Chapter III

INDIA’S NUCLEAR POLICY
After the end of the Second World War the world witnessed a mad race of arms among the countries to outmanoeuvre each other. The acquisition, development and proliferation of nuclear weapons were escalated. Interestingly, Third World countries instead of restructuring their economy were seeking arms. Although the developing countries claimed that they were procuring arms for self-defence, on the other hand it gave birth to fear and suspicion among the nations. With the emphasis on arms acquisition the states started producing more qualitative weapons. The cold war between the Soviet Union and the United States was intensifying towards the end of the seventies with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Several efforts to ease the tension proved useless. Both the US and the USSR started condemning each other for the new cold war.

The eighties also witnessed antagonism between the two Super Powers. The development and possession of nuclear weapons continued at the same rate as in early decades. New weapons like I.C.B.Ms, Titan, Polaris, Minument and many others caused enormous destruction to the civilians. With the advent of the nuclear weapons the superpowers made them competitors spreading their influence all over the world. The large scale destruction and the huge amount involved in producing weapons and its utilisation concerned the peace
loving nations. Surprisingly, the arms race escalated and sharpened further bringing the world the verge of another world war. The mostly affected developing countries were burdened with debt and their economy was deteriorating. The United Nations which was established to ensure peace and harmony all over the world had little to do in this proxy war. Now the arms race posed threat in the form of waste of resources and hindrance to the economic development and democratic process. It diminished the existence of 'Panchasheel' and undermined a world without fear and suspicion. At this stage, the statesmen started giving serious thought to disarmament and to evolve some mechanism so that peace in the world could be restored. Middle powers, like India, also gave serious thought to end the cold war. They had their national interest in the effort of easing tension, as they needed enormous fund for their industrialisation and above all rapid economic development. Thus, India adhered to the policy of peace and disarmament.

India's peaceful nuclear programme began soon after her independence. At that time the focus was to use available nuclear energy for the development of mankind. But the Sino-Indian War and the Chinese nuclear explosion compelled Indian policy makers to reconsider their way of utilising nuclear energy. The Indian government started considering on nuclear weapons and the Indian government initi-
ated proposals for acquiring conventional nuclear weapons. "Despite speculation about work on the design of an explosive system Lal Bahadur Shastri did not talk of a nuclear explosion. It was after the implosion of 1974 that India developed a coherent nuclear doctrine to suit the fast changing circumstances. This doctrine came to be based on the same earlier construct of the geostrategic utility and overall commitment to a peaceful approach. The eighties saw no major shift in India's position on the nuclear policy."\(^1\)

"Historically, the motivations for policy in the nuclear field have been two fold. First, there were the general attraction of a high yield field, in which the investment, although demanding, could be managed incrementally, especially if the program could count on significant foreign assistance and technical cooperation in its less developed phases. Secondly, there was the attractions of nuclear power as a viable and prestigious proposition in a country that has been chronically deficient in terms of the total energy requirement at all points in its independent career. Sometime during the course of the late 1960s or the early 1970s, a third motivation surfaced. Marked by ambiguity and somewhat conflicting interpretations, this is usually code worded India's 'nuclear options', denoting a

connection with nuclear weaponry that is supposed to be both illicit and irresponsible regionally and in a global proliferation sense".2

The critics argue that India's advocacy of peace should be matronized with strength. It implies that the defence industry needs to be fortified with the weapons that the situation demands. Through right management of skills and resources available in the country self-sufficiency in defence production can be achieved. Thus, attempts of the imperialists to destabilise our nation by encouraging anti-national elements and arming Pakistan can be best tackled by utilising all resources-human and material. Moreover, the opposition should be consulted on major international issues. At the same time it must be remembered that security cannot be jeopardised on ideological differences between the opposition and the ruling party. Internal strength occupies much attention than mere acquisition or production of nuclear arms. Thus the citadel of strength is to set aside all difference and to formulate a policy to act in one mind and spirit.

The global situation in the eighties was truly alarming. The world was closely moving towards a nuclear disaster. Amidst the darkness of nuclear catastrophe Indian voice of disarmament raised the prospects of peace all over the world. India's argument of protecting the regions unaffected by the nuclear abyss was also supported by many Third World countries. Despite these serious efforts the arms race continued. Scarce resources which are supposed to be the ingredients of economic development diverted for producing nuclear arsenals. The peace-loving nations were forced to take the side of one or other Super Powers. The reason is that they were dependent on the Super Powers for their economic development. As the Super Powers' confrontation reached to a point of no return, the question that assumed importance whether the humanity would survive in the face of a nuclear confrontation. "To talk of a better, safer and more secure tomorrow had almost become a sacrilege. As the nuclear weapon states resorted to increased stockpiling, they spread a wave of unrest, uncertainty and anxiety among the non-nuclear countries. As the tensions grew, more and more countries were being brought into the orbit of confrontation. With the potential of nuclear weapons gaining horrendous proportions, a stage had been reached where peace and security were attributes gaining less and less priority in the calculations of major
powers."

On November 4, 1980, Reagan was elected as the President of United States of America. During Reagan’s tenure, the Indo-American relations deteriorated and even affected India’s development. On December 29, Washington announced its decision to resume military assistance to Pakistan which concerned New Delhi. It created tension between India and Pakistan, too. Pakistan sought military help on the ground that India was planning to develop nuclear weapons. But Pakistan’s suspicion about India’s strategic weapons’ development was baseless. No doubt Indian Government opted for demonstrating certain abilities it had, but there was no such plan of developing nuclear weapons or medium-range. On June 19, 1980 the Carter Administration had approved the shipments of enriched uranium for Tarapore. The Reagan Administration, on the other hand, seemed reluctant to resume the supply of uranium to India. It was a reversal of the approach taken by the Carter Administration when it approved of export licenses for two fuel shipments for India’s Tarapore. "Transmittal of Executive order authorizing export of low-enriched uranium to India for use

in fuelling of Tarapore Atomic Power Station determined that it was not prejudicial to achievement of U.S. non-proliferation objectives." But it was not sure whether the US Government would resume nuclear fuel supply. This policy of the US shocked the Bharatiya Janata Party. "They lost their belief and confidence in the American Government". "The Reagan policy added up to a sharp change in emphasis from President Carter's Non-Proliferation policy. Carter had emphasized U.S. restrictions on exports of nuclear material and equipment that would be used to build weapons. The Reagan policy emphasized the opposite". In the view of the BJP, the US was reluctant to resume fuel supply to Tarapore reactor because it wanted to strengthen Pakistan to maintain balance of power. The BJP leader questioned in the Rajya Sabha "whether the government had taken any step for our security threat". "The Indian government was aware that


Pakistan had been trying to acquire uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities. The shipment of US made electronic equipment to Pakistan via Canada concerned the Indian government. The Government of Pakistan, on the other hand, assured that their nuclear programme was solely directed towards peaceful purposes. However, the Indian government continued to be vigilant and was prepared to take all necessary steps to safeguard the security interests of India."8

India was not convinced on Pakistan's plea that in case an atom bomb is made it would not be used against India. However, after getting this assurance, India had two options, either going nuclear or restraining Pakistan from going nuclear. The second choice was more valid as it would not involve risk. On the other hand, if at all India goes nuclear then it diverts her economic development. So "India had always favoured the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In safeguarding India's sovereign rights to develop and use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, India had continued to oppose discriminatory arrangements such as the NPT while urging the conclusion of a general

8. Ibid.
convention of the total prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons." The Indian side highly appraised the constructive steps of the Soviet Union aiming at achieving disarmament and a just and durable political settlement of the conflict situations. The Soviet view was that "India was making a significant contribution to the struggle against the nuclear war and for consolidating peace and security in the region".

