Chapter IV

ARMS TRADE AND SECURITY
Security stands for the feeling or means of being secured and a right of protecting the homeland from the enemy's attack. For its accomplishment several means have been undertaken throughout the ages, arms acquisition being one of the most important means. In the medieval ages the security was not threatened so much as at present. There was non-existent of sophisticated weapons as the present day world witnesses. However, it cannot be denied that there was no arms transfer that time, but it was not a consistent feature as at present. So, since the dawn of the concept of security protection arms production is a well-known feature, but after the end of the Second World War the confrontation between the two Super Powers aggravated the fear of destruction by developing more and more sophisticated arms. Now the quality of the arms occupies a prominent place.

It is important that throughout the eighties there was no direct clash among the great powers. But the proxy wars brought tension and fear among the peace loving states. Instead of accelerating the pace of detente there was transfer of large scale arms to the developing countries and this way the great powers tried to show their strength and potential. This in turn threatened the congenial atmosphere of many Third World countries, retarded their economic growth and diverted attention from developing economy to destroying the opponent. In fact, in the initial years arms transfer to the third world was mainly from the US
side. Later other European powers jumped into the fray. France and Great Britain were confined mainly to the European powers and their colonies. The Soviet Union was already the most developed country among the WARSAW countries and concentrated its arms transfer to the communist countries and later to South Asia. So this strategy of the big powers was overshadowed by two broad factors. First, the ideological differences and Second, the economic and strategic considerations. They saw transfer of arms a convenient way of reducing their cost of production on arms and to correct their adverse balance of payment situation. It is noteworthy that in the eighties global military expenditure was almost doubled from the sixties. The United States spent around 300 billion dollar per annum in the mid eighties and the Soviet Union almost equal to the United States both of them accounting sixty percent of total global military expenditure. On the other hand, Third World countries has shown a four-fold increase in their defence expenditure.

After the loss of Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, America started prevailing upon some of the South-West Asian countries. So the strategic consensus of America focussed on South and South-West Asia for which Pakistan acquired significant position. The sheet anchor of American policy was to threat Soviet presence, but it
served dual purpose. The other one was to weaken India which had already started acquiring weapons from the Soviet Union. It is often considered that India was a Soviet ally and Pakistan as an American supporter. Being universally condemned as a strap to America, Pakistan had no option but to support American strategy in the region. But by acting upon America’s South-Asian plans Pakistan posed threat to India’s security. Apart from, Pakistan was not only supporting American strategy or acquiring weapons only to pose threat to India’s security but also it had indirect consequences in India. “From its very inception Pakistan had constituted a strong element in India’s security calculus not only because of the aggressions committed so often by Pakistan against us but because of the fundamental ideological contradiction of the two nation states. It was a clash of ideologies of a theocratic authoritarian state versus a liberal democratic secular state. US policies of supplying high technology weapon systems to it had been one of the major causes of friction between India and the US. US policies in pursuit of its strategic objectives unfortunately led Pakistan to acquire exceptional military capabilities. The power structure in Pakistan was dominated by a military-bureaucratic feudal elite, who had acquired a vested interests in propagating and sustaining an adversal
relationship with India in order to provide legitimacy to its own hold on the power structure. So it would be India's interests to establish stability and integrity, cooperation with Pakistan as this is conducive to Indian security interests also."¹

The acquisition of sophisticated military hardware by Pakistan introduced destabilisation in the Indian sub-continent. India differed with Pakistan's claim of gathering weapons was a right for her security interests. In fact, the large quantum of weapons Pakistan acquired far exceeded the requirements forced on it by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It was a threat to the regional security environment. "It also made Pakistan more and more recalcitrant and indifferent to the process of normalisation with India and Afghanistan".² For this purpose, the military budget of Pakistan also increased to unusualness. In this case the responsibility of the NATO cannot be ignored along with some of Third World countries who aggravated the worsened situation. "That was the result of the attempts to


break the equilibrium of forces that was established in the world and to impose its will upon people from the positions of military superiority".³

The Afghanistan problem remained in the main agenda of Indira Gandhi’s foreign policy which also determined India’s relations with the Super Powers. Of course the relations with the Super Powers did not start from a new slate but the developments before her entry to the Indian Parliament had impact in it. The Western powers were vehemently opposing the presence of Soviet army in Afghanistan. Whatever might be the terms and conditions of the Soviet-Afghan agreement, it was opposed because the Soviet troops threatened American interests in the region. On the other hand, it was implicit from the Soviet move that it was interested in checking American policy of creating more satellites in South-West Asia, even if undeclared. So the Afghan rebels were migrating to Pakistan because of Soviet invasion, some of them for replenishment of supplies of weapons. In this situation, America tried to prevail against Pakistan to encounter Soviet move. The US-Pakistan strategy started

giving military help to the rebels. The complex situation was a matter of concern for India. The immediate response of India was that it had no particular objection to Soviet invasion caused considerable embarrassment for the US. But later the Indian government clearly stated that all foreign troops should be vacated from Afghanistan and the country must be allowed to remain non-aligned. The foreign policy experts were surprised at the shifting stand of India on Afghanistan issue. The reason why India took such a stand was "perhaps the Indians did not believe that the Soviets would pull out of Afghanistan and their dependence on Moscow for advanced military hardware contributed to their reluctance to pressure the Soviets. Initially, some Pakistanis warned against Indo-Soviet attack, but Washington never accepted the argument. The American judgement was not that India would not help much on Afghanistan but that it would not be serious hindrance to either the effort to counter the Soviet forces or to Pakistani and American diplomatic activities." 4 The Soviet Union, to the contrary, opposed such a step of India which was expecting a pro-Soviet stand by the Government of India. But their differences on Afghanistan did not affect their bilateral relations at all. It was because of the fact that India was ready to expand Indo-

Soviet bilateral relations and the Soviet Union was equally willing to be a close ally with India. Once the mutuality of interests had been established and subsistent, the two countries made no secret to pursue their policies for optimum realisation. When the Afghan issue came to the floor of the United Nations the Indian envoy declared that, "India cannot look with equanimity on the attempts by some outside powers by training, arming and encouraging subversive elements in Afghanistan....We are against the presence of foreign troops and bases in the country.... The Soviet government has assured India that its troops went to Afghanistan at the request of the Afghan government and it will leave at Afghan government's request".5 Mrs. Gandhi also declared that the Soviet presence in Afghanistan would constitute a threat to India's security. She said that "there were no reason why Soviet Russia should do anything against India. But it was Pakistan who has acquired arms and power from America used against India"6 "The Government of India on the other hand condemned the US role in South Asia which had gripped it in danger. The Soviet move in Afghanistan was, therefore, a countermove to US action in the sub-continent. So it was powers like USA, China and

5. Times of India (New Delhi), 13 January 1980.
Pakistan those must be blamed, not the Soviet Union". However, India, as Indira Gandhi declared, was not happy with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and urged the USSR to take its troops away from Afghanistan.

