Chapter VII

DISINTEGRATION OF QUASI-FEDERAL STATE :

The period under review i.e. from 1750 to 1795 -1818 can be divided into following parts : (a) From the death of Shahu to the death of Nanasaheb i.e. 1750 - 1761 (b) Restoration i.e. 1761 to 1772 (c) 1772 to 1795 i.e. from the death of Madhavrao to Battle of Kharda, and lastly (d) From 1795 to 1818.

The death of Shahu :

The death of Shahu was a blow to the Maratha State and to the principles underlying the Quasi-Federal State. Shahu was the central figure in Maratha Empire. He belonged to the very family of Shivaji and therefore he was respected by the majority of the members of the Maharashtrian society. From 1750, no Chhatrapati commanded such a respect - neither from the Peshwas nor from the people - as Shahu did. Ram Raja and other Chhatrapatis succeeded to the throne at Satara, were insignificant. Real power shifted from Chhatrapati to the Peshwas. This transfer of power took place gradually. The silent revolution of this transfer of power culminating in the supremacy of Peshwas was going on even during the days of Shahu. Shahu was able to combat his ministers, while his adopted successors were controlled by the Peshwas. The office of Peshwa became hereditary. It was contrary to the principles laid down by Shivaji.
Prof K.P. Patwardhan rightly observes in his introduction to the Rise of the Maratha Power (by Late Justice M.G. Hanade): 'What with Shivaji was exceptional, and prompted by very special circumstances, became a matter of everyday occurrence. Officers came to be hereditary, and watan and jagirs came to be bestowed on a lavish scale ... Hanade recognises that the departure from Shivaji's principles was forced upon the Government of Shahru by the events that has preceded his accession to power.'

Marathas: Supreme Arbiter of Delhi:

Bajirao I, had dominated Delhi. His son Nanasaheb continued the same policy of expansion of Maratha Empire in the North. Nanasaheb marched northwards in 1741; in 1744 he went to Bundel Khand and collected Chauth from Agra, Allahabad, Patna and Bengal Provinces. In 1748 Nanasaheb visited North again. Abdali had invaded Punjab in the early months of 1748. In 1750, he collected revenue from the Subhedars of four districts of Punjab - Sialkot, Pasrur, Gujrat and Aurangabad. In 1752 Abdali again invaded Punjab and seized the Subhas of Lahore and Multan. In April, Marathas i.e. 'Shinde and Holkar concluded a defence pact with Nabab by which the defence of the Mughal Empire against external foes and internal enemies was entrusted to the Peshwa. For his armed support the Peshwa was to receive fifty lakhs of rupees in cash out of which thirty lakhs was the price for keeping Abdali out. The
Chauth of the Punjab and Sind was likewise ceded to the Peshwa for military expenses. The pact thus put the entire resources of the Mughal empire at the disposal of the Peshwa in return for which he pledged himself to meet aggression at any point. The Maratha objective of establishing sovereignty over the whole of North India seemed to have realised. This pact put heavy responsibilities on the Peshwa. Shinde, Holkar and Raghoba (brother of Peshwa) were the three important personalities who handled the affairs in the North. In 1754, they deposed the Delhi Emperor Akbar Ahmad Shah and Alamgir II was made Emperor. This revolution proved the ability of the Marathas to become the supreme arbiters of the Mughal Empire.

Abdali:

When the main Maratha army returned to Deccan in 1755-56 Delhi fell a prey to the Ahmad Shah Abdali, when Muslims and Hindus, rich and poor, were subjected to all kinds of inhuman torture to make them divulge their secret hoards and deliver them to the conqueror. Mansions of noblemen were dug up for treasure. Mathura and Brindaban, two holy places of Hindus, were plundered, thousands were massacred, idols were broken and temples set on fire. In May 1757 Marathas entered Doab and came to Delhi in August. Nagib Khan left Delhi, and Marathas again entered Delhi. A new treaty was concluded. In January 1758, Raghoba crossed Yamuna and invaded Punjab. Abdali's son was defeated
and Lahore was captured. Maratha army reached the banks of Indus. Aaghoba reached Delhi on his return march in June and reached Poona in September 1758.

The defeat and expulsion of his son - Timur Shah who was viceroy of Punjab - in 1758 obviously enraged Ahmad Shah Abdali. He made huge preparations, crossed the Indus and attacked Lahore in 1759. Sabaji Shinde who was at Lahore retreated to Delhi. By the end of 1759 Abdali crossed Yamuna and joined Nagib Khan. In 1760, Abdali defeated Shinde. The news of Abdali's invasion reached Peshwa at Ahmednagar. Peshwa's army, under Sadashivrao set out on the 16th March 1760. On the 2nd August, Sadashivrao entered Delhi. On the 16th October Sadashivrao marched northward and occupied Kunjapura. The great battle of Panipat took place on the 14th January, in which the Marathas were defeated.

Peshwa and the Sardars:

It is usually said that the battle of Panipat is the great dividing line of Maratha History. It is important from our point of view alone, because it changed the relationship between Peshwa and the Maratha Sardars. Thus the execution of the important principle of Quasi-Federal State viz. on behalf of Chhatrapati, Peshwas were to suppress the rebellious Sardars, who defied the central government - was to be abandoned. It was a disastrous blow to the prestige of Peshwa, who had become the one unifying
influence in Maratha Government after the death of Shahu. Chhatrapati at Satara was nowhere in the picture either before the battle of Panipat or after the battle of Panipat. Important decisions used to be taken by the Peshwa and his Sardars in the place of Chhatrapati and Peshwas. This action of the part of Peshwa again flouted the principle of Quasi-Federal State. Of course, Peshwas could not be blamed for this, because Ram Raja was incapable of giving any advice. Incapacity to render advice, to control Sardars etc. on the part of Chhatrapati was an important political factor which brought about the end of Maratha Empire.

Chhatrapati and Peshwa:

During the period 1750 to 1760, the Maratha empire was territorially expanding. The seeds of disruption were also sowed at this time. Peshwa suspected the activities of Ram Raja. A letter written by Ram Raja in 1751 to Balaji Bajirao as a reply to his letter states - Your letter shows that you suspect that Yashwantrao Dabhade Senapati Sena Khas Khel, who has fled from Poona, may have come to Satara, and that he may by a personal interview, so far interest us in his behalf as to induce us to withdraw from you the grant of half the Guzrath, which has already been made, or to interfere with

192. Diary of Shahu.
We wish to inform you that the Senapati has not come to
the huzur ... Rest assured that you stand in our good
graces.' Two letters dated 18-1-1753 and 25-1-1753
addressed to Udaji Chavan and Shivaji Khandekar respectively
reflect the situation. A letter to Udaji Chavan states
'You had the audacity to levy contributions at your plea-
sure from the Khasgi village and to engage in a general
quarrel against Miraj. Whose servant do you call yourself
and whose territory do you pillage? How in the face
of these acts can you expect a continuance of the Saranjam?
Do whatever you think best.' Shivaji Khandekar was
directed to induce Himmat Bahadar, who had laid seige to
Mouje Soni, to go back. Maths, temples and Deosthans
which were protected from the days of Shivaji were looted
by the Sardars. In 1752 the religious monastery of Shri
Nagnath Deo at Manur was attacked and plundered by Daryabai
Nimbalkar. The aim of establishing Swarajya was to
make it an abode of Gods and Brahmins (देव ब्राह्मणोऽच राज्य).
Yet a letter written in 1752 refers to the oppression of
Brahmins. It is stated that Brahmin population of the
Konkan is oppressed by the Angre and the Watandars have

193. Diary of Shahu.
194. " "
195. " "
left the province. The Paragana of Bassein was under the management of the Khasgi Department. Kaghjoji Bhosale in 1752, turned out the government officers of the paragana and brought it under his jurisdiction. This incident shows how important Sardars like Kaghjoji Bhosale could flout the terms and conditions of the treaty. The singleness of purpose which is essential to achieve some political end in view, which was existing from the days of Shivaji to Shahu, was lost. Everybody suspected the real intention of the other. Therefore, there is no wonder, that Marathas lost the battle of Panipat. The Chhatrapati suspected the Peshwa. In a letter to Shivaji Salokhe, Kam Haja writes that 'Pradhan Pandit (Peshwa) was going to his (kaja's) territory. Therefore, he was directed to be on his guard and to protect the government forts.'

There are many instances when the Khasgi territory belonging to Chhatrapati was looted. For example, Yemaji Pant's son had plundered some villages in Baramati. Malharji Holkar was requested to recover the thanas in Mhasawad in Prant Sultanpur which was molested by Bandes, Kanhoji Mohite in 1752, unauthoredly, captured the Thana of Shirwadi and plundered corn and other articles belonging to government.

