Three types of revolutionary models have appeared in the history of 20th century revolutions: The Soviet model, the Chinese model and the Cuban model. The Soviet model prescribes capture of cities by the revolutionaries and then to spread to the countryside. The Chinese model is just a reverse process in which the guerillas liberate the countryside and then encircle the cities. In both the Soviet and Chinese models, politicisation of the masses is a precondition to start the armed struggle. But in the Cuban model two to three guerillas - foco - can go to the countryside and launch guerilla operations and then politicise the masses. In Guevara's theory of guerilla warfare - the Cuban model - action comes before politicisation. In other words, it is to politicise the masses through armed action. Every guerilla operation is an armed propaganda to spread the general climate of collapse for the enemy; that the forces of order - the status quo, enemy's political and military establishments - are collapsing. Guerilla warfare is basically a psychological and moral warfare against an enemy who has perpetrated injustice and repression. What
happens on the battle ground - enemies' physical defeat or not - is less important for the guerillas than the political message that should reach the guerillas' people, the enemy, the super powers and the world public opinion. The guerillas have to prove themselves too tough and they mean what they say. The leadership of the guerillas launches the political and diplomatic struggle (offensive) at the regional and international level to get not only recognition for their organisation but also to get their major objectives achieved through peace negotiations.

Sources of Inspiration

Che Guevara, whose writings inspired the Palestinians, wrote an article in 1959 entitled 'What is a Guerilla Fighter?' He described a guerilla with almost celestial vision of a perfect hero, as 'a sort of guiding angel who has fallen into the area, always to help the poor and to bother the rich as little as possible...'.

In a repressive situation, a guerilla is considered a divine being, a saviour or a Robin Hood, a knight of chivalry who is magnanimous even to his

enemies. He is like a saint. In the Palestinian context a guerilla is called *fedai*, the plural of which is *fedayeen*. The word *fedai* means one who sacrifices. It does not mean a dirty or illiterate and a dangerous desperado or a *hashshasin*.²

The motto of a Palestinian *fedayeen* is: Whenever death may surprise us, it will be welcome, provided that, this, our battle cry, reaches some receptive ear, that another hand stretch out to take up weapons, and that other men come forward to intone our funeral dirge with the staccato of machine guns and new cries of battle and victory. *Al-fatah* had rightly given the call 'Thawra hatta at-Nasr' (Revolution until victory).

The situation for an armed struggle was ripe ever since Palestine was wiped off the world map in 1948. The *fedayeen* derived sufficient inspirations from the writings of Palestinian writers like Musa Alami, Halim Barakat, and Ghasan Kanafani. Musa

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² Webster Dictionary defines the word *hashshasin* as a person of a secret order of the Ismailians, a Mohammadan sect, which at time of the crusades terrorized the Christians and their enemies by secret murder committed under the influence of hashish. The order of Assassins was founded in Persia about 1090 by Hasan ib-al-Sabbah. The second meaning of the word is: one who kills, or attempts to kill by surprise or secret assault; one who treacherously murders by onslaught anyone unprepared for defence; especially, the hired or appointed murderer of a public person.
Alami's *The Lesson of Palestine* provided an answer to the Palestinians who were languishing in anguish, alienation and despair:

Palestine and the self-respect of the Arabs must be recovered. Without Palestine there is no life for them. This our ancestors understood truly as of old. Their understanding was better than ours, when Europe attacked and took Palestine from them. They were willing to die for it and continued to struggle until they recovered it. Thus it is today. 3

Alami's reference is to the Crusaders who had occupied Palestine. The only way for the Palestinians is to recover Palestine to regain their self-respect. This could be done, Alami argued, by emulating their ancestors who had destroyed the Crusader state in Palestine by displaying courage and self-sacrifice.

Ghasan Khanafani, a fiction writer and the editor of PFLP organ *Al-Hadaf*, who was killed by the Israelis in a booby-trap, also inspired the Palestinians through his writings, especially his classical novel *Rijal Fial-Shams* (*Men in the Sun*) published in 1963. This novel has been made into a popular film. 4

4. The feature film "Men under the Sun" based Ghashan Kanafani's story was screened at the International Film Festival of India, New Delhi, 1981.
The motifs of lost dignity and the connection between manhood, self-respect, and armed resistance are a recurring theme in the novel. It is also interpreted as a call to start the resistance: one of the characters is Ustaz Selim, a simple school teacher in a Palestinian village, who puts up violent resistance against the Zionist occupying forces.

In 1958, Tawfiqa al-Houri, a Palestinian writer, and Yasser Arafat started a newspaper in Beirut named Filistinuna (Our Palestine). By 1963, its editorials were reflecting disillusionment with the Arab governments. It was circulated among the Palestinians. The 15th April 1963 issue of Filistinuna reflected Arafat's appeal for armed struggle:

The Palestinian alone (among other Arabs) is determined to refuse all colonialist plans such as partition, compensation and internationalisation. He is firmly convinced that armed struggle is the one and only means for return (to Palestine)... He refuses to allow them (ther arab governments) to represent him in their lethargy, diplomacy and defeatism. As soon as he is able to tear away the fetters with which they had bound him he shall return to being what he was: a fedai. 5

5. Filistinuna (Beirut), no. 30, 15 April 1963.
Sheikh Izzaddin al-Qassem, the hero and martyr of 1933-39 uprising, had already shown the path for an armed struggle which inspired the Palestinians to adopt guerilla warfare. According to Qassem's theory and practice very similar to Guevara two decades later - it is not a necessary condition that the Palestinians be as strong in number and weaponry as their enemy when the fighting starts; even if he knows he is going to die - martyrdom would inspire the others to continue the struggle.

Ghassan Kanafani characterised Qassem's movement as a classic example of the Guevara's "theory of revolution wherein dramatic displays of violence were aimed not at destroying or intimidating the enemy but arousing the fighting spirit and solidarity of the "oppressed." 6

Application of Cuban model

Often a comparison is drawn between the Palestinian revolution or liberation movement and the Cuban revolution. Gerard Chaliand says:

In Cuban terminology, the Palestinian resistance began as a 'foco', a nucleus employing armed violence, without any political preparation of the population it is trying to involve. But while the strategy of the 'foco' as applied within the framework of class struggle has shown itself to be ineffective in Latin America,

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the armed nucleus of the Palestinian resistance, thanks to the military collapse of the Arab States, has been successful within the framework of a national movement. Naturally this strategy was not deliberately chosen but was imposed by circumstances and by the nature of the national movement of which Al-Fatah is the nucleus. 7

The Palestinian revolution has taken its lessons from the Cuban experience. The 'foco' (a small band of guerillas going to the countryside and starting a revolution) failed in other Latin American countries but it succeeded in the case of the Palestinians. However, the Palestinians applied it creatively and not blindly - to their situation.

It is worthwhile to note that the Palestinian revolution derived its inspiration not only from the Cubans but also from the Chinese, Algerian Vietnamese, and other Third World revolutions. The resistance of the Algerians and the Vietnamese gave a momentum to the Palestinian movement. The Vietnamese holding talks with the Americans in Paris was a big fillip to the Palestinians.

Once a Third World liberation movement puts up resistance to a foreign occupation eventually after many years of struggle, the occupying power

is compelled to talk to the people involved in the struggle for national liberation. When a plane was hijacked - a tactic given up later by the Palestinians - the concerned states came forward to negotiate with the hijackers. This often happened in the case of Palestinians. Leila Khaled, a bold Palestinian girl who was a member of the PFLP, carried out a hijacking operation called 'Che Guevara' taking Trans World Airlines plane to Damascus in August 1969.8 She flew the plane over Haifa, her hometown, from where she was evicted along with her family in 1948 when she was a baby. The Israeli authorities talked to her. This is the beginning of the guerilla diplomacy.

When the Black Septemberists took the Israeli athletes hostages in 1972 at Munich, the West German Government along with Israeli officials talked to them.9 The contact with the Palestinian guerillas amounts to the diplomatic negotiations. The Munich operation was just to boost up the morale of the Palestinian revolution.

Another instance of the Israelis entering into negotiations was on 28 December 1972. Four fedayeen of the Black September Organisation entered the Israeli embassy in Bangkok and

9. Ibid., pp. 80-86.
Israeli diplomats as hostages. The Israelis negotiated with the Palestinians secretly and released the hostages. On many occasions, including the Savoy hotel incident in Israel in which a prostitute negotiated between the Palestinian guerillas and the Israelis, there have been talks between the Palestinians guerillas and the Israelis. Therefore, in the case of Palestinians, the guerilla warfare is the beginning of their diplomacy.

Guerilla Warfare as an Instrument of Diplomacy

In the challenging, complex and acute state of diplomacy the guerilla warfare has acquired a great deal of significance. Threatening to use force as a means of bargaining is as old as the art of diplomacy which sometimes leads to war since the beginning of history. Frederick the Great once said: "Diplomacy without arms is music without instruments." Many writers and philosophers have tried to discover or to analyse the threat of force in international relations. Niccolo Machiavelli, a 16th century philosopher, whose own personal experiences in the realm of diplomatic negotiations impressed upon him the intimate relationship between political

10 The Daily telegraph, 29 December 1972.
and military factors, has clearly laid down the foundation. Machiavelli wrote two classics, *Art of War* (1521) and *The Prince* (1532), which stressed that successful bargaining required a clear understanding of how armed force can be utilized as an instrument of policy. In modern times Mao Zedong defined it more precisely: "Political power comes from the barrel of gun." This aphorism of Mao was certainly true of himself and his Communist Party, which gained power in China in 1949 by defeating its rival, the Guomindang or Nationalist Party, on the battlefield.