War, in any form, was not beneficial for the economic development and for that reason it should be avoided. "The best way to win war was to prevent it. That is why India had been trying so hard for peace. That was also the rationale behind India's policy in Afghanistan". The BJP was opposed to presence of a foreign military presence in the soil of another non-aligned country. The party urged the Government of India to take positive initiative in this matter. "It hoped that the non-aligned nations could make a move in finding a solution which would bring moral pressure on the Russians to vacate the aggression, the military occupation of Afghanistan. Of course, America was pumping more arms to Pakistan. The Americans seemed to be bungling in their foreign policy, so far as they assessed India's need

need and Pakistan's need to be equal". 10 The Bharatiya Janata Party stressed that "Pakistan ought to understand that the threat to its security posed by the presence of Soviet troops just beyond the khyber pass could not be met simply by trying to grab arms and armaments. India too must realise that it is in India's own interests that there should be strong and stable Pakistan between India and the USSR as a buffer state. The government of India should take an initiative to overcome the setback in our relations with Pakistan. In the fast deteriorating situation, India alone could play a meaningful role if it expressed itself clearly and unhesitatingly against any encroachment upon the freedom of nations, any violation of frontiers and any interference in the internal affairs of other peoples".11

In 1981, the United States announced the reduction of developmental assistance to India by 8.5 billion dollars. On the other hand it started exporting lethal weapons to Pakistan in pursuance with its West Asian and Indian Ocean policy. Table 5 shows that Pakistan received highest military aid from the US than other South Asian countries. The sale

10. The speeches of Mahavir Bhai, the BJP M.P. in Rajya Sabha, see Rajya Sabha Debates, vol.CXV, No.11, 6 August 1980, cols. 339-49.

11. See the Text of the Presidential Address by Shri A.B.Vajpayee delivered at the 1st National Convention of the Party held at Samata Nagar in Bombay on 28-30 December 1980, p.20.
of F-16 aircrafts, Vulcan Phalanx air defence systems, guns to be mounted on destroyers and harpoon anti-missiles ships were items that indeed caused consternation. The Indian ambassador in the US conveyed India's concerns over American supply of war items to Pakistan. The subsequent meetings between the two heads of government was also preoccupied with this problem.

The AICC reiterated its commitment of friendship with all our neighbours and urged that the process of normalisation of relations with Pakistan should be accelerated. "The AICC strongly opposed any effort in creating instability in the sub-continent through massive US arms aid to Pakistan".12 In the view of the BJP "the US arms assistance to Pakistan was based on faulty prognosis. From Turkey, through Saudi Arabia to Pakistan, the US was creating a cornedon sanitaire in its attempts at containment of USSR. It viewed any massive supply of arms as contributory to a heightening of tension in this region. The BJP believed firmly that the peace, security and progress of the region lay in friendship between India and Pakistan".13 In such a totality when threat to our peace and security was obvious, the Indian government was urged to lodge strong pro-


test against such developments which posed serious threat to our unity and integrity. "So defence build-up was considered as a priority to our security".14 "The country's defence preparedness would not achieve the required degree of self-reliance until the defence production base is widened. The BJP expressed its concern at the low level of expenditure in defence build-up. Even the low level of investment was not bearing fruit because of inefficiency and corruption in some of our defence laboratories".15

Being attacked from several quarters on the performance of the Congress Party and mainly on our defence area, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi reacted sharply. She was aware of the fact that building of defence industries at the behest of developmental efforts would not give tangible results. She realised that through the gift of armaments, the centre of decision and policy-making would have moved out of our hands. In her words."In the early years, we had neither resources, nor the desire to get entangled in the rivalries and conflicts of the blocs and their war preparations. The gigantic proportions of our problems needed our total attention. Only in conditions of peace could we concentrate on development. A small country could and some did achieve growth through large scale aid. For us, self-reliant devel-


15. See Resolutions of the BJP, n.13, p.23.
development was not only desirable but it was the only possible way".16 The number and size of the armed forces does not determine the strength of a nation, not even the possession of sophisticated weapons. But the real strength lays how far a nation brings all her resources to utilise in case of a war. Further, the state of defence preparedness of a nation has great bearing on her ability to prosecute an independent policy in foreign affairs during peace time. The Indian government was worried of its ability in development and production capability of a combat aircraft. It was a matter of satisfaction that the defence research and development laboratories had made spectacular progress in tank technology and took up steps to develop Guided Missiles Systems. Other scientific institutions also extended their help to the DRDO in attaining self-reliance in our defence field. "The armour developed by the Defence Metallurgical Research Laboratory, Hyderabad, was designed to withstand anti-tank weapons providing a very high degree of immunity to the tank. A totally indigenous and an extremely accurate

gun which can fire FSAPDS and HESH Ammunition was also developed by ARDE, Pune. The Instruments Research and Development Establishment, Dehra Dun, had developed fire control system incorporating stabilised sight for the gunner, panoramic sight for the commander and low light level television for navigation to provide high first round hit probability. The aim of the government, therefore, was to organise a well founded indigenous defence science and technology base which could respond adequately to rapidly evolving needs".17

Defence preparedness was a constant friction between the government and the opposition. No doubt, there was no laxity to safeguard the sovereignty of India against external threats. In this direction the Indian government showed alertness in preparing our army, navy and air force to meet the threats of advanced countries across our border. " All aspects of defence preparedness had been reviewed including the strengthening of our defence against enemy air-raids, importing strategic installations and such other measures as were warranted by sudden escalation in the threat environment. As a long term measure, government was involved in perspective planning in regard to defence needs with proper balance between manpower, equipment and facilities for the most cost effective defence management and to maintain full

defence preparedness at all times. The department of defence supplies placed orders on indigenous items. Supplies were received in 3989 cases of the total value of Rs. 58.93 crores during the year 1980-81 and 1656 items of the value of Rs.31.53 crores during the year 1981-82. The value of purchases from small sector by Mazagaon Decks Limited and GSL during 1980-81 amounted to Rs.350 lakhs and Rs.20 lakhs respectively".18 Though the total value of military sales from the USSR to India was not published, yet it was estimated to be more than sixty percent of the total military imports by India. This degree of dependence on Soviet Union made both the countries to be linked strategically more than any other field. There were several reasons why India chose Soviet Union in this field. The main cause was perhaps the low price of the items. Besides, the credit terms available, subsidy granted and the payment in soft currency encouraged India to explore relationship with the Soviet Union. Again the Soviet Union allowed India to produce Soviet designed weapons under licence. This helped India to produce arms and equipment in her domestic factories.

Clearly the United States' relationship with Pakistan

offered best opportunity to the latter for her security programme. But Indira Gandhi did not allow Indo-American ties to go out of hand. It was realised that without American aid India could not be able to achieve a self-sufficient economy and, therefore, India was reported to have established rapport with America. In pursuance of this approach, Indira Gandhi visited Washington in 1982. She explained India's stand on Afghanistan and also conveyed India's apprehension over the US supply of arms to Pakistan. The United States agreed to the Indian need for increased external assistance to maintain the pace of development. Thus, while the convergence between India and the United States remained over many political and strategic issues, the economic relationship continued to improve. In 1982 India was the second largest trading partner of the US. So, India's primary concern being economic development and to realise it, the Indian government thought it proper to maintain cordiality with both the Super Powers. In a hostile regional environment with many delicate problems to be handled India did not want the relationship to be uneven. Her long cherished policies of maintaining independence and autonomous capacity in making decisions was also maintained and cordial relations with the Super Powers were continued and good will of the Super Powers retained.
The Government of India was really concerned with the Super Power rivalry leading to confrontation among the South-Asian countries. "It was believed that if conscious efforts were not taken to make an end to superpower rivalry and arrangements were not made then the South Asian countries would go under foreign hegemony". A.B. Vajpayee argued in the Lok Sabha that, "We should be prepared for any type of danger. We should be vigilant about our security and integrity. But this does not mean that we should create an atmosphere of suspicion and fear. Each nation, after all, should endeavour to settle the dispute amicably". He regretted that the government was not enough vigilant towards these points. The BJP had all along stood for and reiterated its commitment to improve bilateral relations with the neighbouring countries. "Regional cooperation was a logical corollary to a policy of peace with neighbours. India could convincingly espouse the cause of detente abroad only by actively working for it nearer home. Personal rapport between leaders could cement relationships, but what was urgently needed was an institutionalised understanding of what each country stood for. The BJP urged Pakistan that it should give up forever the


path of conflict with India. It must realise that mere acquisition of weapons would not give security and the raising of bilateral issues in international forums would not normalise relations".21

