats have been ineffective and their frequency often exaggerated. There have been fortunately marked differences between doctrine and behaviour, theory and practice. Today the race for nuclear weapon superiority is far less pronounced than it was since the time the first two bombs were dropped in August, 1945. The Cold War has been the defining phenomenon for the past four decades. Fear and challenge had dominated arms control and detente.

Throughout the period of Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union had plenty of survivable nuclear overkill capacity. The Rusians including the Soviet leadership remembered the immense casualties they suffered during a "merely conventional" Second World War. This had no match in the entire history of the United States. The peril induced by nuclear deterrence was not affected by the relative ruthlessness or sufferings of the American and Soviet societies. The imperative of avoiding a nuclear war imposed caution on the leaders so much so that it led Raymond Aron to conclude that there was "a" solidarity of Great Powers against a total war of which they would be the first victims." They remained determined not to interdestroy themselves. Despite detailed warplans and frantic efforts to evolve strategies for fighting and prevailing in a nuclear war, leaders of both sides remained sane and they were also watched and advised by sane colleagues.¹

At the moment of choice, the nuclear threat was put into practice.²

² Ibid., p. 587.
There were nuclear alerts but they were part of coercive diplomacy.

The "tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons as Thomas Schelling called it, is the most important legacy of the first half century of fission. While NATO military doctrine never renounced first use of nuclear weapons in an armed conflict with the Warsaw Pact, circumstance never arose to implement NATO strategy in Europe. Thus the most dangerous moments have also been the most revealing ones: regarding non-use. The confrontation with US on Cuba and on a lesser scale with China over a long common border was resolved peacefully. Soviet caution further enhanced this tradition. Such a sharing of the same tradition has however set a strong foundation for arms control moves and declarations of non-use of weapons all these years. Both history and logic have made it clear that nuclear weapons will never be used unless it is in the hands of the most irrational or the insane.

Bundy concludes:

"There is no level of superiority which will make a strategic first strike between the two great states anything but an act of utter folly."3

In such a scenario nothing would be better than arms reductions and President Gorbachev and President Regan moved in the same direction when they declared in 1987:

"A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought."

After several years of discussion, Regan Administration's plans to fight and win a protracted nuclear war this new trend was a remarkable admission of shared danger.

The coming into power of Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union in 1985, is a watershed in the history of nuclear confrontation between the two super powers. His policies of Perestroika and Glasnost opened a pandora's

box in his country and within the Warsaw Pact. Global tensions were lowered thereby creating an environment favourable to serious disarmament negotiations. The INF Treaty of 1987, eliminating a whole category of nuclear weapons from Europe resulted from major concessions made by the Soviet Union. Gorbachev's policies eventually culminated in the reunification of Germany, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and finally the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself. (1989-1991).

According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, the disintegration of the Soviet Union is an outcome no less decisive and one sided than the defeat of Napoleon's France in 1875 or of imperial Germany in 1918 or of Nazi Germany and imperial Japan in 1945. It is an event of great historical magnitude which had a direct impact on nuclear deterrent strategy of the US. The gigantic structure of nuclear deterrence was evolved as a deterrent to the Soviet threats. With the disappearance of the threat, nuclear war plans lost their relevance.4

One major change of great symbolic significance in the context of nuclear war fighting strategy occurred as the Cold War was ending. The United States's Strategic Air Command Post - the so-called Doomsday plane - which had been in the Air since July, 3 1961, was grounded at the Air Force base in Omaha in July, 24, 1990.5 There is no situation as yet today where the US may have to make the painful choice between defeat and first use of nuclear weapons or fear each others intentions (viz. Russia). This is one important outcome and meaning of the 1989-91 transformation of Europe.

