NOTES

Notes to INTRODUCTION

1. See Hines, p.17 and the note on the page where Hines lists works dealing with influences on the poet or echoes of the ideas he uses in his poetry. Two more works could be added to the list: David Jarraway’s *Wallace Stevens and the Question of Belief* and Rajeev Patke’s *Longer poems of Wallace Stevens*; however, Patke’s work does not remain tied to the influences or echoes but, in going beyond them, shows his own frame of reference as well for interpreting Stevens.

2. Hines, pp. 18-19; Baird, p. xiii. Hines miscites the page number from Baird as p. xii.

3. However, Stevens’ later poetry, especially the symbol ‘rock’ towards which it edges, goes on becoming as unarticulable, untranslatable, or unformulatable as Kant’s X, his symbol for *noumena*.

4. Quoted in Baird, p. xiv. Here, Baird distinguishes between philosophy as a formal discipline and ‘philosophical energy.’

5. Miller, in his “Wallace Stevens’ Poetry of Being,” says in a paragraph, “...the nothing is not nothing. It is. It is being” (157). This comes true if read with reference to his another comment, which opens the preceding paragraph, “It seemed that Stevens was moving closer and closer to a full possession of the plentitude of things...;” but when read with reference to his yet another comment in the same essay, “At the beginning Stevens is already as far as he ever goes” (146), it leaves one thinking whether he equates the nothingness of the early poetry with that of the later — despite the difference that he makes between the import of the nothingness in Stevens’ early poetry and later poetry. One gets the impression that he had difficulties in gathering the nothingness of the early poetry.


7. See Hines, p. 25. Stallknecht treats the imagination in Stevens as a “discovering principle” (558), enabling one to face “the difficulty of what it is to be” — i.e. to be an individual in a world of individuals” (562), to know oneself.

Notes to PROLEGOMENA

1. Hines has interpreted Stevens’ poetry on the phenomenological lines of thought propounded by Husserl and Heidegger.

2. Bates’ book is a historical-biographical study of Stevens.
3. Let me hasten to say that this is not to undermine Holly Stevens’ book, *Souvenirs and Prophecies: The Young Wallace Stevens*.

4. Garrett, Jr. practiced in Reading, Baltimore, New York, and finally in Cleveland as a promising criminal lawyer; John practiced in Reading and finally become a judge of Berks County, Pennsylvania; Wallace himself became a very famous lawyer in surety, worked with different insurance companies in New York, and finally settled with the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company.

5. Stevens’ *Harmonium* has been a special focus insofar as mourning and melancholy in his poetry is concerned. But, the lines quoted from *Esthetique du Mal*, the directness of self-reviling in them, and Stevens’ remembering his father until almost the end, all suggest that he kept mourning the loss of the father throughout his life.

6. Nowhere in Stevens do we find the kind of self-reviling as in the lines from *Esthetique*, where he falls no short of impeaching himself. Jahan Ramzani speaks of Stevens’ elegiac verse as nontraditionally elegiac, and modernist in that sense, because of its “interlacing its pathos” with irony, satire, and its display of “a tendency for rage and self-reviling” (569).

7. For Stevens’ case, there is no need to go into the details of the mythic primal patricide, since his real, biological father was his *imaginary father* and whose death turned him into the *Symbolic father*; this is what is the meaning of the primal murder of the father. Later in the study, the dead father (and thus the lost phallus) is referred to as ‘imaginary’ for he does not exist except as imaginarily for the subject.

8. The essay Stevens read here on 15 January 1951 was “The Relations between Painting and Poetry,” which is included in his *Necessary Angel* (NA 159-6).

9. Richardson’s studies are of psycho-biographical nature.

10. Their friendship began around 1914 as young poets publishing in the avant-garde magazine *Others*, funded by Walter Arensberg, at whose apartment in New York the *Others* crowd socialized (B 113).

Notes to NEUROSIS OF WINTER

1. The Greek word *métoikós*, Chandran explains, means ‘a resident alien’ (54).

2. In the opening lines of Eliot’s “Gerontion,” the protagonist is shown waiting for ‘rain,’ which stands for hope of physical and spiritual betterment and also possibly for the grace of God:

   Here am I, an old man in a dry month,
   Being read to by a boy, waiting for rain
   (Eliot, 1963: 39)

3. While the neglected people of Umuofia in Achebe’s *Things Fall Apart* accept Christianity, the hero of the novel, Okonkwo, resists the cultural trespassing with all his might.
4. Hesla's treatment of the poem is preferred as a point of departure since his is the most recent attempt at reading the poem, and intends to "correct...misreadings" (Hesla 241).
5. One might wish to exclude the 'plural' from this comment; I would suggest, one needs only to read the poem's first line with a plural subject in the place of that 'One'.
6. James' illustration, as quoted in Hesla, is: "Take a mass of carrion...and the 'disgustingness' which for us is part of the experience. The sun caresses it, and the zephyr woos it as if it were a bed of roses. So the disgustingness fails to operate within the realm of sun and breezes... But the carrion "turns our stomach" by what seems a direct operation — it does function physically, therefore..." (248).
7. Initiating from I. A. Richards and reaching up to Derrida's deconstructionist theories.
8. Roland Barthes' essay of the same title.
9. Wimsatt and Beardsley's essay of the same title.
11. Miller writes, "Only the snow man, the man who is 'nothing himself,' is free of imagination's fictions and can behold 'nothing that is not there and the nothing that is.'"("Wallace Stevens' Poetry of Being" 155; also see his Poets of Reality 277); Keyser says, "...if one has a mind of winter for a long time, one will be able to see the winter without thinking of the misery" (596); Susan Weston believes that "The argument of the poem is that one must be a snow man — 'nothing himself' — in order to perceive reality without thinking of any misery in it" (9); Cameron is close to Weston when she speaks on behalf of the poem's speaker thus: "Could he rid himself of all human characteristics, become transparent, he might see the world as it is..." (585).
12. When a clause is joined by a conjunction to some other clause, the punctuation mark indicating their separation is generally not required; at least the semi-colon is very rarely used. The poem's sentence is peculiar because twice it uses both 'and' as conjunction and the semi-colon for separation. This makes the function of the 'and' more intricate since this double separation almost gives the clauses the status of separate sentences. Thus, I prefer to refer to the clauses as 'segments,' a term from geometry used to refer to part(s) of a 'line'.
13. But it is not exactly an after thought, since it is possible that the thought of misery was lurking in the unconscious before suddenly surfacing to the level of the conscious.
14. See line 56 ("The eyes that fix you in a formulated phrase") of Eliot's "The Love song of J. Alfred Prufrock" (15).
15. It could be said that an experience attains universality at one's first remove from it; however, the concern is how one thinks; for instance: a) it worries me; b) it worries you, too; c) it worries all alike.
16. Lacan's word for the ego, moi, suggests the sense of self as attached with the ego.
17. Though Booker quotes Stevens' lines from Chocorua to Its Neighbor, the problem of who speaks cannot be solved easily, for the poem refers to that speech as 'meditation' and 'solitaria,' suggesting that it is not an articulate speech, hence not the je discourse.

18. Speech being the mode through which the Other is realized, Lacan says, "...it's he who is always talking, who is forever talking without saying anything... who nevertheless never stops talking" (Seminar III 126).