196. Diary of Shahu
197. " "
198. " "
Maratha Sardars attacked the villages, looted the property belonging to the other Maratha Sardars. Letters to Anandrao Krishna, Yesubai Dafle, Bachabai Ghatge, Pandit Pratinidhi etc. reveal this fact. A letter, written in 1753, shows that even Feshwa, demanded the surrender of a fort belonging to Chhatrapati. It is stated that 'Pandit Pradhan and Pandit Pratinidhi were pressing Kanhoji Shirke to surrender Gunawantgadh. They were informed that the fort belonged to the government and that they had no reason to ask for its surrender'. In a letter to Peshwa, in 1753, (when his army was about to raid march through Akkalkhop, a village in charge of Khasgi Department) Chhatrapati has directed him not to molest the village in any way. These letters and many others reveal the deteriorating situation in the Maratha Quasi-Federal State round about 1750-1755. Marathas were able to hold these away upon a large territory, because other powers were even more deteriorated than the Maratha power.

**Position of Chhatrapati**

The most important constitutional change took place in the year 1752. It has been already noted that the Emperor at Delhi was called 'Sovereign' or दिल्लीपति, प्रथमपति etc. After the death of Shahu, the position of the Emperor

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199. Diary of Shahu.
at Delhi continued in the same manner, while the position of Chhatrapati, deteriorated to such an extent that the Royal Seal of Chhatrapati, bearing the name of Ram Raja was not used for a period of nearly three years. Even after the death of Shahu, his Royal Seal was used on the letters dated 10th January 1750, 29th September 1751, 12th April 1752, 15th October 1752. The Sanad which Balaji Vishwanath brought from Delhi in 1719 was granted to Shahu Chhatrapati while the Sanad granted by the Mughal Emperor in June 1752 bears the name of Balaji Bajirao Peshwa. This Sanad is very important from the following points of view: (1) It flouted the principle of Quasi-Federal State laid down by Balaji Vishwanath, (2) It made the position of Chhatrapati, constitutionally insignificant. (3) This was the first important treaty which Malharrao Holkar and Jayajirao Shinde - two important Sardars of Peshwa - signed on behalf of Balaji Bajirao. (4) The next step naturally followed - when Peshwas entered into treaty-agreement with Emperors at Delhi without consulting the Chhatrapati in 1752; the Sardars of Peshwas also entered into treaty-agreement with different foreign powers bypassing the authority of the Peshwa. Peshwas reaped the same harvest which they themselves had sown. Peshwas thus usurped the authority of Chhatrapati.

200. Rajwade - Prastavana Khand,
201. Marathyanchya Itihasachi Sadhane, Vol. I.
As a result of this Sanad, granted to Balaji Bajiro by the Emperor in 1752 there was a strong reaction against the Marathas. Vazir, the Jats and Rajput Princes attempted to drive out Marathas from the North. In a letter written to Balaji Bajiro Peshwa on 13th December 1752 Antaji Manakeshwar communicated the court intrigues in the capital carried on by the Vazir Nabab Saftarjang with the Jats and Madhosing, to drive out the Marathas out of Malwa. He reports that the Emperor had conferred the robes of 'Baxigiri' upon Imandanmulukh, son of Nabab Gajalikhan. He was conferred the title 'Nizam-ulmulk' and the 'Sanad of Deccan'. Emperor embraced him when Antaji Manakeshwar protested against the granting of 'Sanad of Deccan' to Imandanmulukh. Emperor called upon him and tried to convince him by sweet words. Antaji Manakeshwar had revealed the double nature of the Emperor. On one hand the Emperor states that the provinces of Agra and Ajmer belong to Peshwa; on the other hand, he encourages Salabatjang to open a campaign against Marathas after collecting necessary forces. In his letters to Salabatjang, the Emperor has repeatedly stated that when the battle against Marathas starts, we, with Jats and other kings, will come into Malwa. Antaji Manakeshwar further states that, he had intercepted few letters written by Salabatjang and addressed to Vazir. In it Salabatjang had stated that 'they are not going to heed the authority of the
Marathas." A report from Antaji Manakeshwar, addressed to Bhausaheb on the 24th January, 1753, clearly reflects the political developments that were taking place in the North. Antaji Manakeshwar states; After the return of the Sardars (i.e. Shinde and Holkar) to Desh (i.e. to Maharashtra) Surajmal Jat visited Haje Mudhosingh and Haje Bakhat Singh. From there he (Surajmal) went to Delhi and signed an agreement with Vazir stating that Nabab Bahadur had handed over the Empire to Marathas. The Peshwa and the Emperor had become brothers after performing the ritual of exchange of head-gears. In such a situation where exists your post of Vazir (Vazir)? The Emperor had handed over two Subhas namely Agra and Ajmer, to the Marathas, which belonged to us. Now the forces of Marathas with their Sardars are engaged in the South. Let us now silence the Nabab Bahadur, take the possession of Emperor at Agra, collect the necessary kings and armies, and put an end to the rule of the Deccanis. I (Surajmal) will incur the necessary expenditure required by you and the Emperor.

Alliance Against Marathas:

In the month of April, 1753, Antaji Manakeshwar wrote to the Peshwa that 'the strong force alone has saved
the Marathas. The Emperor agreed to assign Ajmer and Agra to the Marathas. The Nizam is to administer the Deccan Subhas with the advice and under the supervision of the Peshwa. How crooked and treacherous the Emperor was can be seen from the letter written by Purushottam Mahadeo to Krishnaraoji, on the 17th July, 1754. The Emperor ordered Raghunathrao (brother of Peshwa) to punish the rebellious Jat Surajmal. Accordingly Raghunathrao attacked the stronghold of Surajmal Jat, the Kumbheri. The Emperor changed his mind and prepared to join Surajmal in destroying his southern allies i.e. Marathas. Getting wind of the treachery Holkar swooped down upon Sinkandra, surprised the Imperial army and encircled the Emperor. One Azizuddin was seated on the Imperial masnad and Gazi-uddin's son, a steadfast ally was appointed as Vazir, on the condition of paying the Marathas 82,1/2 lakhs of rupees. On the 20th October, 1755, Govind Ballal, reports the activities of Madhosing of Jaynagar. Madhosing, murdered the mamladars and despatched his emmissaries at Delhi stating that 'he (Madhosing) had killed Marathas. Now come out for defeating Marathas. He would join the Emperor.' Madhosing was prepared to incur the expenditure for driving out Marathas. Govind Ballal further states, that the danger is looming over their heads because Jats, Madhosing, Vazir and Rohillas

204. Peshwe Daptar, Part 21.
are not standing united. Afterwards the Emperor and his artillery would come out to assist them. Peace and tranquility can be maintained here provided a large army with powerful Sardars is despatched here by the Swami, i.e. Peshwa.' Antaji Nanakeshwar informs Sadashivrao Bhauasaheb that not a single rupee has been recovered out of seven lakhs in the last five months. The aim of Surajmal Jat is to unite all Rajputs, take out the prince (from the Marathas) and to drive out Marathas from India. In February 1757 Raja Kesnavrao wrote to Nanasaheb Peshwa, that 'Kohillas and Pathans were openly expressing their loyalty to Abdali. The Rajput kings of Amber and Jodhpur call themselves the servants of Abdali and it is they who have invited Abdali requesting him to relieve them from the clutches of the Marathas. They have promised to serve him. Abdali is prepared to do a favour but he fears Maharashtra.!' Raja Kesnavrao again wrote to Nanasaheb on the 30th April 1757 about the situation in the North. He states that 'Pathans are dominating the entire territory above Narmada. God should not bestow kingdom upon them. He (Pathan, i.e. Abdali) hates Hindus like anything.' Raja Kesnavrao

206. " "
207. " "
208. " "
had correctly suggested that Pathans and Kohillas should be separately defeated. If both are allowed to unite, then it will be very difficult to defeat them. Later events have proved the correctness of Kaja Keshavrao's suggestion beyond doubt. On the 1st March, Kaja Keshavrao again wrote to Nanasaheb about the activities of the Surajmal Jat. He states that the emissaries from Abdali had been to Raja Madhosing of Jaypur and Surajmal Jat, with a suggestion that we together should drive out Maratha Sardars from Hindustan. Marathas are creating a lot of trouble to you (Surajmal) also. Surajmal Jat replied that 'You (Abdali) should first settle down permanently over the Patshahi of Delhi and defeat the Marathas, I will send my traditional tribute to you.' He further communicated that Abdali had called the Emperor who is at present at Patna, back to Delhi. Kaja Keshavrao again wrote to Nanasaheb on the 10th March, 1760, about the developments in the North. He states that 'on his arrival in India, Ahmad Shah Abdali effected a union with the Kohilla forces and has invited other potentates - the Jats, the Rajputs under Madhosing, and Shiya - to fight under his flag against the Marathas. The Rajputs though afraid to open hostilities with the Marathas could not ignore the powerful Abdali and opened negotiations.

with him. On 14th March 1760, Raja Keshavrao wrote to Peshwa giving a vivid picture of the terror and awe Abdali inspired in the hearts of all. He states that Malharrao's efforts to defeat Abdali with his usual guerilla tactics have proved useless as the Abdali is a master of guerilla warfare. He further states that, we do not know what Abdali will do. The Emperor is in Patna, whether Abdali will bring him and enthrone him at Delhi is not known. But what is the use of it? He himself might become an emperor. Rohillas are saying that the rule of the Mughal Emperor has ended. In practice Pathans have become emperor at Delhi. Pathans hate Marathas and Maharashtra and they fear Maharashtra also. Abdali's intention is to reach south. But as long as the Sardars of Peshwa are here he will not go to south. If the Sardars are defeated then Abdali may go to the South.