McGeorge Bundy, who was special assistant on national security to President Kennedy, and was intimately involved in the decision-making during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October, 1962, has made an observation which puts nuclear targeting in a realistic perspective. He says that a single

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strategic nuclear warhead on a single military target would be the worst ever since the Second World War. A hundred warhead on targets would be an instante and terrible disaster: and a thousand warheads would a catastrophe beyond all human experience. This observation should be compared with the SIOP targeting schemes to realise how unrealistic and genocidal they were.6

After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union the US now has two distinctions:

1. it is the least threatened of major state and,

2. it is the one state with modern unmatched conventional weapons.

Nuclear weapons cannot be obolished as the know-how remains but now the great powers know exactly what they require of them dismanatle them. Between them the two sides have some fifty thousand nuclear warheads—the most massive single threat to humanity. This is about 95% of the world's total stock. There are thus enormous arsenals to maintain a non-use policy.

The threat posed by these enormous arsenals was a cause of concern for the leaders of the two super powers. Before the disintegration of the soviet Union President Bush and Gorbachev signed the START-1 in 1991. It was comprehensive treaty, of unprecedented scope with verification ar­rangements which were more remarkable than the reductions, themselves were. START I was the product of nine years of negotiations 250 pages of anexes, texts and protocols buttressed by another 30 pages of related agree­ments, letters correspondence, joint and other statements and declarations. The treaty governed each sides intercontinental ballistic missiles, SLBMs and heavy bombers. For over forty years these weapons were the mainstay of the US approach to security through deterrence. Because of the continued reliance on these weapons throughout the Cold War period-the negotiations

were prolonged—for over two decades—and difficult—each side ascertaining whether the other side had an advantage. The result is 800 pages of text.\(^7\)

It broke tradition with the past as it involved actual and significant reductions in the strategic forces of each side. By including direct and equal limits on ballistic missile throw-weight (lift-capability of missiles) and on ballistic missile warheads, the treaty ensured equal rights between the two sides. Verification was the most extensive and intrusive ever negotiated: it promoted openness and military transparency to an extent not feasible in the past. Verification was possible through the following measures:

- data and notification exchange;

- national technical means (NTM) of verification in combination with "co-operative measures"—display in the open, at the request of another party, of the triad to enhance the efficiency of the NTMs;

- access to telemetric information;

- exhibition and inspections of twelve different kinds;

- monitoring of the ICBM production facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMSs with a view to confirming the number of missiles produced for mobile launchers;

- establishment of the Joint Compliance and Inspections Commission; to resolve the issues related to compliance with the obligations

- to resolve issues related to the extension of the corresponding provisions to new kinds of weapons.\(^8\)

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7. For nine years the talks which were begun on 29 June 1982, were supplemented by several meetings at Geneva, Washington, Houston, Moscow and summit meetings in Geneva, 1985, Reykjavik in 1986, Washington in 1987, Moscow in 1988, Malta in 1989 and Washington in 1990. On 31 July 1991, the Treaty was signed at the Moscow summit.

The Treaty was designed to be relevant for more than its fifteen years duration period, if the parties agreed to its extension. Each side was limited to:

1. 1600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles - which is 36% below the current Soviet level and 29% below the current US level.

2. 6000 total accountable warheads (41%-43%)

3. 4900 accountable warheads deployed in ICBMs or SLBMs (48%-40%)

4. 1540 accountable warheads deployed on 154 heavy ICBMs (US has no heavy ICBMs, 50% of Sov).

5. 1100 accountable warheads deployed on mobile ICBMs.

6. An aggregate throw weight of deployed ICBM & SLBM's equalling 3600 million metric tonnes (US throw weight falls below this level and thus no decrease is required; 54% of Sov)

The deepest reductions that were sought were in the Soviet SS-18 heavy ICBMs to move towards less threatening and more survivable systems, such as heavy bombers. Thus there was to be a reduction 1/3 of strategic warheads to a total of each side of 6100 to 8600.