The Reagan Administration considered India and Pakistan in equal in the spheres of arms strength. Though it never made any cataclysmic statement against India, on the contrary inspired Pakistan to pursue an aggressive posture. Thus, a series of offers were made in favour of India to seal off past divergences. Offer of super computers, weapon systems, fighter air crafts and defence technology were made in this connection. While Pakistan got massive aid all it wanted to get, India got supply to counter Pakistani military build up by the traditional ones. President Reagan clarified his position that the weapons of Pakistan would not be used against India, which could not satisfy the Indian government. In contrast, the Soviet Union desired to see a friendly and strong India, with capability to meet the challenges of the West. In reality both the Soviet Union and India wanted to develop an atmosphere free from security threat. A mutual cooperation, peaceful co-existence and healthy competition could create a peaceful world. So they

were against all types of sophisticated weapons to protect
the humanity from mass annihilation. The Soviet Union
highly valued India's contribution to peaceful international
community and the constructive initiative taken by India.
It is noteworthy to state that the USSR had also desire to
see a peaceful and violence free Asia. Security in Asia was
of vital importance to the Soviet foreign policy. In this
context, the Soviet leaders stated that Asian-Pacific re-
gional security must be attained so that all nations could
act freely. Instead of joining in hostile camps and invit-
ing mutual bickerings, free association of all nations based
on the fundamental principle of peaceful co-existence seemed
to be the guiding factor of Soviet foreign policy. It was
the Soviet Union who shared India's views on Pakistan's at-
tempt to gain military supremacy over India. It was because
of Western apathy towards India, that its defence prepared-
ness suffered heavily for a long time. Both the US and
Britain were reluctant to provide military weapons even at
higher prices. So India quickly turned towards Soviet Union
and later Soviet assistance helped India to develop modern
arms and equipment. For instance, Vijayanta tank was de-
signed and built due to Soviet supply of necessary technolo-
gy. So whenever India wanted any type of help; economic,
political and military, the Soviet Union extended her hands
without superimposing herself in any manner. The Soviet
assistance in ship building industry can not be ignored
likewise.
It was not that India and Pakistan had difference and they did not strive for solving those divergencies. In 1983 Pakistan’s relations with India took a somewhat different path. Both of them accused each other of creating tension in other’s territory. However, Indian and Pakistani foreign secretaries expressed the desire of their respective governments to live in peace and cooperation. Pakistan agreed that Kashmir could now be covered in a no-war pact between the two countries. The Pakistani statement showed a sign of improvement in their bilateral relations.

The Soviet observers carefully noted the exchange of political and military visits between Pakistan, USA and China. It maintained that China and America were secretly acquiring base facilities in Gwadar and other points on Pakistan’s Baluch coast in the Arabian Sea. Pakistan had a key role to play in the operation of the US Rapid Deployment Force. On the other hand China sought access to the Indian Ocean via the backdoor of Karakoram Highway. In such an environment Moscow seemed to be the only reliable friend of India. Indeed, "the top Soviet leaders repeated Moscow’s anxiety to see India’s defence capabilities further improved".22 But the Soviet Union did not take measures to

fulfill Indian needs. It was felt that Soviet strategic assistance was not conducive to Indian interests. It was observed that "complete reliance upon Russia for military imports has done us damage. With more and more ties with the Soviet Union our foreign policy lost its flexibility. The worst that has happened is that supplies from the Soviets have not been accompanied by full indigenisation techniques. The West on the other hand came forward with handsome terms".23 The US had always been more willing to sell arms. George Schultz told the Indian press that "misunderstandings about Indian purchase of US arms had been removed and that the US was prepared to sell military hardware to India".24

Negotiations and preliminary agreements on arms deal between India and the United States were under discussion in 1983. Though India was in need of artillery guns, the Indian policy makers realised that the United States had feared that any technology transfer to India would lead to a leakage to Moscow. "Indian defence analysts believed that neither of the superpowers would give a country defence technology unless there was a convergence of strategic interests

24. Organiser, 10 July 1983, p.3.
energy and water resources. In June, the Soviet Union agreed to help India in extracting oil from Gujarat belt. The foreign minister of the Soviet Union, Gromyko declared that "the Indo-Soviet relations have stood the test of time and could establish peace in Asia and in the whole world. He expressed that Soviet Union would continue to strengthen the Indo-Soviet relations further".27 When Dr. Ramanna visited Moscow, the Soviet Union agreed to assist in setting up two atomic power plants in India.28

From the perspective of US attempts to establish its hegemony over the world, a nation even if non-communist and non-aligned had to consider the interests of the United States. Moreover the American activities of apotheosisation of America was understandably a policy of Soviet containment. Any power refused to come under the influence of any Super Power had to face serious economic and strategic constraints. The occasional rally of Third World countries to stay away from the Western world weakened their position. So the regional powers had to follow the lines of the big powers for the sake of their higher interests. As for example, Pakistan looked for military aid not only because Pakistan wanted to contain India but also she needed

27. Pravda (Moscow), June 17, 1983.
economic development. Russia was not a comfortable partner for Pakistan as India was a close ally of the USSR. On the other hand USA wanted Pakistan to play a proxy role in the Indian sub-continent. So Pakistan followed the directions of the Reagan Administration. As a result it received military and economic aid. India on the other hand depended on the USSR as the Soviet Union's interests coincided with that of India. The Soviet Union fully respected India's progressive democratic principles and independent foreign policy. It had never compelled us to toe the Soviet line in the international affairs. Rather it wanted to see a prosperous, self-reliant and strong India and helped it in this direction. In fact, the United States did not recognise India's importance and status in South Asia nor it allowed her to emerge as a power in the sub-continent. The balance of power that existed in South Asia was well suited to American policy. So the US did not want to disturb it. As a result the Reagan Administration remained absolutely adamant on arming Pakistan at an accelerating rate. What disturbed the American administration was that whenever the US expected, India refused to fall in its scheme despite all pressures. It was also believed that the US aid was aimed to be used as a political lever against India. On that account India also refused to lay aside her independent foreign policy. It was Pakistan which got massive aid because it acted as an US satellite and
Washington by all means used Islamabad to its advantage. And on Pakistani side, it had become able to acquire lead in some sector of sophisticated weapons due to the US aid.

It can be stated that in many ways Pakistani became the central point of contrary between India and USA. "Washington found the Pakistani connection more valuable than the friendship of non-aligned India. It had been the United States efforts all along to retain Pakistan as an ally, against whom was a subsidiary question. The alliance with Pakistan was useful first against the Soviet Union and then against both Soviet Union and China. But the fact cannot be washed away that this connection provided to Washington a useful lever of pressure against India". 29 "There was also regional factor that influenced the pace of change in American policy. The Indian and Pakistani bureaucracies treated Americans in very different ways and Americans, especially those not very familiar with the region, responded accordingly. Representatives, bureaucrats, journalists and politicians routinely received red-carpet treatment in Islamabad and met with officials several grades above their own level. This contrasted sharply with the cool, indifferent and sometimes outright hostile treatment in New Delhi of

Americans who were not certified friends of India. Pakistan even had good ties with important Gulf states that were friendly to Washington and may have served as a conduit to American approaches to Iran. Moreover, India's performance at the United Nations and its shrill attacks on modest American additions to Islamabad's arsenals made it seem highly unlikely to American policy.  