Detente, which India always welcome and worked for, had been subjected to stresses and strains. There had been some developments in the early eighties which, for example US supply of nuclear weapons to Pakistan, caused concern among the peace loving nations. "The AICC noted with deep concern the developments in various parts of the world indicating the revival of a climate of cold war and confrontation. The AICC was deeply disturbed about the consequences on India's security environment. It hoped that fruitful talk between the US and the USSR would come out." The BJP leader


Jaswant Singh argued "if Pakistan possess nuclear weapons, it is no good saying that we are for peaceful uses of atomic energy because it would lead to strategic imbalance of the sub-continent. He wanted to know the procurement and equipping policy of nuclear weapons looking at the grave danger the country was about to face." Pakistan's nuclear aspirations carried within them dangerous potentials for a serious destabilisation of the strategic balance in the sub-continent. In the view of the BJP, "the path of nuclear armament can only harm the peoples of both our lands, not benefit them in any fashion. The BJP committed itself to the concept of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. At the same time the BJP abjured the availability of options to the country. It retained the right to assess the requirements of the safety of the Indian nation and its people in the light of its own perceptions. In the face of these formidable challenges, the BJP remarked, that the primary task was that of forging unity of purpose in the nation. The Bhartiya Janata Party demanded to initiate a debate on the subject, to take people into confidence, to consult with the opposition, to forsake its unidimensional

tilt and to revert to a credible non-alignment. The Indian National Congress was equally opposed to the arms race which was leading the world towards a nuclear abyss. The AICC was concerned about the policies of the US Government. The United States in a bid to ostensibly curb the spread of Soviet influence around the world was unjustifiably creating and enlarging tension spots by massive doles of ultra sophisticated arms to Israel, Pakistan and some other countries, by embarking on the manufacture and deployment of the so-called clean 'neutron bomb' which would only bring the nuclear was closer to reality. Reacting to the nuclear policy of India in the Lok Sabha A.B. Vajpayee said that "Pakistan and other countries while trying to enter into unclear club and particularly Pakistan if goes for nuclear explosion then we should reconsider the whole situation and our nuclear policy. As far as nuclear technology is concerned we should explore all possible ways for its exploration. We should use it for constructive ways."


The prospect of friendly relations between India and the United States could not improve as the Reagan Administration stuck to its policy of stopping nuclear cooperation with India. While "the Soviet Union did not mind the effort of Third World countries to acquire nuclear capability". Rather the USSR extended its help to Third World countries to meet their requirements on defence field. It is noteworthy that the US position on supplying enriched uranium to India was definitely against the principles of Indo-American nuclear cooperation agreement of 1963. "The lack of consistency in its approach to Israel, South Africa, China and even Pakistan on the one hand and to India on the other had only led to the dilution of the credibility of the US policy on control of nuclear technology. America's nuclear policy towards Pakistan revealed that the NNPA and other non-proliferation rules had been repeatedly given a go by in the interest of cultivating a close relationship with that country was reported to have progressed for towards making the nuclear bomb. On the other hand the same act was invoked to bar continuance of the existing commitments and programs to non-nuclear and friendly countries like India, who expressed their commitment to use nuclear energy

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It has been noted that the fundamental disagreement between India and the United States was the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. The treaty contemplated against proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states to preserve global peace and security. Thus the motive behind the treaty was to prevent the emergence of more nuclear weapons states. It objected the transfer of nuclear explosive devices also. The signatory states were agreed not to involve any non-nuclear states to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. However, the treaty granted the right to develop to produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Another source of discongruity between India and the United States was the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act. The Reagan Administration stopped the resupply of fuel to Tarapore reactor on the ground that it would be contrary to the terms and conditions of the NNPA. Moreover, the USA viewed that the world-wide nuclear proliferation can be checked by observing the NNPA safeguards. But India was displeased with the American stand as India had always used it for peaceful purposes. However, the discord was settled when France was agreed to resume supply

of fuel to India. With this USA and India emerged as unreliable friends. From an Indian perspective, the NPT was discriminatory for nuclear disarmament. The treaty did not solve the problem and it did not put restraint to possess nuclear weapons by the nuclear powers but only prohibited its acquisition by the non-possessing states. So India, ab initio, objected the NPT.

The Indo-American relations on nuclear fuel supply to Tarapore was settled after France was agreed to supply enriched uranium to India. "But France as a supplier of enriched fuel could be expected to act under US instruction and ensured that Indian Atomic Energy Programmes are monitored and controlled to American expectations".18 Though Indo-American relations was said to be cordial after the visit of Indira Gandhi to Washington. "It did not guarantee that India and the US would grow closer to each other for the US concession was under pressure from several quarters".19 The BJP considered that agreement on Tarapore was not in nation's interest. In its view if India agreed to receive third party help why it did not do it independently but did it at the American instruction. In its resolution

the BJP viewed. "it was incomprehensible why we had chosen to keep the agreement of 1963, alongwith all the attendant conditionalities, alive, whilst simultaneously opting to accept the additional ones of the IAEA and those to be imposed by France when we eventually finalised the supply of uranium from it. It was misleading to suggest that our options of reprocessing of the spent fuel were encumbered. The whole matter had been rushed through against the expert advice of our Atomic Energy Commission. This also affected the Mixed Oxide (MOX) method of reprocessing adopted by our scientists. So any further nuclear fuel supply arrangements should have a penalty clause for default in supply of raw materials and we should not accept inspection of our nuclear facilities consequent upon the application of the 'pursuit' clause".\textsuperscript{20} Moreover, France was not agreeing to supply to stuff without full safeguards. The point was that "France was demanding the fulfillment of terms and conditions on the basis that it was a member of the London club which imposed on India such conditions".\textsuperscript{21} At this crucial moment, in the Indo-Soviet Summit the Soviet

\textsuperscript{20} Resolutions Passed by the BJP in its National Executive Meeting, Bangalore, 28-30 August, 1982, p.18.

\textsuperscript{21} Organiser, 19 September 1982, p.13.
Union extended her desire to supply nuclear fuel to India.  