These general propositions of statecraft are not enough to understand the nature of relationship between the armed uprising and bargaining in international politics. The practice of coercion and deterrence was not accompanied by any explicit theory or elaborate conceptual framework. Moreover, even if the 20th century theoreticians have not been able to establish a systematic relationship between the guerilla strategy and diplomacy, these two are organically linked to each other. If the guerilla war for liberation continues relentlessly for a


considerable period its diplomatic propaganda - that there is no alternative but to recognise their inalienable national rights to their motherland - creates a definite impact on the international community, the U.N. and the Super Power and also in the enemy camp. The guerilla leadership enters into a dialogue with its enemies through the feelers (some other states). The guerilla leadership has to play its diplomatic card properly and meticulously with the Super Power with a view to exerting pressure on the enemy. It is followed by peace parleys and official negotiations. Of course, the establishment of a new state through the art of guerilla warfare is a 20th century phenomenon.

Like the U.S. - Vietnamese talks, the U.S. held dialogue with the dreaded PLO which hooked the Americans through its diplomatic card. The U.S.- PLO dialogue was followed by Madrid Peace Conference which ultimately led to the secret PLO - Israel negotiations resulting in the Oslo-Washington Peace Accord on 13 September 1993.

The Fedayeen Strategy

The Palestinian guerilla movememt passed through the following stages: (i) Intensive guerilla warfare (1967 to 1975) and then regular warfare with guerilla
tactics: (ii) Diplomatic offensive to get international recognition and to isolate Israel; (iii) Israel's military offensive to liquidate the PLO and Palestine question (1978, 1981 and 1982), and PLO's diplomatic counter offensive to establish an independent Palestine state.

In the first stage (1967-1975) the fedayeen intensified the guerilla warfare, avoided and foiled the peace proposals like the U.N. Security Council resolution 242 (which called them refugees, no a nation) and the U.S. Sponsored Rogers Plan through special guerilla operations. During that stage the U.N. recognised the inalienable national rights of the Palestinians and the PLO (1969-74). While the guerillas fought valiantly the PLO launched diplomatic offensive at the international level and succeeded in legitimising the armed struggle as a part of the national liberation movement through the U.N. The Israeli Government was forced to negotiate with the fedayeen for the release of Israeli hostages. These negotiations amounted to according quasi-legal status to the fedayeen. The fedayeen were successful in isolating Israel through diplomatic moves which culminated in the U.N. resolution that called Zionism a form of racism in 1975. Israel's military offensives to liquidate the PLO failed in 1982 as the guerillas
remained unvanquished in Beirut. The U.S. negotiated with the PLO during the war and Yasser Arafat imposed his terms on the U.S. and Israel for the evacuation. The PLO guerillas evacuated handing over Beirut to the multi-national forces, not Israel. Five thousand fedayeen turned civilians over night and stayed back in Lebanon and, along with their Lebanese allies, put up tough resistance which forced the Israelis to leave Lebanon. Some U.S. Senators demanded the recognition of the PLO by the U.S. In other words, the fedayeen succeeded in harassing Israel through guerilla warfare, political propaganda along with diplomatic moves, and diplomatic offensive—three essential requirements for liberating a state. The PLO's guerilla warfare alternated with intense diplomacy. It is extremely difficult to defeat a determined guerilla because he retreats to advance militarily, politically and diplomatically. And a guerilla is, above all, a psychological warrior.

The broad strategic objective of the fedayeen movement is to establish a progressive, secular, and non-sectarian and non-racial Palestine where all national and ethnic groups Muslims, Christians and Jews will live side by side. It seeks to achieve
this objective by destroying the economic and military foundations of the Zionist State, which it considers to be an imperialist base, through a popular war of liberation. The war of liberation, therefore, faces three enemies: imperialism led by the United States, Zionism as represented through Israel and Arab reaction. Hence, it was necessary to launch a protracted people's war for the liberation of Palestine.

i) Al-Fatah: Al-Fatah vehemently criticised the conventional Arab strategy of Nasser and others which seeks to liquidate Zionism in Palestine by launching a surprise attack after the Arab armies have reached a common agreement or have been unified. According to conventional strategy that liquidation was to be completed within a week so that imperialism did not have a chance to intervene. Al-Fatah is of the opinion that the Zionist existence is the cause of Arab disunity and internal shortcomings. Talking of Arab unity before the liberation of Palestine is illusory. It, therefore, adopted the motto "Liberation of Palestine is the road to unity" as the correct revolutionary alternative to the

motto "Unity is the road to liberating Palestine". According to Al-Fatah, the viable alternative to a "blitzkrieg" within a week to liquidate the Zionist entity is a people's war - a prolonged war of the masses. This strategy of people's war (or a war of the revolutionary masses) adopted by Al-Fatah combines two types of struggle - armed struggle and political struggle. This has been explained by Al-Fatah in a pamphlet entitled "Political and Armed Struggle". The concept of the combination of political struggle and armed struggle has been taken from General Giap's writing: "The practice of revolutionary struggle in our country in new historical conditions has made an original contribution to Marxist-Leninist theory on revolutionary armed struggle, according to which revolutionary armed struggle sometimes takes the form of a long revolutionary war, sometimes the form of an entire people's uprising and sometimes combining all the above forms". The objectives of political struggle as defined by it (Al-Fatah) are as follows:

(1) To mobilise the masses for their participation in the revolution which will pass through different stages, although at no one point will

15 Ibid., p. 9.
the masses have the same standard of readiness and preparedness to participate in the movement. It will enable the masses to be involved with the basic line of thought and the political and social outlook of the revolution. The masses will come to know about the various classes of the Palestinian and Arab societies and about the friends and the enemies of the revolution; thereby they can foil the counter-revolutionary plots of the reactionary Arab regimes. The enlightened cadres will establish a close relationship between the masses and the leadership of the revolution.

(2) To set up a unified command with the purpose of assuming leadership of the masses along with the leadership of the armed struggle.

(3) To protect the armed forces from crackdowns and plots launched by some of the Arab regimes. The experience of the revolution shows that Palestinian as well as Arab masses came out to protect the fedayeen.

(4) To form a popular militia, a defensive organisation, to protect the Palestinian masses from attack by the Arab armies.

(5) To win over some nationalistic elements in the Arab armies for protecting the revolution.
(6) To exploit the contradiction between the Zionist and non-Zionist forces in the enemy rank.\footnote{17}

The political struggle and the armed struggle go side by side and are concomitant and complementary to each other. These two cannot be separated. Al-Fatah has formulated the armed struggle strategy on the basis of the Maoist and the Giapist military strategies. The strategy of people's war passes through three stages: (1) strategic defence stage, (2) the strategic balance stage, and (3) the stage of strategic counter-attack.\footnote{18}

In the first stage (strategic defence stage) decisive battles are avoided. The primary purpose is to harass and exhaust the enemy through "hit and run" tactics. At that stage the revolutionaries are weak and the enemy is strong. The objective of that stage is self-development and expansion to allow a defeated people to change the balance of power against the enemy and in its favour - a sinking balance for the enemy and a rising balance for the partisans.\footnote{19} The stage of avoiding decisive battle has the following characteristics:

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\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{17} Political and Armed Struggle, The Palestine National Liberation Movement, Fatah publication, pp. 9-13.
  \item \footnote{18} Ibid., p. 21.
  \item \footnote{19} Ibid., p. 23.
\end{itemize}
(1) Strengthening the internal front, finding a safe base and ending the phase of dispersement and vagrancy.

(2) Employing the tactics of sharp lightening attacks on the external front to keep the enemy nervous.

The objective of the strategy is self-development, exhaustion of the enemy and the creation of the pyramid of the people's army (partisans, local forces and the centralised mobile strategic forces).^20

Although the strategy at this stage is that of a defensive war, it employs the tactics of an offensive war: of swiftly decided battle. It is based upon the golden rules of the guerilla warfare stage - "if the enemy advances, we withdraw; if he tires, hit him; if he settles, harass him; and if he retreats chase him."^21

The beginning of the guerilla warfare was the beginning of the creation of the fighting force which ultimately developed itself into a regular army capable of crippling the enemy's armed forces. The difference between the commando squads attached to regular armies and the guerilla units is that the former is created to achieve pure and meticulous

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^20 Ibid., p. 24.
^21 Ibid., pp. 25-26.
military goal which is the end of its mission, whereas the latter's activity is of revolutionary significance - concentration on winning over the people through armed propaganda.\(^{22}\) The guerrillas also exert psychological pressure on the Super Powers through a relentless struggle.

Al-Fatah applied the first stage of the people's war on 28 August 1967. The objective was to show to the people that was the beginning of a prolonged revolutionary war and the fedayeen had keyed themselves up to the exaltations: "Do not be afraid: Wrap your first around the burning coal" - "Either homeland or Death". The guerrilla operations were nothing but armed propaganda beamed more at people and the world than at the enemy. They included urban actions, attacks on the enemy patrols in the villages inside the occupied area and the public execution of agents, traitors and collaborators.

