Conclusion
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With a review on Japan's strategies and foreign policies to improve energy security during last decades, we observe that international events, trends and processes based on the different kind the structure of international systems has influenced these policies.

Based on the analytical framework of this thesis, for analyzing Japan's foreign policy regarding to energy security during the years after the Second World War, different kinds of theories has been used. In other words, according to the theoretical framework here proposed, it is not expected that all foreign policies of a specific state are better explained by the same approach. Since different policies are decided by different actors and under different contexts of action, each policy may follow a different logic.

The main question of this research was:

"Which models and approaches are the bases of Japan’s foreign policymaking about the issue of energy security after the first oil shock at the mid of 1970s?"

Now, after studying the events and elements that have impacted the transformation of approaches in Japan's foreign policy regarding energy security and understanding this important point that how has Japan’s foreign policy with respect to energy security transformed in different period, and also what are the main doctrines of Japan's foreign policy that help to improve these evolution processes based on a case study of Iran-Japan relations, it seems that the most important results of this research are:

1. Japan’s approach in the realm of foreign policy making of energy security after the first oil shock at the mid of 1970s has been transformed in the framework of the evolution of international systems from an increased dependency and reliance on multinational oil companies and major state powers (based on Waltz's neo-realism approach) to a model of mutual interdependency between Japan and the oil producing countries (based on Keohane and Nye interdependency theory).

2. And after the collapse of USSR, Japan's foreign policy regarding energy security has been changed to a constructive participatory pattern which is a part of the process of globalizing values and identities that we call it as a global dependency in a hegemonic stability situation (based on Wendt's constructivism theory).
3. With respect to constructive participatory pattern, Iran's stability and security to transporting raw materials to Japan and keeping the route of energy transportation safely is becoming increasingly important in Japan's foreign policy for energy security.

However, although Japanese politicians tried to follow different patterns and approaches to improve their national security and decrease their vulnerability in this issue, Japan is confronting yet new challenges in its process to keeping energy security in both regional and international levels.

During the first year of 1990s, Joseph Nye, the famous international politics theorist, emphasized both the dynamic and the relative nature of power in international relations. He claimed that raw materials and heavy industry are less critical indices of economic power, for example, than they were in the nineteenth century. Instead, it is information and professional and technical services that are crucial. (Langdon, 1993, 20)

Although Nye's idea was accurate, however, the international trends during last two decades have approved that energy security issue has been always between the top politico-economic issues in the world and it seems that it will keeps its position in the foreseen future. In fact, the continual expansion of a nation's manufacturing, technology, and financial power, however, is still fueled by energy and raw materials.

Although some industrialized countries such as the United States, Australia and Canada are key suppliers of certain categories of raw materials, developing countries mostly are becoming the major source for important natural resources, including oil. The political stability and economic development of developing countries may therefore be said to have a direct bearing upon Japan's economic security, and the evolution of the North-South problem can be expected to have a far-reaching effect on the future of the Japanese economy.

In Japan, it is now often remarked that 'the age of limited resources' has arrived. Although the really pessimistic views on the physical depletion of important non-renewable resources, as represented by the Club of Rome's *Limits to growth* (1972), have been empirically refuted, the high concentration of critical resources in a limited number of politically unstable countries or regions, could pose serious threats to the continued smooth supply of these resources.

Japan is dependent on foreign sources for about 85 per cent of its total energy needs and 99 per cent of its oil. On the other hand, Japan is still dependent on the major
international oil companies for a part of its oil imports. In a crisis, these foreign importers could channel oil away from Japan. Likewise, if relations with foreign governments were to deteriorate, such governments might instruct their oil companies to act in a similar fashion.

Japan’s heavy dependence on a few sources for many of its raw materials makes it very vulnerable, especially when these sources are concentrated in politically unstable areas (as in the case of oil). But historical and geographical factors, economic feasibility and the time needed to develop new supply sources all militate against any solution to the problem in the short term. Given its small land area, poor natural resources, large population and the size of its economy, Japan can never become self-sufficient in resource supply. As far as oil is concerned, Japan has been trying, at both the governmental and the private level, to find new suppliers as well as to maintain and strengthen friendly relations with its existing suppliers in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

However, Japan faces different levels of difficulty in the two most important energy exporting regions (Southeast Asia and the Middle East) when it comes to the problems of domestic instability and international conflict.
The Future Challenges of Japan's Energy Security

A. Japan's Energy Security Challenges in Southeast Asia

In Southeast Asia, today we have a serious problem of national instability in a major oil and gas-producing nation. The new democratic system in Indonesia remains fragile. Perhaps more danger may come from regional differences in provinces that produce oil and gas. Demands for autonomy and independence threaten to expand beyond present hot spots.

Apart from the question of safety on the high seas, the possibility of a closure of important passageways such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Malacca Strait is another constant cause of concern: over 70 per cent of oil bound for Japan passes through the Strait of Hormuz; about one third of Japan's total export and import goods, including about 80 per cent of its oil imports, passes through the Malacca Strait. An alternative to the Malacca Strait is the Lombok Strait, but the Lombok route means rerouting by an additional thousand miles. Furthermore, whereas the former is de facto international strait surrounded by Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the latter is within the territorial waters claimed by Indonesia and would subject Japan's lifeline to the policy influence of one country. This increases the importance of keeping the Malacca Strait open to Japanese vessels.