"The Indo-Soviet Summit of 1982 was characterised as a summit for world peace and against madness of nuclear war. Both the leaders showed great determination to extend the areas of world peace and the Soviet leadership made concrete offers to the NATO powers for the reduction of world tensions. The Indo-Soviet friendship was a warning to the imperialists that the forces of peace would exercise their full weight in the international meetings and regional forums against militarism."  

On 30th November 1982, both USA and India exchanged notes confirming the understanding about the substitution of the US by France as a supplier of nuclear fuel for Tarapore power station. The exchange of notes paved the way for the future resumption of fuel supply for Tarapore Atomic Power Station through the signing of an agreement with the Government of France. "The exchange of notes thus helped to resolve the impasse created by the US failure to supply nuclear fuel for Tarapore as provided in the 1963 agreement".

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Suspicion and antagonism among the countries affected the world more in the eighties than ever before. The SuperPowers' strategy of global domination and subjugation took precedence over other consideration. The arms race outmoded the assured desire of endurance. The mad race for acquiring armaments was leading the world towards a nuclear holocaust. While the world was running without food, shelter and many other essential commodities the nuclear power were spending million of dollars on acquing nuclear armaments. In this situation "the BJP believed that it was incumbment on the superpowers to move purposefully towards nuclear disarmament. What was at stake were not just their respective domains, but it was entire humanity. So until the non-aligned countries agree on a mutual reduction of their spendings on arms, their pleadings for peace and disarmament would be lacking in the needed credibility".25 "The Government of India attached great importance to the idea and the potentialities of the world disarmament campaign, in the ceaseless quest of mankind for a lasting, genuine world peace based on the achievement of disarmament. It was clear recognition of the fact that unless the common people everywhere, particularly in the nuclear-weapons states and other militarily significant states, are actively concerned about the imperative and

urgent need to halt and reverse the mad arms race and to make meaningful progress towards disarmament, the human race would continue to face the grave danger of self-annihilation."26

Mrs. Gandhi went to the USSR on a week's visit on September 20, 1982. She discussed with the Soviet leaders her three suggestions made at the disarmament conference, "first, a convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons; second, a freeze on nuclear weapons and total stoppage of further production, and third, immediate suspension of nuclear weapons test. She drew the Soviet attention to the militarisation of India's neighbourhood.... The US had begun to use Pakistan for an opening into China; Pakistan and China had reached military understanding directed against India, and the US was jumping into the ring. Both Moscow and New Delhi were inexorably drawn closer together by compulsion of circumstances created by their common foes."27 It was also reported that the USSR had agreed to assist India in importing a large quantity of heavy water and then gave their technology for making heavy water in India. According to the BJP "the USSR and other

European powers being the members of the London Club would be under tight surveillance terms if they want to have supplies of nuclear material. So India should grab the Russian offer. On the contrary, the suggestion of the Atomic Energy Establishment of Tarapore to scrap the Tarapore plant as the dependence on the Soviet assistance would be contrary to India's policy of self-reliance. The decommissioning of the plant would release India from the tension of finding enriched uranium and it would save India to depend on West for spare parts in the reactor."

The suggestion however, did not appeal much to the Indian government. The reason was simple. A nation, being threatened by its neighbours by acquiring nuclear weapons, cannot decommission its nuclear plants. Again Russia had never put any string by giving aid. So accepting the Russian offer was not at all harmful to India's security. Rather it could be said that the fuel supply first and then technical knowledge was the demand of the time to become self-reliant. Moreover, "Soviet-Indian relations based on the fruitful basis of the treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation. Those relations had stood a good test and both sides valued that treaty and friendship. The Soviet Union stood for the...

strengthening of friendship with India."\textsuperscript{29}

In 1984, the US offered nuclear weapons to Pakistan which obviously meant to arm Pakistan, it testified America's intention of helping Pakistan in case of any Indo-Pakistani nuclear war. Now it was clear that Pakistan had turned into a US bastion to pursue that any help to Pakistan would not be used against India was not to be reckoned with. This act ostensibly justified Pak-American unfriendly attitude towards India. So only one option was left for India ---to go nuclear, either receiving nuclear weapons from the USSR or to develop her own nuclear weapons.

The threats of chemical and biological weapons and their proliferation assumed a global dimension as in any case proliferation of a particular kind of weapon would have a disastrous effect on the whole world in case of a war. Thus the security question was not regional but global, may it be in South Asia or West Asia or elsewhere. It was realised that unless there is a remedy to the large scale proliferation, security will be endangered. Notwithstanding the fact that the proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons was manifested everywhere, there was no concerted

international consensus to look into the adverse effects of acquiring nuclear weapons. It is because nations are free to act and think for their security, national security acquired more attention than the global security. In case of India and Pakistan, if Pakistan is on the verge of producing an atom bomb India cannot ignore the importance, it cannot pursue a non-violent policy of not acquiring nuclear weapons.

Nobody can ignore the fact that the South Asian security environment had become worse in the mid-eighties. Detente and disarmament had been displaced with cold war. The dialogue between India and Pakistan for arms limitations had been deadlocked. The arms race and arms transfer to the Indian peninsula had acquired dangerous dimensions. Installations of cruise and pershing missiles affected disarmament drive. In this situation the Indian government had to take initiatives to save the region from being turned into a 'Conflict Zone'. But the BJP was dissatisfied with the policies of the Indian government. It believed that "instead of pursuing a uniform policy with regard to those issues India adopted double standards which would neither enhance its prestige nor would it able to serve the cause of peace and disarmament.... The foreign pressure would increase if India fails to keep its house in order. The
Congress government, in the opinion of the BJP, miserably failed in discouraging the primary obligation."30 "Pakistan's continued efforts to achieve uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing capability raised doubts about her declared policy of use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only. Inspite of all these, Indian government had been exercising utmost restraint and preserved its policy of peace with Pakistan."31 The Indian government adhered to its peaceful use of nuclear energy and appealed other countries to observe the canons of the international agreement on disarmament. The Indian government was watchful on the point that the nuclear programmes of both India and Pakistan remain peaceful. As the BJP leader Jaswant Singh observed, "the transformation of a peaceful nuclear programme into a military utilisation was not that difficult and it was not that it involved any great change of technology. The real debate on the nuclear energy was for peaceful purposes and in that context the government should consider it, initiative should be taken to realise it."32 In its


32. Ibid., cols.276-77.
neighbourhood, India faced unfavourable developments. The growing build up of arms by Pakistan was a matter of concern to India and contrary to the Indian proposal of peaceful nuclear policy. It posed serious threat to Indian security when the US started pouring lethal and sophisticated weapons to Pakistan. The Congress party hoped that "the Government of Pakistan would realise that peace, friendship and cooperation with India was in Pakistan’s own interest and in the interest of stability of the region".33 Besides Pakistan, China’s role in acquiring nuclear weapons was also shocking. China had asked for nuclear power technology from the outside powers and the US agreed to supply equipments and spare parts to China. Moreover, the USA also agreed to supply F-16 aircrafts to Pakistan. The Indian reactionaries condemned the double game USA played. In case of India the US Government violated the contractual obligations of supplying fuel and vital spare parts to Tarapore, but in case of Pakistan or China it accentuated the flow of nuclear power technology. The Americans argument was that Pakistan would not go for producing nuclear weapons if they are supplied with necessary spare parts and informations. It was clear that American intention was to isolate India in

