Many of the Church statements contain the following elements:

1) An analysis of relevant Biblical material, including the meaning of the word peace, ethical texts in the Old and the New Testament, etc.

2) An outline of Christian attitudes towards peace and war through the history of the church, including the essential points of the Doctrine of the Just War.

3) An analysis of the present armament situation with special emphasis on deterrence.

4) Recommendations for politicians and governments, Christians and churches.

**THE CHALLENGE OF PEACE: GOD'S PROMISE AND OUR RESPONSE**

**PASTORAL LETTER ON WAR AND PEACE BY THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS OF THE UNITED STATES** *(1983)*

* Peace in the modern world: religious perspectives and principles*

   ... The nuclear threat transcends religious, cultural and national boundaries. To confront its danger requires all the resources reason and faith can muster.

   We do not intend that our treatment of each of these issues carry the same moral authority as our statement of universal moral principles and formal church teaching.

* The nature of peace*

   The Catholic tradition has always understood the meaning of peace in positive terms. Peace in positive terms. Peace is both a gift of God and a human work. It must be constructed on the basis of central human values: truth, freedom and love.

   However, the protection of human rights and the preservation of peace are tasks to be accomplished in a world marked by sin and conflict of various kinds.

The Just-war criteria

The moral theory of the 'just war' of 'limited war' doctrine begins with the presumption which binds all Christians: we should do no harm to our neighbours; how we treat our enemy is the key test of whether we love our neighbour; and the possibility of taking even one human life is a prospect we should consider in fear and trembling.

The use of nuclear weapons

For the tradition which acknowledges some legitimate use of force, some important elements of contemporary nuclear strategies move beyond the limits of moral justification. A justifiable use of force must be both discriminatory and proportionate. Certain aspects of both U.S. and Soviet strategies fail both tests. On the more complicated issue of 'limited nuclear war', it seems to us that public officials would be unable to refute the following conclusion of the study made by the Pontifical Academy of Sciences:

'Even a nuclear attack directed only at military facilities would be devastating to the country as a whole. This is because military facilities are widespread rather than concentrated at only a few points. Thus, many nuclear weapons would be exploded.

Furthermore, the spread of radiation due to the natural winds and atmospheric mixing would kill vast numbers of people and contaminate large areas. The medical facilities of any nation would be inadequate to care for the survivors. An objective examination of the medical situation that would follow a nuclear war leads to but one conclusion: Prevention is our only recourse.'

Moral principles and policy choices

In light of these perspectives we address three questions more explicitly: a) counterpopulation warfare; (2) initiation of nuclear war; and 3) limited nuclear war.

1. Counterpopulation warfare

Under no circumstances may nuclear weapons or other instruments of mass slaughter by used for the purpose of destroying population centers or other predominantly civilian targets.
Retaliatory action, whether nuclear or conventional, which would indiscriminately take many wholey innocent lives, must also be condemned. This condemnation, in our judgment, applied even to the retaliatory use of weapons striking enemy cities after our own have already been struck.

2. The initiation of nuclear war

We do not perceive any situation in which the deliberate initiation of nuclear warfare on however restricted a scale can be morally justified. Non-nuclear attacks by another state must be resisted by other than nuclear means.

Whether under conditions of war in Europe, parts of Asia of the Middle East, or the exchange of stratific weapons directly between the United States and the Soviet Union, the difficulties of limiting the use of nuclear weapons are immense. No one can be certain that this escalation would not occur even in the face of political efforts to keep such an exchange 'limited'. We find the moral responsibility of beginning nuclear war not justified by rational political objectives.

We express repeatedly in this letter our extreme skepticism about the prospects for controlling a nuclear exchange, however limited the first use might be. Consequently we seek to reinforce the barrier against any use of nuclear weapons. Our support of a 'no first use' policy must be seen in this light.

At the same time we recognize the responsibility by the United States has had continues to have in assisting allied nations in their defence against either a conventional or a nuclear attack may require nuclear weapons for a time, even though their possession and development must be subject to rigid restrictions .... development of an alternative defense position will still take time.

In light of the probable effects of initiating nuclear war, we urge NATO to move rapidly toward the adoption of a 'no first use' policy, but doing so in tandem with development of an adequate alternative defense posture.
3. **Limited nuclear war**

It would be possible to agree with our first two conclusions and still not be sure about retaliatory use of nuclear weapons in what is called a 'limited exchange'. The issue at stake is nuclear exchange. We wish to raise a series of questions which challenged the actual meaning of 'limited' in this discussion.

- Would they be able under the conditions of stress, time pressures and fragmentary information to make the extraordinarily precise decision needed to keep the exchange limited if this were technically possible?