Great Sanad of 1752:

Thus, this great sanad of 1752 created a stormy reaction in the North of India against the Marathas and ultimately led Peshwas to the battle of Panipat. By this agreement Peshwa, through Shinde and Holkar 'agreed to serve the Emperor loyally and faithfully'. Moreover, they agreed to help the emperor in putting down his enemies -

211. " "
- the enemy may be Abdali or any other king or any petty or big Jamindar. In short, whosoever disobeys the order of Emperor shall be brought before the Emperor for inflicting punishment. Peshwa will by his level best do anything by which the territorial integrity of the Mughal Empire will be protected and the welfare of the Emperor shall be taken care of. For this purpose Peshwas have received Rs. Thirty lakhs out of Rs. Fifty lakhs for the purpose of defeating Abdali and moreover they have received a great grant of collecting Chauth from the territories - Multan, Punjab, Thathha, Bhakhar etc. for the maintenance of the army. Peshwa undertook to establish peace and order in the different Subhas under the Imperial territory. If anybody has taken over the province or territory belonging to subordinate Rajas or Sardars of the Empire, Peshwa and his Sardars shall reconquer that province. We (i.e. Peshwa and Sardars) will cede one-half of the province thus conquered to the Imperial government and shall retain the other half for the maintenance of our army. If the Emperor agrees to our advice in respect of the defeat of the Abdali etc. we ourselves shall perform that duty of defeating the enemies. If however, the Emperor himself decides to undertake that task, we shall accompany him and do our best in the battle. If some of the government are able to fulfil the task in question, the amir, as advised by us should be given the task for completion; or we shall undertake the task after seeking their advice.
By this treaty, the Emperor of Delhi practically became the prisoner of Marathas. His sovereignty remained only on paper and only for ceremonial purpose. In practice Marathas got the authority to do anything and everything in Northern India. On the one hand this Sanad of 1752 enhanced the prestige and power of the Marathas in India; on the other hand it created bitterness among the other subordinate powers of the Empire, and antagonised them. Moreover, the responsibility that emanated from this Sanad upon the shoulders of the Marathas, was simply stupendous. The defeat of the Marathas at Panipat was the defeat of the authority of Peshwa. Peshwas became powerless after the battle of Panipat, though for a short period, Madhavrao Peshwa, was able to establish his hold upon the empire.

**Topsy turvy Situation**

During the Peshwaship of the first three Peshwas, i.e. Balaji Vishwanath, Bajirao and Balaji Bajirao, Peshwas on behalf of Chhatrapati were able to subdue the Sardars who revolted against the central authority. The situation thoroughly changed after the battle of Panipat. Important Sardars like Holkar Malharrao and Shinde Mahadji came to the rescue of the Peshwas. Another important reason for
the weakness of the Peshwas was the division between the	house of the Peshwas. Madhavrao succeeded to the Peshwaship
after the death of Nanasaheb in June, 1761; but he was so
powerless that he had to surrender himself completely to
his uncle Kaghoba. In 1762 Malharrao Holkar was requested
to mediate between the two parties, i.e. Madhavrao and
Kaghoba. Accordingly, he came to Poona. For the time being
it was decided that the 'state should be governed by Madhav­
rao and should be administered by Trimbakrao Kama. All
should obey the orders of the both.' Madhavrao gave his
consent willingly. This agreement was, however, was
shortlived. The clash between the two parties took place
on 12th November 1762. Madhavrao on his own accord called
upon Kaghoba on 13th November 1762 at Pargaon near Ghodnadi.
Malharrao Holkar again worked as an intermediary. After
saluting each other, Madhavrao 'took the shoes of Kaghobadada
upon his head.' Madhavrao entreated Dadasaheb. The agree­
ment took place between the two with Malharrao as witness.'
The internmitent quarrel between the two, weakened the power
of Peshwa. From Madhavrao onwards, Peshwas had to depend
upon their own subordinate Sardars. The personal leadership
of the Peshwa which Bajirao and Balaji Bajirao had, was lost.
When Sardars refused to obey the orders of Peshwas, Peshwas
were militarily helpless to punish them. When Kaghoba

212. Marathi Kiyasat, Part IV.
213. Peshwe Daptar.
marched against Ahalyabai Holkar at Indore in 1767, many Sardars from the Peshwas army defected. Raghoba ordered Mahadji Shinde to march against Ahalyabai Holkar at Indore. He replied, 'I am a servant of Peshwas and I am prepared to do any duty entrusted to me, yet I am not prepared to despatch my army for this purpose.' Gaikwad of Baroda and Bhosale of Nagpur openly joined Ahalyabai Holkar. Raghoba became helpless and he could do nothing against Ahalyabai.

Mercenary Army:

Panipat, internal division of Peshwa family and their feud and the death of the national army are the three important reasons for the downfall of the authority of the Peshwas. Mercineries were enrolled for the services of the State. In the year 1763, Siwachand, Pensingh, Mohansing, Hiraman and Bhopat represented that if permission were given to them to plunder and spoil in foreign territories and to reside without molestation in the Peshwa's camp, they would collect some Lugahe Beldar families for this purpose and prayed that a kaal to that effect might be issued.' Their prayer was granted on the following conditions: (a) that they would pay to government Rs. 5 for each tent. (b) that they would give up to government any elephants, balanquins, drums or flags obtained by them in their raids. In the

214. Marathi Riyasat.
215. Diary of Thorale Madhavrao.
very year 'Trimbakrao Dhamdhere was permitted to keep in his camp 50 Pindhari families and was informed that in case more Pindharis were admitted a tax called Palpatti would be levied at the rate of As. 3 per tent or according to the loot taken. It clearly shows that Peshwas have not learnt any lesson from Panipat - the dangers of employing Bungas, Gadadis and Pindharis. Again in the year 1770 'Mirakhan and Hasankhan Multani alias Pindhari asked permission to reside in the Peshwa's camp with their followers, saying that they would earn their own livelihood and pay the usual tent-tax. Their prayer was granted and they were directed to reside near the encampment of the horse under Ganesh Gangadhar. Employment of foreign mercenaries was not merely a blunder from military point of view, but it was the gravest blunder from the political point of view also. The loyalty of the Maratha army, in the days of Shivaji down to the Shahu's, towards their Chhatrapati or to the Peshwa was based upon strong national, religious bond. Gardis or Pindharis cannot have the same spirit which Marathas had towards their Motherland or their Watan. Therefore, it is no wonder that Narayanrao Peshwa was murdered by Gardis.

216. Diary of Thorale Madhavrao Peshwa.
217. " " "
Effect of Employing Mercenaries:

Nobody realised that the employment of foreign mercenaries is against the principle of Maharashtra Dharma. In the year 1770, orders were issued to Jamatdar Sumesingh Ali Mardhankhan and Shersingh Sikh to recruit 300 soldiers required by the government on pay varying from Rs. 12 to 16 a month. Shersingh was told to get 200 pure Sikhs. In the same year, orders were issued to Apaji Ganesh, the officer of Ahmedabad to enlist 400 Arabs, 100 Habashis and 1000 Siddis on salaries Rs. 15 or 16 a month. How unsound is the policy of recruiting Arabs and Habashis and Siddis can be well understood when we learn from the very historical documents that they have created trouble in the territories of Marathas. For example, in the year 1763, orders were issued to Ramchandra Krishna to garrison the forts of Songiri and Poperi, because the Habashis were causing disturbance in the taluka of Awachitgad. A sentence from the Peshwa Daptar, Vol. 12 states that 'Arabs have become more boisterous. In the current Darbar there is no power other than the power of the Arabs.' It is

218. Diary of Thorale Mdhavrao Peshwa.
219. " "
220. " "
very sad to read that Sumersingh Gardi, who murdered Narayanrao Peshwa on the 28th May 1773, was given every sort of material help to perform his marriage ceremony in the year 1772 and he was paid Rs. 3576 for the year 1772-73. An order to that effect was issued to Antaji Trimbak Khamavisdar of Paragana Chandwad. The misbehaviour of the Gardis was wellknown, even prior to the battle of Panipat. A number of complaints were lodged against Gardis to the Peshwa. Yet it appears that Peshwas have not taken the necessary precaution against the Gardis. A letter by an unknown writer clearly depicts the situation created by the Gardis, in pitting camp. The writer requests Peshwa that Gardis should be instructed to observe the usual practice. The writer of this letter appears to be a Sardar. He complains that 'Gardis are camping too near our camp, and are not following the tradition laid down by the Peshwa. We suffered much congestion for the last four days. If permission is granted to us, we will camp at a distance of two miles away from the main camp.' From there we will come to serve when ordered. Narsingrao was camping at his site by creating flags and tents. Gardis uprooted the tents and flags belonging to Narsingrao. Narsingrao left the site and camped at a distance of three miles away. There was no

222. Diary of Thorale Madhavrao Peshwa.
site for Rajashree Sadashiv Ramchandra to camp. He has also gone away.

On 7th December 1772 an order was issued to recruit more Gardis into the service of Peshwa. 'The sanction appears to be given by Narayanrao against who they ultimately acted.'

