CHAPTER 5

REALIST PERSPECTIVES ON THE NPT
INTRODUCTION

This study aims to analyze, explain and understand the complexity and depth of the NPT in world politics. This research seeks to answer the central questions on the NPT: Why did the NPT evolve into a global security regime? How did the NPT work? What is the limit and possibility of the NPT in world politics? To answer the questions, this thesis uses a pluralistic comparative theoretical approach. This chapter will examine the realist perspectives on the NPT. First, the dynamics and evolution of the NPT are explained and examined through four realist theories: hegemonic stability realism, bipolar stability realism, defensive realism, and offensive realism. It also examines the realist critiques that the liberal promises of the positive roles of the NPT.

THE DYNAMICS AND EVOLUTION OF THE NPT

Examining the realist explanations of the NPT

In spite of shared core realist assumptions, there are varied blanches within a realist school (Doyle, 1997; Dunne and Schmidt, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2008). Realism is not one, but many. Due to these varieties within realism, “They do not lead to a unified understanding of contemporary world politics or to a single theory of state behavior. By making additional assumptions and emphasizing different features of contemporary international politics, they arrive at different assessments of the emerging international order” (Mastanduno, 1990:22). Hoffmann critically point out the realists “essential elasticity and indeterminateness” as well as “the multiplicity of policies that could be defended as realistic” (Hoffmann, 1998:59).
Here we examine four branches of realist theory: hegemonic stability realists; bipolar stability realists; moderate realist (contemporary defensive realists); and extreme realists (contemporary offensive realists). Contemporary neo-realists (or structural realists) focus on the single important factor in international politics: the structure of power distribution in international politics.

Hegemonic Stability Realism assumes that the hegemonic state(s), unipolarity, brings stability in international order, but the decline of hegemony is inevitable. The emergence of multi-polarity or hegemonic change is likely to cause instability and disorder (Gilpin, 1981; Layne, 1993).

Bipolar stability realism regards that bipolarity ensures the stability of international order whereas multipolarity is competitive and often conflicting great powers’ relations (Waltz, 1964, 1979, 1990).

Defensive Realism emphasises that states do not necessarily seek hegemony, relative power and competition. Rather states seek security, stability, and co-ordination, which make international co-operation more possible (Carr, 1939; Kissinger, 1994; Jervis, 1999. See also Wight, 1991).

Offensive Realism emphasise that states seek relative power, military power, and maximum interests, which force states’ competition, arms race, war, and security dilemma more likely (Mearsheimer, 1994-95, 2001. See also Schmidt, 2004; Wight, 1991). However, both contemporary defensive and offensive neo-realists are equally sceptical of liberal internationalist progressive and optimistic assumptions and
worldviews. War and conflict are inevitable in world politics. Anarchy is what states have to live in.

**Realist approaches to security co-operation, institutions and regimes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approaches/ Ideologies</th>
<th>Sources of dynamics</th>
<th>Possibilities for security cooperation through international institutions and regimes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hegemonic stability (conservatism)</td>
<td>Hegemonic power and interests; nuclear primacy</td>
<td>Highly possible when the hegemon(s) take leadership to enhance co-ordination and stability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bipolar stability (conservatism)</td>
<td>Bipolarity; balance of terror</td>
<td>Likely possible when two-superpowers enhance co-ordination to enhance stability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive realism (conservatism)</td>
<td>Consensus among states/Great Powers; diplomacy</td>
<td>Possible, if great power concert and international consensus secure co-ordination and stability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offensive realism (hard revolutionism/hard reactionarism)</td>
<td>States’ relative power and interests</td>
<td>Very difficult as all states compete to seek relative power and maximise military capabilities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Jackson and Sorensen, 2003; Lamy 2005; Baylis, 2005; Jervis, 1999; Wight, 1991)

**THE HEGEMONIC STABILITY REALIST EXPLANATION OF THE NPT**

The hegemon creates international regimes to promote its hegemonic interests.

↓

The US leadership has been the crucial driving force of the NPT evolution.
The NPT regime will be stable as long as the US hegemony remains strong.

Hegemonic Stability Realism

Hegemonic stability theorists assume that hegemonic power(s) create a stable international order and regimes. International regimes are international public goods such as international security, free trade, or transportation. In the eyes of critics, any international order, institution and regime are created and maintained by the strength and rich (great powers) to co-ordinate and promote their own national interests, power, and influence (Car, 1939; Strange 1982; Rajagopalan 1990; Little 2005).

Leading states and their power resources, 1500-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Major Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16th century</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Gold bullion, colonial trade, mercenary armies, dynastic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>tics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th century</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Trade, capital markets, navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th century</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Population, rural industry, public administration, army, culture (soft power)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th century</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Industry, political cohesion, finance and credit, navy, liberal norms (soft power), island location (easy to defend)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th century</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Economic scale, scientific and technical leadership, location, military forces and alliances, universalistic culture and liberal international regimes (soft power)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st century</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Technological leadership, military and economic scale, soft power, hub of transnational communications</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hegemonic change is inevitable. War and change are the likely outcomes when a hegemonic state feel threatened by the rise of a challenger(s) (Thucydides; Gilpin, 1981). Kennedy argued that empires spend increasing costs to maintain their military dominance and imperial over-stretch (Kennedy, 1998). However, contemporary scholarship claims that the US liberal order can be durable due to its liberal characteristics and benign governance (Sato; Ikenberry, 2000; Nye; Cua, 2007; Zakaria, 2008). One of the biggest question of world politics is how to achieve peaceful change without war (Carr, 1939).

Hegemonic Stability Realism and the NPT

The hegemonic power(s) have hegemonic interests in preserving a conservative nuclear status-quo order, thus non-proliferation. As nuclear weapons are so powerful tools of deterrence, further nuclear proliferation reduce great powers’ prestige, ability of intervention, political influence, and management of their alliances and world order (Freedman, 1994-95; Paul, 1998, 1999; Utgoff, 2000). According to Rajagopalan, the US hegemonic power has been the crucial driving force in the evolution of the NPT-based “non-proliferation” regime. The NPT regime is not “the nuclear arms control and disarmament for the international community”. It is essentially “the non-proliferation regime” to preserve the nuclear status quo order, which benefits the hegemonic interests. “[The nuclear non-proliferation] regime served the crucial interests of the United states by constraining the spread of nuclear technology to other likely powers, thus reducing the risks of a challenge to American hegemony and vital American national security interests.”(Rajagopalan 1999). The NPT regime can flourish as long as it is supported by a hegemonic state. The salient influence of the US hegemonic superpower is apparent in the NPT evolution follow (Cirincione, 1995,
We examine the evolution of the US non-proliferation policy and the NPT as follow:

- **The Baruch plan of 1946**

  Since WWII, the US took nuclear control and non-proliferation policy as the first nuclear power. During the War, the Manhattan Project to make atomic bombs was a top-secret programme. Even Vice-President Truman was never informed before he succeeded Presidency. At the newly created United Nations in 1946, the US submitted the first nuclear disarmament plan (the Baruch Plan) to create an international organization to all activities of nuclear energy. This Baruch Plan aimed to secure the US dominance of nuclear weapons knowledge and know-how, thus serve the US interests. As this Baruch plan serve the Americans, the Soviets never accepted it. Simultaneously the US Congress made the Atomic Energy Act to keep their nuclear secrecy at home (Goldshmidt, 1977; Bunn 1992; Sokolski 2001).

- **The Eisenhower 'Atoms for Peace proposal of 1953**

  After the US nuclear monopoly was broken by the Soviet nuclear tests, President Eisenhower proposed “Atoms for Peace” in 1953. Under the US initiatives along with negotiations with Western European countries and the USSR, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was created in 1957 to control atomic energy activities. The IAEA was aimed at the purpose of peaceful uses of nuclear energy as well as the object of a comprehensive monitoring system (safeguards) to prevent military use of nuclear weapons. The IAEA together with the NPT has been the cornerstone of international non-proliferation regimes (Goldshmidt, 1977; Cirincione, 2000; Straus, 2004; Sokolski, 2001).
• The US initiatives to create the WMD non-proliferation regime in the 1970s-80s

The Chinese nuclear tests in 1964 made the American to materialise an international non-proliferation treaty. Together with the USSR, the US played a leading role to draft an international treaty on nuclear non-proliferation in the mid-1960s (Bunn, 1992; Sokolski, 2001) Next proliferation shock by the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974 made the US to take initiative to tighten international nuclear export control. American leadership has often played a critical role in forging coalition-building for meeting proliferation challenges. The US leadership was critical to the negotiation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), creation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Australia Group to control Chemical and Biological agents. G-7 led by the US did every effort to strengthen and tighten the WMD non-proliferation regime (Sokolski 2001; Dunn 1998). Rajagopalan point out the US successful efforts to tighten the non-proliferation regime:

“...There have been continuing concerns in Washington and other capitals about loopholes in the non-proliferation regime. Many of the subsidiary agreements that are also part of the non-proliferation regime... came up as a consequence of what the nuclear powers felt were failures of the non-proliferation regime. ... The US has had an almost unbroken record of successes in its efforts at tightening the rules that govern technology and material transfer under the non-proliferation regime...” (2005).

• The US non-proliferation initiatives after the Cold War

The US became the sole superpower after the collapse of the Soviet empire. The US doubled efforts to deal with the WMD proliferation problems after the Cold
War. "...President George Bush negotiated and signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, prohibiting the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, or use of chemical weapons. President Clinton continued the momentum established by his predecessors. The US helped convincing Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to abandon their inherited nuclear weapons and join the NPT regime as the non-nuclear-weapons states. President Clinton successfully managed the indefinite extension of the NPT in May 1995; led efforts to conclude and sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty [CTBT] in 1996; failed in 1996 but came back in 1997 to convince ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC]..." (Cirincione 2000). The most significant event was the success of the NPT indefinite extension in 1995. The US spent considerable energy and efforts in active diplomacy, direct consultation and even pressures to obtain successfully the majority supports from their allies, friends, and even reluctant members of NAM in all over the world to the unconditional extension of the Treaty (Graham Jr., 2002).

• The US non-proliferation efforts after 9/11 terrorism, 2001

After 9.11 terrorism in 2001, the US Bush administration recognised to deal with new security developments: the nexus of "nuclear proliferation, terrorism and rogue states". The US took "counter-proliferation policy" which went beyond the traditional NPT-based non-proliferation approach. In 2002, the US National Security report put forward a radically new concept of "preventive war". The US started Iraq war in 2003 using this rationale of "preventive war" and "regime change" to stop Iraqi nuclear programme though the evidence was never found even after the war (Litwak 2003-04). Downplaying the NPT, the US with supports of their allies and friends formed the Proliferation Security Initiatives (PSI) to halt illegal trade and transportation
by sea and air of the WMD and missile by terrorists and nuclear proliferation countries. In July 2005, the US and India agreed a new civil energy co-operation, by which the US admitted India as a nuclear-weapon state as an exceptional case. Other non-nuclear states and non-proliferation lobbies criticises that by giving de facto nuclear-weapons status to India, this nuclear deal would erode the NPT-based international non-proliferation regime. The US-India nuclear deals remains debated in the US, India, and international arena (at the time of July 2008). These develop during the Bush administration were drastically apart from the traditional non-proliferation policy based on the NPT (Andreani, 1999-2000).