19. Lacan, in fact, does say that "a material operates in [the unconscious] according to certain laws, which are the same laws as those discovered in the study of actual languages, languages that are or were actually spoken." What he means is that the laws according to which the unconscious operates are found in actual languages, that the reverse is not wholly true; this may be why Lacan uses the word 'like' in the statement that "the unconscious is structured in the most radical way like a language" (Écrits 234).

20. Schneiderman, after consultation with Lacan himself, translates aggressivité as 'aggressiveness' instead of 'aggressivity' as others have (see 'Translator's Note,' p. vii); therefore, every time I use the word or quote from Lacan's translators or critics, Schneiderman's translation is retained.

21. Jouissance has no English equivalent, and Lacan uses the term with a variety of nuances in his work. In French it means pleasure or enjoyment, but the psychoanalyst also assimilates to it the French word jouir, the pleasure derived from sexual orgasm. In yet another sense, he uses it to convey the pleasure derived from meaning, and splits the word as jouis-sense (jouissance of meaning). There are still more shades of the word's meaning, which will be explained later in the study.

22. The two poems, however, differ from each other in the sense that while the "Snow Man" prolongs the period of aggressiveness and introduces intervention at the middle, in "A Dish of Peaches" the aggressiveness towards the peaches is immediately followed by the question "Who speaks?," thus gradually building up the frustration from the start as compared with the belated but sudden introduction of the frustrating 'misery' in "Snow Man."

23. Quoted and translated in Wilden, p. 101 from La Psychanalyse VIII (1964), p. 119. The word 'subject' in the third sentence is equivalent to 'topic' or 'issue.' In this passage appears Lacan's phrase 'desire of the Other' (desir de l'autre); he explicates "man's desire is the desire of the Other" with special attention to the genitive: "...the de provides what grammarians call the 'subjective determination,' namely it is qua Other that [man] desires..." (Écrits 312). Taking the de as a subjective genitive, Fink provides three possibilities of translation: 'man's desire is the Other's desire,' 'man's desire is the same as the Other's desire,' and 'man desires what the Other desires' (54). These might seem to suggest one and the same thing, i.e. man desires the Other's desire, yet the first is different from the remaining two in the sense that it incorporates Lacan's "it is qua
Other that [man] desires,” meaning ‘man’s desire is for the Other as such,’ which is distinguished from ‘man’s desire is for what the Other desires.’ The present study uses two expressions to distinguish the two variations: ‘desire for the Other’ and ‘Other’s desire.’

24. Wilden therefore comments, “the moi is thus another...” (161).

25. Note that Lacan here reminds of the equivocal senses of the S: the S as the je, and the S as Freud’s Es that represents the id, suggesting that the Other speaks with the ego, which is the most characteristic feature of a psychotic’s discourse.

26. Tom Whalen’s article on Stevens’ “Valley Candle” discusses the ‘night’ as consuming darkness.

27. Lacan, therefore, even warns the psychoanalysts indirectly: “Freud tells them that desire is sexual desire, and they believe it. That is precisely where they err — for they don’t understand what that means” (Seminar II 227). With reference to the sexual desire’s insatiability, Freud has said that there is “something in the nature of the sexual instinct itself unfavourable to the realisation of complete satisfaction... the final object of the sexual instinct is never any longer the original object but only a surrogate for it” (SE 11: 188-9; see also FS 6).

28. Broadly speaking, Lacan’s concept of the signifier is the advent of a symbol as a result of the absence of that which it symbolizes and makes part of the social or humanized reality. However, there are two categories of signifiers in Lacan: signifiers that are commonly used in languages, and signifiers that belong in the unconscious (signifiers in the real, or unary signifiers). The signifiers of the second category are the master signifiers (designated as S1) that the subject must dialectize in order for his or her normativization. The categories are not absolute, though; for, a signifier used in the language spoken by the subject (S2) may lose its meaning and be repressed into his or her unconscious, thus becoming an S1, and an S1 after its dialectization may enable the subject to use it in the language spoken by him or her.

29. The Name-of-the-Father is more or less equivalent to the father figure whom the mother regards. Lacan also calls it the ‘third term,’ which breaks the dyadic mother-child relationship and due to which the child comes to be in the triangular dialectic, the Oedipal triad. The Name-of-the-Father’s ‘No’ to the dyadic relationship enabled Lacan to bring together into permanent juxtaposition the homonyms le nom du pere (Name-of-the-Father) and le non du pere (No-of-the-Father).

30. The repressed signifier being part of the unconscious, which is the discourse of the Other, it is in this Other, in this Other of speech, of this ‘you,’ that “the subject locates himself and recognizes himself” and his being (Seminar III 162).

31. Freud wrote Fleiss, “Sie leben also den Wahn wie sich selbst. Das ist das Geheimnis,” i.e. “Thus they love their delusion as they love themselves. That is the secret” (quoted and translated in Seminar III 214).
32. Lacan discusses this while explaining the case of a Hungarian tram conductor and of the famous of Freud's patients, Dora (see Seminar III, chapters XII, XIII; see also SE 7: 1-122).

33. In Freud as well as in Lacan, sexual division or identity has nothing to do with anatomical difference; as Freud puts it, "...for both sexes, only one genital, namely the male one, comes into account. What is present, therefore, is not a primacy of the genitals, but a primacy of the phallus." Thus, in their thought, the only sexual organ that either exists or does not exist is the phallus, which is not the same as the penis in the sense that it does not commit itself to a vagina, so that there are also phallic women and non-phallic men. Thus, "...beings are to be divided up, not into men and women or males and females, but only into those who have the phallus and those who do not, meaning in the last case (since only the phallus exists) those who are castrated, or rather, eunuchs" (see FS 101, 124). Both Lacan and Freud have been attacked for their 'phallocentric' position by their once-followers and feminists.

34. Robert DeMaria's article, "'The Thinker as Reader': The Figure of the Reader in the Writing of Wallace Stevens," explores the poet's interest in the activity of reading.

35. The "motor incapacity" and "nursling dependence" in the infant stage that are not observed in other animals to the extent in which it can be in the human world, is the proof. The human being seeks that motor capacity and independence, as I, in the other through identification and enters the symbolic order; these give him the status of a subject (Écrits 2).

Notes to BITS OF BLUE

1. A rebus is a picture-puzzle, a picture distorted by fragmentation and disarrangement of the fragments. Freud used the term in The Interpretation of Dreams:

   Suppose I have a picture puzzle, a rebus, in front of me. It depicts a house with a boat on its roof, a single letter of the alphabet, the figure of a running man whose head has been conjured away, and so on. Now I might be misled into raising objections and declaring that the picture as a whole and its component parts are nonsensical...But obviously we can only form a proper judgement of the rebus if...we try to replace each separate element by a syllable or word that can be represented by that element in some way or other. The words which are put together in this way are no longer nonsensical but may form a poetical phrase of the greatest beauty and significance. A dream is a picture-puzzle of this sort...

   (SE 4: 277-78)

2. The astounding similarities of thought between Stevens' 'imagination' and Lacan's 'imaginary' allow interchangeable use of these terms; thus, they are not distinguished in this study. Similarly, Stevens' conception of 'reality' being very close to Lacan's 'real' order, I use
the two terms interchangeably, though Lacan uses ‘reality’ to suggest the humanized, social reality.