Seventy-nine operations inside Palestine in the first four months (after 28 August 1967) resulted in the loss of 46 men, half of them belonging to the leadership cadres, and the following losses on enemy side: 318 Israelis, including nine officers,

\(^{22}\) Ibid.
killed or wounded, 13 kibbutzim attacked, five traitors publicly executed, two military trains blown up, 44 vehicles destroyed, the large arms depot near Acre exploded, the suburbs of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv hit by the bazooka, etc. 23

Battle of al-Karameh

Agwar along the East Bank (Jordan) was chosen as a secure base and the West Bank as the battle field. On 21 March 1968, only 200 Fatah guerillas confronted Israeli soldiers, who, after crossing the Jordan River, attacked them at al-Karameh village. It is said by some that the fedayeen violated the rules of guerilla warfare by not retreating when the enemy was advancing, but confronted them. According to Mao Tse-tung:

Although flexible dispersion or concentration of forces in accordance with circumstances is the principal method in guerilla warfare, we must also know how to shift (or transfer) our forces flexible. When the enemy feels seriously threatened by the guerillas he will send troops to suppress or attack them. Hence guerilla units should ponder over the circumstances they are in: if it is possible to fight they should fight right on the spot; if not, they should not miss the oppurtunity to shift themselves swiftly to some other direction. 24

As per Mao Tse-tung's classical theory of guerilla warfare, which was influenced by ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu, the battle of al-Karameh was not entirely a violation of the principles of guerilla warfare. Considering the strength of the Israeli army which included thousands of soldiers with tanks and other sophisticated weapons, it would have been natural for the Fatah guerillas - whose number was just 200 - to run away keeping in mind the flexibility aspect of the guerilla strategy, especially at the early stage of their people's war. It was, therefore, a great and brave decision on the part of fedayeen command to confront the heavy Israeli raid. The decision, according to Abu Iyad (Salah Khalef), was based on the fedayeen leadership's view that the political message of the battle should reach the Arab masses:

Guerillas by definition do not give battle to a regular army. Their effectiveness depends to a large extent on their mobility. However, political considerations inclined us to the opposite view.... the Palestinians and more generally the Arabs, would never understand if once we left the field open to the Israelis. Our duty was to set an example, to prove that the Arabs are capable of courage and dignity. 25

Karameh (meaning "dignity" in Arabic) bestowed glories upon the Palestinian fedayeen, for the Israeli

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army was not only defeated but also ran away abandoning some of their tanks. Twenty-three Israeli soldiers were killed in the battle. The victory at al-Karameh resulted in veritable flood of recruits into guerilla centres. Al-Fatah's total strength of 2000, at the time of Karmeh battle, increased to 15,000 within three months. 26 Within the next two years PLO's strength increased to more than 30,000.

During the battle of al-Karameh fedayeen not only defended themselves but also the villagers. The Jordanian soldiers also joined them in the battle against the Israelis. This battle was the first decisive battle ever waged by the Palestinian guerillas. 27 This battle was used by the fedayeen as a political propaganda to overcome the defeatist apathy of the Arabs. A handful of fedayeen achieved what the Arab armies failed to do in the June 1967 war. After the battle Egypt allowed the Palestinians to open their radio station 'Voice of al-Assifa'in Cairo. President Nasser invited Yasser Arafat, Abu Iyad and Faruq Qaddumi for a meeting. The Karamah battle helped the PLO in its diplomacy with the Arab States.

27 See, no. 23, p. 12.
The year 1968 marked the beginning of regular Palestinian forces. The fedayeen attacks forced the Israelis to concentrate more on the security of the internal lines by creating a security belt in the West Bank in the form of mine fields, mined barked wire and electronic and audio-visual devices. Also they concentrated on air raids and napalm bombing. 28

The struggle during the 1968-70 period became defens-offense for Israel while it became offense-defense for the guerillas. Each party tried to turn the balance against the other. Al-Fatah applied the "circular saw" tactics to overcome the Israeli security belt. 29 This tactics had two objectives: newly recruited forces learned combat by practising it; and neutralise the effect of the planes and provide protection through constant motion of the forces. Thus, while fulfilling the objectives of training and mobility the guerillas also created more spots for the enemy to be protected.

Israelis followed new tactics which they called the tactics of "hot pursuit" and massive attacks, which rely on putting together the opponent, to surround and wipe out not only the patrols which had succeeded

28 Political and Armed struggle, no. 17, pp. 38-43.
29 Ibid. Al-Fatah called it the "circular saw" tactics which implies guerilla penetration into the security belt.
in penetrating the security belt but also their bases in the adjoining areas. These tactics were to counter the guerilla tactics of "patrols in depth" which consisted of sending guerilla units from East Bank to strike at the Israeli targets in Tel Aviv, Beersheba and Gaza. Al-Fatah made a guess that the enemy's "hot pursuit" was ineffective because of his extraordinary concentration on the security belt. It, therefore, sent "special task units" (guerillas) which were able to break these barriers. These attacks launched by the guerillas through 28 inlets in the barriers carried the message "that it is possible for the popular Palestinian army forces to leap into Upper and Lower Galilee and that technology cannot defeat the human element."

Israel was afraid of the guerilla concentration in the north Upper Galilee and south Lebanon. Israelis launched an air raid on the Beirut International Airport in order to force Lebanon to prevent the

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30 See no. 23, p.12. The "hot pursuit" tactics of the Israelis should not be confused with such a term in International Law.
31 Ibid.
32 See no. 17, pp. 41-43.
33 The Northern and Upper Galilee is of great significance for the fedayeen operations. Galilee is the heart of Palestine and Israel's Achilles' heel. It has mountains which are covered with trees and which extend up to Lebanon. Forty per cent of Galilee's population are Arab. Natural waster barriers do not exist there, and the density of population is so much that non-human barriers cannot be set up.
guerilla presence in South Lebanon. But the attack drew the sympathy of the Lebanese people for the guerillas. The guerillas' diplomatic propaganda succeeded in creating of world opinion that Israel was an aggressive state.

Al-Fatah took steps for mobile warfare which requires regular forces. This is called the centralisation of the centralised command. At this stage, the guerillas gradually get transformed into squadrons, battalions, brigades and divisions. The guerilla warfare is to be co-ordinated with regular warfare in strategy, and in campaigns and in battles. 34

Al-Fatah's operations like the "Green Belt", "Good Earth", "Bayonets of Fatah", "al-Hammah", "Farhan As-Saadi" and "Beit Sahour" gave birth to platoons and squadrons which ultimately led to a large-scale mobile warfare. 35 As it is natural with any people's war, the Palestinian struggle in three stages did not proceed smoothly.

(ii) PFLP: Since the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is a Marxist-Leninist organisation, it made a thorough study of the role of political thought and acquired a clear vision of the enemy and of the forces of revolution before defining

34 Mao Tse tung, no. 24, p. 132. Al-Fatah has accepted this theory of Mao Tse-tung.
35 See no. 17, pp. 45-46.
its strategy of the battle. PFLP's international guerilla operations, reviled by the world public opinion, created awareness about the Palestine problem and the urgency to solve it.

The "statement of the policy and strategy" of the PFLP was published in its organ al-Hadaf. According to it, the revolutionary political thought does not exist in a vacuum nor is it an ideological luxury or intellectual pastime. It is based on revolutionary scientific thought through which the masses can identify their enemy, his points of weakness and strength as well as forces which support him.36 The statement reproduced in parts Mao Tse-tung's article on "Analysis of the classes of Chinese society" which starts with "who are our enemy and who are our friends?" On the basis of that analysis the PFLP identifies the enemies of the revolution - Israel, international Zionism, international imperialism led by the U.S. and Arab reaction.37

Like other fedayeen organisations, the PFLP's strategy is also based upon people's war entailing in guerilla warfare in the first stage. But unlike other organisations, it adopted unique tactics -


37 Ibid.
skyjackings and terrorist attacks against the Israelis wherever they may be in the world and sabotage of the U.S. imperialist interests in the Middle East. the PFLP, therefore, started "skyjacking" of the airliners and bombing of the selected targets as tactics of war to discourage tourism and to curtail foreign investment and aid to Israel. Miss Leila Khaled said that aircraft hijacking was an established form of guerilla warfare and "it represented a strategy and not merely tactics in the liberation war."

The PFLP Fedayeen hijacked the Israeli El Al Boeing 707 plane to Algeria in the last week of July 1968, and destroyed two other El Al Boeing 707 planes, one at the Athens airport on 26 December 1968, and the other in Zurich in February 1969. Leila Khaled, a 22-year-old Palestinian girl, was one of the two members of the 'Che Guevara' unit, which hijacked the American TWA plane to Damascus in August 1969. This was a sort of retaliation against the U.S. delivery of the Phantoms to Israel. The unit was also after an Israeli who was aboard the plane and who had massacred many Palestinians.

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38 Miss Leila Khaled in an interview with Beirut's Newspaper Al-Anwar, quoted in The Hindu (Madras), 7 October 1970.