The BJP opposed any exclusivity to Super Powers' interests in South Asia. It was committed to the concept of peace with the neighbours. In its view "an enduring peace on the sub-continent can only be achieved through the process of improving bilateral relations. In that context, the institution of a joint Indo-Pakistani commission was to be welcomed. The BJP was of the view that Pakistan must not rooted in the prejudices of the past. It must abjure the established pattern of overarming and of commenting on India's internal affairs. A mutual agreement between our two countries about non-use of force can no longer be put aside. Therefore, the BJP urged the government for an early conclusion of a comprehensive treaty of peace and friendship with Pakistan."  

that the contention of American government for the supply of Harpoon Missiles to Pakistan was appeasable. The American administration assured that those weapons would not be used against India. Even after the assurance it was realised that if those arms are utilised against India, America would find itself either helpless or unwilling to check Pakistan from doing so. So "it was not a major question of one Harpoon Missile that was given to Pakistan. Pakistan would get supplies from somewhere. Problem was we have to replenish our own stock, to start with our own competence, development of our own competence, to equip ourselves militarily for our defence". 32

While endeavouring to cope with these development effectively, India continued her efforts for peace and friendship with Pakistan. The AICC (I) hoped that "the Government of Pakistan would realise that peace, friendship and cooperation with India was in the interest of stability in the region". 33 "The Congress Party urged all the patriotic forces in the country to realise the threat being posed to the security of India by large-scale induction of arms to Pakistan. India had no aggressive designs towards any


33. Resolutions passed in the AICC meetings held in Bombay on 20th-21st October, 1983, p.22.
country. The Congress government was committed to policy of peace and friendship with all countries and believed that the Pakistan government would reciprocate India's sincere desire which would contribute to stability in the entire region".34

In 1984 the Indo-American relations were at their lowest ebb. Starting from 1st October till the brutal assassination of Indira Gandhi both India and USA attacked each other on major international issues. For the US, India was creating imbalance in the sub-continent by opting for production and acquisition of arms. India, too, criticised American policy of containment. Importantly, the US patronage to the Sikh extremists and her continued supply of arms to Pakistan slid down their bilateral relations. Yakub Khan visited Washington towards the second week of October 1984. In his visit he asked United States for AWACS and Hawkeye, a high-flying plane and F-16 fighter bombers. India urged the United States to consider Pakistani demand for more sophisticated weapons as it carried danger of arms conflict in the sub-continent. Pakistan also showed her eagerness to acquire nuclear weapons on the ground that India was planning to attack Pakistani nuclear

installations. However, India outrightly rejected such an allegation. Moreover, what displeased India was the American ambassador Deane Hinton's statement projecting India as an aggressor. Mrs. Gandhi accused USA for arms supply to Pakistan. It was an American attempt to bring more states under its control. The Anglo-American attempt to bring more base facilities along the coasts so that it could meet Soviet threat. So the Anglo-imperialistic attempt in the Indian sub-continent to create a hostile atmosphere attracted the attention of the non-aligned countries. The non-aligned countries unanimously condemned US action which directly aimed against India and Soviet Union. They also alleged Reagan administration for its overlook to the UN decisions that the Mariana islands be declared independent where the US was building new military base. Thus the entire world saw the danger of escalated cold war. The Indian Peninsula was totally unsafe and threatened. In the context of Anglo-imperialist menace the Soviet Union expressed her anxiety. It was significant that Moscow showed her willingness to transfer Soviet technology and Soviet arms. In his visit to India, the Soviet defence Minister Marshal Ustinov said that "the Soviet Union regards with understanding the striving of the Indian government to strengthen country's defence capability. We want to see friendly India strong, non-aligned state struggling for peace. The time is not far-off when a space flight of a
joint Soviet-Indian crew will be made. It will open another facet of close and friendly relations between our two countries and our two peoples".35 Marshal Ustinov in an agreement with India agreed to supply the improved version of MIG-31 to India which was considered to be superior to F-16 aircrafts. The Soviet Union also agreed to supply advanced technology aircraft to Indian Air Force and latest sensing systems to increase the capabilities of sight, surveillance and detection of naval ships. Both sides also agreed to increase the capability of Indian navy to meet threat in the Indian Ocean. To counter the US militarisation of the Indian Ocean, Moscow had agreed to upgrade operational capability of Indian navy. Simultaneously, the Indian Air Force acquired MI-25 helicopter gunships which had capability to carry a crew of eight fully equipped troops and 1275 kilograms of bomb weight. The Soviet Union also agreed to supply AN-32 aircraft and giant tactical transport aircraft submarines IL-76 by the end of 1984, new surface-to-air missiles, supply of T-80 tanks and importantly MIG -29 aircraft which had fighting capability like F-16 aircrafts.

It is clearly evident from table 3 that huge money was being spent for military preparedness. The Third World

countries were acquiring more and more weapons due to their mutual suspicion and hatredness. Besides the Middle-East countries, the two South Asian countries India and Pakistan were also diverting their economy towards military budgets. The Super Powers were investing their capital to produce more and more sophisticated weapons. The argument is valid on the ground that the money could have been utilised for the developmental activities of the Third World. To examine the argument on the other angle "the key elements in the Indian decision to accept MIG-29 was the realization that an Indian produced supersonic aircraft for the 1990s would simply be not available. France, though highly desirable as a weapons supplier, is a medium sized power and hence was unable to match the credit terms of a superpower and India had resource constraints together with the goal of self-reliance".36 And acceptance of military aid was unavoidable for her security interests. Likewise, Pakistan also did not find any logic to halt arms acquisition as India was interested to increase its defence capability. That is why India opted for Soviet arms and Pakistan for US weapons.

But the Indo-Soviet cooperation testified time-tested friendship. It came more successful than the US-Pakistan

alliance. The Soviet Union showed her willingness to help India in checking terrorist activities in Punjab. The Western press, however, narrated this cooperation in a different way. Moreover, they remarked that the Indo-Soviet military cooperation would be detrimental to peace and nuclear free South-Asia. The Western imperialists characterised it as an attempt of the communists to contend India so that it could use India to its advantage. India rejected the plea for the Soviet Union had never put any hurdle to its aid programme. To the contrary, the Indo-Soviet military cooperation was a defensive arrangement to counter the US strategy. Preservation of security was of utmost importance to India and in the face of US-Pakistan military threat India had no option but to go for Soviet arms. Inspite of acquiring sophisticated arms India had not shown any desire of threatening Pakistan’s security. In the midst of constant danger India always appealed to Pakistan to settle their bilateral differences through mutual negotiations instead of inviting the Super Powers to intervene. At the same time it would be wrong not to consider Pakistan’s concern on India’s strength on nuclear weapons. So it was Pakistan which showed hostile attitude than the US and so it adopted Israeli type of activities by indulging itself in state terrorism by arming and training to the Afghan rebels and the sikhs extremists. However, the strong hands of the CIA were already there. It was only India’s security
alertness that avoided any serious attack on India. The Anglo-imperialists' abortive attempts were frustrated. Thereby, United States always wanted to keep back India in every possible way. That was the reason why India's sincere and serious requests against American military aid to Pakistan was not considered seriously.