3. The seeking of ‘Oneness’ as an effect of the subject’s internal fragmentation and some unspecified lack will be studied later in the chapter ‘Jouissance.’

4. Here, Lacan discusses narcissism with the help of what he refers to as ‘Schema with Two Mirrors,’ in which the interactions between the perceiver’s eye and the vase with the bouquet inside it are elaborated.

5. See Freud’s “On Narcissism: An Introduction” (SE 14: 67-102) for detailed understanding of ‘introjection.’

6. “[The imaginary] conditions the pictorial aspects of all ideation, operating features like resemblance” (ERS 157).

7. Canonization as a religious act stands in stark contrast — it did at least in Donne’s time — with love between man and woman, for whom he seeks the title of sainthood in the poem “Canonization.”

8. The ‘symbolic’ and the ‘real’ are the other two orders.

9. This is obvious when he says, “I was...interested...in the poetry of philosophers;” “I am not a philosopher” (OP 195). In “A Collect of Philosophy,” Stevens argues that all philosophical ideas are essentially poetic, the reason perhaps why he was a poet and not a philosopher.

10. These experiences include mirror-stage effects oriented towards identity formation, castration, desire, Oedipal intervention etc (see ERS 148).

11. “The symbolic is the sphere of culture and language” (ERS 131).

12. Note that ‘capture’ is related with ‘captive’ not only structurally in the passage form Credences but also through the common Latin root capere, allowing to read “once to make captive” as “once to capture.” The concerned passage will be discussed later in detail in the reading of Credences.

13. The ‘moment’ is “irrational” since imagination does not perceive things as they are but ‘transfigures’ or ‘sublimes’ them (NA 77); this metamorphosed state of things is not factual or rational, hence is ‘irrational,’ and is subject to change without notice.

14. Lacan’s notion of the real includes the actual, concrete, corporeal world that exists around; but since there is no term to refer to the metamorphosed state of things except the term ‘image,’ and since the poet does not doubt the reality of the image in the mind, the term ‘real’ is retained to signify both things and their metamorphosed states, which cannot really be referred to by that expression since by ‘real’ we designate the ding an sich, the thing in its purity, without any embellishment or deviation. However, Lacan also uses the term ‘real’ “for the moment of impossibility” of the pure perception of the object “onto which both [the imaginary and the symbolic] are grafted, the point of that moment’s endless return” (FS 31); in this sense, Stevens’
'enhanced,' 'heightened,' 'intensified' sense of reality as a result of its transfiguration or sublimation is nothing but attaining to that 'moment of impossibility.' Thus, the metamorphosed, transfigured, sublimated state of things could appropriately be referred to by Lacan's 'real.' Moreover, Stevens' conception of what he calls 'reality' incorporates the effect it has on the perceiving mind. In these senses, it is not distinguished from Lacan's 'real;' therefore, like 'imagination' and the 'imaginary,' Stevens' 'reality' and Lacan's 'real' are interchangeably used in this study.

15. Stevens often uses the image of the 'room' or 'house' to suggest the world 'within' as having a 'window' from which the mind sees the world 'without' (e.g. see CP 9, 57, 210). Perhaps Stevens owes this image to Robert Frost who uses it in his “Tree at my window” (Collected Poems 318) to the effect that is parallel to Stevens' use of it.

16. This is how Vendler explains “this side of stygia” (Words Chosen 73).

17. Here, as well as in the discussion that follows, the capitalization is used in such representations to suggest the largeness of the concerned entities since the poem involves the issue of their enlargement and diminution; the normal type indicates their original state. The 'space' being originally vast and large it is capitalized at the start of the discussion itself.

18. The expression “the thinking of 'nothing' as a productive principle” is quoted in Jarraway (176) from Riddel's “From Heidegger to Derrida to Chance: Doubling and (Poetic) Language” (in Martin Heidegger and the Question of Literature, ed. William V. Spanos [Bloomington 1979]: 240). However, Stevens does not pose or pause to think of the 'nothing' here, probably because thinking itself is a result of the 'nothing' for him.

19. Vendler says that in his assertions Stevens “more naturally tends to a middle ground, looking for an accommodation, a sensible ecstasy of pauvred color...,” and thus mitigates what would be bold assertions with qualifications, often making them sound like hypotheses that are “interesting to entertain but of questionable solidity” (“The Qualified Assertions” 163). The need for such mitigation or qualification doubtless reflects anticipation of the other; it arises out of the desire for acceptance of the assertions. At the same time, however, they are assertions proper. Always in the difficulty of to be, they also reflect the poet's doubt about the reality or validity of his illusions and hallucinations, the paranoiac knowledge, on which the assertions are based; yet, his efforts to make them acceptable are suggestive of a desire to lend them credibility and reality.

20. Stevens himself spoke of the “anti-mythological” nature of The Comedian: “...[The Comedian] is what may be called an anti-mythological poem” in the sense that “The central figure is an every-day man who lives a life without the slightest adventure except that he lives in a poetic atmosphere as we all do” (Letters 778); Guereschi sees three stages through the poem's six sections in order to apprehend the poet's “line of resistance to the mythological” past: “the
denial of man’s heroic destiny (I, II); the difficulties of apotheosizing Eden (II, III, IV); and the failure of the mythopoetic imagination (V, VI)” (74).

21. Stevens uses Simone Weil’s distinction between ‘decreation,’ which is “making a pass from the created to the uncreated,” and ‘destruction,’ “making a pass from the created to nothing,” and says, “Modern reality is a reality of decreation, in which our revelations are...the revelations of...the precious portents of our own powers” (NA 174-5).

22. Either Ragland-Sullivan misreads that Lacan views the formative value of the image as joining hands with the problem of origins, or Russell Grigg’s translation, suggesting clearly that Lacan was against such a view, of Lacan is wrong: “...the image’s formative value — which tends to be confused with the problem of origins...” (See Seminar III 165).

23. Perhaps such ‘imposition’ was what Stevens had in mind when he wrote that the ‘hand’ grows “larger and heavier and stronger than / The wall” (CP 246).

24. Eliot’s concept of ‘tradition’ is similar to this; Stevens seems to echo it.

25. Bevis realizes the importance of these stylistic devices (113-4).

26. Thus, Stevens uses the term ‘mythology’ with temporal, spatial, and universal (‘tradition’) connotations.

27. As in “A Dish of Peaches in Russia,” the other (“curtains” and “peaches”) separates the moi from the Other, thus cleaving the mind.

28. Apropos of Stevens’ ‘must,’ Vendler writes in her “The Qualified Assertions of Wallace Stevens” that it is often used when the insistence in the assertions “is based on fear, on the apprehension of chaos and disintegration if the assertions are not valid,” that it “is not a word of faith but, a word of doubt, implying as it does an unbearable otherwise,” that it reflects obligations or destinies of a less voluntary sort” (167, 168, 166). However, such instances of ‘must’ are very few, e.g. “The Snow Man;” in most other instances, its use reflects the impossibility of the assertions and the desire to fetch them into the domain of possibility or credibility. His ‘must’ is therefore more a word chosen out of desire than that chosen for qualification; this is why, it is more a word of faith in Stevens than a word of doubt.

29. Cook points out some of the difficulties inherent in the second poem, like “brown moon” and the “witchy origins” of images (Poetry, Word-Play, and Word-War 306).