Events:

From 1761 to June 1772, nearly twelve years were lost in the battle against Haider, Nizam. It is not necessary for us to go into the details of these wars. Haider and Nizam tried to exploit the political vacuum created by the defeat of the Marathas at Panipat. The internal conflict between Kaghoba and Madhavrao gave an additional opportunity to the enemies of Maratha. Madhavrao required nearly eight valuable years to stabilise himself. After the battle of Choda-Peeth, Kaghoba was arrested and kept in confinement in Poona, in 1769. He was released in March 1772, but has been re-arrested in October 1772 while he was running away. On 13th November 1772 Madhavrao died at Theur, near Poona.

Friendship with Nizam:

After the battle of Rakshasbhuvan, on 10th August 1763, in which Nizam was defeated by the Marathas, a treaty was made by one Gardi probably at the behest of Kaghoba.
was signed between the two parties at Aurangabad on 25th September 1763. An era of friendship between Peshwas and Nizam started and continued up to 1795. Madhavrao followed a very practical policy towards Nizam. He promised Nizam ( Nābab ) that, henceforward Marathas will not attempt to exterminate Nizam. 'There should be no enmity between us. Whatever territory belongs to you, you will protect it and whatever territory belongs to us, we will rule over it. Nobody should cause any trouble to another and nobody should invade the territory belonging to another. All the conflicts that will emerge in future should be settled by peaceful negotiations between the two. There is no necessity of waging a war to solve the problems.'

Relation with Haider: Effect:

Haider was of course a powerful enemy of Marathas. In all, four campaigns on the part of the Marathas were essential to subdue Haider, starting from March 1762 and ending in 1772. Both the parties were tired of the continuous campaigns. On 21st June, 1772 both parties signed a treaty at Kikari by which (a) Haider agreed to pay Rs. 50 lakhs, (b) The Maratha territory occupied by Haider was returned to the Marathas, (c) Haider agreed not to invade the territory belonging to Marathas. From the financial point of view, war with Haider was an expensive one.
However, this war is very important from the political point of view. The defeat of Nabab (Nizam) and Haider by the Marathas proved beyond doubt that Maratha State is still alive even after the defeat at Panipat and it is sufficiently powerful to protect its own territory.

Activities in the North:

Though Madhavrao Peshwa was fully engrossed in the affairs of Karnatak i.e. Haider; Nizam and Haghoba he paid attention to the activities in the North also. From 1762 to 1770 he was unable to march towards north personally because of his activities in south and from 1770 onwards because of his illness he could not undertake any campaign. So the political affairs in the North were practically entrusted to Shindes and Holkars. It required a lot of time for Mahadji Shinde to assume power and to establish himself firmly. Madhavrao only gave written directions to Shinde Holkar and other Sardars in the North. A Sanad granted to Kadarji Shinde and Mahadji Shinde in the year 1762-63 states that 'an agreement entered into with the Peshwa by Gulraj and Anandram, Ambassadors of Abdali, it was stipulated by the latter, that the Emperor and Azful Ujara would assist in establishing the authority of the Peshwa over certain Paraganas which were under the sway of the later Nanasaheb
and Bhausaheb. Kedarji Shinde and Mahadji Shinde were directed that if the stipulation was fulfilled, a Jahagir of Rs. 40,000 should be granted in the Antarvedi to the ambassadors in question as settled. On 12th August 1762, Madhavrao wrote to Baburao Konka that 'it is good that you are at present near Sujauddaula. Whatever posts we have lost should be conquered. Necessary letters to the kings and Sardars will be despatched. The first thing which Madhavrao had done, was to effect a settlement between Shinde and Holkar, by which both joined hands to re-establish Maratha power in the North.

Restoration of the Emperor:

According to the great Sanad or agreement between the Emperor and Marathas of 1752, it was the responsibility of the Marathas to protect the Mughal Emperor and to defeat his enemies. On the very next day of the battle of Panipat, i.e. on 15th January 1761, the Mughal Emperor Sah Alam was defeated by the British, five miles west of Patna. This defeat created a very critical situation for the Emperor. On one hand, the Marathas were defeated at Panipat, on the other hand he failed to establish his rule in the eastern

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226. Diary of Thorale Madhavrao Peshwa.
228. " 14-16
territories of the Empire. Therefore he could not do anything. He was patiently waiting for a power which would enable him to return to Delhi. Neither the Marathas nor the British were in a position to do that. With the result Emperor had to spend nearly twelve years in wilderness.

Terms for Restoration :

Attempts by Madhavrao Holkar to defeat the British forces and to take the possession of Emperor failed in 1765. Holkar's forces were defeated. Holkar retreated to Gwalior. The reason for the defeat of this war is vividly described in two sentences. It states that the British artillery is very powerful and therefore soldiers were reluctant to fight. Therefore they retreated. Malharrao had arrived at Kalpi. He is depressed. Mahadji Shinde was observing all these events. He could not do anything because he himself was not yet settled. On 10th August 1765 he wrote to Poona - 'I am going to join Holkar. Holkar at present is at Datia. We have decided to come together and to achieve some important political aims.' Baghobadada had been to North, but returned to South, without achieving anything. On the contrary, he complicated certain matters. Marathas required nearly five years to subdue Kohillas, Jaths and Rajputs. Delhi was captured by Marathas on 10th February 1771.

229. See Appendix

230. " "
On 12th February 1771 a treaty was signed between the Emperor and Marathas. The demands of the Marathas and the reply to them, given by the Emperor is as follows - (a) The Emperor should pay Rs. Twentyfive lakhs to Marathas as soon as Marathas hand over the capital (i.e. Delhi) and the Fort to the Emperor. The Emperor replied that he was prepared to pay Rs. Ten lakhs within eight days, (b) The Emperor should pay to the Marathas Rs. fifteen lakhs as soon as the Emperor reaches Delhi. The Emperor replied that he will pay provided he reaches Delhi. If he fails to pay then, the same amount should be collected from the provincial revenue, (c) The territories belonging to Marathas prior to 1761 should be kept with the Marathas and all other traditions shall be continued. The Emperor replied, 'Yes'. (d) Except the appointment of the Vazir, all other appointments of the Imperial services should be made by Marathas according to their pleasure. Emperor replied yes. After this treaty, the Emperor started from Allahabad to Delhi on 29th March, 1771 and reached Delhi on 25th December 1771 (according to new calendar on 6th January 1772). Madhavrao Peshwa heartily congratulated his sardars. He wrote a cautionary note to them about the British. He states: Do not allow British into Delhi. Once they enter, then it will be very difficult to drive them out; of all the foreigners British have become very powerful. Their influence has

231. Marathi Kiyasat, Part IV.
spread from Calcutta to Masalipattam and Surat.

Expansion of Maratha Authority:

The political thought of the Marathas from 1752 to 1772 was concentrated upon only one important factor or policy viz. the expansion of Maratha authority over other parts of India. The treaty of 1752 between the Emperor and the Marathas gave the necessary constitutional authority to Marathas by which they established their authority from Punjab in the North to Cuttack in the East and down in the South upto Tungabhadra river. The defeat at Panipat had not deterred them. The same thought governed their minds from 1761 to 1772. Two important letters reflect the policy of the Marathas. Ramchandra Sadashiv 233 communicates the news of the capture of Delhi, by Visajipant and Mahadji Shinde. He attributes this success to Swami i.e. Peshwa. He further states that by the good grace of the Swami, his loyal sardars will be able to restore the Mughal Emperor to his throne and will carry out the administration in such a manner that it will be profitable for our government. He states that all Marathas Sardars are governed by one principle and will work in unison.' The unknown author of another letter 234 communicated the influence of Mahadji Shinde and the Peshwa himself in the political affairs of the North. He states that 'nobody is going to act contrary to your orders. Your influence in the political affairs is simply tremendous and that of Sardar Mahadji Shinde is also

good. There is absolutely no worry. Nobody is going to speak anything unless and until ordered by you. We have no other goal except the service of the Swami.'

Objectives of Madhavrao:

Madhavrao Peshwa was suffering from intestinal T.B. In 1769 he asked his younger brother Narayanrao to participate actively in the administration. Because of his ill-health, Madhavrao had to return to Poona from Miraj, from the Karnatak Campaign in December 1770. To a certain extent it appears from certain actions on the part of Madhavrao that he had lost his balance of mind. On 10th September 1772 he prepared a list of nine articles in which objectives to be achieved, were included. He ordered his administrators to sign that demand. Out of these nine articles only three refer to the public administration, one refers to Naghoba and the rest five refer to certain religious acts. The important articles are – (1) State loan should be repaid (2) In Desh and Konkan, the ryot has become unhappy. Attempts should be made by which subjects will be happy. (3) It was the desire of our father i.e.