In the eighteen months after START I, the United States and Russia reached a "Joint Understanding" of June 1992 which led to START II in January 1993. It prescribed further reductions in strategic weapons. Reinforcing the Bush-Gorbachev proposals was the support of the American initiative by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the apparent parallel approval of Russian military leaders. For the Americans the Gulf War was a relevant experience: the armed forces had learnt what their best conventional forces can do and it

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9 Ibid, p. 22. As of September 1, 1990, the aggregate throw-weight of deployed ballistic missiles was 6,623.3 tons for the USSR and 2,361.3 tonnes for the US.
was more than enough. With the absence of mistrust as existed in the Cold War period, the requirement of tactical nuclear weapons was less.

It has been pointed out that now "only one basic requirement remains for the strategic forces of the two powers: they should be considered fully adequate ... to ensure against strategic attack from the other."\textsuperscript{10} This deterrent requirement has been central to both sides throughout the nuclear age, and today it is the only requirement. It is interesting however to note that Bundy, Crowe and Drell in Reducing Nuclear Danger advise the need to maintain a superpower balance even now though at a lesser level. They say,

"Fifty years of experience argue strongly against any confidence in extreme solutions. In particular there is no early escape through either the achievement of strategic superiority or the abolition of nuclear weapons."\textsuperscript{11}

The survivability safety and absence of hair trigger danger go up as the number of warheads come down. These are well protected aspects of START I and II, all with the broad support of both countries. The START-II negotiations especially deal with these aspects. The number of warheads for the US and Russia (including those at present located in Belarus; Kazakhstan and Ukraine) has been fixed at 3,500 to 3,000 respectively.

It must however be pointed out that even if reductions promised for in START-I and II are carried out, the United States and Russia would still have an overkill nuclear capacity by the beginning of the 21st century. Secretary of States Warren Christopher has assured the US Senate that the American stockpile after START-II would still "have a capacity to destroy civilization as we know it several times over."\textsuperscript{12}

Bundy, Crowe and Drell rightly remark,

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid, p. 32
\textsuperscript{12} Quoted in Zuberi, M., "Nuclear Arms Control", \textit{World Focus}, (May, 1993), p.3.
"The United States should respect the reality that as long as there are bombs there will be a nuclear danger that is unique in all history. The bomb is uniquely dangerous because it is uniquely destructive - so destructive ... that no one chose to use it or to provoke its use by others. That reality must permeate American policy choices more thoroughly in the future than in the past."¹³

There have been three broad groups of experts engaged in the debate on nuclear strategy:

1. the deterriors and arms controllers

2. the targetteers and

3. the disarmers.

The first groups consisted of Deterrors and arms controllers. They attempted to ensure the benefits of nuclear deterrence while reducing and minimizing its dangers through arms controls. Their endeavour was to manage the security dilemmas of the nuclears age. Advocates of stable nuclear deterrence believed that a prudent management of the international system was possible. This group included the mainstream American writers on nuclear strategy including Bernard Brodie, Thomas Schelling, Henry Kissinger, Herman Kahn, Morton Halperin and others.

The second group may be called the Targetteers, who were committed to the belief that the best way to prevent a nuclear war was to prepare to fight and win it. Nuclear weapons may be destructive but the basic logic of warfare remained unchanged. They believed that these weapons had not only political but also military utility that the prime target of nuclear weapons

¹³ Bundy Crowe Dreil, a. 10, p. 141.
should be the adversary's military capability even if this involved the slaughter of civilians on a massive scale as a 'collateral' damage that usable and controllable limited nuclear options were both necessary and possibly - that nuclear deterrence can best achieved through a demonstrable capacity for nuclear war-fighting. This group included James Schlesinger, Albert Wohlstetter, Colin Gray and members of the Regan administration. Not surprisingly, this group regarded the Disarmers as hopelessly naive and deterrers and arms controllers as simply misguided.

