CONCLUSION
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In the beginning of this century, a predominant concern of European diplomacy was the "Eastern question" as the Great Powers manoeuvred to establish control over territories of the declining Ottoman Empire. The defeat of Turkey in the first world war resolved the "Eastern question" and the Allied Powers distributed the spoils of the Ottoman Empire amongst themselves. Great Britain secured the Arab support during the war by promising them independence. Contrary to Arab expectations Britain promised a "national home" for the Jews in Palestine through the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917. Hence the Balfour Declaration was illegal. It was a document in which one nation promised to the second nation the country of the third. The resolution of the "Eastern question" did not produce an answer but gave birth to another question - the Palestine question which was to dominate almost the rest of the century.

The U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points" outlining the framework of the peace agreements after the war was one of the finest documents which was also applicable to Palestine. It included
the provision that the non-Turkish nationalities of the Ottoman Empire should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development. He also appointed the King - Crane Commission to elucidate the public opinion of the area to decide the fate of Palestine. It was one of the sanest U.S. efforts in twentieth century diplomacy to solve the Palestine problem as per the wishes of the people of Palestine. The Commission's report recommended serious modification of the extreme Zionist programme for Palestine of unlimited immigration of Jews, looking finally to making Palestine distinctly a Jewish State. The Commission warned the Peace Conference about the consequences of the Zionist programme which could only be implemented through the force of arms as nine-tenths of the population of Palestine were opposed to it. It considered the Zionist programme a serious injustice, for the initial claim submitted by the Zionist representatives, that they had a "right" to Palestine, based on an "occupation of two thousand years ago", could hardly be seriously considered. It was a tragedy for the Palestinians that the Commission's recommendations received no attention and in any case were to become moot with the United States decision to stay out of the League for Nations. Had the King - Crane Commission's report been implemented
by the Allied Powers there would not have been a Palestine problem.

All the mandates over Arab countries, including Palestine, were treated as class 'A' Mandates, applicable to territories whose independence had been provisionally recognised in the covenant of the League of Nations. By failing to consult the Plestinian people in the decision on the future of their country, the victorious Powers ignored not only the principle of self-determination that they themselves had endorsed, but also the provisions of Article 22 of the League's covenant which called for the "well-being and development of such people". This Article also said that the wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory. This was not done in the case of Palestine. The Mandate for Palestine (24 July 1922) which was approved by the Allied Powers incorporated the Balfour Declaration. The primary task of the Mandate was the establishment of "the Jewish national home" in Palestine for which the British would collaborate with the Zionist Organisation. While the Palestinians had enjoyed

freedom, political and civil rights under the Turkish rule, the British Mandate subjugated them not only to the British colonial authorities but also to the Zionist. It was a calculated design of the British colonial diplomacy to put two swords in one scabbard: the native Arabs and the imigrant Jews in Palestine. The purpose of the Mandate system - the well-being and development of the native people in order to enable them to attain independence - was lost.

While Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Transjordan attained independence, following the termination of Mandates, in 1932, 1943, 1944 and 1946 respectively, the Palestine Mandate, with its inherent contradictions, did not lead to independence provisionally recognised in the League's Covenant. It sowed the seeds of conflict and violence which were to continue till the last decade of the century. The Zionist Organisation, financed by the Western Jewish capitalists, succeeded in its diplomacy to colonise Palestine and to achieve a settler state. But the Palestinians failed in the international diplomacy for lack of resources, mobility and effective Arab leadership to counter the Zionist diplomacy.
However, the Palestinians resorted to violent resistance against the British and the Zionists throughout the period of British Mandate, primarily for two reasons: non-fulfilment of the British promise of independence given during the first world war; and the implementation of Balfour Declaration which denied them the right of self-determination and their subjection to the immigrant Jews. The Palestinian resistance aimed at ending the Mandate, stopping the immigration of Jews into Palestine and securing independence. Self-determination had deeper meaning for Palestinians than others as they were fighting not only the British forces but also the Zionist terrorist gangs like the Hagana, Stern and Irgun which were operating in collaboration with the British administration.

The situation in Palestine was not within the control of the British Government because of the Zionist terrorist activities and the arrival of illegal Jewish immigrants. Britain placed the Palestine question before a special session of the U.N. General Assembly in February 1947 concerning the "future Government of Palestine". Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria put forth the proposal for the independence of Palestine which was provisionally
recognised by the League of Nations. With the majority of the permanent members opposed, it was rejected in the General Committee.

Right from the beginning it became clear in the U.N. that Britain and the U.S. were not in favour of independence of Palestine but wanted to impose the European Jewish problem on the Palestinians. The Jewish agency was allowed to present its case before the General Assembly. The Palestinians withdrew their request for hearing as a mark of protest pointing out that the Jewish Agency represented an alien and imposed minority. The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was appointed to find out a solution of the Palestine problem.

The reasons why the Arab Higher Committee abstained were given in the cable to the UNSCOP: refusal of the U.N. to give independence to Palestine failure to detach world Jewish refugees from Palestine problem; replacing the interests of Palestinians by insertion of World religious interests although these were not subject of contention; Palestine Arabs' natural rights were self-evident and could not continue to be subject to investigation but deserved to be recognised on the basis of principles of the U.N. Charter. The Palestinians argued that
the destiny of Palestine could not be decided by the outsiders as it was against the U.N. Charter.

A sub-committee of the UNSCOP visited the Jewish refugee camps in Germany and Austria. During their visit to Palestine, the UNSCOP members were under pressure from the terrorist group Irgun led by Menachem Begin. The Zionists knew how to carry on diplomacy through terror. UNSCOP's sympathy for the illegal Jewish immigrants was clearly evident in its report. By Augst 1947, UNSCOP submitted its report. Although the only unanimous decision of UNSCOP was to immediately terminate the Mandate "at the earliest practicable date and grant independence", it, however, failed to reach an agreement on the future of Palestine and the Palestinian - Zionist conflict. Two plans were recommended by its members: a majority plan (supported by Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay) recommended the partition of Palestine into two states that would be separate and independent with an economic union, and international status for Jerusalem under U.N. trusteeship, and a minority plan (supported by India, Iran and Yugoslavia) proposing a unified federal and independent state of Palestine with Jerusalem as its capital.
The majority plan sought to solve the Jewish problem in Europe and meet the "aspirations" of the Jews in a "national home" in Palestine, exceeding the authority of the U.N. and its competence to recommend partition of a state against the sovereignty of its people and their wishes. It did not realise that such a resolution violated the principles embodied in Article 22 of the covenant of the League of Nations and the Charter of the U.N. The justification for the minority plan was that any solution for Palestine could not be considered as a solution of the Jewish problem in general. It envisaged that the partition is "impracticable and unworkable", and would be a tragic mistake on the part of international community.