Seven Proposals concerning WMD non-proliferation by US President Bush

(February 11, 2004)

- Expansion of activities of the “Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)”
- Early adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution on non-proliferation
- Expansion of the G8 Global Partnership
- Prevention of proliferation of enriched uranium and reprocessing equipment and its technologies
- To oblige the importing countries of equipment for the civil nuclear programs to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol
- Creation of the Special Committee for Safeguards and Verification
- To exclude states under investigation for proliferation violations from the IAEA Board of Governors or the Special Committee for Safeguards and Verification

(Source: MOFA, Japan, 2004: 21)
The US initiatives of strengthening international non-proliferation efforts

- The Atoms for Peace proposal of 1953
- The NPT of 1968
- The IAEA of 1957
- The Zangger Committee and a trigger list of 1971
- The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the London Guideline of 1975
- The US INFCE of 1977
- The US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978
- The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) of 1987
- The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program of 1991 under the Nunn-Lugar Act
- The Lisbon protocol of 1992
- The IAEA revised inspection mechanism ("93+2") of 1993
- The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) of 1993
- The Counter Proliferation Initiative by Les Aspin in 1993
- The US active diplomacy for indefinite extension of the NPT of 1995
- The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996
- The Wassenaar Arrangement of 1996 (a successor to the COCOM)
- Deciding a National Missile Defence (NMD) system in 1999
- The Hague Code of Conduct of 2002
- The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) of 2003
- The US-India nuclear deal of 2005

These evidences show the importance of the US initiatives on nuclear non-proliferation efforts. Cirincione stresses the successful US initiatives:

"...The non-proliferation regime has been built over the past fifty years by many nations, but almost always with the leadership of the United States. It has grown most quickly and most surely when both major U.S. political parties
shared in the construction. The initiatives of one president or Congress would often be fulfilled by the next, regardless of party affiliation. Over these decades, Republican presidents have often led the efforts. … While some demonize it as the source of many of the regime’s problems, the United States remains the one nation in the world with the resources, status, and potential leadership capable of galvanizing international non-proliferation efforts. That leadership role has always been strongest when it has enjoyed the support of both major political parties…” (Cirincione 2000).

Thus, crucially, the US has been the hegemonic power since WWII, and the US has been ever-tightening the NPT-based non-proliferation regime for decades. Thucydides’ famous observation holds true to the US initiatives of nuclear non-proliferation norms and standard creation: “The standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept” (Thucydides. See also Carr, 1939; Reus-Smit, 2008).

**Hegemonic Stability Realism and the prospects for the NPT**

Then, how does hegemonic stability realism predict the future of the NPT? The question of the prospects for the American hegemony was raised in the 1980s. For hegemonic realists, when the hegemonic power(s) decline, so do international regimes. On the one hand, Gilpin was sceptical of the regime maintenance after hegemonic decline. Paul Kennedy’ appraised *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers* was the warning of a hegemonic decline due to its “imperial over-stretch”-- perhaps an insightful observation if we reflect upon the US security policy, military projection, and defence
budget today (Gilpin, 1982, 1984; Kennedy 1988). Hegemonic change theory implies that the current status-quo nuclear order of the NPT regime would decline when it does not suit to the international structure of powers or the changing hegemonic interests. (Rajagopalan, 2005). On the other hand, neo-liberals like Keohane and Nye replied that international regimes can work to promote international cooperation even after hegemony (Keohane, 1984). Murakami argued that the strength of US hegemony "Haken" lies in every aspects of power in military, politics, economy, especially culture and ideational spheres, which Nye calls as "soft power" (1996).

The end of the Cold War stimulated the debates on the prospects for world politics and the future of American hegemony. Neo-realists speculate the prospects for instability caused by emerging multipolarity (Layne, 1993; Mearsheimer, 1990; Waltz, 1993. See also Mahbubani, 2008). Although France, China, Russia, and India vigorously assert "a multi-polar world", emerging multipolarity seem to remain still premature, and the US hegemony is so pervasive. Dueck remarks on the failure of these arguments of multipolar instability: "Clearly, structural realist predictions of American decline or disengagement were premature. ... There is simply no precedent in the modern era for the successful exercise of worldwide, comprehensive, hegemonic influence on the part of any single state" (Dueck, 2004:198). Observing this overwhelming American power, hegemonic stability realists predict a durable US-led non-proliferation regime for years to come.

Then, why does the US hegemonic order, together with its liberal allies, remain so strong even after the demise of their common threats? Sato, a Japanese political scientist and historian, strongly argued the case for the Western "security communities"
which are based on military allies notably NATO and the US-Japan security treaty and shared common values and interests among advanced industrial democracies (Sato, 1999). Recently, Structural Liberals like Deudney and Ikenbery argue that the US-led Western liberal democracies including Japan share notable features like security co-binding, penetrated-reciprocal hegemony, semi-sovereign and partial great-powers, economic openness, and civic identity (Ikenberry 1999, 2000). Jackson and Sorensen explain that “the Western liberal [constitutional] order are so strong and entrenched that they will survive the collapse of the common external threat, the Soviet Union. In short, the liberal order rests on a liberal foundation, not on a particular balance or a certain external threat” (Jackson and Sorensen, 2003:133-134). For the hegemonic stability realists, the NPT-based non-proliferation regime will remain strong as long as the US, the hegemonic power(s), is strong enough to support it enhancing their hegemonic interests in non-proliferation. As the US hegemony looks predominant today, the US-led non-proliferation and counter-proliferation order will be strong for the foreseeable future (Straus, 2004; Sokoski, 2001; Rajagopalan, 1990, 2005).

According to Brzezinski, “American supremacy has thus produced a new international order that not only replicates but institutionalizes abroad many of the feature of the American system itself”. Its basic features include:

- A collective security system, including integrated command and forces;
- Regional economic cooperation and specialized global cooperative institutions;
- Procedures that emphasize consensual decision making, even if dominated by the United States;
- A preference for democratic membership within key alliances;
• A rudimentary global constitutional and judicial structure (ranging from the World Court to a special tribunal to try Bosnian war crimes) (Brzezinski, 1997:29).

Critical assessments

Hegemonic stability realists correctly point out the salient of the hegemonic power(s) and hegemonic interests in the NPT evolution. But critics response, first of all, that hegemonic stability realists exaggerate the power and coercion of hegemony to keep international order. Even for moderate realists and Grotians, the strong need legitimacy, consent and consensus among the weak to maintain a sustainable order (Carr, 1939; Kissinger, 1994; Bull, 1977, 1984). Actually, Nye, a neo-liberal, use the term “soft power” as a source of the US enduring strong hegemony. (Nye, Jr., 2002, 2004, 2008). Liberals criticise the US Bush unilateralism: “A coalition of willing”, the unilateralism under the disguise of multilateralism in essence, can not succeed in the long run (Fukuyama, 2007). True multilateralism matters in the NPT evolution (Dhanapala 2001, 2005). For example, the conclusion of the NPT in the 1960s or the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 could not be accomplished without the world-wide support of non-proliferation efforts in the international community. The US Bush unilateralism causes suspicions of other great powers and the international community, which leads to the considerable weakening trust, legitimacy and efficacy of the NPT today. Consider the failure of the 2005 NPT RC. Even the hegemonic power(s) can not move the NPT at will without considering legitimacy, consensus, and consent on the part of other great powers and lesser powers in the international community.

Second, whereas hegemonic stability realism focuses on the influence of the
US hegemonic power in the evolution of the NPT, other realists see different pictures. For bipolar stability realists, the NPT is the product of bipolar stability during the Cold War. The US and USSR, two superpowers, wrote the most important part of the original draft in making of an NPT in the 1960s, and the NPT-based non-proliferation regime developed during the 1970s and 1980s based on the structure of bipolar stability. Moderate realists or extreme realists contend another view that the NPT has been used as a tool of the nuclear status quo of five great powers. Though original signatory NWSs were the US, the USSR and Britain, the NPT successfully secure other great powers’ status and interests, not only France and China but also Germany, West European countries, or Japan who enjoyed the credible nuclear umbrella provided by the US (Singh, 1998).

Finally, even if this US-led liberal order will remain so strong for years to come, history will tell nothing remain unchanged under the Sun. Neo-realist predictions predicted “the unipolar illusion” (Layne) and “back to the future” (Mearsheimer) soon after the Cold War. Though these prediction does not hold true so far, Waltz may be right to predict “the emerging structure of multipolarity” soon or later, and Kupchan should be rightly worried about “the end of the American era.” If so, it is not fruitless to speculate the prospects for nuclear futures after the US hegemony (Wirtz, 1998). Critics assume that maintaining security cooperation and international stability should be possible even after hegemony if only the NPT order is maintained through “international regimes and institutions”, “liberal democracies and economies” or “great powers’ concert”.

242
THE BIPOLAR STABILITY REALIST EXPLANATION OF THE NPT

Bipolar international system brings stability.

↓

The US-USSR nuclear co-ordination was the dynamo of the NPT evolution.

↓

The NPT and non-proliferation management will be difficult in an emerging multipolar world after the demise of biopolarity.

Bipolar Stability Realism

Contemporary neo-realists focus on the structure of international politics, in other words the distribution of power. Compare with multipolarity such as Europe before 1945, Waltz and Mearsheimer argue, a bipolar world together with mutual nuclear deterrence is more peaceful and stable due to following reasons:

(1) The number of great power conflict is fewer, leaving fewer possibilities for war;

(2) Deterrence is easier, because imbalances of power are fewer and more easily averted.

(3) The prospects for deterrence are greater because miscalculations of relative power and of opponents’ resolve are fewer and less likely.

The Cold War between the US and the USSR brought bipolar stability as Gaddis called it as “the long peace” (Gaddis, 1987). On the basis of bipolar stability during the Cold War, two superpowers collaborated each other for their mutual national interests. The US and USSR share common interests in avoiding direct conflicts, a total
nuclear war, and further nuclear proliferation in the bipolar world during the Cold War (Waltz 1964, 1979, 1986, 1990; Mandelbaum, 1979; Mearsheimer, 1990).

Mearsheimer's argument on bipolar stability and multipolar instability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions of stable bipolarity</th>
<th>Conditions of unstable multipolarity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(The case of the Cold War)</strong></td>
<td><strong>(A prospect for the post-Cold War world)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Europe during the Cold War</td>
<td>• Europe before 1945 and after 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Two superpowers</td>
<td>• Several great powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Rough superpower equality</td>
<td>• Unequal and shifting balances of power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Nuclear deterrence</td>
<td>• Conventional military rivalry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conquest is difficult</td>
<td>• Conquest is less difficult and more tempting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Superpower discipline</td>
<td>• Great power indiscipline and risk-taking</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adopte from Jackson and Sorensen, 2003: 91)

Bipolar stability realism and the NPT

Bipolar stability realists argue that two superpowers created and developed the NPT-based nuclear order to maintain the status-quo world order firmly based on their nuclear dominance. Even liberals like Ungerer acknowledge the significant roles of two superpowers in the evolution of the NPT: “...The pace and direction of arms control agreements during much of the Cold War period – including the specific negotiations that led to the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 – were an
obvious product of strategic bipolarity…” (Ungerer 2001:187). Bipolar stability theory explains that nuclear coordination between two nuclear superpowers stabilised the non-proliferation status-quo order during the Cold War. The US and the USSR were the main players to create a draft of the NPT. After that, the NPT evolved into the global security regime under bipolar stability during the Cold War (Sweet 1984; Nye 1988; Bunn 1992; Frankel 1993; Straus 2004). From now on, we shall examine the case for bipolar stability as follow.

- *The US and the USSR collaborated to create the NPT in the mid-1960s*

  Each of two superpowers tried to halt nuclear proliferation each individually in earlier stage. But nuclear weapons spread to the UK, France, China by the mid of 1960s. Although, both superpowers confronted each other on the German and NATO nuclear issue, the Cuban Missile Crisis, French nuclear tests, and Russian-Chinese confrontation changed the conditions and atmosphere for negotiations. The US and the USSR came to seriously recognise their common interests in creating an international non-proliferation treaty. President Johnson made the conclusion of the NPT a matter of high priority. The US and the USSR drafted key articles of the NPT. Three nuclear weapons states (the US, the USSR, and the UK) agreed the PTBT (Partial Test Ban Treaty) in 1963, and this treaty with the NPT served for nuclear non-proliferation and their dominance of nuclear weapons. Mandelbaum dismissed the multilateralist claim for the UN role, and emphasizes the overwhelming role of the US-USSR coordination:

  “…The Nonproliferation Treaty was in theory negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference [ENDC], the site of much fruitless nuclear diplomacy in the post war period. In fact the
United States and the Soviet Union worked out its terms between themselves, and then invited other nations to subscribe. ... Once, that is, the two nuclear giants decided that they had a mutual interest in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons..., writing treaties embodying these purposes posed few problems...” (Mandelbaum, 1979: 191-223)

Actually, the US and the USSR were co-author of the essential part of nonproliferation in a NPT draft. Thus, the decisive factor in a creation of the NPT is that both superpowers found common interests in making of an international nonproliferation treaty (Bunn, 1992; Fischer, 1993: 29-41; Nye, 1988).