39 The TWA hijacking: PFLP declares war of Popular Liberation Against the U.S. The Arab World Weekly, 30 August 1969, pp. 1A-1C.
The group initials, "PFLP", were engraved on copper fragments inserted in the bombs which were exploded at Marx and Spencer and at the office of the Israeli shipping company, "Zim", in London in August 1969, and also in the bombs that were exploded at Israeli Embassies in The Hague and Bonn, and at the El Al office in Brussels on 8 September 1969. Unlike other fedayeen organisations, these operations in Europe were carried on by the teenager "Tiger Cubs" (or Al Ashbal) boys and girls who represent the "war generation". On 6 September 1970, the PFLP successfully hijacked aircrafts belonging to three international airliners: a Swissair DC-8, a Pan American 747 Jumbo jet and a TWA 707. The attempt to hijack the fourth one belonging to El Al at the Heathrow airport (London) was unsuccessful. The male hijacker was shot dead and Miss Leila Khaled was arrested. The Pan Am 747 jumbo jet was landed at Cairo and was blown up by the hijackers after the passengers had evacuated the airliner.


41 The idea of the commando "cubs" was started by Al-Fatah and was copied by the PFLP. They all wear the same uniform, but the PFLP "cubs" carry a white tag on their caps with the PFLP emblem of a rifle-shaped map of Palestine straddling the entire map of the Arab world.

42 The Guardian (Manchester), 7 September 1970. The male hijacker was later on identified by his fingerprint as Patrick Joseph A'Coggle, an Argentinian Maoist. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 16 September 1970.
The Swissair DC-8 and TWA 707 landed at the "Revolution Airfield" in a Jordan desert. The PFLP demanded the release of the fedayeen detained in the Swiss and West German gaols. On 9 September 1970, a BOAC VC-10 international airliner was hijacked to the "Revolution airfield" and the PFLP demanded the release of Miss Leila Khaled. All these three planes were blown up when their demands were not met. Most of the passengers were released. Fifty-four of them were, however, detailed in order to exchange them with the fedayeen detained in Switzerland, West Germany, and Israel. Utmost care was taken by the fedayeen to see that the hostages were well treated. The passengers admired the good treatment given to them.

The wave of "hijackings" was carried on to foil the implementation of the American "Rogers Plan" for peace in the Middle East and the U.N. Security Council resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, both of whom were accepted by President Nasser and King Hussein.

44 Swiss airliner was blown up to expose her neutrality. West Germany and Switzerland had already agreed to free the six fedayeen but following the U.S. pressure they did not release. Fifty-four hostages of Swissair, TWA and BOAC were detained. Daily Telegraph, 26 September 1970.
Skyjackings and attacks are the techniques of urban guerilla warfare which aims at exerting a psychological impact on men's mind rather than controlling the territory. The urban guerillas, according to Roert Moss, are essentially political partisans, for whom success or failure will hinge less on what happens on the battleground than on their capacity to get their message across, to erode and move the forces of order, and to induce a general "climate of collapse." Guerilla warfare is also a war of nerves in which the fedayeen succeeded to a great extent.

George Habash, in an interview with the Life, explained and justified his Front's position on these attacks on El Al, the Israeli airline, which is also connected with the Israeli Air Force. He said that the PFLP had to stand against whoever supported Israel economically, militarily, politically and ideologically and who wanted to maintain their capitalist interests through Israel. Since the Palestinians do not have any control over the land that was stolen from them and called Israel, it is right that whoever goes to Israel should ask for their permission.

47 Ibid.
France and Switzerland have considerable number of Jews among their population and allow their territory to be used as a base for the Zionists to fight the Arabs; and, therefore, the Arabs have a right to use these bases against the Zionists. 48 Asked about the world opinion to terrorism, Habash said:

When the Jews were doing this sort of thing in Palestine you did not call it acts of terrorism, but a war of liberation.... the attacks of the Popular Frnt are based on quality, not quantity. We believe that to kill a Jew far from the battle ground has more of an effect than killing 100 of them in battle; it attracts more attention. And when we set fire to a store in London, those few flames are worth the burning down of two kibbutzim. Because we force people to ask what is going on, and so they get to know our tragic situation. You have to be constantly reminded of our existence. After all, world opinion has never been either with us or against us; it has just kept on ignoring us.... where was the world opinion in 1917 when the British decided to give land that was 90 per cent populated by Palestinians as a gift to the Jews. 49

The PFLP believed in selective terrorism. Often leaflets explaining their cause were distributed after the operations. It claimed to have carried on 85 per cent of the military activities inside Israel (1968-70) and every attack within the Gaza Strip, and about 50 per cent of those in

48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
the occupied territory. In Gaza, it has fought a battle that Moshe Dayan himself admitted to be the worst of all those activities which have taken place in Israel. Like Fatah's Haifa pipeline "blow-up", the Popular Front blew up tapline's trans-Arab pipeline in May 1969.50 Dr. George Habash believed in transforming the PFLP into a mass political party which would eventually sweep over the corrupt "bourgeois" Arab regimes.51 As a Marxist-Leninist he also believes in the historic emergence of a working class party. But after the collapse of communist bloc the PFLP has mellowed politically and militarily. However, it has not lost its no. 2 position in the PLO.

(iii) PDFLP or DFLP: Like PFLP, PDFLP's strategy is also to defeat imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction in order to liberate Palestine. Its aim is also to establish the United States of Palestine for the Arabs and Jews after the elimination of the Israeli entity. 

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50 After blowing up the pipeline, PFLP posters appeared showing the American-owned oilpipelines in the Middle East as a serpent in the Arab world with a PFLP commando trying to destroy it before it bites and poisons the Arabs.

The Democratic Front's analysis of the class character of the various forces among the Palestinians and the Arabs is not dissimilar to PFLP. This is because of the fact that both are Marxist-Leninist organisations, although PDF is more radical than PFLP. But they differ in tactics and at the organisational level.

The PDF adopts a dual strategy in the armed struggle. (1) It sought to move its bases from the Eastern Bank to the Western Bank for the basic centres of its activities inside the occupied territories. (2) It prepared for mass action and mass participation of the workers of the East Bank to foil any attempt at counter-revolution by the Jordanian regime. 52

The PDF reckons the civilian resistance in the occupied territories as complementary to the armed struggle waged by the Palestinian Liberation Movement. It carried on propaganda in the East Bank amongst the Palestinian and Jordanian masses; and its doctors paid weekly visits to the villages where no medical facility was provided by the Jordanian Government. These doctors politicise the masses. 53

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53 Ibid., pp. 233-6.
The Democratic Front does not divide its ranks into a political and military wing since all its members are politico-military cadres whose activities are based on Marxism-Leninism under the hegemony of the working class. This is the main difference between the PDF and other organisations. 54

The major operations of the PDF carried on armed propaganda. A bomb was thrown in the Hebrew University Cafetaria in Jerusalem in March 1969, and an official statement was given by the Front:

The Hebrew University is responsible for producing main cadres for the Israeli State, namely the administration, the police and the army. It is also responsible for the inculcation of reactionary Zionist culture in the ranks of Jewish intellectuals. This is why the Democratic Front feels responsible to discourage Jewish intellectuals from criminally following the imperialistic and Zionist policy. 55

The next major operation was the demolition of the Labour Exchange at Nablus in April 1969. The PDF explained this action in the following terms:

The Democratic Front aims at hitting the prominent Zionist military and political institutions in the occupied territories. This is why the demolition of the Israeli Labour Exchange in Nablus expresses the rejection by the Democratic Front and the

54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
masses of Nablus of the Zionist political and military policy of employing Arab labour in order that Israeli workers can be drafted into the occupation army. Moreover, the establishment by the enemy of Labour Exchanges in occupied territory is designed to employ cheap labour, thus furthering the exploitation practised by Zionist capitalism and increasing its wealth. 56

The third operation was the demolition of a factory in the occupied Golan Heights in order to spread propaganda among the Jewish workers. 57

The PDF's other famous operations were "Operation Red Line" and "Operation Ho Chi Minh", the "Che Guevara" operation and "Ma'a lot". The second one was carried out just after the death of President Ho Chi Minh in the Kuneitra region and was directed against various targets like Tell El-ahmar (13 km north of Kuneitra), Bir Ajam, Hamieth, Tell Abu Zab (nine km south of Kuneitra). 58 The third one was carried out by about 400 members on the night of 16 December 1969. This "Che Guevara" operation was PDF's biggest operation along a 60-km front stretching from the Golan Heights to Um Sidra in the central sector of the Jordan Valley. 59 During the Ma'a lot

56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
operation in 1974 the Israelis negotiated with the three PDF guerillas for the release of children in return of PDF prisoners. The Israelis violated their promise given to the guerillas and stormed the school massacring Israeli children. The betrayal and retaliatory raids by the Israelis was used by the PLO as a diplomatic propaganda that Israel did not care for its children.

Most of the major groups united under the PLO umbrella. In 1970s Al-Fatah and the PFLP were having a common training camp. Although outwardly the PLO groups show dissidence, they have an understanding. Without these pressure groups, Al-fatah cannot put political and diplomatic pressures against the Arab regimes, U.S. and Israel. The Palestinians call it the Palestinian revolutionary democracy - a unique thing in a revolution.

The Failure of PLO Diplomacy with Jordan:

The world sharply reacted to the wave of "skyjackings" by the PFLP in September 1970. Although Al-Fatah had endorsed the earlier skyjacking since Israel's El Al planes were the targets. Yasser Arafat disapproved of the skyjackings for the world opinion.

60 As discussed with the Palestinian representative Fathi Abdul Hamid.
was against it. The central committee of the PLO (of which the PFLP was also a member) disowned the Popular Front's action and suspended its membership.61 The Palestinian fedayeen had already become a "State within a State". Hussein's regime in Jordan was threatened and the State's authority was seriously challenged, particularly after the "skyjackings and the seizure of passengers as hostages."62 The showdown between the fedayeen and the Jordanian Army became imminent.