South Asia as the later was close to the Soviet Union, even if the US Government denied the allegations. "India was in fact isolated in the international arena. The superpowers and their satellites were in a position to deny nuclear fuel and spares because the Indian nation was not united. So to the BJP, India should go nuclear for an enlightened notional interest lest it would be a grave danger to its security."34

So the eighties witnessed prolonged turbulence, mutual suspicion and rivalries among the nations. National security acquired importance in front of nuclear threat by other countries. In this situation, India's "main security problem was how to shield ourselves and our developmental process, from the turbulence around spilling into our own territory. Our neighbours said they had the same problem vis-a-vis India and they had to shield themselves. The critics argued that if centuries of war, Germany and France could bury their hatchet and today people can travel from one place to another without visa; why should not such a development take place between India and Pakistan."35 It is

not appropriate to take the examples of France and Germany in case of India and Pakistan as the situation is altogether different. Under the prevailing situation in South Asia this can be said that "We should try as much as possible to promote better relations. We have to go a long way to start the process. It would be unrealistic if we overlook these basic differences and thought that there were no problems at all. Good security management lies in anticipating the problems in advance and taking the necessary counter measures to limit the damage these problems might cause us."36

In the General Election in 1984 the Congress party won a spectacular victory and Rajiv Gandhi assumed the office of the Premierships. The critics now raised many questions about India's role in international affairs. However, India's policies carved out during Jawaharlal Nehru and followed by Indira Gandhi, continued during Rajiv Gandhi's era in India's functioning in world. Among other issues nuclear disarmament was indeed an alarming one. So Rajiv Gandhi's objective to mobilise world public opinion against nuclear weapons was primary in India's overall nuclear policy. India had consistently urged to ban the

36. Ibid., pp.7-8.
vertical proliferation and substantial reduction in stock-piling chemical weapons. Rajiv Gandhi carried this campaign to various international as well as regional fora.

Rajiv Gandhi presided over the Second Summit of the six nations in 1985 comprising Sweden, Mexico, Greece, Tanzania, India and Argentina. The main objective of the summit was to dispose of further production and proliferation of the chemical, biological and all other nuclear weapons. The Delhi Declaration was signed at the end of the summit where it was unanimously accepted that all nuclear tests using outer space must be scrapped and the outer space should be used for benefit of the mankind. The summit demanded elimination of nuclear weapons of the two Super Powers to ensure peace and security in the world. Above all, they suggested for verification under the auspices of the United Nations to further the process of disarmament. Unless there is a complete halt of production of nuclear weapons and reduction in conventional weapons there cannot be a nuclear-free world. The participating nations in the summit stressed on the halt of all types of testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons. They believed that only such a step would facilitate to come out of danger of nuclear war. "Two specific steps required special attention that time: the prevention of an arms race in outer space and a comprehensive test ban treaty. In their view, outer space must be
used for the benefit of mankind as a whole, not as a battleground of the future. They further urged the nuclear weapon states to immediately halt the testing of all kinds of nuclear weapons and a treaty on nuclear weapon test ban. Such a treaty would be a major step towards ending the continuous modernisation of nuclear arsenals." However, the summit declaration was not supported by other Third World countries. The critics also argued that India, in its effort of disarmament, was left alone without much support of the non-aligned countries. The BJP believed that "India was being driven more and more into a loan blind ally as far as international support was concerned."³⁸

The international situation was tense in the second half of the eighties. So the AICC(I) urged the nuclear powers "to find a common ground for reversing the disastrous lurch towards mutual destruction. The tremendous potential of scientific and technological development could be harnessed for human welfare only if the astronomical spending on armaments is halted."³⁹ The Soviet Union also stressed

³⁸. Organiser, 10 February 1985, p.16.
³⁹. Resolutions Passed in the AICC Meeting held on 4th and 5th May, 1985 in Delhi, AICC Publication, pp.19-20.
on complete disarmament and put the task before nuclear powers. It also supported Indian call for an early convention of an international meeting with the participation of nuclear as well as non-nuclear states. "The Indian government highly valued Soviet declaration not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Both sides considered that the adoption of such an obligation by all nuclear weapon states would be an important step towards the complete ban on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The two sides stressed the importance of a freeze on nuclear weapons on a global basis beginning from a specific date and under appropriate verification." 40 The common approach of both India and the USSR on major international issues testified that "after Rajiv came to power new orientation had been given to India’s policies. There was no doubt that India became the centre-piece of the Soviet Union’s policy in Asia and also in its global strategy and there was no question of leaving India in lurch." 41

The Indian scientists and researchers were hopeful of discovering new routes in searching techniques to accelerate nuclear research programme. As the Indian problem was to

get enriched uranium from foreign countries, they were set up to produce required uranium for the uranium-powered reactors. "The peaceful efforts had been chosen by BARC covered magneto-hydro-dynamics, lesser fusion, uranium enrichment and the PNE. The MHD process for the production of power involves the conversion of energy released by burning coal directly into electric current, thus dispensing with costly boilers, turbines and generators which are needed in a conventional thermal station. In 1985, Asia’s first MHD generator, a 30 MW experimental prototype, was commissioned at the Tiruchirapalli complex Bharat Heavy Electrics Limited (BHEL) in collaboration with BARC and the High Temperature Institute Moscow."42 India’s nuclear policy was aimed at peaceful uses of nuclear energy. At the same time the Indian government alleged Pakistan’s nuclear activities and the US role in supporting Pakistan’s role by supplying sophisticated arms. India urged both Pakistan and the United States to refrain from bringing nuclear war into South Asia. The Rajiv Gandhi government was equally concerned about media report that Pakistan possessed necessary capability to make the bomb. However, President Zia refused the allegation. He extended his hands in disarmament programmes being carried out by India. On 18 December 1985,

both the heads of India and Pakistan agreed not to attack each other's nuclear stations. The declaration was definitely a welcome step. Of late, during Benazir Bhutto's reign, the US started to assert itself in favour of India. The Reagan Administration advised Pakistan to search out amicable solution in the spirit of Shimla Agreement. The US even stopped military and economic aid to Pakistan due to its desire of acquiring nuclear weapons. Despite these initiatives taken by the US administration the Pakistani government did not give up its clandestine nuclear activities.