- The US and the USSR strengthened the NPT regime in the 1970s-80s

The US took various initiatives of international non-proliferation efforts after concluding of the NPT. In 1971, the Zangger Committee adopted guidelines, a ‘trigger list’ for allowing IAEA safeguards to nuclear transfers of equipment or material for the processing, use of production of fissionable materials. After the Indian nuclear tests of 1974, the US-led seven nations (G-7) along with the USSR formed the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 1975 to control sensitive nuclear exports such as nuclear reprocessing plants (Fischer 1992; Sokolski 2001). The intensification of the Cold War did not hurt the US-USSR nuclear coordination, Therefore, evidence above are the strong case for the salience of bipolar stability in the development of the NPT-based non-proliferation regime during the time of the Cold War.

Bipolar Stability Realism and the prospects for the NPT

How are the prospects for the nuclear futures? The end of the Cold War
vigorously stimulated the debates on the prospects for world politics after the demise of bipolar stability. Many neo-realists claimed the prospects for increasing instability in a coming multipolar world. Unipolarity will be replaced by multipolarity soon or later (Layne, 1993; Mearsheimer, 1990; Waltz, 1993; Kupchan; Zakaria, 2008; Mahbubani, 2008).

### A bipolar-stability realist view of polarity, war, and the NPT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Multipolarity</th>
<th>Bipolarity</th>
<th>Unipolarity/Hegemony</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Low and unstable</td>
<td>High and stable</td>
<td>Not endurable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cooperation &amp; stability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. More parties, more wars.</td>
<td>2. Fewer parties, easier to manage deterrence.</td>
<td>2. Imperial-overstretch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Higher chances of miscalculation and misadventure.</td>
<td>3. Lower chances of miscalculation and misadventure.</td>
<td>3. US hegemony.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The prospects for The NPT**

Coming multipolarity will induce great powers' competition, thus difficult to manage great power's NPT. The bipolar stability during the Cold War enhanced nuclear non-proliferation regime, but the NPT. The US hegemony strengthened the NPT-based non-proliferation efforts. Hegemony can not remain for long. (J. Mearhsimer; B. Frankel; J. Wirtz) J. Gaddis; B. Frankel; T. V. Paul; J. Wirtz; J. Nye)

**Critiques**

Great power's concert Bipolarity is not A hegemonic liberal

---

247
can bring stability like always stable such as order can be durable
the Concert of Europe ancient Peloponnesian (Nye; Ikenberry; Sato)
in the 19C and today’s War. Note the risk of Note the strategy of
emerging multipolar escalation: the Cuban band-wagon (Walt)
world (H. Kissinger; Missile Crisis or and peaceful change
Zakaria; Mahbubani). India-Pakistan (Carr; Bull).
relations.

Assuming these neo-realist prospects for emerging multipolarity, Frankel’s structural theory claims that “bipolarity inhibits the spread of nuclear weapons while multipolarity induces their proliferation. The consequences of the end of bipolarity for the nonproliferation regime are not reassuring, as the structural changes in international politics expose the flawed conceptual foundations of the NPT. The post-Second World War bipolarity helped to mask that flaw. With the passing of bipolarity, the NPT’s feeble foundations may cause the whole edifice to collapse. ... In any event, the NPT regime was not airtight within a bipolar order, and it is difficult to see how it will grow stronger under multipolarity.” (Frankel 1993) Thus, bipolar stability realists suggest a pessimistic hypothesis and prospect for the NPT-based non-proliferation order after the Cold War. The collapse of bipolarity and the emerging multipolar world will mean “back to the future” world of great powers’ competition and further nuclear proliferation (Mearsheimer 1990). To say fairly, it is sure that the collapse of bipolar stability means somewhat instability and fragmentation in world politics. As the US hegemony has been dominant till today, the neo-realist case for nuclear proliferation in an emerging multipolar world is still hypotheses, which only history tell.
**Critical assessments**

Bipolar stability realists offer convincing explanations of bipolar stability during the Cold War. However, critics response that bipolar stability realism is based on too simplified assumptions and logic on international politics. First, critics point out both bipolarity and mutual nuclear deterrence are not always stable but highly competitive, unstable and dangerous. The best case is the Cuban Missile Crisis. Thucydides narrated the case of deadly bipolar competition between Athen and Sparta. Even the creation of the NPT took almost a decade because of the two superpowers’ competition, mistrust and hostility against each other. According to Nye, the initial superpowers’ nuclear cooperation needed détente to loosen fierce competition under tighten bipolarity: “It is also worth noting that the linkage of the non-proliferation issue to the overall U.S.-Soviet relationship has become progressively looser over time. As we saw with the efforts to reach agreement on the regime in the 1950s and 1960s, it was difficult to make progress in the period of tight bipolarity when there was hostility in the overall U.S.-Soviet security relationship. The need to maintain alliance structures created a tight linkage between the proliferation issue and the overall security relationship. Détente seemed to be a necessary condition for initial progress on nonproliferation regime.”

Second, critiques argue that multipolarity can be cooperative and stable. The best example is the Concert of Europe in the 19th century. Even though France and China were officially criticised the NPT in the beginning, both nuclear powers did not act to damage this regime (except some well-known cases like China’s support for Pakistan), and finally accepted it in 1992. Nye, Jr. claims that the diffusion of nuclear power increase the incentives to maintain nuclear non-proliferation regime.
"...It is also noting the change in the structure of power within the nuclear supply area as an incentive for maintaining the regime. Whereas the United States was the predominant international supplier in the 1960s, by the early 1970s the development of French capability to supply reactors and fuel, a German-British-Dutch consortium to provide fuel, and the prospect of a second tier of subsidiary suppliers in the 1980s, made it clear to both superpowers that their leverage within the nuclear supply area was eroding. With this diffusion of power, the prospects of return to unilateral policies look less promising than they might have earlier. In short, the incentives to maintain regime were probably strengthened by the diffusion of power that occurred in the 1970s. All signs point in the same direction and seem certain to eventuate in a third tier of nuclear supplier countries... [W]hen the sea of hostility rose again, it did not submerge this island of cooperation. In part this was because hostility did not rise to its previous Cold War levels (despite rhetorical excesses), and in part because superstructure of regimes constructed in the 1970s raised the level of cooperation and made it less submersible by a rising tide of hostility..." (Nye, 1988: 336-352. See also Potter, 1985).

Even after the end of the Cold War, increasing multipolaization did not mean the immediate collapse of the NPT-based non-proliferation system. The five official Nuclear-Weapons States successfully coordinated their efforts in indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and the agreement in 2000. For some critiques, neo-realists miss the importance of diplomacy, statecraft and great powers’ responsibility.
Third, critiques response that neo-realisists downplay new trends and changes in global political economy today, such as globalisation, economic interdependence, democratisation, international law, rules, norms, consensus, justice, universal human rights, and so on (Nye, 2007). The significance of the NPT-based non-proliferation regime is more than trivial. Furthermore, low politics and non-state actors become increasingly important even in the NPT politics such as environmental, energy, and resource issues, terrorism, and NGOs. We face increasing disorder today, but “a long peace” during the Cold War has gone forever. Although neorealist theory of bipolar stability are quite right to point out two superpowers made nuclear coordination in the NPT evolution during the Cold War, critics replay that the demise of bipolar stability does not necessary mean the decline of the NPT regime. We shall examine realist alternative realist explanations in the next section.

THE DEFENSIVE (MODERATE) REALIST EXPLANATION OF THE NPT

| States seek security through cooperation rather than max-power or expansion. |
| Great power concert can bring international order and stability. |
| ↓ |
| Driving forces of the NPT are great power concert and states coordination. |
| ↓ |
| The NPT will be stable if only great powers maintain concert and states coordination. |

Moderate Realism and Defensive Realism

Moderate realism assumes both possibilities of international cooperation of conflicts
under anarchy. International politics can be either confrontation, conflicts and war, or cooperation, coordination, peace and stability. International politics can be stable even if not perpetual peace. For moderate realists, any international stability and order needs the balance of power (BOP) among great powers considering legitimacy, justice, morality, and interests of others. Diplomacy and statecraft make a difference. In other words, moderate realists are more optimistic than extreme realists, but less optimistic than liberals on the prospects for peace and stability (Carr 1939; Kissinger 1964; 1994; Wight, 1991; Sato, 1999). Moderate realism is close to contemporary defensive realism, but the difference lies in its emphasis on diplomacy, statecraft, and the type and intentions of other states. Defensive realists "recognize the costs of war and assume that it usually results from irrational forces in a society. However, they admit that expansionary states willing to use military force make it impossible to live in a world without weapons. Cooperation is possible, but it is more likely to succeed in relations with friendly states" (Lamy, 2008).

**Defensive Realist explanations of the NPT**

Regarding nuclear issues, moderate realism explain that the NPT-based non-proliferation order was created and maintained through the balance of power (BOP), great power concert, and coordination among states. The NPT regime is essentially a status-quo nuclear order. The official five Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS) regard non-proliferation as important to secure great power status, political influence and maintaining an existing nuclear order for satisfied nuclear states (Mandelbaum 1977; Bunn 1992; Freedman 1994-95, Paul 1998; 1999; Sokolski 2001; Strauss 2004).

Straus, an American neo-conservative, affirmatively argues the case for
established nuclear club's influence of the NPT-IAEA regime evolution:

“...It [the NPT-IAEA regime] divided signatories into those acceding as nuclear states and those acceding as non-nuclear states. It perpetuated the discrimination in their status already established. And it enlisted the self-interest of the established nuclear powers in protecting the importance of their nuclear status by limiting the size of their club...” (Straus, 2004).

Paul critically point out the role of satisfied great powers:

“...The NPT was largely an attempt by the satisfied great powers and their allies to forestall the arrival of new nuclear challengers to their power position in the international system. ... the driving force for non-proliferation comes from the status quo states, especially the United States and its allies, who believe that what will constrain their capacity to manage the international security order ... will be the possession of weapons of mass destruction by smaller actors...” (Paul 1999).

Defensive Realists tend to be conservative ideological inclination to preserve an existing status-quo international order. Conservatives claim that the possession of nuclear weapons by the status-quo states are safe and good whereas by the radical rogue regimes are dangerous and but to international order and humanity. Kissinger admit nuclear weapons of the US, Russia, Britain, France, and China, keep quiet on Israel, India, and probably accept further proliferation to other great powers like nuclear Japan and Germany. But he never accepts nuclear proliferation to smaller “revolutionary”
states like North Korea and Iran, seriously harmful to an existing international order. Kissinger notes,

"...[N]uclear weapons have spread relatively slowly and remained in the possession of countries with everything to lose and nothing to gain from assaulting the international order. But the international system is now confronted by the imminent spread of nuclear weapons into the hands of two countries with a worrisome agenda: the odd, isolated regime in North Korea, which is responsible for multiple assassinations and kidnappings and meets every definition of a rogue regime; and Iran, whose current regime started by holding American diplomats as hostages and has since supported a variety of terrorist groups in the Middle East and continues to declare America its principal enemy. The possession of nuclear weapons by these [revolutionary] countries would constitute a momentous step towards stripping the international order of the remaining restraints of the Westphalian system..." (Kissinger, 2004:33).

In other words, nuclear proliferation to North Korea and Iran is dangerous to international order as revolutionary French Republic to the Concert of Europe in the 19th century, or as rising militaristic Germany and Japan before WWII to the stable international order maintained by Western liberal democracies.

For Defensive Realists, consensus and considering others' interests are important to maintain any durable international order. Actually, not only the nuclear club, but a majority of the international community find common interests and vital
security in preserving the nuclear-status quo based on the NPT, Davis argues.

"...The norm of nonproliferation developed because it was congenial to the interests of an overwhelming majority of states, including the superpowers, and offensive to only a few. The regime is a natural expression of vital security interests. ... The Non-Proliferation Treaty is an expression of aggregate interests in controlling the spread of nuclear weapons. The treaty organizes, institutionalizes, and codifies those interests. The network of treaties, multilateral and bilateral agreements, formal and informal associations, and national laws and policies that constitute the regime evolved as the result of conscious efforts to establish the nonproliferation norm. Cooperation against proliferation has taken many forms" (Davis 1993).

In this regard, even neo-liberal reformist approach is closer to moderate realist conservatism rather than utopian revolutionism. The NPT is maintained and supported because security interests of a majority of the member-states in spite of its fundamental inequality. The NPT is maintained in international community because "ordered inequality" is better than "anarchic equality", Nye argues. "Excessive rhetoric is a hallmark of such conferences, and it will not necessarily signify an imminent collapse of the treaty. ... Most states are likely to accept some ordered inequality in weaponry because anarchic equality appears more dangerous."(Nye, 1985:123-131).