As in the report of the Library of Congress mentioned:

"Japan is vitally dependent on maintaining access to regional and worldwide shipping lanes and fishing areas, but it is incapable of defending the sea routes on which it relied. Its energy supplies came primarily from Middle Eastern sources, and its tankers had to pass through the Indian Ocean, the Strait of Malacca, and the South China Sea, making them vulnerable to hostilities in Southeast Asia. Vulnerability to interception of oceangoing trade remained the country's greatest strategic weakness."

(Library of Congress, January 1994)

The developments have also fostered a quiet but significant arms buildup in Asia. This is probably not as surprising as it may at first appear: Asia has seven of the ten largest militaries in the world; the size and diversity of the region ensure the presence of numerous animosities, ethnic and religious tensions, and historic regional rivalries; and the successful growth and development of the region over the past decade have made new resources available for national military purposes. At the same time, growing population pressures, decreasing global reserves of petroleum, and increasing
competition for food, water, and other natural resources have encouraged increased Asian attention to securing their territorial land and water. (Donnelly, 1993, 212) However, while the three largest oil-consuming regions in the world are the US, the EU, and Asia, the US and the EU can expect to increase the oil supply from within their respective regions and from neighboring regions; hence, their dependency on the Middle East will not increase much. In contrast, imports from the Middle East to Asia are expected to jump dramatically. This is because the demand for oil in developing Asian countries will increase greatly, whereas regional production will not. China has been a net oil importer since 1993 and Malaysia, Indonesia, and India may follow suit in the near future. This situation has caused these countries to aggressively pursue development of oil fields in Africa and the Middle East in order to secure their supply.

An increased dependency on Middle Eastern oil would put all Asian countries at grave economic risk in the event that the oil supply was interrupted. This requires that Japan step up its contribution of know-how to the improvement of oil reserve systems being pursued by developing Asian countries. Other issues that need to be examined are the construction of a joint reserve system and the sharing of oil reserves between Asian countries in times of emergency.

**B. Japan's Energy Security Challenges in Middle East**

The Middle East, with all its cultural heritage and history is a region of compelling interest to a large number of Japanese people. There had been fervor amongst intellectual interest to carry out studies on the Silk Road, since such studies satisfied historical curiosity and the pursuit of its roots. The intellectual interest of Japan in the region now goes well beyond this traditional topic of the Silk Road and it is rightly direct at the core of the entire culture and society.

However, if the Middle East were closer to Japan, its history and impact on it would be different. Middle East, the cradle of some of the world’s oldest civilizations, neither threatened Japan nor provided it with models. It is extremely difficult for the Japanese to become familiar with the Middle East. In general, there was a vague sense that something mysterious was happening in this part of the distant world because the Middle East is the point of contact of three of the world’s greatest religions, that is to
say Judaism, Christianity and Islam, which all emerged in the region. However, all those monotheistic religions were alien to the Japanese, their religious traditions and their way of thinking. Japanese people tend not to accept what are called absolute values or absolute teachings.

In most ways, the Middle East differs from all parts of the world. In Japan, the same people have been settled where they are for thousands of years. In the Middle East, on the other hand, all kinds of different people have been coming and going throughout history, not only people native to the region but also people such as Alexander, Julius Caesar, the Crusaders, Genghis Khan, Napoleon, etc; eventually, all the great conquerors of history left their marks here. In short, the very odd political landscape of the Middle East is so confusing and troublesome that the Japanese prefer not to even think about it.

This lack of interest in the region is facilitated by Japanese ideas concerning Islam and the Moslems. Even in Southeast Asia, Japan, after occupying Malaysia and Indonesia, both of which have a large Moslem population, did not develop a positive attitude vis-à-vis Islam. Since then, the Japanese have turned their attention to economic growth and their contacts with the Southeast Asian countries were predominantly seen in economic and technological not religious and cultural terms.

Although the oil shock of 1973 resulted in a lot of sudden attention being directed towards the Moslem World by the Japanese press, this was for economic and not military or other reasons. Since then, there have been a few international events during which Islam and the Moslems drew the attention of the Japanese, one of which was the report on the terrorist military and political activities of the so-called Moslem fundamentalists. This was of great importance to certain intellectual circles, as were the reports on various cultural conflicts; for example, the destruction of the great Buddha statues in Afghanistan by the Taliban.

Here it should be pointed out that there exists a gap between the perceptual incongruity towards the region and actual concern regarding what is happening here. In comparison to the United States and most other Western countries, Japan remains extraordinarily susceptible to serious disruptions in supply or increase in the price of raw materials. Following the shock of the 1973 oil crisis, Japan managed by 1986 to reduce its dependence on oil for primary energy from 77.4 per cent to 56.6 per cent. In the period since then, however, its dependence has remained at the same level.
The bottom line is that while the United States depends on Middle Eastern oil for only about 5 per cent of its primary energy needs, the figure for Japan is more than 50 per cent. As a result, the Middle East is the one area of the world with which Japan runs a chronic and severe negative trade balance. In short, Japan has more to gain from peace and stability in the region than any other industrial country.