The strategic tie between Pakistan and China was another source of conflict between India and Pakistan. China was an unfriendly neighbour since the 1962 war and it was trying to boost military strength of Pakistan. With the support of China on the one hand and the US on the other, Pakistan was becoming much stronger posing threat to India's security. In July 1985, Pakistan had tested krytons, had been purchasing beryllium and this way its nuclear capability went increasing as the US administration did not pay any heed to world criticism against military aid to Pakistan. Thus, the pace at which Pakistan was attaining a nuclear weapon capability affected the peaceful atmosphere of the Indian subcontinent. Developing strong ties with the nuclear weapon states and more particularly with the US, with the help of
modern missiles, F-16 aircrafts and enriched uranium it was planning to strike Indian cities. Pakistan's navy was strengthened, had Hawkeye Airborne Early warning aircraft to strike at Indian fleet, coastal and offshore installations. On the other hand, China was moving ahead with its nuclear programme. China's attempt to produce neutron weapons and battlefield tactical nuclear weapons instead of neutralising nuclear threat in Asia was alarming. The critics argued that Sino-Pakistan nuclear collusion would create an asymmetric situation in South-Asia. It was revealed that in 1984 China had supplied sensitive nuclear weapon design information to Pakistan.

The BJP was concerned on Pakistani programme of manufacturing nuclear bomb. "It was no doubt that despite Pakistan's protestations, the acquisition of such nuclear weapon could only be intended to intimidate India and could pose a serious threat to its security and integrity. The BJP was convinced that the country could no longer afford to adopt a policy of drift and escapism in that serious matter involving the country's unity, integrity and security. The BJP would like to declare that it could not even conceive the idea of countering Pakistan's threat by willy-nilly pushing India into the umbrella of any superpower, one or the other. The BJP, therefore, urged the government of
India to take people into confidence on the vital question. An immediate response to Pakistani Nuclear Bomb was necessary. The BJP called upon the government to take immediate steps to develop our own nuclear bomb."43 "So the requirement was maintain parity, it not superiority of arms with her enemies. If Pakistan achieved nuclear weapons capability and China earlier, India could see imminent danger in her frontier. We, therefore, should build up our own nuclear weapons and bomb delivery system to achieve something like parity of effectiveness, so far as China and Pakistan were concerned."44

The Bhopal gas tragedy of 1984 created fear among nations on the question of nuclear reactor safety. India agreed with the United States about the importance of reactor safety standards and practices. The critics alleged that if India pursued parallel policy with the United States it would hamper her nuclear research and her self-reliance drive in that field. If at all India seeks foreign advice, Canada or Japan or Soviet Union might be reliable friends rather than the US. It is also argued that because Chinese


nuclear weapons do not pose any threat to India and Pakistan, the disarmament efforts should be confined to India and Pakistan. Any Indian move to acquire nuclear weapons or any research in that matter would be evaluated seriously in Pakistan. So the nuclear controversy can be solved if India abjures its nuclear policy unilaterally. However, this choice was not supported. If at all India announces such a policy it is not sure that Pakistan will follow it. So it can be said that so long there is no end in world nuclear race, so long the Super Powers pursue their ambiguous policies, India must adopt a strategy of ambivalence. It must watch the situation in West Asia and Diego Garcia where US interests lay and take appropriate steps to meet threat.

It is beyond doubt that suspicion and fear encouraged Pakistan to go for nuclear arms. India realised that Pakistan’s drive to acquire nuclear bomb was due to the American military ambition. America’s foreign policy had become to affect India on the one hand and to conspire Pakistan’s nuclear programme on the other. Washington’s occasional warnings to Pakistan to defer it from acquiring a nuclear bomb was a mere eye-wash. India’s requests of not spending money after nuclear weapons and arms manufacturing were not receiving importance to the Pakistani government. Thus, the preparations for making bombs were going and scarce economic potential of the developing countries was being spent after
unproductive causes. In this situation, "politicians can play help the detached intellectuals in this matter by creating a congenial atmosphere through the adoption of travel restriction between the two countries and also the promotion of regular trade and exchange of ideas. At the same time the two countries must have a provision for the mutual inspection of their nuclear facilities, and a mini-Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of their own."45 It was also argued that "our real enemy being poverty and backwardness it would be an act of sheer madness and jingoism to embark on the road to nuclear weapons and this would have disastrous effect on our economy, destroying ourselves from within".46 "Nuclear arms race would also increase our dependence on the advanced countries and thus would compromise our political independence. National resources would be diverted to non-productive and non-usable weapons programmes and the process would become irreversible".47 However, on the other hand, if Pakistan acquires the bomb, it would leave India insecure, but, at the same time, Pakistan’s strategists must realise that any atomic attack


47. Sharma, D., "India’s N-Bomb Decision Cann’t be secret", Ibid., p.29.
against India should be away from the border of Pakistan lest radioactive waves from the explosion would affect its own people as well. Thus the nuclear option was dangerous for both India and Pakistan. That's why the Bharatiya Janata Party "pledged to build up India as a strong and prosperous nation drawing inspirations from India's age-old culture and values. It would help India to emerge as a great world power playing an effective role in the comity of nations for the establishment of world peace and a just international order". The options, therefore, available to India were of either a resolute, purposeful, controlled nuclear weapons programme or an equally purposeful but a joint programme for non-nuclear South Asia.

South Asian countries having low per capita income should not unnecessarily divert their scarce resources for acquiring nuclear weapons. Instead of it they should endeavour to raise their economic standard first of all. "From this perspective the level of poverty is so great that the horrors of war: thus such expenditures in the West are not


49. Resolutions as adopted in the National Executive Meeting of the BJP on 9 October 1985 in Gandhi Nagar (Gujrat), p.2.

Therefore, either a programme of education or pressure, or both, is justified on the part of the liberal West in dealing with Indians, Pakistanis and others who wish to purchase advanced jet fighters, tanks or nuclear fuel from the West.\textsuperscript{51} It is an undeniable fact that war is dangerous to both the developing and the developed countries and particularly Third World countries cannot afford their scarce economic resource to go waste. So it was expected that the Super Powers should take immediate steps not to further deteriorate world environment further. As all wars, small or big, carry the danger of escalation of nuclear weapons, the non-aligned countries appealed great powers not to get involved into regional as well as global conflicts. "Nevertheless, no arms build up can be sustained unless the population is sufficiently docile and accommodating to accept the costs involved. The key to disarmament lies in people shedding the very doctility which has permitted rearmament of such monstrous proportions in the first place. In other words, it lies in what Einstein once called the chain reaction of awareness; and therefore in mass agitation. In the words of Olof Palme it is very unlikely that disarmament will ever take place if it must wait for the initiatives of governments and experts. It will only come

\textsuperscript{51} Jain, B.N.(ed.), \textit{Reflections on India's Foreign Policy} (Jaipur: RBSA,1990), p.50.
about as the expression of the political will of the people in many parts of the world. It seems reasonable to argue that in view of the mounting costs of rearmament, manifested, for example, in an exorable inflation, the political will of the people cannot remain dormant for long."