On 16 September 1970 just before the PLO-Jordan confrontation, Momein Rifai, Prime Minister, signed another truce agreement which called for mutual withdrawal of forces from Amman and a considerable reduction of the army's presence in and around the city. When King Hussein saw it, he was reported to have cried, "I am betrayed", and dismissed the Cabinet.63 A military Cabinet, headed by Brig. Mohammed Doud as Prime Minister, was sworn in and every civilian strategic position was replaced by military personnel all over the country.64 The U.S. pressurised Jordan to get rid of the Palestinian guerillas.

62 King Hussein made this statement to Lt. -Gen. Mohamed Sadek, C-in-C of Egyptian Armed Forces, who was then in Amman as President Nasser's peace emissary, *Sunday Telegraph*, 20 September 1970.
63 Ibid.
64 *Sunday Times*, 20 September 1970.
On 17 September, the Bedouins of the Jordanian army started indiscriminate attack on the fedayeen bases and refugee camps. In the morning of that day, the police were outgunned by the guerillas who were armed with Russian AK 47 automatic rifles and the Chinese hand-generades. Kind Hussein applied a military technique of defeating a hidden, infiltrated guerilla forces in a crowded city. He softened this area with artillery bombardment and then moved in with infantry and killed the enemy in the house-to-house fighting. For this reason the fight was indiscriminate and hoffifying, resulting in heavy casualties, both of the guerillas and of the civilians. King Hussein realised that his plan to cow down the guerillas within 24 hours was wishful thinking. In fact, it took nine bloody days for the army to maul them at the cost of the lives of thousands of men, women and children, mostly Palestinians. Before the cease-fire the guerillas liberated three cities of North Jordan - Irbid, Ramtha and Jerash - and centre of Amman.

The announcement of ceasefire came at midday on 25 September 1970 in Cairo under the aegis of Nasser, after a meeting between Gen. Numeiry, the Sudanese leader, who acted as a peace negotiator

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66 Ibid. The artillery units were manned by the Bedouins and the infantry included Palestinians in the Jordanian
between King Hussein and Yasser Arafat. The terms of the ceasefire were: (1) Transfer of guerilla bases from Amman and other towns to the Israeli-Jordan ceasefire line of the 1967 war on the River Jordan. (2) Withdrawal of the Jordanian Army to positions consistent with their duties of maintaining law and order and defending the country. (3) The guerillas must respect the sovereignty of the Jordanian Government and the country's laws.

Of the three enemies of the Palestinian revolution - imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction - the last one was the first to give the blow. The guerillas were mauled by the Jordanian Army. The Syrians, who were under Soviet and Arab leaders' pressure, could not come to their rescue and the Iraqi troops in Jordan remained silent spectators. Enveloped by all these adverse situations, the Palestinian movement was bound to weaken and to fail in its mission to turn Amman into an Arab "Hanoi". The agreement signed between Yasser Arafat and King Hussein was violated by the Jordanian army; and the guerilla presence in Jordan was over by July 1971. When the diplomacy with Jordan failed, the Palestinians resorted to an extraordinary method of guerilla warfare.

67 Daily Telegraph, 26 September 1970.
The Black September Organisation (BSO) and the Diplomatic implications of its Operations

The Palestinian revolution was in disarray. When revolution suffered setbacks at the initial stage, the actors organised special guerilla operations to keep the movement alive. All the guerilla groups of the PLO met and launched a deadly organisation called the Black September Organisation (BSO), an offspring of Al-Fatah, which operated clandestinely. Taking its name from the September massacre (1970) its avowed aim was to avenge the death of 3,500 Palestinians in Jordan by launching attacks on the U.S., Israel, Jordan, conservative Arab regimes and some European countries close to Israel.

The Black September was the deadliest guerilla organisation the world had ever seen and known. Its avowed purpose was to attack the enemies anywhere in the world. These attacks were most spectacular and drew the attention of the world to the Palestine problem which was withering away.

The Black September was completely an underground organisation. No one knew who its leaders were. The four Septembrists, who assassinated the Jordanian

Premier, Wqasfi al-Tal, gave the impression that they were the ones who started the organisation. They also admitted that they and their colleagues in the organisation were members of Al-Fatah. Some believed that the BSO was linked with Al-Fatah's intelligence organ, "Jihaz al-Rasd". The Septembrists were believed to have been trained in some of the Arab countries as well as in some of the socialist countries. Most probably they were trained by Abu Ali Iyyad, one of the top leaders of Al-Fatah, who was commanding 3,000 fedayeen in Jerash and Ajloun (Northern Jordan) where he was killed by the Jordanian troops in July 1971. Abu Iyad (Salah Khalef) and Abu Yusouf, no.2 and no. 3 in Al-Fatah respectively, were believed to have masterminded the BSO for the most meticulous and extra-ordinary operations.

Whatsoever might have been the world reaction to the Munich episode the Black September operations, from the Palestinian and Arab viewpoint, regenerated the world interest in the Palestinian liberation movement which had earlier been dismissed as all but finished. The PLO's application to the Olympic

70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 "The Palestine Commando Movement Once Again", The Arab World Weekly, 16 September 1972, pp. 5-6.
authorities for Palestinian participation was earlier rejected. The reason why the Black September chose the Olympics as the venue of operation was given in the "Collective Will" of the eight fedayeen who carried on the Munich operation in which 9 Israeli athletes were taken hostages at Munich Olympics on 5 September 1972. The "Collective Will", too poetic and existentialist in its expression, was released by the Palestine News Agency (WAFA) on 11 September 1972. It said:

Why does the Zionist delegation have a place in this tournament? Why is the banner of occupation, which is based on terrorism and intimidation, be raised next to the flags of all countries of the world, and our flag be absent from the tournament? The whole world is having fun and watching, while we suffer and suffer and fight on more than one front, and no ears listen to our complaint or to the moaning of our people." 73

The Black Septemberists demanded the release of 200 of their comrades from the Israeli prison, and also the German leftists Ulrike Meinhoff and Andreas Baader from German prison. The West German Interior Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher negotiated with the fedayeen who extended the deadline for execution four times. Genscher made frantic efforts for negotiations with some Arab Governments who did not want

to get involved. Right from the beginning he was in touch with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir. Israeli intelligence officials reached Munich to advise the German Government. Germans were capable of handling the situation and they could have saved the lives of hostages, if the Israelis could have released some of the prisoners. Golda Meir was too adamant

The Septembrists were given a false promise by Genscher, with Israeli advice, that they would be given safe passage out of the country. Instead of taking them to Munich airport they were taken to Purstenfeld bruck, a German airbase 16 miles away, which was ringed by 500 soldiers including sharp-shooters. The soldiers opened fire at the fedayeen when they came out to check the Lufthansa jet in which they were to fly out. The leader of the Septembrist fedayeen dived under a helicopter and fired back after finding that two of his comrades were shot dead. A sanguine battle continued for about two hours. The fedayeen fought very bravely killing some soldiers and blowing up the control tower, lights and parts of the airport. When five of their comrades were killed they blew up the hostages. Three surviving Septembrists surrendered.

In Cairo, the fedayeen radio cheered: "All glory to the men of Black September. The gold medal you
have won in Munich is for the Palestine nation." 74

Thousands of Arab youth gathered around the PLO office in Beirut to get recruited for the Black September. Once again the *fedayeen* proved that no political settlement — may it be King Hussein's proposed United Arab Kingdom or the Egyptian acceptance of the Rogers Plan — was possible without recognising the PLO. One could know what dimension the Munich incident gave to the Palestine problem from the statement of an Egyptian who said: 'They have proved the virtual impossibility of reaching a settlement that does not take account of the Palestinian problem. They have provoked the kind of Israeli retaliation that deepens Arab hatred. And they may succeed in bringing the Mideast to the brink of war." 75

The Black September served an ultimatum that West Germany would be its target of attack unless it freed the three Septembrists within six weeks' time. In the seventh week the world was taken aback when the Black September hijacked a Lufthansa 727 on 29 October 1972 and got its three members released from the German prison. The German surrender to the demands of the Black September was for fear of reprisals and for diplomatic reasons. Willy Brandt

75 Ibid.
was criticised by his opponents. His reply to them was: 'Do you wish to leave the representation of Germany in the Arab States totally in the hands of East Germany?' The Munich operation was not condemned by any Arab state.

After the Munich episode Israel retaliated by bombing the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. But it failed to counter the Black September. On 28 December 1972 the Black September fedayeen took the Israeli diplomats as hostages in Bangkok and demanded the release of 36 guerillas held in Israeli prison. On the list were 28 fedayeen girls and Kozo Okamoto, a member of the PFLP from Japan.

Israel entered into an agreement with the Septembrit fedayeen through the Thai Government and released 14 prisoners. The Septembrit fedayeen were successful in all their operations. West Germany was also chosen as a target because it paid heavy compensation to Jews who settled in Israel. When the various governments entered into negotiations with them during the guerilla operations, the fedayeen acquired a quasi-legal status. The purpose of such guerilla operations was also to exert diplomatic pressure to get international recognition for their cause. As the "Collective Will" of Munich guerillas further said:
We are not murderers or highway men. We are the oppressed people, who have no land or home, or identity card or passport and nothing to fear for or fear from. We have maintained silence as refugees for more than 18 years. We have begged for mercy, pity and sympathy. And all that they gave us was the relief for those who are held to be weak... As to the land and as to the home, they are for our enemy to come and go.  