It seems that Japan will continue to rely on the Middle East for its major oil supply in as much as the Japanese economy consumes a huge amount of energy for growth and there is not adequate alternative source of supply. The geographical constraint on Japan’s oil supply is inescapable.

The uniqueness of the Japanese approach to overseas oil procurement, in particular to Middle East oil will be the focus of the following discussion. The approach results from the structural weaknesses of the Japanese oil industry:

- a. Japan has become a big oil consumer without having adequate oil supply resources of its own either at home or abroad;
- b. The lack of a large, integrated oil company which can supply a substantial part of the oil required by the Japanese economy.

These two observations are too superficial and it is necessary to substantial and expands them by historical, political and economic evidence concerning the Japanese oil industry and government policies relating to it.

In recent years, Japan has become politically more and more visible in the region. Thus, in the last two decades or so people have become used to the idea of Japan as a visible, if not active, political player in the region. Nowadays, several different agencies are making policy in this region: for example, the Prime Minister’s Office followed by the Foreign Ministry Office and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry known as MITI, etc. The Federation of Economic Organizations is also implicated in this.

During the past two decades international issues have been the most serious impediment to Japan’s oil security in the Middle East. The Arab-Israeli dispute appeared to necessitate a delicate balance between its close relationship with the United States and a perceived need to placate the Arab states. It also reinforced the fact that Tokyo was dependent upon the American armed forces when faced with armed aggression in the Persian Gulf.

The Persian Gulf had not faced a domestic system change since the Islamic Revolution in Iran until the regime change in Iraq in 2003. However, as noted before,
conditions are present that could undermine present authority with possible serious implications to foreign oil and gas consumers. Radical change need not be an obstacle to continued supply as Japan found after the Iranian Revolution. While Japanese business suffered during the uncertainties of regime change, ultimately both Japan and the European states were able to continue to import oil from Iran and Iraq. Yet, the Persian Gulf states, and particularly Saudi Arabia, are considerably more important to Japan and there certainly exist structural factors that can undermine current regimes. Given these developments abroad, what leverage does Japan have to influence either international or domestic problems? It does not have, nor does it seek, the military capability to project its power into Southeast Asia, let alone the Middle East. There is little possibility that political reality in Japan will change this situation. Traditional post-war interpretations of constitutional restrictions on military activity are changing, but there are important limits. Foreign policy is a complicated process in most countries, but the Japanese Constitution makes things even more difficult.

In the past, public opinion has not supported military operations abroad that would entail fighting by Japanese military personnel. There is little probability of these attitudes changing in any significant manner. If conflict takes place in oil producing areas, Tokyo must depend upon the military power of others, and particularly the United States.

Beyond military capability and constitutional restrictions, there are other problems. Japan has not been willing to employ foreign trade and investment as a political weapon, preferring to see them as long-term tools leading to stability and democratization. While Tokyo may see development aid as a foreign policy tool, countries like Indonesia do not appear heavily influenced by it. In the Middle East, aid does not go to major oil producing states. In Japan itself, the deregulation of energy and other elements of the financial structure will limit the government’s ability to develop a coordinated energy policy. Rather than the long-term contract of the past, refiners may be more interested in shopping for the best price on the market.

Yet the level of Japanese involvement in the Middle East has not reflected this vulnerability. Of course, Japan is not the United States and therefore does not have to bother about the Pentagon, the CIA, the media, American Jews, American Arabs, etc. Yet, there are Japanese with an interest in war, peace, human rights, the global threat, the defense budget, the price of oil, the price of the yen, the price of the dollar, etc. However, the ability of Tokyo to implement independent resource diplomacy is not
great. Japan's renunciation of military force or arms sales in its foreign policy poses a serious constraint in an area of the world where the use of force has been all too frequent and arms sales have been a primary instrument of influence. But Japan has also been a marginal player in the political and diplomatic arenas.

On the other hand, Iran, meanwhile, has been accused of seeking to disrupt the American-sponsored peace process and the Americans have labeled Iran a prime sponsor of international state terrorism and accused it of seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction as well as conventional weaponry. The Japanese are aware of those accusations, and agree, in most cases, with the Americans, yet they tend to differ on what should be done concerning Iran. However, Japan, together with the European Union (EU) has rejected the American-imposed complete economic embargo on Iran.

Sanctions have proven to be a more difficult problem in the Middle East than they have been in Southeast Asia. In the Persian Gulf, American sanctions and pressure have provided a more serious challenge, particularly when directed against Iran. While Tokyo has worried about sanctions formulated by its American ally, there is a major question as to how effective they will be in the future. Moreover, Japan needs to plan its own long-term energy security policy with particular emphasis on Iran. In addition, many of the Japanese companies have become multinationals and moved their production bases all over the region.