In spite of all odds India had always endeavoured for the cause of peace and international cooperation. The Plenary Session of the Indian National Congress thus acknowledged the role played by Indira Gandhi and also Rajiv Gandhi and demanded total nuclear disarmament. The session noted that while the Geneva Summit was a positive step, purposeful and determined action, yet there could be no rest for India until peace is won completely and permanently."

To the contrary, the United States refused to any measure of limiting and restricting production and proliferation of nuclear weapons in any case. So all resolutions that had been agreed in Geneva proved fruitless. "Thereby the United States created an artificial impasse in the nuclear weapons question and showed once again Washington's real attitude to the talks on nuclear and space in Geneva, the absence of


53. Inaugural speech by Congress President Rajiv Gandhi and Centenary Resolve at Congress Centenary Session at Indira Nagar in Bombay on 28 December 1985, p. 33.
readiness and desire on USA’s part to reach agreements on real steps to prevent an arms race in outer space and to stop it on earth." 54 It should be realised that practical measures in the field of disarmament would release enormous funds for mankind’s peaceful development. For this reason India has struggled for restoring peace in South Asia as well as in the world. The Soviet Union also highly praised India’s toil for peace and disarmament in the subcontinent and also throughout the world. "The soviet side was convinced that the friendship between India and the Soviet Union and their common endeavour to preserve peace was an important factor in ruling out the threat of thermo-nuclear war and protecting life on earth". 55

It is correct to say that India’s nuclear programme was designed to use available nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The environmental concern was another factor which prompted Indian government to go for peaceful nuclear energy programme. Side by side, India’s nuclear energy programme aimed at achieving status of a nuclear power. So "India’s nuclear energy and space programmes are essentially of dual purpose. India’s development of missiles in particular is believed to entitle it to a voice in the corridors of world

55. Pravda(Moscow), 7 September 1985.
power, necessitating Indian participation in, for example, future arms control negotiations." The American and Chinese reaction to India's nuclear programme was less shriek due to India's policy of peaceful nuclear explosion. It had also no impact on the world nuclear programme. It's adherence to utilise nuclear power for peaceful purpose was, however, taken seriously by the Pakistani government. Other nuclear powers like Britain and France did not react sharply to India's nuclear policy as they were much concerned about Super Powers' nuclear race.

On 17 December 1985, the Indian Government concluded with the government of Pakistan an agreement not to attack each other's nuclear installations. The BJP held the view that "the agreement conferred on Pakistan not just immunity in its military and nuclear programmes but also it conceded to Pakistan a nuclear status equal to ours". The prime motive which actuated India throughout the turbulent years was that the Indian leaders had been deeply conscious about peace, progress and development and India's policy within the Third World had always been based on the principles of


overign equality, peaceful coexistence, mutual respect for a more just, peaceful society where each human being can develop the totality of high potential.58 "India's adherence to a peaceful approach prevented her from translating the PNE capability into a weapon capability. India had a dual advantage: it retained the right to prescribe disarmament, and at the same time Indian non-nuclear status remained safe. It gave India the deterrent capability in Asia. By not going in for a weapon programme, India legitimised. This nuclear capacity and also retained the diplomatic advantage of a non-nuclear weapon power".59

The Indo-Soviet bilateral cooperation during Rajiv-Gorbachev era was marked by cordiality and "constituted an important sphere of the diversified friendly relations between the two countries and also had great international importance as a powerful factor in the struggle of all peace-loving force of the planet against the war threat, for durable peace and security. It was with profound satisfaction that the genuine friend of India had welcomed the statement made by the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi that India would continue to be guided by the ideals bequeathed by

Pandit Nehru and Indira Gandhi. This was a guarantee of future victories in the consolidation of national independence and in the advancement of the active role of the republic in world affairs.\textsuperscript{60} Mikhail Gorbachev arrived in New Delhi on 25th November, 1986. Both the heads met without aides where they discussed about Pakistan's nuclear programme and acquisition of sophisticated weapons from the United states.\textsuperscript{61}

Perhaps one of the highest watermarks in Indo-Soviet relations since Rajiv Gandhi came to power was the official visit of Mikhail Gorbachev to India in November 1986. In their meetings the two leaders issued 'Delhi Declaration on principle for a Nuclear Weapons Free and Non violent world.' "For India, to seek the evolution and establishment of a non-violent world order was not surprising because of its tradition and philosophy. But for the Soviet Union to subscribe to the idea of a non violent world was something novel.... It indicated India's influence on Soviet thinking. It was a happy coincidence that there was considerable harmony in their thinking on world affairs which was based

\textsuperscript{60.} Banerjee, B.N. \textit{India's Political Unity and Soviet Foreign Policy} (New Delhi:Paribus, 1985), p.217.

on their respective national interests. Their policies with respect to peace and disarmament had many common points. That is why in India, Governments changed, different political parties came to power, but our relations with the Soviet Union continued to grow."\(^{62}\)

The overriding question mankind confronting was whether the humanity would survive before the threat of nuclear race. Under these circumstances regional as well as global efforts of nations were considered to be best weapons to counter the threat of nuclear war. "In the contemporary integral, interconnected and interdependent world, a policy should draw from the cultural treasures of each nation and the entirety of human civilisation. A policy should be fertile with thoughts of human destinies and be founded on humanistic principles. And it was by this type of policy that both India and Soviet Union were guided in international affairs."\(^{63}\)

The Indian government was anxious to implement the Delhi Declaration as it would help in ushering in a


nuclear weapon-free and non-violent world. "Rajiv Gandhi's plan which coincided with Mikhail Gorbachev's statement of January 15, 1986 in many respects, is based on four provisions: one, there should be a binding commitment by all nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear weapons in stages; second, all nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapon states must participate in the process of nuclear disarmament; third, to demonstrate good faith and build the required confidence, there must be tangible progress at each stage towards the common goal; fourth, changes are required in doctrines, policies and institutions to sustain a world free of nuclear weapons. Negotiations should be undertaken to establish a comprehensive global security system under the aegis of the United Nations."64

The reason why there was no relief in Indo-Pakistan nuclear race was a matter of concern. The critics argue that it is because of Pokharan Explosion that has led to tension between the two nations. It is first India that went for nuclear weapons and as a countermeasure Pakistan was bound to acquire atom bomb. Inspite of their irregular

attempts to establish cordial relation the overall estimation proves that India and Pakistan both have passed through a tense phase throughout the eighties. It is a moot question why both of them are so eagerly inviting a nuclear war into a peaceful region even if they are aware of the consequences that would cast on their inhabitants. Reasons are multidimensional. It is because there is no international procedure for inspection of nuclear research programme. Again, unless China is brought in, any serious measure for disarmament would not yield good result. Pakistan suggested that the nuclear dispute with India was a bilateral affair and opposed any sort of foreign intervention. Reacting to the Pakistani opinion Rajiv Gandhi said that "the nuclear problem was a global problem and Pakistan had a role to play in it. It should not act a proxy of the United States. It was not a bilateral issue. On the other hand, when the imperialists said that Pakistan and India should sit together to solve the nuclear was irrelevant."65 So Pakistan's nuclear programme was the most important issue before the Government of India. It was an indirect threat to India's security. "It was not like that USA would help to create a congenial atmosphere or Pakistan would defer from its action, if India sticks to her peaceful approach.