It was a fact that the Pakistani army had been deployed on our border. Pakistan had also taken up a programme of development of roads and other infrastructure close to our border. Pakistani troops had also been resorting to firing across the line of control. Violations of our air space by Pakistani aircraft were also not uncommon. Inspite of all these developments India had been exercising utmost restraints and preserving our policy of peace with Pakistan. In such a situation, the BJP leader Shri Jaswant Singh spoke about his party's position. He said that the BJP expressed concern about Pakistan's massive arms acquisitions and threatening our security. He added, "The real danger we are facing is not an Indo-Pakistan situation developing on account of want of incentives. But the real danger we are facing is the introduction, is the importation in our region of the concept of proxy wars. If we, India and Pakistan, become an instrument of superpower conflict or the superpowers policies being played therein as agencies of the superpowers interests, then we will be committing grave ill and a
grave crime to the peoples of both these nations".37 "For that purpose, the BJP urged for a South Asian Regional Summit, which would ensure its independent, non-aligned status without any outside intervention or interference".38 The Indian government also realised that our security preparedness "must be from all sides of this vast sub-continent, not only from land borders but also from our long shore line. That is why India must be self-reliant in defence production, because to give our people not just the security but the knowledge that they could live secure. For this the Indian government was prepared to use its own inventives and also to learn the knowledge and the researches garnered from all other parts of the world".39 The Super Powers wanted harmony between India and Pakistan as long as it served their interests. For example, the United States wanted concord so that it could face Soviet Union and China; on the other hand Soviet Union supported friendly relations among the South Asian countries to challenge the U.S. hegemony in


this region. "So the dire necessity is that if we cannot ignore superpowers interests we should consider our amity with reference to our own interests, not with reference to the interests of any external power including the course of the superpowers". Therefore, the BJP urged "to pursue a policy of peace, friendship and cooperation with neighbouring countries, to reestablish India's Asian identity emphasising on a policy of constructive cooperation in South and South-East Asia. Moreover, the BJP declared to resolve the social and political turmoil in strategically sensitive border states. To the BJP, internal cohesiveness and a united and determined national will was the foundation of a nation's defence preparedness". So the real challenge to our foreign policy lay in the success of our diplomacy in Islamabad, Kathmandu, Colombo and Dhaka and not the capitals of big powers. Through sensitive and patient diplomacy, we could slow down the extravagant militarism in the sub-continent, we could carry greater credibility in urging detente, disarmament and international social justice".

After the assassination of Mrs. Gandhi, the Congress

40. Organiser, 14 October 1984, pp.5-6.


government again emerged under the leadership of Rajiv Gandhi. Rajiv Gandhi's accession to power, however, did not premonish any radical changes in the foreign policy of India. His vision of leading India into the 21st century without much reliance on foreign capital was an astounding task. His pragmatic approach for rapid industrialisation and technological development was considered to be a commendable task. At the beginning the Soviet Union seemed to be slightly suspicious about this Indian effort. The Soviet suspicion was that India might go to West for transfer of technical knowledge and massive aid package. Though the Indo-soviet strong bond of relations continued to be dominated in the foreign policy approach of Rajiv Gandhi, his economic policies inevitably led India closer to the Western countries. While retaining the traditional Indo-soviet relations, India found no contradiction of entering into the West, particularly to the United States. Despite the differences on America's supply of military weapons to Pakistan and divergence on Afghanistan issue, the newly elected Indian Prime Minister opened the door for a better relationship with the United States.

Pakistan also showed its interest in aligning itself with the United States. The Indian Ocean littoral countries like Philippines, Indonesia and other countries of the SEATO
group, too, showed their spontaneous feeling of a fear of India's domination and they were also supporting the United States. In all cases, they had their economic stakes behind supporting the US policies. They wanted rapid economic growth and thereby ingress of dollar was valuable for them. Since its inception Pakistan served as a link between Central Treaty Organisation and the South East Asian Treaty Organisation, even if it did not join the groups. Despite the rapidly changing political and strategic environment in the eighties, Pakistan continued to minister to US strategy. The Shimla spirit has survived but its virility has been lost over the years. To the contrary, India is still guided by her policy of non-alignment and the famous 'Panchasheel' still proves its potency for India. Thus, it appeared that Pakistan's fear of India's policies would not come to a halt unless there was radical transformation of United States' policies in South Asia. "Unlike the 1950s and the 1960s, US power politics in India-USA relations was no longer tempered by a tinge of idealism. In the 1950s, however, though the United States armed Pakistan, US policy-makers repeatedly said that for them India was equally important and extended to it large economic aid. In the 1980s, they had repeatedly stated in unequivocal fashion that India no longer needed concessional borrowings from the IDA and the IMF. Initially, the United States pursued its power politics while at the same time economically aiding India. But
in the eighties, it was power politics simple and pure. The change in attitude was because India was fast building itself as a major power comparable to China. Hence there was the unstated purpose of limiting India's power, especially when it was perceived to be leaning towards the Soviet Union".  

Although the United States showed her willingness to discuss Indian requirements on arms assistance, and economic aid, nothing came out of it because of Indian reservations on the standard of US contract. For instance, the US refused to release night sights for TOW. The Indian inhibition was clearly demonstrated when Rajiv Gandhi expressed his insensitiveness on US arms supply. He said that "He did not visualise any defence deals because of US undependability".

So both India and the United States found barriers in their bilateral relationship. At the same time they did not show any direct confrontation also. So both of them were pursuing double-track policy. The United States did not let down Indo-American relations, rather it encouraged Indian government for its independent and non-aligned status. It did not show eagerness to supply military hardware to India.


but on the other hand could not ignore American interest of developing good relations with India as the later provided market for US products. It also did not stop military aid to Pakistan but continued to state that it would not create threat to India's security. India, on the other hand, did not want to sacrifice her independent course of action but sought American aid for its military build-up. It was a well known fact that the US would not change her policy towards Pakistan. So India had nothing to do but to put certain limitation to it. India could not ignore Soviet Union's aid at crucial juncture but also could not put aside America's higher technology export to India. On the other hand, from the American side they "were trying to buy time from India for the Pakistani military regime at a time when there growing expectations of the Pakistani people that the Indians should help to overthrow their warlords and restore human rights and democracy. The western countries were also quite active in keeping India worried on Sri Lankan front so that India could not retaliate against Pakistani sabotage in the north-west". 45 " In the immediate neighbourhood of South Asia, India's policy was directed towards promoting mutual trust and extending cooperation. India was determined to resolve problems with the countries on the basis of mutual respect, sovereign equality and friendship. It was

on India’s interests as well as the interests of the region that the South Asian countries should work together and build up relationship based on equality, mutual respect, benefit and non-interference and non-intervention. More importantly, India sought cordial and cooperative relations with Pakistan on the bases of sovereignty, equality, non-interference and mutual benefit.46 "Pakistan was also equally hopeful of cordial relations with India and other neighbouring countries. Particularly with India, Pakistan reaffirmed that there would no weakening of efforts to develop a relationship of mutual trust and confidence. Pakistan reiterated that it was not in competition with India in an arms race and the arms it acquired was meant to achieve partial replacement of its obsolete defence equipment. Rather it showed willingness to grasp the hand of friendship that India extended for establishing good neighbourly relations."47

A special place was held by the Soviet Union’s and Indian efforts in the same spirit to reduce the threats of


arms race. The Indo-Soviet relations were marked by the desire of peaceful co-existence and both India and the USSR worked on those lines for stronger peace and security of the mankind. "Before an irreversible situation created the Soviet Union urged all peace loving states to raise their voice against the new danger, the danger that brought the world to the threshold of a new spiral in the arms race".48 The basic consideration of India's foreign policy was to develop very close relationship with the USSR. The USSR had shown its desire of establishing good relations with India over many decades. Looking at the satisfactory progress of Indo-Soviet relations the AICC (I) remarked that "the most significant feature of Soviet attitude towards India was their emphasis on continued good relations and hoped that their relationship would continue in the mutual interests of both countries".49

On the other hand, during Reagan-Rajiv era the Indo-American relations entered the phase of increased misgivings and mistrust. The U.S. administration was not worried if India's security would be endangered by US-Pakistan alliance. "Also the US was not serious of India's


49. Resolutions passed in the AICC Meetings held in Delhi on 4th and 5th May 1985, AICC(I) Publication, pp.21-22.
apprehensions that the US encouragement of Pakistan and other neighbours of India had resulted in a virtual encirclement of India".50 The main thrust of U.S. policy in South Asia was to weaken India. "The idea of projecting India as one of the many South Asian Countries which should busy themselves with development was part of the U.S. policy to neutralise India in some manner or the other".51 As a leading American editor observed, "the Americans were unusually itchy about India and found it more irritating than many other countries with which the United States also had substantive differences. Moreover, the United States had incorrectly defined its interests in South Asia on the basis of an increasingly outdated assessment of India's power potential. As a result, there was growing possibility that American policies would lead India to identify its geopolitical interests more strongly with those of the Soviet Union, posing serious dangers for the United States. In particular, a hostile Indian navy, possible nuclear armed, could greatly complicate American use of the United States Navy's 850 million dollar base complex at Diego Garcia as well as other aspects of American military


The United States was not supporting India's policy of non-alignment. India proclaimed that it was a true champion of the non-aligned movement. The Soviet Union supported India's non-aligned status and tried to show that it was a natural ally of India, while the United States wanted India to be more inclined towards the West. India, to the contrary, in various non-aligned conferences condemned US actions in South Asia. Perhaps this stand of the Government of India dissatisfied America and thereby the US administration tilled towards Pakistan and tried to project the latter more militarily stronger than India in South Asia.