Believing that nuclear deterrence itself has been the main engine of the arms race at the nuclear and conventional levels, the disarmers have emphasised the ethical dilemmas of deterrence. There are various strands of thinking represented in this group. Some were concerned about the possibilities of accidental or inadvertant nuclear war because of the hair-trigger levels of command and control systems. Their objections to nuclear deterrence were based on prudential calculations. Other including those who derived some of this assumptions from the Just War traditions objected to nuclear deterrence on moral points. George Kennan, Michael Walzer, Paul Ramsey, James Turner Johnson represent these two strands. The Pastoral Letter of the American Catholic Bishops attempted to continue the two strands of thought there by becoming a powerful critique of the American nuclear strategy.

Robert McNamara briefly flirted with counterforce targeting and then settled on deterrence through Assured Destruction. It seemed simple logical and especially attractive for McNamara, quantifiable. But war fighters tore Assured Destruction to pieces by pointing out that it was immoral and genocidal strategy.

The weakness of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence has been what would happen if deterrence should fail. The strategist's answer was - prepared to fight a nuclear war at all levels up to assured destruction in the hope that war would be kept at lowest level. Nuclear war fighting in their
view, was critical to nuclear deterrence. In the name of being able to fight a nuclear war, should deterrence fail, the United States had developed new generations of nuclear weapons. They proposed Assured Survival through SDI. But even this could not guarantee survival.

Despite overlapping in the position of the two groups (deterrers and arms controllers and targeteers), the third group were invited about the nature of the problem of nuclear weapons and its appropriate solutions. Much of the debate can be seen in terms of an integration among these broad groups and the positions they advocated.

The nuclear debate remained inconclusive because of the rather sudden end of the Cold War and the unforeseen disintegration of a nuclear super power. The nuclear danger has certainly been reduced but belief in the beneficial effect of nuclear weapons is still firmly shared.

It has never been really easy to come up with a clearly defined policy which would contain nothing regrettable or destructive. This is clearly evident in the various attempts to formulate a moral perspective on deterrence policy. Given the enormity of destruction that is bound to occur in a nuclear war, moral reasoning must pay primary attention to consequences. There are unavoidable uncertainties in the estimation of risks—because sound ethical judgements will be contingent on empirical facts and hypothetical arguments about strategic interactions and values.

On the one hand the pacifists rightly conclude that the possession and threat of use of nuclear weapons are immoral and on the other hand, those who justify the limited use of nuclear weapons do so generally as part of the larger argument about deterrence. For example, the use of tactical and intermediate range nuclear weapons in defense of Europe was justified as the best way to deter a Soviet conventional and nuclear aggression against
Those whose strategies include such views must face the paradoxes and ambiguities inherent in the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. These ambiguities arise from the very logic of the theory.

The very idea that missiles thousands of miles away capable of massive destruction within a few minutes of launching is highly immoral and incomprehensible.\footnote{Corden, Pierce S., "Ethics and Deterrence: Moving Beyond the Just War Tradition", in Ford Harold & Winters Francis X., eds., Ethics and Nuclear Strategy (New York: Maryknoll: Orbis, 1977), p.168.}

Archbishop Hunthausen pointed out the dangers of continued reliance on nuclear weapons; he also drew attention to the risks involved in any move for unilateral disarmament. What is required is a proper blend of moral and political reasoning to enhance national security. If deterrence has to work even as a provisional measure it has "to be ascertained what the morally right course is, not what the morally wrong course is."\footnote{Luffwak, Edward N., "How to Think About Nuclear War", Commentary, 14(August 1982), pp.21-28}

Germain Grisez advised the unilateral renunciation of the policy of deterrence, fully aware that "deterrence is futile without the threat to civilians."\footnote{Hunthausen, Archbishop Raymond, "Address to the Pacific North West Synod of Lutheran Church in America", 12th July 1981 in Heyer, R., ed., Nuclear Disarmament: Key statements of Popes, Bishops, Councils and Churches (New York: Paulist Press, 1968), p.34}