31. The ‘satur-’ in “Saturday” suggests both the satyr and Saturn.

32. Lacan says, “man’s desire is the desir de l’Autre (desire of the Other), in which the de provides what grammarians call the ‘subjective determination,’ namely that it is qua other that he desires;” this is how desire comes full circle; appropriately, Lacan refers to this as “the true compass of human passion” (Écrits 312; also see Gallop 184).

33. Perhaps it is an influence of Husserl, as Leonard and Wharton suggest (85).
34. Carrier interprets these sentences on the basis of Descartes’s famous dictum: “‘He’ (man) ‘is,’” (ergo) “we” (individual men) “are”. Or possibly: “He” (the idea of man) “is,” (ergo) “we” (the images of man) “are”” (167). However, Descartes’s assertion of ‘sum’ is a dependency on the movement of the consciousness, whereas Stevens’ assertion is not a dependency. It is a next step that thinks of things other than ‘I,’ hence possibly suggesting the relation between ‘I’ and the rest of the things and phenomena that have independent existence, their otherness to the ‘I.’

35. It may not be precisely pointed out why, but after long familiarity with Stevens’ poetry one feels that evening is the time of meditative engagement for him. The rather long meditation at New Haven is timed in the evening since the evening evokes “the spectrum of violet” (488); ‘violet’ as a combination of red and blue is suggestive of the conflation of reality and imagination, and to observe this spectrum the peace and twilight of evening seems more congenial. Patke, thus, comments that “...evening is a time when the distinct outlines of reality merge with the interior of the mind...” (220). Indeed, one is more conscious of reality or of its pressures in broad daylight, and this paradoxically hinders the merger of reality and mind; it is as if the moi loosens its defenses in the evening, welcomes reality freely, merges with it. Thus, Stevens wrote, “An evening’s thought is like a day of clear weather” (OP 159).

36. One speaks less when one meditates; Lacan says, “the less we speak, the more [the Other] speaks to us” (Seminar III 138).

37. This is what Lacan more or less means by “the self’s radical ex-centricity to itself” (Écrits 171).

38. For example, Stevens wrote Henry Church about Nietzsche, “In his mind one does not see the world more clearly; both of us must often have felt how a strong mind distorts the world. Nietzsche’s mind was a perfect example of that sort of thing. Perhaps his effect was merely the effect of the epatant. The incessant job is to get into focus, not out of focus. Nietzsche is as perfect a means of getting out of focus as a little bit too much to drink” (Letters 431-32).

39. While explaining “The lion in the lute / Before the lion locked in stone,” Stevens wrote, “I want man’s imagination to be completely adequate in the face of reality” (Letters 790); thus, the ‘lute’ symbolizes the imaginary.

40. The image-making process is viewed as cultivation. ‘Terrace’ is obviously derived from terra; the ‘imaginary’ is Stevens’ cultiva terra that yields images. (‘Cultivation’ means improvement or development, e.g. of the mind [OED].) Warren Carrier, too, interprets the concerned lines in a similar way, but he interprets ‘mandolins’ as feelings: “stop at feelings...go no further than feelings” (168). However, images are prior to feelings; it is the already known or recorded image that helps make sense of its recurrence, or of the recurrence of a similar type of image, which then evokes feelings; thus, Stevens says, “The moon is the mother of pathos and
pity” (CP 107). Images of feelings could also be pre-recorded. It is this record that is used as reference point for perception or evoking feelings at a later moment.

41. The word ‘betrothal’ is printed with an extra h, as ‘bethrothal,’ in Collected Poems.
42. In expressions such as ‘real object,’ ‘object in the real,’ ‘being real, the object...,’ respectively.
43. This is very much implied in the case of the Parisian and the Ugandan (NA 140); the unconscious recording is like that ‘one poem’ of “Primitive Like an Orb:” “one poem proves another and the whole” (CP 441), thus proving the saying, “ex uno disce omnes,” i.e. ‘from an instance you may infer the rest.’

Notes to JOUISSANCE
1. Notice that Lacan’s concept of the phallus has evolved from the Name-of-the-Father through the 1950’s and 60’s.
2. The signifier Nom-du-pere (Name-of-the-Father) also includes the suggestion of a ‘No!’ of the father through the homonym Non-du-pere (No-of-the-Father) since it is the father who says “No” to, or enjoins, the child’s attachment with the (m)Other. The child, thus alienated from the (m)Other, is led to see that it is not he or she but the father that is the (m)Other’s desire. This is how the child comes to respect the symbolic order of culture. The biological father is dispensable here since anyone who enjoys the status of the father figure in the family can perform that function of prohibiting the child’s attachment with the (m)Other.
3. This is how desire founds itself and finds expression in the subject, the “irrepressible revolutionist” as it is (NA 152).
4. See Écrits, pp. 128-29 for how Lacan arrives at this translation.
5. This is one of Lacan’s formulae of sexuation; see fig. 3 below for Lacan’s formulae distinguishing sexual identities.
6. Although the time of that unity is not a remembered experience of satisfaction, it is very much there in the unconscious memory since without this the ‘Oedipus complex’ or the Oedipal situation will never come to be, and then there would be no question of its resolution or decline.
7. See Hamlet, Act V., Sc. 1. In discussing this scene from the play, Lacan says that Ophelia the object “regains its immediacy and its worth for (Hamlet)” (“Desire” 36). In Wallace’s case it was not the question of regaining but simply of gaining (of course, this gaining is ultimately only an attempt at regaining).
8. Wagner has discussed the possibility of the women in Stevens’ poetry being references either to the poet’s mother or Elsie, or possibly to both since the “wife and mother were joined in Stevens’ unconscious...” (91).
9. Hamlet almost enacts this journey as he says to Ophelia, “Lady, shall I lie in your lap?” (Act III, Sc. I)

10. This, I hope, may answer Fink’s confusion that S(a) could be equated with the phallus(Φ). Because, S(Δ) is a combination of S(a), the signifier of the primally lost object of desire, which serves as S1, and the phallus, not as symbolic (Φ) but as imaginary (-Φ), serving as S2. Hence, Hamlet speaks of the phallus (-Φ) and the object of desire S(a) in connection with each other: “here is metal more attractive” (-Φ), “Lady, shall I lie in your lap?” S(a) (Act III, Sc II). The neurotic subject cannot distinguish between S(a) and -Φ, the Other is not barred for him; but for a normal subject, S(a) remains a master signifier (S1) until the phallus (-Φ, i.e. S2) is found, or made to signify (Φ).

11. The last line, excised from the Collected Poems, was there in Stevens’ folder (see Richardson, The Later Years 386-7).

12. Quoting the same lines from “Madame La Fleurie,” Wagner rightly argues, “The poet finds himself joining together what he wills to keep apart. The beard suggests the pre-Oedipal, phallic mother, the woman with a penis, whose masculinity is...a threat to the male child...” (92). It is death insofar as the subject fails to assimilate the third term and thus to come to be in the symbolic order as a human subject; he or she thus remains in the real, the dyadic relationship with the mother.

13. The image of the ‘bush’ appears in “A study of images I,” and there too, as has been discussed, it symbolizes the consciousness.

14. The word ‘found’ is not without its ambiguity here; it could be either the past tense form or the present tense form.