Whereas structural realists focus on the power distribution in international politics, moderate realists claim the salience of great powers' concert, legitimacy, consensus in international community. Any durable international order needs legitimacy,
consensus, compromise, and common interests among states through negotiations and diplomacy. That is a crucial driving force of the NPT evolution, moderate realism claim. We shall examine the case of the defensive realist approach to the NPT as follow.

- **The NPT was created to preserve the interests of satisfied great powers**

The creation of the NPT in the 1960s could not be done only between the US and the USSR. The interests of other great powers including France, China, Germany and other NATO member states should have been taken into consideration (Bunn 1992; Fischer, 1993). According to Kapur, the main importance of the NPT was the bargains between three polarity in the late 1970s: the USA, the USSR, and China. “The NPT was an important turning point in Cold War history. It converted the danger of a bipolar confrontation into bipolar partnership and then extended it into a multipolar (with the United Kingdom and France being the other poles) framework. These became the core powers in the international nuclear order. The NPT became a symbol of superpower cooperation on a vital issue. It also offered a legal and a strategic justification for a world of five nuclear powers. Cold War enemies became nonproliferation partners despite the Berlin Wall, opposing military pacts, proxy East-West confrontations, and other forms of enmity. The NPT showed the vitality of three strategic and diplomatic bargains: between the Americans and the Soviets, as the two became the NPT principals; between the United States and China, as the latter’s nuclear and diplomatic status was assured even though it denounced the treaty initially; and between the USSR and China when the latter was given an equal position in the treaty despite the history of Sino-Soviet rivalry” (Kapur, 1998. See also Hoffmann, 1966; Weltman, 1981). Other non-nuclear-weapon major powers such as Germany and Japan were very cautious in the beginning but they finally accepted the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states on the
condition that they can secure the US credible extended nuclear deterrence for their own security (Freedman, 1994-95; Paul, 2000).

- The concert of great powers after the Cold War

By the beginning of 1990s after the Cold War, the interests of all five NWS in preventing other states from acquiring nuclear weapons have become more obvious. France and China, not yet member-states by then, showed more positive attitudes toward the NPT in the early 1990s. In 1989 and 1990 France publicly proclaimed her explicit support for the NPT and for the non-proliferation regime; finally, in June 1991, France announced her decision to accede the treaty. China formally committed herself for the first time not to help other states to acquire nuclear weapons and to insist on IAEA safeguards on her nuclear exports. In 1990 China participated for the first time in a NPT review conference. And finally, on 10 August 1991, China announced that she too had decided in principle to accede.

After the Cold War, Russia and China showed more positive attitudes toward the international non-proliferation efforts by the US-led advanced liberal states. After the Gulf War of 1990, the secret nuclear weapons programme of Iraq regime was revealed and the plan for strengthening safeguards, the “93+2 programme”, was adopted by IAEA. Since the collapse of Soviet Union, the US-led western nations conducted non-proliferation programme to halt the proliferation of nuclear related materials, technology, and human resource from troubled Russia. Toward the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the five NWSs collaborated together to secure the indefinite extension of the Treaty, which was salient to preserve the nuclear status-quo.
At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, there were a great concern that the issue of national missile defence and especially Russian and Chinese reactions to the new US position on the ABM Treaty, might torpedo the Review Conference. This prospect, however, was removed when the five permanent members (P-5) of the UN Security Council made a joint statement during the first week of the Conference, which effectively took the divisive ABM issue off the conference table. By contrast, at the 2005 NPT RC not only were the P-5 unable to put forward a statement of substance at the outset of the Review Conference, they were unable to agree on any statement before the Conference concluded. Joint US-Russian or broader P5 initiatives diminished at the 2005 Review Conference (Potter, 2005). Thus, empirical evidence indicates that great power concert through state-craft and diplomacy is the driving force in the NPT evolution and international nuclear order.

**Defensive Realism and the prospects for the NPT**

For defensive realists, nothing is more important than great power coordination and others’ security concerns to create and preserve any durable international order. Diplomacy and negotiations are preferable to maintain the durable international order though military measure is a last resort. Kissinger claims the preservation of nuclear non-proliferation order through great power initiatives together with security concerns of others:

“...At what point do the existing nuclear powers decide that a world of unrestrained nuclear proliferation is too dangerous and that they must impose nonproliferation for the survival of humanity? ... Progress is unlikely unless it involves, at the least, the implementation of pressure and a goal that addresses
the security concerns of all interested parties. Multilateral talks, including the proliferating country, are essential...” (Kissinger, 2004: 33-34).

For defensive realists, the NPT-based nuclear non-proliferation order will be stable in the future on conditions that it reflect the balance of power, common interests and understanding among satisfied great powers. But, the current NPT reflects the great powers’ status of P-5 then in 1967. In a post-Cold War and 9/11 era, the NPT-based nuclear non-proliferation order will remain stable in the future if only it can adjust the changes in the balance of great power and interests in the international system (Paul, 1998). Furthermore, Davis claim the non-proliferation efforts can be explained not the distribution of power in the international system (as neo-realisists assert). Rather, Davis argues, a majority of states prefer nuclear stability to proliferation chaos and security dilemma:

“...National interests in maintaining the nuclear status quo, not bipolarity formed the [NPT-based nuclear non-proliferation] regime. The same systemic forces that cause proliferation also cause nations to collaborate to stop it. This will not change in a multipolar or unipolar structure. ... Realism predicts states will organize to preserve the nuclear status quo. ... Although the regime has its origins in the cold war era, mutual interests in maintaining the nuclear status quo make it possible to preserve the regime – perhaps indefinitely...” (Davis 1993).

**Critical assessments**

Defensive realists correctly point out the possibilities of security co-operation
and the importance of great powers' coordination and diplomacy to create and maintain international stability and order. But critics response the problem of Kissinger's conservative status-quo order model for the sake of the five nuclear-weapons great powers' interests. First, offensive realists (extreme realists) counter-argue that moderate realists overestimate the possibilities of security co-operation and underestimate conflicting national interests, mistrust, and security dilemma. Great powers' relationship is not easy to be managed because great powers' struggle for national interests and power in anarchical international politics. The arena of international relations remains "the tragedy of great power politics" (Morgenthau, 1948; Mearsheimer, 2001). Especially, the management of nuclear proliferation would be more difficult in a multipolar world than in a bipolar world or in a hegemonic order. Wirtz speculate difficulties in managing nuclear multipolarity: "The crisis or arms-race instability of a future nuclear balance might become apparent at the worst possible time [after the demise of Cold War bipolar stability]" (Wirtz, 1998. See also Hoffmann, 1966; Mearsheimer, 1990). To offensive and extreme realists, the prospects for the NPT future are not promising due to increasing complexity of great powers' competition and further proliferation.

Second, liberal critics response that defensive realists underestimate the importance of change and progress in world politics. Although the NNWS, especially NAM, urged for disarmament even during the Cold War, the international community expects higher demands on the five NWS' disarmament commitment under Article VI as seen in the case of the NPT RC in 1995, 2000, and 2005 (Dhanalapa, 1995, 2001; Dhanapala with Rydell, 2005). Some foreign policy establishments of the US including Kissinger and Perry started a disarmament campaign named "Toward a Nuclear-Free
World” in 2008 after observing the rapidly declining US popularity and legitimacy. In the eyes of critics, this disarmament campaign on the US side seems to be too late after President Bush’s unilateral foreign policy (Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn, 2008).

Liberal critics also contend that realists neglect the ever apparent fact that middle/small powers and non-state actors play more important roles in world politics today.(Keohane and Nye, 1977; Tanaka, 1995). Non-state actors such as Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), individuals, and mass-media play more influential roles in the NPT politics at the NPT RC since the 1990s (Dhanapala with Rydell, 2005).

THE OFFENSIVE REALIST CRITIQUES OF THE NPT

| Expansionary states seek for relative power. Conflicts and wars are inevitable. |
| Revolutionary states seek nuclear weapons against a status-quo nuclear order. |
| Satisfied nuclear powers deter revolutionary states’ nuclear ambition at any cost. |
| The NPT regime will face increasing difficulties as states’ power-competition induces war, intervention, and further nuclear proliferation. |

**Extreme Realism and Offensive realism**

Realists assume that states seek national interests, security, survival and power (Carr 1939; Morgenthau 1948; Wight 1966, 1979). Extreme realists are very skeptical of security cooperation under anarchical international politics due to deep mistrust,
relative gains and power, and cheating. Especially, expansionary powers seek ambitious domination and power. Arms race, security dilemma, war and conflicts are likely results of these severe conditions of anarchical international politics. Extreme realism contains two opposite ideological stands. On the one hand, hard revolutionism challenges to an existing order by force and hard reactionism seeks for preserving the existing order by force (Wight 1991). Extreme realism is close to contemporary offensive realism. “Offensive neo-realists emphasize the importance of relative power. ... they believe that conflict is inevitable in the international system and leaders must always bewary of expansionary powers” (Lamy 2008. See also Schmidt, 2004; Baylis, 2008; Dunne and Schmidt, 2008).

**Offensive Realist critiques of the NPT**

For Offensive Realists, the prospects for any international control of nuclear weapons are very low. Nuclear proliferation may be managed but never stopped (Brodie 1946; Fox, 1946; Gompert 1977; Dunn 1982; Mearsheimer 1990; Gray 1999). According to Betts, the NPT is no more successful than the UN:

“...Non-proliferation policy and its symbols, the NPT, will be a harmful wishful thinking, thus need to go back to the balance of power, ... The misplaced focus on ways to isolate weapons-related capabilities obscures the importance of the stickier but more salient problem of the incentives many nations have to get a bomb: fear or ambition. ... Distressingly few arms control enthusiasts have faced up to the full price of nonproliferation. The needed reorientation in thinking ... is really only a return to the ageless problem of balance of power ... [Thus] There is no reason to believe that the NPT should
be any more successful in preserving peace than the greatest international institution: the United Nations. Both are valuable symbols, effective at the margins, but insufficient to their purposes. They ... are hardly to be relied on...” (Betts, 1993).

Offensive Realists tends to be ideologically revolutionary or reactionary to world order. Dissatisfied states seek more power and security, thus likely to challenge a status quo international order, whereas satisfied nuclear powers are determined to maintain a conservative nuclear order at any cost if necessary (Bull, 1977; 1984; Vincent, 1984; Lyon, 1984; Wight 1991). On the one hand, realists criticize this status-quo nature of the unequal NPT (Subrahmanyam 1985-86, 1993; Singh 1998; Singer, 2007). The NPT regime is utterly unequal to deny the rights of nuclear weapons of all other non-nuclear-weapon states, especially burdens for powers such as India, Germany, Japan, Taiwan, Egypt, and Syria. Indian scholars and policy-makers are critical of the discriminative nature of the NPT-based non-proliferation regime. Singh justified India’s nuclear-weapons tests in 1998:

“...At the global level, the nuclear weapons states showed no signs of moving decisively toward a world free of atomic danger. Instead, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) was extended indefinitely and unconditionally in 1995, perpetuating the existence of nuclear weapons in the hands of five countries busily modernizing their nuclear arsenals…” (Singh 1998).

We examine the extreme realist explaining of the NPT as follow:
• Satisfied nuclear powers’ interests in nuclear weapons and deterrence

The five nuclear weapons states never promote nuclear disarmament in spite of their obligation under the Article VI of the Treaty. As critical voices often point out, disarmament is never feasible as these five great powers maintain and improve their nuclear bombs for their own national security and political influence (Freedman, 1994-95, 1998; Paul, 1998, 1999).

• Great powers have various national interests beyond non-proliferation

Kapur regard that even the US and their allies interests and efforts in nonproliferation, other major powers, especially China and Russia are not likely to coordinate: “So the counterorganization to the nonproliferation constituency includes two non-Western nuclear powers. The P-5 appear disunited, and Washington’s inability to consolidate the ranks of the P-5 creates bargaining opportunities for the proliferation camp” (Kapur, 1998).