- Would military commanders be able in the midst of the destruction and confusion of a nuclear exchange to maintain a policy of 'discriminate targeting'?

- Given the accidents we know about in peacetime conditions, what assurances are there that computer errors could be avoided in the midst of a nuclear exchange?

- Would not the casualties, even in a war defined as limited by strategists, still run in the millions?

- Unless these questions can be answered satisfactorily, we will continue to be highly skeptical about the real meaning of 'limited'. One of the criteria of the just-war tradition is a reasonable hope of success in bringing about justice and peace. We must ask whether such a reasonable hope can exist once nuclear weapons have been exchanged. The burden of proof remains on those who assert that meaningful limitation is possible.

A nuclear response to either conventional or nuclear attack can cause destruction which goes fat beyond 'legitimate defense'. Such use of nuclear weapons would not be justified. We therefore express our view that the first imperative is to prevent any use of nuclear weapons and our hope that leaders will resist the notion that nuclear conflict can be limited, contained or won in any traditional sense.

**D. Deterrence in principle and practice ...**

2. The moral assessment of deterrence
... For some, the fact that nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945 means that deterrence has worked, and this fact satisfies the demands of both the political and the moral order.

**Moral principles and policy choices**

Targeting doctrine raises significant moral questions because it is a significant determinant of what would occur if nuclear weapons were ever to be used. Although we acknowledge the need for deterrence, not all forms of deterrence are morally acceptable. There are moral limits to deterrence policy as well as to policy regarding use. Specifically, it is not morally acceptable to intend to kill the innocent as part of a strategy of deterring nuclear war. The question of whether U.S. policy involves an intention to strike civilian centers (directly targeting civilian populations) has been one of our factual concerns ...

We wish now to make some specific evaluations:

1. If nuclear deterrence exists only to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by others, then proposals to go beyond this to planning for prolonged periods of repeated nuclear strikes and counterstrikes, or ‘prevailing’ in nuclear war, are not acceptable. The encouragement notions that nuclear war can be engaged in with tolerable human and moral consequences. Rather, we must continually say no to the idea of nuclear war.

2. If nuclear deterrence is our goal, ‘sufficiency’ to deter is an adequate strategy; the quest for nuclear superiority must be rejected.

3. Nuclear deterrence should be used as a step on the way toward progressive disarmament.

In light of these general judgements we oppose some specific proposals in respect to our present deterrence posture:

1. The addition of weapons which are likely to be vulnerable to attack, yet also possess a ‘prompt hardtarget kill’ capability that threatens to make the other side’s retaliatory forces vulnerable. Such weapons may seem to be useful primarily in a first strike. We resist such
weapons for this reason and we oppose Soviet deployment of such weapons which generate fear of an first strike against U.S. forces.

2. The willingness to foster strategic planning which seeks a nuclear war-fighting capability that goes beyond the limited function of deterrence outlined in this letter.

3. Proposals which have the effect of lowering the nuclear threshold and blurring the difference between nuclear and conventional weapons.

   In support of the concept of 'sufficiency' as an adequate deterrent --- we recommend:

1. Support for immediate, bilateral, verifiable agreements to halt the testing, production and deployment of new nuclear weapons systems.

2. Support for negotiated bilateral deep cuts in the arsenals of both superpowers, particularly those weapons systems which have destabilizing characteristics;

3. Support for early and successful conclusion of negotiations of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

4. Removal by all parties of short-range nuclear weapons which multiply dangers disproportionate to the deterrent value.

5. Removal by all parties of nuclear weapons from areas where they are likely to be overrun in the early states of war, thus forcing rapid and uncontrollable decisions on their use.

6. Strengthening of command and control over nuclear weapons to prevent inadvertent and unauthorized use. --- any claim by any government that it is pursuing a morally acceptable policy of deterrence must be scrutinized with the greatest care. We are prepared and eager to participate in our country in the ongoing public debate on moral grounds ... 

THE ETHICS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE* (1982)


The ethics of deterrence are the ethics of threatening to do something which one believes would be immoral, which one intends to do only in circumstances which will not arise

becuase of the conditional threat.

In Analysing this issue we begin by noting that what is threatened is a response to aggression by means which we have already suggested cannot be morally acceptable. Such a conditional intntion implies that one has consented in one's mind to act immorally.

But it may be said the West has not consented to act immorally, because it will never have to use its nuclear weapons. To alternative reasons might support this supposi­tion. One is that the threat to use nuclear weapons is a bluff. The other is that nuclear deterrence will succeed in keeping the peace indefinitely. It would be impossible in practice to maintain a bluff. But even if it were possible the policy would still be morally question­able. We are our brothers 'keepers. Anyone who threatens to annihilate his opponents encourages them and others to respond in kindm and bears some responsibility for the moral climate which prevails. To believe that a policy is immoral and at the same time encourage others to support it, train others to carry it thorugh and argue down its oppo­nents, would be morally and spiritually corrupt.