Diplomatic implications of Guerilla War

The fedayeen guerilla operations against Israel from 1 January 1965 to the 1973 War to the 1982 Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon aimed at imposing the Palestine question on the world public opinion which had forgotten the Palestinians. They, of course, knew their effectiveness. They were aware of the fact that militarily they were no match for the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), who, armed by the U.S. are one of the most sophisticated forces in the world. Yet the Palestinian guerillas attacked the Israeli targets to carry on the armed propaganda which was political and diplomatic in nature. Abu Iyad (Salah Khalef), one of the founders of Al-Fatah and the master mind behind Black september, and number two in the PLO with the rank of Prime Minister who was assassinated by the Israelis in 1992, in his autobiographical account, My Home, My Land, says:

See Mehmood Hussain, no. 8, pp. 127-130.
The founder of Fateh were well aware of Israel's military superiority... but still they set as their main objective the launching of the armed struggle. Not that we harbored any illusions regarding our ability to overcome the Zionist state. But we believed that it was the only way to impose the Palestinian cause on world public opinion, and especially the only way to rally our masses to the people's movement we were trying to create. 77

There were three objectives of the Palestinian guerilla strategy: (1) The guerilla war would result in Israeli retaliation on frontline Arab states dragging the latter to an Arab-Israeli war, which would be followed by a diplomatic solution to the Palestine problem; (2) Creating an 'Arab Hanoi' either in Amman or Beirut in order to liberate Palestine, (3) Relentless armed struggle and mass resistance would force the Israelis to vacate parts of Palestine where the fedayeen would establish a state of their own, the base for further liberation of Palestine.

The guerillas' armed strategy aimed at harassing primarily Israel and then the forces obstructing their struggle. This harassment of Israel should be so much that finally Israel would recognise their grievances and make an accommodation with the Palestinians. Quoting an article written by Nabil Shaath,

a PLO leader, in 1971 about the role of guerilla operations in achieving productive political goal, William Quandt writes about the more ambitious objective of the fedayeen:

...that of bringing about changes within Israel that would make an eventual accommodation possible. Israelis, it was argued, could be forced to recognise the validity of Palestinian grievances. The burden of continuing warfare, heavy defense spending, and costly casualties would also eventually serve to convince the Israelis to accept political arrangements in which Palestinian demands were granted. 78

The October 1973 was a historic turning point for the fedayeen. They collaborated with the Egyptian and Syrian armies in the war against Israel and achieved notable victories. The Palestinian guerilla operations played an important role in the war and succeeded in weakening Israel.

Guerilla Front in October 1973 War

The guerilla leadership of the PLO was asked to cooperate for launching a large-scale but timely limited military operation Egypt intended to undertake in the Suez Canal front. The guerillas were told by

Egypt that the purpose of the impending operation was to generate U.S. pressure on Israel to soften its obstinate stand towards a peaceful Middle East settlement.  

The beginning of the 1973 war boosted the morale of the fedayeen who coordinated with Egypt and Syria. The moment the war started Yasser Arafat appealed to all the fedayeen to plunge into action inside the occupied area and in the frontier. The Third Front of the Palestinian guerillas included operations in five areas: (1) Gaza, Jerusalem, Nagev and Sinai, (2) West Bank, (3) all over Israel, (4) Golan Heights and (5) Northern Front.

A unified guerilla command was set up somewhere in the frontier under the leadership of Yasser Arafat and carried out 267 guerilla and regular military operations. Many of them were major operations: planting of mines, cutting Israeli supply lines, blowing up of the railway line to Siani and a radar station at Ramallah, blowing up of Haifa oil reservoir and a pipeline between Eilat and Asqalan; damaging grenade and weapons factories in Tel Aviv; and attacking the rear of Israeli army in Golan Heights. The most outstanding achievement of the guerillas was

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79 See Memood Hussain, "West Asia: The Third Front", Frontier (Calcutta), 16 February 1974, pp. 4-7.

80 For details see Mehmood Hussain, no. 8, pp. 98-105.
the occupation of the Ru'us Heights and hoisting the Palestine flag after a three-hour battle on the third day of the war in north Israel. Three Israeli aircrafts – Phantom, Mirage and Skyhawk – flying over Bekaa, Al-Rafid and Arquoub were shot down by Al-Fatah and ALF guerillas. Arafat supervised many military operations, decoded Israeli military communications, and was in touch with Cairo and Damascus.

Israel itself admitted that the fedayeen carried out 200 operations during the war, and wanted the guerillas to accept the ceasefire. During the war Israel complained to Dr. Kurt Waldheim, the U.N. Secretary-General, that the Palestinian guerillas were attacking northern Israel.

Although the 1973 ceasefire was accepted by Egypt, Israel and Syria, it was rejected by the Palestinians who once again confirmed that the struggle for the total liberation of Palestine would continue till they establish a secular, Democratic and progressive Palestinian State. On 22 October, "Voice of the Palestine Revolution", the Cairo-based guerilla radio, said: "No, one million times no, we will never lay down our arms."
The participation of the PLO guerillas and the PLA, who moved ahead of the advancing Egyptian and Syrian, was quite fruitful. The Egyptian army did perform miracles by crossing the Suez water barrier and overrunning the Barlev defence line of Israel. It could repulse the Israeli air attacks through the Soviet supplied missiles. The Egyptian forces liberated parts of their Sinai desert and they could have advanced further. But the U.S. supplied Israel some vital informations and pictures through the Sixth Fleet about the Egyptian army positions: That enabled Israel to capture some areas on the West bank of Suez canal. The Palestinian guerilla intelligence had warned the Egyptian commanders about the Israeli moves. But they did not take the guerillas seriously for which the Egyptians suffered some setbacks despite their victory in the war. The cease-fire was imposed by the Super Powers. On the Golan front the Israeli advances were repulsed by the Syrian army alongwith the three battalions of the Hittin forces of the PLA.

The October War created conditions very favourable for the Palestinians. Yasser Arafat described the war as "a positive, historic turning point", despite some of the negative aspects on the military and
political fields. "For the first time", he added, "the decision to repulse the aggression was an Arab one, and the myth of Israeli superiority was shattered forever." 81

The October war established the following points:

(1) Israeli Army is not invincible— a fact the fedayeen have been telling since 1965. (2) Israelis suffered more losses than the Egyptians and Syrians which led to the weakening of the Israeli economy. (3) Arabs regained their honour through the battlefield victories, and their moral was boosted up, despite the setback they suffered towards the end of the war. (4) For the first time the Arab unity was achieved to face the expansionist, racist and aggressive Israel. (5) Israel and the U.S. were totally isolated and the world public opinion was in favour of the Arabs. (6) Oil was used as a political and diplomatic weapon against the West— a strategy that did not last long, although it could create schism between the U.S. and its NATO allies. (7) Israel, a strategically of the U.S., could not be successful in suppressing the Arab liberation movement for all times to come (8) The October 1973 war marked the beginning of diplomatic defeat of Israel at international level. (9) Once

81 Ibid.
again the Palestine problem came to the forefront as the central issue in the Arab-Israeli conflict.  

(10) If the frontline Arab states unite and coordinate with other Arab states including the oil rich states, Israel could be wiped off and the historic Palestine could be re-established.

**PLO's Diplomatic Offensive**

The outcome of the October 1973 war was diplomatically favourable for the PLO. The opening up of the guerrilla front - The Third Front - in the war helped the PLO get recognition at the Arab and international levels. At their fifth summit conference in Algiers in November 1973 the Arab states recognised the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Yasser Arafat was received as a head of state at this conference and his status was equal to that of any other Arab head of the state. The initiative for the recognition of PLO was taken by the Algerian President Boumedienne and supported by all the Arab states except Jordan. This recognition was further endorsed by the Arab summit conference in Rabat on 28 October 1974 in which the recognition of the PLO was unanimously passed.

Armed with the official Arab recognition in 1973 the PLO started its diplomatic offensive at the international level. At the meeting of the Co-
ordination Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement held in Algiers from 19 to 21 March 1974, the Non-Aligned States recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and its struggle. It was a diplomatic victory of the PLO when the Non-Aligned Movement called on to break diplomatic relations with Israel if they had not already done it. Several countries complied with it.

The Arab summit conference in Rabat in 1974 also confirmed the Palestinian people's right to return to their country, to self-determination and the establishment of an independent national authority over all the liberated areas under the leadership of the PLO. Jordan, Syria and Egypt were called on to re-orient their relations with the PLO in accordance with these resolutions.

The PNC's Pragmatic Resolution

Even before the PNC had met the debate on the mini-Palestinian state had already started among the Palestinian masses in the Summer of 1974. Al-Fatah and PFLP declared their determination to establish a Palestinian state on any territory evacuated by or liberated from the Israelis. Some Palestinians argued that "all or nothing" policy would land them
nowhere. The liberation of Palestine should be achieved step by step instead of trying to force through all their demands at once.\footnote{Abdalla Frangi, The PLO and Palestine, (London: Zed Books, 1983), p. 140.} The 12th Congress of the Palestine National Council (PNC) held at Cairo in June 1974 decided to establish an "independent fighting national authority" on the territories to be vacated by Israel. The PNC (1 to 8 June 1974) showed a clear majority for the new strategy. Only 14 members of the PNC voted against it: 12 from PFLP and two from Al-Fatah. What the PNC wanted was a "fight and negotiate" strategy.