The Indian representative at UNSCOP stated that partition would not bring a settlement to the issue as it would increase instability in the region. He further pointed out that the support for partition was to create a Jewish state to serve the political and strategic interests of Britain in total disregard of the principles of self-determination. That was the correct stand taken by Jawaharlal Nehru, and Mahatma Gandhi who had earlier said at the Haripura session of the Congress that Palestine belongs to the Palestinians as France to the
French and England to the English. Gandhi had questioned the entry of immigrant Jews into Palestine "under the shadows of British guns".

The U.N. General Assembly finally voted for the partition plan on 29 November 1947 with 30 states in favour, 17 against and 9 abstentions. The resolution of the General Assembly to partition Palestine identified as resolution 181 (II) constituted a recommendation "to the United Kingdom, as the Mandatory Power, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoptions and implementation, with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union...", requesting the Security Council to "undertake the necessary measures as provided in the plan for its implementation..."

According to this plan, Palestine was to be divided into two states - Jewish State" and "arab State" - and its territory into eight parts. Three were allotted to the Jewish State and three to the Arab State. The seventh, Jafa, was to form an Arab enclave in Jewish territory while the eighth part was to be Jerusalem as a corpus separatum under a special international regime under the U.N. Trusteeship Council for 10 years after which
"the residents of the city shall then be free to express by means of a referendum their wishes as to the possible modification of the regime of the city."

Under the plan, Jews constituting 32 per cent of the population were allotted 56 per cent land while the Arabs constituting 68 per cent were allotted 43 per cent of the land of Palestine. The rest was for Jerusalem. Ironically, the Arabs were in majority in both the states and also in Jerusalem, although the sympathisers of the Zionist case showed the Arab and Jewish population as almost equal in the "Jewish State".

From December 1947 to 14 May 1948 it was a sinister diplomacy of Britain to play the final scenario to erect the state of Israel. It refused to implement the partition plan. Instead of handing over Palestine to the U.N. Commission it handed over Tel Aviv and surrounding areas to the local Jewish (terrorist) authorities and left Palestine on 15 May 1948 one day after the proclamation of the state of Israel. By that time 400,000 Palestinians had left the country to become refugees following the massacres organised by the Zionist gangsters.
right under the nose of British administration. While allowing the Zionist terrorists to occupy as much land as possible the British Government warned against any outside interference in Palestine—a direct warning against to Arab states—as it would be met with force. Thus two-thirds of Palestine was occupied by the Zionists in the British presence.

Five Arab armies—Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq—entered Palestine on 15 May 1948 after the Arab League informed the U.N. through a telegram giving reasons for Arab states' intervention: to help the Palestinian Arabs secure their rightful independence under the principles of self-determination recognised by the U.N. Charter, for restoring peace, law and order and to prevent the spread of disorder into the neighbouring Arab countries.

Despite the limitations of arms the Arab armies, whose number was less than the Zionist forces, achieved limited successes. Although the unified command of the Arab armies was held by the British military personnel, who aimed at securing the newborn Israeli state, the Egyptian army reached
an advanced line near Tel Aviv, the Jordanian and Iraqi armies controlled wide areas including Lydda and Ramlah. As its military position deteriorated, Israel appealed to the U.N. for intervention.

On 22 May 1948 the Security Council called upon the parties concerned to order a cease-fire to their forces. The U.N. undoubtedly played a dubious role when it did not intervene when the Zionist forces were resorting to terrorism and uprooting the Palestinians and occupying territories allotted to the Palestine Arab State. On the contrary, the U.N. through its Secretary General Trygve Lie upheld Israel's accusation against the Arabs for starting an aggression. The Security Council, threatened the Arab States and warned of action, including sanctions. The Zionist diplomacy succeeded in mobilising the Western opinion in its favour. It could even silence the U.S. which had proposed to place Palestine under temporary U.N. trusteeship in the pre-14 May 1948 turbulent situation perpetrated by Zionist terrorists.

The Security Council ordered another cease-fire on 29 May 1948, by which time Israel had consolidated its occupation and usurpation of Palestinian
territories much beyond that allotted to it by the partition plan. Count Folke Bernadotte was appointed U.N. Mediator and dispatched to Palestine to supervise the cease-fire and to "promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation in Palestine". A U.N. Truce Supervision Committee (UNTSCO) was also established. Bernadotte effected a truce on 11 June 1948. He submitted a proposal for Palestine Union comprising two members, one Arab and one Jewish, along with some territorial adjustments (giving Negev, Ramleh, Lydda and Jerusalem to the Arab State). He also proposed return of all refugees and some limitations on Jewish immigration. Since his proposal was opposed by both the parties, Bernadotte later submitted a modified version of his plan. On 17 September 1948, one day after submitting his plan to the U.N. Bernadotte was assassinated by, in the Israeli official view, the Stern Gang, one of the several notorious Zionist terrorist organisations, whose leader Yitzhak Shamir (who was the Israeli Prime Minister when the Madrid Peace Conference started) said: "Blessed be the hand that does it".

The truce was punctuated by Zionist attacks to push more Palestinians out of their country. On 16 November 1948 the Security Council adopted
a resolution calling for armistice between the parties. Under heavy pressure from the U.S. included threats of sanctions and other actions, Arab states signed the Armistice Agreements between 24 February to 20 July 1949: with Egypt on 24 February, Lebanon on 23 March, Jordan on 3 April and Syria on 20 July 1949. These agreements, arranged by U.N. Acting Mediator Dr. Ralph Bunche, enabled Israel to control 77 per cent of the total land of Palestine instead of 56 per cent allotted to the Jewish State under the partition plan. The agreements, as the provisions declared, were "dictated exclusively by military, not political, considerations" and did not prejudice the political positions of any of the parties on the ultimate settlement of the Palestine question. Thus they did not give Israel any legal right to the territories occupied during the 1948 hostilities, beyond the lines specified in the partition resolution.

Based on Bernadotte's recommendations the U.N. General Assembly passed the resolution 194 (III) calling for the establishment of a Conciliation Commission with headquarters in Jerusalem to continue the functions of the Mediator and the Truce Commission. The resolution also included
a very significant provision establishing the rights of the Palestinian refugees: those "wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible". Israel never complied with this resolution concerning the rights of the Palestinian refugees. However, this provision has been reiterated annually by the General Assembly up to the present time as it formulates a principal condition for the final settlement of the Palestine question.