to the use of nuclear energy. So India had only one option, that is to go nuclear and to make nuclear bomb not because China or Pakistan did it but to be recognised as a world power in the international scene."66 Even if the US warned Pakistan to stop military aid in case Pakistan goes for nuclear bomb, yet surprisingly when Soviet Union did the same USA in opposition to Soviet warning extended aid to Pakistan with an aim to check Soviet influence. "It testified American intention of not forcing Pakistan to abide by its promise not to produce nuclear weapons".67

The Soviet Union highly valued India's position and its approach on the issue of the complete halt of all types of nuclear tests everywhere. International security was the most important task before the Soviet Union. India also supported Soviet desire of establishing a comprehensive system of international security. "A high degree of humanism was also evident in the policies of the two countries. Both the Soviet and the Indian people thought not only in terms of their own security or interests, but also related them to universal security and the aspirations of the whole mankind. Only the elimination of nuclear arms would provide


the necessary resources for improving the life of nations, would provide for abolishing hunger, poverty, illiteracy and other social and economic ills".68 "It is clear that India continued to play a key role in Soviet strategy and ideology. The Indo-Soviet relations in Gorbachev-Rajiv era demonstrated special ties with each other. On its arms control position vis-a-vis the United States, the Soviets had New Delhi's support to the hilt".69 "It is observed that Indo-Soviet and US-Pakistan relations stood on very different footing. While the US used Pakistan card to pressurise India, the Soviet Union had never asked India to play its proxy. The different positions of the two states of our subcontinent clearly explained the US hostility to India."70 India had played its independent role considering both national and international situations. Neither it sought Soviet support to dominate or influence other countries. On the other hand, Pakistan never showed its independent


judgement and actions and everytime Washington directed Islamabad to toe US line.

The security environment around the country had considerably degenerated. The Government of India in this circumstances favoured disarmament, a nuclear free world and pursued a peaceful non-aligned policy. But the BJP was not satisfied with the policies of the Indian government. In his presidential address, L.K. Advani remarked, "When dangers face the country our response should not be half-hearted and unconvincing. Considering fully the pros and cons of the issue the BJP was of the view that India must go in for a nuclear deterrent of its own." Besides, it is not that we shall neglect our economic development or ignore peace and disarmament. Our efforts should be to strengthen the movement of peace and disarmament to avoid nuclear war. So the main tenets of the BJP's foreign policy approach were that "the money and energy should be spent to remove poverty and illiteracy instead of spending after nuclear arms, its manufacture and proliferation".

No doubt, India should increasing activity in taking

initiatives and advancing proposals intended to help normalise the situation on the globe,"to achieve disarmament and to reduce the nuclear danger; when the Soviet people supported India's struggle for a world without nuclear arms".73 There had been all sided cooperation between the two countries. But the United States, in its strategy to restore balance of power in South East Asia and to counter India's link towards Russia, started strengthening India's two border states, China and Pakistan. If Pakistan by any means becomes a nuclear power, our security would be threatened. As the BJP observed, "Soviet Union, no doubt, had been a good friend in need but when gratitude and our national interests come into conflict, the later would be more important and on that account a change in our policy was urgently needed".74 India had all capabilities to manufacture bomb. But the only question was whether India would reverse its policy of Peaceful Nuclear Explosion? "Because India owed the United States a pledge of peaceful use and safeguards in perpetuity for Tarapore plutonium and to safeguard and restrict to peaceful use of the plutonium from Madras and

73. Alekseyev, Aleksandr, "USSR-India: Cooperation for the benefit of the peoples", International Affairs (Moscow), (5), May 1987, pp.48-49.

Looking at the security scenario in the eighties, there were two sections of people giving two different opinions. While some argued that if India goes for a bomb it would increase the danger of proliferation as in the case of Europe or America. The other section differ with this sort of stand by India viewing Pakistani attempt to possess a bomb. It must be noted that the Government of India being attacked from several quarters reiterated its faith in peaceful nuclear policy and strived for disarmament. Thus the policy India picked up during Jawaharlal Nehru continued in the eighties. This stand of India was commendable world wide. It was not that India was not bothered about her security as Pakistan had opted for nuclear bomb, but her effort was to deliver humanity from the nuclear holocaust, and to bring about a durable trend towards a healthier international environment. The Indian government was also critical of the America's policies in Pakistan and South Asia. But the United States did not even listen to India's appeal. In South Asia and West Asia, USA had vital interests and it did not want to lose its hold in these regions. "Pakistan's Islamic status enabled it to influence

happenings in the Persian Gulf and served as an alternative cold war defence site. So close link between the US and Pakistan became a necessity and therein came the problems between India and the US. The US attempts at balancing the Indian and Pakistan claims though did not always meet with success, yet the US government could able to wield its influence in South Asia."  

The disarmament treaties between the US and the USSR was regarded as a historical importance on the ground that since the dawn of the nuclear race there was no formal treaty between the two Super Powers. The INF treaty between them was an uphill task which would inspire Third World countries to think on disarmament. "The BJP highly appreciated the efforts of the two superpowers which could lead the mankind in this field". On this occasion the Government of India extended its warm support. India had always stood for peace and disarmament efforts. The Indian government always supported all steps taken in this regard. Shri K.Natwar Singh, Minister of State for External Affairs, in the plenary session of Conference on Disarmament declared, 

77. National Executive Meeting of the BJP, 1-3 January, 1988, Ernakulam(Kerala), p.11.
"We, in India firmly believe that the time has come for the international community to engage in some collective introspection on our present predicament... We urge that serious consideration be given to the changes of doctrines, policies, attitudes and institutions required to realise the prospects of a nuclear weapon free world that has opened up now. We have to develop means to channelise these applications into a stabilising mode. In order to do so, we need continually to assess the implications of these developments for security. We also need to develop appropriate institutional mechanisms which are capable of understanding this task."

Even if the Super Powers agreed to reduce their nuclear weapons, other nuclear powers went on producing nuclear arms. They were not bound by any treaty like the INF. So danger did not come from the Super Powers but from other nuclear powers. In case of India, the Indian Government refused to endorse the proposal for a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia because of Pakistani and Chinese nuclear programmes. "What was necessary that time was that USA should deter Pakistan from going in for fissionable material

or producing uranium of weapons grade". On many occasions, the AICC(I) had taken serious note of Pakistan’s persistent efforts to acquire nuclear capability and urged the Government of India to take all appropriate steps to meet the threat. So the call of the hour was to cover up regional conflicts and to develop regional dialogues and mutual understandings between states. "Then it would be possible not only to wince the "nuclear syndrome" but to achieve a breakthrough in combating poverty, protecting the environment, hunger and other large scale disasters".