The other ground or a judgment that the West will never use nuclear weapons is the belief that nuclear detrrence will contine to keep the peace. Even if one accepts the presumption that it is the existence of nuclear weapons which has helped to keep the peace until now, how can one be certain that it will contine to do so?

It can be argued that the West has no intention of using its weapons unless an opponent attacks it, knowing that in that case the West will use its nuclear weapons. In such a case, it might be argued, the opponent would have to accept full moral responsibility for the West's response. This argument i unsound if Western nuclear weapons are used, it will be because of decisions the West will have taken and which will have been part of the chain of events leading to the deaths which follow. The moral dilemma cannot be avoided in the way suggested.

Our arguments seem to converge on the conclusion that even the possession and possible conditional intention to use nuclear weapons is itself immoral. Is there any way of avoiding this conclusion?
On the one hand there are those who think that to threaten to use nuclear weapons with all their dreadful effects and the attendant risk of nuclear holocaust, is utterly unacceptable, whatever might be the result of abandoning such a policy. On the other hand, there are those who think that the effect of abandoning nuclear deterrence is so frightening that, evil and risky though the defrightening that, evil and risky though the deterrent policy may be, it is the least evil course at present available, and is therefore morally imperative of at least acceptable for the time being, until something better can be found ... 

--- If the deterrent is to work, you have to convince an enemy that you are willing to use it: but if you have to use it, it has failed.

From this trap there might seem one theoretical possibility of escape. Might not deterrence work if one threatened to use it but arranged secretly never to do so? This secret must be confined virtually to two or three top political leaders who, in a democratic society, might be replaced at any moment by others who did not share their views, and who could never be initiated into them in advance, because the matter could not be publicly debated. Furthermore, to keep up an effective deterrent both the public and the service would have constantly to be indoctrinated with the belief that use of nuclear weapons was in the last resort justified. In short, to have a nuclear arsenal deployed is to be committed already to using it in certain circumstances. Quite apart from the fact that it is morally questionable to threaten to use something it is wrong actually to use (of, torture), it would in practice be impossible in this case to threaten to use it and not actually use it when the moment comes. Admittedly nerve might fail; use might not be considered necessary after all; but a purely moral restraint could not in practice be enforced.

The crucial point, proves to be this. There are no weapons whose effect will not be cataclysmic. These, it is though, can be used, particularly against the conventional force superiority of the Warsaw Pact countries, in an intermediate situation between ordinary war and disastrous holocaust.

--- If it is the very use of nuclear weapons which is morally unacceptable, then a nuclear arsenal can be justified only if it is both intended and likely to prevent such use. There is also the practical point that once nuclear war-fighting is included in the probabilities becomes
that much more difficult, and the chances of self-risk free decisions to be taken on this issue of nuclear weapons. You may either decide for a nuclear component in deterrence, and risk nuclear war, or decide against it and risk the political and human consequences of blackmail and defeat by someone with fewer moral inhibitions. We consider than the nuclear element in deterrence is no longer a reliable or morally acceptable approach to the future of the world. This judgement is reinforced by the fact that an integral part of deterrence in practice is crisis management, which may mean in effect going to the brink while relying on fallible human judgement, operating under tremendous stress, to see you through. Given all these considerations, we believe that a nuclear component in deterrence is not sufficiently compelling to outweigh the huge moral imperatives against using nuclear weapons at all.

We believe that mutually stimulated paranoia is blinding all concerned to the way their opponent is in fact likely to behave. The prophecies of aggression are self-fulfilling prophecies. The paranoia is created and intensified by the very existence of the nuclear weapons themselves.

The United Kingdom should renounce its independent nuclear deterrent, for two reasons; in the hope of putting new life into the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by showing that at least one of the nuclear powers is prepared to take its obligations under this instrument seriously; second, to eliminate what we feel to be a destabilising element in the world situation, Britain's ambiguously separate centre of decision making on the use of nuclear weapons.

The UK should cancel the order for the Trident missile at once and phase out the Polaris missiles and submarines, including work on Chevaline.

The UK's withdrawal from other nuclear weapons should be phased in the following order:

(i) Weapons wholly or mainly of British manufacture.

(ii) US made depth bombs, missiles, and artillery under dual key.

(iii) US air and submarine base facilities, and the projected Cruise missiles from 1983.
The timetable for the implementation of this withdrawal, especially (ii) and (iii), is a matter for negotiation with Britain's allies, but the decision to undertake the whole process should be taken in the same single political operation.