15. He “found [himself] / In heaven as in a glass” (CP 383). Lacan’s mirror-stage bears close affinities with this thought. One’s image reflected in (the form of) the other gives a sense of unity, a jouissance. Narcissism is the base of this thought of Lacan. The ‘glass’ in Stevens, or the ‘mirror’ in Lacan, is a perfect foil for what Stevens refers to as ‘heaven,’ or for Lacan’s jouissance. Adamic man established himself (found) in the middle of jouissance while the modern man, in search of the jouissance, locates himself in the glass (mirror); yet, the fact that the mirror-stage is only a ‘stage,’ and that the modern man goes beyond this stage in order to find jouissance in the external world, that even this world, too, cannot yield the jouissance as permanent, that his search for jouissance never comes to end, goes to prove a certain dehiscence between himself and his environment.

16. The lines have a fascinating character; someone else speaking within and without him fascinates the neurotic.

17. “The less we speak, the more it speaks to us” (Seminar III 138).
18. By the *quod*, or the *What-is-it*? Lacan means the “absolute other” that exists “beyond all intersubjectivity;” it is the “experience of the unconscious subject as such” (*Seminar II* 177, 178).

19. The difference between their situations may be that Hamlet shows “the perverse imbalance of the fantasmatic relationship” whereas Stevens does not (“Desire” 22); however, the post-marital Stevens-Elsie relationship, as they “fought like cats and dogs” (B 65), might bring him closer to Hamlet’s perversity.

20. See Patke, p. 30; he does not necessarily agree with this view.

21. Although Kant later popularized the concept of ‘mind as the maker of the world,’” it was Descartes who positioned “the self at the center of the universe because [he] felt that it is the self alone that can provide the Archimedean point from which the world could be mapped” and that “in [the self] alone the world reveals itself in the most transparent way” (Pradhan 121).

22. Also see Patke, pp. 27-9 for more information on the significance of the letter C.

23. Eleanor Cook notices this when she writes that “Crispin has already shed” the notion of divinity external to man. She also cites Stevens here: “He [Aquinas] spoke, / Kept speaking of God. I changed the word to man” (*CP* 245).

24. Lacan includes the unconscious and God into his real order, both being the external guarantee for the truth of (human) reality.

25. Sukenick (50-1) comes close to saying what the *it* is when he writes,

   Crispin is confronted with...a reality about which he cannot generalize, which is impervious to abstract thought, and onto which he can neither impose meanings nor project his own identity. It is that alien reality, utterly nonhuman, that is represented by the star in “Nuances of a Theme by Williams,” which Stevens adjoins,
   
   ...shine like bronze,
   that reflects neither my face nor any inner part
   of my being, shine like fire, that mirrors nothing.

   (*CP* 18)

26. Stevens detests “the speechless, invisible Gods” that “Ruled us before” (*CP* 262).

27. The concerned lines are: “And excepting negligible Triton, free / From the unavoidable shadow of himself.” Here, Triton, whose body partly resembles man’s body, suggests something human about the unconscious, but that is negligible. Even earlier in the same section the lines, “nothing left of [Triton], / Except in faint, memorial gesturings, / That were like arms and shoulders,” support this interpretation. In Lacan’s thought the unconscious is full of the other people, other human beings.


29. Lacan says, “The subject is separated from the Other[ ]...by the wall of language” (*Seminar II* 244).
30. Longinus says in Chapter 33 that “...the highest genius is very far from being flawless, for entire accuracy runs the risk of descending to triviality, whereas in the grand manner, as in the possession of great wealth, something is bound to be neglected... great abilities remain subject to danger by reason of their very greatness,” and that the errors committed by the great writers are not “willful errors, but rather careless oversights let in casually and at random by the heedlessness of genius” (143).

31. The mother as the Other clarifies Crispin’s desire for the Other. He has already had a glimpse of the Other in the last passage of section I, hence his interest in or desire for it, out of which he seeks to “catechize” it.

32. Quoted in Fink, p. 56. The mother’s desire, i.e. the desire of the mother, is also the desire for the mother, which denies the subject's access to object(a).

33. “The jouissance of an Other...does not exist,” says Lacan (Écrits 323).

34. There are other possibilities of interpreting the phrase depending upon whether it is used as preposition or adverb; it could be the inversion of 'a continent above.' It is also possible to think of it as a qualifying phrase for the noun phrase ‘Crispin’s mind.’ It may be Europe, or the ‘South,’ Crispin’s former inhabitation, which he has left. But, in most of these cases the indefinite article sticks.

35. Refer to the discussion of North-South dialectic in “Bits of Blue” above.

36. Constance Rouke observes that “mythologies do not lend themselves to small or delicate comic intricacies” (quoted in Guereschi 73).

37. Cf. the “that monstered moth” (CP 22), where it is a symbol of the desiring subject, not of the Other; hence the distinction in the use of the qualifiers ('monstered' and 'vaporous').

38. Here, one can apply the theory of the dialectization of the master signifier, where, ‘being’ will be the master signifier (S1) and the phallus the S2, another signifier. Bringing S1 in some relation with S2 is a dialectization of S1. However, the phallus or S2 gains more importance here since without it there is no meaning to being (or S1) for the subject.

39. “What is it that the subject is deprived of? The phallus; and it is from the phallus that the object gets its function in the fantasy, and from the phallus that desire is constituted with the fantasy as its reference” (“Desire” 15); also see p. 23 of the same article.

40. This is how George Orwell’s novel Animal Farm derides the socialist view.

41. Icarus is portrayed as the symbol of an aspiring human being in W. H. Auden’s poem “Musée des Beaux Arts” (3).

42. Hawking’s life itself, despite all bad health, is sustained by this desire.

43. For Kermode, the daughters are “without doubt the seasons” (48); for Bloom, too, “These ladies appear to be the poetry of Stevens’ seasonal cycle, possibly based ironically upon Keats’s Human Seasons” (82); Riddel finds “Kermode’s suggestion that the chits are the faces of nature’s
four seasons” fruitful (101), but his own opinion is that they are Crispin’s own “progeny” (100), since ‘chit’ also means ‘sprout’ or ‘shoot’ (101); Sukenick echoes Riddel that “they are merely daughters...four mirrors of Crispin’s self that stir his imagination instead of merely reflecting it” (59). Susan Weston, too, finds it easy to believe that they are “daughters instead of poems” (55), thus upholding the opinion of Riddel and Sukenick. Nassar believes that they “represent for Stevens something like four different kinds of poem, from the most ambitious and self-conscious to the most trivially descriptive” (170). Baird goes far ahead and says, “Each daughter seems to be a century, an age in the history of the American imagination, symbolized in Crispin himself. Each is a presiding woman-genius of an age, curled, marked by acts of imagining barbers” (200).

44. In this paragraph’s method of exposition through juxtaposition — unless otherwise mentioned or cited within parentheses — a description from “Piano Practice” is followed by its similar counterpart in The Comedian.

45. ‘Turquoise’ is greenish-blue, and ‘green’ in Stevens is the color of reality; the “turquoise falling” thus suggests imaginary perception of the real.

46. ‘Passion’ is Guereschi’s name for her (80).

47. Apropos of Freud’s comment — brought to Lacan’s notice by Valabrega, that desire is fulfilled in the dream (Seminar II 212) — Lacan says that desire introduces fantasy (Seminar II 213); Lacan does not agree that it is ever fulfilled, and so does Stevens.