Nanasaheb, that the Holy cities of Prayag and Kashi should be under our jurisdiction. The present moment is opportune for it. Attempts should be made by which these two Holy places will be brought under our jurisdiction. (4) Maghoba-dada should be given a Jagir. On 18th November 1772 Madhavrao Peshwa died.

Reasons for the Decline of Authority:

Ill-health, want of military leadership like Bajirao - grand father of Madhavrao - territorial encroachment by Nizam and Haider upon the Maratha territory and trouble created by Maghoba were the four important factors, responsible for the steady decline of Peshwa’s authority over the powerful Sardars like, Shinde, Holkar, Bhosale, etc. The credit for the northern affairs during this period i.e. from 1761 to 1772 should go to Mahadji Shinde. It appears that the treaty signed between Marathas and Emperor on the 12th February 1771, was not approved by Madhavrao. For, while congratulating his Sardars for restoring the Emperor on the throne of Delhi, he asked them: But what territory and amount the emperor had given to you? Three annual military camps are over and the fourth camp is forthcoming. The interests of the Emperor have been served, but what about our interest? You should have acquired the territory and amount in proportion to the

236. Marathi Kiyasat, Part IV.
damage done to our army. I am sure that you might have taken possession of Kashi Prayag (the two Holy places) from the Emperor." It is obvious that this treaty had not fulfilled the expectations of Madhavrao Peshwa, which are reflected in this letter. No new territory was acquired, nor the amount received. Holy places like Kashi - Prayag were not in the possession of Marathas. This proves two important points in respect of the break-down of the quasi-Federal Constitution. Firstly, Sardars like Shinde Holkar etc. began to enter into treaty agreement without reference to the central authority of Peshwas. Secondly, this was the beginning of the independence of the Sardars in their dealings and policies which were often marked divergence of the dealings and policies of the central government. Thirdly, Peshwa had lost military capacity to punish offending Sardars, however unimportant and powerless they might have been.

Other Powers - Peace and Order:

During the reign of Madhavrao, all the other traditions, based upon the quasi-Federal constitution were observed. The responsibility of maintaining peace and order was continued to be bestowed upon the Sardars. In the year 1763-64 a Sanad was granted to Hanamantrao Babaji and Bapuji Mahadeo 237 on the conditions that they will

237. Diary of Thorale Madhavrao Peshwa.
maintain peace and order. Moreover, they were to surrender detailed accounts and to remit the revenue to government deducting therefrom the expenses of the troops. A Sanad granted to Hajaram Govind in the same year refers to the same task. Anadrao Dhuṣap of Vijaydurg was ordered to obtain either by force or by amicable settlement from the Firangis the fort of Mardangad, taken by them in the preceding year and to manage the territory under the protection of the fort.

Raising an Army:

Raising of the army was entirely left to the Sardars, as usual. A Sanad granted to Visaji Krishna in the year 1766-67 refers to the raising of the new army. In the year 1770-1771, Trimbak Narayan, officer of Taluka Ahmedabad, asked permission to the expenditure of Rs. 10,000 and to the entertainment of additional force with the capture of the fort Khambayat. The permission was granted. Upto 1772 Peshwa Mādhavrao occasionally, continued to punish guilty Sardars. In the year 1766-67, 'The office of Sumant was taken away from Mādhavrao Krishna and conferred on

238. Diary of Thorale Mādhavrao Peshwa.
239. " "
240. " "
241. " "
Krishnaji Mahipatrapo. The latter having failed to pay the nazir agreed upon, his saranjam was attached.\textsuperscript{242} In similar manner, watans and inams of Trimbakrao Dabhade were attached in the year 1763-64, because he had gone over to the Mughals.\textsuperscript{243} In 1765-66, 43 Mahals, were ordered to be attached and the work was entrusted to Antaji Mahadeo. In the year 1767-68 'the saranjam of Tukoji Holkar, consisting of the villages in the Paragana of Gandapur and others, which were under attachment, were ordered to be restored to him.'\textsuperscript{245}

\textbf{Example of Relationship:}

The relationship between central government (i.e. Peshwas) and Sarðars can be best understood by citing the example of Kajashree Vitthal Shivdeo. He was conferred the title of Umde-Tul-Mulukha-Bahadar. In the year 1762-63 he was given the following saranjam - (a) Rs. 50,000 for personal expenses, per year. (b) Rs. 15,00,000 for keeping up a detachment of 5000 horse. The detachment was liable to be inspected by the huzur, (i.e. Peshwa) and was to be on duty throughout the year. The amount sanctioned was to cover all expenses including those incurred in replacing

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{242} Diary of Thorale Madhavrao Peshwa.
\item \textsuperscript{243} " "
\item \textsuperscript{244} " "
\item \textsuperscript{245} " "
\end{itemize}
horses killed in action etc. (c) Rs. 10,000 in connection with the fort of Rajdehar which was entrusted to the saranjamdar. The saranjamdar was directed to render detailed accounts of the territory assigned to him in saranjam, to continue the alienation of land and cash existing therein to make inquiries about its revenues and try to increase the revenue as far as possible. With regard to the keeping of the detachment, the instructions were that the horses and men to be entertained should be fit and strong, each horse being of a value of Rs. 300 or 400 and that they should be produced for inspection, whenever required by the huzur. If it is observed that the number of horses and 'swars' is less, then the proportionate amount should be returned to the government. In the year 1762-63, a Sanad was granted to Trimbakrao Shivdeo. Trimbakrao Shivdeo asked for the repayment of the loan advanced by him to government. The paragana of Kalabag and the government share in paragana Patan Keshavrayache, were made over to him, to be taken back when the loan was paid off. He was directed to submit detailed accounts of the territory to government.

Punishment to Sardars:

In the year 1763-64, the 'saranjam of Durjansing of

246. Diary of Thorale Madhavrao Peshwe.
247. " "


Mandvi was ordered to be attached and Udho Vishweshwar was appointed to manage the Sansthan. Durjansing was informed that the Sansthan would be restored after arrears of nazar due from him were paid. The sardars who failed to do their duty either military or otherwise were punished by the Peshwas. In the year 1772-73, Shri Chimanji Dalpatrao, of Santhan Peth was punished. Chimanji Dalpatrao had agreed to serve government when required. He, however, failed to comply with the orders of the government directing him to accompany Vishaji Keshav in Karnatak campaign of the preceding year. He also failed to give half his Santhan to his brother Parvatsing. He was, therefore, directed to surrender his fort of Khairai together with certain villages in paragana Hazrill, yielding a revenue sufficient for the maintenance of the fort and to allow Pandurang Krishna to divide the remaining Santhan between himself and his brother.

Distance - a Major Factor:

'Distance' was the most important factor which governed the obedience on the part of the Sardars to the central government. Even in the days of Balaji Bajirao there were many complaints against the Sardars like Malharrao Holkar, Antaji Manakeshwar, Laxman Shankar, Bapuji Mahadeo, Damodar Mahadeo, Govindpant Bundele and after 1774 even of

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248. Diary of Thorale Madhavrao Peshwa.
249. " "
Mahadji Shinde. All these Sardars were the creation of the Peshwas. A quarrel started between Shinde and Holkar in 1754 which continued forever. In this very year, Malharrao Holkar advised Dattaji and Janakoji Shinde not to obey the orders of Peshwa and saying that if Peshwas become too powerful, 'they (Peshwas) will order us to clean their clothes.' In the year 1757 Peshwa despatched two Darakhdars - Yerande and Kanitkar, to inquire into the internal affairs of Govindpant Bundele. These two Darakhdars have listed nine complaints against Govindpant Bundele. The important complaints are: (a) last year's balance is not included into new year's opening balance, (b) Extravagant military expenditure, (c) The paraganas where little army is required are handed over to Shinde and the paraganas which require a very large army to maintain are kept with the central government. (d) Presents and Nazranas are accepted secretly. (e) Statement of Mahals is not shown to us. (f) because of the fear complex not a single ryot or Jamindar could see us. (g) Kharbharis exact any amount they like.' This very individual Govindpant Bundele, never carried out the orders sincerely, issued to him by Sadashivrao Bhau. Sadashivrao Bhau sarcastically wrote to him on 4th November 1760, 'that

251. " " "
you merely promised to undertake the work but actually you do not do anything.' Again on 15th November 1760, Sadashivrao wrote to Govindpant Bundele that 'you have not done a single task which was ordered to you.' It is a well known fact that Malharrao Holkar left the battle of Panipat with 15,000 soldiers. Neither Abdali, nor Nazib Khan, nor any other sardar had done any harm to Malharrao suggests his understanding with the enemies of the Peshwas. The most important factor from our point of view is, that the Sardars who disobeyed the orders of the central government were far away usually in the north - from the seat of the central government i.e. Poona.