The peril of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union had plenty of survivable nuclear overwhelmed capacity. The Russians including the Soviet leadership, remembered the immense casualties they suffered during a "merely conventional" Second World War. This has no match in the entire history of the United States. The peril induced by nuclear deterrence was not effected by the relative ruthlessness or different sufferings of the American and Soviet societies. The imperative of avoiding a nuclear war imposed caution on their leaders, so much so that it led Raymond

Aron to conclude that there was "a solidarity of Great Powers against the total war of which they would be the first victims". They remained determined "not to interdestroy themselves". Despite detailed war plans and frantic efforts to evolve strategies for fighting and 'prevailing' in a nuclear war leaders at both remained sane, and they were also watched and advised by sane colleagues.18

Richard Falk has rightly pointed out that.

"Nuclear weaponry is totally unacceptable as an element of security polity policy. It is unacceptable for the same reason that torture and terrorism are unacceptable, and no tactical, pragmatic argument as to effectiveness can overcome such fundamental objections."19 And he has rightly drawn the conclusion:

"We have lived now for several generations relying on weaponry that would have been criminalized at the end of World War II had the atom bomb been developed by Germany and used against British cities rather than developed by the winning side in what was widely perceived as a just war."20

By June 1st 1994, the United States had detargeted all of its strategic nuclear missiles pointed at locations in the former Soviet Union for the first time in 35 years. This was in keeping with the pledge of the Moscow declaration signed by Yeltsin and Clinton on January 14, 1994, whereby they had agreed not to target their nuclear missiles against each other or against any other country. The missiles will instead be targeted towards the seas. Russia has also detargeted its strategic nuclear missiles. The implementation of this decision of theirs was completed by May 30th.

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20. Ibid, p. 88
"Detargeting is an important symbolic point", said Kathleen DeLaski, because it emphasizes "the strengthening partnership between the United States and Russia", the implementation of this agreement proved that the two nations are no longer nuclear adversaries." 21 500 older US Minuteman III missiles are now aimed at the oceans, while the new Trident and Peacekeeper missiles contain no targeting information at all. Russia has now jointly the partnership of Peace Agreement with NATO. The British have also unilaterally detargeted their strategic missiles. Though the detargeting cannot be verified, retargeting can be done "fairly quickly" if the need arises.

The Philip Noel Baker, a Nobel Peace prize recipient said:

"The great intelligence of human beings created the evil of atomic weapons. The attitude of many of our politicians who claim that the fear of nuclear and hydrogen weapons prevents conventional wars is a mistake, nothing but a meaningless myth ... humans have the responsibility to do with what they have created." 22

1995 will mark the 50th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the end of World War II. We seem to have ignored the warning of Albert Einstein.

"the release of atomic energy has so influenced everything that our former ways of thinking have been rendered obsolete. We therefore face catastrophe unheard of in our times. If mankind is to survive, then we need a completely new way of thinking." 23

For 45 years, from World War II to the end of the Cold War, it was agreed that the greatest threat to global security was an all out war between


22. Takashi Hiraoka, Mayor of Hiroshima, quoted in n.20 p.8

23. Ibid. p.9
the two super powers culminating in the use of nuclear weapons. The post-Cold War era is by no means free of the threat of armed conflict demonstrated by the continuing warfare in, as diverse areas as, Indonesia, Burma, Sri Lanka, Peru, Liberia, Somalia and Yugoslavia.

Henry Kissinger made an observation in 1965 which has acquired significance in the context of recent events. He wrote:

"A threat meant as a bluff but taken seriously is more useful for purposes of deterrence when a 'genuine' threat is interpreted as a bluff."

We must never forget what happpend at Hiroshima and Nagasaki which was summed up by one of the survivors:

"Because of a single atom bomb, we survivors have been robbed of our bodies, spirits and souls. We cannot even live like human beings."

Walzer has rightly concluded:

"Nuclear weapons explode the theory of Just War. They are the first of mankind's technological inventions that are simply not compatible within the immediate moral world."

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26. Takashi Hiraoka, n.22, p.8