The Conciliation Commission for Palestine (CCP) was established in January 1949, with U.S., France and Turkey as its members. The Commission arranged a conference in April 1949 in Lausanne consisting of separate talks with Israel and Arab states. Two separate protocols were signed on 12 May 1949 by the two parties agreeing to use the partition resolution's boundaries as a "basis of discussions with the Commission". Although this
act reiterated the international commitment to establish a Palestinian Arab State on the basis of partition resolution, the Commission became ineffective with Israel demanding the international borders of Mandatory Palestine as its frontiers. Israel refused the repatriation of refugees, and moved its capital from Tel Aviv to the Western part of Jerusalem in 1950 in defiance of the U.N. resolutions.

When Israel moved its second application for its admission into the U.N., India voted against it stating that "India could not recognize Israel which has been achieved through the force of arms and not through negotiations". The preamble of the resolution admitting Israel to the U.N. specifically referred to Israel's undertaking to implement resolutions 181 (II) and 194 (III) - the partition resolution and the return of refugees - which have been assiduously rejected by it. Israel is the only state in the world which was created through a resolution of the U.N.

From 1949 to 1967 the Palestine question was shelved at the U.N. as a "refugee problem" with little attention to the Palestinians' inalienable
national and human rights. With Jordan annexing the west Bank and Egypt running the administration of the Gaza Strip Palestine was wiped off the world map. Government of All Palestine set up in the Gaza Strip under the leadership of Haj Amin al-Hussaini collapsed for lack of fund, Arab support and Jordanian hostility. The Palestine question was lost in the broad Arab-Israeli conflict and deleted in 1950 from the Agenda of the General Assembly. Majority of the Palestinians became refugees in the neighbouring countries. The Palestinian problem was only mentioned in the context of a refugee problem through the report of United Nations Relief and Works agency (UNRWA).

Although the PLO was officially set up in 1964 by Egypt and Jordan with the approval of the Aqarab League it could not function effectively. Al-Fatah launched guerilla warfare on 1 January 1965 as Palestinians were disappointed at the attitude of the Arab regimes. The birth of armed struggle under Yasser Arafat's leadership opened a new chapter for the Palestinians who were snivelling and whining in the refugee camps.
The emergence of Yasser Arafat and his Al-Fatah heralded a new era in the history of Palestinian struggle for Statehood. He combined guerilla warfare with diplomacy. He realised that it was futile to carry on international diplomacy without arms. As a student leader in Cairo in late 1940s he had attended international leftist students' conferences in the East European socialist countries. After starting the guerilla warfare he established good relations with China, Cuba, Algeria, North Korea and some of the socialist countries. Some of his guerillas were trained in China and Algeria.

The June 1967 war made the Palestinian fedayeen's task easier. After frontline Arab states' defeat the fedayeen appeared in the centre stage and the core issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict -- the Palestine question - came to the forefront. The war proved Israel as an aggressor state as it occupied not only rest of Palestine - West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip - but also Sinai of Egypt and Golan Heights of Syria. The war brought a second exodus of Palestinians, estimated at 500,000.
The Security Council adopted resolution 242 on 22 November 1967 which called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces. However, it did not explicitly mention Palestine or Palestinians but repeated the traditional phrase the "refugee problem".

As the Palestinian guerilla warfare intensified after the 1967 war with screaming headlines in the international press, the U.N. recognised, for the first time, the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine in 1969 and more specifically in 1970 condemning the violations of human rights, in the Israeli occupied territories. The General Assembly resolution of 1970 also mentioned about the right of self-determination of the Palestinians. Resolutions in similar terms were passed by the General Assembly in 1971 and 1972, stressing the point that respect for the inalienable rights of the Palestinians was an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. By 1973, the PLO's guerilla warfare earned recognition from the U.N. That year, in a resolution dealing with the situation in Africa, but which was regarded as implicitly applying to Middle East also, the General Assembly recognised that armed struggle was a legitimate part of a liberation movement and condemned all
governments which did not recognise the right to self-determination and independence of peoples, notably the people of Africa and the Palestinian people. This recognition was given to the Palestinians despite the fact that some of the spectacular guerilla operations including the Munich operation had taken place during this period.

All these pro-Palestinian resolutions were possible because of the PLO which persuaded most of the Afro-Asian Governments to support its cause. The PLO's diplomacy at the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) conferences also succeeded in wielding pressure on the U.N. reducing the Euro-American power.

Another turning point was the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The PLO's third front in the war supplemented the war efforts of Egypt and Syria. For the first time the war was an Arab offensive against Israel; and Egypt succeeded in recovering a part of its territory. After achieving limited battle field victory, Arabs were in a better bargaining position than before. The PLO launched its diplomatic offensive accompanied by guerilla warfare. The music of diplomacy should have its instruments of arms.
Just after the war the Arab states recognised the PLO in 1973, and more specifically at Rabat in October 1974. The Rabat conference resolution was of special significance as it not only recognised the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people but also affirmed the right of the Palestinians to set up an independent national authority under the leadership of the PLO on any liberated Palestinian land. Jordan, which had administered the West Bank from 1948 to 1967, also accepted this resolution which rectified the mistakes committed by Jordan and Egypt in 1948 whereby the All-Palestine Government was not allowed to function. Armed with Arab recognition the PLO launched international diplomatic offensive. The Arab states along with the Third World countries played a leading role in support of the PLO.

Yassern Arafat made history by getting an invitation from the U.N. to address the General Assembly. Arafat through his speech on 13 November 1974 could convince the world body that he was serious about peace with justice for the Palestinians. He was also the first person to enter the U.N. with a gun. The concluding part of his speech "I have come here bearing an olive branch and the
gun of a revolutionary" - was the highest manifestation of Arafat's diplomacy through guerilla warfare. He was so suave and sophisticated that the member nations were convinced that the PLO was not a terrorist organisation. The U.N., before inviting Arafat, recognised the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people and conferred on the PLO the status of observer in the General Assembly and in other international conferences held under U.N. auspices.

At the 30th session in 1973, the General Assembly requested the Security Council to act to enable the Palestinians to exercise their rights and called for participation of the PLO, on an equal footing with other parties, in all negotiations on the Middle East under the U.N. auspices. It also requested the Secretary-General to make efforts to secure the invitation of the PLO to the Peace Conference on the Middle East. By same resolution the General Assembly established the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable rights of the Palestinian People which compiled valuable reports on the Palestinian issue. It pointed out that the Palestine question consumed more time of the
U.N. since its inception than any other item. After Israeli evacuation, the Committee recommended the territories should be taken over by the U.N. and handed over to the PLO.