However, the impact of the firing of new long-range missiles by North Korea caused everyone to panic. Iran has suspected combat effort to acquire those missiles provided a pathway for the argument that there is a secret axis involving Iran, North Korea and possibly Pakistan, and Japan has realized that assistance to Iran might indirectly help it and its allies to gain the technologies that will eventually threaten Japan’s own security. Therefore, in this respect, Japan comes closer to the American position. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the potential collision of interests between Japan and the United States will emerge for some time to come, but it is important to bear in mind that differences exist.

In addition, Japan's tasks vis a vis the Middle East have been twofold: to maintain access to current sources of oil, to try and find new ones in the area, and to find the means to pay for more costly imports - Japan's 1979 oil requirement cost three times that of 1978; and secondly, to try and ensure against further political disruptions. To
meet these tasks, Japan has adopted two major and sometimes conflicting policy approaches, each one in turn gaining ascendancy over the other.

- Bilateralism: The emphasis on bilateralism has resulted from an appreciation that confused political relations between the West and the Arab oil producers plus a tight oil market contribute to the politicization of oil. The 1979-80 period was characterized by an underlying tension among Japan and its Western allies as they competed for oil and trade and, partly as a consequence, found it difficult to agree over what might be the most appropriate mix of policies both to help stabilize the Middle East and to ensure access to oil.

Differing economic constraints and degrees of dependence on Middle East oil have influenced the various Western perceptions of the threat and policy preferences. Whilst recognizing the need for the West to counter potential Soviet advances in the Middle East, Japan (like the West Europeans) has perceived conflict as indigenous and has emphasized the need for political and economic policies rather than military ones to promote regional stability.

However, Japan's growing stake after 1973 in maintaining harmonious relations with Middle East oil producers through bilateral diplomacy-based on investment, aid and trade involved a number of risks. In particular, Japan's economic interests in the area made it particularly vulnerable to the potential political demands of its Middle East partners on the Arab-Israel dispute. This threatened to complicate the even more important security relationship with the United States. Japan's dilemma was sharper than that of the West Europeans both because of its greater dependence on Middle East oil and because of its isolation in security terms; it has no security alliance such as NATO on which to fall back.

However, there are some difficulties to follow the bilateralism policy. the oil-rich countries of the Middle East which have the capacity to finance the development of almost any agricultural or industrial enterprise do not, on the other hand, have either a sufficiently large indigenous market, or the capacity to staff new manufacturing plants, or populations with the disposition to become involved in an industrial lifestyle. With this respect, this scenario is likely to remain for as much as a decade unless there is a significant change in the stability of the region.

- Multilateralism: Alliance constraints have both complicated and sometimes threatened to jeopardize Japan's bilateral links so carefully established between 1973 and 1979. This is because Japan has been fully aware of its overwhelming dependence
on the United States in strategic, political and economic terms. As a consequence, after the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, when the primary emphasis of American policies shifted to the containment of the Soviet Union in the Third World, Japan has appreciated the need to demonstrate support for its American protector by carrying burdens and accepting responsibilities in keeping with its economic strength.

With respect to the aforementioned points, there are two basic components that have constantly played a major role in Japan's policy towards the Middle East. To put it bluntly, there is the American factor on the one hand and the oil factor on the other. When the international conditions were rigidly set by the Cold War structure, Japan was so heavily dependent on the Pax-Americana that people believed it was only natural for Japan to either take its lead unquestioningly from the United States or remain as inconspicuous as possible.

In a way, the Japanese had no urge to change the existing framework in the Middle East or anywhere in the world for that matter, being content to merely follow American policy. In this sense, Japan was far more passive than the allies of the United States in Europe and it did not even try to lay the groundwork that was necessary in order to establish itself in the region. What happens in the Middle East has a way of affecting America and what affects Americans has a way of affecting other people, including the Japanese, and it is for this reason that the American factor came to represent a predominant political element of the Japanese attitude towards the Middle East.

On the other hand, securing a stable energy inflow is a necessity of the utmost priority for Japan. This energy factor formulated the dominant economic element of the Japanese approach to the Middle East and up to a certain point in the history; the two factors mentioned above meant the same thing. The world oil market was controlled by major oil companies, which are predominantly American. Japan preferred the cheap oil provided by them rather than to invest in overseas or exploration ventures. There were, of course, exceptions like the case of the Arabian Oil Company, which was established in the late 1950s to produce crude oil in the neutral zone between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Japan's oil was perceived as being supplied by the Americans or Euro-American companies to be more precise and not by the Middle East itself. Therefore, Japan did not have to formulate its own stance with regard to the region. Washington expresses its demands and Tokyo complies - the same old pattern repeated itself over and again - and historically this was a reason for Japan to stay away from the Middle East.
The Perspective of Japan's Foreign Policy

Japan's pattern of behavior, exact role and agenda, and policies and strategies in the international system remain puzzling to many when compared to the other major industrialized powers. The reasons and motivations for Japan's pattern of behavior and choice of roles are also subject to intense controversy. Japan's mode of interaction and selection of policy tools in the international system, and especially its predilection for economic over military forms of power, are seen to differ markedly from the other major industrialized powers. For these reasons, a major debate has unfolded about whether or not Japan is a truly effective player in the international system.