3. **THE CHURCH AND THE BOMB**

The two main motions passed by the General Synod during the debate on 'The Church and the Bomb' were:

**Motion 1**

That this Synod, recognising (a) the urgency of the tasks of making and preserving peace: (b) the extreme seriousness of the threat made to the world by contemporary nuclear weapons and the danger in the present international situation: (c) that it is not for the Church to determine strategy but rather to give moral lead to the nation:

1. **Affirms** that it is the duty of Her Majesty's Government and allied to maintain adequate forces to guard against nuclear blackmail and to deter nuclear and non-nuclear aggressors.

2. **Asserts** that the tactics and strategies of this country, and her NATO allies should be seen to be unmistakeably defensive in respect of the countries of the Warsaw pact.

3. **Judges** that even a small-scale first use of nuclear weapons could never be morally justified in view of the high risk this would lead to full-scale nuclear warfare.

4. **Believes** that there is a moral obligation on all countries (including the members of NATO) publicly to forswear the first use of nuclear weapons in any form.

5. **Bearing in mind** that many in Europe live in fear of nuclear catastrophe and that nuclear parity is not essential to deterrence, calls on Her Majesty's Government to take immediate steps in conjunction with her allies to further the principle embodied in this motion so as to reduce progressively NATO's dependence on nuclear weapons and to decrease nuclear arsenals throughout the world.

MOTION 2

That this Synod believes that indiscriminate mass destruction in war cannot be justified in the light of Christian teaching and exhorts the dioceses to study and pray about the issues raised in the report, 'The Church and the Bomb', and in particular the theological and moral issues, so as to enable Christian people to make a more informed and committed contribution to the making and preserving of peace and to search for ways of resolving conflict other than by war.

THE SYSTEM OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE MUST NOT DOMINATE OUR COMMON FUTURE *

Statement by the Council of the Evangelical Church in Germany on the Peace Discussions in Autumn 1983*: Hannover, September, 17, 1983.

... We are convinced that the elements of joint security must be reinforced in faced of the attempt to find security in confrontation. The system of nuclear deterrence and the boosting of weapons potentials must not dominate our common future. The EKD Council reiterates its urgent reminder that the crucial ethical and political goal remains that of safeguarding peace by political means and ending military confrontation and the nuclear arms race.

This demand required the readiness to take concrete steps. They could go in the following direction:

a) The development, testing, production and stationing of more and more nuclear weapons as deterrence must not continue.

b) The strategy of the West to prevent war must be further developed. The threat of the first use of nuclear weapons for defence against a conventional attack cannot remain its underlying principle, because the first use of weapons of mass destruction is intolerable for the Christian conscience.

c) The goal of lessening the dangers inherent in the system of deterrence calls for the abandonment of rigid and categoric thinking about parity. This also applied to the consider-

* Ibid., pp. 257 - 258.
ation of whether single cases of unilateral disarmament for-bearance lead to the destabilisation of the balance of power or, smooth the way to negotiated results and thus have a stabilising effect.

d) At the present moment the crucial thing is to lead Europe cut of the threat of an escalation and new quality of arms build-up-

The prevention of war in any form does not, however, merely call for a change in military strategy. It must rely more and more strongly on political elements representing the accommodation and interlocking of interests.

Such elements are: economic cooperation, joint efforts to preserve nature and the basis for life on earth and joint efforts for a more just, less unstable world economic order: Connective strands must be retained and created, which neither side can cut without harm to itself. This can lead to an agreement on institutions and procedures which reduce conflicts and contribute to crisis resolution. The goal remains that of worldwide peace order: relying for its stability on less power and increasingly on the approval of the people and nations concerned.

2. To the Christians in positions of political responsibility

... In its memorandum 'The Preservation, Promotion and Renewal of Peace' the EKD Council pointed out that latitude granted for the moment by mutual deterrence must be used to break through the chain of arms buildup, because otherwise the time will come when the scandal and risk of the arms race will have to be judged greater than the usefulness of deterrence.

The debate about the responsibility of the government and parliament for peace policy must be conducted in a spirit of courageous candour and clarity, as befits the significance of this problem. We ask all politicians to take the doubts and deep concern in the population seriously.

We especially ask the politicians not to suspect those resorting to means of political protest and legal, peaceful demonstration, but to acknowledge these as legitimate democratic expressions of opinion and to do their best so that demonstrations may remain peaceful.
... Whoever wants to safeguard external peace by political means must not sacrifice internal peace to violence.