✓ The case of the US with Pakistan and India: The US nonproliferation policy has never been fair or universal. It is well known that the US underestimates the problem of Israeli nuclear bombs for long. During the Cold War, the US was tolerant of Pakistani nuclear programme as Pakistan was important as a frontier state against the Soviet Union. The US was fiercely against Indian nuclear tests in 1974. Though the US sanctioned India after the bomb tests in May 1998, the US turned into more understanding even supportive to Indian nuclear status as the US regard India as its “natural ally.” The US-India nuclear deal is the evident case of the US policy.

✓ The case of Chinese link with Pakistan, Iran and Syria: “China is one of the few independent voices in the international system. Even as it negotiated trade and political relations with the Western world, even as it joined the NPT and appeared
to agree to subscribe to the MTCR, it maintained its supply relations in the nuclear and the missile sphere with Pakistan, Iran, and Syria, and it continued to blow the whistle against American hegemony” (Kapur 1998; Delpech, 1998-99).

✓ The case of Russian link with Iran: “Despite internal pressures and the pro-Western tilt in its foreign policy following the end of the Cold War, Russia, like China, developed its nuclear trade with Iran, a pariah in American thinking. Moscow’s actions undermine current U.S. nonproliferation policy. Here Russian commercial and strategic interests and the value of ties with Iran, rather than its nonproliferation commitment, have shaped Russian nuclear trade.” (Kapur, 1998).

✓ The case of Iraq war: During the 1998 crisis and 2003 war against Iraq, differences among the US, its Western allies, Russia and China could not solved (Dunn 1998).

✓ In 1998, almost everything seemed to go wrong. Iran tested the shahab-3 missile with Russian, Chinese, and North Korean assistance. India tested nuclear weapons and long-range rockets with Russian help. Pakistan replied with nuclear tests of its own and deployed rockets developed with Chinese and North Korean help. North Korea was suspected of having violated its NPT pledge and its 1994 agreement with the US not to develop nuclear weapons and, then in August, it fired a three-stage intercontinental-range-capable rocket over Japan (Sokolski 2001:80).

- Signs of new arms race between the five NWS

The NPT assigned nuclear arms control and disarmament obligations to Nuclear-Weapon states. It is also acknowledge that this objective is important to legitimacy and trust of the Treaty in the international community. If NWS do not make progress in disarmament, or perceived as so widely in the international community, it
would damage the Treaty considerably. Regretfully, the signs of new arms race between
the five NWS can be observed today: as listed below:

- The US and Russian nuclear arsenals remaining bloated and held on trigger
  alert beyond necessity
- The weakening of arms control and proposed introduction of missile defence
  are leading to the nuclear arms states down a slippery road away from
  disarmament and opening the way to an arms race in outer space
- The US developing underground nuclear testing sites in Nevada
- The US maintaining tactical nuclear weapons at bases in Europe
- The approaching lapse of START I and the Moscow Treaty,
- Putin’s threat to abrogate the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
- Russian programme of rearmament
- China’s modernization of its nuclear arms
- The Open advocacy of an Indo-US alliance against China, and
- The UK’s recent decision to replace Trident

(Walker, 2007b; Wilkinson 2007)

- Proliferation outside the NPT: Israel, India, and Pakistan

The NPT regime cannot deal with nuclear proliferation cases outside the
regime: Israel, India and Pakistan. Israel is determined to keep nuclear weapons for
survival due to her hostile security environment. Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in
1998 caused international rages, intervention and sanctions, but their nuclear weapons
are unlikely to be rolled back in the foreseeable future (Kapur 1998).

- Opaque proliferation within the NPT: South Africa, Iraq, Iran and North Korea
Some cases indicate that the NPT can not deal with nuclear proliferation even within the NPT-IAEA regime. South Africa was succeeded in making nuclear bombs secretly as much as 8 nuclear bombs during the time when the discriminative apartheid regime was threatened by their neighbour states. Iraq’s secret nuclear programme was revealed after the first Gulf War in 1991. If the Gulf War had not happened, they would had succeeded in getting nuclear bombs secretly under the NPT/IAEA regime. North Korea and Iran seems to have determined to go nuclear especially after the US-led Iraq war in 2003. Against the US wish to discourage the trend of nuclear proliferation, the US-led Iraq war seems to have convinced the leaders of internationally isolated states to get nuclear bombs and deterrence power to halt American military intervention. As long as the international system remains anarchy without a world government, the NPT-IAEA regime is not strong enough to detect and stop states’ determined nuclear going.

- A new breed of potential proliferators

In spite of successful non-proliferation efforts for decades, “there is widespread concern that the calculus of [nuclear] incentives and disincentives has shifted during the past decade, with incentives increasing and disincentives declining”, Reiss argues. The current urgent concerns of the nuclear capabilities of Iran and North Korea could very well cause these states’ neighbors – Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey, and Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan – to reconsider their own nuclear options, sparking a dangerous wave of proliferation. … the world faces a nuclear tipping point. If the scale tips in one direction, a dozen countries could launch nuclear programs in the next few years” (Wolfsthal, 2005; Compbel, Einhorn, and Reiss, 2004).
The emerging power competitions and arms race in Asia

The nuclear challenges to regional stability and world order come from Asia: from Western Asia, to South Asia, India and China, and East Asia. Delpech stresses the difficulties in managing peace and stability in Asia: “Future relations between the US, Russia and China, of which the relationship between Russia and China is the most complex, will be decisive for war and peace in the next century. More broadly, stability in tomorrow’s world will also depend on relations between the five major Asian nations, including Japan, and India. … Taiwan, the Spratly Islands and Kashmir are not the only danger-spots. Developments in Myanmar, the Korean Peninsula and the Asian sea-lanes must be carefully watched in the years to come. With the deepening of Asia’s economic crisis, social and political unrest could eventually result in the disruption of the main components of the region’s stability. Concerns are no longer merely financial. The middle classes are being wiped out by the recession; ruling elites might lose their legitimacy; governments are tempted to be more repressive; and, finally, the probability of military eruptions has increased. A threatening concatenation of events can no longer be excluded. Vague policies of engagement will not compensate for the absence of a security system to regulate the impending changes in Asia’s power relations” (Delpech, 1998-99).

**Offensive Realism and the prospects for the NPT**

Offensive Realists suggest a pessimistic prospect that nuclear proliferation can not be halted or reversed under the current condition of anarchical international politics and the trend of the spread of nuclear weapons technology. International institutions and regimes can do little to deal with nuclear proliferation problems as the League of Nations and the UN could do little to peace and stability. Mearsheimer is famous for his
pessimism regarding nuclear proliferation and its instability (1990). Gray expected the pessimistic ‘second nuclear age’ (1999). The apparent signs of the further nuclear proliferation challenge to the new world order come from Asia (Delpech, 1998-99; Ministry, 2005). Liberals like Hoffmann share nuclear proliferation pessimism:

‘...a world of many nuclear powers would raise extremely difficult issues of management. The present international system [of the Cold War] is characterized by restraints due to a set of political circumstances which one can and should not expect to find perpetuated and generalized in the future. The present system also conceals danger points which these restraints have so far blunted or averted. But the future may display those points in certain kinds of situations and for compelling reasons. With weakened restraints and exacerbated danger points, there would be a crucial need for corrective mechanisms to preserve a modicum of stability; yet in such a world the obstacles to these mechanisms would be formidable. ... The very difficulty of ‘thinking through’ nuclear world suggests that the more nuclear weapons spread, the more problems will arise that only a far more centralized international system could handle; yet proliferation undermines centralization...’ (Hoffmann, 1966).

Wirtz speculates “conventionalization” of nuclear deterrence and war enhances further proliferation and instability:

‘...An extremely dynamic nuclear balance, possibly produced by the politics of nuclear alliances, will stand in stark contrast to the slow and relatively
predictable pace of change in the superpowers' Cold War arsenals. And even an overwhelming nuclear advantage appears incapable of deterring millenarian states; perceptions of the intensity of leaders' motivations for engaging in war, and the actual strength of those motivations would have a greater impact on stability in deterrence situations not characterized by MAD. When combined, these developments indicate that future nuclear relations could be governed by the logic of conventional deterrence ...” (Wirtz, 1998:153).

Thus Offensive Realists predict that further proliferation is most likely to cause further problems, difficulties and deteriorating situations.

**Critical assessments**

Offensive Realists correctly point out why it is difficult to halt and roll back nuclear proliferation in anarchical international politics. In fact, the NPT is almost impotent to deal with actual and determined nuclear going states. But, critiques counter-argue that the realists needlessly underestimate the salience role of the NPT regime in world politics. Assuming the impotence of the NPT, extreme realists can not explain why the NPT has been supported by almost 190 states in international community and why nuclear proliferation has been slowed down for nearly four decades till today. Think the positive roles of the NPT in world politics, critics say.

First, Moderate Realists response that the NPT made it possible the great powers’ cooperation to halt nuclear proliferation and avoid nuclear arms race and instability among nations (Nye, Jr., 1988; Bunn, 1992).
Second, critics claim that most of states accept the NPT as it serve their national interests and security or, at least, the NPT does not seriously hurt their national interests. Otherwise, why did a majority of member-states support indefinite extension at the 1995 NPT REC? (Dhanapala with Rydell, 2005; Davis, 1993).

Third, moderate realists, liberals, and Grotians criticise extreme realists that the NPT provide a standard and normative and legal basis of non-proliferation in the international society (Pilat, 1990; Bailey, 1993; Dhanapala with Rydell, 2005). Most probably, not a few states would consider their nuclear-weapons options if there were no legal and normative constraints of the NPT in the international community. Such would-be candidate states include Brazil, Argentina, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Syria, Egypt, and so on. Thus the pessimistic assessment of extreme realists (offensive realists) underestimates the possibilities in security co-operation. Extreme realism can not offer adequate explanations of the success of the global NPT regime.

THE ROLES AND MEANINGS OF THE NPT:

Examining the realist critiques of the NPT

Realist critiques of the roles and meanings of the NPT

- The false promise of the NPT as a basis of international peace and security
- The false promise of the NPT’ three pillars
- The false promise of the grand bargains between the NWS and the NNWS
- The false promise of the security assurances to NNWS and UN collective security
- The false promise of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs)
- The false promise of universal membership, compliance, and verification
The false promise of the NPT as a basis of international peace and security

Liberal institutionalists and the UN officials argue that the NPT and its regime strengthen international peace, security and stability as a whole (The UN, 1995, 2005; Dhanapala, 1995, 2001; Dhanapala with Rydell, 2005; Graham, Jr. 2005; Cirincione, 2000). However, realist critics response that liberals overestimate the role of the NPT. Furthermore, the liberal promise of the NPT is even deceptive. A liberal harmony of interests is merely a deception at the mask of powerful states’ ambitions and interests (Carr 1939; Strange, 1983). For critical realists, the NPT regime is a private goods serving a status quo and the specific interests of the hegemonic power(s), not a public goods serving the common interests or security in international community. The NPT is in essence for satisfied great powers and their allies, Paul argues:

“...[T]he driving force for non-proliferation comes from the status quo states, especially the United States and its allies, who believe that what will constrain their capacity to manage the international security order...will be the possession of weapons of mass destruction by smaller actors. ...The NPT was largely an attempt by satisfied great powers and their allies to forestall the arrival of new nuclear challengers to their power position in the international system...” (Paul, 1999:373-391).

On the one hand, conservatives of the five NWS just use the liberal promise of the NPT for international security as a whole only for an excuse or cajole. For conservatives, peace and order should be a top priority at the cost of justice and equality.
Unequal order is much better than equal chaos, some American establishment noted. On the other hand, both hard revolutionary realists and soft revolutionary idealists severely criticise the hypocritical and deceptive liberal promise of the NPT for international peace and security (Subrahmanyam, 1985-86; Singh, 1998; Falk, 1977). To revolutionries and revisionists, the conservative status-quo nuclear order should be fundamentally challenged for the sake of justice and equality.

Thus, in the eyes of realists, the NPT and its regime never contributes to international security and peace as a whole as liberals and UN officials claim. At best, the NPT-based non-proliferation regime can promote specific interests of the hegemonic power and great powers by enforcing co-ordination among weaker-states. For realists, peace, stability, and order are sustained by the status-quo hierarchical nuclear order.

The false promise of the NPT’ three pillars

Liberals and UN officials repeatedly stress that the NPT is based on three pillars: non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT-based international non-proliferation regime assumes three fundamental “principles” in Krasner’s term (1983. See also Umemoto, 1996). However, most importantly, the NPT’ three pillars are conceptually and theoretically problematic or even flawed.