In short, for many observers, both academic and non-academic alike, key questions about Japan's international relations remain unanswered. These are related to the 'what', in terms of trying to establish what has been and is Japan's pattern of behavior and role in the international system; the 'why', in terms of trying to explain why Japan opts to behave in the way it does; and the 'how', in terms of the means, methods and effectiveness of how Japan pursues its international role. (Hook and others, 2001, 24)

Few people discuss Japanese foreign policy in "strategic" terms. Indeed, most observers characterize Japan's postwar policies as "passive," "reactive," excessively "differential" to the United States, and lacking any articulation of "Japanese" interests-all characterizations that connote the absence of any strategic logic or rationale. (Donnelly, 1993, 202)

Japanese themselves describe their foreign policy as using value free diplomacy (issainokachi handan of Shinai giako), omindirectional diplomacy (zenhoi gaiko), or multidirectional peace diplomacy (zenhoi heiwagiako), to achieve neo-mercantilist goals. Critics of mainstream argue that Japan has avoided making important foreign policy decisions and call Japan's diplomacy "dependent diplomacy on the United States". Others believe that Japan has no foreign policy except for economic diplomacy and think that Japan's foreign policy lacks principles.

According to some analysts, Japan's approach to the issue of security has been that of an expending international trading company, not that of a nation-state. Japan's international activities have concentrated on maximizing national economic well-being, and all matters of power politics have been scrupulously avoided. Economic
and politics are seen as separable and armaments and real politik are not believed to be critical to a successful foreign policy. Instead, international trade is seen as the primary guarantor of peace. They describe Japan as a "power without purpose" and "fundamentally incapable of responsible international leadership." (Nester, 1990, 79-81)

To these criticisms, Shinsaku Hogen, a retired administrative vice-foreign minister, responded that,

"It is wrong to think that Japan's postwar diplomacy lacks initiative. The U.S. - Japan security treaty is a prime example of Japan's autonomous diplomacy. Japan made that decision." (Itoh, 1998)

In fact, while Japan has clearly tried to keep as low a political profile as possible, it is not true that its foreign policy has been 'value free'. In reality Japanese foreign policy has been built on a very clear principle. Anything that contributes to Japan's short and long term goals of development, predominance and international recognition is justifiable.

One must also consider the general features of Japan's approach to the world and the distinctively Japanese style in foreign policy. Both Japanese and non-Japanese scholars comment often on a certain insularity in Japanese culture and on the closed nature of Japanese society; without attempting to probe this subject in depth here, it is still possible to observe that the attention paid to most areas of the world, beyond the immediate East Asian neighborhood, has been relatively sparse until recent years. (Kuroda and Asai, 1990, 184)

The legacy of World War Two and an anti-military constitution further encouraged a style of foreign policy that was reticent and reactive rather than assertive, often being expressed in the lowest-common-denominator language of simple opposition to the use of force and promotion of diplomatic solutions to conflicts. Also, as Yasumasa Kuroda points out, "Japanese approach the world in a syncretic way," seeking conciliation rather than confrontation with all parties and trying to avoid offense to any of them; it is therefore instinctive to avoid taking sides in distant regional conflicts even when the tactical advantages of an active diplomacy push in that direction. (Kuroda, 1990, 45)

Most observers agree that Japanese foreign policies - in term of Japan's postwar strategic objective - have been generally successful. From a country devastated by war, Japan has risen to the front ranks of the world's industrial and technological powers. Its personal-income levels are at least as high as those in the United States,
and its economic impact is truly global in nature. Although Japan has not translated its economic capabilities into comparable military strength, and hence remains dependent on the United States as its ultimate security guarantor, it has managed to sustain an active U.S. involvement in Japan’s defense while significantly improving its self-defense capabilities. (Donnelly, 1993, 208)

Most observers find it easier to identify the road Japan has traveled in the post-World War II period to its current status as an economic and financial great power. Retroactively called the “Yoshida Doctrine,” this policy emphasized economic reconstruction and growth, minimal defense efforts, and a reliance on the United States. This external policy was characterized by passivity and reactiveness regionally and globally, a near-obsession with economic and resource diplomacy, the avoidance of involvement in political and strategic issues, and strong dependence on a Pax Americana international system. It was a neo-mercantilist, neo-isolationist, low-profile, low risk strategy. (Yasutomo, 1993, 323)

In the post-Cold War world, however, ever-deepening global interdependence of international peace and security creates the new situation and Japan needs to do a review on its foreign policy. Thrust into a prominent global position due to its prodigious economic success, Japan’s idle observer stance in world affairs will no longer be tolerated by other nations. Indeed, the era of passive Japanese foreign policy has come to an end. Japan is now expected to play a substantial, if not leadership role, in helping to create post-Cold War international order and institutions. Japan in the twenty-first century faces both the responsibility and promising challenge, at long last, of conducting proactive foreign policy.