4. To all those bearing responsibility in the church.

... The Church's message must be proclaimed in a sinful world needful of salvation. However, this does not mean that it should fatalistically accept the manmade threat of nuclear weapons or learn to live with it.

The ethical aim of a peace policy not based in deterrence is binding on all of us, even though the way to reach this goal is controversial in its specific details. We thus ask those with special responsibilities in the church not to abandon its fellowship, but to listen to one another and attach greater importance to prayer for peace and enlightenment on our common way forward than the pressure of opposing opinions which beset us in the church too.

THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE
Joint Pastoral Letter of the German Catholic Bishops*

1. Security policy within the framework of peace policy.

There are chiefly two threats looming ahead: the danger to the freedom of nations and their citizens from totalitarian systems which disregard elementary human rights in their sphere of dominion and which might be tempted to use their power for expansion or for the application of political influence and extortion; the second danger lies in an escalation of armaments with an immense accumulation of nuclear and conventional weapons which, to the fear of many people, might one day cause the catastrophe of an outright war. We must counter both dangers simultaneously—above all by political means. An affirmation of military power as a component of security policy does not contradict the enunciated demand of settling conflicts by nonviolent methods. Today, military power must even primarily serve this objective. We must therefore consider what demands must today be made of such a military contribution and what criteria should govern it.

In the face of the other danger arising from the arms race, the important thing is to do everything which diminished the risks of an arms build-up in the interest of our joint survival without endangering one's own security. The threat and use of force must be removed, or at least gradually, reduced, in international relations.

Dangerous misconceptions and miscalculations can only be avoided if all sides are seriously and permanently willing to reexamine their own position at the same time to give due consideration the experience and anxiety, the interests, the perceptions and the values of the other side.

For that reason, the aim of the military contribution towards the maintenance of peace under present conditions must not lie in the waging of war but in the preventing of war and indeed of any warfare at all...

2. The prevention of war.

Hitherto, the attempt is being made to prevent war by means of their nuclear deterrent.....

... The following question arises: Under the system of mutual deterrence, can either side really be sure of his opponent's intentions? The Pople called upon ups to reverse the arms race; he would only tolerate the deterence as a means of maintaining peace along a path which leads to an arms limitation and disarmament: --- some of the staddpoints which must be considered in an ethical judgement of the nuclear deterrent.

The first and ecisive standpoint is the goal of this strategy, i.e. the prevention of war. If that is the goal of the deterrent according to the declared will of the deterrent according to the declared will of politicians and strategists, then the political and military leaders must be able to substantiate the fact that war can really be prevented by this strategy and why they consider this to be the case...

The second standpoint for an assessment of the deterrent thus refers to the means, i.e. the envisaged conventional and nuclear weapons as well the appropriate operational planning. The intention of preventing war with all one's strength strength must become credible by virtue of the choice of the whole range of arms.....

If the deterrent is intended to establish above all a political objective for the chosen weapons within the framework of prevention a war, them these must be judged primarily in these terms.....
These various points of view point to the criteria which a deterrence must satisfy if it is still to be acceptable in ethical terms.

2.1 Existing or planned military means must never render war more feasible or more probable. We clearly realize that this demand of ours will encounter opposition which can hardly be overcome. After all, weapons only provide an effective deterrent if their use can be threatened in a credible manner. The use of a threat of mass destruction which one must never carry out - a morally intolerable concept -- is regarded as being particularly effective for the purpose of preventing war. This immense tension is only acceptable if the whole range of security policy is directed towards the goal of preventing war and if the military measures remain integrated within the higher ranking concept of 'maintaining peace by political means.'

2.2 Only such military means and so many military means may be deployed as are necessary for the purpose of the deterrent aimed at preventing war.

In particular, the military means must not indicate any quest for superiority. Rather, they must be geared to the objective of achieving stability, which then prevails when neither side can derive political or military benefit from their weapon systems. We must not in the long run satisfy ourselves with a minimum of destructive potential, which is always fraught with a real danger of explosion (John Paul II). For that reason, all responsible persons in the State and in society have the urgent duty to strive with their whole strength towards finding alternatives to the threat of mass destruction.

23. All military means must be compatible with effective mutual arms limitation, arms reduction and disarmament.

So far, this goal has not been achieved ....