**Internal Conflict:**

After the death of Madhavrao, his younger brother Narayanrao became Peshwa in 1772. The conflict with Raghoba continued. This conflict ended in the murder of Narayanrao by Gardis, in the presence of Raghoba. Raghoba presented Jagirs and rewards to the murderers. For a few months, Raghoba managed the affairs of the Maratha kingdom. It is to be remembered that the ceremonial robes of Peshwaship were not given to Raghoba by the Chhatrapati of Satara. Raghoba undertook expeditions against Nizam and Haider Ali in order to divert the attention of the people. On 18th April 1774 a posthumous son was born to Gangabai at Purandar, widow of murdered Narayanrao. The opponents of Raghoba sought this opportunity. Under one pretext or another,
important sardar left the campaign which Raghoba had undertaken. They came to Poona and proclaimed the new child as Peshwa Savai Madhavrao. Ceremonial robes were received at Purandar, after twelve days. The Barbhais declared Raghoba as a murderer and usurper and called upon all the individuals to withhold cooperation with him. Raghoba soon became a fugitive and in a desperate moment turned to the English of Bombay for armed aid to recover his Peshwaship. The Bombay government was too eager to help him and thus to interfere in the internal affairs of the Marathas. Thus began the Anglo Maratha conflict which ended in 1818.

End of the Real Authority:

The authority and power of the Peshwa ended with the death of Madhavrao. All the Peshwas who succeeded, were powerless. They became the tool in the hands of either their chief secretary (Karbhari like Nana Phadanwis) or the powerful sardars. The minority of the Peshwa from 1774 onwards and the difficulties which central government faced, encouraged the sardars - big and small - to effect greater freedom. Thus the Quasi-Federal Constitution of Maratha State underwent radical changes in practice. Sardars began to look after their saranjam as independent kingdoms owing only nominal allegiance and merely expressing it occasionally.

252. Marathyanchya Itihasachi Sadhane, Vol IV.
to the Peshwa. Sardars and Saranjamdars, who were a part and parcel of a single structure of this Quasi-federal state, became in practice separate entities and each began to drift from the centre as he thought best. As we have already noted above, the important reason for this sorry state of affairs was the lack of de facto authority at Poona. The battle of Panipat was a serious blow to the Peshwa's unifying authority. After 1782, though the Peshwas ceremonial precedence over his feudatories continued as before, he had little control over their internal affairs. His authority came to be limited to the provinces directly held by him. The feudatories carried out his mandate or defied them as it suited their interests. The feudal tendency among the Marathas that had raised its head after Shivaji's death gathered momentum making the structure weak and vulnerable.253

Unrealised Objectives :

There are very few references to Maharashtra Dharma or Hindu Dharma during this period. Excluding a few districts, Maharashtra proper was under the direct rule of Peshwas. Brahmins from different parts of India used to come to Poona, for grants, Daxina etc. As the size of Maratha Empire, increased reaching the banks of the holy

253. Maharashtra State Gazetteer - History - Maratha period - page 97. contributed by Dr. V.G. Dighe.
rivers like Sindhu, Ganga and Yamuna, a yearning developed into the minds of the Peshwas, particularly Nanasaheb, that the two holy cities of Hindus namely Prayag and Kashi (Varanasi) should be in the hands of the Marathas. Balaji Bajirao had been to Prayag and Kashi, but he was not successful in bringing these two holy places into Maratha domain. On the 5th September 1758 Raja Keshavrao wrote to Nanasaheb Peshwa requesting him to bring the holy cities like Kurukshetra, Prayag, Varanasi and Gaya under the Maratha rule. In this letter he states 'No Brahmin so far had acquired fame as Nanasaheb had. Now you (Nanasaheb) have acquired additional territory upto Attock including Lahore. Now on the western side Multan and Kabul and on the eastern side Ayodhya, Prayag and Bengal (Bengal) only remain to be brought under your control. Much of this territory at present is under your control. In such a situation why should the cities like Kurukshetra, Prayag, Varanasi and Gaya should be under the Muslim rule? As long as the protector of cows and Brahmins, like you, are at the helm of the affairs of the state, this universal dream should be realised. On 29th September 1759, Antaji Manakeshwar, wrote to Raghoba the plan of action in the eastern region of India. He states that unless we three namely, the Emperor, Vazir and myself - proceed in that direction, the goal of bringing Kashi Prayag etc. will not

be fulfilled; according to the desire of Nanasaheb.

He further states that it is not sufficient merely to post Sardars at these holy places. Kaja Keshavrao also states that this object will require a period of one year to realise. This letter (i.e. No. 254) expresses the ultimate goal of the Maratha rule to bring the territory from Kabul to Bengal under one flag. The Ancient Empires of Hindus possessed the territory from Kabul in the west to Bengal in the east. Shivaji had been duly coroned according to the ancient Hindu traditions. From Chhatrapati to Samrat (Emperor), was the goal to be achieved. On the occasion, Balaji Bajirao wrote to Pilaji Jadhav that 'we are the true disciples of Shivaji Maharaj!' He took pride in it.

It is but natural, therefore, to expect Balaji Bajirao, trying his level best to extend the territory of Maratha Empire upto Kabul in the west and Bengal in the east. The existence of the large Maratha army in the North, in the year 1759 had the salutary effect upon the treatment given to the Hindu pilgrims by the Muslim rulers. One Trimbakrao from Prayag wrote to Nanasaheb, on 15th November 1759 that 'good treatment is being meted out to pilgrims by the new Suba. Pilgrims are not harassed as they used to be. They are lightly taxed. Any one who possesses the letters of the

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256. Marathyanchya Itihasachi Sadhane, Vol. VI.
government (Parawana etc.) is not given any trouble. Servants of the Suba do not show any disinterest regarding the pilgrims or their rituals. If the Maratha forces would come to this part, it is not very difficult to conquer territory up to Bengal.

Unfortunately, this dream of Balaji Bajirao was never realised. Marathas suffered a terrible defeat at Panipat. Madhavrao, Mahadji Shinde recovered the Maratha Empire and the prestige, but it was short-lived. Though, Mahadji was able to take the Mughal Emperor from Patna to Delhi and to restore him, he was unable to bring these two holy places, under the direct rule of the Marathas. Disunity among Marathas, killed the very life force of Maratha nationalism. Moreover, they have now to face an enemy equipped with modern weapons and a well disciplined army. It was a conflict of two cultures—east Vs west. From 1773 onwards the most important factor that dominated the political thought was to 'hold on' as long as possible, the existing regime against the onslaught new forces from the west.

Conflict with British:

Nana Phadnis at Poona and Mahadji Shinde in the North were the two dominating personalities which decided and

and executed the policy of Maratha State. The Barhais conspiracy brought the conflict with English – the battle at Wadgaon, treaty of Purandhar; again the conflict between the two parties resulting into the treaty of Salbai, in 1782. It appears that the Barhais tried to face the British in the traditional manner - granting of Sanads etc. In 1774-75 Sanads were granted to Appaji Hari, Kamaji Annaji, Appaji Ganesh of Ahmedabad and Naro Anandram of Surat. One Mehta Brajlal was granted a sanad because he offered to conquer from the English the Taluka of Broach together with the fort, on the conditions that (a) on completion of the conquest villages worth Rs. 16,000 would be given as Inam, (b) Rs. 1,000 to 1200 for campaign expenses. (c) Military saranjam (d) Assistance in securing his watan in Junagad. (e) Rs. 5,000 for distribution as reward. Similar orders were issued to Bahiro Kaghunath, Baji Gangadhar, Naro Anandrao etc. how the spirit of nationalism and national army was gradually diminishing can be seen from the order issued to Visaji Keshav. He 'was directed to arrange for the re-taking of Salsette after enlisting Siddis and other good soldiers from Surat and other places.' In the very year Vasudeo Anant was informed that the 'government had despatched armies, Gadadis and people.' For the

258. Diary of Savai Madhavrao Peshwa, Part II.
259. 
260. 

reconquest of Sashti. In the year 1774-75, orders were
issued to Visaji Deshav in regard to the recovery of the
Salsette taken by the English. (a) Full discretion was
given to him to entertain such men as might be required.
The expenses incurred on that account would be admitted
without objection. (b) Permission was given to entertain
three hundred sailors for four months at a cost of Rs. ten
thousand. (c) Permission was given to spend the amount
required to prepare boats for temporary use.