The General Assembly passed another significant resolution - 3379 of 10 November 1975 - calling Zionism a form of racism, on par with the ideology and practices of apartheid in South Africa. The PLO's diplomacy was so successful that more countries recognised the PLO than Israel. Although the General Assembly passed innumerable resolutions in support of the rights of the Palestinians, the Security Council did not change its position. This was because of the obstructionist posture of the U.S. which used veto against the implementation of the U.N. resolutions. This led the General Assembly to strongly deplore the negative vote by a permanent member of the Security Council.

The Arab states failed to recognise the PLO till 1974. It was because the PLO, in the aftermath of the 1967 war, was taken over by the guerrillas who charted out their independent course of action. As the Palestinians mounted pressure on the Arab League through the Arab masseses the conference of Arab Heads of State and Government held at Rabat
in October 1974 passed a resolution recognising the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. This resolution was of special significance as it affirmed the right of the Palestinians to set up an independent national authority under the leadership of the PLO on any liberated Palestinian land. Jordan, which had administered the West Bank from 1948 to 1967, also accepted this resolution. The Arab states' recognition helped the PLO launch international diplomatic offensive to achieve its goal. These Arab states along with the Afro-Asian countries played a leading role at the U.N. in support of the PLO.

The Chinese role in the development of Palestinian revolution is of special significance. China was the first country in the world to accord full diplomatic recognition to the PLO in 1965, following the then PLO President Ahmed Shukairy's visit to China. At that time the Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi wrote a poem which was of diplomatic significance: "Palestine is the front, China is the rear area. The front protects the rear area which supports the front. Our common glory is to defeat U.S. imperialism. Glory, Glory to us both." China

supported the Palestinian strategy of total liberation of Palestine. Most of the arms and ammunition the PLO acquired till 1972 and thereafter came from China. It also provided military training to some of the fedayeen. It was the Chinese diplomacy of that time to support the third world liberation movements. China supported the PLO's rejection of the Security Council resolution 242, which the Chinese thought, would lead to capitulation of the Arab countries to the Israeli aggressors.

The Soviet Union, after the expulsion of its experts from Egypt in 1972, extended support to the PLO within the framework of the U.N. resolution. The former Super Power's biggest mistake, from the Marxist point of view, was its support for the Palestine partition resolution. That was Stalin's mistake. Judaism is a religion, like Islam or Christianity, and cannot be the basis of nationality. The socialist countries deliberately ignored the fact that Zionism was one of the principal enemies of Communism. The arms aid they had given the Zionists for usurping Palestine remains a deplorable chapter in the history of the so called Marxist regimes. However, their policy was reversed and they compensated it by promoting the PLO in international diplomacy. The Soviet
Union supplied arms and ammunition to the PLO. But the Palestinians considered China as their true friend. There was rivalry between the Soviet Union and China for spreading their spheres of influence among the Palestinians; and the PLO derived the benefits, both moral and material, without being a party to the Sino-Soviet conflict. Although the Soviet Union supplied arms and ammunition to the PLO it was a silent spectator to the Syrian intervention in Lebanon against the PLO and leftist forces in 1976. The Soviet failure to play any role in the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 made the PLO realise that the Soviet Union was the lesser super power that played second fiddle to the U.S. After carefully planning for three years Israel launched a full-scale war against the PLO and Palestinians in Lebanon in June 1982. The sole purpose of Israel's war, backed up by the U.S. was to liquidate the PLO and the Palestine question for all times to come. Credit goes to the PLO for fighting the war for three months without any external support. Even the frontline Arab states never fought Israel for such a long period. Although the fighting ratio between the Israelis and the PLO was 14:1, the PLO fedayeen remained unvanquished in Beirut. When Israel failed to defeat the PLO, the U.S. entered into diplomatic
negotiations with Chairman Yasser Arafat who proved himself not only a great guerrilla fighter and strategist but also an excellent negotiator. This was the first and the most difficult U.S. - PLO negotiations for the evacuation of fedayeen from Lebanon. The negotiations went on for several days and Arafat demanded the recognition of the PLO by the U.S. in exchange of the fedayeen evacuation. Whenever the negotiations became difficult the U.S. negotiator Philip Habib affected annoyance and resorted to bombardments. The Israelis and Habib negotiated with Arafat through fire, Phantoms, cluster bombs, phosphorous bombs and sniping from the air. During the negotiations Arafat succeeded in the "war of wills" in diplomacy, as in guerrilla warfare, in imposing his conditions on the Israelis and the U.S. with regard to his departure from Beirut: for ten days he discussed in details how he was going to leave Beirut. The departure followed all the formalities of a victor in accordance with the international protocol: the guard of honour and military salute to the PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat at the stadium; a Greek military mission led by a general escorted Arafat, and an official Greek envoy along with four Greek ships escorted
Arafat's boat which flew a Palestinian flag. He left Beirut like a victor, after handing over the city to the multinational forces.

It was, indeed, a very bad precedent in international diplomacy when the multi-national forces, under the U.S. pressure, allowed the Israeli forces to enter West Beirut in order to organise the massacres of Palestinians men, women and children at the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps which had sided with Arafat during the resistance. The massacres were in clear violation of the agreement Arafat had signed with the U.S. envoy Philip Habib for the protection of Palestinian civilians after the PLO's evacuation.

There is truth in the saying that a guerilla retreats in order to advance. The night before his departure from Beirut, Arafat's master strategy became Israel's waterloo in Lebanon in the next two years. The Lebanese masses, whom Arafat had clandestinely given arms, and about five thousand fedayeen, who had turned civilians overnight, put up tough resistance and forced Israel to quit Lebanon by 1985. This resistance also forced Lebanon to annul the Israeli-Lebanese Agreement signed under the U.S. auspices to free the country from
the fedayeen. Once again the Cairo Agreement of November 1969 which recognised the fedayeen presence in Lebanon became effective. This was Arafat's inimitable style of diplomacy through guerilla warfare.