On the other hand, "Unlike our defence deals with the West which were largely in the nature of outright purchase, the Soviet cooperation had by and large helped in indigenous defence production. It appeared that the extent of mutual confidence between the two countries was such that there was no nagging insistence on safeguards against transfer of technology as one had to encounter in any deal for strategically sensitive items, the kind of safeguards the U.S."

insisted upon".53 "Since the Soviet Union's dominant concern was to weaken the military alliances which the US and Western Powers were building around its borders, it countered this by pursuing a policy of arms transfer involving support to the non-aligned movement, liberation movement and countries asserting independence vis-a-vis the western alliance system like SEATO and CENTO. This served two purposes-undermining Western influence and at least neutralising the neutrals, if not winning friends".54 Gorbachev praised India's contribution to the struggle for peace and security in Asia and the whole world. He declared that the "friendship and cooperation between the USSR and India and their commitment to peace was an important factor in preserving life on earth".55 The Soviet leader shared India's concern about Pakistan's acquisition of atomic weapons. He reaffirmed that "Soviet Union had great respect for India and it would support India in case of any need"56, even in the event of conflict between New Delhi and its neighbours.57

57. The Muslim (Lahore), 12 November 1985.
India's relations with the neighbouring countries started deteriorating after Rajiv Gandhi assumed power. With Pakistan our relations was so unpleasant that Pakistan started differing with India in international as well as bilateral issues. To add fuel to fire Pakistan started encouraging terrorist activities in the border states of India. The Bhartiya Janata Party held the view that "a logical corollary of those hostile actions was dependent on India's diplomatic steps to discipline Islamabad. But the government had neither will nor the vision to take any effective action".58 In such a totality when there was large scale military exercises, it was meant to weaken India because India had to divert her resources from economic development to military awareness. It was not alone Pakistan that India had to contend with, but it was the force behind Pakistan that had to be tackled, i.e., the US strategic consensus which aimed to build Pakistan a militarily strong nation".59

India, a truly non-aligned state, was following the principles of the non-alignment as guiding factors of its


foreign policy. The Indo-Soviet relations improved observing the principles of non-alignment. "The reasons for Soviet support was based neither on formal alliance nor on ideological-political affinity. Soviet Indian relations were clearly based on realistic recognition of each other's capabilities, on enlightened mutual interests and on the hard-headed premises of international interdependence and international co-existence. Experience of national life and world affairs had confirmed for both the countries the basic validity of their policy premised toward each other. Its most outstanding attribute had been that it had never been focussed against any other country deliberately, notwithstanding however inevitable fall out of any policy projection as an unavoidable corollary due to the inter-meshing of international politics".60 The Indo-Soviet relations reflected the role of Soviet Union and India in world affairs and their moral right to save the world. "Their relations based on freedom, equality and non-violence and was a major contribution for peaceful world order".61 The Delhi Declaration was described as a historic document, a truly extraordinary document. The Rear-Admiral Pushkin pointed out

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that "a nuclear war can not be won. The Delhi Declaration representing the interest of people everywhere should be heard also everywhere. There was no other way to peace".  

To the contrary, the policies of the United States had been motivated to limit India's role and influence in the region. The United States was aware of India's growing strength and power that it had acquired. So it was feared that India would dominate the developing states of South Asia which was inimical to American interests. It was an established fact that India was not as much close to the US as Pakistan was, so the United States opposed India's actions in a number of cases. In fact, the US contention was far from reality. India had no intention of playing as a dominant state in the region nor was it capable enough to thwart US actions in the sub-continent. The American interests were no doubt hostile to those of the Indians as it were projected by the critics. Occasional frictions overshadowed their bilateral meetings because of America's global equation. The South Asian region was of much importance to the United States. So also it was highly vulnerable to other outside powers. The Soviet Union was equally attracted to this region what the United States could not allow. Any other attempt was acceptable other than to see a  

Soviet dominated South Asia. This was perhaps the fundamental flaw in Indo-American relationship. On important global and transregional issues both India and the United States found themselves at odds while Indian policies converged with the USSR. The Government of India showed its enthusiasm on disarmament issues. It appealed all the powers for disarmament and for establishing a peaceful world order. So the alignment between India and the USSR demonstrated unity on a variety of issues. India shared Soviet concern that the Indian sub-continent would turn to a battle-field if the United States did not show any interest in that matter. The Indian perception was that the US could not able to manage the South Asian security and integrity. So instead of blaming India or the USSR, the US should encourage the regional countries to solve their bilateral problems. And the countries of South Asia would come for an understanding and could play satisfactory role in international fora, if they are allowed to determine their future by themselves. On the other hand, India persuaded Pakistan and other countries of the region of not entrusting them to the outsiders who were least concerned of their progress and development.

No doubt the Reagan Administration was interested to forge closer ties with India as it expected India to be a major military partner of the United States. It also showed
its willingness to export military hardware to India. Sometimes, both sides made significant steps in overcoming their divergencies and Indo-American relations were likely to grow. Policies were set up to suit both sides. The most important deal concluded in 1987 was to supply 11 general Electric FE-404 engines to India which was described as the most recent combat-aircraft engine. Again USA was agreed to supply radars to equip Chandipur test-firing range in Orissa. Mr. Gandhi’s visit to USA in October 1987 gave further initiative to the proposal of supplying military weapons. Perhaps India had made request for submarine launched missiles during his visit. So Indian doubt about US supply of weapons had been settled down. The US-India military linkage was strengthening. "The Indian government’s propensity for alignment with the West was not the result of haphazard moves determined by the merits of various economic and political questions. India received its military equipments from the US and its officers got their training from the British commonwealth and the United States".63

The acquisition of early warning radar system by Pakistan would bring insecurity to India and so the Indian

despite the widely publicised Symington Amendment in the U.S. Congress".65

Never before had India faced such external threats as it was in the later part of the eighties. India was being squeezed between pressure-tactics of two Super Powers. "The Soviet Union had agreed to supply matching aid of arms to Pakistan as it was received from the US".66 "So we were likely to face situation in which all the three superpowers and their satellites would be encircling India with their mighty military force stationed within striking distance of our major cities and the BJP condemned that the government had been found wanting in meeting this challenge. So the BJP considered to pay special attention to the development of relations with our neighbours and to encourage regional cooperation in South Asia in the common interests of all states in the region so that the superpower rivalry would be checkmated."67