Salsette :

Yet Selsette remained in the hands of English.
Raghoba was defeated on 17th February 1775 in the battle
of Mahi by Harpant Phadke. He fled to Surat and concluded
a treaty by which the English agreed to support his cause
with a force of 2500 troops which with due proportion of
artillery. Raghoba agreed to cede to the Company in
perpetuity Bassein with its dependencies, the island of
Salsette and other islands adjacent to Bombay, Jambusar
and Oplad paraganas in Gujrat and the Peshwa's share of
revenue of Ankaleshwar. For the expenses of the troops
Raghoba was to pay 1,1/2 lakh of Rupees monthly and by way
of security deposited with the Company Jewellery worth
Rupees six lakhs. Thus, for the first time the foreign
hand entered into the Maratha empire and it gradually

261. Diary of Savai Madhavrao Peshwa, Part II.
swallowed the Maratha Empire. How shrewd Madhavrao Peshwa was, can be judged by the events which took place afterwards, when he advised Mahadji Shinde 'not to allow British into Delhi' in 1771. The allied forces - Haghoba and British - were trying to push in the direction of Poona. Meanwhile, the supreme government in Calcutta, disapproved the policy and measures of the Bombay Council in supporting Haghoba. They declared the war as "impolitic, dangerous, unauthorised and unjust." On 1st March, 1776 both the parties concluded an agreement by which British Alliance with Haghoba was dissolved. By this treaty the English gained their main objective - Salsette and the islands adjacent to Bombay. From this time onwards Nana Phadanwis followed a policy of keeping the British Company away from the Maratha Empire. He alone had understood the danger of accepting subsidiary alliance of the British Company. The seizure of Salsette, by the English on the 23rd December 1774, under the excuse that the rumours of Portuguese fleet was threatening Salsette, was an act of wanton aggression. Yet the Maratha power could not do anything for the recovery of its lost territory.

Renewed Activities - Grand Alliance:

For the renewal of activities which Marathas, the British Company found an excuse that a French agent was at Poona. Setting aside the treaty of Purandhar, the Company's army marched in the direction of Poona on 25th November 1778.
The Company's army was totally defeated at Wadgaon. On 17th January a treaty was signed by which British Company accepted to surrender Raghoba, abandon Salsette and all territory acquired since 1772. But the Bombay government repudiated the treaty. Realising the danger from British Company, Nana Phadnis tried to form a grand coalition against English, almost of all Indian powers. As a result of this policy concessions were given to the Nizam, Haider etc. In the year 1776-77, the paragana of Gangapur was given in Jahagir to the Nabab i.e. Nizam. In 1777-78 the Chauthai Amal in Paraganas Nimal, Tembhurni, Kajur, Kusbet, Wole and Nakade was granted to Jabitjanga, a loyal servant of Nizam in consideration of his friendly attitude towards government. Again in the year 1779-80 the Jahagir Amal of Paragana Dhoki, was granted to Nizam Alli Khan Bahadur. In that very year Balaji Govind was directed to remove the attachment, placed by him on the Jahagir in Prant Kalpi bestowed on Nabab Gaziuddin Vazir.

How the relations with Haider were improved, is reflected by the fact that in the year 1779-80 'Clothes worth Rs. 392 as Rs. 203 were received as presents from Sharafat Daula and Haider Naik respectively. In

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262. Diary of Savai Madhavrao Peshwa, Part II
263. " "
1780-81, Krishnarao Narayanrao Joshi was sent to Nabab Haider Ali Khan, with Clothes as a present to Haider Ali. In 1782-83, Clothes worth Rs. 1250 were received as presents from Nabab Haider Ali Khan Bahadur. It is clear that this friendship did not continue for long. There were many conflicts between Marathas and Tipu. (Haider died in 1782 December.) Tipu suspected that the English were becoming more friendly with the Marathas. In 1787 'a treaty was formerly entered into with Nabab Haider Ali Khan Bahadur through Balaji Janardan, Hari Ballal, Mahadjirao Scindia, Anandrao Bhikajirao Raste and Krishnarao Ballal.' After the treaty some misunderstanding arose between the two powers owing to the conduct of Kalo Bahirao of fort Nargund. Tipu Sultan now sent Badrddin Jamalkhan Bahadur and Alli Raja to Tukajirao Holkar and Gangadharrao Bhikajirao Raste to propose that the two governments should continue friendship on terms of original treaty. The original treaty (which was concluded in 1780) was accordingly ratified.

In the year 1786-87 'a treaty of Alliance was concluded between the Peshwa, Nabab Nizam Ali Khan Bahadur and Nabab Tipu Sultan Bahadur, by which the powers bound themselves to live on terms of friendship with each other and to unite together to defend themselves against outsiders. According to this treaty, territory belonging to Tipu,

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264. Diary of Savai Madhavrao Peshwa, Part II.
265. " "
which was taken by the Marathas was restored, his subjects under Peshwas' imprisonment released. On the other hand Tipoo surrendered Taluka Nargund, paid the tribute and arrears for four years.

British Diplomacy:

The tripartite alliance - mutual defensive alliance - was perhaps the best in the interest of three powers, namely Maratha, Nizam and Tipoo. But as soon as Lord Cornwallis had declared company's intention of eschewing all schemes of conquest or entanglements with the native rulers, the three parties forgot the sacred alliance and entered into traditional enmity against each other. These powers voluntarily entered into trap laid down by British. Marathas and Nizam joined hands with British to crush Tipoo. Nana Phadnis, perhaps thought that Tipoo and British would exhaust themselves in mutual destruction and Marathas would become arbiters of future negotiations. Hostilities, therefore, were resumed. In 1791-92 the villages in paragana Haskot, which were in the possession of Tipoo Sultan Bahadur were attached. Similarly, Tarf Dhekankota, Ratangiri, the fort and taluka Devaraydurg and Paragana Tumkur were also attached. In the treaty concluded Marathas received Hons 13,06,666 and mahals. As a result of this treaty, forts and mahals taken by the Marathas were ordered to be restored to Tipoo Sultan. The treaty and the

266. Diary of Savai Madhavrao Peshwa, Part II.
and the actual campaign proved the guilt of Nana Phadnis beyond doubt. Instead of mutual destruction (Tipoo and English) British Company's power increased and the Tripartite defensive alliance automatically came to an end. In the treaty concluded, the Marathas instead of being arbiters came to occupy a secondary place and lost the initiative to British.

After the death of Madhavrao I in 1772, Peshwas lost their hold and initiative and the political power was transferred from the hands of Peshwa to the minister, i.e. Nana Phadnis. History repeated itself again. After the death of Shahu, Chhatrapatis lost all political power and became the prisoners of Peshwas. After 1774, Peshwas lost political power and became the prisoners of their sardars like Shinde Holkar, etc. The tide of the power changed in the direction of Sardars like Mahadji Shinde from 1782 onwards. Peshwas were neither able to control their sardars nor were they able to protect their territory - which was under their direct control. Mahadji Shinde worked as an intermediary between the two powers: Peshwas on one hand and British on the other. The treaty of Salbai, signed on 17th May 1782 is the best example in this respect. It provided for the withdrawal of the British support to Haghoba and restoration of all British conquest in Gujrat and Malwa subsequent to


268. Diary of Savai Madhavrao Peshwa, Part II.
the treaty of Purandhar. Thus the British attempt to put Raghoba on the Peshwaship and through him to control the affairs of Maratha Empire were frustrated.

Trouble in the North:

Shinde was able to help Peshwa (i.e. Nana Phadnis) in 1781-82, but Peshwa was unable to help Mahadj Shinde in 1787. Mahadj Shinde was consolidating his power in the North. Shinde was invited by the Emperor Shaha Alam to undertake the regency of his house and to regulate the affairs of Mughal Empire. Shinde consequently met the Emperor on 15th November 1784 and assumed the robes of his new office and became the power behind the Imperial Throne. This is again an instance of political importance. A subordinate legal authority (i.e. Shinde), receives the robes and title from foreign authority (i.e. Emperor) without the consent and permission from the central government (i.e. Peshwa) at Poona. This shows the markedly changed relationship between the central government and sardars. It was not very easy for Shinde alone to manage the affairs at Delhi. The task before Mahadj was to defeat - (a) a number of turbulent Mughal chiefs, (b) Sikhs - who were ravaging the Imperial territory, and (c) the Rajput princes. Their hatred against Marathas and the demand of yearly tribute with dues, united them into a grand alliance and incited them to revolt against

269. Diary of Savai Madhavrao Peshwa, Part II.
Shinde. At the battle of Lalsot, against Rajputs, Shinde's army was defeated, in 1787. A letter written by Mahadji Shinde to Peshwa, on 18th August 1787 reveals the critical situation which Mahadji Shinde had to face. In this letter Mahadji states: "Rajputs have won the battle at Lalsot because our North Indian Battalions defected. You might have heard this news in the letters which I wrote to you. Our financial position has become stringent. Emperor has not been paid for the last nine months and therefore, he is pressing us for the money. If Emperor remains in our hands, then we can keep all the other things i.e. political power in our hands. If he comes out and does not remain under our control then it will open ample opportunities for other powers to interfere in the political affairs and all sorts of intrigues will follow. Moreover the Emperor is not firm, he is greedy. We have tried our level best to raise the necessary amount from the money lenders - but nobody is prepared to give us loan; because we have yet to repay the loan which we have taken long ago. Because of this helpless situation, we are requesting you to arrange for the amount. This will help us a lot. It will prove from the letters from different ambassadors at different courts that we are one and it will remove the misunderstanding that there is no unanimity against amongst Badshah, Peshwa and ourselves. It will prove that South rushes financial help and army, when there is trouble.