During the siege of Beirut Arafat gave the hints to a U.S. senator that the PLO might accept the U.N. Security Council resolution 242 alongwith all other U.N. resolutions concerning Palestine. Also during that time Arafat's interview to an Israeli newspaper opened his diplomatic card: that his first preference was for an "Arab-Jewish undivided state" but if that was not possible he would even be prepared to accept a separate "Palestinian state" adjacent to Israel. With this in mind Arafat started a flurry of diplomatic initiatives, especially with the U.S. some of whose Senators demanded the recognition of the PLO. While continuing the joint fedayeen-Lebanese resistance against Israel and the U.S. marines in the aftermath of 1982 Yasser Arafat improved the PLO's diplomatic relations with Egypt - which had suffered earlier because of Egypt-Israel peace treaty- and took diplomatic initiatives to open a dialogue with the U.S. He was also responsible for re-establishing the diplomatic relations between Egypt and Jordan. It was an attempt by Arafat to diplomatically isolate
Syria which attacked the PLO forces in Lebanon in 1983. In November 1984, he convened the PNC in Amman to endorse his dialogue with the Jordanian monarch. In the following week he conferred with President Hosni Mubarak in Cairo and issued a joint communique on 3 December which called for an international peace conference under the U.N. auspices, with the participation of the PLO. On 11 February 1985 he concluded an agreement with King Hussein for a joint Jordanian Palestinian delegation to any peace conference whose Palestinian members would be decided by the PLO. This agreement known as the Hussein-Arafat-Mubarak peace initiative was conveyed to the U.S. by King Hussein during his Washington visit in May 1985. He declared in the Rose Garden of the White House that as per the Jordan-PLO agreement they were ready to negotiate within the context on an international peace conference a peaceful settlement on the basis of the pertinent U.N. resolutions, including the S.C. resolution 242 and 338. Although the peace process did not materialise due to the Israeli bombing of the PLO headquarters in Tunis it established the modus vivendi which was used at the time of Madrid Peace Conference.
One of the most important milestones in the history of Palestinian revolution was the intifada against the Israeli occupation that started on 8 December 1987. It was a spontaneous outburst of the Palestinian masses, an uprising that shook the Israeli state. The five-year old intifada - relatively non-violent was the supreme form of Palestinian diplomacy through mass resistance as it pursued the following agenda: end to the Israeli occupation, and establishment of the independent Palestine State. The intifada set up a 'parallel state' with its own administration in the Gaza Strip and West Bank: a de facto Palestinian State. The non-violent movement created an international impact and imposed the Palestine question on the World public opinion through the nightly television. Credit goes to the Western mediapersons who, defying the Israeli military authorities, splashed it across the TV channels. This was the Palestinian people's diplomacy through the satellite channels.

The intifada established the following points which became the infrastructure of PLO's diplomacy: (1) The U.N. General Assembly held a special session, discussed the intifada and condemned Israel for the human rights violations, (2) The failure of Israeli forces to suppress the mass uprising convinced
the Israeli people that Israel cannot keep the occupied territories under occupation, (3) Israelis, who were in the grip of fear psychosis that what they gained in the 1967 war might prove to be their 'waterloo', argued in favour of 'territory for peace'; (4) The United States indicted Israel for gross violations of Palestinian human rights; (5) The U.S. realised the inevitability of the establishment of the independent Palestine State as all other options were closed.

Arafat had two diplomatic weapons through which the Palestinians could be able to establish their state:

a) The fact that Palestinians are not afraid of dying in the war whereas the Israelis are;

b) The possibility that the PLO would accept the U.N. Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 along with U.N. resolution 181(II). (While the S.C. resolutions call for the Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied since 1967, the 181 (II) ensures the establishment of a Palestine Arab State).

These diplomatic cards were not used earlier because the PLO was in a weak position and failed to establish the strategic balance against Israel. The intifada, through the non-violent war of the Palestinian masses, succeeded in turning the strategic
balance against Israel as the Israeli forces failed
to suppress it. Yasser Arafat and the PLO leader-
ship seized the opportunity and launched the diplo-
matic offensive to get the Palestine State.

The PLO moved - as Walid Khalidi pointed out -
from exclusive reliance on 'armed struggle' to armed
struggle as an 'aid to diplomacy', and finally
to diplomacy alone with no mention of the armed
struggle, as at the Algiers 1988 PNC. That was
because the intifada, a non-violent war of the
masses against the sophisticated war machinery
of Israel, produced better results than the armed
struggle. The stones of the Palestinian women
and children were more powerful than the Israeli
nuclear weapon. The guerilla warfare of the fedayeen
established a strategic stalemate with technologi-
cally superior Israel and the intifada turned
the strategic balance against it. The intifada
was a relentless war against Israeli occupation
in which Israel and international Zionism conceded
their most spectacular defeat. The intifada was,
at the same time, the supreme form of Palestinian
diplomatic offensive to get the Palestine State.

The intifada yielded results much faster than
any other event in the history of Palestinian revo-
lution. The eruption of volcanic intifada set
in motion a series diplomatic developments involving the Palestine question: (1) Jordan relinquished responsibilities for the West Bank in July 1988; (2) The Declaration of the Palestinian State at the 19th session of the Palestine National Council (PNC) in Algiers between 12 to 15 November 1988; (3) 43rd session of U.N. General Assembly shifted to Geneva to enable Yasser Arafat to participate in the debate on Palestine; and the Assembly passed resolutions, like it had done in the 1970s, for the establishment of an independent Palestine State on the basis of the U.N. resolution 181 (II), within the framework of the Security Council resolutions 242 and 338; (4) Although the U.S. voted against these two resolutions, it opened dialogue with the PLO next day, 16 December 1988, in Tunisia; (5) Madrid International Peace Conference on West Asia started on 30 October 1991; (6) Last but not the least, the PLO-Israel Peace Accord was signed on 13 September 1993 in Washington. the new intifada in the aftermath of the signing ceremony forced Israel to implement the Accord on 4 May 1994.

All these developments were possible because of Yasser Arafat's towering personality steadfastness and the cybernetic dynamism in diplomacy. His
intelligent leadership has always grasped the waves and counter-waves of international politics and interpreted it correctly much ahead of his time. Arafat became the symbol of Palestinian revolution in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, and took the diplomatic offensive once he was convinced that the intifada was not going to stop until they establish the independent Palestine State. The U.S. - PLO dialogue, however, suffered a major setback when President George Bush announced its suspension in June 1990 under pressure from the American-Israeli Public affairs Committee (AIPAC), the powerhouse of the Zionist lobby in the U.S.

The peace process suffered another major setback during the Gulf war. The Israeli Peace Movement, which wanted a settlement of the Palestine problem, was also disrupted. Unlike the 1982 war in Lebanon or the army's campaign against the intifada, which were widely criticised, the war against Iraq galvanised public opinion behind the Israeli government.