The world has become too small and too crowded, its people too intermingled and too interdependent, its weapons too lethal. The global community appears, therefore, to be uniting around the idea that it should assume greater collective responsibility in a wide range of areas including security; involved here is the concept of global management of issues, so-called global governance.

In fact, our understanding of hegemony, particularly economic hegemony, in the decade ahead should be transformed from notions of single country dominance to notions of collective international leadership. Claims that dominance produces desired stability have often been self-serving nationalist claims by those who benefit from or agree with the interests of the hegemon leadership on the other hand, demonstrated by building consensus where by all major participants have an important role in the
international decision making. This type of leadership/cooperation system may be seen as ushering in a "post-hegemonic" world order or substantially changing the concept of the hegemony. It will remain hegemonic in so far as a relatively few wealthy and powerful countries will continue to established the "rules" by which international relations will normally operate. Furthermore, Vigorous economic competition for markets, trade, and finance are likely within the collective hegemony. (Meeks, November 1993)

In this point of view, following a "cooperative security" approach by industrialized countries will be the most important political trend during the foreseen future. The cooperative security approach is accomplished by preventing and reducing potential conflicts via multilateral cooperation which stresses confidence building measures, arms control and disarmament as opposed to aggressive deterrence in order to achieve and maintain peace. Cooperation is of course the key feature.

This emerging concept of 'cooperative security' has a decided appeal for the twenty-first century and for a country like Japan. Cooperative security involves a preventive approach which aims to stop or minimize conflicts before they even occur and controlling the crisis to minimize their effects on the structure of international relations.

Considering the combination of these elements, the world in the twenty-first century appears to demand more multilateral cooperation from international security to economy than ever before. With this regard, reformulating Japanese foreign policy will most feasibly involve participation in multilateral institutions, the most notable of which is the UN. Japan will certainly play a crucial role in this transformation of international relations in the decade ahead.

On the other hand, Japan's close and cooperative relations with Western nations constitute the basis of its security, in both politico-military and economic terms. Although it is not a Western nation, and has a vastly different cultural, ethnic and historical background, Japan shares with the nations of the West the values of democracies that are based on a political system of popular representation and an economic system of free enterprise.

For the United States, Japan is the cornerstone of US Asian policy, as US officials often assert. When former Prime Minister Suzuki visited Chatham house in 1981, he noted that Japan 'contributes to the peace and security of the Far East by providing facilities and areas to the American forces stationed in Japan', and that 'Japan's very
existence as a stable power upholding freedom and democracy, as well as the free market economic system', is vital to US foreign policy. (Akao, 1983, 247)

From an economic perspective, over the course of nearly twenty years, the United States, Japan, Canada and the largest countries of Europe have learned the necessity of collective economic agreements. This need began with the energy crises of the 1970s and continued through various attempts to coordinate economic boycotts and sanctions. Mutual vulnerabilities and interdependence with developing countries concerning debt, trade, environment, and labor issues have further reinforce the need for "economic regimes".

Although the United States was willing and in the best position to be the hegemony protector in military defense of the advanced industrial states, this role became increasingly unpopular domestically as other advanced countries with lower defense costs developed and used new advanced technologies to catch and pass the United States in trade competition. Nowadays, the strength of Europe and Japan necessitates the formation of a collective economic hegemony instead of single country hegemony as in the past.

Discussions at this stage seem to be coalescing around certain specific aspirations:

1. Japan aspires to an active rather than passive or reactive diplomacy;
2. This activism should take the form of involvement in the political-strategic and not just the economic arena.
3. This involvement should be global as well as regional.
4. This political involvement should gradually change from a form of nonmilitary contributions to a military power.
5. This activism should be played out primarily in the form of multilateral diplomacy, rather than reliance only unilateralism or bilateralism.

The call for Japan's larger international role, however, is still fraught with reservations and complexities. Any new, independent initiative taken in the sphere of security will probably trigger the suspicions of Asian neighbors; Japan bears a grim historical legacy. With the US-Japan Security Treaty, on the other hand, Japan's neighbors are comfortable, believing that the treaty will prevent Japan from repeating past aggressions. The US-Japan bilateral security treaty will undoubtedly remain the core of Japan's security policy for the time being, at least as long as the region
remains unstable. This was explicitly reaffirmed in the Japan-US joint Declaration on Security – Alliance for the Twenty-first Century announced by Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton on 17 April 1996 after their summit meeting.

However, Japan needs to change its thought on collective defense and revise in its security treaty with U.S which emphasis on "Far East" threats. In the new world order, security for Japan is not about the security in its homeland. Japan still has to keep sea lines of communication; it goes all the way to the Middle East. After September 11th, the threats remain elusive and Japan can not limit its security issues within the Far East. Japan's security goes global, and Japanese politicians have to change the definition of it, and possibility, security treaty must be rewritten or do a side agreement as a more practical way.

Furthermore, the bilateral security relations with the US alone will no longer suffice in the post-Cold War era because of two phenomena in progress; namely, globalization and multipolarity.