There was no significant development in Indo-Soviet relations in 1989, perhaps because "some of India’s leading nuclear scientists had demonstrated little enthusiasm for Soviet nuclear facilities, particularly in comparison to alternative sources in the West and Japan or in India’s own advanced nuclear-energy programme". Another fact was that, even if the USSR offered assistance in India’s peaceful


80. Resolution passed in the AICC Meeting held on 23rd and 24th April 1988, at Maraimalai Nagar (Tamil Nadu), p.33.

81. TASS, 18 November 1988.

nuclear energy programme, the Soviet leased submarine to India in 1989 created unhappiness in USA. The US was also opposed to sell a nuclear powered submarine to a country like India as it would create fresh tension between India and Pakistan. But the US administration did not stop the transfer of high-tech to India, for it did not want to displease India as it did not in the case of Tarapore. Later, towards mid-1989, on the visit of Frank Carlucci, American Secretary of Defence. "India conveyed him its apprehensions about Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme", and the US assured India to look into the matter. It shows that inspite of divergencies, ups and downs in US-India bilateral relations. Cordial relations grew up towards the end of the eighties.

We have also seen that the world military expenditure was stepping up neglecting the developmental process. Though the liabilities were increasing day by day, yet there was no cut on defence expenditure. The nuclear weapons were accumulating in a greater scale. Those steps definitely affected the research works, economic and scientific developments of not only the developing countries but also the developed nations. Despite the sincere desire of India and other concerned nations the Super Powers went on increasing

their defence build-up, as for example, table 1 shows that the United States spent as much as $300 billion in 1989 whereas $134 billion in 1980. We can assess the increase of defence expenditure in just ten years, a three-fold increase of expenditure. The graph shows that the rapid increase of defence expenditure by the US Government. In 1987 it was at the highest peak, though later due to sufficient initiatives taken by the world leaders, the US defence expenditure toward down in 1988 and 1989. We can argue that the money spent after the production and proliferation of weapons could have been directed to the poor countries struggling for raising their standard of living. A liberalised trade and official aid could have ameliorated the conditions of poor Third World countries. Excepting Italy and Canada, in case of other NATO powers, there was no substantial increase in defence preparedness (Table 2). Thanks to the agreement of both the Super Powers the nuclear weapons were decided to be reduced in phases.

The Geneva Conference succeeded in mobilising public opinion against the production and proliferation of nuclear warheads. New ideas and proposals were also tabled in the special session. India proposed an Action Plan in this regard which envisioned that nuclear disarmament cannot be attained till the nuclear weapons are committed to observe the doctrines of deterrence. If the proposed regulations of
the conference are not strictly observed and till the reduction of nuclear arms are not taken under immediate effect the world cannot be regarded safe. So, "India's Action Plan was based on the premise that the process of disarmament cannot be confined to USA and USSR, but there should be a binding commitment by all nations to eliminate nuclear weapons".84 India's approach was to eliminate the nuclear weapons by 2010 A.D. and to establish a non-violent, nuclear-weapon free world, so that the mankind would survive.85 To sum up, "Rajiv Gandhi's foreign policy was based on the principle of 'pacification' rather than 'pacifism'. Pacifism generally means elimination of force; pacification on the other hand, refers to the belief that violence is unjustified. He was not a pacifist in a sense that he did not believe that in interstate or international affairs, resort to force has already been eschewed. The threats are there.... There have to be defence ministries, defence budgets and defence forces. But they are only for 'defence' and never for committing aggression. We have to have nuclear programmes, but only for peaceful purposes."86

85. Election Manifesto, Congress (I), 1989, p.57.
The supreme objective of a nation is to promote its national interest. So foreign policy is formulated and implemented considering a nation's desire. Sometimes global interest is also taken into consideration. Then only a foreign policy is good and effective when it contains the contents of other nations' interests. It must guess for friendly countries, but may have to be unfriendly for the adversaries. Adoption of suitable means and tactics at the right moment can only testify the validity of a country's foreign policy. So the worth of Kautilya's diplomacy is still authentic on which our present days diplomats must rely on. No doubt, Pakistan and China both moved against India and their drive for nuclear bomb concerned Indian diplomats. On the contrary, India had to receive nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union. In this situation, South Asia was moving towards grave danger which would escalate arms race to an unprecedented scale.

In such a situation, the critics argue whether India should go nuclear and seek nuclear weapons or should it go without nuclear weapons? Acquisition of nuclear weapons as it understood cannot leave off their hostilities, rather it would affect their good relations. It would besprinkle fear and suspicion. To solve these unresolved problems the focus should be fixed on the elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons, to let the people live peacefully. It
should be realised that the risk of employing nuclear weapons implies destruction. Without an Indian willingness to move on this issue, other states like Pakistan cannot do a lot as they are aware of India’s nuclear capability. However, it does not mean that it is unnecessary to keep our defence equipment prepared but surely it does not say that we should keep on arming ourselves with the weapons the developed countries eager to proliferate.

There is another section who argue that if Pakistan and China go nuclear and bring nuclear warheads to our border, why not India? If they have not made nuclear weapons sufficiently to their advantage, they can get it elsewhere or else they can make it tomorrow, because they have that capability and technology and if not, they can get it to make it. So the critics stress that India should think of her future now itself. It should not hesitate to acquire sophisticated weapons being supplied by the developed countries. May they earn by exporting nuclear weapons to the Third World, but security is much important than considering one’s income. We shall have to aware of the danger of nuclear confrontation. So, it is a moot question whether India should go nuclear or not? "If India has to become a nuclear weapons state for the time being, she has to go in for a fission bomb with suitable delivery system and it will
be mainly meant for deterring Pakistan. The weapon system has to be acquired with a full commitment not to be its first user. We have to bear in mind that use of such weapons may do a lot more damage to Pakistan but India cannot escape the fallout depending upon how close to the border the target is. It should also be kept in mind that cutting down the conventional weapons will not be a feasible proposition.87

The nuclear race which dominated the international scene over many decades was on the edge in the last part of the eighties. There were significant political and economic changes in the second half of the eighties. The process of halting nuclear race seriously started in the eighties only. New political and economic orders were setting in. The climate was improved, opportunities widened and above all NAM was seem to have acquired renewed validity. Under such a change in the world, India’s foreign policy had to be affected. So the question arose whether there would be an end in the hostility between India on the one hand and China and Pakistan on the other? In the totality of the situation, taking the example of the two Super Powers the three Asian countries should normalise their relations. India’s efforts to normalise relations with Pakistan and

China were also of key importance. In case of India, it has only one option to her security problem, i.e., to keep up her peaceful nuclear research and simultaneously to try for normalising relations with the neighbours.
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a Operations and maintenance
b Research, development testing and evaluation.

Source: SIPRI DATA BASE
TABLE-II

DEFENCE EXPENDITURE: NATO