48. Guereschi imputes the name to the fourth daughter (80).

49. In a letter, Stevens uses the word ‘rout’ apropos of one’s discovery of oneself as multiplicity owing to many influences: “There is a perfect rout of characters in every man — and every man is like an actor’s trunk, full of strange creatures, new + old. But an actor and his trunk are two different things” (Letters 91). Yet, in separating the actor and his trunk he seeks to keep one’s identity apart from the influences. This is what Crispin does in establishing his identity, different from the ‘prudes.’

50. Cook has also suggested this, his word is ‘embraced’ (“The Comedian as the Letter C” 201); what is at issue is overcoming one’s alienation from oneself, one of the dominant themes in Stevens.

51. Patke writes that “the poem has many beguiling aspects for which the undemanding reader can acquire and retain an indulgent affection” (8), while Cook comments, “We do Stevens an injustice if we see Crispin as abject failure or as tragedy” (“The Comedian as the letter C” 198).

52. Milton speaks of “the dreaded name of Demogorgon” (Paradise Lost, Bk. II, l. 966); Spenser says that he dwells “down in the bottom of the deep abyss” with the three fatal sisters (Fairy Queen V l. 22); he figures as “cruel Demogorgon” in Dryden’s The Flowers and the Leaf (l. 493); and in Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound he is depicted as the eternal principle ousting false
gods; e.g. he overthrows Jupiter, who represents the darker forces within Prometheus — Compare this with “darkened by time” (OP 21).

53. The second half of this sentence is derived from Timothy Webb, p. 196.

54. As already mentioned, to ‘symbolize’ is also to ‘kill’ in Lacan; “the letter kills” (qtd in Fink 24, 182n1) in the sense that in symbolizing the real, it introduces a break or fissure into the fullness of the real and creates an absence in that part of it which is symbolized. However, in this poem the symbolization is effected not by letter but by vision (‘eye’), hence it is imaginary symbolization, which is called ‘introjection.’ Lacan argues that that the word ‘introjection’ always means “symbolic introjection. It is always accompanied by a symbolic denomination” (Seminar I 83).

55. Lacan advises to read ‘phallus’ in the place of ‘King.’

56. I borrow this from Fink, p. 44.

57. In fact, Lacan does speak of the human subject in terms of a signifier in Seminar XX: “A man is nothing but a signifier. A woman seeks out a man qua signifier (au titre de significant). A man seeks out a woman qua...that which can be situated through discourse...” (33). Lacan has effectively shown that humans have no existence except in language; in short, as signifiers. This explains why one has a sense of identity as distinct from others, which is parallel to the existence of any signifier of a language as dependent on others.

Notes to RUBBINGS OF REALITY

1. I cannot resist the temptation to say that the coffee in the cup of Robbe-Grillet’s sample passage cools down in the first four or five sentences, freezes by the end of the next half dozen lines, and by the middle of the passage the reader himself freezes and becomes indifferent to what is being read by him or is before his eyes. While the description is extremely accurate, the reader’s interest in, or even faculty of, creating the same picture in his mind comes to standstill after the initial efforts (see Ellmann & Feidelson 365-66).

2. Normally, it is the ego that speaks with the other; and, since the ego is an imaginary function, it is the ego that makes reality august.

3. In fact, Lacan has shown the interdependency among his three orders (imaginary, symbolic, real) in Seminar XX through the Borromean knot.

4. Though I have used Stevens’ wording for my own purpose, I believe that both Nanzia Nunzio of Notes (CP 395-6) and the ‘you’ of “To the one of Fictive Music” (CP 87-8) represent desire, which is the origin of the imaginary that serves as the desire’s instrument aimed at its fulfillment. Lacan uses the word ‘desire’ in two senses: as the mental function set in motion by the lack, and to represent that which lacks; the latter use suggests the lost as illusion. In this way, there is no desire without the lack; therefore, both senses of the word cannot really be separated. Stevens,
too, wrote about that Ozymandias section from the Notes as “an illustration of illusion as value” (Letters 431), and he concludes “To the One of Fictive Music” with an apostrophe to the illusive “Unreal” (CP 88), thus justifying the lack as desire.

5. William Empson was so very correct in his observation that “understanding that other people are different is one of the bases of civilization” (94); it is only a half of that particular base, the other half is that there is at the same time a sense of identification between or among people. The two halves are interdependent and are well balanced in Stevens’ use of the positive degree in “drawn close”—suggesting that it is a normal process—instead of comparative or superlative form of ‘close.’

6. The original adage is “There is nothing in life except what one imagines of it” (OP 162).

7. Santayana believed that “the poetry we see in nature is due to the emotion the spectacle produces in us; the life of nature might be as romantic and sublime as it chose, it would be dust and ashes to us if there were nothing sublime and romantic in ourselves to be stirred by it to sympathy...the poetry of nature may be discerned merely by the power of intuition which it awakens and the understanding which it employs” (Three Philosophical Poets 35).

8. Even though Stevens presents this thought on “night” in the form of a question in “A Word with José Rodriguez-Feo,” in a title of another poem he writes, “Questions are Remarks.”

9. In “Landscape with Boat” Stevens suggests that man and his subjective responses to “...what he saw / And...what he heard,” which the ‘he’ of the poem rejects, are real or part of it:

   He never supposed
   That he might be truth, himself, or part of it,
   That the things he rejected might be part
   And the irregular turquoise, part, the perceptible blue
   Grown denser, part, the eye so touched, so played
   Upon by clouds, the ear so magnified
   By thunder, parts, and all these things together,
   Parts, and more things, parts.

   (CP 242)

10. Patke writes, “...in the dropping of quotation marks, the shift [of the speaker/speaking voice] is no longer signaled overtly. This enables the poet to equivocate silently about the degree of his own presence or absence in what the guitarist has to say” (82). This is true also of the dropping of quotation marks when the audience speaks, so that the questions of who speaks and who listens remain unanswered. It is a question of identity and identification.

11. Part of one of Stevens’ statements goes thus: “…philosophy is the nonsense of apt comedians” (OP 263).

12. This is how Andrew Marvell describes virginity in “To His Coy Mistress” (see Gardner 251).
13. “The child who beats another says that he has been struck; the child who sees another fall, cries” (Écrits 19). This is due to “imaginary transitivism” (Seminar III 145) “expressed by the fact that one child who has beaten another can say — The other beat me. It’s not that he is lying — he is the other, literally” (Seminar III 39), “because for him it’s exactly the same thing” (Seminar III 145); of course, transitivism anticipates the “notion of the role of spatial symmetry in man’s narcissistic structure” (Écrits 27).