There were obvious reasons for the Palestinians to rejoice during the Gulf war. President Saddam Hussein made a very vital point in a negative way: Iraq was ready to withdraw from Kuwait provided Israel and Syria withdraw from the occupied territories of Palestine and Lebanon. -This condition
along with Iraqi missile attacks on Israel made him popular among Palestinians and other Arab masses. The PLO wanted Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and Yasser Arafat was also involved in diplomacy to bring about a reconciliation. The PLO argued that it was an Arab problem to be settled by the Arabs themselves, and the U.S. should not be allowed to intervene. But once the Gulf War started the PLO had to side with Iraq for Saddam Hussein's anti-Israel stand, which was, of course, a side issue. In a way it was PLO's retaliation against the U.S. for suspending the dialogue with it.

During and after the Gulf war it was believed that the PLO was a gone case and there was no hope for the Palestinians as they incurred the wrath of the U.S. and the Gulf states. Despite the prediction doom, the PLO emerged as the only 'Arab victor' of the Gulf war.

The Gulf war hastened the peace process which started in Madrid on 30 October 1991. In order to contain the 'Green Peril' - the Islamic radicalism, better known as "Islamic fundamentalism" - the U.S. convened the Madrid International Peace Conference for a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly the Palestinian
problem. The intifada had already set the agenda before the Gulf war and the U.S. had realised that unless Israel withdraws from the Palestinian territories and self-determination is given to the Palestinians Israel would be in mortal danger and the U.S. interests in the region would be jeopardised.

The PLO understood the importance and mechanism of the unipolar world. Yasser was dynamic enough to grasp the realities after the Gulf war when he told the Indian audience on doordarshan:

After every world war a new world order comes into being. The Gulf war was the third World War after which a new world order is being given. The collapse of the Soviet Union is part of that order.3

These few lines give enough of indications about the PLO's pursuit of diplomacy with the U.S. Arafat is not a crusty old guard who would sing the swansong. The PLO wanted to be a part of the new world order as being carved out by the U.S. If the disappearance of Palestine was a part of the old world order that emerged after the second world war its reappearance in the new world order is very much on the agenda. Preventing a Palestinian

state to come into being was one of the U.S. policies during the cold war to curb the Soviet influence in west Asia.

History was made as Israel sat down with the "invisible" Palestinians for the first time on 30 October at the Madrid International Peace Conference. The framework of peace was based on the U.N. Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 which called for Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied since 1967. Negotiations were conducted in phases beginning with talks on interim self-government arrangements for the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Although the U.S. had no objections to the PLO's participation, Israel put the PLO in quarantine. But Arafat's remote control diplomacy was so perfect that the PLO representatives from the occupied territories put up an extraordinary performance not only in Madrid but also in the bilateral talks that followed in Washington. Israel's ban on its citizens and Palestinians from the occupied territories to have any contact with the PLO proved to be a futile exercise which enhanced the Organisation's prestige in international diplomacy. The U.S. Secretary of State James Baker came forward to protect the Palestinian delegation.
During the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's time five rounds of bilateral talks ended in deadlock. Only in the fourth round Israel and the Palestinian delegations exchanged proposals on self-rule but failed to make any substantive progress. Shamir wanted to drag the negotiations for at least a decade during which he had a plan to settle 800,000 Jews in the West Bank; and the self-rule talks would have become meaningless.

After Yitzhak Rabin, who was elected on the basis of his territory for peace programme, took over as the Israeli Prime Minister in June 1992 prospects for peace looked "brighter". But there was hardly any progress at the sixth, seventh and eighth rounds of bilateral negotiations. At the ninth and final round of talks in Washington (27 April to 13 May 1993) the three partners - Israel, Palestinians and the U.S. - submitted their respective drafts on "Agreed Statement of Principles" for the Palestinian self-rule in the occupied territories. The Palestinian delegation, after consultations with the PLO in Tunis, rejected the other two drafts. The Palestinians boycotted the trilateral meeting on 12 May 1993. The Palestinian draft stated clearly that all powers exercised
by the Israeli military government and its civil administration should be transferred to the PISGA (Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority). But it was missing from both the Israeli and American drafts which stated only about transfer of function from the Israeli civil administration to the Palestinians. The ninth round ended in a deadlock.

The PLO and Israel then activated a secret channel through the Norwegian Foreign Minister J.J. Holst in Oslo. A Norwegian research group was in touch with Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. Arafat knew J.J. Holst personally and was in touch with him since December 1992-January 1993. Holst and his wife hosted the clandestine PLO-Israel negotiations in their drawing room. At least 14 rounds of secret talks were held under Norwegian auspices before they could prepare the final Israel-PLO agreed draft by 19 August 1993. Without Holst's mediation it would have been extremely difficult for Israel and the PLO to reach the agreement. Till the last moment Israel was not ready to recognise the PLO; and Holst convinced Israel that without the PLO the Accord could not be implemented. When the PLO-Israel underground diplomacy started Israel abrogated its law which banned any Israeli contact
with the PLO. It was imperative since the U.N. had rescinded the resolution (3379 of 10 November 1975) that equated Zionism with racism in December 1991, following the Madrid Conference. Holst moved fast and flew between Tunis and Jerusalem and back to Tunis exchanging documents between the PLO and Israel recognising each other.

The signing of the historic Israel-PLO Peace Accord on 13 September 1993 known as the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, on the South Lawn of the White House heralded a new era in the 45 years violent Israeli-Palestinian relations. It was indeed a great victory for the Palestinians when their leader was received by the U.S. President Bill Clinton. Indeed the Palestinians travelled a long way from the U.S. Secretary of Statte John foster Dulles who said about them in the 1950s "the elders will die and the younagers will forget (Palestine)" to Presidet Bill Clinton who assured them a self-rule which would lead to an independent sovereign Palestine State.

The aim of the Accord is to establish a Palestininan Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council, for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip for a transitional
period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity would be preserved during the interim period. The five-year transitional period began upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, i.e. from 4 May 1994.

The permanent status negotiations would commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period (i.e. May 1996), between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives. These negotiations would cover the remaining issues including Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbours, and other issues of common interest. Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there would have the right to participate in the election. The outcome of the permanent status negotiations would not be prejudiced or pre-empted by agreements reached for the interim period.