A war of destruction is never a solution and never permissible. The fact that this possibility nevertheless exists shows that mankind is how in an impasse which forces us to act with courage. The only solution lies in undertaking greater efforts towards a political maintenance of peace and continuous disarmament. States and power blocs must finally learn to shape their relations without the threat or use of force.
RENUNCIATION OF THE SPIRIT AND LOGIC OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Resolution of the Synod of the Federation of Protestant Churches in the German Democratic Republic

_We hope that this renunciation (of the spirit and logic of deterrence) will open the way to a more flexible policy that can gradually lead us our from the compulsions of the deterrence system and make possible a system of justice and common security between East and West North and South. We see real opportunities today to translate (this) into concrete steps in the following:

- a nuclear freeze
- taking up the world disarmament campaign launched by the U.N. and making it apply to our own country.
- requesting our govt. to outlaw the use of nuclear weapons and the possession as a crime against humanity. (Vancouver: Declaration of Peace and Justice, Nov. 25)
- requesting our govt to promote trust and cooperation in the interests of common security...

... We shall the fact that the Chairperson of the Protestant leadership Conference in the GDR and the Chairperson of the Council of Protestant Churches in (West) Germany, acting out of their churches' special responsibility, have addressed the governments of both German states with the plea that, within their respective alliances, then do what they can to see that the negotiations in Geneva progress successfully and a palpable reduction of weapons systems on both sides be attained.

HOPE AGAINST HOPE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

A Pastoral Letter to All congregations by the General Synod of the Netherlands Reformed Church*

It is now eighteen years since the 1962 pastoral letter 'On the Question of Nuclear Weapons' was published in which the Synod uttered a 'No without any yes' to unclear arms.

The synod did not sepak unambiguously about the possession of nuclear weapons. The reasons for this was not because a qualifying clause was added to the 'No' which implied a 'Yes' to the deterrent function of nuclear weapons, but because 'abolition' of these weapons, but possible in the normal sense of the word: the be realized.

On the contrary, the experience of the last eighteen years has shown us how the possession of these weapons can sweep us all or along in their accelerated build-up and sophistication and in the development of a strategy of 'limited' nuclear warfare. So, first of all, we must repeat our 'No' of 1962 and then in all clarity state that this 'No' also holds without qualification for the possession of all nuclear weapons.

Of course we continue to hope for steps towards bilateral and multilateral disarmament. But at the same time we consider it necessary to plead for an approach in which negotiation goes hand in hand with steps which are already clearly set upon the road of disarmament. since it has turned out to be impossible to reach multilateral decisions leading towards such steps, they should be taken unilaterally. They should not only point out the direction to be taken; they should also testify to a readiness to take that road ourselves. We consider that the denuclearization of the Netherlands would be such an unambiguous step.

--- In this present time of great danger for the whole of humanity, we look to the coming of him, who says to his Church: 'Do not fear, I am the first and the last, and the living one; and I was dead, and behold, I am alive for evermore, and I have the keys of death and of aded' (Rev. 1:17-18).

THE CHURCH AND PEACE

Statement by the Bishops' Conference of the Church of Norway, Fredrikstad, 29 March - 2 April 1982.*

3. The Church's responsibility for peace

More than anytime it is necessary that Christians today pray to God for help and rescue, in order that agony of war may be kept away from us.

* Ibid., pp. 269-270.
4. Justice and Peace

The underlying causes for rearmament, conflict and war are numerous and complex. In this world of sin we will never be able to realise complete peace between man and nations. It is therefore also part of God's will that injustice shall be restrained by the power granted to political authorities. The Christian church regards these authorities as expressions of God's will that injustice shall be restrained by the power granted to political authorities. The Christian Church regards these authorities as expressions of God's will to uphold order and justice among men. On this basis, the church has also though it right and justifiable to have sufficient military defence to guard a nations freedom and rights. The church has also regarded it justifiable to uphold these rights by the use of military force, if necessary.

It is generally accepted, also in our church, that a military defence which is supposed to wage 'just wars', is ethically justifiable. This implies a defence aiming at restraining injustice and ward off an evil which puts the life and future of a people at stake.

In this connection, the church has also though it justitia — our church wants to protect the conscience of individuals who after serious considerations conclude that it is not ethically justifiable to serve in the armed forces.

The limits of war:

To start and fight out a war with these weapons is thus in a fundamental way a destruction of Creation itself. In such a situation the development of nuclear arms must be described as an expression of man's revolt against God. It is an abuse of knowledge and resources which according to God's will are meant for the benefit of all humankind.

The increasing rearmament, with its strains on the peoples, and the growing tension in the world, in many cases lead to the violation of basic human rights. ear and insecurity paralyse people. — remove from them the possibility of a live in freedom and joy. We are witnessing nations being attacked and occupied, the freedom of opinion being subdued and individuals being interned or done away with.
Disarmament

This fear for the future is in itself a calamity for humankind, implying great ethical problems. Man must be liberated from the threat of a nuclear war. This does not mean that other mass weapons of a more conventional kind are more acceptable. But, disarmament must have a visual starting point in that states today having nuclear arms, or possessing the capacity to develop them, dispose of these weapons. — together with Christians and churches all over the earth, we appeal to the world’s statesmen to sit down together, deliberately and immediately, in order to dispose of all arsenals of nuclear arms.