(1) The principle of non-proliferation: A debate

Regarding the first principle of the consequences of proliferation, there are two opposite views on the consequence of nuclear proliferation and deterrence stability:
proliferation pessimism and proliferation optimism. On the one hand, all liberals and traditional realists (such as Sagan and Hoffman) are deeply pessimistic on the consequences of nuclear proliferation. Policy-makers tend to use nuclear weapons, especially in the case of miscalculation, escalation, and crisis instability without any credible second-strike ability and communication methods. In addition, a taboo of non-nuclear use may be broken in an unpredictable case like accidental use, escalation, and terrorism. Quite different from the case of the Cold War, further nuclear proliferation is likely to bring instability and risks and dangers of nuclear use. More nuclear weapons states, more risks and dangers of nuclear use, proliferation pessimist claim. On the other hand, some neo-realists are rather optimistic on the consequence of nuclear proliferation and deterrence on the basis of rationality. Keeping nuclear weapons make policy-makers more cautious to embark on wars. As the Cold War was "a long peace", regional nuclear proliferation may bring strategic stability if only it is well managed. Waltz argues, more nuclear weapon states may be better for peace and stability (Waltz 1981; Sagan and Waltz, 1995. See also Hoffmann, 1966; Mearsheimer 1990; Nye, 1985; Feaver 1995, 2000; Lavoy 1995; Betts, 2000). So far there are little agreement on this proliferation debate between proliferation pessimism and optimism. However, the NPT' first principle of non-proliferation is firmly based on proliferation pessimist theory.

(2) The principle of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy: A debate

Another pillar of the NPT is the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This principle is based on the assumption that nuclear non-proliferation can be strengthened together with the promotion of the civilian nuclear co-operation under IAEA safeguard. However, the compatibility and distinction of military and peaceful nuclear use is
highly problematic. Under the condition of anarchy without strict and effective inspection and enforcement, more peaceful nuclear use means more nuclear weapons proliferation risks. For example, Japan, one of the largest civilian nuclear use country under the NPT, can make nuclear weapons within a very short time supposedly 6 months. The problem of "withdrawal" is highlighted since the North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT in 2003. Iran has become an international concern that it may withdraw from the NPT, as North Korea did, after it has developed enough nuclear technology under the NPT for years (Muller, 2005; Porter, 2005; Sur, 2005). Since the making of the NPT, some policy-makers and specialists are correctly worried that peaceful nuclear use can be easily turned into military objectives (Bunn 1992; Sokolski, 2001; Mandelbaum, 1979). As Wolfsthal argues, "The problem is that the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is interpreted as giving all states the right to acquire peaceful nuclear production facilities, including ones that can produce the exact same materials used in nuclear weapons. Thus, governments often rely on peaceful nuclear production facilities as a cynical nuclear insurance policy: they can walk right up to the nuclear-weapons line by acquiring large stockpiles of weapons-usable uranium or plutonium without running afoul of their commitments" (Wolfsthal, 2005. See also Compbel, Einhorn, and Reiss, 2004). Thus, the liberal principle of civilian nuclear co-operation is fundamentally contradicted with the non-proliferation principle.

(3) The principle of nuclear arms control and disarmament: A debate

Since 1960s, scholars and policy-makers has debated the causal relationship between horizontal proliferation (the increase of nuclear weapons states) and vertical proliferation (the increase of number of nuclear weapons possessed by the NWS). Some argue low-posture nuclear doctrine; others claim high-posture nuclear doctrine. On the
one hand, all liberals and revolutionary realists argue that nuclear arms control and disarmament are necessary for halting horizontal nuclear non-proliferation. Doves insist low-posture nuclear doctrine (nuclear arms control and disarmament by the Nuclear-Weapon States) contribute to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation efforts. On the other hand, conservative realists response that nuclear arms control and disarmament among the five Nuclear Weapon States would cause dangers and instability. Furthermore, realists claims that low-posture nuclear doctrine (nuclear arms control and disarmament by the five NWSs) would not reduce but, on the contrary, enhance the motivation of further nuclear proliferation and instability. Vertical (the legitimate five Nuclear Weapon Powers’) nuclear arms control and disarmament could increase the strategic utility of nuclear weapons by other Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. Nuclear arms control and disarmament do not strengthen non-proliferation but enhance further proliferation. (Bull 1968; Freedman 1994-95; Glaser; 1998; Gray 1999).

Therefore theoretical debates have been deeply divided on the relationship between nuclear proliferation, arms control, and disarmament, which are fundamental principles of the NPT regime. Does any nuclear weapons proliferation bring either dangers or stability on certain conditions? Does the civilian nuclear cooperation encourage either nuclear weapons proliferation or non-proliferation with effective safeguard and enforcement? Does further nuclear arms control and disarmament strengthen either non-proliferation and peace or vice-versa? The clear answer will be unlikely to come soon. But discourses and policies on the NPT regime are based on these unsolved, flawed, and debatable principles.
The false promise of the NPT’ three pillars in practice

As a matter of fact, the NPT’ three pillars have been the central issues and inherent tensions in the NPT history. Ungerer observes the inherent tension within the NPT:

“...of the three central goals of the NPT regime – [1] non-proliferation, [2] peaceful uses of nuclear energy and [3] disarmament – the NWSs were primarily concerned with the first [non-proliferation] moderately concerned with the second [peaceful uses of nuclear energy] and pleased to have negotiated a formula for the third that would (hopefully) put off the question of nuclear disarmament indefinitely. But the clear expectation of the NNWSs was that signing up to the NPT would bring positive security benefits in the long-term through the steady reduction and ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons. The inherent tensions in these opposing viewpoints has defined much of the nuclear disarmament agenda for the last 30 years...” (Ungerer 2001: 195).

The fallacy of nuclear non-proliferation

Whereas liberals point out the positive role of the NPT regime to halt further nuclear proliferation, critics response that liberals exaggerate the role of the NPT to halt nuclear proliferation. From Israel to India, Pakistan, North Korea, and possibly Iran tomorrow, states go nuclear if they need or determine to do it. The NPT and its non-proliferation regime can do little to deal with the hardest cases of proliferation, offensive realists and strategic analyst argue (Betts, 1993; Gray, 1999). Above all, it is impossible to stop nuclear proliferation to great powers such as Germany and Japan...
(Kissinger 2001; Mearsheimer 1990). See the case of Indian "peaceful" nuclear tests in 1974 and eventually nuclear tests as "a nuclear-weapon states" in 1998. For realists, the NPT is valuable as a symbol, but "insufficient to their purpose", Betts claims:

"...The needed reorientation in thinking ... is really only a return to the ageless problem of balance of power ... There is no reason to believe that the NPT should be any more successful in preserving peace than the greatest international institution: the United Nations. Both are valuable symbols, effective at the margins, but insufficient to their purposes. They ... are hardly to be relied on ..." (Betts 1993).

Many realist thinkers and practitioners alike warn that the NPT-based traditional non-proliferation regime are unable to deal with new waves of proliferation challenges today (Carter, 2004). The NPT was created in the late 1960s' world, and it's founders never expected to cope with new proliferation challenges and problems in the post-Cold War and 9/11 terrorism world today. First of all, the NPT/IAEA safeguard and inspection system is far less than perfect. Under the safeguard of NPT/IAEA, South Africa got 6 nuclear weapons, Iraq considerably advanced their nuclear weapons programme by the time of Gulf War. Although the IAEA safeguard was up-dated in 1993, North Korea developed nuclear projects, and Iran is suspected to take same course today. Second, the right of peaceful nuclear energy is legally assured even if we see the problematic case of North Korea and Iran. Third, the NPT could do little with nuclear proliferation outside of the NPT such as Israel, India, and Pakistan. The worse is that it is possible to develop "peaceful" nuclear energy under the NPT, and then withdraw from the treaty and going nuclear like North Korea. Although the NPT claims
almost universal membership, the treaty can do little to cope with the case of withdrawal today (Muller, 2005; Porter, 2005; Sur, 2005). The worst of all, the NPT regime is utterly impotent to deal with new proliferation challenges to private groups and non-state actors today. The current NPT regime can not halt illegal nuclear trade, transfer, or smuggle. North Korea is well-known for selling missile and nuclear technology to improve their poor economic condition. Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan sold nuclear technology to anybody who want it through the international black market. The loose control of nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union has not been drastically improved despite about dozen cases of nuclear smuggle implies it is a tip of iceberg. To deal with nuclear proliferation challenges from the so-called “rogue states” and “terrorist groups”, the US considerably revises its traditional NPT-based non-proliferation policy to up-dated “counter-proliferation” and Proliferation Security Initiatives. Mistry claims US and international efforts on non-proliferation have fallen short in Asia:

Today’s challenges go beyond preventing proliferation. They entail reversing nuclear proliferation in North Korea; curving the export of nuclear and missile technology from North Korea, Pakistan, and China; preventing the use of nuclear weapons in South Asia; and averting an arms race among China, India, and Pakistan (Mistry, 2005).

Thus, in the eyes of realists, liberals exaggerated the role of the NPT regime to nuclear non-proliferation. For realists, the liberal promise of the universal and strengthened NPT regime to stop further proliferation is merely a utopian dream without any solid ground as the cases of the League of Nations and the UN to world
peace (Dunn 1991; Betts 1993; Gray 1999).

The fallacy of nuclear arms control and disarmament

Whereas liberals claim the Treaty is not only for non-proliferation but also for nuclear arms control and disarmament, realist critics argue that "the non-proliferation regime and its main tool, the NPT have only one objective: preventing the spread of nuclear weapons" (Rajagopalan 2005). For realists, first of all, great powers are not likely to give up their nuclear weapons. These absolute weapons are regarded as their vital national interests (Freedman, 1994-95, 1998; Glasar 1998; Gray 1999). In the eyes of critical realists, the liberal promise of disarmament is deceptive hypocrisy (Singh, 1998). Nuclear disarmament would be possible if international system would change fundamentally where nuclear weapons would not matter politically and militarily in international security. Otherwise, nuclear disarmament is neither feasible nor desirable for the foreseeable future (Brodie 1946; Bull, 1961; Mandelbaum, 1979; Baylis, 2000, Waltz; Glasar, 1998; Quinlan, 2007-08). We shall examine the reasons and empirical evidence of this realist claim of disarmament fallacy as follow.

• The five NWS are unlikely to give up their nuclear weapons

Article VI of the NPT set the five NWS' obligations of proceeding nuclear arms control and disarmament. During the Cold War, it was difficult to promote nuclear disarmament and also difficult to practice even nuclear arms control under the severe confrontations and unlimited nuclear arms race. Though the US and Russia made some progress in nuclear arms race and reduction since the late 1980s, realists are critical of the liberal claim that the end of the Cold War gives us the best opportunity to step toward a "Nuclear-Weapons-Free" world. Rajagopalan argues the case against
disarmament: “we should acknowledge that five decades of ceaseless promotion of nuclear disarmament has brought the world no closer to the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. Without the support of the United States – an improbable scenario – nuclear disarmament is unlikely to be successful” (1999). For realists, disarmament of Article VI is neither feasible nor desirable in the foreseeable future. The salience of nuclear weapons is unlikely to decline or disappear for the foreseeable future. Realists claim that the five nuclear-weapons-states are unlikely to give up their nuclear weapons at the cost of their national interests, prestige, power, influence, and security (Glaser 1998; Freedman 1994-95, 1998; Gray 1999). Non-nuclear-weapon states of the NPT criticised boosting nuclear arms race between the US and the USSR during the Cold War at the NPT Review Conference hold every five years’ interval. The figure below clearly shows how two nuclear superpowers were not faithful to their disarmament commitments of Article VI of the NPT.
Figure: Principal nuclear weapon states: nuclear arsenals, 1945-90

The five NWS' nuclear postures confirm the case against disarmament:

• Russia: The Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Strategic Missile Force, Colonel General Yakovlev told that "For Russia, the strategic nuclear force is, and will possibly remain for quite some time, the main and probably the only instrument of the state capable of warding off major military threats."(Aldred) As Russia face the NATO eastern expansion to Central and Eastern Europe and loss of conventional military superiority, Russia relies on nuclear deterrence, even reserves the principle of the first nuclear strike today.