The September Accord is like an unequal treaty which carries within itself the seeds of violence and war. The biggest problem it faces is the
menace of 120,000 Jewish settlers in the West Bank and about 4,000 in Gaza Strip who occupy 60 and 40 per cent of the territories respectively. Their protection by the Israeli army makes the situation extremely complicated. There is no mention about the future of these settlements. Hamas attack combined with Arafat's diplomacy would force these armed settlers to leave the nascent Palestinian state. The worst part of the Accord is that the self-rule has begun under the Israeli tutelage, with the Zionist tendency to interfere in the decisions of the Palestinian self-government. While implementing the Accord Israel tries to humiliate PLO. If the PLO has to take the permission of Israel for the visit of a foreign dignitary to Gaza and Jericho it is a humiliation of the PLO since the Accord does not specify it. Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto had to cancel her trip to Gaza, although she was invited by Yasser Arafat. If Israel is to decide the structure of the Council to be elected and its authority the self-rule might turn into a farce. However, Arafat has the capability to overcome these initial problems through tactful diplomacy.
The two economic development programmes, "Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation in Economic and Development Programs", and "Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation concerning Regional Development Programs", are incorporated in Accord. The first protocol (Annex III) includes Israeli-Palestinian bilateral cooperation in the fields of water, electricity, energy, finance, transport and communications, trade and commerce, industry, labour relations and social welfare, human resource development, environmental protection, and media. The second one (Annex IV) calls for the multilateral peace efforts in promoting a Development programme for the region, including the West Bank and Gaza Strip, to be initiated by the G-7 with the participation of other interested states, Arab states and members of the private sector. These economic and development programmes are part of the globalisation in the New World Order. Here the U.S. assurance of 'qualitative edge' of Israel - promised in the Letter of Assurances to Israel before the adrid Conference - becomes effective. As the political Zionism declines with the implementation of the Accord, the economic Zionism begins to spread its tentacle. The PLO, of course, knows the limits
of the possible. While welcoming the G-7 participations, the PLO should have avoided or minimised the Israeli role in the economic spheres. An oppressor cannot turn a Gautam Buddha overnight. Israel still upholds the theme of "greater Israel" as its established boundaries on the walls of its Knesset (Parliament).

It was a mistake of the PLO to have agreed to this kind of unequal Accord. The PLO opponents among the Palestinians question the entire peace framework. It may amount to "endorsement" of the Israeli usurpation of 77 per cent of the Palestinian land in 1948. Why didn't the PLO demand the implementation of all U.N. resolutions concerning Palestine including 181 (II) which allotted 43 per cent territory to the Palestine Arab State?

The Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 cannot nullify the U.N. resolutions. The area of the West Bank (including Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip is just 23 per cent of Palestine with approximately 6,000 sq. km. Can it accommodate six million Palestinians? Why was full independence with sovereignty not given to the Palestinians, instead of self-rule? Why did the self-rule start only in the Gaza Strip and Jericho with just 400 sq. km.? Why does Israel try to humiliate the Palestinians at every stage after signing the Accord?
Why should the PLO consult Israel for anything it wants to do in the self-rule area? How could there be a peace Accord when 5,000 Palestinians are still in Israeli jail?

These are the questions raised by the Palestinians, especially because the PLO started the revolution with the programme of total liberation of Palestine. It is but natural that Hamas and other radicals have taken up these questions. Lack of Arab regimes and Islamic countries support to the PLO for total liberation of Palestine constrained Arafat to sign the accord to have a base for the Palestinians. A section in the PLO leadership has come to believe that Israel is a reality which they have to accept like swallowing a quinine pill. Arafat's justification for the Accord - that he got the best under the worst situation - sounds convincing. Arafat's statement at a mosque in Johannesburg in May 1994 is an historic answer to his detractors. He talked of Jihad for peace in Palestine. He also said that the PLO - Israel Accord was like the truce Prophet Mohammad signed with the hostile Queresh tribe for 10 years. That truce was first violated by the Queresh tribe. Finally the Prophet conquered the entire Arabian peninsula with his message.
Hamas considers the PLO to be an obstacle for its programme of full liberation of Palestine. Apparently the PLO is caught by the horns of a dilemma: if it does not curb Hamas activities Israel gets annoyed, delaying the different stages of self-rule; and if it restricts Hamas activities the PLO loses its popularity. Arafat still has enough of diplomatic shots in the locker to tackle both Israel and Hamas.

The 1994 Nobel Peace Prize came through the hazy peace process from Oslo, the birth place of the Accord, amid controversy and hostage crisis on 14 October. A member of the committee objected to the PLO Chairman's name for his "terrorist" background which, of course, was overruled by the four members. It was pointed out to the dissenting member, a former Norwegian Minister who is an ardent supporter of Israel, that Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who shared the Nobel Peace Prize with President Anwar Sadat, was also a terrorist. His terrorist gang held British Policemen hostages when the UNSCOP members visited Palestine and was responsible for the Deir Yassin (near Jerusalem) massacre of 254 innocent Palestinian villagers.
on 9 April 1948. In his book, *The Revolt*, Menachem Begin admits that the purpose of massacres carried out was to create a general exodus of Palestinians, thereby empying the land of its people: "The massacre was not only justified, but there would not have been a state of Israel without the victory at Deir Yasin." Historian Toynbee was right when he said that the Zionists have committed bigger crimes than even the Nazis. Finally, the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize was shared by Yitzhak Rabin, who was a member of the terrorist Haganah gang, Shimon Peres and Yasser Arafat in order to strengthen the peace process. Peres deserves it more than Rabin. Nobel Prize for Arafat is an honour bestowed upon the Palestinians who with stood the Zionist onslaughts.

Premier Rabin's attempt to blackmail Arafat on the issue of the release of an Israeli soldier taken hostage by Hamas proved to be one of his efforts to deprive Arafat of his share in the Nobel Prize. Hamas demanded the release of 200 prisoners including their leader Sheikh Yasin from the Israeli jails where 5,000 Palestinians are still languishing in darkness. Rabin's conspiracy against Arafat was unmasked when the hostage was found at Bir Nabala in West Bank, still under
the Israeli military occupation, not in Gaza Strip or Jericho, the self-rule area of Palestinian Authority. The hostage was killed during the Israeli military raid against the Hamas redoubt alongwith other Israeli soldiers and three Hamas activists. Rabin, of course, owned the responsibility for the action, exonerating Arafat. Hamas blamed Israel and Palestinian Authority for the incident. Hamas extended the deadline for execution of hostage to enable Arafat to win the Nobel Prize. Instead of scoring point against self-rule Authority and undermining Arafat's popularity, Rabin could have used Arafat as a mediator between Hamas and his Government for the release of hostage. Sheikh Yasin and others could have been released to get back the Israeli soldier. The fact that there are 5,000 Palestinian prisoners still in Israeli jails is a sad reflection on Israel. His statement that he would return the Nobel Prize for getting back the lives of Israeli soldiers was the crocodile tears he shed for the deceased Israelis. Rabin has been delaying the proper implementation of the Accord and trying to undercut the Palestinian Authority right from its inception. On the one hand he
did not allow the Palestinian police to be adequately armed, on the other he wanted them to counter Hamas. He also attempted to prove that Arafat was not the victor since the signing of the Accord. He certainly does not deserve the coveted prize before giving up the Zionist attitude. Within a few hours of winning the Nobal Peace Prize Rabin's Zionism was displayed through the storming of Hamas hideout by his military.