Dr. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad had rightly observed,"Mr. 65. Chakravorty, N, "India and the world", World Focus, vol.8 Nos.7-8, July-August 1987, p.11.
Jinnah and his followers did not seem to realise that geography was against them.... It was one of the greatest frauds on the people to suggest that religious affinity can unite areas which are geographically, economically, linguistically and culturally different."68 So the way Pakistan was moving and acting in collusion with the Super-Powers demonstrated its motive to further destabilise the sub-continent. The destabilisation movement in Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir were dangerous for India's security. If we accept Uncle Sam's conception that India and Pakistan were equally responsible for their desolation, we shall be on wrong boat. Starting from the partition of India, the Indian leaders had been opposed to any division of India, but the saboteurs destroyed the unity of the country. So further spoilage of the sub-continent was detrimental to the interest of the people of both India and Pakistan. The critics argued that Pakistan's acquisition of military weapons was not conducive to its economic development which Pakistan could not realise. Her anti-India stance only promoted the military regime to go for United States' military aid. The foreign policy experts also viewed that the situation in the sixties and the seventies was similar to the eighties as far as US-Pakistan alliance was concerned. As the table 1 shows the US military aid to Pakistan in 1982 was less compared

to total aid to other countries. It started increasing in 1983 and it was quite high in 1985. Though the US administration was in favour of building a strong American base in Pakistan, due to pressure from the Third World countries of the Indian sub-continent supported by some big powers, the arms aid started reducing since 1986 and in 1990 it was almost same as it was in 1982. The acquisition of arms by Pakistan has only one reason behind it, i.e., to counter India. The anti-Hindu air prevailing there only encouraged her to go for war with India. All these developments are not favourable for the developing economies like Pakistan or India. Though the political situation was not much changed in the eighties, due to the world economic crisis a large amount of military expenditure was surely inimical to the developing countries especially. So the critics argued that instead of concentrating her resources to counter India, Pakistan should think of her economic development. Moreover, the arms aid to Pakistan which posed a serious challenge to the peace and development was not the US responsibility solely. The critics argue that it would be wrong to state that Pakistan would not have gone for arms had there been no US arms. Other big powers were there to provide arms to Pakistan. What was a matter of concern was that despite several talks between the great powers to reduce their expenditure on defence, the US continued to export and
the US spent around 40 percent on its defence accounts of the total government expenditure. In 1987 the defence outlay was 274 million dollar out of 1,004.584 billion dollar which was $130.976 billion in 1980. So within a span of seven years the defence expenditure was more than double. It was the desire to acquire more sophisticated weapons that invited the United States to use Pakistan in its game of power politics. So the attitude and response of Pakistan reflected more security challenge to Indian. If we probe little deeper into the issue we could see Pakistani eagerness to maintain parity of arms with India. The sooner, Pakistan is motivated to come out of its chosen path, the better it would be for the growth and security of South Asia.

Mr. K.C.Pant, Indian defence minister visited Moscow in 1988 February. In his discussion with the Soviet leader he expressed "India’s concern about Pakistan’s military build up an arms assistance by the US, which brought the ashes of cold war into the region".69 India was "not worried about the arms aid per se, because that is really bilateral between the US and Pakistan. But what it means is that we have to spend a lot of our funds on defence which is totally unnecessary. We need it for much more creative

activities, development activities, rather than defence. The second thing is that it freezes a lot of Pakistan's own finances for their own nuclear programme which is now very clearly established as a military weapon programme."70 It would be totally wrong if Pakistan is blamed alone. For the protection of its interests in the Indian Ocean and Persian gulf, the United States went on stockpiling arms and strengthened Pakistan on nuclear field. Therefore, the US had increased its arms aid from 85 million dollar in 1979 to 500 million dollar in 1985, a eight-fold increase in a period of six years. So the US had certainly succeeded in furthering its aims in the region, though it could not be able to solve the major problems confronting the world that time. At least it succeeded in preserving the military regime in Pakistan which was friendly to American policies. It must be noted that the US was equally interested to support the democratic uprising in Pakistan but it was skeptical of equal response from Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. It seems that there was a linkage between US arms offer and Pakistan's fundamentalist regime. The United States wanted to further its image in Asia and also the Pakistani military regime wanted to remain in power as long as possible. There

two perceptions coincided and matched due to various reasons. The United States was disillusioned with Indian foreign policy and sought to block the prospect of cordiality between India and Pakistan and so it gave her unstinted support to the Zia regime. On the other hand the conflicts between India and Pakistan -- conflict over strength and conflict of dominance in the sub-continent, encouraged Pakistan to accept willingly American friendship and military support to achieve parity with India. Therefore a 'marriage of necessity' was the guiding factor for both Pakistan and USA. The American announcement to give 4.2 billion dollar during 1988-1993 showed the enhanced American interest in Pakistan. Besides India too be blamed because (as the Table 2 shows) the import of weapons by India was the largest among all the countries over the world. Further, table 4 shows that defence expenditure of India in 1986 was $ 8.35 billion which started increasing since 1987 and it stood at $ 9 billion in 1990. Per capita defence expenditure is quite high in case of a country like India. Only since 1989 it started decreasing. So it is neither desirable nor necessary to spend huge amount after defence when we are striving for uplifting our economy. Even after spending money for defence preparedness it could not fulfill our defence requirements. In this situation, the BJP remarked that "the total mishandling of our security arrangement made our foreign policy episodic and adhoc. The
principal and immediate anxiety of the BJP was the strategic imbalance of our armed forces. Defence capital expenditure for 1987-88 had actually been cut down by almost Rs. 100 crores, whereas the defence revenue expenses had gone up by Rs. 700 crores. In other words, we had spent more on the peripherals at the cost of modernization, upgradation and the future combat effectiveness of our armed forces. Moreover, our relations with neighbours had been strained and India’s position had been reduced to a status of almost regional inconsequence.”

No doubt Indo-American relations improved that time, but difference on US arms supply to Pakistan aggaravated. From the US side a change in political strategic approach in the international arena was observed. "There was a change in US attitude because of Rajiv Gandhi’s pursuit of high-tech from the developed countries.”

The AICC(I) expressed its satisfaction in India’s relations with the United States. "There had been noticeable increase in the interest shown by US industry in seeking collaboration with Indian partners. High technology areas of cooperation were being explored and trade both ways had increased. But the AICC(I) remained concerned at the


continuing massive US supply of sophisticated arms to Pakistan. It called upon the government of the United States to review its policy with a view to deescalate the arms build-up in the region."73

Pakistan was receiving arms from the United States on the pretext of tackling the Afghan rebels, but it started channelising those arms to the terrorists in Punjab. Therefore, "the Indo-Pakistan relations had reached to a low level and the United states was condemned for this conflagration".74 So US military assistance to Pakistan affected the Indo-Pakistani relations more than the Indo-American relations. The danger of cold war was not far away from the South Asian region. "The continuous deposit of US arms in Pakistan had led to certain pernicious developments which impinged on India’s foreign policy. Apart from US arms assistance inevitably whetting the appetite of military dictators in Pakistan which had never shed its aggressive adventurist designs in the sub-continent."75 As Gursharan Singh has rightly pointed out, there were three main obstacles to Indo-USA security ties: "First, India’s non-align-
ment policy and consequent refusal to join in formal military pacts or even to acknowledge the communist states as a global military threat; Second, Pakistan's objections that US arming of India may prove detrimental to its own security, together with US willingness to sustain such objections and third, the political, financial and technological terms offered by Washington for the sale of US arms or the transfer of military technology to India. Shift in US attitude towards India is clearly seen after the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). "Though both sides were interested in carrying out the beginning they had made, the conflicts between NSDD 147 and NSDD 99—which set out the broad guidelines governing security assistance to Pakistan to help it improve its overall defences would continue to be potent threats particularly to Rajiv Gandhi's ability to carry out the Indian public opinion with him."  