However, the most likely scenario for the 2015s is that Japan’s defense expenditures will grow by about 4 per cent annually and stay close to the 1 per cent of GNP figure that has received consensual domestic support. This certainly means that Japan will not be in a position to use its military forces to break up block a day or to intervene effectively in some Asian ground conflict.

A 'global civilian power', however, does not mean being completely uninvolved in international security. At the same time, the world’s deepening interdependence demands collective efforts and actions. Today’s political, environmental and economic issues all have ramifications which extend beyond national borders, ultimately impacting upon security issues. Similarly, security issues have direct relevance on economic stability.

It seems that Japan initially will play more important role to increase the global security by integrating into the UN’s collective security function. All of these accords, of course, with the general expectation of a more active Japanese role globally as Japan emerge as a candidate for a permanent seat in the Security Council. Such candidacy will inevitably raise the issue of Japan's broader participation in UN peacekeeping and enforcement missions; as one U.S. diplomatic observer says,

"Japan will not be taken seriously as a political power as long as it continues to project the image of a nation that is invariably prepared to adjust its position on issues of political principle in order to win narrow economic benefits." (Von der Mehden, May 2000)
However, due to the UN’s insufficient functioning, and the lack of an Asian-Pacific mechanism like NATO, Japan opted to rely strictly on a bilateral military alliance with the US.
The Perspective of Japan’s Energy Diplomacy

With respect to these issues, securing a stable supply of energy is—and will continue to be—of vital national interest for Japan. However, the end of the Cold War paradigm and the acceleration of globalization demand a comprehensive overhaul of Japan’s energy diplomacy.

First, it has become even more important that energy policy and security policy be coordinated. Now, more than ever, energy problems and security problems are indivisible from one another. Japan must fully consider how it would deal with a repeat of the Persian Gulf War or with threats to sea lanes that carry oil to Japan. Japan’s recognition of its own economic vulnerability is certain to remain an important basis for its foreign policy. Dangerous exposure to international relations pressure if, for example, another and more serious oil embargo were to be applied by some oil producers and its energy and raw materials deficiencies have to be constantly borne in mind when Japan approaches the rest of the world.

This forward-planning must also encompass the issue of collective self-defense. If the U.S. deems Japan to be delinquent in the fulfillment of its obligation to maintain its own energy security, the very foundation of the U.S. - Japan security alliance could be threatened.

It is likely that oil supply from the Middle East will remain important for Japan in the foreseeable future. Given the presence of many factors which will inhibit her from playing a greater role in the political and military arena, this is likely to remain as Japan’s main contribution to the international management of Middle Eastern affairs. It is important to recognize that it will be in the interest of global economic management for Japan to sustain this role.

The Middle East also will play a different role in Japan’s economic future than other regions. It is unlikely that the Middle East will draw the levels of investment already in train in Southeast Asia, North America, Europe and Australia. In fact, Japan’s economic security has to be considered in the wider context of Western solidarity and North-South relations.

For the foreseeable future Japan has the economic clout to have a determining influence in world economic affairs as well as a major role in the global oil market. To date it has been constrained from demonstrating the potential international
political dimensions of its economic power partly by constitutional impediments but mainly as a consequence of a widely held consensus in Japan that the mistakes of the 1940s must not be made again. A national confidence that apart from this lapse the Japanese approach will prevail internationally through the nurturing of hard-won economic surpluses and their subsequent deployment in sound economic activity overseas appears to be progressively confirmed as a comprehensively-successful policy.

With this regard, it is no use for Japan to seek to monopolize resources through bilateral deals, or to use its wealth to acquire resources. In this interdependent world, neither zero-sum games nor bidding up prices in a race to secure resources will guarantee security; the game cannot be won simply by expelling the weaker competitors from the market. Japan's high economic growth was made possible only in the context of an increased interdependence with other countries, both developed and developing. Japan's economic security is therefore closely linked to — indeed, it is part and parcel of — world peace and stability.

Japan's efforts have been directed towards increasing the overall supply of resources and sharing this larger pie with others. Japan is expected to utilize its economic power and technology to develop the world's resources; to intensify its efforts in the area of conservation and the efficient use of energy and other resources. With its great economic power and influence, Japan can no longer maintain such a low diplomatic posture. It must shoulder a larger share of the global burden, a share commensurate with its economic status.

Economic security, however, is not synonymous with self-sufficiency, and Japan must continue to work towards the former. But it cannot ensure its security in isolation; it cannot survive alone. Coordinate of policies among the OECD countries is vital. The social and political stability of the resource-producing regions and the stability of other countries' relations with these regions are very important.

In this regard, securing the politico — economic situation of the Middle East, as the most important region in Japan's energy diplomacy, is at the top of Japan's security agendas.

Because keeping the Straits of Hormuz open is so vitally important to Japan, the possibility of some form of contribution to the US-proposed Rapid Deployment force in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean could come up for consideration in the
future. Japan could, however, provide surveillance assistance, intelligence sharing, and search-and-rescue support to United States naval forces. The Iraqi crisis in 2003 brought considerable discussion of the future role of Japan in the new world order. However, the internal stability of the countries along this supply route is therefore of paramount importance and, equally, it is essential for Japan to maintain friendly relations with them. There is an urgent need for Japan to develop a more lasting and "intimate relationship with the Middle East through political dialogue and cultural exchange" beyond trade. The establishment of such a bilateral relationship is essential to Japan's energy security.