APPENDIX II

STATEMENTS BY INTERNATIONAL CHURCH ORGANIZATIONS

Statement on Peace and Justice

by the Sixth General Assembly of the World Council of Churches Vancouver, August 1983. *

6. The World Council of Churches has consistently drawn the attention of the churches to the economic threats to peace. Even without war, thousands perish daily in nations both rich and poor because of hunger and starvation.

7. While the equivalent of nearly two billion dollars (US) is being expended globally each day for armaments, the world economy is engulfed in a prolonged and deepening crisis which threatens every country and international security.

No Peace Without Justice

8. The peoples of the world stand in need of peace and justice. Peace is not just the absence of war. peace cannot be built on foundations of injustice. Peace requires a new international order based on justice for and within all the nations, and respect for the God-given humanity and dignity of every person. Peace is, as the Prophet Isaiah has taught us, the effect of righteousness.

10. From its inception, peace with Justice has been a central concern of the ecumenical

*Ibid., pp. 271-274.
movement.

**Nuclear weapons and disarmament**

The growing sophistication, accuracy and mobility of new generations to weapons now ready for deployment or currently being designed make them more dangerous and destabilizing than ever before. The failure of arms control among nuclear-weapon states has made the non-proliferation treaty, in practice, an instrument of invidious discrimination, incited the spread of nuclear weapons, and compounded the prospects for nuclear war in several areas of regional tension in the Southern hemisphere.

We call upon the churches, especially those in Europe, both East and West, and in North America, to redoubte their efforts to convince their governments to reach a negotiated settlement and to turn away now — from plans to deploy additional or new nuclear weapons in Europe, and to being immediately to reduce and then eliminate altogether present nuclear forces.

We urge the churches as well to intensify their efforts to stop the rapidly growing deployment of nuclear weapons and support systems in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and to press their governments to withdraw from or refuse to base service ships or airplanes bearing nuclear weapons in those regions.

18. The volume of highly profitable trade in conventional weapons has nearly doubted in the past five years, a very large part of it in the direction of the developing nations and regions where armed conflict already defies containment. The destructive power of these weapons steadily increases, blurring the distinction between conventional and nuclear warfare:

a) nuclear war can under no circumstances, in no region and by no social system be just or justifiable, given — the magnitude of devastation caused by it will be far out of proportion to any conceivable benefit — to be derived from it:

b) nuclear war is unlikely to remain limited.
c) All nations now possessing nuclear weapons or a capable of doing so in the foreseeable future should unequivocally renounce policies of 'first use'.

d) The concept of deterrence, the credibility of which depends on the possible use of nuclear weapons, is to be rejected as morally unacceptable and as incapable of safeguarding peace and security in the long-term.

e) The production and deployment of nuclear weapons as well as their use should be a complete halt in the production of nuclear weapons and in weapons research and development in all nations, to be expeditiously enforced through a treaty;

f) All nations should agree to any ratify a comprehensive test ban treaty.

g) All means leading to disarmament, both nuclear and conventional, should be welcomed as complementary and mutually reinforcing: multilateral — bilateral — Unilateral utubutuutves leading to the relaxation of tension and building of mutual confidence among nations and peoples.

--- we urge the churches to press their government to abstain from any further research, production of deployment of upons in space: and to prohibit the development and production of all weapons of all weapons of mass destruction — including chemical and biological means.

**PEACE, JUSTICE AND COMMON SECURITY**

Message of the Christian World Conference Life and Peace Uppsala (Sweden), 20-23 April, 1983.

1. The Christian concern for life and peace.

   ... The Christian gospel is a gospel of peace. From the beginning that gospel has been preached in a violent world. Today, however, we witness violence real or potential, on an unprecedented scale. For the first time in history we human beings, always possessed of limited power to destroy, are now capable of wiping out the civilization centuries. The production and threat to use nuclear weapons capable of annihilating the human race demonstrates an ultimate arrogance before God who alone disposes of life and death ......

We confess that we have not always called war into question as a means of settling conflicts.

3. The doctrine of nuclear deterrence. The current military and political doctrine of nuclear deterrence must be challenged. The dangers of nuclear proliferation and accident, and the increasing sophistication of weaponry, leading to the concept of the so-called 'limited nuclear war', all render the doctrine of nuclear deterrence increasingly dubious and dangerous from every point of view. From the Christian standpoint reliance upon the threat and possible use of nuclear weapons is unacceptable as a way of avoiding war. Some are willing to tolerate nuclear deterrence only as a temporary measure in the absence of alternatives.