The Bharatiya Janata party made it clear that "the principal challenge India faced in the field of external relations was regional. India's national and security interest would be served only through a larger awareness of the regional demands, regional needs, regional fears and regional sentiments of South, South-west and South-East


77. Ibid., p.35.
Asia. So proper ordering of our relations with all neighbours was the need of the hour."78 The BJP further differed with the government "in which it had been dealing with crucial issues of national security, particularly in the context of Pakistan. It was a matter of deep concern that Pakistan continued to aid and supply arms to anti-national elements in Jammu and Kashmir and to the terrorists in Punjab."79 The BJP held the view that "national security is a primary responsibility of a state. Safety of nation is an integral whole; an amalgam of the internal, the economic and the Social, Political, the military and diplomacy. The BJP alleged that the conduct of diplomacy by Rajiv Gandhi had left India's foreign policy in tatters. It viewed that India was facing challenges in the field of external relations, arose from a re-assertion of the altered importance of non-alignment in a rapidly transforming world. The BJP was committed to mutually beneficial aims of good bilateral relations with all our neighbour and a strengthening of SAARC. It stood for normalisation of relations with China, honourable solution to the border problem and comprehensive settlement of all outstanding matters with Pakistan and Sri

78. Resolutions adopted by the National Executive Meetings of the BJP, Palampur (Himachal Pradesh), 9th to 11th June 1989, p.10.

Lanka. Thus, the BJP stood for a foreign policy committed to world peace, disarmament and a non-exploitative new international economic order. The party added that it would work towards re-impacting dynamism to the non-alignment movement; a policy of peace, friendship and cooperation with neighbouring countries and to thwart superpowers dominance in South Asian region. "80

In the second half of the eighties India received arms worth 19,300 million dollar (See table V). It was quite high compared to other countries. The other nations, as shown in the table V, also equally received arms from the developed countries. But in case of India, being a developing country, it should spend its scarce economic resources for socio-economic development of the country. It is being felt that a nation cannot be militarily strong if it has surmounted socio-economic problems. So the critics argue that development, poverty alleviation and other socio-economic tasks are equally constitute important strategy package alongwith acquisition of arms and nuclear weapons. War is no longer a viable instrument of national power, the military preparedness is treated a less significant component than the socio-economic development now-a-days. But it cannot be denied that military security constitutes a


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perceptible necessity for national defence. A nation cannot just ignore military preparedness in the current international scenario, specifically when frequent threats to its security is forcefully imposed as we have seen in the case of India and Pakistan. So defence preparedness should come only after a country overcomes its socio-economic problems.

In the eighties when the Super Powers realised the necessity of disarmament and demilitarisation the countries of the Indian sub-continent were looking for arms for their national security. Occasional divergencies no doubt skillfully sorted out, but it was realised that high defence structure was the only adequate solution to meet the armed confrontation in the future. So the defence experts suggested that India should form a national body which would examine the situation time and again and would suggest how to handle the crises diplomatically. They did not see any impediment of receiving arms from the Super Powers but the dire necessity should be to increase indigenous defence production. Besides the defence management practices, they argue, India should go nuclear at all hazards. And if India goes for arms import then Soviet Union seems reliable partner. It seems that the economic and strategic links of India and the USSR have benefited both the countries. The USSR had political advantage of strong Indo-Soviet ties as it opened up the opportunities to get access to Third World market. Similarly, India visualized advantages of scientific and technological transfer of knowledge and also availed
latest technology from the USSR. So unless a radical change takes place that could harm both the nations of any international impulsions, the Indo-Soviet cooperation was expected to grow. The Soviet Union considered India as its most reliable partner in international affairs. Both the leaders Gorbachev and Rajiv Gandhi underlined to expand their bilateral relations not only for the benefit of the two peoples but also for the mankind as a whole. For strengthening peace and security in Asia first and then all over the world both the statesmen agreed to work on a number of issues. The Soviet Union looked enthusiastically the role of India in the entire history for preserving peace and the new Soviet leader Gorbachev had strived to take the Soviets to a state free from all types of tensions, suspicion and fear. He assured the Indians that his country would like to work actively along with India and would work for deepening Indo-Soviet ties. Rajiv Gandhi in that euphoric atmosphere assured the Soviet leader about India's unchanged foreign policy approach, i.e., the policy of non-alignment and assured to work for peace and disarmament. Thus the bilateral relations between India and the USSR improved and the atmosphere of cordiality and mutual understanding continued to grow further.

On the other hand, US perception of and India's anti-imperialist policies demonstrated their non-charitable relations, though both sides claimed it to be quite satisfacto-
ry. The fundamental reason is that both of them dealt Pakistan differently. India’s earnest hope to dissuade Pakistan from engaging in a military competition could not bring tangible results. The United States had been longing for mutual reconciliation and so it urged both India and Pakistan to come to the ‘negotiation table’, but failed to make significant achievement. It was also realised that India’s military lead over Pakistan and its desire for preponderant strength which was undoubtedly expensive and wasteful, prevented it to use the opportunities at its hand. The Stockholm example could not cast much influence on Indo-Pakistani bilateral relations. Neither of them was ready to sacrifice its requirements for military technology. A zone of peace was on the verge of transformation, transferring it into a zone of conflict. More importantly, the SAARC also could not modify itself in recognition of the realities of the situation.
TABLE-I

US FOREIGN MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN
(in US $ Million)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>TOTAL AID TO ALL COUNTRIES</th>
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<th>% OF TOTAL AID</th>
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<td>1989</td>
<td>4,828</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>4.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>4,893</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>4.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Represents Zero

Source: US AID: New Delhi, annual, various issues.
# TABLE-II

**THE LEADING IMPORTERS OF MAJOR WEAPONS, 1985-89**

(in US $ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1,876</td>
<td>3,688</td>
<td>4,585</td>
<td>3,383</td>
<td>3,819</td>
<td>17,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>939</td>
<td>2,289</td>
<td>4,608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>2,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (Third World countries)</td>
<td>5,753</td>
<td>5,026</td>
<td>4,601</td>
<td>4,012</td>
<td>3,893</td>
<td>23,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>2,309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>1,638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (Industrial World)</td>
<td>2,615</td>
<td>1,903</td>
<td>2,116</td>
<td>2,335</td>
<td>2,589</td>
<td>11,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>11,601</td>
<td>12,420</td>
<td>13,237</td>
<td>12,367</td>
<td>14,093</td>
<td>63,692</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SIPRI data base
### TABLE -III

**SIGNIFICANT US MILITARY AID 1979-88 ($ million)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>435.0</td>
<td>113.0</td>
<td>1530.0</td>
<td>200.6</td>
<td>1440.0</td>
<td>295.3</td>
<td>1266.0</td>
<td>281.7</td>
<td>625.9</td>
<td>402.4</td>
<td>649.5</td>
<td>275.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. KOREA</td>
<td>225.0</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>230.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>230.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>162.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAKISTAN</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>300.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>325.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>311.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>312.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>230.0</td>
<td>30.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHILLIPINES</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>152.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>127.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THILAND</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDONESIA</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDDLE EAST</td>
<td>4379.5</td>
<td>1346.7</td>
<td>2350.8</td>
<td>1449.7</td>
<td>188.0</td>
<td>2725.3</td>
<td>117.3</td>
<td>3088.5</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>3226.2</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>3210.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICA</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATIN AMERICA</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>294.9</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>243.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>226.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>215.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>142.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## TABLE-IV
### TRENDS IN DEFENCE EXPENDITURE OF INDIA
(in $ billions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Defence expenditure</th>
<th>GDP</th>
<th>Defence expenditure GDP(%)</th>
<th>Per capita defence expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>8.35</td>
<td>206.42</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>9.30</td>
<td>259.11</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>9.58</td>
<td>284.62</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>8.94</td>
<td>279.80</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>303.29</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Deliveries Value (in $ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>52,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>27,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>19,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>15,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>13,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>10,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>9,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>9,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>8,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>8,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>