It is also significant to note that despite the recognition of the state of Israel by the PLO the Palestine National Council (PNC) did not drop the clause (article 21) in the National Charter which calls for the "full liberation of Palestine". The 5,000 years Palestinian history tells us that Palestine does not tolerate the outsiders' occupation. The Zionist occupation is, as yet, the last usurpation of Palestine. It is a coincidence of history that Jericho, the first place conquered by Israelite tribes under Joshua's leadership in the 12th century B.C., was also the first place to be liberated on 4 May 1994. The Israelites were defeated and expelled by the local people, the Canaanites, that time. History repeated itself several times as tragedy and in our time as farce.
Another historical coincidence has its significance: David's Kingdom of Israel which included Judea and Samaria (West Bank) lasted for 28 years (1000 to 972 B.C.); and the Israeli rule over the west Bank also came to an end after 27 years (1967-1994). The Israeli "claim" over the west Bank or the Judea and Samaria is buried by the September Accord for all times to come. After David's death his son Solomon ruled the Kingdom of Israel for another 40 years, after which it split into two parts losing independence. That means the actual life span of the Kingdom was 68 years. The possibility that there may not be a state of Israel in another 30 to 40 years time cannot be ruled out. For, history always repeats itself, especially in the case of Palestine.

The crusaders conquered Palestine (1099 to 1187 A.D.) and established the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. Salauddin Ayyubi defeated them on 2 October 1187 ending the 88 years of European rule over Palestine. The German emperor mounted another crusade over Jerusalem in 1229 which ended by 1239. The Western occupation of Palestine started in 1917 and completed 77 years in 1994. It is quite possible that the Western domination of entire Palestine may not exceed 88 to 99 years.
General Allenby declared that he had at last settled scores and ended the crusades when he accepted the keys of the city, upon entering Jerusalem in 1917. By occupying Palestine and by creating Israel the West was settling the old score harming the Palestinian Arabs, both Muslims and Christians. But the Western powers forgot two things: the Jews are outsiders to Palestine, and the history of Palestine has its own dynamics of resistance, with local people defeating the outsiders.

If there are radical changes in the frontline Arab states Israel would be in mortal danger. No one knows for sure what would happen to Jordan after King Hussein. Palestinians constitute more than 60 per cent of the Jordanian population. Emergence of a pro-Palestinian regime in Jordan could not be ruled out. Yasser Arafat has agreed, as per the suggestion of the U.S., to form a confederation with Jordan. This would ostensibly be a confederation of two independent states: Jordan and Palestine. Inadvertently the U.S. would stalk on a potential volcano that might

erupt to wipe off Israel. Any radical change after President Assad in Syria would give a fillip to the Palestinians' total liberation programme. The radicals in Lebanon would provide a succour to the Palestinians.

Any radical change in Egypt would be of immense help to the Palestinians. The Palestinians have the biggest weapon with themselves - the intifada to liberate entire Palestine. The Accord and the peace process encompassing frontline Arab states have failed to resolve the primary contradiction between Zionism and Arab nationalism. At best the contradiction is subdued for the time being. But as long as Israel exists it would remain as an affront to Arab nationalism. Once the euphoria of peace process and globalisation is over the primary contradiction would sharpen and lead to Arab unity for the full liberation of Palestine, with Palestinians playing the pivotal role: Diplomacy can help the Palestinians liberate upto 43 per cent of their land as per the U.N. resolution 181 (II). But diplomacy could only be an aid to intifada. Liberation of rest of Palestine would depend upon the intifada and Salauddin
syndrome amongst the Palestinians. Hence the final war and final diplomacy are not yet over.

It is imperative that the U.S. should curb the AIPAC's sinister influence on its foreign policy. The U.S. should realise that Israel was a strategic necessity during the cold war to counter Soviet Union and has outlived its existence. Shorn of jingoistic and Zionist texture the Israeli Jews can live with the Palestinian Arabs in peace in a unified Palestine. The Jews and Arabs lived in proper harmony in Palestine before the Balfour Declaration. The prophets of Judaism are also the prophets of Islam. Muslim Arabs can live with the Jews peacefully like they live with Christian Arabs. The three religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, share the same tradition, and Palestine is the holy land for all the three faiths. Instead of indulging in shadow boxing with the resurgent Islamism the U.S. should win over the hearts of the Arab and Islamic people by shedding its Zionist kernel. Only then could it discover itself in a brave new world, and the New World Order would become meaningful for these people. The New World Order - whose only guardian is the U.S. - should be based on new human values and ideas encompass-
ing all the people. After all it was the U.S. which forced Israel to negotiate with the Palestinians and got the Accord implemented, whereby the PLO would get the West Bank and Gaza Strip that was denied to them by the Arabs in 1948. It is also under President Clinton's pressure that Rabin decided on 15 October 1994 to continue the peace process after the Bir Nabala incident. The U.S. should also realise that all roads to the Arab and Islamic capitals go via Palestinian Jerusalem, not Israeli Jerusalem.

What Hamas calls PLO's compromise may prove to be a diplomatic master stroke of Chairman Yasser Arafat. The Accord is just the beginning of a new phase, a means to an end. If Israel thinks that it can use the PLO to carry on the dirty job it was doing in the occupied territories, it is sadly mistaken. If the PLO becomes Israel's policeman in the self-rule area it would dig its own graveyard. Demonstrations against the PLO on 15 October 1994 indicate the confrontation between Hamas and self-rule Authority. Following a violent confrontation in November an agreement has been reached between the PLO and Hamas. The PLO, unlike Israel, is accountable to the Palesti-
nian people in the elections. Arafat has accomplished his task within the limitations of his time. It is for the next generation of unvanquished Palestinians to carry on the intifada to achieve their final goal—statehood in the indivisible Palestine. The children of the intifada and fedayeen have to bide their time—and build up a strong nation—so as to aspire for a resurrection to ululate and to recite the final Palestinian rhapsody on the beach of blue Mediterranean and in the holy land.