• Britain: The 1998 Strategic Defence Review states "The Government wishes to see a safer world in which there is no place for nuclear weapons ... Nevertheless, while large nuclear arsenals and risks of proliferation remain, our minimum deterrent remains necessary element of our security."(Aldred)
China: The 1998 Chinese White Paper on National Defence states "China has persistently exercised great restraint in the development of nuclear weapons and its nuclear arsenal has been very limited. It has developed nuclear weapons for self-defence, not as a threat to other countries."

(Aldred 1998: 237-251). Today, China has been improving their nuclear power, Delpech observes: "A country with a growing number or nuclear weapons and increasingly apparent regional and global ambitions could be worrisome in the future. China has never stated that it would place less emphasis on nuclear weapons now that the Cold War is over. Beijing's diplomatic support for nuclear disarmament has been long-standing, but its actual deeds paint a different picture. China is the only one of the five established nuclear powers to have stepped up its nuclear and ballistic-missile capabilities, while also modernising its conventional forces and drawing the appropriate lessons from the Gulf War as regards new technologies. No slowdown has been observed in China's development of two new generations of more advanced, solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with multiple warheads." (Delpech, 1998-99: 63).

In the prospects for the rise of China and the US engagement together with Japan, India, and Australia, it is difficult to expect to restrict Chinese nuclear power anytime soon.

Situations are getting worse after the terrorism on September 11, 2001. Some American and French officials openly denied the NWS' obligations and responsibilities of disarmament commitments of 2000. They are not legally even politically bound by these previous disarmament commitments because political and security contexts have drastically changed since then. Straus, an American conservative realist, claim that the disarmament agenda of the NPT has been obsolete and replaced by the better management of nuclear powers' arsenals:
The NPT's leveling demand for universal disarmament was always unrealistic; it is now obsolete. The superpowers have drastically reduced their arsenals, and the danger from them is not in their numbers but in their security. ... Today the NPT's disarmament demand could be replaced with obligation for the nuclear powers to manage their arsenals better ... and even – though this is a very long-term goal indeed – aim at their ultimate integration (Straus, 2004).

- The stale progress in nuclear reduction and arms control

The stale progress in nuclear reduction is apparent as seen in the number of existing nuclear weapons. In spite of the liberal and pacifist hope for nuclear disarmament, there remain thousands of nuclear weapons in the world. UN Undersecretary-General Dhanapala points out that there were about 38,153 nuclear weapons when the NPT came into force in 1970, and there remain about 36,500 nuclear weapons in the end of 2003 (Dhanapala with Rydell, 2005). The UN Department for Disarmament Affairs estimates that “Today it is estimated that some 30,000 nuclear weapons still exist worldwide, either active or stockpiled. According to external sources, the United States is estimated to have some 7,100 operational nuclear warheads, and 3,000-5,000 in the current stockpile. The Russian Federation has an estimated 8,000 operational nuclear warheads, and some additional 8,000 stockpiled. China is said to have some 402, France 348, and the United Kingdom 185 operational warheads” (UN, 2005). Even UN Secretary-General Annan's lower estimation suggests there remain still 27,000 nuclear warheads, and many of them are ready to use (Annan, 2005). Thus these estimated numbers suggest that there remain around 36,500 to 27,000 nuclear bombs today. For realists, it is difficult to believe that the world is moving toward disarmament
under the NPT as liberal arms controllers claim.

- The little progress of arms control and disarmament efforts after the 1995 NPT REC. The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference adopted *Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament*. The five nuclear-weapons states made commitments to more concrete steps, items and action plans on the duties of nuclear-weapons states to proceed nuclear arms control and disarmament (Dhanapala, 1995; Dhanapala with Rydell, 2005). However, we saw little signs of progress in these nuclear arms control and disarmament after adapting *Principles and Objectives of the 1995 NPT REC*. Empirical evidence suggest the stagnation of arms control efforts as follow (2000):

- The setbacks to the early entry into force of the CTBT, especially after its rejection by the US Senate in 1999. Two additional nuclear weapons states (Russian Federation and China) have yet to ratify the treaty. Of the 44 states whose ratifications are required for the treaty to enter into force, only 26 have ratified as of the end of January 2000, while India, Pakistan, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) have not yet signed.

- The lack of ongoing negotiations on nuclear disarmament (e.g. on START III) and the stalemate in the CD over this and related issues, including a fissile material treaty, security assurances, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

- Developments with respect to nuclear doctrines that highlight the sizable role of nuclear arms in some states’ security policies. In April 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) reaffirmed its first-use doctrine, acknowledged the value of tactical weapons, and termed nuclear weapons ‘the supreme guarantee of
the security of the Allies.' The Russian Federation has adopted a first-use nuclear
doctrine and given new emphasis to tactical nuclear weapons. Also troubling are
announcement by India of a doctrine of 'minimum deterrence' and a recent
indication of acquiescence to this doctrine by at least one nuclear weapon state.

- The resistance on the part of the nuclear weapon states to proposals to de-alert their
arsenals.

- The resistance on the part of the nuclear weapon states to agree to binding nuclear
security assurances for non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT.

- Persisting questions about the consistency of nuclear sharing arrangements with
obligations under Article I of the NPT.

- The recent adoption by the United States of a policy to deploy a limited national
missile defense system as soon as it is technologically possible, to seek amendments
in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to allow such a development, and to threaten to
leave the treaty if such amendments are not agreed.

- The persisting conduct by some nuclear weapon states of subcritical tests of nuclear
explosive devices, an activity focused on maintaining, not eliminating, nuclear
stockpiles. There is also a risk that such tests may become a legitimate activity for
any party to the CTBT, despite their inconsistency with the spirit and goals of the

The little progress in arms control and disarmament efforts after the 2000 NPT RC.
The 2000 NPT RC adopted the appraised *The 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear
Disarmament* (Dhanapala with Rydell, 2005: 120-122; Scheinman 2005: 6-11). The five
nuclear weapon states of the NPT committed to nuclear arms control and disarmament
in a more concrete and clear way. However, again, we observe little progress, even
reverse trends, in achieving any of these steps since the 2000 NPT RC agreement.

- While the moratorium on nuclear tests held up (with respect to NPT states parties), the CTBT has still not entered into force and is opposed by the United States.
- The CD [Conference on Disarmament] remains in deadlock.
- The 2002 Moscow Treaty did not require the elimination of single nuclear weapon or delivery vehicle, nor did it require the ‘irreversible’ elimination of fissile materials for those weapons.
- The NWS have made their ‘unequivocal undertaking’ to eliminate their nuclear arsenals, yet elimination still remains only a distant goal.
- The US withdrawal from the ABM treaty had the effect of ending both that treaty and START II, while placing hopes for START III in limbo if not displacing that goal entirely.
- There have reportedly been some unilateral reductions, but since these are unverified, it is difficult – given the lack of transparency – to determine the extent this has actually occurred.
- The UK and France have de-alerted their nuclear forces, though the US and Russia continue to maintain some part of their nuclear forces on high alert.
- Some NWS are continuing to conduct research on such weapons, while exploring new roles for them in security policies.
- The ‘thirteen steps’ clarified that the ‘ultimate goal’ was ‘general and complete disarmament’, rather than eliminating nuclear weapons – this was to ensure that the NWS do not use the failure to achieve ‘general and complete disarmament’ as an excuse not to eliminate their nuclear weapons. (Some government officials of the US and France insists that this Action Plan is no more relevant today since it is
a product of another time.)

- Even the requirement for 'regular report' (step 12 of the 13 steps) has been challenged by the NWS, which continue to resist making detailed written reports on their nuclear arsenals or specific steps taken to eliminate them. (Dhanapala with Rydell, 2005).

Thus, contrary to the liberal promise of the NPT' three pillars, above empirical evidence of the stagnated arms control efforts suggests that our world is not stepping forward to nuclear weapons disarmament realists argue.

The false promise of the grand bargains between the NWS and the NNWS

Whereas liberals stress the NPT' grand bargains and balance of obligations between the nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon states, realists downplay the importance of these basic deals. For critics, the NPT and its non-proliferation have been discriminative in favor of the NWS over the NNWS. Imbalance, inequality, and discrimination are clear if we examine the details of the NPT regime.

International regimes set norms, rules, and decision-making procedures. If we see the norms, rules, and decision-making process of the NPT, the imbalance of obligations is apparent in everyone's eyes. Regarding norms, the NPT set a clear distinction between the Nuclear-Weapons States (NWS) and the Non-Nuclear-Weapons States (NNWS). Only five states are entitled the NWS status, and other states have to accept their disadvantageous non-nuclear-weapon status. This is the very source of discrimination as same as the UNSC P-5 seats which acknowledges the special status of
the five great powers. Different norms and obligations are defined according to their nuclear status (Ghali, 1995; Fischer, 1992, 1993).

On the one hand, the norms and obligations of nuclear non-proliferation are precisely and clearly defined. Ever tightening non-proliferation efforts become a burden of the NNWS nuclear activity. On the other hand, the norms and obligations of nuclear arms control and disarmament are defined only vague in content and time-frames. The five NWS committed more concrete nuclear arms control and disarmament obligations in 1995 and 2005, but it is neither legally binding nor setting any time schedule. This discrimination and imbalance of norms and obligations become the biggest cause of disputes in the NPT history (Subrahmanyan, 1985-86; Singh, 1998; Pilat and Pendley, 1990).

Regarding “rules”, the NPT and its non-proliferation regime set different or unequal rights and obligations. On the one hand, the rules of non-proliferation, the US-led G-7 strengthened non-proliferation efforts such as London guideline, the NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group) and the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Group). On the other hand, the rules of nuclear arms control and disarmament, such as the CTBT and the START II, are neither completed nor ratified. Any plans for concluding a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty or START III are not likely to come into reality for the foreseeable future (Dhanapala, 2005; Muller, 2005; Potter, 2005; Sur, 2005).

Regarding, “decision-making procedure”, the NPT and its non-proliferation regime contain weakness and problems. Some important decision-making procedures are not democratic at all. The NPT-based non-proliferation regime has been strongly
influenced by nuclear supplier countries (the NSG) especially the US, the UK, and the USSR (Russia). Then, it is quite difficult or almost impossible to revise and change the current unequal state of the NPT Articles, Keeley argues. "The amendment procedure specifically requires the approval of all nuclear-weapon states that are parties and of all states that are on the IAEA Board of Governors when the amendment is circulated, as well as the approval of a majority of parties to the treaty. This underlines the power of the nuclear-weapon states and the members of the IAEA board. Whether the differences among states on any amendment of substance could be sufficiently resolved so as to meet this triple requirement is questionable. Thus, an attempt to amend the treaty, if successful, could create not a consistent and agreed set of modifications, but rather a patchwork of agreements holding among some parties but not among others. In the absence of an overwhelming consensus, modifying the written terms of the treaty thus may be impossible or, if possible, undesirable" (Keeley, 1987:42). Furthermore, Dhanapala point out the institutional weakness of the NPT review process:

"...the importance of this [NPT] review process is magnified by one of the treaty's greatest liabilities: its weak institutional infrastructure, a surprising attribute indeed, given the treaty's obvious value in advancing the security interests of its states parties. Yet the NPT has no permanent secretariat to assist the states parties both at and between the Review Conferences. It has no Executive Council to address treaty-related developments that might require some coordinated multilateral responses. It has benefits of the technical contributions from the IAEA in the fields of safeguards, physical security, nuclear safety and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but the treaty still lacks an institutional infrastructure of support to assist in the pursuit
of disarmament and non-proliferation goals not related to safeguards. While
the IAEA has sought for many years to assist the NWS in fulfilling their
responsibilities under article VI, the NWS have shown little enthusiasm for
entrusting the Agency with significant new responsibilities in this field, at least
not yet. This weak infrastructure—what Canada has recently (and aptly) called
the NPT’s ‘institutional deficit’—has substantially and unnecessarily held back
the development of the NPT regime…” (Dhanapala with Rydell, 2005: 61-62).