270. Papers of Mahadji Shinde.
in the North. It will also put down all the powers. If this is done, then the English and the Vazir will not dare to exploit the situation and interfere in the internal affairs of Mughals..." Instead of sending financial help and despatching army to the North, Nana Phadnis despatched Tukoji Holkar, who was jealous about Shinde's power. Instead of helping Shinde, Holkar encouraged his enemies. However, Shinde came out with flying colours, surmounting all the difficulties. He defeated the Rajput forces in two battles namely Patan (June 1790) and Merta (September 1790). Holkar, who openly joined the enemies was defeated at Lakheri in 1793 by Shinde's army.

Internal Conflict:

Shinde arrived in Poona in June 1792. Prior to his arrival, attempts were made by Nana Phadnis to prohibit his entry into Deccan. There are many reasons for this which show the chaotic political situation in Poona. Mahadji Shinde was now the highest functionary of the Mughal Emperor (i.e. Vazir) and he had a very powerful army with him. Nana Phadnis went to the extent of seeking help from the British which they wisely declined. It appears that Shinde wanted to clarify certain matters. In a letter written to Peshwa in December 1791, he refutes certain doubts about the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the North. Mahadji Shinde states: "We (Mahadji Shinde) are in receipt of your

271. P.R.C. Vol. II.
272. Papers of Mahadji Shinde.
order, asking us not to come to the South because, after our departure to South, it will be very difficult to maintain peace and tranquillity in the North. Several problems and conflicts will crop up. If it is decided that peace and order can be maintained by keeping sufficient army, army will remain but peace and order will vanish. Uptill now we have defeated our enemy by conquering many important places and territories and have firmly established the rule of the Emperor. This will disappear from the place. We will have to make efforts again to re-establish Badshahi. Moreover, the loyalty of the North Indians is questionable. Our answer to all these doubts is that - "for the maintenance of peace and order we have kept a large number of army and number of loyal and trusted sardars. There is no power left which will dare rebel against our authority. We have not visited the Swami for a long time and therefore we have a desire to see him. We have to perform certain traditional rites of God in Desh. Sardars are here in the North, they will maintain peace and order. There was some trouble from Ismailbeg because of the perfidy, which allowed him to go to Kanoda. However, he was subdued. Therefore, we do not visualise that anybody outsider will revolt against us. However, we are not sure about anybody from our own doing perfidious act."

Failures of Quasi-Federalism :

This letter, written by Mahadji Shinde to Peshwa
Savai Madhavrao, reveals the situation of the Maratha Confederacy and the breakdown of the Constitution. The failures can be enumerated. (a) The central government failed to assist Mahadji Shinde, a Sardar of Maratha Confederation—when he was carrying out his duty according to the treaty-agreement entered into by Peshwa on one hand i.e. Central government and the Mughal Emperor in 1752. (b) The Sardars like Tukoji Holkar who were despatched to the North by the central government, joined the opposite camp, i.e., the enemies of the central government. (c) The central government which was weak requested foreign power like English to help subdue its own sardar—the worst act from the constitutional point of view. (d) Mahadji Shinde came to the South irrespective of the order, which ordered him in specific terms, giving reasons that he should not come to the South. Mahadji Shinde could not be punished by the central government for his unconstitutional act. One can easily understand the vast difference between the relationship of Peshwa and his sardars during the regime of Bajirao I and Balaji Bajirao and that of Madhavrao and Savai Madhavrao—i.e., during the period 1720 to 1760 and from 1760 to 1790.

Firman banning cow-slaughter throughout India:

In June, 1792, (1792), in Poona, a great ceremonial Darbar was held. Mahadji Shinde delivered to the Peshwa the titles and honours brought for him from the Emperor and the Firman prohibiting cow-slaughter throughout India.
Theoretically at least, the aim of the Hindu religion and Maharashtrai Dharma was realised by the issuance of this Firman. 'The office of the Nayabi - in 1792-93 with the dignity of Wakil Matalik and Anirum Umrao (Conferred on the Peshwa by the Emperor) was bestowed on Mahadji Shinde and presents of jewellery, clothes etc. were made to him. 273

The differences between the central government i.e. Peshwa, Nana Phadnis and the Mahadji Shinde were debated in the open Darbar, where charges and counter charges were levelled against each other. Ultimately Shinde's 'accounts were signed by the Peshwa, acknowledging a balance of five crores of rupees, as ready cash could not be obtained from the Poona Ministry, Shinde accepted a transfer of Peshwa's share of the conquests in Hindustan: It was also agreed that Shinde should have the sole management of affairs and the Peshwa government should furnish him with such troops as he may require for his future operation.' This agreement reflects the topsyturvy situation in the constitution of the confederacy, in respect of the relationship between central government and Sardar.

Unfortunately, Shinde died of fever on 17th February 1794 at Wanavadi near Poona. He was succeeded by his nephew Daulat Rao, a boy of 14 years of age.

273. Diary of Savai Madhavrao Peshwa, Part II.
274. P.K.C. Vol. II.
This was the last occasion when all the chiefs of Maratha confederacy acted in unison under the authority of Peshwa. After the death of Mahadji in February 1794, there was no individual who can challenge the supremacy of Nana Phadnis. The tripartite agreement between Nizam, Haider (Tipoo) and Peshwa had become meaningless. Tipoo's power was broken in 1792. Nizam tried to exploit the differences between Nana Phadnis and Mahadji Shinde by entering into secret correspondence with Shinde and bribing him with money to fan his rivalry. Shinde, however, had not done anything to encourage Nizam. Since 1782, Nizam was leaning heavily on the English for their support. After the war of 1792 with Tipoo, there were talks of perpetuating the alliance, giving protection to Nizam, which would have given him an opportunity to save his independence from Marathas. Taking into consideration the British policy towards native states (which was in the interest of the Company), the broken power of Mysore state, the death of Mahadji Shinde, time was opportune for Peshwa (i.e. Nana Phadnis) to press his demands about long standing arrears.

Activities of Nizam and the behaviour of Azam-ul-Umra had alienated many powers. The result was that no power was prepared to help Nizam.

War and Treaty of Kharda:

On 26th December 1794, Peshwa started with his armies
in the direction of Nizam's territory. All the important sardars had joined the Peshwa. 'Daulatrao Shinde was sent with an army on a campaign and presents of clothes and jewellery were made to him.' The Peshwa visited Tukoji Holkar at his tent. The battle between the two armies took place in the vicinity of Kharda. On 11th and 12th March, 1795 Nizam was completely defeated. He surrendered and submitted himself to a humiliating peace treaty. This treaty is important because some articles of this treaty reveal the objective, continuously cherished by the Chhatrapatis from Shivaji onwards and by the Peshwas. The peace treaty was concluded on 10th April, 1795. According to this treaty it was agreed that -

(a) The territory of Hindustan (North India) and south India is governed by the Emperor at Delhi. For the administration of this territory, he who possesses the authority (i.e. Peshwa) should govern the territory. In short every order of the Emperor must be carried out.

(b) In Deccan there should be no cow slaughter at all. Muslims should enjoy all the religious rights like Nimaz, Hoja, Bangsalbat etc.

275. Diary of Savai Madhavrao Peshwa, Part II.
276. "  "
277. Aitihasik Patravyavahar.
(c) Hindus and Muslims are both the children of God. While the people of both religions are observing the canons of their respective religions, it will be unjust on the part of the Muslims to create trouble to Hindus. Uptil Now, Hindus have never considered Muslim Pirs and Paigambar as something alien to them. Therefore, no Muslim should create any trouble to Hindu religion. Both should observe their respective religions without any obstruction to each other.

**Principles Underlying Treaty**

This important treaty reflects three important principles - (a) Legal sovereignty of the Mughal Emperor over all the powers of Hindustan, (b) Religious freedom to Hindus and Muslims alike, (c) Banning of cow slaughter - the cherished ideal of the Hindus.

Nizam ceded his territory worth 33 lakhs of Rupees annually and promised to pay Rs. 3 crores as war indemnity. Yet the 'victory of Kharda proved 'a dead sea fruit' as the terms of treaty were never fulfilled by the Nizam. The death of Savai Madhavrao Peshwa and the chaotic situation which followed ended ultimately in Peshwa signing the treaty of Bassein in 1802. The Maratha Quasi-federal State, really speaking ended in 1795. What remained afterwards was a caricature of plots and counter plots, looting and arson. Peshwa spent his time and property amongst dancers and singers and menial servants. What remains now is to narrate the
history in a few sentences. There was neither any ideal nor any political thought worth consideration. On 27th October 1795 Savai Madhavrao Peshwa died. His death brought the end of the regency of Nana Phadnis. The battle of Kharda was the last act in which Nana Phadinis's success can be seen. Nana Phadnis lost his power in 1796. He died in prison on 13th March 1800. Therefore, it will be correct to conclude that the battle of Kharda was fruitful only from the political point of view. From territorial and financial point of view, it was fruitless. Its significance lies only in bringing all the Maratha sardars, under one flag, for the last time in the history of Marathas.

From 1795 onwards, the period of confusion started. It will be dealt with in the next chapter.