However, the controversial and decisive changes in the Ten Point Programme of 1974 were passed unanimously by the PNC in 1979 and 1981:

2. The PLO fights with all means, the first of which is armed struggle, for the liberation of Palestinian territories and the establishment of a militant, independent popular administration in every part of Palestine which is liberated. We wish to stress that this can only be achieved by a change of the balance of power in favour of our people and its struggle.

and:

4. The PLO regards every act of liberation of Palestinian territory as a step on the path to the realization of its strategy, the establishment of a democratic Palestinian State as laid down in previous congress resolutions of the Palestinian National Congress.\footnote{Ibid., p. 141.}
The PLO in point 2 of the programme did reject 'any partial state solution... the price of which would be renunciation of a historical right and revocation of our people's right to return to, and self-determination in, our country'.\textsuperscript{85} It was, however, made clear that creation of a democratic state is a lengthy process and the first step is the establishment of a Palestinian State in any part of Palestine which was liberated. "The PLO fights with all means"—mentioned by the PNC for the first time—implied methods other than armed struggle. However, in real terms, "a change of the alance of power in favour" of the Palestinian people remaied the pre-condition for a political solution.\textsuperscript{86}

\textit{Arafat's Historic Speech at the U.N.}

The PNC's 10-point resolutions of 1974 became the corner stone of PLO's diplomatic offensive which succeeded instantly the same year and the years that followed till the signing of the PLO-Israel Peace Accord in 1993. Even without accepting the Security Council resolution 242, the PLO was invited to the U.N. to participate in the discussions on the Palestinian Question in 1974. Invitation to the PLO was supported by 105 states, with only four-Isrel, the

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
U.S., the Dominican Republic and Bolivia – voting against it and 20 abstentions. 87

It was a historic event for the Palestinians and the fedayeen on 13 November 1974 when the PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat addressed the UN General Assembly. equally historic was his speech at the UN which clarified many of the doubts and suspicions about the PLO prevailing all over the world, especially in the West. He directly dealt with the question of terrorism.

Those who call us terrorist wish to prevent world public opinion from discovering the truth about us and from seeing the justice in our faces. They seek to hide the terrorism and tyranny of their acts, and our own posture of self-defence.... The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the reasons for which each fights for. Whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders, the settlers and the colonialists, cannot possibly be called terrorist, otherwise the Americans in their struggle for liberation from the British colonialists would have been terrorists; the European resistance against the Nazis would have been terrorism, the struggle of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples would also be terrorism, and many of you who are in the Assembly hall were considered terrorists...88

Arafat made it clear that the PLO wants to establish an independent democratic Palestine where even the Jews would be allowed to stay without discrimination. He told the world body the history of

of Palestine, the injustice done to the Palestinians through planned colonisation and Israeli terrorism through which his people were rendered homeless. "We bravely faced the most vicious acts of Israeli terrorism"... said Arafat. 89 He also said that 19,000 Arab houses were destroyed by the Israelis during the past seven years.

Today I have come here bearing an olive branch and a freedom-fighter's gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. I repeat: do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.

War flares up in Palestine, and yet it is in Palestine that peace will be born. 90

With these words, resembling Arabic poetry, the PLO Chairman Arafat concluded his 80-minute historic speech and raised his hands to give a sign of victory. The representatives of member nations noticed his holster revolver. He was the first political leader—who did not represent a government—to address the U.N. along with his gun. He succeeded in his diplomacy of the gun and the olive branch: the U.N. recognised the inalienable national rights of the Palestinians and accorded the PLO observer status at the U.N.

89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
The 1982 Israel-PLO War in Lebanon

Israel launched a full-scale war against the PLO and Palestinians in Lebanon on 4 June 1982. Israel had planned this war three years in advance; and it was a continuation of its 1981 war against the PLO in Lebanon. The sole purpose of Israel's war was to liquidate the PLO and the Palestine question. Israeli occupation of Lebanon fitted into the Zionist ambition of "Greater Israel". This war - popularly known as the fifth Israeli-Arab war of 1982 - had some unique characteristics: (a) It was the first war in which PLO was the main and the only actor from the Arab side; (b) the PLO fought the war all alone for 88 days without any external support; (c) it was the longest war any Arab party fought against Israel; (d) the fighting ratio between the Israelis and the PLO was 14:1; (e) the Israelis failed to enter West Beirut, the PLO headquarters where the PLO repulsed all the Israeli advances; (f) the U.S. and Israel entered into diplomatic negotiations with the PLO for the evacuation of guerillas.

The 1982 Israeli War in Lebanon has been described as "brilliant", "stunning" and "spectacular". If it is analysed in the proper context, the disproportionate military balance hardly makes for a "brilliant"
victory. The fact that a non-state guerilla group with only 14,000 guerillas could fight one of the most sophisticated and technically superior defence forces with a strength of 170,000 continuously for nearly three months was, indeed, remarkable.

According to one estimate, the Israelis rapidly deployed in Lebanon a force of 120,000 with 1,600 tanks, 16,000 armoured personnel carriers, 600 guns or multiple rocket launchers (including at least 500 self-propelled howitzers or field guns), with massive air and naval support. Compared to this the PLO with only 14,000 guerillas was poorly equipped, and its heavy weapons included obsolete T-34 tanks, 122 mm, 130 mm, and 155 mm howitzers, BM-21 mobile 30 or 40 - tube multiple rocket launchers, BRDM - 2 scoutcars, BTR - 152 personnel carriers, SA-7 and SA-9 missile launchers, and ZSU-23-4 mobile radar-guided anti-aircraft guns. Unlike Israel, the PLO did not have the resources to fight such a war which was no less than the 1956, 1967 or 1973 Arab-Israeli war.


93 Ibid.
In the March 1978 Israeli invasion of South Lebanon, the Israeli forces were able to overrun PLO bases and occupy the area south of Litani River and east of Tyre. The PLO guerillas had put up a fierce resistance and slowed the Israeli advance. The PLO inflicted heavy casualties on the Israelis, preserved its combat units and withdrew in relative order, with a minimal loss of guerillas.94

Hence, after Israel failing twice in 1978 and 1981 - and the Syrians in 1976 - the Israeli Defence Minister Ariel Sharon and Prime Minister Manouch BEGIN desperately needed a "victory" against the PLO in 1982; and they had one more advantage: the U.S. collaboration. The U.S. not only supplied the Israeli forces with the latest cluster bombs and vacuum bombs but also the American Sixth fleet in the Mediterranean collaborated in the War. Some of the war's much heralded F-15s and F-16s flew missions from the two U.S. financed air bases in Negev, Uvda and Ramori. Israel also used extremely lethal anti-personnel weapons such as cluster bombs and phosphorous bombs, some of which the U.S. transferred to the IAF from the Picintinny Arsenal before the war.95

94 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
Israel had thought that it could liquidate the PLO within three to five days and keep Lebanon under its control. It could never imagine that the PLO under the command of Yasser Arafat would remain unvanquished in Beirut, even after 88 days of the war. Although Israeli forces occupied the whole of Lebanon it failed to enter West Beirut which housed the PLO headquarter and its other establishments. As Faical Aweidha, the PLO ambassador in New Delhi, put it: "The streets of Beirut belong to us, No enemy can face us there." 96

Giving an account of the 88-day siege of Beirut from all sides by 120,000 Israeli forces, Arafat, who defended the city with his 8,000 guerillas, said:

The battle of Beirut certainly brought about many changes. For example, it deprived the Israeli army of its role of spearhead in the American Rapid Deployent Force. And against what did this army deploy about one hundred and seventy thousand of its force in the various land, sea and air sectors? Against two men and a boy as they say. The number of our forces in Beirut facing the enemy forces did not exceed eight thousand.... a ratio of one to fourteen. And this in spite of the fact that we did not have a main fighting force in Beirut: most of our fighters in Beirut were from organisations. This is why the Pentagon and NATO are so baffled by the phenomenon of the Palestinian fighter who halted the Israeli army for eighty-eight days. As against all this, what is the value of the Israeli army in the comprehensive strategy of the American Pentagon and NATO? 97

The advancing Israeli forces were held up for five days at Khaldeh where the guerillas, under the command of late Abdullah Siyam, put up tough resistance. During this time Beirut was fortified by the PLO under the supervision of Yasser Arafat.

These five days worked the miracle of the fortifications of the forward lines of Beirut, the coast and the traditional crossing points to the eastern areas: five days only for the first rapid fortification. After that we started daily adding to the fortifications of the city.98

These Palestinian fortifications later became difficult for the French and other experts of the multi-national forces to dismantle. A French expert wrote in Le Monde that the Palestiians set up fortifications with primitive means, but they were extremely complicated.99 For a long time they failed in dismantling a number of booby-traps. Arafat later offered the services of a Palestinian military expert to help them, specially the Americans, to dismantle the mines and booby-traps left behind by the guerillas.100

Under Arafat's supervision 38 wells were dug up in Beirut, ensuring the water supply which was cut off by the Israelis. He engaged students in

98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
the bakeries which supplied bread to the entire city; and essential services were maintained. The Palestine Red Crescent Society set up underground field hospitals; the PLO established tele-communication centre which was in touch with most of the world capitals; and ensured publication of newspapers and radio broadcasting. The whole city with its 600,000 Lebanese and 200,000 Palestinian population cooperated with Arafat in the resistance.