Notes to APOGEE
1. Lacan’s comment may be recalled here: “Hamlet is constantly suspended in the time of the Other” (“Desire” 17).
2. ‘Jouissance’ is Lacan’s term for the pleasure principle. “There is no jouissance without castration,” says Lacan (Seminar XX 38-9); since castration is a phallic function, and since jouissance results from giving up castration, jouissance is also a phallic function. In Lacan’s structure for masculinity, the phallic function marks the limit of pleasure; “Man’s pleasures are limited to those allowed by the (phallic) signifier itself” (Fink 106). Beyond that is death. Women, however, are capable of experiencing the jouissance beyond the phallus, their limit is further beyond.
3. The reality of the human body fades progressively as it keeps being increasingly symbolized from one’s conception itself and hence belongs to the symbolic order; its death is when it is ‘fully’ symbolized and assimilated into the real order. This is why the foetus in embryo and the dead body are almost similar, things which ‘cannot feel the touch of earthly years’ or of the symbolic order.
4. In the dialectization of a master signifier, the meaning of the master signifier is realized by the subject and a contact with the lost object(a) is established even though it is lost as soon as it is thus recovered. For more details see Fink, pp. 77-9.
5. Here, I use object petit a and object(a) as distinct from each other to represent respectively the actual object one desires and which can only satisfy the need, and the object constituted as primally lost as a result of one’s coming to be in the symbolic order. This distinction is maintained throughout this study.
6. In reality, the subject never approaches object(a), which in this sense remains at the level of a signifier-in-the-real, like the phallus
7. Lacan also refers to this as “semiotic jouissance”: the jouissance of meaning (“jouis-sense”) derived from lalangue (quoted in Fink 194n20). Lalangue is the language of symptoms and thus “indicates that part of language which reflects the laws of unconscious processes, but whose effects go beyond that reflection, and escape the grasp of the subject” (FS 46).
8. This is the 'more than jouissance' or 'surplus jouissance' that the subject is incapable of either experiencing or bearing; therefore, it is "something more than pleasure which can easily tip into its opposite," namely, pain (FS 34).

9. Lacan refers to the subject as signifier in Seminar XX (33, 39; also see Lee 176).

10. The neurotic's ego (or the imaginary function, in other words) being very strong, and thus very sensitive, the other easily becomes an Other for him. This Other, however, is different from the Other of the neurotic desire in the sense that the neurotic desires what he is deprived of — the signifier that he has somehow lost.

11. The poetic act for Stevens is "a projection of poetry into reality" (OP 238-239).

12. In the discussion on The Comedian it has already been suggested that, like Gandhi, the individual's growth was important for Stevens.

13. One more instance of this is in "Apostrophe to Vincentine," where Stevens speaks of "what I knew you felt" in section IV, which conversely betrays what the 'I' felt (CP 53).

14. "Hatched" means 'marked with close parallel lines' as in the sign # (and not 'incubated'), thus implying the women's sublimation by this added embellishment and adding to their 'resplendence.'

15. Recall the "too human god" of Esthetique du Mal "Who by sympathy has made himself a man / And is not to be distinguished" (CP 315).

16. Here, the first couple was alienated from God, like a child from its mother, because of that law made by (not God, now) God-as-Father. The law, language, signifier, or symbol comes to exist in the place of what is lost.

17. Before the entry into the symbolic order, the child supposes itself to be the mother's desire; in other words, he is or has the phallus that the mother desires. The father's 'no!' takes the child away from that sense of being or having the phallus, which thereafter exists as a signifier for that which has been lost as a result.

18. Fantasy proper is the subject's relation with object(a) (.§ a); it is truncated if the Other's demand takes on the function of that object in the subject's fantasy (§D). Such a subject, therefore, is never free in the sense that his desire fails to break the shackles of the symbolic order (demand as symbolic), beyond which rests his real that he must court in fantasy and symbolize.

19. Whereas the normal subject's desire is mediated by the Other and is directed towards the phallus (also see Lee 220n31), that of the neurotic subject is mediated through the repression of phallus and is directed toward the Other. The psychotic subject's desire, however, remains suspended in the Other without mediation by the phallus, since there is a foreclosure of the phallus.

20. The young boy, here, is neurotic insofar as he is not (properly or sufficiently) castrated.

22. At the end of Lecture XXXI, “The Dissection of the Psychical Personality,” Freud writes that famous dictum (see SE 22: 80). Lacan’s translation of it goes thus: ‘There where it was, must I come to being’ (Écrits 129). Lacan, in fact, translates the latter half of the dictum as ‘it is my duty that I should come to being’ owing to the very next sentence Freud wrote after the dictum suggesting ‘a civilizing task,’ thus endowing the soll(must) with a moral or civilizing connotation (see Écrits 128 & note 6 to the chapter).

23. The French word seems more suitable here since the meaning ‘to take oneself in hand’ is absent in the English ‘assume.’

24. The “disintegration of the imaginary unity constituted by the moi” is necessary for the subject’s re-integration with his being (Écrits 137), which lies with Es in Freud’s dictum.

25. For Lacan’s discussion of Antigone, see Seminar VII, pp. 243-301 (for more discussion, see Lee 122-32).

26. The corresponding passage is also translated in Lee, p. 125. Lacan here speaks of death as a result of crossing the Ate, the limit.

27. Speaking on the significance of the signifier, Lacan adds, “...the signifier’s answer to whomever interrogates it is: ‘Eat your Dasein.’” The meaning of this allusion to Heidegger is explained in the preceding paragraph by Lacan: “So runs the signifier’s answer...: “You think you act when I stir you at the mercy of the bonds through which I knot your desires. Thus do they grow and multiply in objects, bringing you back to the fragmentation of your shattered childhood” (See Lacan’s seminar on “The Purloined Letter.” Trans. Jeffrey Mehlman. Essential Papers on Literature and Psychoanalysis. Ed. Emanuel Burman. [New York and London: New York University Press, 1993], p. 295). Written in a baroque manner, it suggests the cut the signifier introduces into an individual, making him or her a subject, thus ‘murdering’ him or her reality (Écrits 104). (Also in Yale French Studies 71-2).

28. In Hamlet’s case it is the question of the phallus; however, as an object or thing it (imaginary phallus) is essentially in the field of the Other. What he seeks is not the phallus-as-signifier but the Other as the-phallus-as-thing.

29. The OED lists these variants of the word: fortalice, foralyse, fortalyce, fortalitie, fortellesse, fortilage, fortelleze, fortelace, fortilesse, fortalise. The seventh approximates Stevens’ spelling; however, from among so many variants, Stevens’ choice of this particular variant shows the very purpose that I am trying to explicate here.

30. The “moderate satisfactions” the subject experiences belong in the domain of symbolic order, of Law; Lacan says, “…the Law seems to be giving the order, ‘Jouis!’”, to which the subject can only reply ‘J‘ouis’ (I hear), the jouissance being no more than understood” (Écrits 319). A great
deal seems to be compressed in the statement: the Law gives the order to enjoy, but the subject's situation is such that he, being a subject of the Law and hence at the level of privation, simply listens obediently to the Law even though he enjoys; thus he never disobeys the Law. The *jouissance* here, in being "no more than understood," is tamed. This is very much like the (supposed) freedom given by the traffic rules to enjoy, say, a speed of 80 km/hr ("Jouis!"); but that enjoyment is limited in the rider's awareness of the limit ordained ("J'ouis"); the rider is simply made to understand that this limit is enjoyment and that its violation is subject to punishment.

31. It is not a 'division' as such because though object(a) is the Other's desire, yet it *ex-sists* for the subject in equal radical Otherness as the Other itself. Thus, there is no Other of an Other.

32. Booker describes the phallic signifier as "that primordial signifier whose very absence makes the activity of all other signifiers possible" (493).