The false promise that the NWS’ security assurances and the UN collective security
guarantee the NNWS’ security

Whereas liberals like President Wilson insist collective security to ameliorate
the problem of the BOP, critics response that the UN collective security is premature.
The NPT system is no better than the UN for the foreseeable future. Only rarely, at best,
the UN collective security will be a basis for a world order (Nye, 2008: 181-182) First,
the UN collective security works best when there is clear-cut aggression. It is much
more difficult to apply in civil war or unidentified terrorism by non-state actors. Can the
UNSC deal with nuclear proliferation, threats and risks following to any agreed criteria
and rationale? Can the nuclear-weapons states help the non-nuclear-weapon states in
case of actual nuclear threat or attack? Can member-states take a collective action of
preemptive attack or even more problematic preventive war against a nuclear “rouge
state”? Second, collective security will work if there is no veto, but if the US, Russia,
China, Britain, or France cannot reach agreement, collective security will be hamstrung
one more. Consider the difficulties in making consensus among great powers to deal
with the proliferation problems of Iraq, Iran, or North Korea. Third, collective security
works when UN member states provide the necessary financial and military resources,
but it is difficult to imagine collective security working if the states with large military forces do not contribute. Great powers are not likely to contribute personnel and finance assistance to the UN force if they do not consider it as national interests. Except nuclear-weapon-free zones, the five Nuclear-Weapon States strongly avoid "legally-binding" security assurances to the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. For critics, a new world order based on collective security is not likely to be achieved for the foreseeable future as the structure of international politics does not change fundamentally (MURAKAMI, 1996; SATO, 1999).

Mearsheimer argue nine reasons why collective security is seriously flawed:

- States often find it difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between the 'aggressor' and the 'victim' in international conflict.
- Collective security assumes that all aggression is wrong, whereas there may be circumstances where conquest is warranted against a threatening neighbour.
- Because some states are especially friendly for historical or ideological reasons they will be unlikely to join a coalition against their friends.
- Historical enmity between states may complicate the effective working of a collective security system.
- Because sovereign states have a tendency to 'pass the buck' in paying the price of dealing with aggression there is often difficulty in distributing the burden equitably.
- Difficulties rise in securing a rapid response to aggression because of the unwillingness to engage in pre-crisis contingency planning.
- States are often reluctant to join a coalition because collective action is likely to transform local conflict into an international conflict.
• Democracies are reluctant to make an automatic commitment to join collective action because of state sovereignty.

• Collective security implies a contradiction in the way military force is viewed. It is seen as abhorrent and yet states must be willing to use it against aggression. (Mearsheimer, 1994-95).

Therefore, in the realist eyes, the formal NPT system to international peace is no more successful than the League of Nations to WWII and the United Nations to the Cold War. As states have the highest priority on their national interests and security, the UNSC P-5 (five NWS) are less likely to be faithful to the resolution on security assurances to the NWS in case of actual crises and conflicts, critical realists reply.

The false promise of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs)

Realists are sceptical of liberal expeccts for establishing NWFZs covering northern hemisphere beyond southern hemisphere, including Asia. For realists, it is difficult to expect for creating and expanding NWFZs due to the deep mistrust and enduring, even worsening, hostility such critical regions as Western Asia, South Asia, and East Asia. Delpech and Cirincione point out the signs of nuclear proliferation in Asia:

"...the most complex nuclear issues are located in Asia and nowhere else. ... Discussions of the role of nuclear weapons in the next century usually provide opportunities to state that 'the ways of the future' are openness, confidence-building measures and disarmament, as opposed to traditional power relations. ... The belief that 'the West and the rest' are moving in the
same direction is inaccurate and may lead to serious errors of strategic judgement ...” (Delpech, 1998-99).

“...The West ‘promotes nonproliferation as a universal norm and nonproliferation treaties and inspections as means of realizing that norm .... The non-Western nations, on the other hand, assert their right to acquire and to deploy whatever weapons they think necessary for their security [seeing weapons of mass destruction] as the potential equalizer of superior Western conventional power…” (quoted in Cirincione, 2000:133).

Brief examinations suggest enormous difficulties in creating a NWFZ in West Asia, South Asia, and East Asia. Can Israel agree with giving up their nuclear weapons anytime soon? Deep mistrust between Israel and its Arab neighbours will not likely to be overcame for the foreseeable future, and the US have never been tough on Israeli nuclear weapons compared with the problematic cases of Iraq and Iran. Can Japan, North Korea, and China agree with a NWFZ? China is suspected to challenge the US hegemony whereas the US and Japan keep their strong alliance as a hedge. The long-time regional problems of North Korea and Taiwan make issues more complicated. Does any serious policy-makers expect the establishment of a NWFZ in South Asia today? The US supports the rise of India and accepts their nuclear status. Political instability in Pakistan, a Kashmir problem, an India-China rivalry, and an Iranian nuclear ambition make things more difficult and complicated.

Cirincione warns “approaching critical mass”, “the [nuclear proliferation] chain grows” to cause “nuclear dominoes” in Asia.
“...Consider what is already happening: North Korea continues to play guessing games with its nuclear and missile programs; South Korea wants its own missiles to match Pyongyang’s; India and Pakistan shoot across borders while running a slow-motion nuclear arms race; China modernizes its nuclear arsenal amid tensions with Taiwan and the United States; Japan’s vice defense minister is forced to resign after extolling the benefits of nuclear weapons; and Russia – whose Far East nuclear deployments alone make it the largest Asian nuclear power – struggles to maintain territorial coherence. Five of these states have nuclear weapons; the others are capable of constructing them ... These nations form an interlocking Asian nuclear reaction chain that vibrates dangerously with each new development...”

“...The [non-proliferation] blocks would fall quickest and hardest in Asia, where proliferation pressures are already building more quickly than anywhere else in the world. If a nuclear breakout takes place in Asia, then the international arms control agreements that have been painstakingly negotiated over the past 40 years will crumble. Moreover, the United States could find itself embroiled in its forth war on the Asian continent in six decades – a costly rebuke to those who seek the safety of Fortress America by hiding behind national missile defences. ... Like neutron firing from a split atom, one nation’s actions can trigger reactions throughout the region, which in turn stimulate additional actions. ... If the frequency and intensity of this reaction cycle increase, critical decisions taken by any one of these governments could cascade into the second great wave of nuclear-weapon proliferation, bringing
regional and global economic and political instability and, perhaps, the first combat use of a nuclear weapon since 1945” (Cirincione, 2000:123).

For realists, any scenario of nuclear disarmament and NWFZs in such tensed and unstable regions of Asia are not feasible (Delpach, 1998-99). As the second best policy is nuclear deterrence stability or nuclear peace thorough the balance of power. Realists today argue the case for nuclear deterrence stability (Heisbourg, 1998-99; Sagan and Walz, 2003; Perkovich, 2004; Dittmer 2005; Rajagopalan; Sridharan, 2007). To realists, as Jervis observe, security regimes are desirable, but difficult to be achieved. As same as other arms control treaty, NWFZs are most likely to be established where it actually does not need it such as Southeast Asia. Much worse, it is most unlikely to be achieved where it is desirable to halt nuclear proliferation, realists reply.

The false promise of the NPT as an enlightenment prospect and progress

Whereas liberals emphasize change and progress in world politics, realists, especially conservative realists, are basically critical of progressivism. For example, Walker, a liberal, called the evolution of the NPT as “an grand enlightenment prospect” to control nuclear energy based on reason, international law and organization, to achieve justice, equal opportunities, and progress in international peace and order (Walker, 2007a:431-453). However, realists are deeply skeptical of this liberal progressivism in the NPT. Broadly speaking, we can observe three types of realist prospects for the nuclear future: proliferation pessimism; proliferation optimism; and non-proliferation optimism.
(1) Proliferation pessimism: Classical realism and offensive realism (C.Gray, R.Betts)

Generally speaking, realists are skeptical of human reason and morality and pessimistic on future. Due to security demand for nuclear weapons in anarchical international politics and the diffusion of scientific knowledge and technology, nuclear weapons proliferation is inevitable, Gray argues. “The security demand for some WMD offset to contemporary U.S. conventional prowess, the diffusion of nuclear ... knowledge, and the post-Soviet relative ease of access to necessary technologies and skills all add up to mission impossible for nonproliferation” (C. Gray, 1999: 109). Once proliferated, the risks and dangers are multiplied due to security dilemma as Thucydides narrated. Deterrence may work, but human beings are imperfect in morality and ability. Morality never improved as much as scientific knowledge, technology, and power did, Gray claims: "The most dangerous threats confronting us today are the results of the interaction of expanding human knowledge with unchanging human needs. The spread of weapons of mass destruction is a response to intractable political conflicts; but it is a by-product of the diffusion of scientific knowledge" (J. Gray, 2004: 10-17).

(2) Proliferation optimism: Rational deterrence realism (Waltz)

Some realists agree the inevitability of proliferation, but more optimistic on the consequence of nuclear proliferation. Waltz argues, “more may be better”. Assuming the rationality and reason, nuclear proliferation may bring “nuclear peace” as we observe it during the Cold War. However, this proliferation optimism is based on the assumption of human reason and rationality, which can not be seen in a classical realist tradition from Thucydides, to Kennan, and Kissinger.

(3) Non-proliferation optimism: Defensive realism and hegemonic stability realism
Some contemporary realists are rather optimistic on the prospects for maintaining nuclear non-proliferation. First, contemporary defensive realists emphasize the possibilities in security cooperation. Kissinger expects great powers’ concert to deal with nuclear proliferation challenges because further nuclear proliferation to the “revolutionary states” like North Korea and Iran pose serious threats to the current international stability maintained by great powers. Davis find the cause of the NPT regime in security interests in “an overwhelming majority of states”, arguing that “The norm of nonproliferation developed because it was congenial to the interests of an overwhelming majority of states, including the superpowers, and offensive to only a few. ... The anarchic nature of world politics assures there will be continuing interest in nuclear weapons. Realism predicts states will organize to preserve the nuclear status quo.... The Non-Proliferation Treaty is an expression of aggregate interests in controlling the spread of nuclear weapons. ... Although the regime has its origins in the cold war era, mutual interests in maintaining the nuclear status quo make it possible to preserve the regime – perhaps indefinitely...“ (Davis, 1993).

Then, non-proliferation optimism can be seen in hegemonic stability realists, assuming the durability and predominance of the US hegemony since WWII till today. Some American realists even dream of nuclear sharing by the US initiatives on the premise of the overwhelming US conventional weapons today (Straus, 2004). As long as the US hegemony remain strong and hegemonic interests in non-proliferation do not change, the non-proliferation order will be stable enough, hegemonic stability realists argue (Rajagopalan, 1990, 2005).

Although realists’ prospects for the nuclear future are varied as above, all
realists are critical of the liberal vision of the progressivism in the NPT. States’ interests and power are the keys in the evolution of the NPT. Realists reject the liberal historical understanding of progressive enlightenment movement toward nuclear disarmament.

CONCLUSION

This chapter examined the Realist perspectives on the NPT. Realist theory is based on common assumptions of pessimism on human nature, politics, and history. Realists focus on state interests, power, security and military, assuming competition, war and conflicts among nations in anarchical international politics. First, the dynamics and evolution of the NPT was examined through the four Realist lenses: Hegemonic Stability Realism, Bipolar Stability Realism, Defensive Realism, and Offensive Realism. Hegemonic Stability Realists explain that the hegemonic power and interests played a crucial role in the dynamics and evolution of the NPT regime. As long as the US hegemonic power and interests remain dominant, the NPT regime will continue to be stable as before. Bipolar Stability Realists explain that two superpowers’ nuclear co-ordination under bipolar stability and the delicate nuclear balance of terror was decisive in the dynamics and evolution of the NPT regime. In an emerging multi-polar world, the NPT will become weaker than before. Defensive Realists explain that great-powers concert and security coordination among lesser powers are crucial in the dynamics and evolution of the NPT regime. Even in an emerging multi-polar world, great-powers concert will be able to co-ordinate the NPT regime through skilled diplomacy and consensus on legitimacy. Offensive Realists criticize that the NPT can not be effective under anarchical international politics. States seek survival, security,
and max-power with diverged interests and perceptions. Expansionary or revisionist states seek nuclear weapons for increasing their power and status to change an existing nuclear order. This chapter also examined the roles and meanings of the NPT through the lens of Realist theory. Realists are critical of liberal promise of the NPT. For Realists, the NPT can not enhance nuclear arms control and disarmament, but it serves the five NPT NWS’ interests in preserving the states-quo hierarchical nuclear order at best. Or it can not stop the hardest cases of nuclear proliferation, as offensive and strategic realists argue.