When the Israeli forces organised the blockade of Beirut, and the Israelis were ceaselessly raining bombs from the sky, Arafat told his comrades: "Brothers, this is our fate, and at this moment, I can smell the breezes of paradise". He gave the slogan: "The winds of Paradise have blown". It spread like wildfire among the Beirutis with graffiti on the walls. The guerillas greeted Arafat with this slogan and the people celebrated the most morbid and macabre moments, thinking that the 'gates of Paradise' have opened for them.

Arafat raised the morale of the fedayeen so high that they put up tough and extraordinary resistance to the Israeli forces, many of whose advances were

101 In Islam, to be killed in war is to die a martyr, assured of Paradise and therefore of immortality. The slogan expresses both awareness of the coming battle and, above all, readiness for the martyrdom it may bring. See Ibid.
repulsed. On several occasions the Israeli army retreated especially near the airport. Commenting on the Palestinian guerillas the Israeli army radio admitted: "Their fighting capability is no less than us. They are following the classical method of warfare which should be taught in military school."\(^{102}\)

**The U.S. Negotiations with PLO**

Despite their best efforts when the Israelis failed to evict the PLO from Beirut the U.S. ambassador Philip Habib opened negotiations with Yasser Arafat for the evacuation of the Palestinian guerillas. "The Palestinian-Israeli battle on the negotiations front was really a war of nerves and a battle of wills," as Arafat put it. The negotiations went on for several days and Arafat demanded the recognition of the PLO by the U.S. In order to exert pressure on the PLO, the Israelis continued to bombard Beirut. According to Arafat:

> Whenever the negotiations became difficult, Philip Habib would affect annoyance and send us warplanes and warships to negotiate with us through fire and destructions. He knew that every additional day of negotiations would mean further killing, destruction and bloodshed... The Israeli enemy and Habib negotiated with me through fire, Phantom, cluster bombs and sniping from the air.\(^{103}\)

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\(^{102}\) Mehmood Hussain, no. 96.

\(^{103}\) See no. 7.
During the negotiations Yasser Arafat succeeded in the "war of wills" in imposing his conditions on the Israelis and the U.S. with regard to his departure from Beirut. For ten days he discussed in details how he was going to leave Beirut. At that time a message came from the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin asking whether Arafat was blockading Tel Aviv or he was blockading Beirut. Arafat replied: "By being blockaded in Beirut, I am blockading Tel Aviv and all capitals." This was a unique and ironic diplomatic negotiation with Israel.

The Lebanese President Elias Sarkis, who was happy at the Israeli war against the PLO, sent a letter to Arafat through a Lebanese general to whom Arafat gave a very significant reply which was of historic significance:

Tell President Sarkis this: the Franks came to this region and left it, taking their people with them. The Tartars came here and left, and this region defeated the Tartars. In the same way the Zionists will leave this region and take their dogs with them. What is more, General, I expect you have followed the course of the war against us on the screen in Baabda. But I should like to ask you: is there any bill we have not paid? We have paid the Israeli bill in full, and we have also paid the American bill in full, and the Lebanese bill and some Arab bills. Are there any bills we have not yet paid? 105

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104 Ibid
105 Ibid.
Arafat then asked his comrade, Abu al-Walid, to sign the "ridiculous" bills that Bashir Gemayel presented – the electricity bills. This statement of Arafat was a satire heaped at all those who were hostile to the Palestinians. During the siege he gave several interviews to various newspapers, including the Israeli, in which he said that the Israelis do not understand history:

I am asking, and I am turning with my question to all Israelis: How long can you go on in this arrogant way?... 10 years? 20 years? 50 years? OK! We have the ability to suffer and be dispersed. May be the result will be a disaster. But not for us. 106

Arafat leaves Beirut as a Victor

Arafat imposed his terms and conditions on the U.S. envoy Philip Habib regarding the departure of the PLO forces from Beirut. The departure followed all the formalities of a victor. These were in accordance with the international protocol: the guard of honour and military salute to the PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat at the stadium in the presence of a large crowd of Lebanese and Palestinians; a Greek military mission led by a general escorted Arafat; an official Greek envoy was sent and four Greek ships escorted Arafat's boat that took him to Greece; and

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Arafat's boat flew a Palestinian flag. Men, women and children bade farewell to Arafat and the guerillas with tears in their eyes: "The defenders of the city are leaving".

"All these formalities were not for Yasser Arafat but as the symbol of a city that had fought and held out, and was entitled to impose its terms," said Arafat. He further added:

It was not for me personally, but for the honor of the coming generations of our people. As for the people of Beirut, one of the few times in my life I have wept was when I said farewell to Beirut and the people of Beirut; I have never known such sympathy as theirs. 107

The question arises why did the PLO leave Beirut, although it did not let the Israelis capture it? Arafat's answer to this was:

Neither Israeli pressure nor the American negotiator nor Arab silence could make the forces of the Palestinian revolution leave Beirut. Our forces left for the sake of Beirut and its men, women and children, who gave us more than any people in the world can give another people. They shared their last loaf of bread, dipped in blood and gun powder. They shared to the extent of offering their martyrs.

..."Beirut, which had made for itself a splendid place in history. Standing before it was the killer of women and children, the coward Sharon, unable to occupy it for all the quantity of American equipment at his disposal. Sharon failed to storm Beirut when those heroes of Joint Forces were defending it. 108

107 See no.97.
108 Ibid.
On the occasion of Eid al-Fitr, the sacred festival of Muslims at the end of the month of fasting Ramzan, Yasser Arafat sent a message on 20 July 1982 from the besieged Beirut to the Arabs and Muslims of the world, questioning their silence:

In the name of all free and honorable men and women of the Arab and Islamic nation, I ask my brethren leaders and presidents: you have duties towards these masses (Palestinians), the duties of brotherhood and Arabism, the duties of religion, of nationalism, of neighbours and of Islam. What then is the explanation for this silence and indifference?

..."Where are the Arab and Islamic masses who have throughout history proven through all battles and crises their force and integrity?109

Arafat repeated Salauddin Ayyubi's appeal: "I do not need your prayers, but I need your swords". It was, indeed, a satire on the Arab and Islamic silence. The Arab and Islamic world was busy elsewhere: Iran-Iraq war. Yet Arafat promised: "We shall meet together on the beloved land of Palestine. Revolution until victory."110

Arafat's Master Guerilla Strategy

It was the will power, determination, courage, bravery and valour of the guerillas for which they could resist such a massive war in Beirut. The night


110 Ibid.
before his departure, Yasser Arafat played a master strategy which became Israel's 'waterloo' in Lebanon in the next two years: (i) Arafat clandestinely distributed half a million pieces of arms among the Lebanese masses without the knowledge of the Israelis and the Americans (ii) about five thousand Palestinian guerillas turned civilians overnight and retreated to other parts of Lebanon to put up resistance later. It was extremely difficult to defeat the fadeyeen, for they retreated to advance militarily, politically and diplomatically. After all, a guerilla is a great psychological warrior.

During the crisis Arafat often talked of 'dark tunnel' which Beirut entered alongwith him'. He told his comrades that they were entering a dark tunnel and they did not know where they were going but he smiled and predicted a "tornado", a "hurricane" after their departure. What he meant was the war of attrition against the Israeli occupation of Lebanon through the Palestinian and Lebanese guerillas.

As per the agreement Arafat handed over Beirut to the multi-national forces: Italian, French, U.S. and the UN forces who were responsible for the safety of Palestinian civilians. What followed were the
massacres of Palestinian men, women and children in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps by the Phalangists in connivance with the Israeli forces, and blessings from the U.S.\textsuperscript{111}

The PLO guerillas were officially dispersed in nine Arab countries, and the PLO headquarters shifted to Tunis. Soon the fedayeen staged a comeback into Lebanon. The fedayeen and the Lebanese National Movement put up tough resistance through guerilla operations against the Israeli forces and the U.S. marines who were forced to withdraw by 1984-85. The guerilla warfare once again performed miracles in the war of attrition against Israel. The Israeli casualty rate was so high that the Government was under pressure from the Israeli masses to withdraw shelving their dream of 'greater Israel.'

The PLO undoubtedly suffered heavy losses losing its base but it gained diplomatically. The whole world, including the Israeli public opinion, opposed the massacres of at least 18,000 civilians, both Palestinians and Lebanese. The casualty figure touched 50,000. The world saw the ugly face of Zionist Israel, and some U.S. senators led by Mac Closky demanded

\textsuperscript{111} The Italians and the French, part of the multinational forces, withdrew from Beirut under the U.S. pressure to facilitate the massacres. See no. 97, Also see Claudia Wright, "The Turn of the Screw - The Lebanon War and American Policy" Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XI 4, Vol. XII 1, Summer/Fall 1982, pp. 3-22.
the recognition of the PLO by the U.S. During this time Arafat gave the hints to a U.S. senator that the PLO might accept the U.N. SC resolution 242 which opened a vast range of Palestinian diplomacy to get a state. During that time Arafat's interview to an Israeli newspaper opened his diplomatic card: that his first preference was for an "Arab-Jewish undivided state" but if that was not possible he would even be prepared to accept a separate "Palestinian state" adjacent to Israel. With this in mind, Arafat started a flurry of diplomatic initiatives which were to bear fruit a decade later.

112 See Mehmood Hussain, no. 96.