Japan also can explore the possibility of using ODA as a positive tool to encourage countries to move onward for the abolition of weapons of mass destruction, for environmental preservation and for protection of human rights. Whether Japan, with its constitutionally imposed constraints on military power, will be able to use ODA as a viable foreign policy tool in the next millennium depends on how successful it will be in redesigning ODA in the future.

Japan would also hope to acquire influence over American policy regarding the importance it attaches to political and economic diplomacy to help stabilize the Middle East and South-west Asia. Economic aid has been used by the Japanese to help promote stability in Asia. In fact, Japan's Middle East policy can be, in the best case, both independent and coordinated with other Western nations. In some cases, it may even be closer to U.S. policy than it has been in the past; the Arab-Israeli arena comes to mind, as the U.S. experience seems to indicate that a policy of balance and mediation better serves the cause of stability than a policy of choosing sides. To build peace in this tangled conflict, good relations with both sides are necessary, and Japan has been moving in this direction.

On the other hand, there are problems in the Middle East toward which a more independent Japanese policy would be natural and beneficial. The U.S. relationship to Iran, for example, is freighted with baggage that makes an objective approach to conflict resolution extremely difficult. There is, at the least, room for doubt whether current U.S. policy toward that nation does, in fact, serve the world community's best interests. In this case, and perhaps others, Japan might be able to serve as a bridge between Middle East and West, since it is free from the taint of imperialism and cultural penetration in the area. There could be a "division of labor" between the United States and Japan (and others), in which each nation would focus on
contributions to regional stability that best suited its own inclinations and capabilities. (Mahallati, 1998, 13)

These decisions demonstrate Japan's support for American global policies as well as its own willingness to play a more assertive role in shoring up stability in strategic regions and in guaranteeing its economic security.

It does not need to mention that Japan is both a major trading partner of the rich Middle Eastern countries and also potentially a very significant element in the pattern of international assistance flows to those countries of the region which are recipients of overseas assistance as loans. Japan is one of the seven major trading partners of Middle Eastern and North African countries. Japan’s major export trade is with the Persian Gulf countries and it parallels its own oil imports.

From the perspective of Middle Eastern oil producing countries, the Asian region is a promising market and a cornerstone in maintaining demand security - a concept that is viewed by oil-producing nations in much the same way as oil-importing countries view supply security. Interdependent relationship between the Middle Eastern oil-producing countries and the Asian oil-importing countries including Japan is expected to deepen further in the 21st century.

While Middle Eastern oil and gas resources become more necessary than ever before for the Asian countries, the Asian region, when viewed from another standpoint, is expected to be a promising growth market for the Middle Eastern oil-producing countries. The oil and gas supply security is essential for the importing countries, and likewise the Asian region becomes extremely important for the oil-producing countries in that it ensures the demand security. Special attention will have to be paid to this interdependence in the management of Japan’s resource policies.

On the other hand, to give Japan more influence with oil-producing countries in the Middle East, cooperative relationships with Korea, India, and China must be built up, and the bargaining power of the entire Northeast Asian region increased. Development of oil and natural gas pipelines from Russia’s Far East will also generate leverage with oil-producing countries in the Middle East. Naturally, even after the end of the Cold War, remnants of historical enmities still exist in Northeast Asia.

At the same time, with dependency on Middle East resources expected to increase in the twenty-first century, efforts to create a multinational framework for resolving regional energy and environmental issues will also prove beneficial to the
establishment of a regional security system. At that juncture, Asia will have to confront its own specific regional issues, such as the "China problem." Moreover, whatever approach is adopted must be founded on the US-Japan strategic partnership. (Tsutomu, July 2003)

However, although it seems that Japan will continue its regional policies to improve its geo-economics and geo-strategic relations with East Asian countries during coming years, however, one of the most important regional security concerns is the territorial conflicts between Japan and its neighbors about some islands which are strategically important for securing the routes of energy transporting and also for exploring oil and natural gas especially near the Senkako and Spratley Islands.

Additionally, Japan's energy policy in the next years will have three principal strands. First, it will attempt to intensify conservation efforts and to diversify sources of energy. Second, it will try to protect Japan in the longer term against the adverse effects of changes in production policies by Middle East oil producers, embargoes and unpredictable events such as wars, coups and political crisis. Third, it will focus on securing sufficient oil to ensure steady growth (a) in the events of possible short falls in world oil supplies that turbulence in the Middle East could bring about and (b) in the face of growing competition from the Western allies for access to such oil as is produced. It will also emphasize the need for increasing exports to help pay for the growing oil bills.

And finally, it must say that Japan's oil supply security is still far from Winston Churchill's oil axiom: 'on no one country, on no one route and on no one field must we be dependent. Safety and certainty in oil lie in variety and variety alone'.