33. The second stanza might recall "that which it wants to hear" from "Of Modern Poetry," which is full of evocations of the identification process.

34. Lacan says with respect to the phallus as real, "I say "thing" and not "object," because it is a real thing, one that has not yet been made a symbol, but has the potential of becoming one" ("Desire" 48); he is speaking of the phallus-as-thing as obviously belonging to the real order, it is the same as the imaginary phallus (-Ø).

35. Nassar also seems to equate the soldiers in these two poems (175, 30).

36. Because the phallic *jouissance* is narcissistic, Lacan goes so far as to say that "Il n'y a pas de rapport sexual," "There is no such thing as a sexual relationship" (qtd. and trans. in the footnote in the English translation of Seminar XX, p. 5).

37. Fink explains that "the word 'ex-sistence' was first introduced into French in translations of Heidegger...as a translation for the Greek *ekstasis* and the German *Ekstase*. The root meaning of the term in Greek is 'standing outside of' or 'standing apart from' something...Lacan uses it to talk about 'an existence which stands apart from,' which insists as it were from the outside...something which, rather than being intimate, is "extimate"' (122).

38. Vendler has discussed in her *Words chosen out of Desire* how Stevens seeks to go beyond the romantic poets, especially Keats.

39. Lacan speaks of the phallus as reflecting "on the level of the object" ("Desire" 48).

40. One of Stevens' adage goes: "Everything tends to become real; or everything moves in the direction of reality" (OP 165).

41. It is not simply here that Stevens shows his (psycho)analytic precision but almost throughout the poetry. In this sense, Wagner might want to change his stance of looking down upon Stevens' "limited" analytic ability; he writes, "The fact is that although Stevens shows a profound feeling for certain of the problems of epistemology...and phenomenology, his philosophical, even his..."
ordinary analytical abilities are quite limited. And this limitation is particularly evident in those areas that encroach on primal experience, the pursuit of the ultimate object” (100).

42. Notice the French syntax — noun followed by adjective — in “farouche extreme.”

43. Make this and the following points much before in the dissertation): Since Stevens’ conception of what he calls ‘reality’ comes much closer to Lacan’s concept of the ‘real,’ I use the two terms interchangeably.

44. The same is with ‘imaginary’ and ‘imagination.’

45. Lacan asserts that both metaphor and metonymy function together, that metonymy is implied in metaphor: “The creative spark of the metaphor does not spring from the presentation of two images, that is, of two signifiers equally actualized. It flashes between two signifiers one of which has taken the place of the other in the signifying chain, the occulted signifier remaining present through its (metonymic) connexion with the rest of the chain” (Écrits 157). The two processes “could be seen as two elements of one process, since every condensation is also a displacement from S to S1 [i.e. from one signifier to another], and every displacement relies on terms generated by condensation” (Grosz 103).

46. In an article, “The Phallic Phase and the Subjective Import of the Castration Complex,” that emerged out of a group of contributors involving Lacan himself, it is clearly stated that the neurotic pretends to give up on the ultimate as his desire and holds onto its signifier:

Doubtless aphanisis of desire corresponds to a recognizable stage in the clinical treatment of neurosis: but this should not prevent us from seeing that the neurotic, far from fearing it, seeks refuge in it, and pretends to give up his or her desire in order to safeguard that which is more precious than desire itself — its symbol, the phallus.

(FS 110)

This is so because it is that signifier that sustains the possibility of there being desire; yet, the aphanisis, i.e. disappearance, of desire makes the neurotic subject hold onto the signifier of the desire in such a way that the object from the actual world, which can function to signify that desire, becomes a fetishistic object of his or her attention.

47. Lacan speaks of the Other as the locus of all knowledge: “...knowledge is in the Other and owes nothing to being except that the latter has borne (véhiculé) the letter thereof,” and later associates it with the unconscious thus: “Everything indicates — that is the meaning of the unconscious — that man already knows all he needs to know” (Seminar XX 96-7, 105).

48. In Lacanian thought, insofar as satisfaction of the drives is concerned, the object is not specific even though the object under the subject’s gaze is sublimated as in the case of the
satisfaction of a need, where the object is not sublimated but is often very specific. Thus, "...as regards satisfaction of the drives, the object can strictly be termed indifferent, and that in the case of sublimation, satisfaction is obtained even though the drive is inhibited in relation to its aim" (FS 112). Stevens' poem therefore has nothing to do with the bouquet as such even as the poem's argument makes it clear in its little emphasis on the bouquet as compared with the emphasis on the effects it has on the mind.

49. Stevens often uses the image of the lake to suggest consciousness/imaginary, e.g. as in "lake of reflections in a room" (CP 468), and of the sea to represent the unconscious/real, e.g. as in "the sea whose tide swept through me" (CP 65).

50. "The drive marks the subject's attempt to realize itself in the field of the Other and to find in that field the object which is eternally lacking" (FS 112).

51. I use the word 'insists' here in the sense in which Lacan uses it in the title of one of his seminars, "The Agency of the letter in the unconscious" (See Écrits pp. 146-78); the word 'instance' in the title of Lacan's essay also takes on the meanings 'process' or 'action,' 'agency,' 'authority,' and 'insistence.'

52. Miller catches the essence of the 'rock' symbol in 'mise en abyme,' "a term in heraldry meaning a shield which has in its center (abyme) a smaller image of the same shield, and so, by implication, ad infinitum, with ever smaller and smaller shields receding toward the central point" ("Stevens' Rock" 11); the term therefore suggests the 'rock' as that ever shifting aim of desire which keeps substituting a surrogate object in its place with each shift, and which thus is no more, is the nothing that the subject believes is something. This is what Lacan calls the object(a).

53. I use 'Lacanalyse' for 'Lacanian psychoanalysis' or to suggest Lacan's psychoanalytic thought; however, as far as the above comment is concerned, Lacan has borrowed it from Freud.

54. Lacan asks, "...isn't what is at stake in creationism a creation on the basis of nothing — thus on the basis of the signifier?" (Seminar XX 41). Insofar as humans have subjectivity, they owe it to the signifier; they have no existence except in the symbolic. Hence Lacan says, "As soon as the subject himself comes to be, he owes it to a certain non-being on which he raises his being" (Seminar II 192), he or she comes to be as a marker at the place of something (being) that is hollowed out and existing thereafter as absence (non-being). Thus, man is a signifier himself, man and woman are nothing but signifiers (Seminar XX 33, 39), "men, women, and children are only signifiers" (quoted in Lee 176 from Seminar XX).

55. Lacan says that "it is castration that governs desire, whether in the normal or the abnormal... Castration means that jouissance [of the Other] must be refused" (Écrits 323-24), thus conversely suggesting that castration must be refused in order to experience jouissance (also see Fink 72).
both cases, illness ("abnormal") or cure ("jouissance") depend on castration, on what castration
does with the subject or the subject with his castration.

56. Stevens recognizes man’s being “at the mercy of language” (ERS 175) when he says that
“The gaiety of language is our seigneur” (CP 322).

57. It has been already suggested that Lacan does not clarify the apparent distinction between the
phallus qua object, object(a) as object as such, and das Ding; however, in his thought, all of them
represent the ultimate object of human desire, the being itself, and attaining which is attaining
death; and Stevens often seems to see it that way since, especially in the later poetry, he muses
on “how being / Includes death” (CP 444).