4. Common security. The security of one nation cannot be achieved by endangering the security of others or by seeking military superiority over others. The devising of an alternative international security system based on the principle of common security, and resolute steps towards disarmament should go hand in hand.

5. The arms trade. The international arms trade is sinister, cynical and upprincipled. Its growth has gone hand-in-hand with the increase in the number of oppressive military regimes, which violate human rights and foster injustice. It has also provided the munitions for the scores of wars fought mainly on Third World soil since the last world war. This trade must be condemned and internationally controlled.

STATEMENT ON PEACE

By the Lutheran World Federation Executive Committee, Turku, Finland, 4-13 August 1981.

The Executive Committee affirms

19. - that Christians have a responsibility to seek peaceful means for resolving political conflicts and for eliminating injustices and oppression, recognizing that the choices presented are often between greater or lesser evils; and

22. - consult with each other regarding church actions supporting peace, disarmament, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, support of negotiations and the pursuit of human rights, social justice and national independence;
26. communicate to governments, political leaders and the wider public the churches' concern and efforts for peace.

Attention should be drawn especially to:

--- the need for immediate action to reduce the threat of nuclear war:

the effort and experiences of churches in their work for peace in other countries and especially those living under different social systems ...

APPENDIX - III

JOHN PAUL-II AND NON-VIOLENCE : Vimal Tirimanna VJTR June 1993 *

Keeping very much in line with his immediate predecessors and the Council, Pople John Paul-II seems to be adopting what one may tend to call "a pacifist attitude" towards war. If there is any marked difference between the present Pope and his immediate predecessors, it is his consistency in adopting pacifist attitudes. Ever since the beginning of this papacy, John Paul had been consistently calling people to abandon war and violence in resolving international disputes and internal problems of nations.

The Pope's position on war and violence has been very clear almost from the very beginning of his papcy. Fro him "Violence only begets violence." "The Pople combined con-demnation of social injustice with apparent support for a pacifist response to injustice."

the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces on 2 August, 1991, certainly created a situation of injustice, and the Pope did not hesitate to condemn it as "a violation of international law". Yet the Papal statements of that period regarding the crisis never justified the use of force or violence to correct this unjust situation which upheld the use of limited force or violence on such occasions, under strict conditions ("Just war" criteria).

The first six months after the invasion of Kuwait, saw more than fifty papal statements on the Gulf crisis. However, in those statements one cannot find" definitive guidance for conscience" pleas and some principles. Nevertheless, as Bryan Hehir points out, there is a clear structure of argument running through all these statements.

* Vidyajyoti Theological Review, pp.1-7. 23
Hehir considers the Pope's letter to President Bush on 15 January, 1991 as the most clearly structured papal statement on the Gulf War:

"I wish now to state my firm belief that war is not likely to bring an adequate solution to international problems and that, even through an unjust situation might be momentarily met, the consequences that would possible derive from war would be devastating and tragic."

One should note here the structure of the argument, which while acknowledging a "just cause", refuses to "justify" resort to force. The argument "rests on fears of disproportionate results."

The consistency of the present Pope's views on war and peace is seen once again after the Gulf War, in his encyclical Centesimus Annus. After a treatment of the great changes that took place in Eastern Europe in 1989, the pope sees such experience "as bimative for other situations of social change." then he goes on to emphasize the non-violent means by which changes occurred in most of the East. His consistent non-violent position becomes apparent when he says:

May people learn to fight for justice without silence, renouncing class struggle in their internal disputes, and war in international ones.

One needs first of all to address these root causes of war, if war is to be abolished. This, for the pope is another reason why the use of force is not the means to correct and unjust situation, for it creates further evil effects.

The eminent American theologian John Courtney Murray described in the early 1960s the Catholic position on war as fulfilling a triple function when he wrote:

"---To condemn war as evil, to limit the evil it entails, end to humanize its conduct as far as possible."

However, Pope John Paul II places much more emphasis on the condemnation of war than on efforts to limit its effects and humanize its conduct. He appears to be pessimistic about the ability to contain modern war fare. he stops just short of an absolute advocacy of non-violence. This "pacifist" position of the pope is consistent throughout.
The pope's opposition to war and violence is based mainly on his considerations of the consequences. For Yoder, we have to be non-violent, because God is non-violent.

In centesimus Annus, the Pope seems to put forward the experiences of Eastern Europe in the recent past as normative for all other situations as well. But the context of Eastern Europe was totally different from most of the other situations where people are clamouring for change and justice. It is naive to imagine that the same combination of factors for social change would ever exist in other situations that long for social change.